EDUCATION, FREEDOM AND REASON: THE FOUCAULDIAN CHALLENGE TO ENLIGHTENMENT IDEALS

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my own work, written under the supervision of Professor W.E. Morrow. I submit it to the University of the Western Cape for the Degree of Doctor of Education. It has not been previously submitted, either in part or in whole, for any degree or examination at any other university.



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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the formative influence which the Enlightenment movement's proposal for the pursuit of freedom through the exercise of reason has had upon the development of liberal and Marxist thought. It indicates how liberal and Marxist philosophies of education, as derivative studies, share the dilemmas and quandaries which their respective parent traditions confront in the pursuit of this Enlightenment ideal.

It argues that Michel Foucault's reflections on the problematic relationship between freedom and reason crystallize contemporary difficulties with this cardinal Enlightenment notion, challenging us implicitly as educators to continue with the arduous task of promoting autonomy despite this definitive but antinomous legacy.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..... Page i

PART ONE: THE MATRIX OF CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS

CHAPTER ONE — The Enlightenment: Characterizations ..... Page 1

CHAPTER TWO — The Enlightenment: Exemplifications ..... Page 21

PART TWO: THE LEGACY FOR THE MODERN WORLD

CHAPTER THREE — Liberalism ..... Page 46

CHAPTER FOUR — Classical Marxism ..... Page 65

CHAPTER FIVE — Twentieth Century Marxism ..... Page 84

CHAPTER SIX — Liberal and Marxist Philosophies of Education ..... Page 103

PART THREE: FOUCAULT - CHALLENGES AND CONTINUITIES

CHAPTER SEVEN — Nietzsche and Foucault ..... Page 125

CHAPTER EIGHT — Foucault: The Project of Critique ..... Page 145

CHAPTER NINE — Vindicating Liberal Philosophy of Education ..... Page 159

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... Page 181

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INTRODUCTION

How do contemporary reflections upon 'education' identify the substance of this notion? If one confines such considerations to a generally secular perspective, it becomes evident that the concept of 'education' is usually explicated in terms of reason and freedom. One primarily associates the practice of education with the pursuit of knowledge, and the latter is construed as the systematic and rational organization of thought and information.

Such an account situates philosophy of education within the discipline of epistemology. However, if one reviews numerous British and American publications in philosophy of education over the past few decades, one notes the frequency with which these are classified as either liberal or Marxist philosophy of education, complementing an epistemological emphasis with a political one.

Both liberal and Marxist approaches to the study of education associate the acquisition of knowledge with the attainment of freedom. Although their expositions acknowledge the importance of vocational and professional training, their philosophical thrusts emphasize the value of educational perspectives, which subsume the details of particular subjects and technical preparations under a broad rubric of emancipation. This does not only imply freedom from ignorance, an obvious connotation of the acquisition of knowledge, but also suggests a more general notion of political liberation, of emancipation from experiences of oppression through the attainment of specific kinds of power which the acquisition of knowledge confers upon people. Liberal and Marxist philosophies of education synthesize epistemological and political issues in their expositions of educational practice.

This thesis assumes that philosophy of education, whether liberal or Marxist, is a derivative study, whose orientations are adopted from mainstream European intellectual and philosophical traditions. Within these liberal and Marxist traditions, understood as inveterately secular ones, the relationship between freedom and reason has been both a formative and problematic one. Clarification about the identity and prospects of liberal and Marxist philosophies of education requires both an historical and philosophical analysis, because the association between freedom and reason received one of its clearest formulations in the 18 th c. European Enlightenment movement. This movement's articulations had a profound influence on the development of subsequent liberal and Marxist thought, from which contemporary philosophies of education derive their own identities and educational proposals.

The Enlightenment's self-consciously secular professions announced that the development of, and exclusive dependence upon, the faculty of reason denoted a qualitative break with the superstition and confusion of previous generations. The perfection of reason would extend and consolidate human knowledge, liberating people from ignorance and fear, and emancipating them from irrational and oppressive political and social systems. Institutionalized education would ensure the transmission of these related benefits of freedom and reason to all subsequent generations.

This thesis examines the evolution of this aspiration, and considers its consequences for contemporary educational practice, concluding with an assessment of the continuing tenability of the distinction between liberal and Marxist philosophy of education.

The first part provides an account of the Enlightenment movement's reflections upon the nature of secular reason and its anticipated emancipatory benefits, thereby delineating the intellectual and historical context from which subsequent liberal and Marxist movements derived their identities and aspirations. This review of the Enlightenment's perspective emphasises its notion of reason as systematic regulation of the natural and social worlds for the benefit of 'Man', and as a belief in the reconcilability of human conflicts, both of which constitute a substantial notion of human emancipation.

The second part explores the problematic evolution of this association between freedom and reason, as it manifested itself in the history of liberalism and Marxism. An examination of liberalism's distinction between negative and positive liberty, autonomy and self-determination, suggests that the concept of liberty contains internal tensions which are described as the 'antinomies of freedom,' which disclose the acute difficulties involved in trying to achieve emancipation, in striving to eliminate oppression, exploitation and domination through the exercise of reason. Through an assessment of 19 th and 20 th c. Marxism, the second part also explores the realization by Marxists that reason contains an ambiguous potential for oppression and liberation, confounding hopes for a final reconciliation of social and political differences. The problematization of the pursuit of freedom through the exercise of reason in both liberal and Marxist experience generates a theoretical convergence of both traditions upon the perennial and intractable issues of oppression and domination. This part concludes with a study of representative contemporary writings in liberal and Marxist philosophies of education, arguing that their derivative orientations replicate the dilemmas confronted by their parent disciplines in their attempts to promote freedom through the development of reason.

The third and final part of this thesis argues that Foucault crystallizes and consolidates the quandaries of the Enlightenment tradition. He challenges the legacy of the Enlightenment's association of freedom and reason by simultaneously acknowledging that our contemporary concerns are ineluctably confined to this tormenting problematic, and proclaiming a radical secularization of this relationship by insisting that we must proceed with this quest for a rational freedom, divested of the hope that a final, reconciled

emancipation is actually possible. This challenge is articulated in terms of a Nietzschean epistemological understanding, which fundamentally influenced Foucault's analysis of freedom and reason. Foucault defends a concept of autonomy, which he portrays as a permanent and arduous possibility, less elated and hopeful than the ambitiously optimistic version of its Enlightenment exponents. The thesis concludes with a vindication of a notion of liberal education, which is inspired by the concept of an educator as a 'genealogical interpreter'. The term is derived from a Nietzschean epistemological critique, conveyed through Foucault's work, and concentrates upon the limits and possibilities of an educational contribution to an amelioration of the oppressive consequences of thought and action in the contemporary world.

PART ONE

THE MATRIX OF CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS

CHAPTER ONE

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: CHARACTERIZATIONS

Introduction

A complicated and ultimately problematic relationship between reason and freedom emerges from a study of the 18 th c. European Enlightenment, and provides the central focus of this chapter. Generally, the Enlightenment movement can be characterised as a secular one, whose quest for knowledge sustained a concern for the relationship between theory and practice. Although its concepts of knowledge, and its methods of knowledge acquisition, were derived from the historic successes of the 17 th c. scientific revolution, the Enlightenment philosophers were preoccupied with the study of man and the reform of society. Knowledge would be employed for the improvement of man's individual and collective existence. Inherent within the Enlightenment programme were ambitious visions for society, which would inspire the transformation of government, economy and education. Primarily this programme was motivated by concepts of freedom, a desire to promote the correlative notions of autonomy and self-determination, effected through the development of man's rational faculty - hence the central relationship between reason and freedom.

This chapter will explicate these themes, for they have provided a fundamentally formative influence upon diverse aspects of European and international thought since the 18 th c. More specifically, they have contributed significantly to the development of both liberal and Marxist thought, and, derivatively, to the emergence of liberal and Marxist philosophies of education.

Scientific Inspiration

The successes of the 17 th c. Scientific Revolution, epitomized by Newton's comprehensive explication of the laws of gravity and physical motion, reflected changes in epistemological perspectives and portended an intellectual movement towards radical secularization. The epistemological changes consisted of a

decisive move from a rationalist perspective, best represented by Descartes, to an empiricist one. The obvious appeal of rationalism resided in its mathematical precision, deductive certainty and comprehensive systems. However, its rationally perspicuous schemes did not provide any substantial knowledge about how the world worked. Knowledge could only be provided by the laborious efforts of observation, experimentation and inductive reasoning, a protracted quest for the universal laws which regulate the physical world's movements.

In many ways, the contrast between the rationalists and empiricists was specious, more the result of a possibly futile preoccupation with the obtainability of certainty than with the relative merits of each in the search for scientific knowledge. For both perspectives are synthesized in the practice of scientific research; once numerous observations and experiments have been conducted, and nomological statements have been articulated from these, a process of rational deduction is adopted in order to provide explanations for particular phenomena.

This, however is a digression. The important point is that the commitment to empiricist methods, to conscientious observation and experimentation, disclosed a comprehensive understanding of the nature of physical reality. Knowledge of physical laws endowed scientists with predictive capabilities, and with this came the opportunity to exert more effective control over the physical environment. The accomplishments of the 17 th c. scientific revolution were in fact a triumphant vindication of Bacon's early 17 th c. claim that,

> Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed;...
>
> (Hampshire, S., 1956, P.24).

This correlation between knowledge and control not only reflected the success of an empiricist method, but also contributed towards the development of a more secular ethos in the 18 th c. The reason for this was that the more scientists could produce natural explanations for the behaviour of phenomena in the physical word, the less necessary was recourse to Divine explanations; as human knowledge advanced, so the preoccupations with God, His creative and sustaining purposes, receded.

This secular reorientation, however, passed through a transitional period, and even in the 18 th c., some Enlightenment thinkers were ambivalent about its adoption. Newton himself construed his discoveries as manifestations of God's ordering immanence, and suggested that they did not contradict the basic tenets of Christian theology. Hampson refers to this when he writes,

> The cardinal fact in religious experience has hitherto been the Fall. Man, born in sin, made his erring way through this vale of tears, with eternal damnation the final destination of the great majority. There was nothing in Newtonian physics with its revelation of man's inability to explain the laws which regulated the course of nature (as opposed to observing and employing them - MK), that implied the contrary.
>
> (Hampson, N., 1968, P.80).

In 1738, Voltaire, one of the eminent writers of the Enlightenment, wrote in his Elements of the Philosophy of Newton that,

> The whole of the philosophy of Newton leads necessarily to the knowledge of a supreme Being, who has created all things, and disposed of them with perfect liberty... If the planets revolve in one direction rather than another, in a non-resisting space, the hand of their creator must have directed their motions in that direction with an absolute liberty.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.405).

However, despite the alleged compatibility of Christian theology and Newtonian science, professed by Newton himself and 18 th c. successors like Voltaire, influential sentiment gravitated in the opposite direction, so that,

> The general trend of scientific thought in mid 18th c. was therefore hostile to the conception of a static universe dependent on divine intervention for its creation and viability. Science, in other words, seemed to have dispensed with the need for God as a necessary factor in its explanation of the universe.
>
> (Hampson, N., 1968, P.91).

The secular scientific view had become one which proclaimed the self-sufficiency of the physical universe, impelled by its own internal dynamic, whose operations would gradually be explained. One did not have to rely upon a Divine entity to explain the existence of regulatory laws; one merely had to understand their mechanism and employ them for human control of the natural environment.

The understanding of, and successful control over, the natural world, generated by the 17 th c. provided the 18 th c. with both inspiration and challenge. A rational approach to the world seemed to contain infinite possibilities for transformation through liberation from ignorance, and it is upon the Enlightenment's conception of reason that this chapter will now focus.

The exercise of reason in a secular world was a prospect which generated both anxiety and optimism among the Enlightenment philosophers. Their excitement and positive expectation was derived from the successes of their 17th c. predecessors. Gay indicates this when he writes that,

> The sciences of nature promised a way to knowledge, and an accumulation of knowledge, to which all reasonable men could assent... If the scientific method was the sole reliable method for gaining knowledge in a wide variety of contexts, from the phenomena of the heavens to the phenomena of plant life, it seemed plausible and in fact likely that it could be profitably exported to other areas of intense human concern - the study of man and society.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.164).

The decisive influence of the 17 th c.'s empiricist orientation upon the 18 th c. philosophers is reflected in the writings of many of them. In his Essay on National Education (1763), La Chalotais claimed that,

> Thus the fundamental principle of every good method is to begin with what is perceptible, and proceed by degrees to what is intellectual; to attain what is complex by means of what is simple, and to make sure of facts before seeking causes.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.382).

If the acquisition of secure knowledge about man and society was to proceed rapidly, respect for scientific (empiricist) principles was indispensable. David Hume wrote in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) that,

> As the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation... For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.88).

Gay cites a clear statement of empiricist sentiment from the 18 th c. natural historian, Buffon, who wrote that,

> Sensible people will always recognise that the only true science is the knowledge of facts.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.153).

The obvious advantage of these empiricist procedures was that the observation of man and society, like that of the natural world, would disclose regularities which enabled one to predict and control the course of human action. Behind the enjoined methods of the Enlightenment philosophers, one detects the extension of the Baconian precept that,

> Nature to be commanded must be obeyed
>
> (Hampshire, S., 1956, P.24).

into the field of social studies.

Such a quest for knowledge and control was clearly a prerequisite if the unity of theory and practice was to be achieved, if knowledge and its expansion was to have a salutary impact upon the future of both the individual and society. This synthesis was an explicit ambition among Enlightenment philosophers. In his Essay on National Education La Chalotais claimed that,

> Man is made for action and he studies only in order to render himself capable of acting.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.382).

In his reflections upon human development, articulated in his The History of Human Progress (1793-4), Condorcet speculated,

> In fine, may it not be expected that the human race will be meliorated by new discoveries in the sciences and the arts, and, as an unavoidable consequence, is the means of individual and general prosperity; by further progress in the principles of conduct; and lastly, by the real improvement of our faculties, moral, intellectual and physical, which may be the result of either the improvement of the instruments which increase the power and direct the exercise of those faculties, or of the improvement of our natural organization itself?
>
> (Calpaldi, N., 1967, P.292).

In some interesting reflections upon knowledge, language and society (which also reveal sound empiricist convictions) D'Alembert indicates how the pursuit of knowledge in any social order seeks to avert harm through action. In his "Preliminary Discourse", included in the monumental compendium, the Encyclopédie, which he edited with Diderot, D'Alembert wrote,

> All knowledge is divisible into direct and reflective. Direct knowledge is immediate and independent of the operation of our will... The mind acquires reflective knowledge by unifying and combining direct knowledge.
>
> All our direct knowledge is received through the senses; thus, we owe all of our ideas to our sensations...
>
> The necessity of protecting our bodies from pain and destruction causes us to examine external objects with a view to discovering which are useful and which are harmful. As soon as we examine these objects, we become aware that among them are a large number of beings who seem entirely similar to ourselves, whose forms are like ours, and who seem to have the same sensations. All this causes us to believe that they also have the same needs we experience and, thus, the same interest in satisfying them. Hence, we conclude that it is advantageous to join with them in discovering what is beneficial to us and what is detrimental to us in nature. The

communication of ideas is the principal bond of this union and requires the invention of signs. Thus are societies formed and languages born.

(Capaldi, N., 1967, P.90-91).

The Quest for Scientific Social Reconstruction

The Enlightenment philosophers' ambition to combine theory and practice, knowledge and action, in the interests of social improvement, is succinctly captured by Gay, when he refers to the 18 th c. as one in which Europe experienced a "recovery of nerve". Gay shows how 18 th c. optimism was fostered by the clear realization that scientific understanding of the natural world enabled societies to combat successfully the perennial scourges of epidemics and famines, and to promote relative longevity.

> There seemed to be little doubt that in the struggle of man against nature, the balance of power was shifting in favour of man.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.3).
>
> Men saw life getting better, safer, easier, healthier, more predictable - that is to say, more rational - decade by decade ...
>
> Medicine was the most highly visible and most heartening index of general improvement: nothing after all was better calculated to buoy up men's feeling about life than growing hope for life itself.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.17)

The Enlightenment's self-understanding as a secular movement necessarily committed it to a preoccupation with "this world". Eschewing concerns with traditional Christian cosmology and theology, the movement concentrated upon a systematic, empirical (scientific) study of the natural and social worlds, believing that knowledge would produce emancipation; freedom from superstition, mysticism, ignorance and fear; freedom to confront the future confidently because knowledge endows man with a self-determinative capability, demonstrated by his ability to control his environment.

However, the adoption of a secular perspective involves much more than an alternative focus. It requires a series of radical redefinitions, which generate profound problems of their own; and it was of course within this crucible that the contours of contemporary reason could be discerned.

In his book, The Heavenly City of the 18 th c. Philosophers (1932), Carl Becker suggests some valuable continuities and contrasts between the secular philosophers of the Enlightenment period, and the Christian

ethos which most of them claimed to have repudiated. Becker indicates that the identification of continuities and contrasts can only be conducted against the background of the relative assumptions of these different periods of European history. It would be inaccurate simply to describe the Enlightenment as the age of reason, and the Christian medieval epoch as the age of faith.

Commenting on Voltaire and St. Thomas Aquinas, Becker writes that,

> What they had in common was the profound conviction that their beliefs could be reasonably demonstrated.
>
> (Becker, C. 1932, P.8).

Rationality for both writers consisted of an integrated, consistent and coherent account of the world, many of whose fundamental features were assumed, rather than conclusively demonstrated. The world of St. Thomas Aquinas was of course the traditional and consolidated one of the expansive Christian narrative.

> Paradise lost and paradise regained - such was the theme of the drama of existence as understood in that age. (The 13 th c.).
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.10).

The Christian narrative offers an explanation for the world in which people find themselves, in terms of the benevolent purpose of a Divine Creator, whose finest creation is Man himself. The entire trajectory of human history is circumscribed by the actions of creation and final salvation. Between these poles a struggle is conducted, in which Man, deviant and sinful, seeks reconciliation with his Creator through the mediation of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, whose sacrificial life and teachings are God's merciful offer of salvation to aberrant man.

The story is coherent and satisfying on numerous levels. It provides a comprehensive explanation for existence itself, offering a lucid answer to abstract metaphysical questions about the reasons for, and the nature of, reality. But on a more concrete level, it suggests reassuring answers to questions about collective and individual identity. The question of "Who are we/am I?" inevitably assumes an historical dimension, because it is implicitly concerned with the issues of origin and destiny; "Where do I/we come from, and where am I/are we going?" The Christian drama offers a secure orientation, because it is about Man per se, and it is from this collective identity that the individual can derive his own. Not only does it provide an identity, but it also suggests answers to the moral questions about how we should conduct ourselves. The precepts for action are inferred from the comprehensive account of a loving Creator, a sacrificial Saviour, a common identity and destiny, encapsulated in Christ's basic injunction "Love one another as I have loved you".

The relinquishment of this human self-understanding, which is of course the very substance of secularization, and which constitutes a definitive feature of the Enlightenment movement, poses problems, because the orientating assumptions which provide identity and moral guidance have been repudiated. Consequently, a new imperative emerged, namely the provision of substance for the concept of Man, who, deprived of his Christian identity, appeared as an abstract entity, a general category from which few concrete inferences about identity and conduct could be made.

This does not imply of course that these phases occurred within any clearly demarcated temporal sequence; coherent Christian theology, a repudiation accompanied by the emergence of a disconcerting definitional vacuum, followed by close attention to the development of a new understanding of Man. There was obviously a subtle and nuanced transition during the course of the 17 th and 18 th centuries, but the effect is significant because it provides a qualitative change in modern self-understanding, a novel, rational and secular one. For Becker, secular thought does not engage with St. Thomas since his arguments,

> seem irrelevant because the world pattern into which they are so dexterously woven is no longer capable of eliciting from us either an emotional or an aesthetic response.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.12)

The vacuum was filled with a scientific understanding of Man, which offered answers to the questions about identity and morality, containing preoccupations, assumptions, and problems which can now be explored.

The preoccupations of the Enlightenment philosophers have been the concern of this chapter so far, but there is one important addition in the context of the present discussion, namely, the focus upon history, which requires mention.

An examination of history becomes an essential component of the Enlightenment's secular reorientation, because it superseded the Christian narrative, which had provided answers to questions about identity. If a secular perspective upon the central subject, Man, was to have any substance, a new understanding of his origin and destiny would have to be provided, and the only way to do so was to study his temporal evolution, to develop a sophisticated understanding of history.

Becker emphasised this when he wrote,

> The modern climate is such that we cannot seemingly understand our world unless we regard it as a going concern. We cannot properly know things as they are unless we know "how they came to be what they are"... Historical mindedness is so much a preconception of modern thought that we can identify a particular thing only by pointing to the various things it successively was before it became that particular thing which it will presently cease to be.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.14)

In his introductory essay to a collection of Kant's writings on history, Lewis White Beck distinguishes between two approaches to history, adopted by the 18 th c. philosophers. These were the analytical and synthetic Philosophy of history. Analytical Philosophy of history was the study of the epistemology of historiography but,

> The 18 th c. did not, it is true, make much progress in this field because it did not clearly see the difficulty of the problems to which this discipline applies.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.XIII)

The 18 th c. philosophers produced more substantial work in the synthetic philosophy of history, consistent with the requirements for a secular understanding of Man's temporal experience.

> The synthetic task of the philosophy of history is to find the meaning of history, the significance of the whole sweep of the past in man's conception of himself and of his place in the world and in time. The 18 th c. was luxuriant in the growth of philosophies of history in this synthetic or speculative sense.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P. XIII)

Significantly, synthetic philosophies of history substituted a concept of progress for that of the Christian telos, the eschatological vision of universal redemption, towards which Christian theologians believed history to be moving. The theme of progress was explored by writers like Kant and Condorcet, reflecting optimism and confidence about the development of Man in a secular world. This point is important, but a more detailed consideration of it is postponed until the next chapter when Kant's views on history will be examined.

This preoccupation with historical progress, which accompanied the Enlightenment philosophers' other perspectives upon Man's secular experience, was embedded within a complicated nexus of assumptions which require explication. Not only do these assumptions provide a coherent context which corroborates the Enlightenment's claim to rational sophistication, but they also expose the vulnerability of the Enlightenment's professed rational edifice. These assumptions are the secular equivalent of the central tenets of the Christian narrative, which the Enlightenment assiduously displaced, but their very status as assumptions has provided subsequent critics with an exploitable opportunity to subvert the Enlightenment's rational claims. This however anticipates later chapters. The assumptions themselves now require attention.

The disclosures of the 17 th c. scientific revolution were both practically and aesthetically satisfying, for what they revealed about the natural world were its universal consistency and uniformity, increasingly encapsulated in the nomological statements which constituted the very essence of scientific theory, and provided the basis for scientific explanation. Answers to questions about the world should no longer be sought in the Scriptures, but in the world of nature itself, the world in which laws regulated occurrences

both universally and eternally. Their discovered presence and efficacy provided the world with a sense of integration, and knowledge of the laws endowed men with an unprecedented control over their environment. There was no longer any need to invoke Divine benevolence to restrain the chaotic and terrifying natural forces which had afflicted societies since time immemorial. Control was now vested in the former victims, inducing a comprehensive sense of emancipation.

> In the 18 th c. climate of opinion, whatever question you seek to answer, nature is the test, the standard: the ideas, the customs, the institutions of men, if ever they are to attain perfection, must obviously be in accord with those laws which nature reveals at all times to all men.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.53)

In this summary, Becker emphasises the 18 th c.'s welcome dependence upon nature's consistent operations, and alludes to a fundamental abstract assumption in the minds of the 18 th c. philosophers; if the world of nature is regulated by universal laws, so must be the world of man and society. If the former is susceptible to rational control, the latter must be susceptible to rational reconstruction.

Cassirer too referred to these expectations when he wrote,

> The rationalistic postulate of unity dominates the minds of this age. The concept of unity and that of science are mutually dependent --- For the function of unification continues to be recognised as the basic role of reason. Rational order and control of the data of experience are not possible without strict unification.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.22-23)

Cassirer wrote later in the same book,

> The philosophy of the 18 th c. tried to apply the same universal method of "reason" to both nature and history.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.199)

Such views are clearly corroborated in the writings of both Condorcet and Hume. Condorcet made universal claims about men in society when he wrote in The Progress of the Human Mind that,

> After ages of error, after wandering in all the mazes of vague and defective theories, writers upon politics and the law of nations at length arrived at the knowledge of the true rights of man, which they deduced from this simple principle: that he is a being endowed with sensation, capable of reasoning upon and understanding his interests, and of acquiring moral ideas.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.437)

From his universal characterization of the nature of man, Condorcet proceeds to make certain political inferences when he continues,

> They saw that the maintenance of his rights was the only object of political union, and that the perfection of the social art consisted in preserving them with the most entire equality, and in their fullest extent.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.437)

The assumption of unity within the human or social world is even more explicitly stated by Hume in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) in which he wrote,

> Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour --- But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.136-7)

It can be seen from these excerpts, particularly that from Hume, that the assumption of uniformity (almost characterized as laws of human conduct) is necessary for the optimistic anticipation of a salutary relationship between theory and practice, knowledge and action. Just as knowledge of the laws of nature enables men to control their natural environment, so would a knowledge of consistent human nature enable social reformers to conduct rational social reconstruction. For Hume, the study of history would disclose this consistency, and would implicitly serve a purpose, viz., the provision of principles which could be employed to regulate future society.

In the statements by Condorcet, we discover confidence that Man, universally, is capable of reasoning, understanding his own interests, and acquiring moral ideas. From this he makes the optimistic inference that this universal characteristic will ensure the consensual formation of a political union, which will preserve an order of political equality, simultaneously protecting the rights of all. For Condorcet, the observation of a universal human nature provides the precepts for a new political order, and a guide for individual conduct.

What we detect in the sentiments of writers like Condorcet and Hume is an assumption of universal consistency and integration, a natural order extended through both the physical and social worlds, an order which empirical observation reveals (particularly through the study of history), a uniform structure from which all men can infer an appropriate political order in which harmonization can be secured. There is a positive hope here, the secular equivalent of the cohesion, integration and harmonization guaranteed by the operation of a benevolent God in the Christian cosmology, an optimistic homology between totalising secular and Christian visions.

The intention of this present discussion is not to engage with Hume and Condorcet on the validity of their claims about a universal human nature, and the inferences which they make from them. What is important is the expectations generated by their assumptions of uniformity, and the alleged identification of regulatory laws which constitute the very phenomenon of uniformity. This expectation is of course one of harmony and integration, providing us with one of the most abstract, but fundamental, concepts of rationality operative within the Enlightenment movement. It is a concept of both theoretical and practical reason, one which professes a superior epistemological understanding to that of its predecessors (epitomized by the advances of empirical science), a concept of reason which employs this allegedly universal understanding to engage and transform both the natural and social worlds, aspiring towards an integrated and comprehensive improvement in the life experience of its possessors, Man himself. As Cassirer precisely states it, it is a concept of reason as agency.

> Reason cannot stop with the dispersed parts; it has to build from them a new structure, a true whole. But since reason creates this whole and fits the parts together according to its own rule, it gains complete knowledge of the structure of its product. Reason understands this structure because it can reproduce it in its totality and in the ordered sequence of its individual elements. Only in this twofold intellectual movement can the concept of reason be fully characterized, namely as a concept of agency, not of being.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.13-14)

Human intelligence is not simply observational and spectatorial. Empirical observation may detect regularities, but the dual function of Man's rational faculty is to construct integrated systems or structures out of these independent observations, and convert them into transformative totalities which affect both the natural and social worlds. Intelligence becomes a dynamic agent affecting the diverse aspects of its own world, but above all it harmonizes these aspects into a comprehensive unity.

> The correlation between nature and human knowledge has now been established once and for all and the bond between them is henceforth inseverable. Both members of the correlation are quite independent but by virtue of their independence they are, nevertheless, in complete harmony. Nature in man, as it were, meets nature in the cosmos half way, and finds its own essence there.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.44)

This vision of unity and integration, derived from assumptions about the rational uniformity of the world, clearly demonstrates the kind of thematic continuity between the Medieval Christian world view and that of the Enlightenment, to which Becker refers in his book (1932).

Cassirer refers to this issue when he asks rhetorically,

> Where is the guarantee, the decisive proof, that this general system of phenomena is completely self-contained, homogenous and uniform?
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.56)

and he continues to state,

> Assumptions about universal uniformity demonstrated the difficulty of completely severing science from theology, or at least from metaphysical assumptions. A relentless empiricism might have to acknowledge that the world of facts can only support itself, and that we seek in vain for any firmer foundation.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.59)

Cassirer shows that this question obviously opened the way for Humean scepticism about the scientifically necessary law of cause and effect. Once again, it must be stated that this chapter cannot engage with this debate which is important for the history of the philosophy of science. Its main intention is to show how these assumptions of regularity, unity and harmonization were extended into the domain of social studies and social reform. These assumptions affected subsequent philosophical reflections about the development of secular social man, fostering not only optimistic hopes but also difficult problems, reservations and dilemmas, not only among certain Enlightenment thinkers (as will be shown below) but for philosophical developments since, then, particularly within the liberal and Marxist traditions.

These metaphysical assumptions implied a certain promise of deliverance for Man, deliverance from the perennial afflictions of war, oppression, tyranny, famine, disease and premature death. The development and practice of reason could produce a universal human amelioration. But deliverance, unlike salvation in Christian theology, depended upon human effort, and not upon Divine grace. Yet the effects of both perspectives were similar, namely a commitment to humanitarian service. The Enlightenment philosophers were

> inspired by the same ideal - the Christian ideal of service, the humanitarian impulse to set things right.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.40)

The deployment of reason was viewed as a panacea for human afflictions, and it was this perspective which induced Becker to entitle his book The Heavenly City of the 18 th c. Philosophers, alluding to the inspiration towards the construction of a peaceful, benevolent and bountiful situation in the temporal world.

Qualifications Of Enlightenment Optimism

Thus far, this chapter has outlined the major preoccupations and assumptions of the Enlightenment movement, many of whose features have been described in general terms. Attention has been devoted to a discussion of the 18 th c. philosophers' relationship to their "unenlightened" predecessors, emphasizing, with Becker, how a simple dichotomy between an age of Medieval faith, and one of enlightened reason, is untenable. The fundamental 18 th c. commitment to promoting the relationship between reason and freedom was based upon metaphysical assumptions, whose tenets were to produce major problems for equally inspired successive generations.

One task remains for this chapter, to dispel any impression that the Enlightenment's optimistic expectations were unqualified. 18 th c. philosophers detected significant problems in their programme for the rational reconstruction of the secular world. An acknowledgement of these reservations and anxieties is necessary, because it will be suggested in later chapters that Foucault's critique of the Enlightenment's commitment to reason and freedom is an accentuation of some of the problems perceived by writers of the time.

Previous discussion has indicated why the 18 th c. philosophers developed an enduring interest in the subject of history; if the Christian theology was relinquished, the question of Man's identity became urgent, and it became a secular hope that the study of history would provide an answer to it.

Given the 18 th c. philosophers' respect for empirical approaches to the acquisition of knowledge, one would expect that their focus on history would have involved detailed empirical and comparative research into this discipline. Towards the end of his book, Carl Becker (1932) makes the interesting point that the philosophers were not really engaged in empirical, comparative, historical enquiry, seeking the constant and universal principles of human nature through objective, inductive scientific method. Instead, they were working with a consistent, agreeable, a priori conception of a universal human nature to which the necessary facts could be applied (Becker, C., 1932, P.100 - 102). This conception was an article of faith, rather than the product of discovery, a projection of valued 18 th c. European perspectives onto the rest of humanity, in the interests of a uniform identity. These valued perspectives were that Man is natively good, easily enlightened, disposed to follow reason, generous, humane, tolerant, led by persuasion rather than force, a good citizen and a man of virtue. (Becker, C., 1932, P.103)

It will be argued that these a priori projections were necessary not only to answer questions about secular identity but also to assuage a set of profound anxieties generated by secular reorientation itself. These anxieties emerged from more general reflections upon the place of Man in nature, justifications for normative ethics, and the ambiguous benefits of knowledge itself.

In a particularly illuminating review of the development of concepts of rationality since the 17 th c., Charles Taylor (1985) discusses the consolidation of the contemporary West's "theoretical culture". He indicates how the 17 th c. scientific revolution incorporated key concepts from the classical Greeks, to develop a new understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the world.

Taylor refers to the Greek term "theoria" which means "contemplations", indicating that its practitioners' intention had always been the promotion of a "disengaged perspective". "Theoria" was an attempt to see things as they are, disengaged, outside the realm of human desires, goals and perspectives, a prerequisite for the attainment of a superior view of reality i.e., a more accurate perception of the nature of the observed world.

Contemplative activity was linked to the notion of "logos" or "reason", but the latter referred to more than the exercise of a logical faculty; it also implied speech. A rational understanding of the world manifests itself through the processes of articulation. Articulation lays out the features of the world in "perspicuous order", systematically consolidating the products of meticulous contemplation.

Such classical Greek concepts contributed to the development of a clear notion of objectivity for the 17 th c. scientists. However, their work effectively extricated these Greek tenets from an important set of classical assumptions, and consequently transformed the 17 th c.'s understanding of the relationship between knowledge and the world. For what the Greeks believed was that Man's supreme achievement, or goal (telos) was the attainment of knowledge, and that virtuous conduct consisted of the promotion of this end. Knowledge was valuable because it disclosed the meaningful order of the world, and most importantly, helped Man to understand his place within it. Such comprehension offered a substantial concept of happiness to the ancient Greeks. As Taylor expresses it, these ideas reflected a link between knowledge and attunement with the world.

> We don't understand the order of things without understanding our place in it, because we are part of this order. And we cannot understand the order and our place in it without loving it, without seeing its goodness, which is what I want to call being in attunement with it.
>
> (Taylor, C., 1985, P.95)

This relationship between knowledge and attunement continued into the Christian epoch, when theologians could proclaim that a Christian knowledge of the world revealed God's purposes and the place of Man within them. Both the classical and Christian perspectives provided a sense of attuned human accommodation within the world, albeit presented from divergent assumptions.

For Taylor, the fundamental significance of the 17 th c. scientific revolution's inauguration of the contemporary West's "theoretical culture" is that it severed the link between knowledge and attunement, redefining Man's conception of his relationship between himself and his natural context. A secular

understanding of the relationship between Man and the world, informed by the scientific disclosures of the 17 th c., engendered an ambivalent response among the 18 th c. philosophers. These disclosures offered a disconcerting legacy, because their perspicacity contained the promise of unprecedented control over the natural world, coupled with a realization that man's place in the world was a matter of universal indifference. There was no attunement in the sense of a natural place for Man in the order of things. At best, his intelligence would enable him to transform his natural environment into a more hospitable one, as he obeyed nature in order to command it (Bacon). For many thinkers, the prospect of secular self-determination was accompanied by a profound sense of diremption.

> Having made man master in his own house, some of the philosophers felt like strangers in it.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.161)

The problem of perceived isolation was compounded by a much more immediate one. Although the 18 th c. philosophers admired and subscribed to the empirical methods of the 17 th c. scientific revolution, they did not share the Greek disposition of detailed contemplation, which had contributed to that revolution's articulation of objective knowledge, for they were

> The eager bearers of good tidings to mankind. Disinterested? Objectively detached? By no means --- To be amused and detached observers of the human scene was not characteristic of them.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.36).

The 18 th c. philosophers' commitment was to the synthesis of theory and practice, knowledge and action, for the general improvement of society. Their participation in the historic expansion of scientific knowledge, with its promise of indefinite amelioration, made such ambition feasible and practicable.

Their immediate problem was that although the natural world evinced an intricate system of regularities which rendered it intelligible and manipulable, it was essentially a mute mechanism which could provide no guidance for action. Its uniformity could offer a guarantee of success, once its laws had been mastered and deployed, but it could not instruct Man how to use its disclosed potential. The world of nature was perceived as a factual nexus, divorced from the field of values which were required for the direction of moral action.

> The irresistible propulsion of modern scientific inquiry was toward positivism, toward the elimination of metaphysics, and the clean separation of facts and value ---
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.160)

One of the fundamental benefits of a Christian world-view had been its inveterate moral precepts, emanating from an understanding of the nature of God and His relationship to the acme of creation, Man

himself. A radical repudiation of these assumptions exposed a vertiginous vacuum at the centre of secular rationality, generating profound anxieties amongst some philosophers who considered themselves in the vanguard of secular advancement. The philosophers

> --- tried to apply the scientific style of thinking to the regions of aesthetic, social and political theory. But they discovered that, having eliminated the problem of God, they had burdened themselves with new difficulties, almost as intractable as the old.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.126)

If the old problems had revolved around incredible religious mythologies, superstitions and their detrimental consequences, the new ones concerned the issue of normative ethics. Having come to understand the world, how should one proceed to act within it?

Secular Identity And The Problem of Action

Having delineated the problem in these terms, one can revert to the issue raised by Becker (1932), when he wrote that the 18 th c. philosophers' concept of Man was an a priori notion projected onto the rest of humanity. Metaphysical affirmations have a necessarily universal quality, for by definition they are claims about existence per se. Within Christian metaphysics, the category of "Man" had a unitary quality, because the very term subsumed all human individuals under the notion of sinful, but redeemable, children of God. This common denominator, this common identity within a Christian cosmology, was ethically significant, because, from this acknowledged sinful status, certain moral obligations could be inferred. The individual was constrained to seek his own reconciliation with God, and to manifest this commitment to salvation through emulating the love of Christ for his fellow man. Humanity, in its entirety was united in this common identity; there was a consensus about his moral obligations, an intensive, enveloping system of moral constraints.

Within a secular perspective, could the category of "Man", with all its unitary implications, sustain an identity? Wouldn't the elimination of the Divine context, which rendered the entire perspective coherent, threaten to disintegrate a concept which provided moral obligation with uniform expectations? Could justifiable ethical constraints be sustained without this unifying category? Without it, men simply co-exist in a conflictual relationship perpetually antagonistic towards one another, fragmented as they struggled to survive in their indifferent, natural world. Would their animosity express itself in unrestrained violence and coercion? For some philosophers, secularization seemed to contain amoral implications, portending a situation of perpetually naked aggression. They

were more aware that nature without God, implied, quite literally, the law of the jungle.

(Hampson, N., 1968, P.122)

Perhaps then, the affirmation of a secular concept of "Man" as good, enlightened, disposed to follow reason, generous, humane and tolerant, was a necessary antidote to such a pessimistic prognostication. For with this unitary notion, one could continue to anticipate amelioration and a prevalent sense of concordant moral responsibility. Without it, disintegration seemed imminent, and one would be debilitated by the absence of motivation and direction.

> Without a cogent distinction between good and bad, without a justifiably constraining morality, the philosophers' injunctions for a regenerated society were futile.
>
> (Becker, C., 1932, P.86)

The projection may be construed as a necessary self-deception, a sustaining and inspirational concept to impel men into a constructive future, even though it possessed the quality of a faith which was incompatible with the 18 th c.'s empiricist professions. This does not suggest that rational vindications of moral precepts were neglected; the eminent Enlightenment philosopher, Kant made an enduring contribution to this project, whose success in terms of universally acknowledged cogency, continues to elude the modern world.

This is not the point at which to debate the various post-18 th c. attempts to provide rational justifications for moral precepts and constraints. Retrospection obviously indicates that radically transformative action, inspired, impelled and directed, by the successors of the 17 th c. scientific revolution and 18 th c. reformative initiative, has occurred. For our purposes, it simply has to be acknowledged that such initiatives were undertaken without the clarity of vision which the 18 th c. rational exponents would have required. They seem to have recognized that they were proceeding precariously and ambivalently, and that their rational inspirations were infused with antinomies, contradictions, even self-deceptions. Subsequent chapters will argue that these persisted in their legacy to both the liberal and Marxist traditions, and that Foucault's writing can be construed as a relentless insistence that these antinomies be confronted in the experience and politics of the modern world.

A final point needs to be made for the purposes of thematic anticipation, before proceeding with a more specific outline of the 18 th c. philosophers' visions of rational freedom.

It pertains to the above discussion about rational moral constraints, with particular reference to applied knowledge to the synthesis of theory and practice. In the second volume of his study of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay (1969) indicates how the foundations of contemporary social science were laid during the 18 th

c. This was an obviously logical development from the 18 th c. philosophers' commitment to the rational transformation of society. The accumulation of empirical information, both about their own societies and those to which travellers, nascent anthropologists, and comparative historians were directing their attention, was subordinated to the supreme value of social amelioration in the interests of freedom, tolerance, reason and humanity (Gay P., 1969, P.322). The problem of the scientific distinction between facts and values, already mentioned above, reemerged in considerations of the ambiguous potential of applied knowledge itself.

> Knowledge itself - of this they were certain - was a value; ignorance was certainly always an evil. But - and of this they were certain also - if knowledge was always a value, it was not always used well.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.322)

For the 18 th c. philosophers (and their successors) realized that there was no guarantee that the empowerment of freedom by reason would produce salutary consequences for society. The permanent possibility existed that the power conferred by knowledge would be abused, reinforcing tyranny, exploitation and oppression, rather than expediting freedom.

Within the classical Greek and Christian periods, guarantees of a constructive relationship between knowledge and power seem to have existed. In his book Philosophy in Question (1988), David Hiley reiterates how the Platonic and Aristotelian view of the relationship between knowledge and virtue revolved around the assumption that virtue consists of the realization of essence. Since Man is essentially a knowing being, his excellence, or virtue, resides in the promotion of knowledge, which could not be employed for evil purposes. Hiley also shows how Bacon's famous identification between knowledge and power was part of his religious conviction that God had enjoined Man to establish dominion over the earth. The powerful exercise of knowledge could only be constructive, because it was directed by God himself, whose intentions are benevolent.

The Enlightenment philosophers rejected the teleological conception of Man which had necessarily linked virtue and knowledge, so that Plato could claim that "no-one freely goes for bad things or things he believes to be bad". (Protagoras 35 a.d.). Their secular orientation also eliminated God as the guarantor of a positive and constructive exercise of reason. Hiley concludes,

> Within a larger religious or metaphysical framework - or within a teleological conception of history - knowledge, power and freedom were merely different sides of a single conception of moral and social progress. Outside of that framework, however, they become incompatible goals.
>
> (Hiley, D., 1988, P.47)

The perceived precarious nature of the philosophers' task in synthesizing theory and practice, knowledge and action, reason and freedom, was mitigated by one expectation: that embedded in the notion of progress; this will be given more attention in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ENLIGHTENMENT: EXEMPLIFICATIONS

Having considered some qualifications of the view that the 18 th c. philosophers contemplated the future with unconditional optimism, we can turn to a consideration of some of their proposals for transformation. These serve to illustrate the intentions and anticipations of the Enlightenment movement, providing concrete examples of the relationship between reason and freedom. Attention is given to the fields of government, economics, the idea of human progress, and education.

Rational Reconciliation and Government

Writers like Voltaire, Montesquieu and Condorcet shared the Enlightenment's aspirations for freedom through the exercise of reason, and devoted a lot of attention to questions of government. For the latter was perceived as the very institutionalization of a rational freedom, the foundation upon which, and the confine within which, all people could enjoy liberty.

In Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary he indicates that fortunately the conditions for the attainment of freedom through reason, tolerance and humanity, have already been established. He was referring respectfully and deferentially to the English system of government, in whose praises Voltaire reflects the sentiments of the Enlightenment.

> The English constitution has in fact arrived at that point of excellence in consequence of which every man is restored to those natural rights, which, in nearly all monarchies, they are deprived of. These rights are, entire liberty of person and property; freedom of the press; the right of being tried in all criminal cases by a jury of independent men; the right of being tried only according to the strict letter of the law; and the right of every man to profess unmolested, what religion he chooses, ---
>
> (van Baumer, Le. F., 1978, P.421)

For Voltaire, the English system of government protected that liberty which emanates from an acknowledgement of the tenets of reason, more particularly, those of the doctrine of Man's natural rights. It is clear to Voltaire that the world's monarchies are perverse, because they flout the precepts of reason,

with their oppressive hierarchies and their refusal to acknowledge the natural rights of Man as disclosed through rational analysis.

The doctrine of natural rights is a controversial one, not one which can be explored here. Voltaire's views are, however, relevant to our present discussion because they reveal an assumption about a universal phenomenon, natural rights, the acknowledgement of which constitutes rational action, and the institutional embodiment of which constitutes rational government. His claims are a clear example of rationality as the anticipation of an integrated, stable and peaceful society, in which the liberty of the individual is guaranteed, and his prospects of happiness and fulfilment maximized.

Montesquieu (1689-1755) is a clear example of a thinker who believes that human reason is a unitary, universal phenomenon, which can successfully regulate human societies, without presupposing that its particular manifestations will be uniform. However, he does view human reason as a comprehensively beneficial regulator, which must be embodied in the constitutive laws of any society. In the Spirit of the Laws (1748) he writes that,

> Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth; the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied.
>
> They should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed ---.
>
> They should be relative to the nature and principle of each government ---.
>
> They should be relative to the climate of each country ---.
>
> This is what I have undertaken to perform in the following work. These relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.425-26)

The empirical study of societies discloses a number of universal possibilities, which provide the definitive features of any particular society.

> The facts are sought, sifted, and tested by Montesquieu, not only for their own sake but for the sake of the laws which they illustrate and express. Laws are comprehensible only in concrete situations; only in such situations can they be described and demonstrated. On the other hand, these tangible situations take on real shape and meaning only when we employ them as examples, as paradigms illustrating general connections.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.210)

Effectively, Montesquieu appears as a precursor of positivism. Just as the natural scientists of the 17 th c. had established universal laws which regulate discrete phenomena, Montesquieu sought the limited number of organizing principles for government and social legislation. Cassirer refers to Montesquieu as

an early proponent of "ideal types", of uniform, synchronic structures which impart distinctive form to particular political and social systems. A republic for example, owes its existence to the principles or structures of civic virtue.

> Montesquieu strives for a universality of meaning, to elicit the inner rule by which governments are guided.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.211)

These principles, structures or inner rules would be employed for the reconstruction of society, inferred from the careful, systematic study of past and contemporary history.

> Montesquieu is a man of his time, a genuine thinker of the Enlightenment, in that he expects from the advancement of knowledge a new moral order and a new orientation of the political and social history of man ---.
>
> From a knowledge of the general principles and moving forces of history he looks for the possibility of their effective control in the future.
>
> (Cassirer, E., 1955, P.215)

Interestingly, and problematically, though, Montesquieu's scientific study of society presented a number of alternatives, between which science itself could not help him to select. He introduces significant evaluations of the alternatives into his normative proposals, which were inconsistent with those of other Enlightenment figures, like Condorcet, who also claimed to be proponents of rational reform. In his Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu writes,

> Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power ---
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.426)

Both Voltaire and Montesquieu favoured constitutional monarchies, the former because the English Monarchy's form of government seemed to embody a rational system of individual liberty, the latter because constitutional monarchy, with its separation of legislative, judicial and executive functions minimized the abuse of political power. Their proposals were contradicted by Condorcet, who felt that the rational conclusion for writers upon politics could only be the following:

> They (writers upon politics) perceived that the means of securing the rights of the individual, consisting of general rules to be laid down in every community, the power of choosing these means, and determining these rules, could vest only in the majority of the community: and that for this reason, as it is impossible for any individual in this choice to follow the dictates of his own understanding, without subjecting that of others, the will of the majority is the only principle which can be followed by all, without infringing upon the common equality.
>
> (van Baumer, Le.F, 1978, P.437)

Condorcet's evident conviction is that a just exercise of power can only be conducted through complying with the will of the majority, a will which was certainly not prevalent in the kind of constitutional monarchy envisaged by Montesquieu. The point is not to engage in a debate about the relative merits of constitutional monarchy and democracy, but to indicate that within the arena of enlightened thought in the 18 th c. those who engaged in rational analysis (often inspired by the systematic rigour of empirical science, as was Montesquieu) frequently produced contradictory proposals for action, and it was difficult to see how these differences could be resolved rationally (producing integration through consensus) when there was no agreement about which criteria constituted rational arbitration between alternatives. Montesquieu, for example, would not have conceded that submission to the will of the majority was the rational way to resolve disputes about policy implementations. This comparison alerts one to a significant fissure within the corpus of rational thought, one which was to intensify in the subsequent history of enlightened reflection and action. It portended difficulties for the Enlightenment's successors, implicitly impugning the vision of universal integration frequently articulated by its more optimistic proponents. This, however, will be pursued in subsequent chapters. We can now proceed with an outline of a second vision of rational freedom, pertaining to the realm of economics.

Rational Integration and Economics

The 18 th c. writers under review here are Nemours, Turgot and Adam Smith, who provide clear examples of thinkers who believed that the world of economics is regulated by certain natural laws. If economic prosperity was to be fostered, compliance with these laws was of course imperative.

Dupont de Nemours (1739-1817) was a French economist and statesman, who first applied the term "Physiocracy" to the group of economists headed by Dr Quesnay. For him, political economy or economic liberalism was a corollary of natural philosophy, hence the term "Physiocracy" (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.439). In his book On the Origin and Progress of New Science (1768), he considered the economic reasons for the formation of civil societies, endowing these reasons with a universal applicability,

> Men are not united by chance into civil societies. It is not without reason that they have extended the natural chain of reciprocal duties and submitted to a sovereign authority. They had, and they have, an end essentially marked out by their nature which makes them behave in this way ---.
>
> There is, then, an order, natural, essential and general, which comprises the constitutive and fundamental laws of all societies; an order which could not be entirely abandoned without effecting the dissolution of society and soon the absolute destruction of the human race.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.239-240 - emphasis in the original).

His very concept of the study of economics as a "New Science" discloses his belief and confidence in a set of natural, regulatory, economic precepts which impel the formation of civil societies everywhere. Recognition and acknowledgement of these laws, as well as compliance with them, are a prerequisite for survival and development, and a clear reflection, once again, of the Baconian claim that "nature to be commanded must be obeyed". The world of human production and exchange is portrayed as an extension of the world's natural order.

In a eulogy for Dr Quesnay, the founder of the Physiocratic school of economic though, Nemours wrote that Quesnay

> concluded that physical laws are not limited to those which have heretofore been studied in our colleges and academies; and that when nature gives to the ants, bees and beavers the faculty of submitting themselves by a common accord and by their proper interest to a good, stable and uniform government, she does not refuse to man the power of enjoying the same advantage. Animated by the importance of this view and by the prospect of the great consequences that could be deduced from it, he applied his whole mind to the research of the physical laws relative to society; and at last succeeded in assuring himself of the immovable basis of these laws, in grasping their entirety, in developing their logical sequence, in deducing from them results.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.440)

Quesnay and Nemours exemplify the 18 th c.'s reverence for the empirical methods of the 17 th c. scientific revolution. Quesnay was involved in an empirical study of the insect and animal worlds, about which he formulated universal laws, deduction from which enabled him to explain the conduct of groups of ants, bees and beavers. They projected these inductive and deductive processes into the human world, about which, they believed similar claims could be made.

In a detailed account, clearly influenced by doctrines of the social contract, and by religious sentiment, Nemours provided his readers with an idea of the nature and function of these regulatory laws, which are universally evident.

He described how, in pre-social existence, physical needs were paramount. All men had the right to provide for their subsistence and well-being, a duty to work and respect the rights of others.

> Conventions are entered into between men for the sole purpose of recognizing and guaranteeing mutually these rights and duties established by God himself.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.441)

Nemours continues to discuss how the natural produce of land and sea was obviously not enough to provide men with the requirements which would satisfy them, immediately emphasizing the need for concerted production. Each man's attention to productive efforts generated new requirements, primarily liberty and security; liberty to use personal, movable and landed property, and security for the possession of what one acquires from the use of this property. For Nemours, individual incentive, exertion, and security for the results of his labour, are the primary conditions of expansive prosperity and the fulfilment of human needs, regulatory law's defiance of which can only be detrimental for all. Society was established to provide these guarantees and protections. These laws are sacrosanct because of their Divine origin.

> Would one believe that in spite of the evidence of Sovereign truths, the thread of which we have just followed and which manifest to us the laws of this physiocratic Government; would one believe that there are still to be found men and writers who say it is not true that God has established a natural order which ought to serve as a rule for society ---
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.443)

Nemour's incredulous tone reveals an inveterate faith in a Divinely instituted system of rational regulation in economic affairs, compliance with which is virtually a guarantee of peace, prosperity and social harmony. It is a clear example of an Enlightened synthesis of faith in the possibility of rational integration, and commitment to a scientific study of the word, an optimistic dialectic in which the alleged regularities of empirical evidence are accorded Divine origin, which is necessarily benevolent, and is consequently a guarantor of salutary results for men's labour.

Similar optimism is evident in the more secularly - orientated work of Turgot (1727-81), who wrote on questions of economic reform and served in the administration of pre-revolutionary France. His work is significant for two reasons; firstly, it outlines, once again, a vision of rational integration, a harmonization of interests in society, which anticipated Adam Smith's notion of the "Hidden hand" of economic regulation. Secondly, he is an early proponent of liberal capitalism, in that he advocated maximum individual liberty to buy and sell in an open market, and enjoined state action to confine itself to the protection of individuals in their commercial relationships with one another, and to the protection of the inhabitants of the entire state from foreign aggression.

In 1759, writing complimentary remarks about a dissident Physiocrat, de Goumay, Turgot commented,

> Those principles appeared to him as only the maxims of simple common sense --- that in general a man knows his own interest better than another man can know it for him. Hence, he concluded

> that as the interest of individuals is, on the whole, precisely the same as the general interest, we should leave every man free to manufacture whatever he considers desirable, because, with industry and commerce left free, it would be impossible for the aggregate individual interests not to concur with the general interest.
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish K., 1978, P.206)

In this illuminating passage, Turgot outlines a notion of rational self-interest, derived from empirical observation of individual psychological propensities, and concludes that the cumulative effect of the individual's self-interested action will be both socially beneficial and harmonious. An inductive process proceeds from the rational, self-interested individual, to a rational (integrated) society.

For Turgot, the State must provide the conditions for successful commerce, maintaining a strong impartial and distant presence.

> --- the State can interest itself in commerce only under two points of view. As protector of the individuals who compose it, it is its interest that no one should in the course of business suffer any wrong from another against which he cannot secure himself. Next as being a political body, having to defend itself against exterior invasions, it is the interest of the State that the mass of the wealth of the community and the yearly productions of the land and of industry should be the greatest that is possible.
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish K., 1978, P.207)

Interference by the State beyond these protective requirements is a form of irrationality. The State may not favour particular commodities, by prohibiting certain productions and encouraging others, or interfere with the natural price regulation in exchange between the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Neither the defense of monopolies, nor the protection of exporters against importers (a tenet of the mercantilist school, intended to secure a highly favourable balance of payments) was rationally defensible, for it could only interfere with naturally beneficial incentives, related to the necessary levels of production and their acceptable cost.

> The general liberty of buying and selling is therefore the only means to insure on the one side to the seller a price sufficient to encourage production; on the other side to the consumer the best merchandise at the lowest price.
>
> (Bramstead, E. and Melhuish, K., 1978, P.207)

Turgot's views evince an optimistic belief in a natural (rational) order of production and exchange, compliance with which will ensure the production of all that is necessary to meet human and social requirements, at a price which is best for all. His is a vision of rational economic activity, consonant with the disclosures of empirical observation, and with the desire for harmonious social integration.

Issues raised by both Nemours and Turgot are extended and consolidated in Adam Smith's (1723-90), famous work The Wealth of Nations (1776). In this book, Smith examines the question of how social wealth is produced, and is once again interesting, for our purposes, because his understanding of the process is affected by conceptions of economic production which are both universal, timeless and natural. There is an integrative and affluent potential in Man's rational appreciation of the laws which regulate the activities of production and exchange in any society.

In his introduction to The Wealth of Nations, Smith indicates that a nation's productivity is fundamentally affected

> by the skill, dexterity and judgement with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.171)

Any rudimentary consideration of any national economy must appreciate the basic necessity for the division of labour, for

> The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.173)

The division of labour, whose component parts each require skill, dexterity and judgement, is not the result of intentional action, but reflects a natural necessity.

> This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.181)

That natural necessity is of course productive efficiency. If a single labourer, or group of labourers, is required to conduct every aspect of the productive process, it will inevitably be tardy. Improved skill, dexterity, and judgement requires specialization, (division of labour) which will ensure the competent execution of a particular task, and contribute to the rapid production of greater quantities.

> The division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour. The separation of different trades and employments from one another, seems to have taken place, in consequence of this advantage ---

> This great increase of the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.175-76)

Having indicated that all societies must be involved inevitably in the processes of production for the purposes of survival, and having delineated how the division of labour is conducive to the skilful maximization of social produce, Smith continues to consider the principles which regulate the exchange of produce itself. He distinguishes between natural prices and market prices.

> When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of labour, and the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be called its natural price ---
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish, K., 1978, P.213-14)

The market price, however, is determined by the law of supply and demand, and will obviously deviate from the natural price determined by the costs of production and transportation. Nevertheless, the natural price is a norm towards which market prices tend to gravitate.

> When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the effectual demand and no more, the market price naturally comes to be either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price ---
>
> The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish, K., 1978, P.214-15)

Smith's account of the systems of efficient production and exchange emphasizes a number of basic natural requirements, and refers to a natural balance or equilibrium in the establishment of prices, natural or market. This natural, rational order must be protected by a commitment to dual notions of freedom, both of which replicate the views of Turgot, both of which are provided by the State. The latter must ensure that its inhabitants are free to produce and exchange by protecting them from foreign aggression, and that the inhabitants themselves do not commit injustices towards one another, particularly if these should interfere with commercial interaction. Any interference by the State, for example, in the protection of monopolies, is a violation of the natural rational economic order, producing a detrimental effect upon its inhabitant's freedom.

> A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural route.
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish, K., 1978, P.216)

The only way to permit the untrammeled expression of a natural, rational, economic order, which will promote commercial freedom and prosperity, is to pursue a policy of laissez-faire, the removal of systems of preference and restraint.

> All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of men.
>
> (Bramsted, E. and Melhuish, K., 1978, P.224)

Finally, Smith believed that the system of free competition in an open market must harness all the skill, dexterity and judgement of all the participants in the productive process, and have a comprehensively beneficial and integrative effect on the entire society. From the exigencies of local production to the harmonization of the national economy, a rational process operates in a free environment to secure the welfare for all.

> It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.179)

Nemours, Turgot and Smith were representatives of one of the Enlightenment's visions of freedom, a vision of freedom secured through compliance with an allegedly natural and rational economic system, which would maximize production and harmonize the respective economic interests within any particular society. Of the three, Smith was the most comprehensive and lucid analyst, whose achievement is summarized by Gay.

> The Wealth of Nations is a cardinal document of the Enlightenment: it is secular in its perception of the world, devoted to facts, confident in its search for scientific generality, intent on translating knowledge into beneficent action, comfortable in its expectation that humanity and utility often coincide, yet alert to the conflict of interests and the need for intervention on behalf of values higher than those of getting and spending.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.368)

Reason and Progress

The idea of progress was an integral part of the synthetic philosophy of history, which became a significant part of certain philosopher's concerns during the 18 th c. (see above P. 9). Two of the most promising exponents of the idea of progress were Kant and Condorcet. As with many important and central concepts, the idea of progress was both a varied and contested notion, as is revealed in a comparison between these two philosophers.

My extended discussion of the nature of 18 th c. secularization and its attendant problems, suggested why the idea of progress became significant in 18 th c. thought. The study of history offered an extensive understanding of man's temporal experience, hopefully presenting a keen sense of collective direction around which a concept of identity could crystallize. However, it was also consonant with the optimistic sentiment of the Enlightenment movement, in that it reflected anticipations of a better future; the enhanced quality of human reason would secure an emancipated future, freedom from ignorance, affliction, oppression. Such expectations were obviously inspirational and motivational, positing a vision of improvement which would galvanize action, and reinforce determination to repudiate the perspectives and errors of the past.

One notices such a tone in the work of both Condorcet and Kant, but there are significant differences between the two men. In his introduction to The Progress of the Human Mind Condorcet's soaring confidence was expressed as follows:

> The result of [my work] will be to show, from reasoning and from facts, that no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us.
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.454)

As with many 18 th c. writers, Condorcet believed that such optimism was justified by the scientific accomplishments of the previous century, whose disclosures provided a sure guide for the socially transformative ambitions of the present.

> If man can predict, almost with certainty, those appearances of which he understands the laws; if even when the laws are unknown to him, experience of the past enables him to foresee with considerable probability, future appearances; why should we suppose it a chimerical undertaking to delineate, with some degree of truth, the picture of the future destiny of mankind from the results of its history. The only foundation of faith in the natural sciences is the principle, that the general laws, known or unknown, which regulate the phenomena of the universe, are

> regular and constant; and why should this principle, applicable to the other operations of nature, be less true, when applied to the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man?
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.454)

As with Montesquieu, Condorcet's faith in the possibility of positive transformation resided in the observable regularity of the world, an understanding of which enabled men to direct constructive reform systematically. Because of this dependence upon the regulative and precise nature of scientific procedures, applied to the social world, Condorcet cannot be depicted as a utopian thinker, despite the inordinately optimistic quality of his vision and writings. For a utopian is inspired by a comprehensive vision of transformation, with only a nebulous conception of how it might be realized, usually a hope for collective volition, informed by a consensual commitment to some benevolent future. Such utopian expectations were to suffuse the life and thought of early 19 th c. European socialists, whose vague yearnings for a better future incurred Marx's contempt.

Condorcet's idea of progress can consequently be described as a positivist one. Not only did he believe that the Europe of his time was in the vanguard of historical progress, providing possible inspiration to all peoples, but also that contemporary Man's understanding of the laws of historical development would impel the world towards indefinite improvement under the self-conscious, self-determinative control of enlightened agents, men themselves.

> It is between this degree of civilization (Europe's) and that in which we still find the savage tribes, that we must place every people whose history has been handed down to us, and who, sometimes making new advancements, sometimes plunging themselves again into ignorance, sometimes floating between the two alternatives or stopping at a certain limit, sometimes totally disappearing from the earth under the sword of conquerors, mixing with these conquerors, or living in slavery; lastly, sometimes receiving knowledge from a more enlightened people to transmit it to other nations - form an unbroken chain of connection between the earliest periods of history and the age in which we live, between the first people known to us, and the present nations of Europe.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.163)

For Condorcet, the path of progress, from the ancient to the modern world, has been characterized by vicissitudes and reversals, but now the prospects for rapid and qualitatively superior advancement are imminent because of the scientific understanding procured by man in the previous one hundred and fifty years.

Condorcet certainly admired European accomplishments, believing that a democratic European revolution (he wrote The Progress of the Human Mind during the French Revolution, whose Jacobin phase, 1793-94, actually claimed his life) would pave the way for a progressive and benevolent European attitude towards the rest of the world, some of whose inhabitants were subordinate to European rule. The benefits of European experience would expand to achieve a vision of international progress.

> Then will the inhabitants of the European quarter of the world, satisfied with an unrestricted commerce, too enlightened as to their own rights to sport with the rights of others, respect that independence which they have hitherto violated with such audacity ---
>
> In one place will be found a numerous people, who to arrive at civilization, appear only to wait till we shall furnish them with the means; and who, treated as brothers by Europeans, would instantly become their friends and disciples ---
>
> The march of these people will be less slow and more sure than ours has been, because they will derive from us that light which we have been obliged to discover, and because for them to acquire the simple truths and infallible methods which we have obtained after long wandering in the mazes of error, it will be sufficient to seize upon their developments and proofs in our discourses and publications.
>
> (Capaldi, N., 1967, P.293-295)

If Condorcet's idea of progress was optimistic, scientific, and universally applicable, a vision of international improvement which invested the present with hope, inspiration and a sense of historical identity, Kant's lacked this dimension. Kant's idea of progress was a philosophically specific one, and evinced more circumspection in its anticipation of the future. Such inferences are made from a study of two of Kant's essays, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784), and "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" (1798).

Kant's title "Idea for a Universal History" does not refer to a notion of universal history. For Kant, an Idea performs a very specific and important regulatory function.

> An idea for Kant is like Plato's Idea in being a conception for which no experience can give us an exemplar, yet a conception which is not arbitrarily constructed by the imagination. But whereas Plato thought the Ideas were objects of pure reason in a noumenal world in which the world of sense participates by imitating the Ideas, Kant thought of them as necessary creations of the human mind with no known metaphysical existence. Necessary though, for what? Kant believed that they were necessary for the guidance of our theoretical knowledge and practical or moral experience, holding before us an unrealized systematic goal for our piecemeal dealings with particular problems.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.XIX-XX)

Kant alludes to this explicitly in both his "Idea for a Universal History" and "An Old Question Raised Again", where he clearly aligns himself with the synthetic philosophy of history. He wrote,

> It is strange and apparently silly to wish to write a history in accordance with an Idea of how the course of the world must be if it is to lead to certain rational ends. It seems that with such an Idea only a romance could be written. Nevertheless, if one may assume that Nature, even in the play of human freedom, works not without plan or purpose, this Idea could still be of use.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.24)

Such a justification and qualification must obviously have seemed necessary to the author of Critique of Pure Reason, which was concerned with the nature and limits of human knowledge, concluding that knowledge beyond the phenomenal world was not possible. Such epistemological conclusions might have inclined Kant more towards an analytical philosophy of history, with its respect for systematic, empirical progress. In the same essay Kant indicates his respect for such procedures, but emphasizes that such research is not his intention.

> That I would want to displace the work of practising empirical historians with this Idea of world history, which is to some extent based upon a priori principle, would be a misinterpretation of my intention. It is only a suggestion of what a philosophical mind (which would have to be well versed in history) could essay from another point of view.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.31)

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (theoretical reason) had been followed by his Critique of Practical Reason. The former had focussed upon the nature and limits of knowledge within the natural, phenomenal world, while the latter considered the nature of moral action in the noumenal world, the world of free and responsible human action, located within the context of the natural world's necessary and regulating universal laws. In Beck's introduction to Kant's essays On History, he asks what connection there could be between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy on the one hand, and his philosophy of history on the other. In answering his own question, Beck states

> The philosophy of history --- must be a conceptual link between Kant's two worlds of nature and morality.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.XVIII)

Fundamentally, Kant's Idea for a universal history, and his reflections upon the notion of progress, informed his understanding of the inextricable relationship between nature and morality, of action in the context of the natural world. Consequently, his conception of nature and its effects upon society, of morality and its possible progress, constitute the central focus of our present concern.

At the beginning of his "Idea for a Universal History", Kant remarks that the experience of life from the point of view of transient individuals and societies is confusing and even chaotic. He stated his intention to consider an extended view of human experience, to consider whether a general order was discernable in the apparent disorder of human life.

> Since the philosopher cannot presuppose any [conscious] individual purpose among men in their great drama, there is no other expedient for him except to try to see if he can discover a natural purpose in this idiotic course of things human. In keeping with this purpose, it might be possible to have a history with a definite natural plan for creatures who have no plan of their own.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.12)

Kant's references to a "natural purpose in this idiotic course of things human" and "a history with a definite natural plan" should not be construed as an alleged or detected teleology whose goal is preordained. The natural purpose or plan is accurately depicted as a contextual challenge, whose outcome has no guarantee. Nature's purpose for man is the development of his reason, the evolution of which is a prerequisite for his survival. Effort is required to sustain this evolution in both naturally and socially adverse conditions, with no assured success.

> Her giving to man reason and the freedom of the will which depends upon it is clear indication of her purpose. Man accordingly was not to be guided by instinct, nor nurtured and instructed with ready-made knowledge; rather, he should bring forth everything out of his own resources. Securing his own food, shelter, safety and defense (for which Nature gave him neither the horns of the bull, nor the claws of the lion, nor the fangs of the dog, but hands only), all amusement which can make life pleasant, insight and intelligence, finally, even goodness of heart - all this should be wholly his own work.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.14)

Collective effort within the arduous circumstances of the natural world stimulated the emergence of society, whose continuing existence was always jeopardised by disruptive antagonism.

> By "antagonism" I mean the unsocial sociability of men, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.15)

Attempts to establish an orderly social existence, despite its persistent conflicts and inner tensions denotes a transition from barbarism to culture. But Nature's endowment of reason to man requires a further attainment, relating to a concept of morality.

> The highest purpose of Nature, which is the development of all the capacities which can be achieved by mankind, is attainable only in society, and more specifically in the society with the greatest freedom. Such a society is one in which there is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent with the freedom of others. Nature demands that humankind should itself achieve this goal like all its other destined goals. Thus a society in which freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree with irresistible power i.e. a perfectly just civic constitution, is the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race ---
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.16)

Kant's conception of a "perfectly just civic constitution" is a moral one, whose attainment surpasses the transition from barbarism to culture. For Kant, this accomplishment is a central criterion of progress, as is evident from his essay "An Old Question Raised Again", in the first paragraph of which he wrote,

> If it is asked whether the human race at large is progressing perpetually toward the better, the important thing is not the natural history of man (whether new races may arise in the future), but rather his moral history and, more precisely, his history not as a species according to the generic notion, but as the totality of men united socially on earth and apportioned into peoples.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.137)

In 1798, a philosopher like Kant did not have to write a moral history to demonstrate the existence of moral progress. For Kant, a momentous, historic event, the French Revolution, and the responses to it, constituted evidence of moral advance, and consequently of progress. Progress was not implicit in the deeds, crimes or achievements of the participants of the Revolution. Rather,

> It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered.
>
> Owing to its universality, this mode of thinking demonstrates a character of the human race at large and all at once; owing to its disinterestedness, a moral character of humanity, at least in its predisposition, a character which not only permits people to hope for progress toward the better, but is already itself progress insofar as its capacity is sufficient for the present.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.143-44)

Kant equates this capability for universal disinterestedness, for impartial acclaim for the aspirations of the French revolutionaries, with a moral disposition, and with progress for the human race. It was a moral response to a moral ambition. In what, precisely, did the latter consist?

> This moral cause inserting itself (in the course of events) is twofold: first, that of the right, that a nation must not be hindered in providing itself with a civil constitution, which appears good to the people themselves; and second, that of the end (which is, at the same time, a duty), that that same national constitution alone be just and morally good in itself, created in such a way as to avoid, by its very nature, principles permitting offensive war. It can be no other than a republican constitution, republican at least in essence ---
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.144)

Kant's conception of republicanism is irregular, but illuminates his whole notion of moral progress. It is certainly not synonymous with democracy, but is derived from his conception of practical reason, succinctly formulated in his Categorical Imperative. The latter is a peremptory injunction, which combines the notions of freedom and reason into a moral system. For Kant, human agents, as occupants of the noumenal world, can only act autonomously, freely, if they exercise their reason. Reason is an inherently universal notion, and moral prescriptions are only rational if the agent's moral prescriptions can be enjoined for all other agents without exception. In this way moral injunctions achieve an autonomous, universal and impartial quality, consonant with the requirements of reason. It was precisely in the light of this understanding that Kant could proclaim that the disinterested and universal spectatorial acclaim for the

aspirations of the French revolutionaries towards a self-determinative constitution (which respected the autonomy of its citizens), denoted moral progress. For the second important component of the Categorical Imperative was that people should treat one another as ends in themselves, rather than as means to their own partial, self-interested purposes. Considering a person as an end in himself meant respecting his potential for rationally autonomous decisions, whose moral quality was demonstrated by its universality. Any society whose constitutive laws were the product of the autonomous rational (universal) decisions of its inhabitants, and which respected the autonomy of its citizens, could be considered as a "kingdom of ends", and it was in this sense that Kant employed the term "Republican". For Kant, this "kingdom of ends" could be compatible with monarchy, which is why the term is not synonymous with democracy. Towards the end of "An Old Question Raised Again", he wrote

> --- it is provisionally the duty of the monarchs, if they rule as autocrats, to govern in a republican (not democratic) way, that is, to treat the people according to principles which are commensurate with the spirit of libertarian laws (as a nation with mature understanding would prescribe them for itself), although they would not be literally canvassed for their consent.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.150)

The Idea for a universal history and its relationship to the question of progress is therefore seen to constitute a regulatory conception inherited from Kant's practical reason, or understanding of the dependence of freedom upon reason in the articulation of ethical duty. The evolution of this intricate nexus occurs within the context of the natural world, whose imperatives and exigencies foster the development of human reason within an adverse crucible, constituted not only by the hostility of the natural environment, but also by the potentially disintegrative tensions of civil society. If an autonomous ethical reason, embodied in the kind of civil constitution which was framed by the French revolutionaries, can prevail despite these circumstances, progress is evident. The Idea is a guide for action, an a priori conception, containing no guarantee of attainable or sustained progress. The burden of responsibility still resides with collective human volition, which may falter or succumb to the adverse conditions which it confronts. The Idea is a substantial part of a collective human intention, requiring persistence for its realization. Kant acknowledged this on the first page of "An Old Question Raised Again"

> But how is a history a priori possible? Answer: if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.137)

In the writings of Condorcet and Kant, we encounter different conceptions of progress. For Condorcet, a greater optimism is evident because of his confidence in qualitative transformation, produced by human control over the laws of social development. Such knowledge provided a guarantee of success.

Kant's concept of progress is more precarious. It is constituted by a very demanding ethical understanding, which links the development of human freedom and autonomy with the promotion of human reason, a fusion which is perpetually challenged by the adverse circumstances of the natural and social worlds. For Kant, the possibility of progress is in continuous jeopardy, requiring chronic vigilance and effort to sustain it. His Idea of progress is a secular one, whose challenging legacy to his successors has not abated; in fact, its demands have become more arduous, as can be seen in the development of both liberal and Marxist thought.

Reason and Education, Education and Power

To situate a discussion of education at the end of a chapter on the Enlightenment is not to disparage considerations of eduction, for the latter presuppose an understanding of the issues reviewed above, and illuminate some of the significant dilemmas in which both Enlightenment thinkers, and their successors have found themselves.

To many of the Enlightenment thinkers, education was a significant component in the translation of theory into practice, in the whole process of social improvement. Education would foster happiness both through the elimination of ignorance and superstition (together with its attendant expression, fear), and promote the redress of a central social grievance, inequality itself. In his Treatise on Man (1772), Helvetius wrote,

> If it be true that the talents and the virtues of a people determine their power and their happiness, no question can be more important than this: are the talents and virtues of each individual, the effect of his organization, or of the education he receives?
>
> I am of the latter opinion---.
>
> If I can demonstrate that man is, in fact, nothing more than the product of his education, I shall doubtless reveal an important truth to mankind. They will learn, that they have in their own hands the instrument of their greatness and their felicity, and that to be happy and powerful nothing more is requisite than to perfect the science of education ---
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.417)

Helvetius attributed the universal unhappiness of man, and of nations, to both their imperfect laws, and "the too unequal partition of their riches". Justice required an equitable distribution of wealth in order to make men happy.

> There are few good patriots; few citizens that are always just. Why? Because men are not educated to be just --- But are children capable of conceiving adequate ideas of justice? This I know, that if by the aid of religious catechism we can engrave on the memory of a child articles of faith that are frequently the most absurd, we might consequently, by the aid of moral catechism, there engrave the precepts of an equity, which daily experience would prove to be at once useful and true...
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.420)

Condorcet too, identified inequality as a fundamental source of human unhappiness, and believed that education, or instruction, could rectify this. In his Progress of the Human Mind, he wrote:

> Our hopes, as to the future condition of the human species, may be reduced to three points: the destruction of inequality between different nations; the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and lastly, the real improvement of man ---
>
> Instruction, properly directed, corrects the natural inequality of the faculties, instead of strengthening it, in like manner as good laws remedy the natural inequality of the means of subsistence ---
>
> (van Baumer, Le F., 1978, P.455-6)

However, this common belief in the transformative potential of education, particularly its ability to promote happiness through the elimination of inequality raised the central problem of agency; who would conduct these reform programmes? For the philosophers obviously knew that their valued, rational, secular, understanding, was the possession of a small minority. Their visions of freedom, of social transformation, were not extensive.

> The new style of thought was in the main reserved to the well-born, the articulate and the lucky: the rural and the urban masses had little share in the new dispensation.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969, P.4)

The benefits of the new, enlightened, vision and understanding were intended for "the people", but access to them was limited. The philosophers' obvious recourse was to the political rulers and authorities in their society. Their power and resources offered the prospect of reform under the tutelage of enlightened thought.

> All the philosophers, more or less consciously, thought of themselves as educators, and enlightenment was what they taught ---
>
> Education here was a two-stage process: the philosophers had to educate the king in the need for educating his people.
>
> (Gay, P., 1969 P.502)

Such a strategy for access to and the enlightenment of, "the people", posed a major problem for the relationship between authority and autonomy or freedom. The latter was the explicit goal of Enlightened rationality, but it involved a conflictual relationship with, even a severance from, authority. Two kinds of authority are referred to here. Firstly, the moral and epistemological authority of European tradition, epitomized by the consolidated influence of the Church, against which much enlightened thought was a reaction. Secondly, the existing political authorities, whose decisive power presented the philosophers with a dual potential; either it could be employed to extend the benefits of enlightened education to "the people", or it could impede this progress, frustrating the implementation of the cardinal ideas of the Enlightenment and severing the necessary link between theory and practice. No easy translation of thought into action was feasible. For the philosophers, progress to popular enlightenment entailed, at best, the difficult process of persuading existing political powers to co-operate with them, and, at worst, adapting to chronic conflict with resolute opposition from both secular and religious authorities. Such issues are implicit in one of the century's most famous essays, Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" (1784).

At the beginning of this essay, Kant offers his definition of enlightenment.

> Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere Aude! (Dare to know). "Have courage to use your own reason!" - that is the motto of enlightenment.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.3)

Kant's opening paragraph clearly illustrates the 18 th c. quest for freedom through the exercise of reason. It combines the correlative notions of autonomy and self-determination; enlightenment consists of freedom from dependence upon "direction from another", and of a resolution to employ one's reason to determine one's own future.

Kant did not believe that the Enlightenment was an accomplishment by 1784. Rather, it was an aspiration, a time of struggle for emancipation from authorities and perspectives, both of which maintained restrictive tutelage over the minds of men.

> If we are asked "Do we now live in an enlightened age?" the answer is, "NO", but we do live in an age of enlightenment.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.8)

For Kant, an age of enlightenment was an age of challenge to those who perpetuated the condition of tutelage, conspicuous amongst whom were the religious orders. A deliberately repressive attitude towards enlightened, critical thought existed at the time, as Kant noted in his ironical comment that,

> That the step to competence is held to be very dangerous by the far greater portion of mankind (and by the entire fair sex) - quite apart from its being arduous - is seen to by those guardians who have so kindly assumed superintendence over them
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.3)

Religious obscurantism was a particular target for enlightened thought.

> I have placed the main point of enlightenment - the escape of men from their self-incurred tutelage - chiefly in matters of religion because --- religious incompetence is not only the most harmful but also the most degrading of all.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.9)

In most of his essay, Kant devotes attention to the conditions and processes of enlightenment. The processes revolve around two concepts of reason, public and private, and an interesting tension is generated between the two.

> By the public use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is entrusted to him.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.5)

The public use of reason is what a later age would refer to as academic freedom, the right to subject any consideration or assertion to critical questioning. However, Kant notes that the arena of public reason is limited, in a particular sense. Public reason must be exercised independently of private reason, whose appropriate sphere is that of one's personal vocation. He indicates that there are limits to the influence which conclusions derived from the arena of public reason can exert upon the vocational domain, citing military and clerical examples to illustrate his point.

> Thus it would be ruinous for an officer in service to debate about the suitability or utility of a command given to him by his superior; he must obey. But the right to make remarks or errors in the military service and to lay them before the public for judgement cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar. Similarly a clergyman is obligated to make his sermon to his pupils in catechism and his congregation conform to the symbol of the church which he serves, for he has been accepted on this condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, even the calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous in the symbol and to make suggestions for the better organization of the religious body and church.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.5-6)

Consequently, a tension between the realms of public and private reason seems to emerge because of the permanent possibility of a discrepancy between vocational duty and rational conviction. To condone the

dichotomy between private and public reason would seem to frustrate any attempts to synthesize theory and practice and produce conservative political consequences, for the whole point of developing a critique within the arena of public reason is that new formulations and conclusions should have an effective impact upon the domain of private reason, upon the multiple vocations which constitute civil society. If this is denied, then public reason becomes politically impotent because its calculated detachment from the vocational realm renders it completely ineffectual.

Kant's dilemmas continue when he stipulates the main condition for enlightenment:

> if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.4)

This condition is one of expressive freedom, which permits the articulation of any criticism within the arena of public reason. He cites approvingly the policies of King Frederick of Prussia, who permitted extensive re-evaluation of religious beliefs and dogmas in his state, a freedom to question which was enjoyed particularly "by those who are restricted by no official duties". (Beck, L., 1963, P.9)

In extending his hopes for liberalization from the religious quarter (which for him was a particularly important preoccupation, because religious obscurantism epitomized impediment to enlightened thought) to the broader political one, Kant discloses perhaps his most chimerical anticipation, when he writes,

> But the manner of thinking of the head of a state who favours religious enlightenment goes further, and he sees that there is no danger to his law-giving in allowing his subjects to make public use of their reason and to publish their thoughts on a better formulation of his legislation and even their open-minded criticisms of the laws already made. Of this we have a shining example wherein no monarch is superior to him whom we honour.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.9-10)

Kant was again referring to Frederick of Prussia, whose liberal policies were compared to other rulers just before this excerpt, when Kant wrote,

> This spirit of freedom spreads beyond this land, even to those in which it must struggle with external obstacles erected by a government which misunderstands its own interest. For an example (Prussia) gives evidence to such a government that in freedom there is not the least cause for concern about public peace and the stability of the community.
>
> (Beck, L., 1963, P.9) - Emphasis added.

Kant seems to imply that the expansion of the arena of public reason will produce a harmonious, rational, enlightened prescription for political and social reform, which will be assimilated into the State's legislative practices, and subsequently permeate the vocational structures of civil society, in which private and

circumscribed reason is exercised, producing a new social order, a new set of practices generated by the theoretical conclusions of public reason, effecting an unproblematic synthesis of thought and action.

Now it is precisely this assumption which is questionable, although it is consonant with the thoughts of many 18 th c. philosophers that the liberation of rational reflection from traditional restrictions would produce a new harmonious order. What this perspective neglected was the possibility that the arena of public reason could produce a cacophony of discordant voices which would certainly disrupt "public peace and stability of the community", and which would refuse to wait for the translation of public reason into public (vocational) practice via the legislation of an existing government whose own interests may be served best by recalcitrance. One could not assume, as Kant does in this essay, that a government was the agent of rational (public) process, a benevolent agent which would ensure a new harmonious social order which reflected the enlightened self-determination of public reason, because the latter was not necessarily an integrated recommendation, a unitary voice, embodying all interests.

It was to foster the emergence of an enlightened arena of public reason, that many 18 th c. philosophers advocated education for "the people", to promote freedom from "self-incurred tutelage". But the ambiguous potential of these proposals seems to have been evident to European rulers, whose assistance was required for their implementation. Its rational quality seems to have been dubious, in so far as education's rational conclusion may have been to establish a new social and political order, whose implication was the current ruler's or regime's deposition. In short, the interests of all parties in a new enlightened order were not compatible, and the philosophers' appeal to the anticipated rational, integrated and harmonious order, were not sufficient to allay the anxieties of those who perceived possible disadvantages for themselves. This group included political rulers themselves whose consent was required for reform, and the religious authorities, whose credibility depended upon the gullibility and ignorance of "the people". Reason and the exigencies of hegemony could clearly diverge, suggesting that confrontation, rather than rational persuasion and reconciliation, was imminent. Although the events of 1789 dislodged an impediment to rational reform, the regime of Louis XVI itself, the sequel indicated that the voice of reason could be very dissonant, producing the kind of national disruption which Kant's essay had suggested was avoidable.

To summarize, reflections upon the Enlightenment's attitude towards education produce a consideration of the relationship between education and power. The discussion of Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" has suggested that the issue of this problematic relationship between education and power is implicit in his writing. It does not become explicit because, his assumptions enabled him to evade the question of power. One can infer that this evasion was the product of his understanding of the efficacy of rational thought, its inherent ability to transform both society and politics through a process of enlightened and harmonizing influence. By accentuating the tension between the realms of private and public reason, suggesting that the impact of the latter upon the former may be necessarily conflictual, and by exposing

Kant as another exponent of the Enlightenment view that rationality is necessarily a unifying force, this latter section has tried to demonstrate the disruptive potential of rationality, thereby explaining the reluctance which established European political and religious authorities had towards the Enlightenment programme. At a fundamental level, its tenets were challenging and subversive, illuminating many of society's irreconcilable interests rather than promoting an integrated order.

Education, like many of the Enlightenment's foci, revealed a number of tensions, dilemmas and incompatibilities, which were to become an important part of its legacy. This was ironical, since the Enlightenment's emphasis on rationality possessed the initial promise of comprehensive integration and resolution. Rational ambitions have endured, exerting a formative influence upon modern liberal and Marxist movements, but a significant part of their inheritance has been the antinomies which emerged during the initial period of Enlightenment thought.

PART TWO

THE LEGACY FOR THE MODERN WORLD

CHAPTER THREE

LIBERALISM

In focussing upon the relationship between reason and freedom, Chapters one and two emphasized the integrative and harmonizing characteristics of the Enlightenment concept of rationality. Accentuating the Enlightenment philosophers' concern for a synthesis between theory and practice to secure an amelioration of both individual and collective existence, these discussions indicated how these philosophers were inspired by the successes of the 17 th c. scientific revolution. They hoped to emulate the control which scientists exerted over the natural world, performing a comprehensively rational reconstruction of every aspect of social life. The detailed study of the Enlightenment thinkers' perspectives upon government and economics attempted to convey this sense of anticipated control over fundamental features of social life, stressing in particular their expectation of stable and integrated societies, in which reconciliation between competing social interests would be effected.

This chapter, and the subsequent two, will explore the legacy of the relationship between reason and freedom for the European liberal and Marxist traditions. Not only have these two traditions incorporated the optimistic ethos of the Enlightenment period, but they also reflect many of the tensions, contradictions and qualifications evident within the Enlightenment movement. The previous chapters' references to the dubious status of Man as a unitary concept, anxiety about the salutary relationship between knowledge and power, the tenuous status of the concept of progress which superceded Christian teleology, and the evident possibility of permanently incompatible interests disclosed through the examination of education and political power, all testify to some diffidence about the optimistic expectations of Enlightenment thought. The following three chapters will explore the formative influence of secular rationality upon these two European traditions, obviously indicating the positively transformative expectations of both. However, it is with the tensions and contradictions that we shall be primarily concerned. An exhaustive delineation of these is required because this I will ultimately argue that significant emphases within Foucault's work are a direct development of these more negative components of the Enlightenment movement, and a reassessment of our philosophical, educational and political future. They constitute a fundamental challenge to the Enlightenment's characterization of the world, and a redefinition of the limits within which we must think and act as human agents. Not only do these re-evaluations have consequences for general

social and political thought, but also for educational practice within society. The latter will become a specific focus at the appropriate time.

This chapter then will concentrate upon reason and freedom in the liberal tradition. This tradition is an expansive one, whose formative influences emerged before the commencement of the Enlightenment itself. The chapter will not attempt to conduct an historical review of the extensive literature upon the genesis and evolution of European liberalism. In order to illuminate some of the significant tensions which beset this tradition, the chapter will focus on a famous exposition of the basic tenets of liberalism, Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty". Berlin's essay is a lucid and comprehensive one which implicitly reflects the major influences of Hobbes and Mill upon the liberal tradition. It is not only a masterly exposition of a liberal perspective, but one which is also sensitive to some of the significantly perennial problems which liberals must face in the defence of their beliefs.

The relationship between reason and freedom is explored in the writings of Hobbes and Mill. Their perspectives upon this relationship differ fundamentally, but each has contributed to the development of liberal thought, and their influence upon Berlin is evident. Berlin's essay can be read as a significant synthesis of liberal themes, to which he imparts his own cogent interpretation of the nature of contemporary liberalism. I will argue that Berlin's assimilation of his predecessors' concepts of freedom into his cardinal distinction between negative and positive liberty effectively discloses basic antinomies within the liberal notion of freedom. In addition, these antinomies expose ambiguities within our understanding of rational emancipation, so central to the Enlightenment project. This ambiguity consists of an historical irony, namely that the emancipatory potential of rational action and reconstruction can transmute into oppressive and restrictive systems, contrary to its formulators' initial intentions. It is these antinomies and ambiguities which constitute a central tension within the liberal tradition, one which may be intractable, but does not implicitly discredit liberalism as a political perspective. However, considerations of liberalism's enduring merit must be postponed until later. Having summarized the general intentions and direction of this chapter, we can proceed with an examination of Berlin's essay, beginning with a consideration of his notion of rationality, before exploring his distinction between negative and positive liberty.

The Role of Reason In Berlin's Interpretation of Liberalism

In his review of modern concepts of reason, Berlin identifies two conspicuous ones. Referring to the work of writers like Hegel and Marx, Berlin outlines a concept of reason which is consonant with the aspirations of those Enlightenment thinkers who sought to emulate the successes of their 17 th c. predecessors. These thinkers hoped to transform the social world through a careful manipulative compliance with its regulatory laws, disclosed through a rigorous, scientific investigation into the nature of the social world.

This notion produced a formulation of freedom as compliance with necessity, because to understand the mechanisms of the world empowers one to manipulate it; one's capabilities and the limits of action are disclosed through a scientific appreciation of the world's dynamic constitution. Effectively, this is a more recent adaptation of the Baconian maxim that nature, in order to be commanded, must be obeyed. Berlin expresses this concept of reason as follows:

> What you know, that of which you understand the necessity - the rational necessity - you cannot while remaining rational, want to be otherwise. For to want something to be other than what it must be is, given the premisses - the necessities that govern the world - to be pro tanto either ignorant or irrational
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.142)

Berlin in fact goes so far as to describe this formulation as the "metaphysical heart of rationalism" (Berlin, I., 1969, P.144), but this definition is complemented by his subsequent discussion of another significant conception of reason in the contemporary world, one whose definitive features were also present in Enlightenment thought. The identification of manipulable laws, either natural or more particularly social, an understanding of which enables men to transform the world, is obviously a feature of positivism. This confidence, a constitutive aspect of Enlightenment optimism, was complemented (as indicated in the previous chapter) by certain a priori assumptions about the integrated and harmonious nature of the world. It is this notion which Berlin identifies as a major facet of contemporary reason, and is as much a part of the metaphysics of rationalism as the concept of reason as compliance with necessity.

This second, complementary, concept of reason concerns the issues of compatible ideas and reconcilable actions, logical considerations in the synthesis of theory and practice. For if man, endowed with and promoting secular rationality, was to transform the world in accordance with the precepts of rationality, the latter would have to be integrated. A contrary situation would not only seem to violate the notion of rationality, but would also perpetuate conflict through its proposals for multiple and incompatible projects. This second concept of reason pertains to the realm of social order and the diminution of conflict, conflict being one of the major afflictions which the Enlightenment philosophers hoped to eradicate. Berlin writes that this perspective and expectation assumed that,

> a just order must in principle be discoverable - an order of which the rules make possible correct solutions to all possible problems that could arise in it --- All true solutions to all genuine problems must be compatible: more than this, they must fit into a single whole: for this is what is meant by calling them all rational and the universe harmonious.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.146-7)

Berlin repudiates both concepts of reason, effectively distancing himself from two cardinal aspects of Enlightenment thought without however relinquishing concern for the relationship between reason and freedom. For Berlin, both the positivist conception of reason as compliance with necessity (whose

antecedents lie in the Enlightenment's admiration for the scientific successes of the 17 th c.), and reason as the reconciliation of all aspirations and the compatibility of all actions, are fundamentally mistaken. He considers the intractable problem of human discord to be the reality from which we must proceed, the reality which constitutes the very nature of human politics. Unanimity, the elimination of discord, would simultaneously eradicate politics, converting social life into a technological exercise.

> Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by experts or machines like arguments between engineers or doctors. That is why those who put their faith in some immense world-transforming phenomenon, like the final triumph of reason or the proletarian revolution, must believe that all political and moral problems can thereby be turned into technological ones.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.118)

However, Berlin's claim that contests over the appropriate and acceptable ends of human life are the characteristic feature of social existence, presents certain disconcerting consequences. He introduces these in a summary of his discussion of Western concepts of reason, in which he indicates that, ironically, the rational assumptions about compatibility and reconciliation, part of the Enlightenment's quest for peace and harmony, have produced disastrous effects.

> One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals --- This is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests in the conviction that all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.167)

Berlin's scepticism about this view inclines him towards a depiction of human existence as tragic. The multiplicity of human ends cannot be reconciled, and their conflict can only lead to fatal consequences for some of the participants.

> It seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict - and of tragedy - can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.169)

This tragedy is inherent both in the obvious fact that the realization of some ends "must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others" (Berlin, I., 1969, P.168), often with fatal consequences for the adherents to the latter in the event of violent confrontation, but also because the respective ends are equally defensible, and the perversity of one end cannot be demonstrated; it evinces a logical coherence of its own which cannot be

refuted decisively, but its incompatible implementation with other, equally defensible ends, commits it to conflict with other proposals, and frequently this will assume a violent nature.

In her introduction to a collection of Isaiah Berlin's essays on Russian writers, Russian Thinkers (1979), Aileen Kelly refers to Berlin's perspective as a "Complex Vision". She comments that,

> The central concern of Berlin's writings has been the exploration of what he sees as one of the most fundamental of the open issues on which men's moral conduct depends: are all absolute values ultimately compatible with one another, or is there no single final solution to the problem of how to live, no one objective and universal human ideal?
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.XIV)

Berlin does not believe in the existence of this "single, final solution", and it is from this conviction that he derives his tragic understanding of human life. However, this tragic portrayal of human social existence does not produce despondency or resignation in Berlin's political conclusions. Rather, he responds to them with the promotion of a concept of pluralism, which is a demanding and challenging notion through which Berlin imprints his own interpretation upon the Western Liberal tradition. Kelly writes,

> Pluralism, in the sense in which he uses the word, is not to be confused with that which is commonly defined as a liberal outlook - according to which all extreme positions are distortions of true values and the key to social harmony and a moral life lies in moderation and the golden mean. True pluralism, as Berlin understands it, is much more tough-minded and intellectually bold: it rejects the view that all conflicts of values can be finally resolved by synthesis and that all desirable goals may be reconciled. It recognises that human nature is such that it generates values which, though equally sacred, equally ultimate, exclude one another, without there being any possibility of establishing an objective hierarchical relation between them: Moral conduct therefore may involve making agonising choices, without the help of universal criteria, between incompatible but equally desirable values.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.XV)

If tragic confrontation is a constitutive feature of human existence, tragic occurrences can nevertheless be averted through the establishment of political systems which minimize the incidence of these confrontations. Berlin's general concept of pluralism therefore acquires substance from his central distinction between negative and positive liberty. The distinction between negative and positive liberty generally corresponds with that between autonomy and self-determination respectively, and it is the problematic relationship between them which was described in the introduction as the antinomies of freedom. This clarificatory distinction of a concept central to the Enlightenment exposes tension within aspirations towards rational emancipation. The exponents of freedom encounter disconcerting dilemmas when attempting to implement a political programme based upon its precepts. 'Freedom' defies the expectations of harmonious practice intimated by a commitment to rational action. In addressing the distinction between negative and positive liberty, Berlin writes,

> Almost every moralist in human history has praised freedom --- I propose to examine no more than two of these senses (of freedom) - but those central ones, with a great deal of human history behind them, and, I dare say, still to come. The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use both words to mean the same), which (following much precedent) I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question "What is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?" The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to the question "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?"
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.121-22)

Berlin's essay unequivocally supports the establishment of a political system based upon the principles of negative liberty, of freedom from interference by others, and given his tragic conception of human existence, it is clear why he should do so. For Berlin, positive liberty, associated with projects of assertive self-determination, is necessarily prescriptive (Berlin, I., 1969, P.131). Prescriptions are obviously derived from value systems, which usually assume an absolute form, and having done so, become impositional. It is precisely the insistence of adherents to absolute value systems, (and their expression in self-determinative action) that all should subscribe to, and participate in, these courses of action, which generates tragic confrontation, through a process of imposition and resistance. For Berlin, respect for the principles of negative liberty, and their embodiment in political institutions, is the best available recourse to avert fatal confrontation and tragedy.

The epitome of tragedy in the 20 th c. has been the experience of Fascism and Communism, particularly in their respective German and Russian expressions. For Berlin, these regimes have been a manifestation of commitment to positive liberty, ruthless, intolerant, monist conceptions of the world, which have been imposed upon millions of people in accordance with specific notions of rational social reconstruction. The number of casualties incurred by these regimes either through war or state terror testify to their tragic nature. Endowed with the requisite technology, and specific ideas about the rational self-determination of their societies, these regimes imposed a particular order upon reluctant citizens, and any recalcitrance was suppressed as irrational.

Berlin's approach to society and history is an empiricist one. His tragic, 'complex vision' of human experience, and his support for negative liberty is presented as an appropriate expedient to mitigate the effects of misguided monism. He writes,

> To preserve our absolute categories or ideals at the expense of human lives offends equally against the principles of science and of history; it is an attitude found in equal measure on the right and left wings in our days, and is not reconcilable with the principles accepted by those who respect the facts.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.171)

Berlin's empirical approach to society and history discloses to him not only that there are multiple, and equally defensible, systems of belief whose tenets are ineluctably incompatible, but also that averting tragedy implies respect for the individuals subsumed within these various value systems. For him, the individual is the primary social fact and diverse beliefs must not only be considered in terms of intellectually systematized expositions, but also in terms of individual beliefs and aspirations. His commitment to negative liberty is as much an expression of respect for the plurality of consolidated belief systems as it is for the ambitions of the empirical individuals who anonymously pursue their limited, personal and transient goals. It is this respect for individualism which clearly identifies Berlin with the liberal tradition.

However, Berlin's identity as a liberal is not our central focus. What is our concern is his cardinal distinction between negative and positive liberty, the former being a crucial aspect of his system of pluralism, which is his admittedly difficult proposal for the alleviation of tragic confrontation in the world. The major question for this chapter is the viability of this distinction between negative and positive liberty, having suggested above that the relationship between the two is an antinomous one. In his definition of negative and positive liberty, Berlin refers to the "great deal of human history" which has considered the issue of negative freedom, and which has established precedents for discussion. In an attempt to examine the tenability of Berlin's key distinction, we shall explore the concept of liberty in the work of two major political philosophers who have contributed to the debate, namely Hobbes, and Mill, whose influence upon Berlin's formulations is conspicuous.

Hobbes on Liberty

Hobbes' account of the relationship between reason and freedom is developed in his major work on political philosophy, Leviathan (1962), which was first published in 1651. In this book, he contrasted the 'State of Nature' and the 'Laws of Nature' to produce an account of rational political conduct and legitimate political rule, out of which he defined a concept of negative freedom.

Hobbes is one of the most famous contract theorists who posited a fictional 'state of nature' to explicate the problems of political legitimacy and individual liberty. This imaginative heuristic device enabled him to consider the conditions under which pre-social man might exist, and the reasons why social existence, with its numerous restrictions, is preferable to the 'state of nature'.

He envisages the 'state of nature' as a pre-social situation in which individuals enjoy absolute freedom, pursue and satisfy every inclination and desire, unregulated by any political authority. However, these pursuits by many individuals produce a situation of chronic conflict since competition for particular resources inevitably arises between them.

> Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.143)

Absolute freedom is attended by a poor quality of life, which is "nasty, brutish and short". (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.143), and above all pervaded by a perpetual fear of death. However, Hobbes suggests that pre-social man in the 'state of nature' possessed a strategic and expedient faculty of reason which indicated an alternative to this acutely anxious condition of absolute freedom.

> The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.145)

Hobbes' Laws of Nature constitute his substantive notion of reason, which effectively curtails freedom. Having indicated that all men enjoy the Right of Nature, which is to preserve their own lives, Hobbes writes that the two fundamental Laws of Nature are firstly, to seek peace with other men and to adhere to this arrangement for as long as it is consistent with self preservation, and secondly, to relinquish their unconditional or absolute freedom to all things, since this latter conduct is the very source of conflict. (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.146-7).

This simultaneous relinquishment of absolute freedom by all culminates in a social contract whereby civil society is constituted. However, since men have been involved in relationships of indefinite animosity, and since it is evident that men could benefit from a violation of the contract while others are adhering to it, an agent of contract enforcement is a basic necessity.

> If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.151)

The figure upon whom the validity and effectiveness of the contract depends is the Sovereign. Men suspend hostilities between themselves by transferring their right to absolute freedom to the Sovereign, who provides all men with protection and the circumstances in which they may conduct their lives in security. The contract is sustained not through trust, but through power. The contract of all (to suspend hostilities) through the submission of all to a sovereign (who can enforce the terms of the contract) formally constitutes a commonwealth.

> And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.
>
> And he that carrieth this person, is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides his subject.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.177)

In describing the establishment of an orderly society, a commonwealth under the auspices of an omnipotent sovereign, Hobbes draws an inevitable distinction between ruler and ruled, sovereign and subject. If the 'Laws of Nature' inclined men in the 'State of Nature' to a rational relinquishment of their absolute freedom in the interests of peace, security and longevity, what kind of freedom remains for the parties to the contract? What latitude remains for the subject?

In the eighteenth chapter of Leviathan "Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution", Hobbes confers an almost absolute and unquestionable authority upon the Sovereign, arguing that since his subjects voluntarily transferred their rights to him, they implicitly consent to all actions undertaken in their name.

> A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative; every one, as well as he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.177)

This formulation implies that the will of the Sovereign may not be contested, for not only is his will a reflection of the will of his subjects, but also there is no-one to judge a controversy between Sovereign and subject. To challenge the Sovereign is to subvert the commonwealth, impelling society into the 'State of Nature' again, in which differences are resolved through force (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.178-9). For Hobbes, the maintenance of security through unity is the political priority. He rejects any arguments which would ensnare the Sovereign in legal debates about his legitimacy. In the Hobbesian commonwealth, legitimacy is derived from the Sovereign's ability to protect his subjects; power and authority are conflated. The subject's obligation is coterminous with the Sovereign's efficacy.

> The obligation of subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.212)

Hobbes' Sovereign has the stature of an absolute monarch, but he denies that this reduces the sovereign's subjects to a miserable condition. For his basic claim is that no condition is as abject as that of the 'State of Nature', and the risk of the Sovereign's abuse of power is worth the security, release from fear and violent death, which the commonwealth provides (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.185-6).

Against the circumscriptions of absolute sovereign power, Hobbes offers a limited domain of private liberty, which can be seen as protean negative freedom. It is constituted both by the explicit approval of the Sovereign, and by that which is not directly prohibited by him.

> The liberty of the subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted: such as the liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the like.
>
> (P.206)
>
> As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion.
>
> (Hobbes, T., 1962 P.211)

Hobbes' analysis of the 'State of Nature' began with a focus upon the isolated, predatory, combative and vulnerable, individual. The 'Laws of Nature' suggested a strategically rational retreat from the anarchy of absolute freedom into the safety of a commonwealth, whose members were supervised and protected by a sovereign who required total obedience. The rigid parameters of personal security and political stability demarcated a private sphere within which the individual could pursue his personal and limited ambitions, confined mostly to economic activities and personal relationships.

J.S. Mill On Liberty

In the 19 th c., a similar emphasis upon the value of a protected sphere of individual liberty was provided by John Stuart Mill. For Mill, the sphere of individual liberty was not the minimal remnant permitted by the state, after it had established its absolute rule to prevent a relapse into anarchy, into the 'State of Nature'. Anxiety about a reversion to pre-social existence did not motivate Mill's writings. Working in an age of democratic revolutions, he was concerned about the threat posed by the very successes of the democratic movement itself. Formally, this consisted of the product of 'the people's' wishes, the state itself, whose increasingly augmented resources equipped it to interfere profoundly with the liberty of the individual. Informally, the threat emanated from the pressure of 'majority tyranny', a pressure upon the individual to comply with majority sentiments.

In his introduction to On Liberty (first published in 1859), Mill provides an overview of the evolution of the European concept of liberty, indicating that it had initially referred to protection for the individual against arbitrary and despotic power. With the emergence of the democratic principle in America, England and Europe in the latter part of the 18 th c., and the first half of the 19 th c., a less antagonistic notion of the relationship between rulers and subjects began to develop. For, with the success of democratic movements, governments were depicted as representatives of 'the people' to whom they were ultimately accountable, effectively converting the subject into a citizen. Mill's perspective on these developments demands caution, however, as he indicates when he writes,

> --- such phrases as 'self government', and the 'power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.62)

Although he was concerned about the limits of official State interference with the freedom of the individual, Mill believed that considerable attention had to be devoted to the stipulation of limits to the interference of a more daily, pervasive and subtle encroachment in the form of the 'tyranny of the majority'. This was his self-appointed task in On Liberty.

> There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as protection against political despotism.
>
> But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question where to place the limit - how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control - is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.63)

Within Hobbesian contract theory, individual liberty, or freedom from interference, was one of the limited products of a more general concern to allay the perpetual fear of imminent and violent death through the establishment of a social contract, enforced by an absolute sovereign. It did not constitute a political and social ambition with demonstrably inherent merits.

The same cannot be said of Mill's pursuit of negative liberty, of the individual's freedom from an allegedly unwarranted interference. Once Mill had identified the nature of the threat to individual liberty, either in the form of the state or the 'tyranny of the majority', what justification could he provide for wanting to demarcate and defend the sphere of individual liberty, since one cannot assume that individual liberty is an axiomatic benefit?

The second and third chapters of On Liberty concentrate upon this issue. Generally, Mill's justification for his project to defend a sphere of individual liberty revolves around an epistemological argument, and a concept of human nature, whose basic developmental prerequisite is the existence of individual liberty.

Mill's epistemological defense of individual liberty is derived from his sceptical attitude towards the attainability of either certainty or absolute truth. He begins with an assumption of human fallibility, and argues that freedom of thought and discussion is imperative if truth is to be promoted through the systematic exposure of error. Mill condemns all who would prevent freedom of thought and discussion because,

> All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.77)

Free and open discussion is necessary in different circumstances. Those whose propositions are tentative require rigorous challenging to transform claims into relative certainty. Those who subscribe to established truths must expose the latter to frequent re-evaluation to prevent complacency and the degeneration of relative truth into "dead dogma" (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.97). If truth is to remain a vital and dynamic force in social life, one can only ensure this through continual reassessment. Finally, Mill alludes to the necessary relationship between thought and action, arguing that,

> The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.80)

Having begun with a sceptical attitude towards the attainment of certainty Mill argued that individual freedom of thought and discussion was necessary both for the acquisition of relative certainty, and, by extension, for confidence in one's beliefs and justifications for selected practices or courses of action.

In the third chapter of On Liberty, Mill provides an extended consideration of individual liberty as a prerequisite for the fulfilment of human nature. He acknowledges that in the development of society, there has been an inevitable tension between the individual and society, between spontaneity and discipline, and that it is chronically difficult to reconcile the two.

> There has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess, and the social principle had a hard struggle with it --- But society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.125)

Mill conceded that social existence is the natural form of human life, and that it requires particular levels of conformity, but he insisted that diversity must be permitted if individuals are to develop and find fulfilment. Respect for individual freedom is the basic condition for this diversity to flourish, and with it, individual human nature.

> As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them.
>
> (P.120)
>
> It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.127)

Mill's arguments, derived from his understanding of epistemology and of the requirements for human nature to flourish, combine to form an impressively systematic argument for the defense of a sphere of individual liberty. His characterization of contemporary society, and the significant threat to individual liberty posed by it, seems to have inclined him towards a very private notion of guaranteed personal freedom. This is evident in the following two passages in which he articulates a correlated understanding of both autonomy and self-determination. He writes,

> The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental or spiritual
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.72)
>
> He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision.
>
> (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.123)

Mill's clear emphasis upon individual independence, his insistence upon an autonomous realm in which the individual may pursue his own projects, identifies him as a precursor to the position adopted and explicated by Isaiah Berlin, in his defence of negative liberty. There is an admirable cogency about Mill's work, but it does not reflect the dimension of dilemma and cautious advocacy evident in Berlin's writing, which emanates from the latter's detailed considerations of the problem of multiple projects of positive

liberty, the confrontation between which constitutes the very substance of human tragedy. Mill's preoccupation with the threat to individual liberty inherent in the centralized state of modern democratic society, and his reservations about apparently unitary concepts like 'the people' (with its potential for bigoted interference and imposition on the individual), impelled him towards an almost exclusive concern with negative individual liberty. He offered very little comment about the problem of the individual's participation in collective projects of positive liberty, in decisions about collective social and political goals. Perhaps the relationship between negative and positive liberty is implicitly addressed in his famous regulatory 'principle of harm', in which he stated that the only justification for interfering with the liberty of action of any individual is self-protection. (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.68). In outlining the nature and scope of negative liberty, he also referred to the right of individuals to combine, and pursue a collective project, as long as this did not bring harm to others. (Mill, J.S., 1986, P.71). This 'principle of harm' has generated significant controversy since Mill's initial formulation, because commentators have been involved in debates about the precise nature of 'harm'. These cannot detain us here. For our purposes the significant point is Mill's evident assumption that it is a satisfactory principle which can obviate social conflict, that a resolute determination not to harm others, or interfere with their personal autonomy, can ensure social harmonization. It was an optimistic expectation, consonant with the views of certain Enlightenment figures, and contributed to the substantial formulation of 20 th c. understandings of negative liberty. Mill's work did not reflect the appreciation of complexity and potential incompatibility evident in the more sophisticated liberal analysis of Berlin, which sustains a keen sense of tension between negative and positive liberty.

To what extent have these surveys of Berlin, Hobbes and Mill contributed to our exploration of the antinomies of freedom and the ambiguities of reason? Berlin's work is significant in that it provides a clear articulation of the persistent tension between negative and positive liberty, conceding that positive liberty is a necessary feature of the political world, despite the acute threats which it poses to negative liberty. He preserves the sense of conflictual equilibrium between the aspirations of negative and positive liberty, preferring to promote the former to minimize the tragic potential of the latter, but acknowledging that positive liberty, as a political aspiration, can never be relinquished for,

> It is a profound lack of social and moral understanding not to recognize that the satisfaction that each of them (negative and positive liberty) seeks is an ultimate value, which, both historically and morally, has an equal right to be classed among the deepest interests of mankind
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.166)

Berlin's empirical focus classifies these dual features of the concept of freedom, and describes the effects of the tension between them. His concept of reason is an expedient one, recommending a strategy (the primacy of negative liberty) to mitigate the tragic effects of expansive and impositional formulations of positive liberty. For Berlin, the institutional preservation of a realm of negative freedom is a rational recourse to prevent the oppressive negation of liberty which is permanently implicit in doctrines of positive liberty. He displays an astute vigilance and strategic resourcefulness in his comprehension of the

oppressive potential of rational self-determination embodied in modern secular programmes of positive liberty, illuminating the ambiguous nature of such programmes.

Our review of Hobbes' analysis of freedom in his Leviathan did not illuminate the antinomous nature of the contemporary concept of freedom, since for him individual freedom was a limited remainder after the more exigent political concerns of security had been established through the formation of the covenant, and the comprehensive submission of all to the rule of the Sovereign, in the interests of the convenant's implementation. However his work disclosed the historical antecedents of the concept of negative liberty, whose status was considerably enhanced by the writings of John Stuart Mill.

Mill augmented the notion of negative liberty, endowing it with the stature which it occupies in Berlin's work, and accorded it a primary status, absent in Hobbes' perspective. For Mill, the establishment of negative liberty was logically related to the promotion of truth and human self-fulfilment, and he effectively avoided the problem of positive liberty by assuming that respect for the liberty and welfare of others would harmonize social relations, introducing concordance into collective projects of a broader political and social nature.

The Emerging Challenge for Contemporary Liberalism

In her introduction to Berlin's book, Russian Thinkers (1978) Aileen Kelly refers to his study of the Russian writer, Alexander Herzen, and comments that,

> Berlin has perceived and conveyed to the English reader the originality of Herzen's belief that there are no general solutions to individual and specific problems, only temporary expedients which must be based on an acute sense of the uniqueness of each historical situation, and on a high degree of responsiveness to the particular needs and demands of diverse individuals and peoples.
>
> (Berlin, I., 1978, P.XX)

Interestingly, such a focus upon historical specificity and the kind of 'complex vision' of tragedy and its alleviation, articulated by Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty", is also evident in John Hall's recent book, Liberalism (1988). Berlin's sympathetic view of Herzen's historical analyses, and Hall's assessment of the status of contemporary liberalism both suggest that Berlin's philosophical perspective on the evolution of liberal thought can be complemented by a relatively non-philosophical one. Hall himself is classified as an historical sociologist, and his conclusions reflect the same sensitivity to the problem of tragedy as do Berlin's. This point may seem obvious in the light of our previous discussion of Berlin's professed empiricism, but it is an important one because the very facticity of historical constraints often seems to indicate the limits of philosophical proposals. Philosophical analyses and proposals are contextualized within specific sets of material conditions, which can frustrate the translation of thought into action, of

theory into practice. Berlin's extended description of the fraught relationship between negative and positive liberty is complemented by an historical sociological analysis such as Hall's although significantly, neither Berlin nor Hall really attempt an explanation for the tragic features of the world which they study. It will subsequently be suggested that the Nietzschean influence upon Foucault, in fact offers such an explanation for the impasses exposed in Berlin's masterly philosophical review.

John Hall's book on liberalism is a reply to the conventional Marxist claim that political liberalism and capitalism are necessarily associated, argued by Anthony Arblaster in his book The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism (1984). Working within a Marxist paradigm, Arblaster claims that political liberalism is a significant part of the superstructure erected upon the base of capitalist economic relations of production, reflecting the oppressive nature of these exploitative relations, despite the latter's concealment behind the ideological liberal rhetoric of freedom and equality.

Hall challenges the Marxist assumption that the issue of political power is subordinate to that of economic exploitation, insisting that the question of power is a persistent one, certainly related to that of economic exploitation, but deserving an analytical priority of its own. Essentially, Hall views the phenomenon of power as an enduring one, whose significance transcends its envelopment by historically specific modes of production, and states,

> I am not of Arblaster's party because the need to control political power seems to me to be a permanent problem facing human society.
>
> (Hall, J., 1988, P.3)

Hall seems to view the problem of power relations as an ontological feature of human existence, suggesting that,

> Human beings face a permanent political problem because they are all too capable of oppressing each other.
>
> (Hall, J., 1988, P.46)

His very general characterization of the nature of power relations, and of the appropriate liberal response to them, receives an historical illustration from his study of one of the modern world's most momentous experiences, that of industrialization.

The world transformative impact of industrialization policies since the late 18 th c., can be depicted as a comprehensive programme of positive liberty. The developments in science and technology which permitted this quantitative leap in economic expansion and social evolution were an effective emancipation from the confines of the relatively static societies and economies which characterized the pre-industrial era.

This knowledge, as Enlightenment thinkers continually reiterated, endowed man with an unprecedented autonomy, an ability to reconstruct his natural and social environments on a previously unimaginable scale. Freedom from ignorance endowed him with a freedom to recreate his world, a material manifestation of the correlation between autonomy and self-determination.

Liberalism crystallized as a political doctrine respecting the rights and freedoms of the individual during the 18 th and 19 th c. capitalist phases of Western industrialization. However, the magnitude of these economic projects of positive liberty obviously enveloped entire populations, often sacrificing the rights, interests and freedoms of many of the participants, whose involvement was both necessary and peremptory for the success of the project. Specific studies of national programmes of industrialization disclose variations in the nature and scope of oppression and exploitation attending these developments, and it is precisely these apparently inevitable features to which Hall directs our attention, accentuating the dilemmas confronted by contemporary liberals. The age of Western industrial development has produced political perspectives which claim that,

> The attempt to master one's own fate is the only doctrine suited to mankind in an age of maturity.
>
> (Hall, J., 1988, P.177)

and yet the very process of industrialization has, apparently necessarily, negated these aspirations for many of the participants. The experience of modernization has accentuated the tensions between negative and positive liberty, creating the tragic results delineated by Berlin. Hall portrays this dilemma in historical sociological terms when he writes:

> The forced transition to modernity splits the innermost desires of liberals; they must endorse the change, while being horror-struck at its effects,

and he continues with the expression of a hope that,

> The sociological question to which we can now turn naturally suggests itself: once the forced transition has been made, is there any chance that, even in the absence of democracy, a measure of softness may come to characterize social and political relations? The particular question I have in mind here is whether widespread adoption of the scientific-industrial complex will have consequences for social evolution.
>
> (Hall, J., 1988, P.196)

The 'softness' to which Hall refers obviously concerns the diminution of oppression and exploitation, the abuse of power, which for him are the basic issues in human political relations. In Berlin's terms, it would imply the restoration of a maximum sphere of negative liberty, much of which has been eclipsed by the enveloping imperatives of positive liberty's programme of industrial development, one from which

individual withdrawal into the autonomous realms of negative liberty and personal self-determination has often been impossible.

In a complementary manner, Berlin's and Hall's perspectives reflect the antinomies of freedom and the ambiguities of reason. Berlin's analysis of the "metaphysical heart of rationalism", (in both its positivist and integrationist manifestations), and its relationship to political programmes of positive liberty, indicates not only the tragic potential for confrontation between equally defensible conceptions of positive liberty, in either its oppressive or fatal variants. It also suggests how the imperatives of positive liberty's implementation impinge upon the sphere of negative liberty, frustrating the liberal's hopes for an inviolable realm of freedom and self-determination for the individual.

Hall's historical sociological review of the constituent features of the modern world provides an illuminating illustration of the dilemmas articulated in Berlin's philosophical analysis. It also discloses the material constraints operating upon Berlin's proposals and hopes for the realization of a protected realm of negative liberty within civil society, indicating the difficulties of translating thought into action, theory into practice. This in no way constitutes a disparagement of Berlin's philosophical endeavours, but certainly acknowledges the limits within which philosophical reflection must be conducted.

Not only does Hall refer to such material constraints, but he also suggests that our contemporary problems are compounded by the controversy which continues to characterize the philosophical quest for a set of cogent arguments (hence unanimity and reconciliation) about the form and conduct of our political systems. Such philosophical consensus is the cognitive equivalent and prerequisite for political reconciliation and the diminution of tragic conflict. It seems, however, to elude us, and although philosophers may contend that controversy provides philosophy with its basic vitality, its diversity often manifests itself in politically destructive forms. Hall writes,

> I wish absolutely powerful philosophical foundations for liberalism were available, all of which could be clearly understood by every inhabitant of the planet. That this is not so is a source of profound worry and unhappiness.
>
> (Hall, J., 1988, P.190)

Berlin and Hall are committed liberals, whose understanding of the antinomies of freedom and the potential of rational conduct both to liberate and oppress (the ambiguity of reason) confronts them with quandaries and dilemmas.

This chapter concludes by suggesting that, as inheritors of the Enlightenment quest for autonomy and self-determination, Berlin and Hall are also transitional figures on the philosophical route to a Foucauldian exposition which incorporates the tensions in their thought, and tries to consider the problems of contemporary freedom despite these. Berlin and Hall seem to have assimilated many of the important

qualifications and reservations expressed about the Enlightenment's aspirations by the 18 th c. writers themselves, and have incorporated these into their own systematic, cautious and perspicacious interpretations of contemporary liberalism. These reservations pertain to the 18 th c. hope for an unproblematic relationship between reason and freedom, knowledge and power, with their promise for collective emancipation from conflict and oppression through integration and reconciliation, through a scientific reconstruction of society. In concluding some reflections upon the relationship between reason and freedom, Berlin writes,

> Can it be that Socrates and the creators of the central Western tradition in ethics and politics who followed him have been mistaken, for more than two millennia, that virtue is not knowledge, nor freedom identical with either? That despite the fact that it rules the lives of more men than ever before in its long history, not one of the basic assumptions of this famous view is demonstrable, or perhaps, even true?
>
> (Berlin, I., 1969, P.154)

The Enlightenment's optimistic formulations certainly did equate virtue and knowledge, reason and freedom, in the way suggested by Berlin's question. The Foucauldian answer to Berlin's question is affirmative, but denies that we are consequently directionless. For Foucault the issue is more complicated and the task of emancipation more difficult than has been anticipated.

CHAPTER FOUR

CLASSICAL MARXISM

Despite their history of political animosity, both liberalism and Marxism share a common intellectual ancestry, the Enlightenment itself. Both traditions have formulated their central political projects around the development of the related notions of reason and freedom, although these have assumed various interpretations in each tradition.

Chapter 3 explored a liberal conception of the relationship between reason and freedom, focussing upon the ideas and interpretations of Isaiah Berlin, also indicating the general historical liberal concerns out of which his work has emerged, represented by Hobbes and Mill. The important emphasis in Chapter 3 was Berlin's acknowledgement of, and engagement with, the evident tensions in the relationship between negative and positive notions of freedom, between autonomy and self-determination. Generally, Berlin indicates that support for institutionally protected negative liberty, freedom of the individual from interference, constitutes a strategically rational recourse against projects of collective self-determination, which have frequently impinged upon the individual's freedom of thought and action in the name of a general and abstract concept of rational social reconstruction and consensual collective conduct. However, such recommendations are hopeful palliatives, for Berlin recognizes that such rational projects of collective self-determination are an inherent part of social existence, each with their own internally coherent justifications, many of which must necessarily clash in tragic conflict.

Protection for the individual, respect for negative liberty, is an attempt to minimize the tragedy which attends the confrontation between the multiplicity of rational social projects and prescriptions, while acknowledging that no viably complete separation between negative and positive liberty is possible. Berlin's explication of the tension constitutive of our Western notion of freedom also exposes the ambiguous nature of our rational ambitions. The Enlightenment's hope for human emancipation through the development of reason has revealed its dual potential for both liberation and oppression; Berlin indicates how this has evolved through his detailed examination of the development of Western concepts of reason, synthesized and consolidated by the Enlightenment and impelled into the modern world.

This chapter will examine some of the cardinal features of 19 th c. Marxist thought, developed in the Marx-Engels partnership, indicating how these are consistent with the Enlightenment's aspirations. It will focus upon an issue developed by Enlightenment philosophers (and referred to by Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty"), namely that if one understands the constitutive and regulatory laws of social existence and evolution, one can exert a constructive influence over its future development. This was abbreviated to the formula of freedom as compliance with rational necessity, with its famous and familiar Baconian lineage.

Not only will this concept of reason be developed in relation to 19 th c. Marxist thought, but the second of Berlin's understandings of Western reason, viz., that reason is an integrating and harmonising force, will also be considered. Within 19 th c. Marxism there is an evident reconciliatory hope, the anticipation that the capitalist mode of production was evolving towards a cataclysmic collapse that would produce a classless, reconciled, and conflict-free society.

These themes will be developed, taking cognizance of certain equivocations within the Marx-Engels exposition. These equivocations concern the relationship between the alleged laws of social development, and their injunction to respect the particularities of historically specific conditions, as well as the associated problem of the relationship between occurrences and action; Does history happen to people, or do they forge it?

Although these theoretical issues and problems will be considered in this exposition of 19 th c. Marxism, this chapter's primary intention is to indicate the reconciliatory expectations within this tradition. For in the 20 th c., Marxist writers like Horkheimer and Adorno (who will be the subject of Chapter 5) have had to confront the difficulties attending an acknowledgement that such reconciliatory expectations are a chimera. It will be suggested in Chapter 5 that if this reconciliatory hope is relinquished, liberalism and Marxism must experience a political philosophical convergence, both concentrating upon the very antinomies of freedom and ambiguities of reason considered in Chapter 3. As the encounter between Hall and Arblaster on the one hand, and Hall and Berlin on the other suggested, the problem of power and oppression occupies a position of theoretical centrality once the ambiguous nature of rational progress has become evident. In Berlin's terms, the immanence of tragedy becomes our primary political consideration. Such a convergence prepares the way for reflection upon the contribution of Foucault to these dilemmas, suggesting that his accounts of philosophy and politics are both a response to, and a development of these common problems facing both liberals and Marxists in their respective pursuit of their Enlightened ideals.

Marxism's Epistemological Claims

In a recent publication entitled Socialisms (1987), Anthony Wright has situated Marxism in a relationship to the Socialist tradition which preceded its emergence, and which may survive its demise. That Marxism evolved as a particularly rigorous and assertive component of the 19 th c. European Left is evident in Engles' review of Marxism's attitude towards left-wing sympathisers in his 1880 publication, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. He was obviously acknowledging that Marxism was an integral part of European Socialism, but emphasized that Marxism was both distinctive among, and superior to, other socialist movements because of its scientific perspective.

In an historical review of utopian socialism, Engels considered its adherence to certain preconceptions formulated during the 18 th c. Enlightenment, and suggested that these preconceptions have been responsible for seriously defective political analyses and proposals by the utopian socialists. He criticized the legendary utopian socialists St. Simon, Fourier and Owen, because their programmes for social reform were articulated in general, universal terms, inspired by the visions of rational, secular reconstruction proposed by the 18 th c. Enlightenment philosophers. Engels identified their ambition to emancipate humanity from its condition of exploitation and oppression as a general, comprehensive and reformist gesture.

> Like the French philosophers, they do not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with, but all humanity at once.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.112)

Their Universalist aspirations were obvious in their commitment to the causes of absolute truth, reason and justice, whose precepts they hoped to realize in the daily experience of all social relations. For the utopian socialists, these precepts had an immutable value, applicable to every society.

> To all these (French and English socialists, early German communists) socialism is the expression of absolute truth, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.122)

Although the utopian socialists were as sincere in their aspirations as they were dedicated and assiduous in the pursuit of their realization, their efforts were futile because they were based on hope and fantasy, rather than upon science. Engels' contrast was based upon the distinction between utopian and scientific socialism; only the latter, embodied in Marxism, was a practicable programme for effective emancipation. Engels asserted,

> To make a science of socialism it had first to be placed upon a real basis.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.122)

The 'real basis' upon which scientific socialism (Marxism) was constructed had been explored by Marx and Engels during the late 1840's, primarily as a philosophical reaction against Idealist sympathies in Germany. The Universalist, reformist aspirations, evident in the thought of the utopian socialists, who sought to implement coherent, moral programmes, were considered by Marx and Engels to be the product of Idealist delusions. In the German Ideology (1845-6) Marx and Engels provided a succinct account of the 'real basis' of scientific socialism.

> The premisses from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premisses from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premisses can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.
>
> (McLellan, D., 1977, P.160)

Unlike their Idealist predecessors, Marx and Engels insisted that an analysis of society and its transformations must begin with a study of individuals in their concrete activity in their material context.

> The first premiss of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.
>
> (McLellan, D., 1977, P.160)

This methodological insistence provided the genesis for the historical materialist perspective which is one of the distinctive features of Marxist analysis. In the third section of Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels reiterated his understanding of the concept of historical materialism, consistent with both his and Marx's definition since the early days of the German Ideology.

> The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life - and, next to production, the exchange of things produced - is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought not in men's brains, not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.131)

A focus upon individual people in their concrete, material conditions of existence implied a necessary concentration upon systems of production, for it is upon these that all societies depend for survival. For

Marx and Engels, this was the primary social reality, an observation with the status of an empirical fact, and one which was universally evident. Above all, such a focus could provide an explanation for the structure and evolution of any particular society, a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of history.

Although Marx and Engels did not employ the terms, their historical materialist approach clearly consists of both synchronic and diachronic elements, for it provides the concepts for an analysis of the interactive components of a society at any particular time (synchronic), as well as an explanation for the changes which any particular society experiences (diachronic).

The methodological primacy of the productive processes in the analysis of society contributed to the emergence of the base-superstructure metaphor, by which the relationship between the constituent parts of society has been rendered both consistent and intelligible. The thesis is that the material conditions of social life, the productive processes and the social relations attending them, constitute the base of society, upon which all other social, political, legal, cultural and educational phenomena are erected. These latter constitute the superstructure of society, and their precise nature and function is ascertained through a study of their relationship to the base. This thesis received a clear formulation in Marx's Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), in which he writes,

> I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state could be neither understood by themselves nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and French of the 18 th c. under the name "civil society" ---
>
> The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.84)

Marx and Engels complemented this analytical account of the structure of human society, uniform if one accepts their materialist premisses, with a diachronic analysis explaining historical change.

The central concepts in this diachronic analysis are class struggle and oppression. The three texts, The Communist Manifesto, (1848), Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880), and Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), all provide general, schematic accounts of the evolution of Western society. Living and writing during the burgeoning period of 19 th c. Western European capitalism, Marx and Engels were particularly interested in the nature and destiny of capitalist society. Just as their synchronic analysis of the constitutive features of society had been articulated in general and universal terms, so was their perspective on the forces generating change in Western society. The significance of class and the prominence of oppression are conspicuous in the first paragraphs of the Communist Manifesto.

> The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
>
> Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.49)

Marx and Engels surveyed the history of ancient and Medieval society, identifying the salient features of class conflict. Most of their attention was however devoted to the study of contemporary capitalist bourgeois society. Towards this, they expressed an evident ambivalence, a combination of admiration for the bourgeoisie's material achievements, and an aversion to the latter's social effects. In the Communist Manifesto, they depicted the revolutionary nature of the bourgeois ascendancy which demolished the feudal structures of Europe, and transformed the mode of production into a dynamic and prolific one. Unlike previous modes of production, the capitalist one is relentlessly expansive, imposing upon the world a global bourgeois imprint.

> It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.53)

Bourgeois rule has been characterized by an efficient instrumental rationality which has promoted population control, uniform financial systems and political centralization; it has impelled the world into the modern era.

However, the price to pay for these transformative accomplishments has been the intensification of class antagonism and exploitation.

> The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.49)

Modern capitalist society's rationalized mode of production has rendered the relations between classes in the productive process more brutal and virulent than in any centuries of previous history. However, commensurate with the erection of an unprecedentedly massive, productive and exploitative economy, the bourgeoisie has also generated a formidable adversary - the exploited proletariat itself, whose grievances, degradation, and resentment accentuate the significance of struggle within civil society, and identify economic emancipation as its primary objective. Engels alludes to this succinctly when he writes,

> In modern history at least it is, therefore, proved that all political struggles and all class struggles for emancipation, despite their necessarily political form - for every class struggle is a political struggle - turn ultimately on the question of economic emancipation. Therefore, here at least, the state - the political order - is the subordinate, and civil society - the realm of economic relations - the decisive element.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.275)

For Marx and Engels, the proletariat is a necessary corollary for the triumph of bourgeois, capitalist rule, for it has been the exploitation of their labour, the appropriation of the products of their efforts, which has constituted the very nature and volume of capitalist affluence, concentrated in the hands of the minority owners of the means of production. Engels' passage, cited above, reiterates the value of Marx's base-superstructure metaphor for an analysis of the conflicts and struggles fundamental to capitalist society, indicating that all overt political issues within the superstructure reflect bourgeois and proletarian antagonism within the base, within civil society, where the proletarian quest for economic emancipation, release from exploitative relations of production, is the primary objective.

These cardinal tenets of historical materialism, both synchronic and diachronic, can be subjected to extensive critique. The proclaimed status of a scientific socialism could be impugned, as could the Marxist insistence that 'class' and 'developments in the economic base' are the primary concepts for explanations of historical change. Such debates would however change the focus which is to demonstrate the formative influence of the Enlightenment's notions of reason and freedom upon the development of Marxism.

Reason And Freedom In The Development Of Classical Marxism:
Reason As Compliance With Necessity

Having outlined the main features of the classical historical materialist perspective, this consideration can receive more explicit and direct attention. The rest of this chapter will focus firstly, upon the claims by Marx and Engels that historical developments are regulated by certain laws of social evolution. Our emphasis will be upon a concept of rational historical development which can be both comprehended and mastered, providing the possessors of such knowledge with greater control over, and constructive, progressive and rational participation in, the historical process. Such a notion is obviously reminiscent of the Enlightenment philosophers' ambitions to understand the regulative forces in society in order to exert control over the rational reconstruction of society, and of Berlin's claim that classical Marxism exemplifies an interpretation of "freedom as compliance with necessity". These reflections will not suggest that Marx and Engels evince an unqualified commitment to this view, only that it occupied a prominent position in their theoretical disquisitions, raising for them some problems in relation to historically unique occurrences, of which they were obviously aware, and towards which they encouraged careful and particular analyses.

The second focal point will be upon the concept of reason as social reconciliation, again a perception with prominent antecedents during the 18 th c. Enlightenment, and one of the dominant features of Western rational thought, according to Berlin's analysis. This chapter will complete the attempt to indicate the consistent efforts made by both liberal and Marxist theorists to embody the Enlightenment's aspirations towards freedom through the development of reason, despite their different interpretations of this project, and their alternative conceptions of the agents responsible for freedom's realization.

Although one of historical materialism's fundamental tenets is that class struggle provides history with the momentum for change, the works of both Marx and Engels also suggest that class conflict is a manifestation of profound structural tensions within society, and that these impel economies from one mode of production to the next. These tensions, claimed Marx and Engels, are situated in the base or in civil society, and consist of an incompatible relationship between the forces of production (labour power combined with the means of production) and the relations of production (the formal, historically consolidated relationship between the class antagonists in society). At particular times in history, the structural nature of the relations of production inhibits the development of the forces of production, and it is at this time that class conflict is most intense, for this fundamental incompatibility is an impediment to progress. Marx suggests a necessary relationship between civilization, conflict and progress in The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), when he writes,

> The very moment civilization begins, production begins to be founded on the antagonism of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the antagonism of accumulated labour and actual labour. No antagonism, no progress.
>
> (McLellan, D., 1977, P.196)

In the Communist Manifesto, which is so replete with general historical reviews, Marx and Engels discussed the revolutionary and transformative phase of bourgeois ascendancy, when they described the bourgeoisie's conflict with the constraints imposed upon their economically expansive progress by the feudal vestiges of 18 th c. France.

> At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property, became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.54)

Such sundering marks the revolutionary transition from one mode of production to the next (feudal to capitalist in this particular example), to a mode of production whose relations of production are conducive

to the development of the forces of production, although these relations, like their various predecessors', contain exploitative elements of their own.

The alleged scientific character of Marx's and Engels' analyses of society and historical transformation emerges from their claim that the product of the interaction between the impersonal relations and the forces of production is regulated by certain laws, which impart a necessary quality to historical change and development. Both writers made references to their intention to demonstrate the necessary sequence of the modes of production in their works. In his 1888 preface to the English edition of the Communist Manifesto, Engels outlined the base-superstructure metaphor, the historical centrality of class struggle, and the necessary role which the proletariat would perform in the emancipation not only of itself, but of society generally, and commented that,

> This proposition, which, in my opinion, is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology, we, both of us, had been gradually approaching for some years before 1845.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.46)

The analogy with Darwin's theory clearly implies a concept of necessary evolution, a process containing inherent propensities to produce a logical, pre-determined result, the latter being the demise of capitalist society at the hands of a revolutionary proletariat. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels conducted a sustained critique of Hegelian Idealism, contrasting the coherent fabrications of the idealist with the identification of real trends in nature and history by scientific socialists. He asserted:

> But what is true of nature, which is hereby recognized also as a historical process of development, is likewise true of the history of society in all its branches and of the totality of all sciences which occupy themselves with things human --- Here, therefore, just as in the realm of nature, it was necessary to do away with these fabricated, artificial interconnections by the discovery of the real ones - a task which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws of motion, which assert themselves as the ruling ones in the history of human society.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.270)

In his 1867 preface to Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Marx writes that,

> --- it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.177)

and that his questions do not concern the levels of antagonism within society, but the natural laws of capitalist production itself.

> It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.176)

Such perceptions and analytical ambitions reflect the intentions of both Marx and Engels to demonstrate the superiority of their methods and approaches to those of the morally indignant utopian socialists, who depended upon the impact of denunciation for political change. For Marx and Engels, efficacy emanated from an identification of the impersonal and necessary laws of development, which correct analysis exposed as operative in civil society, in the tension between the relations and forces of production. Engels discloses the anticipated political efficacy of their common approach when he writes in a vein clearly consistent with 18 th c. precedent that,

> Active social forces work exactly like natural forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with them --- But when once their nature is understood, they can, in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing servants.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.145)

Marx and Engels believed that an understanding of the "active social forces" which regulated historical development would enable the possessors of this knowledge to control and direct these forces, freely complying with necessity to effect a transition to a post-capitalist and emancipated society.

However, despite these apparently unequivocal assertions about social, historical and economic reality, and statements of intention to demonstrate the laws of social evolution, with an implicitly positivist faith in the regulative similarity of both the natural and social worlds, one must introduce caution into the discussion. For just as these sentiments are evident in the work of both Marx and Engels, so one also detects reservations and qualifications within their writings, which preclude such an unproblematic characterization.

Their explications and qualifications reflect a confusing degree of ambivalence towards their basic theoretical tenets. In a letter dated November, 1877, Marx explicitly denied that his considerations and assertions in Capital could provide one with a "master key" of general "historico-philosophical theory" which one could apply to all circumstances to ascertain their necessary development (Feuer, L., 1984, P.479). In a series of letters written to people towards the end of his life on the topic of historical materialism, Engels discussed the famous base-superstructure correlation, denying that one could simply reduce superstructural phenomena to manifestations of developments within the base, and encouraging analysts to respect the historically specific, to refrain from any facile application of an abstract formula to particular events (Feuer, L., 1984, Section XVII). Yet these letters, written in the early 1890's, seem to contradict

views expressed only a few years earlier (1888) in Ludwing Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In this piece, Engels introduced a consideration of the question of agency, and insisted that,

> In the history of society, the actors and all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious purpose, without an intended aim.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.270)

Such aims and purposes are clearly part of the historically specific, which any analyst must consider if he is serious about idiographic explanation. Engels commented that an examination of agency created the superficial impression that historical developments are quite fortuitous. He claimed that, on the contrary, the clash of wills, conflicting agency, coalesces into a development which imparts a necessary character to historical evolution.

> Historical events thus appear on the whole to be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws, and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.271)

The numerous expressions of intention by members of society operating within the superstructural domains of politics, ideology and law always seemed to Engels to be situated within a set of economic constraints, whose formative influence was always decisive.

> We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.437)

In these considerations, Engels obviously strove to reconcile what appear to be mutually exclusive alternatives. However, although he wished to accord theoretical significance and political efficacy to human agency, he nevertheless subsumed the latter under economic laws which determined the result of conflicting wills in constellations of unintended consequences. He was apparently unable to sustain a credible theoretical tension between these perspectives, ultimately capitulating to a determinist notion.

This chapter's intention is not to try to reconcile these contradictory explorations and assertions, evident particularly in Engels' work. It has simply been necessary to acknowledge these tensions in their thinking as we have charted the emergence of one variant of rational Enlightened thought in their work, that which emphasizes a scientific rationality in the study of society, modelled explicitly upon the natural sciences, and implicitly inspired by the aspirations of the Enlightenment philosophers. The issue of freedom has not been

given much consideration, although its relationship to an explication of scientific socialism was evident in Engels' statement that social forces remain, like natural ones, blind and destructive, only for as long as they are misunderstood (see above Page 74). Once their mechanisms have been comprehended, they become emancipatory, endowing their possessors with an ability to control their application; man's substantial freedom becomes compliance with necessity.

The precise nature of these laws of social development has not been considered; they do not seem to have had the status of nomological propositions in the work of Marx and Engels. In many ways, their formulations seem to have been quite nebulous, suggesting at best that they are tendencies, or generalizations, perhaps even a sustained embodiment of a colligatory concept of history. Yet, despite this, they often claimed a rigid necessity for these laws, agonising frequently over the theoretical retrieval of the significance of human agency, and enjoining their successors to respect the particularities of the historically specific.

An exhaustive debate about these issues would become a cumbersome digression. It has been necessary to avoid a substantial consideration of them to retain our focus on the issue of reason and freedom. The final section of this chapter reverts to one of the by now familiar Enlightenment themes, the synthesis of theory and practice. For the perspective of scientific socialism allegedly imparted to its adherents the promise of both an understanding of the world and an ability to transform it, a promise of emancipation from ignorance and confusion and of a capacity for collective self-determination. Scientific socialism not only embodied the prospects of social control and transformation through a rational understanding of necessary historical developments, but it also contained a clear intimation that the transition from a capitalist mode of production to a socialist one would be qualitatively different and immutable. Its distinctive feature would be the termination of class antagonism, implying the advent of a harmonious and integrated society, a comprehensive rational reconciliation which would succeed the rationally scientific transformation of the world.

Marx's famous and frequently quoted eleventh thesis on Feuerbach "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it". (Feuer, L., 1984, P.286), is a clear indication of his commitment to a synthesis of theory and practice, to translate thought into action, consistent with the ambitions of the 18 th c. philosophers. The perspectives upon social and economic relations, upon the dynamics of historical change, all of which constituted the substance of historical materialism, provided philosophers with an interpretation of the world. What was the envisaged relationship between thought and action, philosophy and the world, in the formulations of Marx and Engels? Who would be the social and political beneficiaries of historical materialism's insights? Could the latter have an enduring impact upon historical developments, and if so, what would the nature of these effects be? The final sections of this chapter addresses these questions.

One of Engels' reflections in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy concerns the impulse behind philosophical investigations in the history of human thought. He alleged that one can identify "an imperishable desire of the human mind - the desire to overcome all contradictions". (Feuer, L., 1984, P.243). Engels claimed that philosophers have misunderstood how to eliminate contradictions in human life. Firstly, they have thought that the human mind is the locus in which this elimination occurs; the mind assumes full responsibility for the articulation of a coherent system of thought and action, one from which all errors and inconsistencies have been removed. Secondly, philosophers have thought that they themselves, as individuals, are capable of achieving this goal for others.

According to Engels, he and Marx have completely inverted this understanding. For them the tenets of historical materialism itself, which constitute the substance of scientific socialism, also constitute a body of correct philosophical understanding in that they are not intelligent, imaginative and coherent products of an isolated human mind. Rather, they are the products of a human mind which is determined to reflect the true nature of reality. When Marx and Engels articulated the historical materialist perspective, with its emphasis upon production and exchange, class conflict, the tension between relations and forces of production, and the necessary sequence of modes of production, they also believed that they were describing the rudimentary features of human existence and its processes of transformation in an accurate way. They effectively equated their historical materialist perspective with the only veritable form of contemporary philosophy. In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels insisted that the conflicts and antagonisms, identified in the course of history, could not be resolved in thought. Their resolutions were latent within the processes of material change itself; the task of philosophers like Marx and himself was to perceive and describe this, and not arrogate to themselves the status of problem-solvers, for such a claim would have been a distinctive exaggeration, replicating the conceited errors of their "philosophical" predecessors. Engels writes that,

> the means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light (through their analysis of the conflict and tensions within historical modes of production - M.K.) must also be present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of production themselves. These means are not to be invented by deduction from fundamental principles, but are to be discovered in the stubborn facts of the existing system of production.
>
> What is, then, the position of modern socialism in this connection? --- Modern socialism is nothing but the reflex in thought of this conflict in fact ---
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.131-32)

Similarly Marx, in Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1843) emphasized that it was insufficient to abolish religious illusions, as Feuerbach had done (again consistent with the secular

orientations of the 18 th c. Enlightenment). For Marx, one had to abolish the real, material conditions which rendered illusions necessary. The critical function of philosophy, by which we must understand the perspective of historical materialism, is to expose the reality of human conflict and detect the passage to its resolution. Philosophical criticism is not a consolatory formulation, but a guide to emancipatory action.

> Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chain not so that man will wear the chain without any fantasy or consolation, but so that he will shake off the chain and cull the living flower.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.304)

If, for Marx and Engels, the tenets of historical materialism were a perspicuous revelation about the conflictual dynamics of society and history, constituting a modern philosophy which reflected the facts of the world, in thought, they clearly subordinated philosophy to the task of history. This task of history is one of emancipation, but it is not one which the philosopher can accomplish. Such alleged capabilities have been part of a deluded philosophical past, for, as Engels commented in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

> the task of philosophy thus stated means nothing but the task that a single philosopher should accomplish that which can be accomplished only by the entire human race in its progressive development.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.243)

Marx and Engels depicted themselves as the harbingers of emancipation, the critical philosophers who exposed the nature and evolution of human conflict through their scientific approach to the world. The latter disclosed that the world contained the potential for the resolution of its own conflicts, for the emancipation of the victims of class rule and exploitation. But philosophers could only alert the agents of historical emancipation to their task, and thereby expedite the process.

Who were the beneficiaries and agents of historical materialism's understanding?

For Marx and Engels, the agent of emancipation was the proletariat itself, and the beneficiaries were all the members of existing capitalist society. The proletariat embodied the perfect synthesis of theory and practice, for the philosophy of historical materialism not only reflected the dynamic reality of social and historical conflict, but disclosed to the proletariat its objective opportunity to exploit these fundamental tensions for its own benefit, and for the benefit of the entire society. The knowledge of society's mechanisms, imparted by the scientifically discovered tenets of historical materialism, endowed the proletariat with a comprehensive and superior understanding, enabling it to recognize its unique opportunity for radical historical transformation. Marx referred to the possibility of this transformative occurrence in an abstract discussion of the emancipation of the German working class, implying that these

developments were possible for all societies which had passed into a capitalist mode of production. In Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, he posed the question "Where, then, is the positive possibility of a German emancipation?", and in reply wrote:

> In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it; --- a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.305-306)

For Marx and Engels, the proletariat was the most abused, exploited and degraded class in the history of oppressive class relations, but this status presented it with an opportunity to effect a universal emancipation. Marx and Engels claimed in their general reviews of Western social and economic development that the revolutionary bourgeois ascendancy had had a global impact. The emergence of an adversarial proletariat was a necessary concomitant of the bourgeois triumph, and since the latter was a universal phenomenon so was the oppressed proletariat. A proletarian insurrection would assume a necessarily universal form, uniformly abolishing the exploitative relations of bourgeois class rule and inaugurating a classless society.

This depiction immediately reintroduces the theoretical problems alluded to earlier in this chapter. Would such an insurrection be the product of proletarian misery, resentment and indignation, confidently resisting bourgeois rule because it was fortified by the perspicacity offered by the tenets of historical materialism, or would it be the visible manifestation of tensions between the relations and forces of production in the structural constitution of capitalist society? However one answers these questions, the problem is compounded by the claim that this cataclysmic insurrection will emancipate all people, former class enemies included, and establish a harmonious society through the advent of a classless one.

Once again, these significant theoretical difficulties are deliberately avoided, because this chapter's basic intention is to demonstrate the way in which the work of Marx and Engels exemplifies two concepts of Western reason viz. reason as the exposure of the necessary evolution of society, and reason as a force for universal reconciliation. The tenets of scientific socialism, emerging from a historically materialist perspective are a clear illustration of the first concept of reason. Freedom within this mode of understanding consists of complying with the momentum of necessity. This is complemented within Marxist thought by the notion of reason as reconciliation, because the collapse of the capitalist mode of production promised the advent of a classless society, whose essential characteristic would be an absence of those tensions which had wracked all pre-existing society. It consequently denoted a fundamental and qualitative change in the experience of social existence, because the new society's immutable

characteristics seemed to be assured. This chapter will conclude with a portrayal of these expectations, eschewing any attempt to justify them, or resolve any of its theoretical difficulties.

Reason and Freedom In Classical Marxism:
Reason as Reconciliation

In his Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Marx articulates a succinct notion of the realization of philosophy. He writes that,

> Philosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.307)

This comment is clearly compatible with Engels' notion of a viable contemporary philosophy which insists that philosophy is concerned with the reflection of facts in the mind of the philosopher. Engels did not deny that philosophers should concern themselves with the elimination of contradictions, but he did affirm that such a desirable resolution can only occur in the world, and again be reflected in the mind of the philosopher. For Marx and Engels, the basic contradiction in the world was the conflict or antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, who were necessarily related aspects of the capitalist mode of production. The concept of the realization of philosophy or philosophy becoming a reality, implied the successful resolution of contradictory tension, in effect the effacement of the proletariat and bourgeoisie as historical rivals. Resolution could only be achieved through the dissolution of the antagonists themselves, and this was the proletariat's historic task.

The anticipation of such a conclusive resolution pervades the work of Marx and Engels. To refer again to the consistency which characterizes the significantly temporally distant works, The Communist Manifesto (1848) and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (1880) the former describes, at the end of Section II, how "political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another" (Feuer, L., 1984, P.70), a view which was subsequently developed into the base-superstructure metaphor for the appreciation of social structure. Marx and Engels concluded this section by claiming that once the proletariat "sweeps away by force the old conditions of production (either the exploitative relations of production, or the tension between the relations and forces of production, depending on one's theoretical emphasis upon resentful agency or structural incompatibilities respectively - M.K.), then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class" (Feuer, L., 1984, P.70)

Retaining his focus upon political form as an expression of economic oppression, Engels' analysis of the terminal point of the capitalist mode of production in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific describes the State as an oppressively political institution which protects the exploitative relations of production in capitalist society. In seizing political power, the proletariat takes possession of the means of production, whose exclusive ownership by the bourgeoisie had created the very possibility of class exploitation. For Engels, this action by the proletariat would initiate the effective erasure of the state because now,

> State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The state is not "abolished". It dies out.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.147)

As it "dies out" so too does the existence of political oppression. At the end of the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx envisages a literal end to politics when he poses the question:

> Does this mean that after the fall of the old society there will be a new class domination culminating in a new political power?
>
> (McLellan, D., 1977, P.214)

He replies negatively, reiterating his claim that,

> The condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class ---
>
> The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society.
>
> (McLellan, D., 1977, P.215)

Such political developments would occur inevitably because they would reflect reconciled conditions in the base, in civil society. Marx's study of political economy was primarily a study of the productive relations in civil society and in his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he confidently announces that,

> The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production.
>
> (Feuer, L., 1984, P.85)

This chapter's focus on the theoretical expositions of both Marx and Engels has tried to indicate how their work embodies a relationship between reason and freedom, consistent with the aspirations of the 18 th c. Enlightenment. It has indicated how they sought to establish the existence of certain laws of social

development, emerging from their materialist premisses in the study of history, suggesting that the recipients of such allegedly scientific knowledge of historical transformation possessed the potential for emancipation. The incumbent emancipatory task fell upon the proletariat, but Marx and Engels demonstrated that when the proletariat discharged its momentous, historic and scientifically informed task, it would emancipate not only itself but all members of society, including their former oppressive adversaries, the bourgeoisie, as its revolutionary action would inaugurate a classless, conflict-free society.

The very concept of a classless society is theoretically significant. If a scientific study of society disclosed that freedom consists of compliance with historical necessity, it also contained the promise of a rational resolution to the conflicts of history, in that it would effect a comprehensive reconciliation between the parties to historical conflict. The anticipated "classless society" denoted such historical resolution and social integration, suggesting that all antagonisms would be erased, introducing a qualitatively new and superior social existence in which harmony and unity was assured.

The evident appeal of the classical Marx-Engels formulation resides in its comprehensive analysis and its claims to universal validity. It contains a synthesis of rational vision, systematic and rigorous in its scientific aspirations and optimistic in its anticipations of resolved conflict, epitomized by the concept of a classless society.

Marxist rationality revolves around the dual notions of regulation and reconciliation, incorporating an understanding of freedom as both collective control and self-determination, and as emancipation from the timeless afflictions of oppression and exploitation.

What, however, would the future of Marxist theory be if these cardinal premisses were renounced? During the first decades of the 20 th c. Marxist theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer reflected upon the development of a Marxist perspective deprived of the hope of an inevitable, scientifically assured and directed, progress towards a classless society. The relinquishment of these expectations engendered major theoretical problems; if Marxism was not a science capable of guiding the proletariat to revolutionary emancipation, how could Marxist strategy be conceived?; if the advent of a classless, reconciled, post-revolutionary society was a chimera, and politics itself could not be erased from social experience, what was the relationship between power and freedom?; how could Marxists contend with the historical irony that for many, Marxism as a vision of rational freedom had become a system of sophisticated oppression in its various national embodiments?

Such issues became urgent as Marxism's historical materialist understanding was translated into political practice. Chapter five will examine the attempts by Adorno and Horkheimer to address these problems, suggesting that their conclusions imply a convergence with the theoretical issues predominant in the liberal interpretations offered by Berlin and Hall in Chapter 3. If there is no inevitable move towards a classless

society, politics remains an indelible, urgent and ineluctable feature of social existence, and this implies that the correlated notions of power and freedom remain permanently prominent. The antinomies of freedom, developed in the tension between negative and positive liberty, re-emerge; Marxism becomes one more contender in the quest for rational self-determination, containing a potential for oppression and exploitation in its impositional expressions, exemplifying the ambiguous potential of rationality for emancipation and suppression.

CHAPTER FIVE

TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXISM

The considerations of this chapter are not as extensive as its title may suggest, for it is exclusively concerned with the work of the two major Frankfurt School theorists, Adorno and Horkheimer. They have been selected because, (as exponents of the broad tradition of Western Marxism between the early 1920's and the early 1970's), they focused upon Marxism's failure to realize the promises inherent in its own reconciliatory visions. The evolution of the 1917 Russian socialist revolution into the oppressive and bureaucratic Stalinist state, combined with the defeat of revolutionary proletarian aspirations in Western Europe during the 1920's, necessitated a fundamental re-evaluation of Marxist expectations.

These re-evaluations assumed different forms. The work of Antonio Gramsci, for example, during the 1920's and 1930's was both innovative and enduring, as he sought to explain the unanticipated resilience of Western capitalism in the face of revolutionary proletarian challenges. One of his primary concerns was to formulate a novel strategy to contend with the resistance of capitalist society to pressures for revolutionary socialist change. His work was characterized by concrete and specific cultural and political analyses, accompanied by astute and apposite strategic proposals.

By contrast, the writings of Adorno and Horkheimer, extending over half a century, were frequently both sociologically and philosophically more abstract. Their perspectives reflected our present concerns, in that they analysed what we have described as the ambiguities of reason. Sharing Western Marxist reservations about the nature of Russia's Marxist achievements, as well as disappointments about the arrested nature of Western proletarian advances, they examined both capitalist and socialist society as products of Western secular rationality. The ambiguity, or tension, upon which they focussed was the promise of Western reason to foster free, harmonious and reconciled societies (epitomized by the Marx-Engels formulations), a promise which was belied by the reality of systematically and "rationally" oppressive societies, in both capitalist and socialist variations. Movement towards integrated and rational societies, the central legacy of Enlightenment expectations, had failed to materialize. The scourge of domination which had appalled enlightened thinkers and inspired them to find a solution, continued to persist with an apparently intractable tenacity.

This chapter will examine some of the cardinal features of Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the ambiguities of reason, of the relationship between reason and freedom in a representative corpus of Western Marxist thought. Its intention is to indicate how both liberal scepticism about the claims of Western reason, articulated by Berlin, and a Marxist disillusionment with the accomplishments of Western rationality (in capitalist, but especially in socialist societies), represented by Adorno and Horkheimer, produce a convergent preoccupation with the problem of persistent contemporary political domination.

Berlin explored the antinomies of freedom, indicating how confidence in a programme of rational conduct and emancipation could be translated into a collective project of positive liberty, which could have tragic consequences for those who did not concur with it. To minimize the incidence of tragic confrontation and oppression, Berlin advocated respect for negative liberty, for freedom from interference, while acknowledging the inevitability of aspirations towards collective positive liberty, and the irresolvability of the antinomous relationship between positive and negative liberty.

Adorno and Horkheimer's analyses of contemporary oppression attempted to explain the phenomenon of domination in terms of the ironical reversals of aspirations towards freedom through the exercise of reason. They articulated a disillusioned and frequently pessimistic portrayal of modern society, which has been deprived of any expectations of rational reconciliation. However, despite the constraints of modern, systematic oppression, they continued to offer both a concept of, and a hope for, freedom.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to indicate that, despite their divergent historical experiences, expectations, and antagonisms, the liberal and Marxist traditions, which share a common provenance in the 18 th c. Enlightenment both contain profound reservations about the potential of Western secular reason to foster social freedom. Adorno and Horkheimer's subtle and perceptive reformulations do not present us with clear alternatives and recommendations, but with a crystallized account of the precarious and ambiguous nature of the Enlightenment project, whose conspicuous legacy is one of political and philosophical dilemmas. The contemporary world inherits a spectrum of problematic procedural choices, rather than solutions to historically accumulated difficulties.

In considering the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, this chapter will review their account of contemporary domination and its relationship to the development of Western secular reason. Horkheimer provided sociological and historical illustrations of this phenomenon, which characterizes both capitalist and socialist societies, while Adorno contributed valuable, but highly abstract and abstruse, philosophical explanations for these unintended and oppressive features of modern society. Adorno and Horkheimer can be viewed as complementary analysts, who offered abstract and concrete accounts of the same phenomenon respectively although this classification should not be construed in a completely exclusive sense.

Having delineated their perspectives upon the ambiguities of Western reason, the chapter will proceed with an examination of their interpretation of contemporary materialism and critique as well as the possibilities and nature of freedom, despite the chronic threat of domination. Their Marxist commitments displayed no adherence to reconciliatory expectations, but they continued to espouse an emancipatory ideal, even though its possibilities and substance were more circumscribed than the freedom envisaged by their predecessors.

Adorno and Horkheimer: The Ambiguities of Reason

Adorno and Horkheimer addressed themselves to the problem of the ambiguities of reason in a collection of essays entitled the Dialectic of Enlightenment, first published in 1944. In their first essay "The Concept of Enlightenment" they reiterate the self-understanding of the Enlightenment programme.

> In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.3)

This juxtaposition of aspiration and disillusioned reflection captures the dynamic of the dialectic of enlightenment. What had begun as an emancipatory project has evolved into "disaster triumphant"; the quest for rational freedom has become a sophisticated variant of the very system from which enlightened thought had hoped to deliver mankind. Adorno and Horkheimer sought to understand this tragic irony, and to suggest ways of countering it.

> It turned out, in fact, that we had set ourselves nothing less that the discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.XI)

To remain hopeful, such an analysis would have to be a radical one. It would not simply be an exercise in historical description and reconstruction, but a determined attempt at reformulation and retrieval.

> The point is rather that the Enlightenment must examine itself, if men are not to be wholly betrayed. The task to be accomplished is not the conservation of the past, but the redemption of the hopes of the past.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.XV - emphasis in the original)

The hopes of the past have been the consistent ones of emancipation. The task of the present is to examine why their realization has been so difficult and fraught with tragic consequences. A radical analysis

requires a thorough reappraisal of the concepts and assumptions of Western secular rational articulations. For Adorno and Horkheimer, one can not confine oneself to the inherited terms of rational reflection, for this simply reproduces the disastrous malady.

> It is characteristic of the sickness that even the best-intentioned reformer who uses an impoverished and debased language to recommend renewal, by his adoption of the insidious mode of categorization and the bad philosophy it conceals, strengthens the very power of the established order he is trying to break.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.XIV)

Their radical re-evaluation of the Enlightenment produced an analysis which contradicted conventional depictions of the movement. Traditionally, the Enlightenment had been portrayed as a movement of reason against error, superstition, fear and myth. Adorno and Horkheimer disputed this characterization by equating the Enlightenment itself with myth, contributing to the repudiation of the "insidious mode of categorization and the bad philosophy it conceals" in an attempt to subvert the oppressive system which the conventional understanding of enlightenment as emancipatory reason had produced.

For Adorno and Horkheimer, the similarity between enlightenment and myth resided in the structure of their comprehensive aspirations for coherent understanding and control, not in the similarity of their methods.

> Myth intended report, naming, the narration of the Beginning; but also presentation, confirmation, explanation: a tendency that grew stronger with the recording and collection of myths. Narrative became didactic at an early stage. Every ritual includes the idea of activity as a determined process which magic can nevertheless influence.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.8)

In mythological understandings of the world, magical rituals were envisaged as effectual activities.

> On the magical plane, dream and image were not mere signs for the thing in question, but were bound up with it by similarity or names. The relation is one not of intention but of relatedness. Like science, magic pursues aims, but seeks to achieve them by mimesis - not by progressively distancing itself from the object.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.11)

The magical practices, embedded within mythological perspectives, sought to exert control and achieve understanding through imitating and complying with the related orders of the mythological cosmology. The scientific procedures, engendered by enlightened thought, intentionally distanced themselves from the objects of understanding and control. Both approaches however evinced a search for unified and comprehensive understanding and control, and consequently Adorno and Horkheimer write that,

> Just as the myths already realize enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.11-12)

However, for Adorno and Horkheimer, the central focus of their examination of the dialectic of enlightenment was the consequences of the search for, and the belief in the possibility of, a unified comprehension and control. These consequences are compressed into their laconic and powerful statement that,

> Enlightenment is totalitarian.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.6)

Writing during the mid 1940's, when the war against Nazi totalitarianism was approaching a climactic phase, this expression obviously conveyed the sense of a completely enveloping oppression, succinctly articulating the dialectic of enlightenment. The emancipatory reason developed since the 18 th c. had evolved into a systematic tyrant, primarily because the comprehensive understanding of the natural world, conferred upon by men by the disclosures of natural science, has endowed them with a controlling capability which has assumed an extensive and subjugatory form. Scientific knowledge progressed rapidly once researchers had realized that nature evinces an exploitable uniformity and regularity. The postulation of functional laws generated an expectation of epistemic unity, which however has subsumed all existing phenomena beneath it, including the intended beneficiaries of knowledge, people, themselves.

> In advance, the Enlightenment recognizes as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity: its ideal is the system from which all and everything follows. Its rationalist and empiricist versions do not part company on that point.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.7)

The descriptive, explanatory and predictive components of scientific knowledge have realized the Baconian dictum that nature, in order to be commanded, must be obeyed. In the dialectic of enlightenment, people have become a significant part of the commandable and manipulable material of the natural world. In successfully objectifying and controlling the human dimension of the natural world, the emancipatory knowledge of the Enlightenment has become an oppressive expertise. This is the regrettable and tragic consummation of the Enlightenment's quest for freedom through the exercise of reason. The powerful unity of knowledge has fostered the systematic subordination of the natural world, and the relentless incarceration of the social one.

> What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the only aim. Ruthlessly, in despite of itself, the Enlightenment has extinguished any trace of its own self-consciousness.
>
> (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979 P.4)

Writers like Adorno and Horkheimer could consider themselves as beleaguered exponents of the Enlightenment's self-consciousness, for it was they who strove to articulate and explain the devastatingly ironical reversal of the dialectic of enlightenment. Their incisive analyses captured the ambiguities of western reason in that they illuminated the apparently inextricable concurrence of progress and regression, emancipation and subjugation.

The unified visions of comprehensive explanation and control informed the aspirations of both mythological and scientific articulations. The latter, underpinning the evolution of enlightened thought since the 18 th c., has been more successful in its ambitions, primarily because of its technological understanding and sophisticated equipment. This has been instrumental not only in the subordination of nature, but also in the subjugation of people, once its power had been translated into political capacity.

Adorno not only contributed to this detailed and novel account of the dialectic of enlightenment, but also provided a philosophical explanation for these disastrous developments. One does not find this explanation in a single source, but derives it from persistent preoccupations in Adorno's work.

One of his most significant preoccupations was a critique of idealism. Although the progress of enlightened thought was predicated upon scientific procedures which explicitly repudiated the kind of speculative thinking associated with idealism, Adorno nevertheless suggested that idealism has continued to exert an important and pernicious influence over the development of Western secular reason. This view is evident in two distinctly separate formulations: "The Actuality of Philosophy", delivered as an address in 1931 (but which was only published after his death in 1969), and the essay, "Subject and Object", written in the year of his death. In concluding her introduction to Adorno's "The Actuality of Philosophy", Susan Buck-Morrs (employing the pseudonym, 'Benjamin Snow') writes that,

> The goal of transcending idealism by leading its concepts via their own immanent logic to the point of self liquidation was one idea to which Adorno kept returning.
>
> (Telos, No. 31, Spring 1977)

How does a consistent concern with a critique of idealism provide an explanation for the negative and oppressive manifestations of the dialectic of enlightenment? Idealist thought has been characterized by a philosophical search for systematic totalities. Although the work of Hegel (1770-1831) can be considered as the apogee of idealist formulations, the latter have an extensive historical lineage. Martin Jay writes in

his book, Marxism and Totality, that the discourse of totality in the history of Western culture has always been associated with coherence, order fulfilment, harmony, plentitude, meaningfulness, consensus and community, and contrasted with alienation, fragmentation, disorder, conflict, contradiction, serialization, atomization and estrangement. (Jay, M., 1984b P.21). He also indicates that the concept of totality is normative because it is equated with a desirable goal (viz. comprehensive knowledge and reconciliation), and non-normative in that it insists that complex phenomena can only be understood if one appreciates their relational integrity. The latter point refers to the methodological dimension of the concept of totality (Jay, M., 1984b P.23-24).

For Jay, the concept of totality had a formative influence upon the Enlightenment; the philosophers believed that an assiduous development of rational enquiry would enable them to know the world (evident in the vision of Diderot's Encyclopedia), based upon an assumption of the essential unity of mankind (Jay, M., 1984b, P.30-32).

In Adorno's assessment, the philosophical idealist's yearning for total understanding (a methodological dimension), and a universal integration (a normative dimension) is precisely what is both pernicious and impossible in the history of Western philosophy. Despite Marxism's materialist repudiation of idealism, it has shared the latter's aspirations for total comprehension and universal reconciliation and harmony, perpetuating the detrimental consequences of such ambition.

In the opening pages of "The Actuality of Philosophy", Adorno addresses the impossibility of idealism's goals. Reflecting upon the contemporary task of philosophy, he states,

> Whoever chooses philosophy as a profession today must first reject the illusion that earlier philosophical enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real.
>
> (Adorno, 1977, P.120)

The "earlier philosophical enterprises" to which he is referring are the idealist concerns with the most comprehensive and abstract category in philosophy; the question of Being itself. For Adorno, such an investigation is a chimera, because

> The fullness of the real, as totality, does not let itself be subsumed under the idea of being which might allocate meaning to it; nor can the idea of existing being be built up out of elements of reality. It (the idea of being) is lost for philosophy, and thereby, its claim to the totality of the real is struck at its source.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1977 P.20)

The idealists' focus on the relationship between consciousness and the world, between the subject and the object, has been motivated by the desire for both knowledge and unity. It is an intelligible wish, but one whose allure must be resisted. He writes in "Subject and Object" that,

> The picture of a temporal or extratemporal original state of happy identity between subject and object is romantic, however - a wishful projection at times, but today no more than a lie.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. 1978, P.499)

Persistence with this illusion is not only a lie, but a catastrophe, as 20 th c. developments have shown. For in an age of technological sophistication which augments political power, specific political interests possess the ability to impose their unitary visions upon others, oppressing and annihilating opposition if necessary. In "Subject and Object" Adorno continues to warn against any collective practice invoking a mythical age of subject - object identity. Instead

> The spell of the old undifferentiatedness should be obliterated. Its prolongation is the sense of identity of a mind that repressively shapes its Other in its own image.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. 1978, P.499)

For Adorno, idealism represents a rampant epistemological and normative hubris, pursuing a perfect correspondence between consciousness and reality, subject and object, oblivious to the errors necessarily induced by its failure to reflect upon the linguistic and conceptual terms with which it proceeds. His essay "Subject and Object" attempts to disclose these philosophical mistakes, exposing the ineluctable ambiguity of the fundamental categories of 'subject' and 'object'.

> To engage in reflections on subject and object poses the problem of stating what we are to talk about. The terms are patently equivocal.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. 1978, P.497)

Adorno indicates how the notion of "the subject" refers not only to the empirical individual but also to "consciousness in general". These dual meanings experience an inextricable dependence, for the empirical individual both articulates and derives his identity from the notion of humanity, or consciousness in general, but is simultaneously aware that the category of the general subject is incapable of incorporating every existent empirical individual. The universal and the particular coexist within the empirical individual in a relationship of uneasy equilibrium. Similarly, "consciousness in general", which can envelop a multiplicity of individuals within the comprehensible exchange of an established linguistic community, can only incorporate a finite expanse of objects, can only achieve a limited, if complex focus. A range of objects, from the concretely empirical to the evaluative and prescriptive, must necessarily elude its grasp, maintaining an infinite series of alternative possibilities. Total comprehension, correspondence

and integration will defy us perpetually. Subject and object manoeuvre around one another in an eternal and restless configuration of interdependency, unable to establish a stable and static embrace of complete and reciprocal recognition. It is in this way that thought is inadequate to reality.

For Adorno's metaphilosophical analysis, idealism's ambitious but myopic pursuits do not only constitute epistemological arrogance, but also a profound and endemic political danger, to which the events of the 20 th c. have testified. The confidence in knowledge, generated by the proliferation of scientific achievements and positivist emulations in social studies since the 18 th c. Enlightenment, has engendered numerous formulations with claims to a total understanding of society's dynamics and requirements. Classical Marxism itself has exemplified such an understanding, professing to comprehend the movement of history towards a reconciled future, proclaiming itself as the embodiment and potential fulfilment of secular reason. Such comprehensive projects constitute a programme of positive liberty in Berlin's sense, a collective aspiration towards self-determination which necessarily entails a vision both of how things are and how they should be. The exponents of such views are subjects in Adorno's sense, for the collectivity consists not only of an accumulation of empirical individuals, but of an association of agents who share a particular understanding of who they are generally, and of the nature of the object upon which they must act, transforming it into a new entity, a new society and set of social relations.

However, for Adorno, the obvious problem is generated by the object's failure to comply with the vision and exertions of the subject; reality sustains its elusive quality, maintaining a frustrating discrepancy between thought and reality, provoking the subject with the awareness that the concept is not adequate to the world. The recalcitrant object is not only inanimate matter, over which technological or instrumental reason can exercise an increasingly efficient hegemony. It is also other subjects, with a dissident formulation of the appropriate relationship between concept and reality. Such diverse understandings conflict, manifesting themselves in violent confrontations which have fatal and oppressive consequences for the vanquished party. Adorno seems to consider the hubris of idealism as a basic contributor to the intractability of social conflict, since certainty about the correct relationship between subject and object fosters intransigence, and a willingness to coerce or terrorize the defiant other into submission. In this way reason becomes a tyrant and oppressor, curbing the liberty of others, particularly when it is reinforced by the resources of technology. In this way, the emancipatory potential of reason transmutes into a regressive and barbarous force, accentuating the ambiguity of its own nature.

Adorno's abstract critique is not only applicable to the kinds of totalitarian visions represented by Stalinism and Fascism during the 1940's. For him, the capitalist systems of the liberal democratic countries also embody oppressive social relations, for the exponents of capitalism also envisage a correct relationship between subject and object, thought and reality. These portrayals too can never be total, and evince coercive features which inflict suffering and curtailment upon subject/objects like the exploited proletariat in capitalist relations of production. Such perceptions enhance the impression of universal domination, as

diverse conceptions of reason compete for prevalence. The endemic struggles and oppressions continuously expose the betrayal of reason.

Adorno's and Horkheimer's analysis of the history of contemporary reason in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, and Adorno's abstract explanation for the ambiguous nature of rational development, are clearly fundamental critiques of classical Marxism. Both writers maintained a hope for the retrieval of emancipatory ideals, as indicated in their introduction to the Dialectic of Enlightenment, but their historical and philosophical analyses precluded any adherence to the tenets of classical Marxism, which for them exemplified an inverted idealist excess in its professions of a total comprehension of society's evolution towards a classless society. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the history of Russia since 1917 illustrated the coercive attempts of a revolutionary subject to compel the object (a future, integrated, socialist society) to comply with its vision. Frustration with the lack of correspondence between subject and object had fostered the emergence of systematic state terror, whose methods reproduced the oppression which Marxists had denounced in Tzarist regimes.

Horkheimer's Reformulation of the Emancipatory Project

The distinctive feature of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique is its aspiration towards emancipation within a context of radical contingency. Classical Marxism's expectations had offered an historical guarantee for the realization of universal freedom, but the rational pursuit of this goal has perpetuated domination. Their disillusioned perspective did not promote despondency and capitulation, but an acknowledgement of the acute difficulties attending the quest for emancipation, and especially of the dangers inherent in the exercise of power in the name of a rational ideal. The ambiguities of reason, the coexistence of emancipation and domination, of progress and regression, had to be acknowledged continually. History simply provides the context and challenges within which this process evolves, offering no guarantee of success.

Horkheimer refers explicitly to this problem of radical contingency in an essay written in 1940 and entitled "The Authoritarian State". Commenting on the relationship between Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism, he writes that,

> According to Hegel, the stages of the Weltgeist follow one another with logical necessity and none can be omitted. In this respect Marx remained true to him. History is represented as an indivisible development. The new cannot begin before its time. However, the fatalism of both philosophers refers to the past only. Their metaphysical error, namely, that history obeys a defined law, is cancelled by their historical error, namely, that such a law was fulfilled at its appointed time.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E., 1978, P.105)

It was the failure of the law to reach fulfilment, to inaugurate the age of freedom in a classless society, which had precipitated the kind of re-evaluation in which Adorno and Horkheimer involved themselves, one which disclosed the threats in a contingent future.

> Whoever cares for a human arrangement of the world can look to no court of appeal, to no existing or future power.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. 1978, P.113)

A future without guarantees had to be confronted with the full realization that a contingent context provides agents with ambiguous opportunities - the pursuit of freedom and the exercise of oppression. However, having indicated the philosophical errors in their predecessor's conceptions of freedom and reason, and having alerted their contemporaries to the perpetual dangers inherent in the rational pursuit of freedom, how did Adorno and Horkheimer conceive the relationship between reason and freedom in a contingent future? The answer to this question provides an indication of their substantial notion of freedom which they considered viable despite the constraints operative upon it in the struggles of an uncertain future.

As critics of classical Marxism, Adorno and Horkheimer contributed to a reformulation of the basic tenets of materialism, which now incorporated Adorno's incisive philosophical observations about the ineluctable discrepancy between subject and object. The important point to note is that for Adorno and Horkheimer, this very discrepancy is the fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of freedom. Although the point is an abstract one, both writers were concerned about the pursuit of freedom in a material context, and this was particularly evident in the writings of Horkheimer. His essay, "Materialism and Metaphysics" is informative on this issue.

In this essay Horkheimer contests the established opinion that materialism and idealism are alternative metaphysical systems. Initially considering the work of Dilthey he characterizes his understanding of a metaphysical perspective. Horkheimer writes that Dilthey's philosophical efforts

> are marked by the three traits he regards as characteristic of the philosophical (really, the metaphysical) mind: self-reflection, that is the consistent and radical questioning of subjective and objective data; the integration of all knowable reality into a unified whole; and the attempt to provide an ultimate and intrinsic foundation for the universal validity of knowledge.
>
> (Horkheimer, M., 1972 P.10-11)

In Horkheimer's estimation, these metaphysical traits are precisely those which characterize idealism, which proceeds on the assumption that consciousness can comprehend the totality, that the subject can embrace the object, that thought is adequate to reality. Although the history of materialism has disclosed similar assumptions, evident in the case of classical Marxism, Horkheimer's rejection of the latter clearly required a new conception of materialism. The idealist propensities which had permeated classical Marxist

thought had to be extirpated, and a new concept of materialism formulated. Consequently, Horkheimer states that,

> the struggle today between materialism and metaphysics is above all a conflict between materialism and idealism.
>
> (Horkheimer, M., 1972, P.21)

For Horkheimer, a contemporary materialism, taking cognizance of historical developments, is characterized by the following features, all of which he considered to be fundamentally anti-metaphysical. It denies any correspondence between thought and reality, between subject and object, for reasons which concur with Adorno's analysis. Contemporary materialism can never constitute an absolute epistemological claim.

> The claim that there is an absolute order and an absolute demand made upon man always supposes a claim to know the whole, the totality of things, the infinite. But if our knowledge is in fact not yet final, if there is an irreducible tension between concept and being, then no proposition can claim the dignity of perfect knowledge.
>
> (Horkheimer, M., 1972, P.27)

In addition to being an injunction to acknowledge epistemological limitations, this passage also reflects a determination to act without the security of inferred guides for conduct. Horkheimer believes that one of the consolations of metaphysics is that it makes peremptory demands upon man, structuring the course of his actions.

> Because metaphysics wrestles with the "enigma" of being, with the "totality" of the world, with "life" with the "in itself", or however else its object may be described, it expects to be able to draw positive conclusions for action. The reality which it seeks to comprehend must have a structure, and knowledge of this must be decisive for the conduct of human life; there must be attitudes and behaviours which are in consonance with this reality.
>
> (Horkheimer, M. 1972, P.17-18)

Horkheimer's critical observation is reminiscent of the discussions, conducted by some of the Enlightenment philosophers, concerning the insecurity induced by a radical secular perspective, which deprives men of both divine guidance and directives for life emanating from the natural order of things. For Horkheimer, this is the challenge for an uncompromising secular materialist, whose efforts direct reality according to his will, rather than having his will directed by reality. (Horkheimer, M., 1972, P.19)

Consistent with the priorities of his Marxist predecessors, the contemporary materialist is primarily concerned with the material conditions of existence. The immediate problems of privation, exploitation, domination and suffering are the ones to which he addresses himself.

> Materialism is not interested in a world view or in the souls of men. It is concerned with changing the concrete conditions under which men suffer and in which, of course, their souls must become stunted.
>
> (Horkheimer, M., 1972, P.32)

The material context of such self-determinative action contains dangers and obstacles, about which the contemporary materialist must be cautious. He experiences the onerous task of pursuing ameliorative projects, whilst continuously sensitive to the possibility of inflicting and compounding suffering. An appreciation of limits, a sensitivity to flux and change, constitute the contemporary materialist's dialectical approach to action in the world. There are no absolute prescriptions, no metaphysical guides, guarantees or consolations. Action is performed in a state of chronic tension and vigilance. As he expresses it in his essay "On the problem of Truth" (1935).

> A basic principle is the inseparability of the regressive and progressive impulses, the preserving and decomposing, the good and bad sides of particular situations in nature and human history.
>
> (Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E., 1978, P.433)

Horkheimer's materialist, political realism displays a conspicuous absence of any sanctimonious rectitude. As a materialist, he acknowledges the peremptory demands for action; human interaction with nature to ensure survival, and the concomitant regulation of social relations for efficient production are not optional. Yet action always contains the danger of complicity in oppressive and dominating practices. One cannot complacently align oneself with the good and the right cause, for as the ambiguities of reason disclose, carefully constructed, rational and benevolent programmes can assume a detrimental and destructive form. He sustains an optimistic and pessimistic synthesis in his vision of limited action, insisting that there is no compensation for the past aberrations of deflected rationality, and that it is a perpetually difficult task to direct reason towards freedom.

> For all the optimism he has about changing situations, for all that he treasures the happiness which comes from solidarity among men and work for a changed society, he has a pessimistic streak as well. Past injustice will never be made up; the suffering of past generations receives no compensation.
>
> (Horkheimer, M., 1972, P.26)

Horkheimer's reflections on the relationship between reason and freedom seem clearly to articulate two concepts of reason. The first and most obvious one, is the tradition of rational thought epitomized by the Enlightenment's expectations of a comprehensive understanding of reality which would expedite the harmonious reconstruction of social and political life. Similar anticipations informed the grandiose systems of idealist thinkers like Hegel, whose dialectical resolutions permeated the corpus of classical Marxism.

The second concept of reason is the one employed by Horkheimer himself in the process of critique. It is conventional in the sense that it is regulated by respect for logical consistency and the evidence of history. His reflections and observations identified the ambiguous quality of a totalizing reason, whose pursuits often curtailed the freedom which it sought to realize, and compounded the suffering it hoped to alleviate or erase. His critique sustained hope in the efficacy of human intervention in the course of history; he was not an advocate of detachment, as his seminal address, "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937) emphasized. His formulations continually reiterated the dangers inherent in action, alerting his listeners and readers to the antinomies of freedom, in the sense established through our discussion of Berlin; programmes of positive liberty, pursued in the name of reason, could become oppressive and impositional, depriving people of negative liberty, freedom from interference, with which they were often incompatible, but clearly belying the promise of universal freedom which their rational professions contained.

Horkheimer's analyses were concrete acknowledgements of the dilemmas confronting political agents. He seems to have articulated the agonizing logic of political action, refusing to be explicitly prescriptive. In concluding this chapter, we shall return to the more abstract considerations of Adorno, whose reflections upon the tasks of contemporary philosophy further elucidate this dissident branch of Marxism's concept of reason, freedom and political action.

Philosophy As Critique: Theory and Practice

In his inaugural address "The Actuality of Philosophy" (1931), Adorno not only offers a critique of idealism, but also considers the nature and possibilities of contemporary philosophy. After reviewing recent foci in the history of philosophy, with particular emphasis upon idealism's totalizing project, he states,

> I have discussed the most recent history of philosophy, not for a general intellectual history orientation, but because only out of the historical entanglement of questions and answers does the question of philosophy's actuality emerge precisely and that simply means, after the failure of efforts for a grand and total philosophy: whether philosophy is itself at all actual --- whether, after the failure of the last great efforts, there exists an adequacy between the philosophic questions and the possibility of their being answered at all ---.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1977, P.124)

He proceeds to consider and reject the view that philosophical questioning can be dissolved into those issues addressed by the separate sciences, ultimately claiming that

> Plainly put: the idea of science is research; that of philosophy is interpretation.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1977, P.126)

To construe the task of philosophy as interpretation is to deny that philosophy "has a role in the great problems in the traditional sense" (ibid., P.127), the pursuit of answers to the great questions of being, which have invited totalizing formulations like idealism.

Adorno presented a very distinctive concept of interpretation, inspired by some of Walter Benjamin's formulations, and claiming an affinity for a notion of materialism developed in a complementary relationship to Horkheimer's one.

Traditional connotations of 'interpretation' associate it with the construal of meaning and intention. For Adorno, such a conception is too reminiscent of the idealist's preoccupation with the purposes of existence, manifested through the intentional efforts of a divine entity, or through the natural order of things. His epistemological conclusions, articulated in works like "Subject and Object" continually reiterate the view that thought is inadequate to reality, leaving philosophy with the task of arranging ephemeral "constellations" from the multiplicity of available and inexhaustible phenomena, which can never be comprehended completely. Despite his extraordinary abstraction, Adorno insists upon a respect for and engagement with the infinite variations of experience.

> Construction out of small and unintentional elements thus counts among the basic assumptions of philosophic interpretation.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1977, P.128)

Martin Jay (1984b) has provided a clear account of this Benjaminian influence upon Adorno's work. He indicates how Benjamin believed that philosophy's task is the representation of truth, not the acquisition of knowledge (P.248). At first sight, this may appear as a thoroughly spurious distinction, but for Benjamin and Adorno knowledge consists of the abstract conceptual relationships erected by the ethereal and

totalizing efforts of idealists. Truth for them is rooted in the experience of concrete reality, not in the positivist sense of an immediate appropriation of the given, for Adorno's conception of the incessant mediation of the subject - object relation denies such immediacy, but nevertheless in the encounter with the temporally and spatially mediated present. Jay writes:

> The appropriate form for the representation of truth by philosophy: ideas do not subsume particular exemplars under a general rubric; they preserve the integrity of concrete objects, which they organize into patterned configurations.
>
> (Jay, M., 1984b, P.248)

These configurations, or constellations (to employ Benjamin's term),

> signify a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle.
>
> (Jay, M., 1984a, P.14-15)

The critical and political significance of this depiction of truth is that no particular constellation can ever be stabilized into a permanent representation. The very concept of a transient constellation seems to be a logical development of the view that the subject is inadequate to the object, thought inadequate to reality; alternatives are perpetually possible, and consequently no portrayal can be elevated to the status of finality e.g. the movement towards a classless society. Alternative constellations, derived in an infinite series from mediated experience, generate different demands and actions, sustaining a permanently dialectical flux which refuses closure or conclusivity.

> The interpretation of given reality and its abolition are connected to each other, not, of course, in the sense that reality is negated in the concept, but that out of the construction of a configuration of reality the demand for its [reality's] real change always follows promptly --- Materialism has named this relationship with a name that is philosophically certified: dialectic.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1977, P.129)

It can be seen from this statement that Adorno's abstract account concurs with Horkheimer's reformulation of materialism, which emphasizes the conventional materialist's focus upon the experience of concrete reality, and insists upon an acknowledgement of the fortuity and contingency of a perpetually changing interaction between society and nature, subject and object.

In 1969, Adorno wrote a short essay entitled "Resignation" in which he addressed the political criticisms of his detractors.

> The objection raised against us can be stated approximately in these words: a person who in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical change in society and who for that reason neither takes part in or recommends spectacular, violent action, is guilty of resignation.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1978, P.165)

Adorno sought to rebut this accusation, and in doing so provided a clear statement of his concept of freedom. His tone was similar to Horkheimer's in that he refused to be prescriptive, simply indicating that the nature of conceptualization contains the possibility of freedom, because the inadequacy of thought to reality sustains a permanent discrepancy within which people have the latitude for free manoeuvre. The relationship between reason and freedom consists of an acknowledgement of this discrepancy and a refusal to deny or suppress it. The latter would be irrational in its perverse pursuit of an impossible closure, finality or correspondence, whose consequences can only be politically oppressive.

Political struggle consists of the competing establishment of alternative configurations or constellations, but he did not commit himself to any normative representation.

Accusations of resignation or political acquiescence levelled against Adorno and Horkheimer, emanated from political activists who believed that theory must contain prescriptions for transformative action. Since they refused to prescribe courses of action, their critics classified them as detached thinkers whose analyses were politically worthless; their silence upon these matters ultimately committed them to an acceptance of existing political and social relations.

Adorno retorted that the political activist's cardinal insistence upon the translation of theory into practice is a "pseudo-activity" which attempts "to preserve enclaves of immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and obdurate society" (Adorno, T., 1978, P.167). It is a political view which does not acknowledge the mediated nature of subject and object, and consequently evolves into a form of oppressive praxis, with a necessary emphasis upon an instrumental reason which uncritically implements theoretical prescriptions. For Adorno, collective subscription to such tenets is a form of capitulation and resignation, both facile and dangerous in its implications. By contrast, a commendable intransigence is displayed by

> the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither superscribes his conscience nor permits himself to be terrorized into action ...
>
> (Adorno, T., 1978, P.168)

Such thinkers are the ones who do not give up, resign or capitulate, because they know that "as long as thinking is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possibility" (ibid., P.168). It is precisely the permanent possibility of alternatives, articulated by the critical thinker, which constitutes freedom, a refusal to submit to oppressive and instrumental practices.

> Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuration of praxis which is more closely related to a praxis truly involved in change than is a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis.
>
> (Adorno, T., 1978., P.168)

Converging Concerns: Liberalism and Marxism on Domination

The reformulation of liberalism articulated by Berlin, and the challenge presented to classical Marxism by Adorno and Horkheimer, both seem to converge upon and crystallize around a general notion of tragedy. This tragedy consists of a relinquishment of rational hopes for unity and reconciliation, of an abandonment of the comprehensive correlation between reason and freedom anticipated by the philosophers of the 18 th c. Enlightenment.

The universal persistence of domination and oppression is the concrete manifestation of these tragic circumstances. Although they are complementary notions, Berlin illuminates the problem of the antinomies of freedom, while Adorno and Horkheimer explore and explain the ambiguities of reason. These representatives of two major Western philosophical and political traditions seem to display a profound diffidence about knowledge and the emancipatory potential of rational pursuits, without however, lapsing into resignatory pessimism or political acquiescence.

Their analyses are an acknowledgement that the task of rational emancipation is far more complex than initially envisaged, primarily because its advocates must sustain a relentless awareness of the dangers inherent in this pursuit.

The rational pursuit of freedom is conducted within a contingent, material context, which has to be recognized as a fundamental limitation. Berlin's work acknowledges the interminable relationship between negative and positive liberty, aware that collective pursuits of positive liberty or self-determination are an inevitable feature of the historical process, posing a permanent challenge to demands for freedom from interference. His hopes reside in the institutional and constitutional arrangements which can maximise the domain of negative liberty, and minimize the incidence of tragic confrontation. Adorno and Horkheimer provide a sense of limitation incurred from the relationship between thought and reality, language and the world. They indicate how the discrepancy between subject and object, inherent within our linguistic formulations themselves, may generate frustration, inviting coercive attempts to secure a desired correspondence, culminating in conflict and oppression as incompatible formulations confront one another.

Neither Berlin, nor Adorno and Horkheimer, envisage an end to these antagonistic circumstances, but each of them pursues a limited and strategic rationality which may mitigate the consequences of these tragic configurations. Amelioration seems to establish the confines of their retrieval of emancipatory ideals, an obvious diminution of Enlightenment ambition, but one which they expect to produce fewer fatal and catastrophic results. The former exposition of their respective notions of freedom is a clear indication of this.

This chapter effectively concludes the first main argument of this thesis. It has been argued that both the liberal and Marxist traditions have been formatively influenced by the Enlightenment's quest for freedom through the development and exercise of reason. It has also been shown that the acknowledgement of fundamental difficulties in this formulation by exponents of each tradition has produced a convergent concern with the tragic circumstances of continuing conflict and domination.

CHAPTER SIX

LIBERAL AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

To suggest that a philosophical perspective upon the theory and practice of education can be 'liberal' or 'Marxist' is to acknowledge the derivative status of these reflections. This chapter will contend that the corpus of work designated as 'liberal and Marxist philosophy of education' is one which is completely immersed in the broad traditions of liberal and Marxist thought. Previous chapters indicated how the 18 th c. Enlightenment's development of the issues of rationality, autonomy and self-determination have had a formative influence upon the evolution of liberal and Marxist thought. These notions have exercised a similar influence upon the emergence of liberal and Marxist philosophy of education, because as disciplines, they orientate themselves towards these major European traditions of thought. Liberal and Marxist philosophies of education perform an ancillary role, in so far as they promote education's contribution to the maintenance and transmission of the values embodied in liberal and Marxist perceptives upon the organization of society.

However, it will also be argued that as derivative disciplines, liberal and Marxist philosophies of education replicate the problems, quandaries and dilemmas evident in our discussion of the evolution of liberal and Marxist thought during the 20 th c. Consistent with the conclusions of the previous two chapters, this one will indicate that the antinomies and ambiguities permeating liberal and Marxist philosophies of education generate a convergence of concern upon the issues of domination and exploitation, as they did for their parent disciplines.

Contributors to the formulation of a liberal understanding of education have included R S Peters, who has presented systematic and extensive conceptual analyses of the meaning and nature of education; P S Wilson, who has offered detailed analyses of the problems of interest and discipline in education, with particular reference to the issues of individual freedom of choice and A O'Hear, who has provided a valuable contribution to the study of education in society, attempting to situate the conceptual contributions of writers like R S Peters in the material constraints of contemporary economic production, reflecting upon the relationship of education and training, and emphasizing the importance of education for autonomous, individual judgement.

Each of these writers displays a fundamental concern with the educational promotion of reason to foster individual autonomy and self-determination. Their evident interest in the relationship between reason and freedom in the life of the individual clearly discloses their liberal orientation. However, it is the work of Charles Bailey and Pat and John White, which provides the most ambitious and comprehensive defence of liberal philosophy of education. They synthesize the conceptual, individual and social issues in composite presentations, which explicitly develop the self-conscious liberal tradition within which they write. Their work is central to our purposes, for not only do they represent an educational engagement with the issues of reason and freedom in the life of the individual, but they also encounter some of the fundamental limits evident in such pursuits, limits which have been explored by writers such as Berlin in a broader liberal context. Through a consideration of their theoretical problems, we witness the replication of the dilemmas which confront the wider liberal tradition, clearly indicating that the future of liberal philosophy of education is inextricably involved with liberalism's subsequent development.

The approach of both Bailey and the Whites to a consideration of freedom and reason in educational theory and practice is situated within a particular understanding of human experience. Their primary emphasis is upon a notion of agency (Bailey, C., 1984, P.176; White, P., 1983, P.7; White. J., 1982, P.50-51) which contains a detailed network of related concepts. If a human being is an agent, he is confronted by a number of alternative courses of action; his self-understanding revolves around a notion of freedom to choose between alternatives. The concept of agency also implies that the selection of an alternative is not an arbitrary decision, but an informed choice based upon systematic reflections whose exercise is defined as a rational approach to the issue.

This is a clear reiteration of the close relationship between theory and practice, thought and action, in human experience, and an assertion about the unavoidability of justificatory procedures in human conduct. If people are free to choose between alternatives, they are obliged to offer justifications for their particular selections. This is the burden of agency, and the central understanding around which Bailey and the Whites organize their discussion of liberal education.

How does this understanding produce support for a liberal approach to education? A closer examination of Charles Bailey's Beyond the Present and the Particular: A Theory of Liberal Education (1984), P Whites' Beyond Domination: An Essay in the Political Philosophy of Education (1983), and J White's The Aims of Education Restated (1982), provides some answers to this central question, as well as disclosing some of the limitations of this approach.

If agents are constituted by an inherent freedom to choose between alternatives, and obliged to provide justifications for their decisions, controversy must be a fundamental feature of human interaction. On any particular issue, numerous courses of action may be proposed by concerned and involved participants,

and these will offer different justifications for their respective alternatives, producing a controversial situation.

Liberal Philosophy of Education

Charles Bailey: Hopes for Consensus

For Bailey, controversy, or a diversity of conflicting perspectives, is an ineluctable feature of human experience, and for him the task of education is defined by this understanding. If we presuppose controversy, education must contribute towards the management and resolution of it through the promotion of dialogue, which consists of rational argument and justification.

> Justification, then, is the production of reasons for beliefs and actions, not the collection of supporters; it is a matter of reason rather than rhetoric, of conviction rather than persuasion. Justification is required as a feature of the attempt to make human life rational, to make our activities and beliefs part of an intelligible and coherent whole, to understand what we are about.
>
> (Bailey, C., 1984, P.12)

Bailey seems to view educational institutions as spheres of negative liberty in which a number of important processes and preparations occur. They are spheres of negative liberty in that they are free to articulate and reflect upon society's extensive controversies and conflicts, simultaneously assisting the institutions' students to think rationally about these issues, and decide how they shall participate in them once they have left the confines of the educational institution. Bailey's approach is liberal in that he wishes to protect the individual's freedom to reflect upon these issues without interference or pressure (a respect for individual autonomy or negative liberty), so that he can make an informed choice about his future conduct, maturing into a responsible agent, who enjoys the benefits of rational self-determination. A liberal education directly confronts the complexities of agency, acknowledges the inextricable relationship between thought and action, theory and practice, and both respects and assists the individual to reflect and decide, to combine his negative and positive freedoms.

As Berlin notes in his explication of contemporary liberalism, controversy is primarily generated around questions of ends. The evaluation of and justification for the pursuit of particular ends, individual and collective, political and moral, are the controversial issues with which educational practice will be concerned.

> Education must be concerned with ends --- Educators must be duty-bound to introduce pupils to controversial matters as controversial matters.
>
> (Bailey, C., 1984, P.180)

Debate about controversial pursuits can only be conducted and concluded responsibly if pupils are both logical and informed, and it is the study of society's inherited knowledge which provides this ability.

> To involve pupils in knowledge is to involve them in the evidence, the reasons for believing, and this can only be done if the atmosphere is one of questioning, discussion and critical examination of the kind that initially accompanied the discovery of the 'truth' in question.
>
> (Bailey, C., 1984, P.61-62)

In this way, an appreciation of the controversial dimension of the quest for knowledge is liberal in the sense of emancipatory, for it frees the individual from the ignorant and limited perspectives of the present and the particular. For Bailey, exposure to a diverse range of human knowledge, as well as the acquisition of an ability to participate in the skills and debates attending these, extends the individual's capacity to transcend the present and particular. The individual develops a broad cognitive perspective which assumes an historical and international content, releasing him for the constraints of his own particular location in space and time, fostering a truly educated mind (Bailey, C., 1984, P.20).

There is a conspicuously optimistic expectation in Bailey's extended analysis and definition of contemporary liberal philosophy of education. If controversy about ends is a distinctive and constitutive feature of human experience and interaction, Bailey anticipates that the rational approach to conflict and controversy embodied in the processes of dialogue, argument and justification is sufficient to resolve disputes. This expectation is evident, not so much in Beyond the Present and the Particular as in a short article entitled "Neutrality and Rationality in Teaching" (1975), in which Bailey addresses proposals by the Schools Council Humanities Project in Britain in the late 1960's that teachers should maintain a neutral stance in their teaching activity.

The project recommended procedural neutrality for teachers because it believed that pupils' deference towards their teachers' authority produced indoctrinatory effects, particularly in fields of study involving value judgement and controversial issues concerning the justification of particular moral and political pursuits. Bailey rejected the Project's recommendations, arguing that impartiality rather than neutrality was required. For Bailey, a policy of neutrality could only foster an irresponsible detachment which would promote confusion among pupils who could detect no resolution to the disputes in which they were participating. If teachers did not indicate the rational processes towards resolution, pupils would be left with the impression that non-rational individual decision was the only available recourse at the conclusion of a debate. He argued instead for a pedagogical commitment to rigorous impartiality, by which he meant that all arguments and views, including those of the teacher, should be submitted to rational evaluation. In this way, Bailey believed that the pupils would see that teachers themselves were not elevated above rational criticism, were not incontrovertible authorities, but people whose professions had to conform to rational criteria if they were to be respected. Within such an understanding, impartiality would obviate the problem of indoctrination, reaffirm the value of rational reflection and resolution, and avert the confusion

inherent in a neutral, non-interventionist "pedagogical" approach. Bailey expresses this succinctly when he writes,

> That all is subject to argument, that no person counts for more than his argument counts, even the teacher, and that all statements are subject to rational criticism - all this is part of the rational commitment, but this is picked out by the concept of impartiality.
>
> (Bailey, C., 1975)

Bailey's optimistic expectations for the potential of impartial procedures are reflected in his rhetorical question,

> What is the point of discussion and rational procedures if we do not expect them to lead to truth?
>
> (Bailey, C., 1975)

Bailey's argument for impartiality is cogent if one assumes the attainability of such a truth, one whose superior claims are so transparent that all involved in a dispute must acknowledge its status, and conduct themselves accordingly. In such a way, consensual thought would ensure compatible and co-operative actions, thereby eliminating conflict.

Although the distinction between neutrality and impartiality is a cardinal one in Bailey's discussion, his epistemological assumptions emerge as a most critical issue, for it is these which render the former distinction coherent. He pursues a discussion of his assumptions when he engages the views of Elliot, who had been one of the influential contributors to the Project's recommendations for procedural neutrality. Elliot was evidently not as hopeful as Bailey about the potential of rational discussion for the resolution of difficulties and disputes. Bailey addresses himself directly to Elliot's claim that,

> Rational men have discovered no criteria by which they can agree on the relative weighings to be given to conflicting relevant reasons.
>
> (Cited in Bailey, C., 1975)

Bailey is evidently disturbed by Elliot's concept of the limits of rational procedure, suggesting that if we accept Elliot's assessment, we become disorientated, divested of hope for a solution, and confronted by the reality of incompatible and conflictual assertions, each fortified by their own concept of rational justification.

> What Elliot is saying is that rationality only takes us so far and then we have a variety of conflicting but equally rational views, all supported by relevant reasons ---
>
> (Bailey, C., 1975)

Within the context of general liberal thought, articulated in Chapter 3, it can be seen that Elliot's views upon the limits of rational procedure concur with Berlin's claim that numerous perspectives on particular issues can be formulated, each with their own systematic justifications, but each mutually incompatible. Bailey's and Elliot's different epistemological expectations clearly reflect a significant dispute within liberal education, replicating a broader debate within the liberal tradition. The discussion over the relative merits of procedural neutrality and impartiality seem to be manifestations of this critical difference. Bailey represents the aspiration towards a consensual epistemological vantage point, or a comprehensive provisional truth, whose elusive nature has induced the sense of tragedy so graphically presented in Berlin's writings. Having acknowledged the inextricable relationship between theory and practice, thought and action, and committed to the view that education contributes significantly to the preparation of the individual for a life of rational and responsible self-determination, Bailey is disconcerted by the implications of Elliot's views for the more general manifestation of socially conflictual collective self-determinations, or positive liberties. His evident hope is that the experience of rational debate and resolution acquired within the autonomous sphere of educational institutions which respect the individual's freedom of thought, will be extended into the domain of broader social interaction. Elliot's views suggest that systematic dispute will endure into perpetual controversy and conflict, impugning the reconciliatory expectations of rational procedure.

Elliot's support for procedural neutrality clearly implies a determination to protect diversity, and seems compatible with Berlin's views that a respect for negative liberty (diverse autonomous aspirations) is the most hopeful way to avoid the tragic conflict entailed by the imposition of comprehensive programmes of positive liberty, despite the acknowledgement that this is a palliative rather than a guarantee, since in certain circumstances, such impositions may be unavoidable. Although not articulated in the same terms, Elliot seems to be trying to accommodate the antinomies of freedom, explored by Berlin, in a specifically educational context. He is acknowledging the perpetually tense relationship between negative and positive liberty, emanating from the acknowledgement that respect for the negative liberty of autonomous individuals or groups will generate systematic defenses for particular values and courses of action, which are incompatible with other views similarly formulated. Elliot is reluctant to declare that a particular position is correct, because for him this would be tantamount to an illegitimate imposition of one set of conclusions upon other participants in the debate. Hence his preference for procedural neutrality, while implicitly recognizing that the differences articulated in the broader field of social conflict must necessarily be concluded; some concept of action, of positive liberty has to be adopted in the world of social organization and economic production, containing the permanent potential for an erasure of others' negative liberty.

As indicated in previous chapters, it is precisely this anxiety which produces a preoccupation with the questions of oppression and domination, coercing others into compliance with one's own vision of positive

liberty. For writers like Berlin and Elliot (and, it has been suggested, for writers in the Marxist tradition, like Horkheimer and Adorno), politics is concerned with this precarious situation, with persistent efforts to minimize relapses into dominating practices, struggling with the theory and practice of freedom and emancipation. Such concerns prevail in the work of the two influential liberal philosophers of education, Pat and John White.

Pat White: Domination and Political Education

Clearly situating herself within the Millian tradition, Pat White explores the issue by juxtaposing an assumption about the elementary nature of individual freedom, the individual as a 'chooser' whose liberty must be respected (White, P., 1983, P.7), and the necessity for the existence of political power, which establishes the orderly confines within which individual pursuits can be conducted. The obvious problem is that any specific political order may deprive the individual of aspects of his negative liberty, and this kind of imposition or curtailment requires justification. She is obviously implying that a justifiable restraint is a rational and legitimate one, whereas an unjustifiable one is an imposition, tantamount to oppression and domination.

Pat White's central problem is the traditional one of trying to establish the procedures which constitute justifiable interference. An initial response is that a justifiable interference is a 'rational' one, a view which has been embodied in the historical notion of the 'public good' which suggests that there are certain policies which are in everyone's interests, and these constitute the rudiments of a political organization within which individual, idiosyncratic preferences can be pursued without interference; an elementary structure whose merits and benefits are acknowledged universally, and which consequently qualify as rational. Anyone whose pursuits challenge or compromise the public interest can be restrained legitimately. (White, P., 1973, P.217-223).

However, she delineates the major difficulties associated with such proposed resolutions, indicating that the very idea of a public interest presupposes a notion of the good life for man (White, P., 1973, P.226-227), and it is fundamentally impossible to extricate this consideration from the controversial situation, which it is intended to allay. Consequently, White concludes that the only activity which is in the public good is the provision of political education, which enables pupils to confront the dilemmas and infinite potential for domination and injustice inherent within social existence. At the beginning of her later work, Beyond Domination (1983) she writes,

> Political education provides the context or framework for the whole of education: it is not in any sense peripheral or an extra.
>
> (White, P., 1983, P.2)

Consistent with the view that education is an integral part of social life, she indicates that a political education has to be an initiation into the procedures of participatory democracy, for this alone is the political organization which will minimize the incidence of domination. Not only does a participatory democracy maximize the number of views and proposals expressed, but it sustains a respect for diversity and a continuous vigilance to curtail oppressive practices.

> The only way to dispose of political power in a morally acceptable way is to allow each individual access to an equal share in the exercise, or control of power. This is the basic case for democracy.
>
> (White, P., 1983, P.9)

Having defended her understanding of the need for a participatory democracy, and the kind of political education which promotes it, White acknowledges the problems which have been an endemic characteristic of liberal debate. Moving from debate to decision, from thought to action, one is always confronted by the problems of democratic practice. As with Berlin and Elliot, she acknowledges that the exercise of power in society is always contrary to somebody's interests, because of the absence of total consensus, which would constitute a rational, integrated, solution (White, P., 1983, P.19-25, 52-63). Majority decisions may often appear as infringements upon the rights and freedoms of minority groups, whose conclusions do not concur with those of the majority. Yet action is peremptory, and must be implemented despite these protests. As with Hall and Berlin, White hopes that participatory democracy will limit the exercise of arbitrary power, and minimize the occurrence of tragic confrontation in the contest between multiple positive liberties, the prevalence of one of which seems to constitute an oppressive eclipse of some party's negative liberty. Her conclusions, along the spectrum from political education to participatory democracy, reflect the dilemmas and anxieties of the liberal tradition from which she derives her perspective and inspiration.

John White: Redefining Contemporary Autonomy

John White's The Aims of Education Restated (1982) provides an illuminating complement to the difficulties analysed by Pat White. In the introduction to his book, he indicates that disputes about the aims of education revolve around two main claims. Firstly, that the aims of education are intrinsic to itself, and secondly, that they are essentially about the preparation of an individual for life in society. The first notion stresses the growth of understanding, the development of individual potential and personal autonomy, while the second emphasizes literacy, numeracy and vocational preparation. White's intention is to pursue an answer to the question:

> What guidelines should we follow in trying to settle what the aims of education should be?

(White, J., 1982, P.3)

In addressing this issue, White problematizes the concept of individual freedom, and provides an informed, circumspect and viable notion of personal autonomy, which constitutes a central aim of education. In doing so, he augments the substance of liberal individualism, and complements the understanding of liberal education offered by Pat White.

John White demonstrates that although philosophers of education distinguish between the 'intrinsic' and 'vocational' aims of education, both perspectives encounter similar difficulties in their implementation. He indicates how the notion of the 'intrinsic value of education' is a vestige of philosophical idealism, an integral part of a series of related understandings to which a secular view of ourselves can no longer adhere. White associates philosophical idealism with teleological assumptions, derived from Greek thought, that the pursuit of knowledge expedites the realization of Man's essence. If Man is essentially a knowing being, the pursuit of knowledge can only declare itself as the intrinsic aim of education. The educator experiences no doubt about what the good of the pupil must be - the quest for knowledge to realize the pupil's own essence.

Chapter 1 and 2 devoted attention to the relationship between contextual assumptions and specific proposals, emphasizing how secular reformulations alter these relationships fundamentally and irrevocably. Charles Taylor's comments on the loss of a sense of attunement in secular perspectives, and David Hiley's analysis of the ambiguous potential of knowledge once the guarantee of God's benevolent directives has been relinquished, articulate this challenge very clearly. This modern understanding of the status of knowledge in both collective and individual life deprives the educator of any easy confidence in the 'intrinsic aims of education' and compels him to acknowledge the problematic dimensions of knowledge acquisition and transmission. These often assume an important political character, valuably identified by Marxist reflections on education and society (see below). A secular appreciation of the genesis, evolution and impact of knowledge in society (explored in detail in Chapter 7) reveals that the formulations of knowledge are contestable and controversial, confounding the search for an identifiable good which emerges from the nature of 'knowledge itself' (White, J., 1982, P.12-25).

> The idea of education as an aim intending to promote the pupil's growth has encountered difficulties, because 'growth' is not an inherent, preordained process, but a series of developments prescribed by controversial social values; its nature is contestable.
>
> (White, J., 1982, P.25)

For White, the contemporary promotion of knowledge contributes to the formulation of conflictual values, and becomes subordinate to decisions about which ones are correct. It is immersed in endemic social dispute which precludes any clear identification of the 'pupil's good' or 'the common good'.

A vocational emphasis confronts similar difficulties, because a vocational training's concentration upon instrumental means must eventually consider the ends to which particular skills are directed. These ends are themselves controversial, incorporated into political decisions about economic policy. Not only are these controvertible issues, but a problem also arises for the vocational training advocate when he considers the relationship between 'society's needs' and those of the individuals who are inserted into society. Perceived needs for personal fulfilment may be constituted by a complex array of social values, aspirations and expectations, and these may be completely incompatible with one's required location and contribution in the economic organization for the 'common good' (1982, Chapter 3 & 4).

The quest for knowledge is implicated in the inconclusive disputes of society's collective existence, suggesting that it can not disclose its inherent worth or direct 'the good' for all. Knowledge is necessary and indispensable (in all the complex dimensions considered in Chapter 7), but its limits have to be acknowledged, inherent in its possibilities and dangers. White concludes,

> The upshot of the argument from the social nature of man seems to be that it is too weak to show that there must be a common good.
>
> (White, J., 1982, P.76)

The 'social nature of man' is a thoroughly secular notion, connoting the dispute and divergence, conflict and ineluctable primacy of politics, which constitute the assumptions within which liberals like Berlin and Hall, and Marxists like Adorno and Horkheimer conduct their analyses. What does it imply for a contemporary understanding of autonomy?

White's analysis and understanding inclines him to reformulate autonomy as an ability to articulate and consider such a range of incompatible possibilities, appreciating that the very criteria to which one may refer in making a decision are themselves controversial and mutable. To educate an individual implies that one endows him with an ability to formulate and comprehend the tension inherent in these debates about the relationship between knowledge and society, thought and action, values and conduct. Moral controversy epitomizes this process and White writes,

> Different moralities embody different emphases --- The least we can do by the pupil is to make him as aware as possible of these difficulties and of the ineradicable tensions there must be between the two poles. We can then leave it to him, as a morally autonomous agent, to strike his own balances.
>
> (1982, P.100)

Such a conception acknowledges the limitations of educational practice. White explicitly states that such a notion of autonomy does not prescribe the substance of an outlook on life (1982, P.125-6), but alerts a pupil to the difficulties involved in formulating one; in fostering autonomy, it frustrates simple solutions and complacent prescriptions.

John White's engagement with the question of autonomy complements Pat White's concern with the problem of power, education and participatory democracy, because the sensitivity to ambiguity and tension, inherent within John White's concept of an autonomous agent, is precisely the disposition required for effective participation in Pat White's envisaged system of democratic procedure.

The first section of this chapter has explored particular differences between exponents of liberal philosophy of education, namely Charles Bailey, Pat and John White. It has been shown that they share a commitment to a liberal conception of freedom through the development of reason, but that Bailey expresses more of an optimistic hope for the potential accomplishments of rational reflection and decision than do Pat and John White. Bailey evinces a classical Enlightenment hope that the promotion of reason will produce an orderly society through the reconciliatory influence of rational debate and dialogue; disputes are conducted on the assumption that contesting interests will converge upon the 'truth' of the matter, which will resolve the conflict and foster compatible action.

Pat and John White are more circumspect in their approach to liberal education, articulating a sense of the limits within which they are working. Bailey's insistence upon seeking a consensual, albeit provisional 'truth' in controversial matters is clearly motivated by an anxiety about the consequences of its absence. If the truth is not elicited, conflict is permanent, and its consequences severe when dispute is translated into action. For if there is no rational agreement about the correct moral or political solution to a controversial issue, a particular view will be implemented by those capable of asserting their own preference. Others will be subjected to this decision experiencing different degrees of resentment, exclusion, and oppression. Pat and John White acknowledge this disconcerting limit upon rationality's capabilities, explaining it in terms of an inevitable dependence upon criterial precedents which are themselves controversial (in John White's case), and advocating a precarious participatory democracy to minimize the effects of domination, which is the political effect of this epistemological deficiency. Bailey's views seem anachronistic, for although one can appreciate the moral and political desirability of a conclusive rational solution, the experience of moral and political debate is such that one must acknowledge its historical inadequacies and confront the oppressive and fatal consequences of these. Such is the import of contemporary liberal responses from Berlin and Hall, to Pat and John White, for whom the reality of incompatible and respectively justifiable positive liberties, with their threats of violence and domination, is the major challenge to liberal thinking today. Liberal thought strives to sustain viable concepts of freedom, particularly that of the individual, whose liberty is continuously pressurized by the imperatives of broader social and collective projects, which co-exist in conflictual relationships.

The second part of this chapter will argue that certain perspectives within Marxist philosophy of education are obliged to confront a similar challenge, once the reconciliatory hopes invested in its understanding of historical evolution have been relinquished. As with the mainstream liberal and Marxist traditions, liberal and Marxist philosophies of education experience a convergence upon similar problems, once the limits of their rational expectations have been acknowledged.

Marxist Philosophy of Education

Sarup's and Sharp's Classical Expectations

This point can be made initially through an analysis of two influential books in Marxist philosophy of education, Madan Sarup's Marxism and Education (1978) and Rachel Sharp's Knowledge, Ideology and the Politics of Schooling - Towards a Marxist Analysis of Education (1980). Both writers begin their reflections upon, and advocacy of, Marxist philosophy of education, with an examination of the merits and defects of the New Sociology of Education (N.S.E.) whose direction and concern had been provided by Michael Young's edited volume, Knowledge and Control, published in 1971.

Young had criticized the conventional sociology of education's preoccupation with the issue of order, with the question of how societies manage to cohere. This had been a very limited approach to the sociology of education, because it failed to address problems with the very substance of educational practice viz. the transmission of knowledge itself. The traditional focus on social cohesion had not considered crucial questions about the structure of the knowledge conveyed to pupils, and had failed to appreciate that knowledge is not some kind of self-contained impartial entity whose acquisition is a universal benefit for pupils, but a series of perspectives and understandings with a profound political influence and significance.

As Marxist analysts, Sharp and Sarup welcome this development in the sociology of education, because part of their traditional Marxist understanding of society is that the ruling ideas in the superstructure (which includes the educational institutions) are those of the ruling class. An acknowledgement of the political nature of knowledge selection and conveyance buttresses the conventional Marxist view that the superstructure reflects and supports the exploitative relations in the economic base. Sharp writes that the traditional sociology of education has taken the question of the content of knowledge for granted,

> Whereas in reality educational knowledge involves a series of conscious and unconscious choices. An educational curriculum can only ever be a selection.
>
> (Sharp, R., 1980, P.7)

Sarup concurs with his complimentary statement that,

> The most challenging aspect of Young's thesis is the suggestion that we treat knowledge, or what counts as knowledge as socially constructed.
>
> (Sarup, M., 1978, P.15)

Having acknowledged the contribution made by the New Sociologists of Education to an appreciation of the political dimension of knowledge acquisition and transmission, (an appreciation of the particular interests served by specific understandings, values, and lines of research), Sharp and Sarup focus upon the limitations of their achievements. The N.S.E. displayed a definite empirical approach to research, in that it emphasized the primacy of perception. The phenomenological apprehensions of pupils, teachers and educators generally, were fundamental to their investigations, because they disclosed how the agents themselves perceived and evaluated knowledge. For the N.S.E., its task was a description of perceptions, to record what was included and excluded in curricula, and to seek the professed (or denied) political reasons for selection. Both authors commend the N.S.E.'s intentions to promote dialogue, foster self-conscious cultural assumptions, and encourage democratic curriculum selection procedures.

> --- the main project of the 'new' sociology of education is the attempt to make the world better, the realization of a free and equal society in which dialogue would be the ideal form of relationship.
>
> (Sarup, M., 1978, P.51)

However, Sharp and Sarup shared the view that the N.S.E. was too nebulous, because it did not have a sufficiently developed critical dimension, which could declare some of the phenomenological perceptions to be incorrect. As Marxists, Sharp and Sarup are not simply interested in describing the constitutive perceptions of the world's agents, but in transforming the world rationally. Although the N.S.E. was interested in transformation, it evidently did not possess the critical knowledge required for the task, relying exclusively upon the chaotic intentions, meanings, and conflicting perceptions of the agents who were the basis of its study. For the New Sociologists of Education, the agents' meaning systems and intentions, their syntheses of thought and action, would direct social transformation.

It is at this point in their analysis that Sharp and Sarup can proclaim that Marxism is a significant methodological and political advance over the simple voluntarism and phenomenological limitations of the N.S.E. In their advocacy of a Marxist approach to education, Sarup and Sharp implicitly disclose many of the self-assessments and expectations of classical Marxism. What is interesting about their critique of N.S.E. is that for them, Marxism embodies a superior insight into the functions and necessary evolution of society - a rational perspective. They implicitly regard Marxist analyses and prescriptions as a solution to the conflicts manifested in the divergent and politically interested meaning systems described by the N.S.E. Marxism is a privileged perspective in that it exposes the truth of the situation, elevated above the limited points of view which a phenomenological analysis exposes. This is quite evident in Sharp's statement that,

> Marxism is more than just another point of view. It is inspired by a critique of class societies, and a political commitment to work to transcend the deformations inherent in relations of domination and exploitation. (Marxism's insights) serve to point the way to an alternative political practice designed to strengthen a social movement committed to overcome relations of exploitation and achieve a better future for human self-realization.
>
> (Sharp, R., 1980, P.159)

This is obviously an assertion of the epistemological superiority of Marxist analysis, as well as a claim that its analyses and proposals can transcend the domination and exploitation which afflicts capitalist society. Her educational inference is that pupils and teachers should adopt a Marxist perspective, which will disclose the truth about capitalist relations of production, together with their sustaining superstructural dimensions, and indicate the course of action necessary for their abolition. A Marxist education will expedite the emergence of a just society, dispelling all those cultural views and meaning systems which simply manifest confusion and obfuscation, or at worst, ideologically buttress the systems of domination and exploitation which must be eliminated.

Sarup, too, stresses that we must concentrate upon the contradictions in society which are reflected in the educational systems. (Sarup, M., 1978, P.165). This will contribute to the desired process whereby "the working class, through it struggles, makes itself" (P.177). This view seems to be a remarkable conflation of alleged objectivity and overt partisanship, possible because of a belief that the truths of Marxism can only produce a desirable situation i.e. one which has no domination or exploitation, one in which a general reconciliation is evident.

Yet, unlike Engles' explication of Scientific Socialism, neither Sharp nor Sarup suggest why this outcome should evolve. They do not suggest that it is a necessary historical development (for this would be too determinist) nor do they imply that its pursuit is the political aspiration of a partisan interest, for this might appear too voluntarist (and they denounce N.S.E.'s naïve voluntarism) (Sarup, M., 1978, P.8), as well as simply one competing interest among many, depriving both themselves and 'the working-class' of their privileged epistemological understanding and historical role.

Sharp and Sarup's expectations and proposals are surprising in that they assume that classical Marxism's analyses and predictions about a classless and reconciled society will be vindicated; educators must simply provide pupils with this perspicacity. It is also surprising in that they do not address the problems for Marxism presented by such established figures and critics as Adorno and Horkheimer, whose articulations of the historical refutations of classical Marxist expectations have clearly problematized the issue of domination and exploitation for succeeding generations of radicals. In an extraordinarily lucid disclosure, Sarup, having acknowledged that the world of knowledge is a world of dominance and subordination, a world with moral and political dimensions, recommends that,

> We should present a curriculum in such a way that it does not impose or enforce.
>
> (Sarup, M., 1978, P.60)

as if the Marxist proposals for the rational reorganization of the world were axiomatically universally beneficial and reconciliatory, contrary to the kind of caution enjoined by writers like Adorno and Horkheimer concerning the oppressive potential of particular rational reconstructions.

This critical survey of the work of Sharp and Sarup consequently concludes that their assumptions about Marxism's epistemological superiority, and their expectations that Marxism's political rationality will promote emancipation from the oppression and exploitation of capitalist societies, are not theoretically demonstrated. They seem to adhere to a series of hopes and aspirations, advocating these as an anticipative framework within which Marxist education can be conducted. Their proposals ignore the circumspect and sophisticated analyses of Marxist writers like Adorno and Horkheimer, cognizance of whom would not only induce a more thorough and cautious approach to the issues of oppression and domination (and education's role in alleviating or perpetuating these), but would also alert them to the force of liberal concern with the same problem. The references of writers like Berlin and Hall to the value of freedom in society (attended by a developed theoretical sensitivity to the problems of freedom), cannot be dismissed as the ideological concealment of exploitative bourgeois rule, for they acknowledge the antinomies of freedom within modern capitalist and socialist states. The historical and theoretical superficiality of Sharp's and Sarup's analyses and proposals is revealed, only to expose them to the acute dilemmas which liberal writers like Hall and Berlin explore. Sharp and Sarup can neither demonstrate the working class's privileged perspective, nor can they vindicate any expectation for the reconciliatory effect of its historical efforts. For society, the diversity and conflict remain, and so does the task of confronting the perpetual vicissitudes of domination, exploitation and oppression, whose definition and practice themselves endure as contested issues.

Bowles and Gintis: Vindicating Contemporary Radicalism

In 1976, two American authors, Bowles and Gintis, published a famous study of schooling in capitalist society entitled Schooling in Capitalist America. In this work, Bowles and Gintis develop a correspondence principle which is intended to relate the experience of schooling to the imperatives of capitalist production. Effectively, it is a modern case study illustrating the base-superstructure metaphor of classical Marxism. They write,

> our critique of the capitalist economy is simple enough: the people production process - in the workplace and in schools - is dominated by the imperatives of profit and domination rather than by human need --- The educational system helps integrate youth into the economic system through a structural correspondence between its social relations and those of production
>
> (Cole, M., 1988, P.1-2)

Contributing to a collection of critical essays on the work of Bowles and Gintis, Mike Cole (1988) indicates that some educational theorists have been disturbed by the correspondence principle between schooling and capitalism, because it provides no guarantee of transition to socialism. In fact, its alleged functional rigidity implies either the impossibility of such a transition, or confers a theoretical emphasis upon volutarism in the superstructure, which some Marxist analysts find an unacceptable deviation from the tenets of classical Marxism (Cole, M. 1988, P.8-9)

Bowles and Gintis contest the determinist inferences from their earlier theoretical work, arguing that the field of education certainly is open to conscious transformation.

> The view of education as a system of uncontested domination is surely not a logical implication of our work. If the capitalist division of labour were itself a system of uncontested domination, then the correspondence principle would, by default, imply the same of the education system.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.237)

In a series of articles, Bowles and Gintis explain their understanding of action for transformation, of participation in this contested sphere. As sympathizers with Marxist methods and insights, they nevertheless write that, having adhered to the base-superstructure model, they can not

> locate a central contradiction in the education/economy relationship,
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.21)

Bowles and Gintis cannot identify a central contradiction between capital and labour, oppressor and oppressed, which will decide the emancipatory evolution of American capitalist society, and affect the future of educational practice there.

Instead, Bowles and Gintis begin to work with a series of concepts, embodied in their notions of 'sites' and 'games'. Writing in general and abstract terms, Bowles and Gintis state that they work with a concept of social formation as a

> structural articulation of sites, and a site is a structure articulating the appropriative, political, cultural and distributive practices occurring within it.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.22)

More specifically, these sites contain contradictions, which in Bowles and Gintis' terms are to be understood more as inconsistencies than as antagonisms. One of their main examples is the tension generated within numerous sites in capitalist society, between personal rights and property rights, both of which are simultaneously promoted in capitalist society. In Schooling in Capitalist America, they argue that

an adequate educational system in a good society would foster the personal development of each member of society, act as an equalizing force, and as a stabilizing one, which would foster continuity of life. Still accepting these criteria in 1988, Bowles and Gintis write that,

> Educational systems of advanced capitalist society fail to perform their developmental and egalitarian functions. Indeed, in the process of performing their stabilizing function, schools consistently thwart full personal development and legitimate rather than attenuate social inequality.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.236)

For Bowles and Gintis, the educational systems of capitalist society reproduce the co-existence of these incompatible pursuits, for unequal property rights belie programmes of equal opportunity and personal fulfilment. They believe that autonomous educational action can exploit this contradiction, by alerting people to these incompatible goals and inconsistencies within liberal capitalist society, and by establishing democratic structures sensitive to these contradictions in both the productive and educative spheres of society, educational action can contribute to progressive transformation (Cole, M. 1988, P.29-31)

> Progressive educators must exploit the internal contradictions of liberal discourse by developing curricula which dramatize the major oppositions inherent in the joint advocacy of rights vested in persons and property.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.31)

Apparently sensitive to accusations of facile voluntarism, Bowles and Gintis modify their notion of 'site' into that of 'game'. In their paper "Can there be a Liberal Philosophy of Education in a Democratic Society?", Bowles and Gintis explore the distinction between 'choosers' and 'learners', in an attempt to clarify some issues pertinent to autonomy. This consideration has two dimensions. Firstly, the entitlement of choosers to prescribe for learners what they shall learn, and secondly, the process whereby choosers come to value what they select. The first point raises the issue of domination, and the second, that of independent judgement and the influences upon it. The problems are interrelated in a complex way, reminiscent of the questions addressed by John White in his reflections upon autonomy.

If one claims the right to choose a curriculum for a learner, one obviously provides reasons for one's formulations. These reasons are constructed around a set of criteria, whose acceptance contributes to the formation of one's identity as an educational authority. In a sense, these criteria constitute the chooser, who is inevitably confined by an array of criterial constraints which constitute his own cultural and linguistic inheritance. As John White indicates, these criteria are by no means absolute, and are themselves the subject of perpetual controversy. Bowles and Gintis would consider the imposition of curricula upon learners as an oppressive practice, which violates the learner's autonomy, while simultaneously recognizing the difficulty of initiating the aspirant learner into a debate, whose orientating terms are

themselves controvertible. To promote equality, freedom and personal development, one has to strive for a situation in which one appreciates the constitutive features of one's personal and collective life, reserving the right to dispute certain constitutive values and social prescriptions. One seeks to participate in the revision of those ethical, political and cultural values which will impose new constraints upon oneself, and to provide the context for subsequent agents to revise, modify, or comply with. In this way, Bowles and Gintis strive for a sophisticated understanding of the notion of agency, one which perceives autonomy as tentative action within a set of necessary constraints, and which seeks to promote freedom by maximizing the number of participants in the process. If this is successful, the effects of participation should minimize the incidence of oppression and domination (Cole, M. 1988, P.225-229).

For Bowles and Gintis, the theoretical advantage of these notions is that they vindicate agency and freedom, without lapsing into some simple voluntarism which fails to appreciate the limits, influences and possibilities within which it proceeds. It is alert to the inherent problems of domination through imposition, and seeks to minimize this through participation and consultation. However, they are also aware that this introduces a precarious contingency into their proposals. The constitution of, and compliance with, constraints, is redolent of a game, whose rules both empower and restrain, but whose definition is never immutable. In their analyses of both education and society, they offer this as preferable to the notion of a site. (Cole, M. 1988, P.239-240).

Bowles and Gintis have incurred sustained critiques of their modifications of Marxist analyses and aspirations. Opposition seems to have crystallized around their alleged reformism, which relinquishes attempts to achieve radical emancipation. Cole rejects their emphasis upon a struggle for freedom, equality and rights, arguing that their insistence upon consistency through a demonstration of the incompatibility of simultaneous programmes of personal and property rights is simply an attempt to fulfil liberal promises. As such, Cole claims that their approach is not only philosophically idealist, but also constitutes a relapse into ideology in that it conceals the profound contradictions/antagonisms within capitalist society. (Cole, M. 1988, P.36-45). Cole concludes,

> We need therefore to develop our own discourse in the interests of the people in general and which is specifically anti-sexist and anti-racist.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.42)

Freeman-Moir et. al. also criticize Bowles and Gintis for their reformist attitudes. They claim that Bowles and Gintis' concentration upon the exploitation of contradictions between personal and property rights in capitalist society is futile, because it remains ensnared in the logic of capitalist development. As long as capitalism persists, there can be no freedom, reconciliation or consistency because capitalism is a priori inimical to these. One must repudiate the context not operate within it.

> If the clash over rights is to have any solid outcome, then personal rights have to be taken out of the realm in which they are defined. That means revolutionary action ---
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.220)

The denunciation of Bowles and Gintis as ideological purveyors and reformists, who compromise the emancipatory task of Marxism, can be explained in terms of a reaction against the anxiety which Bowles and Gintis' ontology inevitably generates. This ontology is clearly stated when they write,

> While there is a strong tendency in all of social theory (Marxism and non-Marxism alike) to conceive of society as a unified expression of a single underlying logic, the notion of society as a set of overlapping games recognizes the irreducible heterogeneity of such distinct areas of society as state, family, education, economy and community. These sites, rather than expressing an underlying unity, articulate as overlapping and heterogeneous games. The notion of distinct and mutually irreducible forms of domination (state, class, gender and race) also flow naturally from this perspective.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.240-241)

If one accepts this ontology, and rejects the reductionism and reconciliatory expectations of classical Marxist theory, one must concentrate upon the diverse manifestations of domination and oppression, all of which are not co-ordinated by a pervasive influence like the exploitative relations of production. One must also acknowledge that the 'interests of the people in general' is not an easily identifiable project, whose realization is imminent once capitalism has been superceded. But this acknowledgement affirms the contingent and precarious nature of political experience, one whose radical indeterminacy is a profound source of anxiety; thought and action without guarantees of success, thought and action which ironically subvert the emancipatory intentions of the sincere liberator. These are the politics of uncertainty articulated by Marxist sympathisers like Adorno and Horkheimer whose theoretical profundity and historical understanding seems to be ignored by the detractors of Bowles and Gintis. Rachel Sharp's anxiety is reflected in her description of the import of Bowles and Gintis' work, allayed by her reiteration of classical tenets which obviously radically alter one's expectations for emancipatory transformation. For her, Bowles and Gintis' position and proposals seem,

> rather akin to the pluralist model of society characteristic of liberal social theory, and in their displacement of any of these sites from a position of casual primacy, human history is reduced to the realm of mere contingency.
>
> (Cole, M. 1988, P.192)

If the focus and dependence upon the causal primacy of the relations of production is a theoretical antidote to the anxieties generated by an ontology of radical contingency, its emancipatory expectations have not been vindicated by historical experience. If the critiques of writers like Adorno and Horkheimer are accepted, the 'liberal' approach cannot simply be dismissed as ideological obfuscation, reformism and hypocrisy, or compromises with oppression. For the variant of liberalism represented by Berlin and Hall

does not appear as an apology for capitalism, nor as a facile portrayal of attainable human freedom, but as one which grapples with the precarious nature of historical contingency in an attempt to elicit a viable concept and practice of freedom, continuously aware of the antinomies of freedom embodied in the tension between negative and positive liberty.

Such a theoretical position seems to be the very one which writers like Bowles and Gintis now occupy. Having relinquished the tenets of classical Marxism, whose credibility has become increasingly questionable within the tradition of Western Marxism, they confront the morass of politics defined by liberal exponents of Berlin's calibre. A refusal to concede the nexus of dilemmas, quandaries and dangers within the ontology of radical contingency will obviously engender the kinds of hopes and denunciations expressed in the work of Cole, Freeman-Moir et. al. and Rachel Sharp.

Such competing ontologies as classical Marxism and radical contingency are indeed incompatible, and may exemplify the kinds of hostile systems around which basic conflict revolves, as suggested by Berlin. We do not need to pursue this debate here, for the main point to be made is that, if the expectations of emancipation and reconciliation emanating from the analysis of classical Marxism are relinquished, the concerns of Marxists (who may now prefer the appellation of 'radical') converge with those of certain liberal apologists, for whom the quest for freedom is fraught with the difficulties repeatedly adumbrated above. This convergence has been demonstrated not only in a consideration of mainstream Marxism, but also in the debates between Marxist philosophers of education, who derive their analytical categories and expectations from this parent tradition.

This chapter reinforces the major argument which this thesis has been constructing since its inception. Both liberalism and Marxism have been primarily concerned with the promotion of freedom through the exercise of reason, a conceptual association inherited from the secular ambitions of the 18 th c. Enlightenment. Our review of the history of this relationship between freedom and reason in these respective traditions has disclosed how liberals have problematized the notion of freedom, whose negative and positive variants co-exist in a tense and conflictual manner, often revealing the limits of rational procedure in the synthesis of theory and practice, and in the resolution of debate and conflict. Two of 20 th c. Marxism's most eminent theorists, Adorno and Horkheimer indicated how the very concept of reason could produce oppressive consequences, introducing ambiguity into the pursuit of freedom through the exercise of reason. This chapter has attempted to show how these difficulties are replicated in both liberal and Marxist philosophy of education, whose fundamental concepts are derived from the liberal and Marxist traditions.

Michel Foucault's study of the history of reason through his analyses of the emergence and transformation of both the human sciences and particular social values since the 18 th c. also presents a profound challenge to the Enlightenment's notion of emancipatory reason. The third part of this thesis will examine

aspects of his work, primarily arguing that he articulates a significantly subversive perspective upon the development of Western reason, initiated by the extraordinary work of Nietzsche, who exercised a profound influence upon him. It will also claim that Foucault's work is significant and valuable because he contends with the kinds of antinomies of freedom, and ambiguities of reason which have emerged inexorably in both the liberal and Marxist traditions. A conspicuously tragic tone attends the writings of authors like Berlin and Hall, Adorno and Horkheimer, and it will be suggested that Foucault's work is an articulation of a radically secular tragic perspective, which confronts the major disappointment of the Enlightenment's legacy for us; the failure of reason to promote freedom in a universal and unambiguous way.

PART THREE

FOUCAULT - CHALLENGES AND CONTINUITIES

CHAPTER SEVEN

NIETZSCHE & FOUCAULT

Introduction

In an interview with Gérard Raulet (Telos No.55 Spring 1983), Foucault made some brief and interesting comments about his intellectual and philosophical indebtedness to Nietzsche's work. He remarked that he had written very little about Nietzsche, but that, since first reading Nietzsche in 1953, he had taken the challenge of Nietzsche's work very seriously.

Nietzsche's challenge consists of his radical reflections upon "the question of truth, the history of truth and the will to truth" (Foucault, 1983, P.204). Foucault referred to the import of Nietzche's illuminating examinations of these topics on numerous occasions (1980, P.133; 1982 P.216; 1988, P.107), relating them to his own concerns by posing the question,

> What is the maximum of philosophical intensity and what are the current philosophical effects to be found in these texts?
>
> (Foucault, M., 1983, P.204)

The "question of truth" is an integral part of knowledge and reason, and this thesis has focussed upon the relationship between reason and freedom. Previous chapters have explored the development of this complicated and often anguished relationship in the evolution of both liberal and Marxist thought, accentuating the contradictions and dilemmas experienced by both traditions as they encounter the difficulties of promoting freedom through the exercise of reason.

Chapter six concluded with the suggestion that Foucault's work can be considered as a crystallization of the antinomies of freedom and ambiguities of reason explicated in the chapters on liberalism and Marxism. Foucault's examination of the history of truth, as it emerged within the context of the evolution of the human sciences, is instructive because it emphasizes the oppressive consequences of the articulation and

formalization of 'regimes of truth' (1980, P.133). For Foucault, reason can not be depicted as the unproblematic agent for the attainment of individual and collective freedom, for its concrete manifestations impose an intricate system of oppressive effects upon the societies in which it is implemented.

Foucault's acknowledgement of the significance of Nietzsche's reflections upon the history of truth for his own examination of the relationship between reason and freedom is important for our purposes. These acknowledgements, as indicated above, are very brief, and Foucault left us with no systematic account of how Nietzsche's diverse considerations influenced and permeated his own work. Consequently, one is confronted with the task of interpreting the impact of Nietzsche upon Foucault's extensive corpus.

This chapter will pursue this interpretation with a very specific focus. Any exploration of the concept and history of truth in Nietzsche's work must consider his central notion of the Will to Power, for the latter is a culminating concept which synthesizes many of his central concerns. His analysis of truth in Western society generally, and in Western philosophy in particular, is conducted on a very abstract level. It contrasts with Foucault's study of reason and truth in the history of particular Western European institutions, which were established to study and contain madness, practice medicine, and discipline deviance. It will be argued that one can construe Foucault's studies of reason and truth since the 18 th c. as specific historical manifestations of the will to power, a complement to Nietzsche's more abstract analyses.

Nietzsche's formulations of the relationship between knowledge and power, and Foucault's subsequent historical reflections upon similar concatenations, are valuable for our purposes, because they illuminate many of the issues of domination and exploitation considered earlier. The experiences of domination and exploitation were portrayed as clear manifestations of the discordant relationship between reason and freedom. It is suggested here that an interpretation of Nietzche's influence upon Foucault clarifies the latter's contribution to an articulation of the Enlightenment's problematic legacy for the contemporary world. This interpretation enables one to explain the experience of tragedy so poignantly described by Isaiah Berlin, and to develop a deeper understanding of the political constraints within which a contemporary secular culture must proceed. It also complements the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, whose political reflections, analyses and proposals concentrate upon the inadequacy of thought to reality, and for whom this acknowledgement directs the course of any future adequate political criticism and action. Briefly, an interpretation of Nietzsche's influence upon Foucault both consolidates and extends the quandaries and dilemmas accentuated in our study of the evolution of reason's relationship to freedom in the history of both liberal and Marxist thought. It contributes to our understanding of our present secular identity, demarcating limits and possibilities for the continuing pursuit of freedom in our political arrangements. Foucault crystallizes the challenge to the Enlightenment's optimistic association of reason and freedom, as it has emerged from the tortured history of that relationship in both liberal and Marxist

experience. Having done so, he offers us a disillusioned, but far from capitulatory, vision of our future possibilities and dangers, one which must also affect our understanding of our prospects as educators.

Nietzsche's Philosophical Significance

Although Nietzsche's writings are presented in discrete sections, these sections contribute to the development of sustained reflection on epistemology, ethics, theology and aesthetics. If one considers Nietzsche's working notes, published as The Will to Power (1967) as an overview of his general concerns, which received detailed explication in his published books, one may conclude that his philosophical reflections can be subsumed under the rubric of the problem of 'European Nihilism', which is the title of the first book in the Will to Power. For Nietzsche, the advent of nihilistic perceptions was a debilitating occurrence, to which his life's work was a consistent response; he strove to transcend the negative perspectives and influences generated by the challenge of nihilism. To Nietzsche, the entire legacy of Western culture and philosophy had to be re-evaluated in terms of this experience, and it was to this task that much of his work was devoted.

In section 12 of the Will to Power, Nietzsche provides a detailed account, which is radically disorientating, of the experience of nihilism. He describes nihilism as a realization that existence has no goal, aim or purpose, that the world and one's place in it is not part of an intelligible unity or totality, and that there is no true world which transcends this expansive flux of directionless processes.

The term which Nietzsche employs to describe this world of flux is 'becoming', and many of his expositions portray an acute tension between the categories of 'being' and 'becoming'. The postulation of 'being' had been a philosophical error perpetrated for centuries by those thinkers and writers for whom stable essences, objectivity and immutability are an integral part of life's meaning (T.I. 'Reason' in Philosophy 1).[1.] In order to deny appearance and transience in the interests of an enduring, structural order, philosophers have continually contrasted the world of 'appearance' with that of 'reality', deriving comfort and consolation from their own alleged ontological dichotomies. Such affirmations have been reassuring because they posit the presence of a unitary order, of which man can feel an integrated and purposeful part (W.P. 515). Pronounced theological convictions permeate such philosophical declarations, for God Himself is the permanent origin whose essential creativity endures for eternity. The visible world may be ephemeral and destructible but there is a purposeful (because divinely intentional) order which buttresses it. Traditionally, social phenomena like moral systems have been endowed with the status of objective, natural, and permanent entities, which regulate our lives according to Divine prescriptions, conferring an ultimate meaning upon our actions (T.I. - The 'Improvers' of Mankind 1). For Nietzsche, a nihilistic perspective is a radical repudiation of the postulations of 'being', an acknowledgement that the world of 'becoming', the

world of 'appearances', is all that we have. Yet in affirming this, we deprive ourselves of a sense of purpose, integration with one another and with the world, and of the comfort of an enduring world; no meaning, no unity, no transcendent truth.

However, Nietzsche's systematic exposure of former philosophical error does not imply that rectification is easily attainable. Nietzsche did not expect that contemporary philosophers in particular, and people in general, could embrace the world of 'becoming', repudiating the categories of 'being' in the interests of truth. The tension in Nietzsche's analysis resides precisely in his realization and acknowledgement that 'becoming' necessarily generates the deception of 'being', a deception which is embodied in our collective accumulation of knowledge (W.P. 517). In conventional understanding, knowledge has been portrayed as a complicated association of propositions which correspond with the state of affairs in the world (B.G.E.2). Philosophers have usually defined their task as an impartial quest for truth, themselves as objective exponents of it. For Nietzsche, this was a consistent process of deluded hubris (G.S.346), for our knowledge really consists of a detailed series of related statements which constitute a particular perspective, whose purpose is to impose order upon the world (W.P. 515,518). Our linguistic conventions are arbitrary constructs, consolidated by historical experience and developed into a body of truth, whose purpose is to ensure our survival (G.S. 111, 121, 354, 374, B.G.E. 3 & 4, W.P. 480 & 507). Our truths, embodied in our putative knowledge, are provisional stabilizations of the flux of 'becoming', which we then represent to ourselves as the permanence of 'being'. The ineluctable irony of our human situation is that this error is a prerequisite for our survival, for knowledge imposes the order of 'being', upon the chaos of 'becoming'. Contrary to traditional perceptions the will to truth is a will to power (W.P. 552 & 617), an unacknowledged pursuit of collective control over the uncertainties and instabilities of the world of 'appearance', the world of 'becoming' (B.G.E.5-9).

The irruption of nihilism into Western culture and philosophy is consequently both an exposure and a challenge. It is a relentless disillusionment because it reveals the vacuity of all former claims to the discovery of objective and enduring truths; it discloses the fiction of 'being' (W.P. 708). Yet a significant aspect of nihilism's revelation is that man is a creator. If centuries of immersion in the delusions of objective truth have obscured the human impulse towards the construction of regulative knowledge, nihilism has reverted epistemology's scrutiny to its own provenance. Nihilism's challenge consists of a demand that we acknowledge our own agency in the generation of a transient and groundless knowledge, while simultaneously recognizing the need to deny this process. Integrity induces an unendurable and vertiginous responsibility, but participation in life requires an expedient amnesia and self-deception. ("On Truth and Lie in an extra-moral sense" and W.P. 514).

Our present project does not require further exploration of the question of nihilism. It has been discussed because it is the issue which impelled Nietzsche towards a protracted analysis of the related topics of

language, reason, knowledge and truth. For our purposes, his understanding of the character of knowledge is crucial, because it illuminates many of the problems discussed in previous chapters.

Although Nietzsche's emphasis upon the creative nature of language and knowledge implies an indefinite expansiveness, this characterization is accompanied by an acute sense of the limits within which we must operate. Firstly, our collective envelopment and constitution by the medium of knowledge - language itself - implies that we are committed to an external experience of self-reflexive limitation and frustration. We cannot extricate ourselves from the object of investigation, which is language. We require that language conducts an introverted and convoluted enquiry into its own nature and capabilities, the recognition of which deprives us of former hopes for a detached and impartial vantage point from which to assess our corpus of knowledge (W.P.473 and 486). Language emerges as both an enabling and limiting condition of our existence.

As one of our primary regulative facilities, language is necessarily coarse and superficial, accomplishing its stabilizing tasks through a process of simplification. It conducts an almost violatory seizure of the world with its systems of classification which entail crude dichotomies and contrasts, whose delineations deceive us into presuming that they have identified fundamental ontological distinctions (B.G.E. 24 and W.P. 569). Even the very structure of grammar has deceptive consequences, for its postulation of subject and object endows the latter with a rigid and separated ontological status, about which we think we can obtain a final and absolute knowledge. (B.G.E.34, T.I. 'Reason' in Philosophy 5).

Secondly, the necessarily perspectival nature of our knowledge is such that a comprehensive understanding is precluded. There can be no universal apprehensions. A perspective is an imposition of identity upon the world from a particular viewpoint, equipping its possessors, articulators and exponents to organize their world (W.P. 481). The concept of perspectivism presupposes multiplicity, and we cannot expect a concordance of perspectives. Within a world of multiple perspectives, their juxtaposition generates a conflictual relationship, committing us to an existence of continuous struggle (W.P. 556 and 568).

Nietzsche cautions us against the view that the will to truth as the will to power is only a matter of self-preservation. He characterizes the will to power as expressive and expansive, continuously seeking the augmentation of its own capabilities. Preservation itself may be a consequence of this discharge of force, and this is manifested when a particular perspective is projected as a normative one for all, thereby assuming an impositional character, and aggravating the condition of struggle (G.S. 359, B.G.E.13). The combative nature of perspectivism is evident from Nietzsche's claim that the will to power is manifested through resistance; the assertive quality of knowledge necessarily fosters challenge and confrontation (W.P.656).

Nietzsche's depiction of knowledge as perspectivism provides an illuminating explanation of the experience of tragedy described by both Berlin and Hall. As liberal writers, they are both concerned about the preservation of liberty in the contemporary world, and emphasize the dangers inherent in the promotion of programmes of positive liberty. The latter are redolent of Nietzsche's expansive perspectives which are projected as normative ones for all (W.P.481), thereby erasing alternative perspectives and, by implication, curtailing the free action of those whose activities are informed by the eliminated perspective. Nietzsche's account is disconcerting, because if particular perspectives emanate from specific needs, and there is no "rational" position which transcends the confines of perspectivism, there cannot be any anticipation of a rational resolution to conflict in the sense of a general perspectival accord to which all participants can assent. Diversity is an intractable feature of human involvement with language and knowledge, and consequently conflicts are permanent.

Nietzschean perspectivism must not be construed as a series of insular and rigid outlooks. The notion of 'interpretation' designates the process whereby perspectival limitations can be transcended, but no interpretation can be so expansive as to secure a unitary and harmonious perspective. 'Interpretation' concerns modification and adaptation of perspective, not the elimination of multiplicity.

Nietzshe's abstraction also provides us with an explanation of the interminability of criticism, an important feature of Adorno's and Horkheimer's concept of political action. Their aversion to the classical Marxist emphasis on totality can be translated into Nietzschean terms. The notion of totality is the equivalent of a unitary perspective which proclaims its own universal validity, an impositional interpretation which tries to negate the experience of multiple perspective. This culminated in conceptual and physical coercion, converting the idea of totality into the reality of political totalitarianism. Unitary perspectivism is an implicitly spurious claim that language is adequate to reality, that the articulations of knowledge can comprehend the world, in its entirety. Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of totality disputes this, indicating that the discrepancy between language and the world is a prerequisite for critical thinking. In Nietzschean terms, critical thinking consists of the interpretive modification of a perspective, probing the omitted or alternative intellectual space necessarily excluded by the specific articulations of any particular perspective.

No critical commentary upon Nietzsche's extended reassessment of the history of truth will be offered here, because this chapter's intention is to present an interpretation of the influence of Nietzsche's cardinal concepts upon the work of Foucault. Once this has been completed, the impact of their related perspectives upon our understanding of education will be considered, presenting us with the opportunity for a critical evaluation of their concepts and significance.

Nietzsche's Influence Upon Foucault's Work

In a succinct and concentrated explication, Foucault (1982), reflecting upon the history of his interests and research, remarks that,

> My objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1982, P.208)

It was Foucault's attempts to relate a particular account of the constitution of subjectivity which eventually committed him to a study of the relationship between power and knowledge. His conceptual progressions indicate that the constitutional identity of western subjectivity since the 18 th c. emerges intelligibly within a particular nexus of power and knowledge.

If one considers the content and import of Madness and Civilization (1961) Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1). (1978) one notices that in the latter study Foucault presents some very general characterizations of the emergence and nature of the modern European State since the 18 th c., which retrospectively enhance the value of the insights offered in his earlier works.

In the first volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies a significant transformation in the attitudes of European sovereigns towards their subject populations, a politically significant redefinition of sovereign prerogatives. Formerly sovereign power had been concerned with the right to decide issues of life and death. As the sovereign, a ruler was entitled to demand that his subjects protect his domain against any hostile incursions, as well as to inflict death as a punishment for recusant or seditious conduct.

Such demands and retaliations are of course present in the administration of modern state systems, but Foucault observes that contemporary governments have a much more subtle and complex understanding of the generation and maintenance of state power. Essentially, this focuses upon a different, and less antagonistic, definition of the political relationship between rulers and subjects. Their political coexistence now emphasises the duty of the ruler to promote the welfare of his subjects rather than his right to demand the sacrifice of their lives, a significant shift which qualitatively alters the character of state power in the contemporary world. Rulers began to appreciate the national and international political advantages of enhancing the quality of life of their subjects, who constituted an important economic and military asset. The improvement of their lives would contribute to the promotion of both national stability and international strength.

> How could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.260)

If the emergence of the modern state has been coeval with that of mass society, its governmental duties have not simply conferred an anonymous identity upon society. Foucault indicates that the enhancement of national welfare and capability necessarily entailed a sustained and detailed interest in the conduct and development of the individual. He designates this significant combination of state concern for both individual and popular welfare as "bio-power", commenting that,

> The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed ---. The old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.262)

Foucault's studies of the emergence of the modern asylum and prison provide us with a detailed account and analysis of the processes generated by a modern focus on the discipline of the body, the important individualizing pole of the comprehensive practice of 'bio-power'. Foucault had not formulated this latter concept when he wrote Madness and Civilization and Discipline and Punish, but their political and philosophical significance is clearly accentuated if they are considered within the context of this later characterization of the modern state and its government. This chapter will argue that a conspicuous aspect of this significance is Nietzsche's influence upon Foucault's formulations.

The location of the individual within the matrix of 'bio-power' generates the question of the modern subject's identity; how have we come to be who are we? Foucault explores this central question and interest of his work by situating the individual at the point of formative intersection between power and knowledge. The dual and conflated influence of power and knowledge effect the identity of the modern subject.

At the beginning of his essay on "The Subject and Power" (1982), Foucault refers to his concern with how the subject emerged as an object of investigation. His notion of 'bio-power' explained how the subject became a cardinal interest in the complex configuration of contemporary political relations, an object of political concern. The detail of this 'political anatomy' (1984, P.262) is explored in Foucault's analysis of 'dividing practices', which constitutes the very substance of works like Madness and Civilization and Discipline and Punish, and provides us with a clear example of Nietzsche's influence upon him.

Foucault's analysis of 'dividing practices' is portrayed here as a specific historical manifestation of Nietzsche's will to power. Our review of Nietzsche's main epistemological contentions indicated that for him, the history of truth is the history of the imposition of order upon the flux of 'becoming', upon the transience of 'appearance'. These stabilizing impositions fail to acknowledge the processes of subjective creativity, and are consolidated into bodies of knowledge, whose status is proclaimed as objective, static and essential. They become reified truths, whose existence is postulated as ontologically distinct and

permanent. Subjects of knowledge, like philosophers, then mistakenly assume that there is an object to be discovered, forgetting that it is a product of a creative will to power, inherited through a cultural and intellectual legacy, but distorted in the processes of historical transmission.

The 'dividing practices' considered by Foucault in the context of the asylum and prison are classificatory systems with salient moral import. They represent efforts to categorize individuals, precisely and with an alleged objectivity, as mad and sane, normal and deviant, with the intention of subjecting them to correctional surveillance and reform. The 'dividing practices' are significant because they consist of processes of intensive investigation, observation, typology, evaluation and judgement, an unprecedented concentration upon the details of individual thought and action, and a preoccupation with social uniformity. Foucault explains that the concept of the subject has to be appreciated in its subtle variations. Not only does it imply that the individual is the subject of enquiry, but also that the individual's subjective identity is constituted by the complex reticulations of classification and judgement, all of which pressurize him into a particular pattern of inveterate conduct and self-understanding.

In Madness and Civilization, (1961) Foucault addresses the social phenomenon of extensive confinement, which emerged in Europe during the middle years of the 17 th c. His analysis shows that the 'houses of confinement' were established because of a number of socially motivated concerns. During times of economic depression, they contributed to social order and stability by confining vagabonds, providing them with sustenance and menial tasks to prevent them from resorting to violence and crime in order to survive. Large numbers of this itinerant and threatening population also participated in elementary forms of economic production during confinement, but Foucault indicates that this was neither a primary intention nor very significant economically. Foucault comments:

> In fact, the relation between the practice of confinement and the insistence on work is not defined by economic conditions; far from it.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.136)

What emerges from Foucault's study of the evolution of confinement practices is a preoccupation with the moral correction of idleness.

> --- the very requirement of labour was instituted as an exercise in moral reform and constraint, which reveals, if not the ultimate meaning, at least the essential justification of confinement.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.138)

Foucault considers the contribution of two 19 th c. French reformers, Tuke and Pinel, to the evolution of the 'houses of confinement'. He notes that Tuke's famous Retreat was an institution which exemplifies the dual notions of subjectivity noted above. Inmates at the Retreat were not only the subjects of surveillance and

correction, but also the intended agents of a revised moral practice, expected of them by normal society. Reform was not induced by sustained processes of coercive and punitive inflictions, which would have been the responsibility of the moral reformers themselves. Instead, Tuke concentrated upon the reconstitution of moral agency, transferring the burden of guilt and responsibility onto the subject himself. The internalization of norms and values became the new custodian of conduct, so that the agent's internal discipline and acute sense of guilt, rather than the fear of retributive physical consequences began to regulate his life and actions, equipping him for participation in the activities of normal society.

> For the first time, institutions of morality are established in which an astonishing synthesis of moral obligation and civil law is effected. The law of nations will no longer countenance the disorder of hearts.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.138)

Tuke's understanding of the processes of moral reform, of reconstituted subjectivity, was influenced by religious convictions, particularly those of the Community of Quakers (Foucault, M., 1984, P.143). For Pinel, reform was predicated upon scientific advance, more particularly medical expertise, which examined, evaluated, contained and attempted to redress an acute form of social deviance, madness itself.

Foucault suggests that two errors are prevalent in the historical evaluation of the work of Tuke and Pinel. The first is that they were seen as reformers in a morally superior, philanthropic sense. For Foucault, their efforts denote a significant modification in the exercise of social power, an important contribution to the transition to an age of 'bio-power'. Secondly, the particular medical focus promoted by Pinel may be construed as a triumph for secular science and objectivity. Yet Foucault indicates that such a view conceals the influence of a continuing emphasis upon compliance with a dominant moral uniformity. The exaltation of science augmented or fortified the moral order by conferring an enhanced status of objectivity upon it. (Foucault, M., 1984, P.160-161, 163-164).

Foucault's study of the 'houses of confinement' between the 17 th and 19 th centuries clearly illustrates a number of Nietzschean concerns. In demarcating an area of study viz the confinement and reform of a marginal section of society, whose spectrum ranged from vagabonds to madmen, Foucault illuminates the way in which established moral categories, consolidated by centuries of Christian conviction, exerted a particularly stringent form of control upon society by intensifying and implementing vigorously their detailed systems of classification, their 'dividing practices' which identified and approved the normal and acceptable, and distinguished the reprobates and deviants who had to be confined and subjected to correction and reform. Foucault depicts a complex and established body of discriminatory moral knowledge, whose practice and application constitutes a significant exercise in modern social power. The proliferating precision with which moral truth was formulated extended a controlling power over an increasing number of European subjects, regulating their national conduct and inscribing normative identities upon them, fulfilling the precepts of 'bio-power'.

The "objective" status of these practices and formulations has been confirmed both by historical tradition, and more recently, by the complementary authority of science, or in this particular case, of medicine. The assertions and regulations of these systems of moral knowledge have assumed an essential immutability which conceals their origin in practices which favour the needs and interests of some at the expense of others. Moral knowledge is a perspective which prohibits alternative formulations and suppresses adversaries in a relentless course of struggle. Their durability and effectivity erase the memory of their origin in perspectival subjective creativity, and their historical respectability obscures the relationship between power and knowledge operating in their implementation. Although Madness and Civilization has directed our attention to these Nietzschean influences in Foucault's work, we shall pursue the interpretation further by examining Discipline and Punish (1975), a later work which seems to illustrate the argument even better.

Foucault's study of aberration and its control in Madness and Civilization illustrates the manner in which power and knowledge co-exist in a reciprocal relationship. It indicates how an historically specific need for social control generated and augmented a body of moral and "scientific" knowledge, whose practice or implementation produced a power-effect, fulfilled the needs of its adherents and exponents. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault makes explicit reference to the inextricability of the power-knowledge nexus when he writes,

> Perhaps too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands, and its interests --- We should admit, rather, that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.175)

Discipline and Punish seeks to exemplify this eminently Nietzschean theme by explaining the development of the French penal system in the 18 th and 19 th centuries. Foucault reiterates very clearly a number of the themes evident in Madness and Civilization. Just as he had dismissed any characterization of Tuke and Pinel as benevolent reformers, so he disdains any view of penal leniency as the product of humanitarian sentiment. The evolution of the prison reflects the exercise of new forms of social power, as did that of the asylum. The penal system no longer displayed incidents of brutal retribution, but proceeded to engender a new knowledge of man, whose normative constraints upon the individual would both constitute his identity and standardize his actions, contributing again to the maturation of 'bio-power'.

For Foucault, if the law (which itself is an important body of knowledge contributing to the stabilization of society, to the practice of power) commits one to penal reform, then the disciplines inculcate a penetrating

regime of normalization, 'inscribed' upon the body, mind and conduct of the deviant who has been identified in terms of the classificatory schemes of the 'dividing practices'.

> The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P. 195 - emphasis in the original)

These normalizing practices, erected upon a proliferating knowledge of the individual and his aberrations, induce a docility and compliance, foster a reformed subjectivity. In a graphically inverted metaphor, Foucault claims that in the secular age of 'bio-power', and the 'disciplinary society', "the soul is the prison of the body" (Foucault, M., 1984, P.177). The power of incarceration fosters the generation of a knowledge of deviance and correction, which buttresses the exercise of penal reform. Part of the latter is a reconstituted subjectivity, an assimilation of designated correct norms, an 'inscribed' soul which directs the actions of the body in a prescribed and approved manner.

Although Discipline and Punish devotes detailed attention to the 'political anatomy of the body', the circumscription of the individual by normalizing practices, it also provides some incisive comments on the popular pole of 'bio-power', and these also display an explicitly Nietzschean influence.

Referring to the specific exigencies of modern European state formation, Foucault writes that the emerging disciplines, embodied in a knowledge of the human sciences, were partly a response to the dual and related demands of demographic expansion and economic production. The disciplines contributed to an improvement of the 'tactics of power' necessary to organize these features into an efficient and expansive force. The disciplines facilitated the economical and effective regulation of the population by promoting docility and utility within the industrial, educational, military and medical sectors. Foucault employs a very Nietzschean concept when he claims that,

> --- the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.207)

By 'human multiplicities', he is referring to what seem to be the naturally dispersed and centripetal forces and influences in the world of 'appearance', in the flux of 'becoming'. Such phenomena are identifiable; in this case Foucault is discussing the diverse movements and projects of population groups which have to be curtailed in the interests of organization and production. The truth of a discipline is part of a will to power because,

one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique.

(Foucault, M., 1984, P.207)

The claims of a discipline are impositional and regulatory, temporarily stabilizing the plural dynamism of the social world, investing a fluid world of social 'becoming' with the stabilizing categories of social 'being', rendering possible the exercise of a particular kind of power. In this sense, Foucault's account of 'bio-power' is suffused with Nietzschean understanding.

Nietzsche's notion of the will to power is a conflictual one, as indicated above. This sensitivity to the combative dimension of perspectival imposition and assertion is evident in Foucault's discussion of the way in which the 18 th c. European bourgeoisie's normative perspectives were presented as universally acceptable in the language of egalitarianism and representative government. For Foucault

> The development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, dark side of these processes.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.211)

The 'disciplinary mechanisms' are 'dark' precisely because they articulate a regulatory truth, whose power-effects are nonegalitarian, and asymmetrical i.e. they produce systems of exclusion, and domination for those who are confined to the negative categories of a disciplinary classification. Foucault, like Nietzsche, is clearly conscious of the pernicious consequences of disciplinary knowledges (perspectives) whose intensity, detail and efficiency have escalated in the modern world. This is the ambiguity of the power and knowledge constitutive of a regulatory and classificatory perspective. Foucault acknowledges this in his succinct statement that,

> The "Enlightenment" which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.211)

The Enlightenment's promise of universal emancipation has been betrayed by the persistence of oppression.

Foucault comments periodically that his primary interest is with the western subject; how the identity of the subject has evolved, and how it is that the subject can tell the truth about itself. In pursuing these questions, Foucault has presented us with detailed considerations of the power-knowledge nexus, for it is only by explicating this that he can address the topic of the western subject. His reformulations of the issue of power in western society have been acclaimed as innovative and illuminating, though he has remarked that,

> I am far from being a theoretician of power. At the limit, I would say that power, as an autonomous question, does not interest me.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1983, P.207)

Despite Foucault's acknowledgement that his incisive comments on the nature and exercise of power in western society are a by-product of his interest in the western subject, they provide an important preliminary for any study of the political and educational consequences of Foucault's work. It has been shown how his conception of knowledge and its relationship to power is profoundly influenced by a Nietzschean understanding. Foucault's reformulations effectively problematize the conception of knowledge in the contemporary world, and this must have important consequences for educational practice, which is concerned with the transmission of knowledge. This topic will be our central concern in the next two chapters.

Since Foucault's understanding of power has significant implications for action, educational as well as political, we will devote the rest of this chapter to a consideration of it. This will not only provide an informative background to the considerations which follow in Chapter 8, but will also continue this chapter's concern to interpret Nietzsche's seminal influence upon Foucault's work.

Foucault's depiction of power in society seems to be a logical development of Nietzsche's claim that,

> All "purposes", "aims", "meaning" are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power. To have purposes, aims, intentions, willing in general, is the same thing as willing to be stronger, willing to grow - and, in addition, willing the means to this.
>
> (W.P.675)

Nietzsche's emphasis upon the expressive and expansive nature of the will to power suggests that it is characterized by a productive or constructive dynamism, consonant with the notion of the will to truth as a series of knowledge - formulations which organize the world, imposing particular constructs and orders upon it. This is of course a positive development in a qualified sense, for as Nietzsche acknowledges, truth cannot be construed as universally beneficial. There are those for whom the discriminatory formulations of knowledge, particularly those relating to moral prescription and action, are decisively adverse; this is the inherent and dangerous ambiguity of the will to truth as the will to power.

In commenting upon contemporary analyses of power, Foucault states that these have been exclusively negative. He identifies two conspicuous views of the issue.

> The one argues that the mechanisms of power are those of repression --- The other argues that the basis of the relationship of power lies in the hostile engagement of forces.

(Foucault, M., 1980, P.91)

Foucault's portrayal emerges partly as a response to the traditions of analysis represented by liberalism and Marxism. He characterizes liberal conceptions of social power as negative because they are articulated in terms of contractual relationships, whose distribution of rights and duties has oppressive consequences, which are often concealed by preoccupations with notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy. Marxist accounts portray social power as the forceful domination of subordinate classes by ruling ones. Neither perspective acknowledges the productive or constitutive features of power. Foucault argues that if power was only prohibitive or oppressive, it would be ineffectual.

> What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1980, P.119)

Foucault introduces two comments which would seem to confirm and limit the extent of Nietzsche's influence upon his work. In referring to the second of his unacceptable definitions of power as "the hostile engagement of forces", he states that, "for convenience I shall call this Nietzsche's hypothesis" (1980, P.91). Almost immediately he continues with the observation that,

> It is obvious that all my work in recent years has been couched in the schema of struggle-repression, and it is this - which I have hitherto been attempting to apply - which I have now been forced to reconsider ---
>
> (Foucault, M., 1980, P.92)

Foucault made these comments in 1976, acknowledging the Nietzschean influence upon his previous works (including Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish), but suggesting that this is a limited influence because it is too preoccupied with a negative concept of power. This seems to be an incongruous inference by Foucault, for, as indicated above, Nietzsche himself emphasized the positive (though ambiguous) nature of the will to truth as the will to power. When Foucault insists that the positive effect of power is the formation of knowledge and the production of discourse (1980, P.119), this seems to be precisely the process which he charts in works like Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish. These works, which he describes as too "Nietzschean" in their import seem nevertheless to evince the positive analysis of power which he was advocating in 1976.

This is a difficult inconsistency to resolve, although his subsequent essay, "The Subject and Power" (1982) provides some persuasive possibilities. In the latter part of that essay, Foucault develops further his

thought upon the specific nature of power. He introduces a number of illuminating distinctions, which may significantly qualify the 1976 remarks referred to above.

For Foucault, power is neither a possession nor an abstract entity. It is best characterized in terms of exercise and effect, manifested in the relational experience of human action, but can be extended beyond this.

> The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others --- Power exists only when it is put into action.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1982, P.219)

This concept of power as a certain modification of actions by actions raises important questions about the related notions of violence and agency. Foucault indicates that the exercise of power is not a direct and immediate action upon people or things. Rather it is a form of 'government', which structures "the possible field of action of others" (1982, P.221). Foucault's use of 'government' in this context recalls the 16 th c. designation which referred to the direction of individuals or groups; the government of children, souls, communities, families, the sick (1982, P.221). An exercise of power emerges as a process of demarcation, which directs and constrains the "field of action of others". It constructs and denotes a limited range of possibilities.

Violence, by contrast, eliminates possibilities, for,

> A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys ---
>
> (1982, P.220)

An exercise of power presupposes that agency is a fundamental and continuous aspect of the process. It assumes that agents are capable of certain initiatives and responses, and it is these components which constitute the actions over which power will exercise a modifying influence. Violent action is one of annihilation and ruthless subjugation, whose coercive measures preclude the initiatives and responses of other agents. The latter's participation is not an issue, for they are either eliminated or fearfully subordinated. The exercise of power is a subtle and complex process, striving for certain effects, but skilfully sensitive to the unintended consequences and unanticipated responses which may demand new formulations and modification of the field of action.

Foucault's important distinctions can be applied to earlier works like Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish, and it seems that the 'disciplines' which he so carefully delineated in those books clearly emerge as examples of the exercise of power. The normative constraints, evaluations and

judgements constructed and conveyed through the consolidated dichotomies of idle and industrious, depraved and virtuous, mad and sane, deviant and normal, the evolving bodies of knowledge and assessment, all seem to have constituted spectrums of action and acceptability which structured "the possible field of action of others". The disciplines were well defined systems of condoned possibilities which imposed regulatory networks upon society. In terms of 'bio-power', they respected the agency of others in so far as the promotion of individual and collective welfare in the interests of national integration and international power was one of their primary intentions, the improvement and extension of life rather than its premature cessation. Foucault describes the exercise of power in terms clearly applicable to the implementation of disciplines:

> It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.
>
> (1982, P.220).

One can conclude from this important essay on the nature of power that Foucault's earlier comment on the negative "Nietzschean hypothesis" in his writings is implicitly altered by these subsequent reflections. This hypothesis in conventional studies of power equated power with the "hostile engagement of forces" (1980, P.91). This effectively identifies power with violence, which Foucault systematically repudiates in the essay on "The Subject and Power". The latter essay seems retrospectively to associate the practice of the disciplines, as explicated in Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish, with the positive exercise of power. If this inference is correct, Foucault's characterization of his study of the disciplines as too negative in their import seems to have been a temporary re-evaluative inaccuracy, which is rectified by the perspective articulated in "The Subject and Power". This modified view also restores credibility to the claim that there is a continuous Nietzschean influence operating in Foucault's formulations. Nietzsche's depiction of the will to truth as the will to power projects a constructive image of the effects of power, in that bodies of knowledge constitute a particular, stabilizing and orderly imposition upon the evanescence of the world of 'appearance'. Foucault's account of the practice of the disciplines as exercises of power creates a similar impression, for the disciplines construct certain fields of possibility for action, thereby imposing an identifiable and relatively continuous pattern of regularity upon the social world.

Although Foucault distinguishes between power and violence, he does not imply that they are separable. He explores the relationship between them by introducing an important set of concepts like 'agonism' and 'struggle', 'confrontation' and 'strategy'.

'Agonism' and 'struggle' are terms which apply to the vicissitudes characterizing the exercise of power. If the exercise of power presupposes respect for agency (in the terms explained above), then this exercise is an inherently unstable process. By structuring "the possible field of action of others", any exercise of

power must anticipate recalcitrance and resistance, for it is effectively circumscribing the alternatives available for the free agents who are its 'subjects' (in the dual Foucauldian sense explained above on P. 133).

> To live in society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible - and in fact ongoing. A society without power relations can only be an abstraction --- I would say that the analysis, elaboration and bringing into question of power relations and the "agonism" between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence.
>
> (1982, P.222-223)

Phases during any exercise of power may be confrontational, periods during which adversaries contest for control over the initiative in structuring "the possible field of action of others". They employ various strategies, which Foucault defines as the means to attain certain ends, the way one seeks to have advantage over others, and the procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive one's opponent of his means of combat (1982, P.224-225).

For Foucault, these phases in the exercise of power are critical, and may evolve into violent confrontation, at which point the exercise of power is transformed into an attempt to annihilate one's opponent; one does not thereby structure the field of possible action of others, but seeks to monopolize the field of action by eliminating resistance. Since the latter cannot be pursued as a consistent political policy (and one can see why if one recalls Foucault's analysis of "bio-power"), Foucault writes that,

> For a relationship of confrontation, from the moment it is not a struggle to the death, the fixing of a power relationship becomes a target - at one and the same time its fulfillment and its suspension.
>
> (1982, P.225)

Foucault is arguing that power relations (the particular form of an exercise of power) supercede the antagonism of strategic confrontation. There seems to be an indefinite dialectic of power and confrontation which, translated into Nietzschean terms, suggests that power relations are temporary stabilizations, whose form is embodied in the particular character of a body of knowledge, enunciation of truth, or the order of disciplines. Confrontations, as strategic struggles, are eruptions of resistance, which disrupt the transient equilibrium of a particular exercise of power. Such an equilibrium is the preferred condition towards which societies strive continuously.

At the end of this quite definitive essay, Foucault makes some brief but incisive remarks, which indicate how the experience of domination is inherent within this dialectic of power and confrontation which characterizes all societies. He writes that,

> The consequence of this instability is the ability to decipher the same events and the same transformations either from the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the power relationships.
>
> (1982, P.226)

Reverting implicitly to his central concern with the subject's identity, Foucault is suggesting that one's constituted subjectivity within the field of action demarcated by the exercise of power fundamentally affects one's interpretation and perspective upon the situation. A decisive exercise of power, represented for example by the implementation of the disciplines, is a stabilizing perspective in the Nietzschean sense. However, as both Nietzsche and Foucault continually reiterate, no will to truth as a will to power is an uncontested unilateral process; resistance is generated, and the recalcitrant perspective posits an alternative understanding of an appropriate order for the world of appearance, incompatible with the dominant features of the hegemonic exercise of power, and committing society to periods of intermittent conflict and confrontation.

There is no suggestion, in either Nietzsche's or Foucault's formulations, that there is an "objective" perspective which can transcend these divergent and conflictual constituents of the dialectic of power and confrontation. Such objectivity has been dismissed as one of the deluded phantasms of the Enlightenment's postulation of a reconciliatory rationality. When Foucault writes that,

> what makes the domination of a group, a caste, or a class, together with the resistance and revolts which that domination comes up against, a central phenomenon in the history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and universalizing form, at the level of the whole social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interactions,
>
> (1982, P.226)

he is not implying that there is any deliverance form this process of stabilization, disruption and re-stabilization. His Nietzschean appreciation acknowledges the permanence of the phenomenon of perspectival imposition, whose effect is dominatory in that it entails negative classifications, dismissals and exclusions. There is no rational vantage point from which this 'agonistic' experience can be harmonized, and this pronouncement constitutes one of the central challenges to the Enlightenment's identification of reason and freedom.

1. The abbreviated titles in this chapter refer to the following writings by Nietzsche:

T.I.	-	Twilight of the Idols (1990)
W.P.	-	The Will to Power (1968)
B.G.E.	-	Beyond Good and Evil (1990)
G.S.	-	The Gay Science (1974)

CHAPTER EIGHT

FOUCAULT: THE PROJECT OF CRITIQUE

Recapitulation

Having identified the nature and extent of Nietzsche's influence upon Foucault's work, one can specify Foucault's relationship to the themes and issues around which this thesis has been organized.

We have been concerned with the legacy of the Enlightenment for liberal and Marxist thought, and the manner in which the preoccupations of these two traditions have affected contemporary writing about philosophy of education.

Both liberalism and Marxism adopted the Enlightenment programme of promoting freedom through the exercise of reason. These traditions have consistently displayed conspicuous features, which disclose important assumptions about the nature of the world, and the inherent potential of rational thought.

Chapter One portrayed the 18 th c. Enlightenment as an intellectual movement which strove to synthesize theory and practice in the interests of extensive social reconstruction. The Enlightenment philosophers sought comprehensive social and political improvements which would ameliorate if not eliminate, the perennial and endemic afflictions of war, tyranny, oppression, famine and disease. This chapter indicated how the Enlightenment movement was inspired by the successes of the 17 th c. scientific revolution, whose achievements revealed that rational thought could master the natural environment. The exercise of reason was a practice of control, predicated upon the consistency and uniformity of identifiable natural laws. Once the mechanisms and dynamics of the natural world had been understood, this knowledge could be employed for the benefit of society.

It also emphasized that many 18 th c. philosophers believed that the social world was regulated by a system of laws, an understanding of which was necessary if society was to be reconstructed rationally. Both natural and social phenomena were construed as part of a single continuum of consistency and

uniformity, endowing the world with a dependable, intelligible and manageable character. This was presented as the genesis of positivist thought, whose scientific confidence equated reason with systematic control for universal amelioration. The second chapter provided some detailed accounts of this thinking in action.

However, the controlling and regulating aspects of systematic rationality were informed and inspired by expectations of reconciliation, the second fundamental characteristic of 18 th c. portrayals of reason. The implementation of rational reconstruction was inspired by a vision of unity, a possible evolution towards the conversion of the natural world into a more hospitable environment for society, and towards the elimination of social conflict.

The first two chapters suggested that despite the 18 th c.'s intellectual commitment to scientific rigour and an empiricist methodology, these procedures were conducted upon certain metaphysical assumptions about the world's inherent coherence and propensity for unity and reconciliation. They emphasized the continuity between the religious convictions of the "age of faith", and the "age of reason", whose secular reformulations had allegedly repudiated the illusions and deceptions of man's religious history. This characterization did not imply an unqualified optimism or intellectual naïvetè, for it was noted that some philosophers were disconcerted by the consequences of a secular perspective for questions of identity and moral action. Although 'Man' was often postulated as a generic unity, some writers were sceptical about the practical import of such a concept, suggesting that its abstraction was not sufficient to forge a viable fraternal universal human community. They were sensitive to the ambiguous potential of knowledge to emancipate and oppress, depending upon the intentions of its possessors and practitioners. One could not assume that a commitment to rationality would generate a virtuous dispensation, whose inclinations were altruistic and philanthropic. Secular rationality had contributed to a disruption of clarity about the language and practice of morality, and no simple equation between knowledge and virtue could be made.

Chapters three to five provided an account of the formative impact which the project of pursuing freedom through the exercise of reason has had upon the development of liberal and Marxist thought. Not only did they indicate the persistent influence of the concept of reason as systematic control and anticipated reconciliation and unity upon these two traditions, but they also explored the ironical historical transformations of the relationship between reason and freedom through and identification and characterization of the antinomies of freedom and the ambiguities of reason. The history of liberalism and Marxism reflects and accentuates the tension and ambivalence present within the perception of the Enlightenment's formative expositions.

These chapters emphasized liberalism's and Marxism's theoretical convergence upon the persistent problem of domination, the political manifestation of the ambiguity of reason. Writers like Berlin, Hall, Adorno and Horkheimer acknowledge the agonizing project of defining and pursuing a course of freedom

which is dependent upon the precarious tenets of rational action. Collectively, these authors are continuously aware of the tenuous expedients and compromises which must be employed to preserve a commitment to contemporary freedom, sensitive to and anxious about the dangers of rational action which constitutes our only, but precarious, recourse in the pursuit of our controversial political objectives.

The substantial intellectual and historical background has been necessary, firstly because it has enabled us to identify the central conceptual influences upon the development of liberal and Marxist philosophies of education, examined in Chapter six and classified as derivative studies, which replicate the dilemmas of their parent traditions. Secondly, because it permits a characterization of Foucault's work as a crystallization of these enduring problems.

Chapter seven offered an interpretation of the influence of Nietzsche's epistemological perspectives upon Foucault's writings. It was suggested that Nietzsche's identification of a profound and ineluctable tension in the development of knowledge has been assimilated into Foucault's studies of the emergence of the human sciences and their role in the evolution of modern society. This tension is inherent in the recognition of the experience of 'becoming', and the acknowledgement of the necessary, but illusionary imposition of stabilizing concepts of 'being' upon this flux.

The Nietzschean - Foucauldian response to the inherited quandaries of the Enlightenment's legacy suggests that Foucault represents a relentless radicalization of secularism. Conventional portrayals of the modern secular world depict the Enlightenment as the intellectual movement which superceded the "age of faith". As indicated above, adherents to a secular vision retained the central concepts of inherent order and controllability for both the natural and the social worlds. Enduring hopes for reconciliation, which implies the attainability of peace, order, justice and unity , conferred a reassuring meaning or purpose upon the historical experience of social life. Reason was exalted as the systematic agent of comprehensively constructive and positive transformation. The problematic history of the relationship between reason and freedom generated familiar anxieties about the professed benefits of this association, but Nietzsche articulated the consummate negation when he delineated the phenomenon of nihilism. His analysis disclosed that there is no inherent meaning or purpose, no movement towards the desired and commended state of order, justice and reconciliation. He exposed the project of reason as a fraudulent necessity; asseverations about detachment, objectivity and impartiality concealed the reality of the will to truth as the will to power. Reason is certainly a regulative force, but one whose implementation is a fundamental part of a protracted struggle, a faculty which does not evince a propensity towards universal integration and reconciliation. Reason is a profoundly flawed asset, whose exercise generates the exclusions, tragedies and oppressions described by observers as diverse as Berlin and Adorno.

This perspective is not exalted, neither are its insights offered as a pretext for cynicism or capitulation. The radicalization of secularism problematizes contemporary experience in a disillusioned manner, pursuing

the projects of freedom and political reconstruction within the hazardous limits which the nature and exercise of an indispensable reason has demarcated.

The Context of Critique

Foucault's unorthodox historical re-evaluations and theoretical innovations incorporate and address this complex evolution of the relationship between theory and practice, reason and freedom, knowledge and power. His challenge consists of a continuing acknowledgement that the hopes of the Enlightenment for emancipation through the exercise of reason, manifested through the efforts to increase control and expand reconciliation, have gone awry. History's ironic and tragic reversals impose limits and enjoin caution, but this does not imply impotence. Instead, they illuminate the difficulties and dangers of a relatively tardy progress towards the erection of tenuous and controversial practices of freedom.

Foucault's work problematizes our present. It examines our history and consolidates our realization that there is a problem in reason for freedom because of the problem of power in knowledge. Despite the disconcerting exposure of the circumscriptions within which we must live and proceed, he challenges us with the encouragement and implementation of a permanent critique. This is a refusal to accept and comply with the constraints of the present, a continuous transgression of inherited limits, a persistent focus upon the definition and pursuit of freedom, "a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty" (Foucault, M., 1984, P.50).

Foucault's concept of critique is complex and sophisticated, emerging from his analysis of, and response to, the issues we have been examining. This chapter will consider his process of critique, because it explicates his detailed challenge to the legacy of the Enlightenment, complements the historical studies examined in the previous chapter, and provides us with interesting possibilities for a redefinition of what educational practice may consist of.

Chapter One recalled that for some of the 18 th c. philosophers, the pursuit of a secular orientation generated important questions about identity. Towards the end of his life, Foucault wrote a short essay, adopting the title of Kant's famous piece, "What is Enlightenment?", in which he explored the significance of Kant's response to this question for the issue of contemporary identity. Foucault's employment of the same title testifies to his acknowledgement of the importance of the Enlightenment for the modern world. His examination is not an attempt to formulate a different response to this question, but to identify its significance in the history of philosophy and modern thought.

Foucault suggests that Kant's essay concerns the distinctiveness of his own present, an inference about a century whose intellectual luminaries addressed the problem of identity in an age which deliberately and self-consciously repudiated its past. Foucault writes that,

> It is in the reflection on "today" as difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text appears to me to lie.
>
> And, by looking at it this way, it seems to me we may recognize a point of departure: the outline of what one might call the attitude of modernity.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.38)

When Kant wrote that the 18 th c. was not an "enlightened age" but an "age of enlightenment" (Beck, L., 1963, P.8), he suggested that the latter is characterized by an attempt by people to liberate themselves form "self-incurred tutelage" (Beck, L., 1963, P.3). The "age of enlightenment" is one in which people identify themselves as participants in a sustained process of critique, striving to divest themselves of the heteronomous encumberances of the past. For Foucault, Kant's assiduous self-reflection inaugurates the attitude of modernity, an ethos, or mode of relating to contemporary reality (Foucault, M., 1984, P.39).

Kant's essay explicitly associates the attainment of freedom, of liberation from "self-incurred tutelage", with the promotion of autonomous reason. The "attitude of modernity" is both self-conscious and self-critical; defining its identity in terms of rational emancipation. However this task does not exist as some essential and immutable form, which can endure consistently through the centuries. One has to acknowledge that the evolving history of the relationship between reason and freedom has a profound impact upon one's conception of the critical task. For Foucault, the development of philosophy reflects these modified understandings and appreciations, contributing to the development of the "attitude of modernity".

Kant's self-reflective quest for the identity of his age initiated a formative influence which has contributed to the definition of the confines within which we live and work today. The Enlightenment's legacy for the contemporary world qualifies it for privileged attention.

> I think that the Enlightenment as a set of political, economic, social, institutional, and cultural events on which we still depend in large part, constitutes a privileged domain for analysis. I also think that as an enterprise for linking the progress of truth and the history of liberty in a bond of direct relation, it formulated a philosophical question that remains for us to consider.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.42-43)

For Foucault, contemporary philosophy embodies and continues the "attitude of modernity" by self-reflectively relating the contemporary world to its cultural and intellectual inheritance conveyed by the definitive concerns of the Enlightenment itself. If the 18 th c. proposed the project of freedom through the exercise of reason, and derived its identity from these formulations, contemporary philosophy must

contend with the consequences of this aspiration. Foucault's historical work delineates how the relationship between reason and freedom has evolved into one concerning the problem of power in knowledge. Contemporary philosophy acknowledges that it is this problematic which confers a particular identity upon the modern world, imposing a stringent set of limits upon thought and action, ones with which philosophers contend in their contribution to an identification of our present prospects and possibilities. Contemporary philosophy is engaged in a dialogue with the Enlightenment, or more precisely with the consequences of its inauguration of the "attitude of modernity", the pursuit of freedom through the exercise of reason. It is not an attempt to replicate this ambition, but a fundamental critique of it. However, contemporary analysis, the continuation of the "attitude of modernity", is an ethos best characterized as a "limit-attitude", (1984, P.45). For Foucault, a modern identity still revolves around questions about what is necessary for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects (1984, P.43), but the legacy of the Enlightenment compels us to acknowledge the formidable nexus of limits (pertaining to the relationship between power and knowledge) within which we define and strive for our autonomy. Philosophy's critical task is to analyze and reflect upon our inherited limits with the intention of transgressing them. If limits define our identity, critique challenges and transgresses these, contributing to a reconceptualization of ourselves.

By invoking a concept of limits, Foucault acknowledges that it is reminiscent of Kant's "analytic philosophy of truth in general" which sought to establish the nature and limits of knowledge. However, Kant's attempts to define the meaning of the Enlightenment, and to derive a sense of distinctive identity from an answer to this central question, also indicate that he was involved in a "critical ontology of the present", which asks "What is our present? What is the present field of possible experiences?" For Foucault, issues concerning modern freedom are best addressed through a critical and historical ontology of the present, rather than through an "analytic philosophy of truth in general" (Foucault, M., 1984, P.95).

In retrospect, one can discern that works such as Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1) articulated an historical ontology of the present. Foucault's detailed and unique perspicacity disclosed a new understanding of how we have become who we are, offering a "history of the present" (1984, P.178). Complementing this is his critical ontology of the present, which accepts and challenges the inheritance of the Enlightenment, refusing to be restricted by its complex and inadvertent impositions and limits.

The Process of Critique

How does one conduct this critical ontology of the present? In the illuminating interview with Gérard Raulet, Foucault acknowledges the similarities between his study of the evolution of modern reason and that of the Frankfurt School. Both evince a concern with the transmutation of an emancipatory aspiration

into an oppressive effect. However, Foucault also indicates important differences in their work. The Frankfurt School's account of the transformation of modern reason is derived from Kant's distinction between pure reason and practical reason emphasizing that the former's evolution into instrumental rationality has produced the oppressive effects denounced by the School (1983, P.200-201). Foucault is not prepared to accept the unique and general implications of this portrayal; unique in that it suggests that the "bifurcation of reason" occurred once only, and that we are living with the consequences of this momentous event, and general in the sense that the broad category of Reason does not acknowledge the multiple rationalities with which we must contend daily (1983, P.205). Foucault insists that we can and must conduct a rational critique of the indefinitely ramifying manifestations of reason, an injunction consistent with the detailed, specific and particular nature of his historical studies. To subvert the pretensions of reason inherent in the multiple development of western thought does not commit one to irrationality, but to a systematic and critical ontology of the present. Failure to recognize this ensnares one perpetually in the restrictive confines of the dominant rationalities' dichotomies; only a radical critique can emancipate one from the oppressive effects of these established rational practices. (1983, P.201). The Enlightenment represented a rational ambition, not the acme of rationality, and the continuing conduct of re-evaluation is the task of rational critique.

What is the substantive nature of such critique? In a comment reminiscent of his concerns in "What is Enlightenment?", Foucault remarks that one can consider philosophy as the "discourse of modernity on modernity" (Foucault, M., 1988, P.88). His historical ontology of the present indicates how the character and problems of modernity have been constituted by the related issues of truth, knowledge, power and freedom. Philosophy is a critical reflection upon the ambiguous effects of this complicated nexus, and reference to effects implies a concern with experience. Foucault approaches the detailed task of criticism through the concrete concept of experience.

Foucault explicates his concept of experience by developing a set of idiosyncratic distinctions between a history of ideas, a history of mentalities, and a history of thought. He comments that,

> For a long time I have been trying to see if it would be possible to describe the history of thought as distinct both from the history of ideas - by which I mean the analysis of systems of representation - and from the history of mentalities - by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and types of action. It seemed to me there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought: this was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problemizations.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.388)

For Foucault, the task of critique does not entail the application of abstract categories in order to secure a solution. Rather,

> It is true that my attitude isn't a result of the form of critique that claims to be a methodical examination in order to reject all possible solutions except for the one valid one. It is more on the order of "problemization" - which is to say, the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems for politics.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.384)

The process of problemization, rather than the quest for a solution, constitutes the task of critique for Foucault. Critical problemization can be directed against histories of ideas (systems of representation) which often contain professions of comprehensive understanding, implying a capability for total solutions. He cites the disorientation of Marxism during and after the events of May 1968 in France as an example of this process. Adherents to concepts of Marxist totality (in both its normative and methodological senses - see above P. 90) were confronted by questions about women, relations between the sexes, about medicine, mental illness, the environment and minorities, issues with which Marxism's descriptive and explanatory totalities could not deal. For Foucault, critical progress occurs when we convert the immanence of experience into a series of problems for abstract systems which claim comprehensive understanding and solutions for social difficulties.

> This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties into which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this is what constitutes the point of problemization and the specific work of thought.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.389)

It is clear from Foucault's account that the process of critical problemization exposes discrepancies between thought and action, professions and their unintended effects. Political programmes, (such as those articulated by classical Marxists), which claim to be informed by a rational purpose and direction which will secure comprehensive solutions to problems of social conflict, are confronted by issues which elude their purview altogether. Experience confirms the contention that thought is inadequate to reality, that the most systematic and expansive descriptions and analyses cannot embrace, contain and direct the totality.

However, critical problemization does not simply alert one to the question of excluded considerations, but also concentrates attention upon the oppressive effects of particular formulations, emphasizing the historical irony whereby claims to the practice of emancipatory rationality produce exploitative and oppressive results, erasing the freedom which it professes to promote.

The issue of exclusion and oppression, clearly delineated by Foucault's concept of critical problemization, is substantially developed by a consideration of his notion of genealogical analysis, for if the processes of critical problemization expose the discrepancies alluded to above, genealogical analysis contributes to an epistemological explanation of this discrepancy and directs a particular strategic response to it.

Foucault's Nietzschean perspective clearly informs his genealogical analysis of knowledge, its effects, and the possible strategic responses to the latter. In referring to the phenomenon of exclusion (in the oppressive sense described above), Foucault designates certain articulations as subjugated knowledges.

> By subjugated knowledges I mean two things: on the one hand, I am referring to the historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemization. --- On the other hand, I believe that by subjugated knowledges one should understand something else, something which in a sense is altogether different, namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1980, P.81-82)

Foucault identifies two classes of subjugated knowledge, those which have been excluded in the processes of formal erudition, and those forms of tentative, popular articulation, disqualified because of their inadequate rigour and systemization (Foucault, M., 1980, P.83). These classes are distinguished not only by differences in formalization, but also by significant variations in scope. Erudite knowledge aspires towards a universal validity, while the popular articulations have a very limited and local focus and application.

Despite these distinctions, Foucault's classifications emphasize that both are involved in a relentless experience of struggle for identity, acknowledgement and influence. A genealogical approach to the history of the emergence of knowledge accentuates the experience of struggle, striving to co-ordinate an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (1980, P.81) against the scientific credentials of predominant formulations, whose claims to objectivity and impartiality obscure their participation in an indefinite struggle to secure a perspectival hegemony.

Foucault's conception of an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" is developed through his notion of genealogical method. In one of his few explicit discussions of Nietzsche's work, Foucault considers the significance of the genealogical approach for both Nietzsche's and his own writing. He identifies genealogy's focus upon the three issues of origin, descent, and emergence, whose significance for the formulation and consolidation of prevalent perspectives in the development of knowledge becomes clear below.

Consistent with Nietzsche's analysis, Foucault indicates how a genealogical assessment of the emergence of a body of knowledge opposes the latter's claim to be founded or erected upon a privileged origin. For both writers, the concept of origin implies an appeal to an essential and immutable identity, which is satisfactorily explicated by, and reflected in, a prevalent body of knowledge. The latter's adherents and exponents subscribe to a dubious notion of correspondence between their formulations and the world as it is in its immutable essence, attributing their claims of epistemological superiority to this alleged

characteristic and achievement. (Foucault, M., 1984, P.78). The notion of origin confers an illusory and deceptive quality upon the provenance of knowledge, attributing a unity and stability to a process which is characterized by dissension and disparity.

> Examining the history of reason, he (the Genealogist) learns that it was born in an altogether "reasonable" fashion - from chance; devotion to truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions and their spirit of competition - the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason --- What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things; it is disparity
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.78-79)

The genealogist's acknowledgement of the decisive influence of dissension and disparity upon the conflictual development of systems of knowledge recalls the sense of effort and struggle inherent in Nietzsche's account of knowledge as a perspectival imposition of being upon the swirling flux of becoming. A refusal to recognize this process generates the impression that present articulations are the product of continuous, consistent and orderly progress, the systematic emergence and clarification of an originary and indubitable truth, descending to its contemporary inheritors with an inexorable equilibrium. The genealogist has a different task, an alternative critical trajectory.

> On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.81)

The genealogist complements his critique of progressive descent with an analysis of the nature of specific historical emergence. This is a critique of concepts of goal, finality, integration and consummated purpose. For the genealogist, no particular configuration displays such characteristics. Historical emergence, "the moment of arising" is merely one of "the current episodes in a series of subjugations" (1984, P.83). If the study of descent discloses the contingent nature of an historically inscribed identity, that of emergence emphasizes the confrontational character of the process. The critique of emergence as a commendable culmination counters with the claim that

> Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.85)

The genealogist's perspective on emergent knowledge accentuates its formative influence upon the erection of a particular epistemological and social order, one which contributes to a succession of dominatory practices. This is the very antithesis of a concept of emergent knowledge as a progressive accumulation of salutary truth.

A focus upon the issues of origin, descent and emergence is obviously a historical concern; the character of a particular evolution through time is under scrutiny. In concluding his reflections upon the origin, descent and emergence of knowledge, and of how these categories have distorted our understanding of the role and impact of knowledge formulations in our social and political development, Foucault indicates how the genealogist (employing alternative conceptions of these significant categories) operates with a critical notion of effective rather than traditional history.

An effective history is one which reassesses the portrayals conveyed by traditional historical narratives and evaluations. It incorporates the genealogist's critical understanding of origin, descent and emergence in order to emphasize the disruption, disorder and discontinuity of the violence of truth and knowledge, insisting that we confront and contend with the recognition of this profound and radical disorientation. This recognition also becomes participation in a combative process, stressing the strategic import of genealogical critique.

> Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.88)

Effective history's perspective contradicts the Enlightenment's depictions of knowledge as an impartial benefactor, and its hopes that history is a controllable dynamic whose impetus can be directed towards a reconciliatory and "millennial ending". Its genealogical critique disrupts certainties, refuses consolations, acknowledges the ineluctably pernicious consequences of its articulations, and resists the confines imposed by historical legacies. Effective history is relentlessly restive, incessantly challenging the limits of inherited epistemological and social orders, and continuously exposing the effects of formalized knowledge. It reveals the "subjugated knowledges" which have been omitted from the acceptable order of things, illuminating the oppressive consequences of such exclusions. With Nietzschean perspicacity, it denies inherent meaning, purpose and order, concluding that the stability and orientation we possess is transient and contingent.

> The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value --- We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.89)

Foucault's elaborate process of critique is a continuation of the self-reflective "attitude of modernity" which he claims was self-consciously inaugurated by Kant in his essay "What is Enlightenment?" This attitude is sensitive to an experience of transition, an awareness that the present requires an explicit definition, a differentiation from the character of the past. Such preoccupations are fundamentally concerned with the problem of identity.

Foucault indicates that Kant responded to this exigency by identifying his present as the "age of enlightenment", a period in which people could formulate their aspirations in terms of the attainment of freedom through the exercise of reason, and emancipation from the "self-incurred tutelage" of perennial heteronymy. This project of enlightenment initiated the modern ethos and experience, generating the problematic relationship between reason and freedom, which the first part of this thesis has explicated. The effects of the Enlightenment's ideals have delimited our present, conferring upon us the task of formulating a new identity, one which distinguishes itself from Kant's articulations and those of his sympathetic successors. This is not a task which repudiates the past, but one which critically inherits it, challenging its presuppositions and problematic legacy, and tentatively suggesting a response. This is Foucault's contribution in his critical ontology of the present.

Foucault's critical ontology of the present concurs with the Frankfurt School's analysis of contemporary society in that both identify the impositional, coercive and detrimental effects of visions of comprehensive rational reconstruction. Both Foucault and the Frankfurt School address the epistemological and political consequences of classical Marxism's aspirations to reconstruct the social world in its pursuit of a reconciliatory classless society.

Foucault's critique is an acropetal one, in that it is conducted from the concrete detail of experience. It does not engage expansive rational formulations on its preferred terrain of integrated abstraction. By doing so, Foucault exposes the discrepancies between profession, aspiration and practice which emerge during the course of a rational programme's implementation. That which is omitted is portrayed as oppressed or subjugated, politically disadvantaged by the necessarily exclusive categories of official or formalized bodies of knowledge. Foucault develops this line of critique with his genealogical analysis, whose focus upon formalized knowledges' claim to demonstrably impartial origins, progressive descent and salutary emergence exposes knowledge's complicity in a process of lethal historical struggle. Such

analyses and revelations are concentrated within the perspective of effective history, which explains why these discrepancies, exclusions and oppressions occur, in terms which again testify to the profound Nietzschean influence upon Foucault's work.

Foucault's critical ontology of the present, his continuation of the discourse of modernity on modernity, is neither a deliverance from, nor a solution to, the problems he exposes in their enveloping intricacy. His crystallized challenge to the delusions of the Enlightenment's ideals extends into a challenging articulation of our contemporary identity. This consists of a Nietzschean understanding of the indispensability, inherent and chronic danger, of the knowledge we employ in our collective political projects. This is a leitmotif in Foucault's writings and addresses. We are confronted by an inevitable culpability, one whose mitigation he does not explore, but this may be considered as part of the challenge of our radically secular future. He writes,

> The historical analysis of this rancorous will to knowledge reveals that all knowledge rests upon injustice (that there is no right, not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth) and that the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind). Even in the greatly expanded form it assumes today, the will to knowledge does not achieve a universal truth; man is not given an exact and serene mastery of nature.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.95)

He attributes this dilemma to the character of thought, language and knowledge itself, inextricably related to the domain of action. He vindicates the Enlightenment philosophers' insistence upon the inseparability of theory and practice, but relentlessly proclaims the cost.

> Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, disassociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of its existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action - a perilous act.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1977 - Frontpiece)

This poignant pronouncement clearly corroborates the claim that Foucault's analyses and understanding crystallize the problem of the ambiguity of reason and the antinomies of freedom. The presence of power in the articulation of knowledge fundamentally problemizes the attainment of freedom through the exercise of reason. Its tone is reminiscent of Horkheimer's conclusions about the dangers of political action in "Materialism and Metaphysics", in which he emphasizes the permanent impossibility of exoneration for the social and political agent. One can never be aligned unequivocally with the just cause, for action entails an articulation whose consequences are detrimental for some. Horkheimer's circumspection anticipates Foucault's succinct claim that thought is a perilous act.

In an interview conducted in April 1983 (Foucault, M., 1984, P. 377-379), Foucault responded to some questions about the feasibility of consensual politics, questions motivated by a desire to assess Foucault's hopes for the possibility of an end to domination. Although he acknowledged that the exercise of power can not simply be equated with the infliction of domination (because people may combine in powerful relationships of super - and sub-ordination - rather than domination - for the attainment of a collective goal), his conclusions seem quite pessimistic, suggesting that the exercise of power is suffused with dominating practices, a conclusion consistent with his views upon the relationship between thought, knowledge and action. Again he employed some subtle and idiosyncratic distinctions to make this point, recommending that we discriminate between 'consensual politics' as either a regulatory principle or a critical one. He commented that he could not identify with the regulatory principle, for this implied a commitment to consensuality, a belief in its attainability, a concept of unity which terminates the experience of domination. Instead, he sympathized with the critical principle, which is against non-consensuality, by which he meant that one does not proclaim the impossibility of consensuality; one simply strives to approximate this goal, while disbelieving in its ultimate attainment, hoping thereby to maximize the experience of unity.

These subtle distinctions, against a background of ambivalent analysis, are important because they seem to suggest the possibility of mitigating the negative consequences of inevitable power - effects. This possibility is significant because it contributes to the formulation of an educational project whose features may be construed as positive or constructive, despite its articulation within the hazardous context of the power - knowledge nexus which Foucault's problematizations have demarcated so keenly and disconcertingly.

CHAPTER NINE

VINDICATING LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Foucault's historical and critical ontology of the present has been considered as a response to the effects of the Enlightenment's definitive project of the pursuit of freedom through the exercise of reason. In problematizing this cardinal relationship, he also problematizes the contemporary definition and function of knowledge. His Nietzschean incisiveness identifies the inherent complicity of knowledge in the pursuit of political projects, whose effects are exclusionary and oppressive, rather than emancipatory and reconciliatory. He exposes the promise of reason as a problem of power.

Chapter six explored a spectrum of perspectives in the liberal and Marxist philosophies of education, emphasizing that they replicate the dilemmas conspicuously evident in the main liberal and Marxist traditions. In examining some liberal philosophers of education, it noted how Pat White's scepticism about reason's potential for resolving disputes inclined her to emphasize the centrality of a political education in her understanding of the school's contribution to the promotion of freedom through the development of reason. In comparing Pat White with Charles Bailey, it noted how the latter's hope for a rational consensus, for the achievement of a provisional truth which can direct concerted and concordant action, is not shared by Pat White. She concedes that we are confronted by the permanent problem of a necessary organizational power which curtails individual freedom. Simultaneously, she acknowledges that rational debate cannot decide conclusively and consensually the legitimate violation of liberty by power. Her formulation is a reiteration of the problem of the antinomies of freedom, of the perennial tension between the demand for negative liberty and the exigencies of positive freedom. Consequently White proposes that a political education is essential to alert pupils to these inherent quandaries of social existence and interaction. She believes that this will contribute to the maintenance of a participatory democracy, an established and valued institutional procedure which will maximise individual vigilance to curtail abuses of power, excessive encroachments of positive liberty upon the enjoyment of individual freedom. In this way we can strive tentatively to move 'beyond domination'.

Pat White's acknowledgement of the limits of rational thought and action is shared by John White, for whom these epistemological reservations also induce a modified understanding of what it means to be

autonomous. For John White, the concept of individual liberty as negative freedom to pursue a life of self-fulfilment is too nebulous and decontextualized, because it fails to appreciate that this notion presupposes the concept of the 'ends of man' or the 'good for man'. These are themselves controversial issues with significant political consequences, as Pat White emphasises in her discussion of the public good. John White consequently redefines autonomy as an appreciation of the diverse and conflicting possibilities available to the individual, of the limits and constraints imposed by circumstances, and the realization that rational resolution is often not possible. His analysis complements Pat White's and both seem to enjoin an appreciation of limitations, while hoping to minimize the deleterious consequences of these.

The chapter's assessment of prominent exponents of Marxist philosophy of education concluded that once the theoretical deficiency of Sharp and Sarup's hopes for a comprehensively reconciliatory Marxist rationality have been exposed, they confront the problems of exploitation and domination which preoccupied critical Marxist analysts like Adorno and Horkheimer. Sharp and Sarup's theoretical confinement to the hopes and expectations of classical Marxist categories is not experienced by radical authors like Bowles and Gintis, whose appreciation of disjuncture and discrepancy in the theory and practice of social organization persuades them to embrace a form of critique which accepts pluralism and diversity. They do not anticipate comprehensive solutions to social conflicts, but pursue forms of criticism which expose inconsistencies and incompatibilities, obviously hoping that this will produce a form of redress which will alleviate the experience of exclusion and oppression in society.

Concern with exclusion and oppression is the point of convergence for writers in both the mainstream liberal and Marxist traditions, and in the derivative studies of the liberal and Marxist philosophies of education. Exclusion and oppression are integral considerations of the phenomenon of power, and the Nietzschean inspired work of Foucault indicates how these are subsumed under the problem of knowledge. Our study of Foucault has examined his detailed, perspicacious and radical evaluation of the intricate relationships between theory and practice, reason and freedom, knowledge and power, his situation within and response to the legacy of the Enlightenment's ideals and aspirations.

Educators are obviously concerned with the transmission of knowledge, but Foucault's problematization of this within the context of the relationship between reason and freedom presents educators with a profound challenge to reconsider their educating practice. Our analysis of his work discloses his concentration upon the problems of oppression, domination and exclusion in the construction of society through the formulations of knowledge.

Foucault's problematization of the concept of knowledge impels the educator towards a re-evaluation of her own task, for she is immersed in a complex nexus whose constitutive features are precarious and effectively dangerous. Foucault's history of reason radically disputes the association of knowledge with a respectably innocuous impartiality. The proponent of knowledge, the educator, is involved in a significantly

consequential struggle around the establishment of truth, and is not simply an innocent purveyor of it (Foucault, M., 1980, P.132).

Foucault's reflections upon the status and task of contemporary philosophy emphasize that it is part of the "attitude of modernity", of the "discourse of modernity on modernity" (1984, P.38 and 1988, P.88). One can argue that contemporary philosophy of education is one of the important dimensions of this self-critical pursuit for a contemporary identity. If Foucault's problematization of knowledge is cogent, the distinctive identity of the liberal and Marxist philosophies of education begins to erode. Their common provenance in a secular quest for the realization of freedom through the exercise of reason impelled them along antithetical political trajectories, but both have been subjected to varieties of historical irony which accentuate the ambiguity of reason and the antimonies of freedom, confronting both with the enduring and intractable problems of oppression and domination. This does not imply a complete erasure of difference, but suggests that a dependence upon inherited categories is inadequate to the problems which both traditions encounter in their quest for a modern identity. The task of the educator is significant because she participates in the disorientating experience of this crucible, and strives to impart definite form to a contemporary identity, which she recognizes to be both inherently transient and necessarily dangerous. The contemporary philosopher of education confronts the vertiginous challenge of relinquishing many of the safe and established forms and orientations of the past, acknowledging the absence of security in either the liberal or Marxist philosophies of education.

Foucault's analyses and concepts of critique indicate how the concrete experience of evolving history poses problems for the comprehensive representations of politics. The Foucauldian depiction of the evolution of knowledge and its complicity in the detrimental processes of power presents problems for the liberal and Marxist philosopher of education, whose categorial organization homologously reflects the difficulties of their parent traditions. Foucault indicates that the Enlightenment's search for a particular secular identity has presented us with a problematic legacy, out of which we must forge a new identity. Much of this challenge consists of the realization that the liberal and Marxist perspectives are implicated in this problematic inheritance. The crystallization of these difficulties entails the arduous task of acknowledging the oppressive consequences of these terms of analysis, modifying them, and constituting a new identity despite them. This is not an aspiration towards radical renewal, a definitive break with history, for Foucault's history of the present insists upon the tenacious endurance of the confines which this legacy imparts to us. Nevertheless, our freedom consists of a recognition that latitude exists for a qualified reorientation, and contemporary philosophy of education, reflecting upon the nature of the educator's immersion in the reticulations of knowledge, contributes to this process.

Such an account emphasises the significance of Foucault's formulations, - his crystallization of the antinomies of freedom and the ambiguities of reason, his radicalization of secular perspectives, - for the modern educator. However, more detail is required to explicate the precise nature and consequences of

Foucauldian thought for educational practice. This chapter offers an interpretation of the import of Foucault's work for contemporary educators, arguing that it contributes to a vindication of liberal philosophy of education. Before proceeding it must be stated that this argument does not imply that Foucault, and his philosophical mentor, Nietzsche, are "really" liberals; no attempt is made to confer such an identity upon them. It is suggested that their particular problematization of knowledge in the modern world can inform the construction of a contemporary liberal philosophy of education, without attributing liberal intentions to them.

On an initial and superficial level, one could associate a modern educator with the project of critique explored in the previous chapter. It will be argued that this constitutes a major component of a contemporary liberal understanding of education. However, such a depiction might portray educators in very general and detached terms creating the impression that they are decontextualized, itinerant minds, for whom intellectual endeavour is an uncircumscribed task. Before providing a substantial description and defense of a contemporary liberal philosophy of education, it is necessary to consider the social location of a modern educator because it is this which identifies some of the important constraints within which pedagogic activity can be conducted. It is illuminating to subsume educators under the more general category of 'intellectuals', because informative and critical work upon the emergence, status and function of intellectuals in the modern world has been produced in recent works. Such reflective studies identify the nature of, and possibilities for, intellectual work today, assisting intellectuals to situate their efforts. In Foucauldian terms, they provide a history of the intellectual's present, enabling her to describe the historical trajectory which constitutes and defines her identity. They insist that intellectual effort is not a limitless transcendence, but an activity which is enhanced by an acute appreciation of its own limitations. Previous chapters have indicated the value of Nietzschean - Foucauldian analyses of knowledge in stipulating the limits and dangers of unavoidable rational pursuits. It is argued here that epistemological perspicacity is complemented by the sociological - historical studies of two authors, Zygmunt Bauman (1987) and Reinhart Koselleck (1988). Such a synthesis contributes to the development of a comprehensive understanding of intellectual possibilities which enables us to define the character and scope of a modern liberal education.

Situating Modern Intellectuals

Bauman and Koselleck provide detailed accounts of the way in which the status of contemporary intellectuals - purveyors of knowledge, including teachers - has been constituted and circumscribed by the emergence of the modern state. They indicate the institutional and political confines within which knowledge, in its intricate and ambiguous complexity, has been transmitted, contributing to the formation of a modern intellectual identity.

Both Bauman and Koselleck associate the emergence of the modern state with the problem of social order, and both emphasize the significance of the dichotomy between the public and private sphere which attends the consolidation of modern state power. The private sphere is important because it is the social location within which intellectuals have acquired their modern status and function.

In the first part of his book, Koselleck (1988) considers the development of the Absolutist State in Europe during the 17 th c. as a response to the religious civil wars which had erupted after the Protestant secession from the Roman Catholic Church during the first half of the 16 th c. He indicates that the religious fragmentation inaugurated by the Reformation committed Europe to an indefinite period of civil war because of the Protestant emphasis upon the sacrosanct primacy of the individual conscience, which is fashioned by the individual's private encounter with God through the Scriptures. This Protestant conception of the correct spiritual disposition is inherently disruptive because it generates a proliferating number of incompatible interpretations and proposals each claiming provenance in the authority of God Himself. Conflicts of interpretation, translated into warfare, are irresolvable, because the authority capable of arbitrating the disputes, God Himself, is a controversial one. The religious civil wars became brutal and intransigent because each of the participants subscribed to the belief that their vision of spiritual truth enjoyed Divine sanction; one could not compromise the integrity of Divine revelation and blessing. Consequently, conflict erupted not only between Catholics and Protestants, but between numerous Protestant sects, whose subtle doctrinal differences dissipated the momentum of this powerful dissenting force.

Koselleck shows that a general European peace could only be imposed by an assertive and capable political power, committed to a social order which could not be predicated upon the successful resolution of these religious disputes, whose continuation could only be indefinite because of the antagonistic pluralism inherent in respect for the dictates of conscience. This political necessity generated and consolidated the distinction between the State, or the public sphere, and civil society, or the private sphere. It indicated that one of the basic conditions for peace was the retreat of the private conscience into civil society. The individual conscience would have to confine itself to civil society, where it could enjoy the protection of the State if it refrained from trying to translate its convictions into political policy, thereby encroaching upon the public sphere and risking the recrudescence of civil war.

> The public interest, about which the sovereign alone has the right to decide, no longer lies in the jurisdiction of conscience. Conscience, which becomes alienated from the State, turns into private morality.
>
> (Koselleck, R., 1988, P. 31)

The Sovereign's concern was with the establishment and maintenance of peace, and the protection of the private sphere in which the dictates of conscience could be developed and observed. Such a political arrangement was identified as the public's best interest.

However, if the exigencies of peace required a clear distinction between the public sphere in which political decisions were implemented, and the private one in which religious and moral conscience could be respected, the consolidation of peace generated a profound tension between these two realms. Koselleck devotes the remainder of his book to this antagonistic relationship, indicating that the private sphere fostered a subversive sentiment ultimately responsible for the destruction of French Absolutism in 1789, initiating the changes which have constructed the modern world. He skillfully articulates the significance of this conflictual relationship between politics and morality for the conduct of intellectual work in society, and this chapter will argue that his conclusions have important consequences for educational activity.

If Koselleck depicts the 17 th and 18 th c. European monarchs' preoccupation with order as a response to the endemic disruptions of religious civil war, Bauman complements this with a study of governmental responses to the dislocating effects of economic and technological developments on society since the 17 th c. He describes how the protective canopy of parochial social relations began to disintegrate under the impact of these economic and technological changes, producing large numbers of "masterless men" and "vagrants" who moved easily beyond social control and regulation. In an analysis clearly reminiscent of aspects of Foucault's work, he indicates how these dislodged people were considered as an itinerant threat, necessitating a redeployment of social power to contain it, marking the advent of intensive surveillance and confinement (Bauman, Z., 1986, Chapter 3).

Bauman employs the metaphor of "wild cultures into garden cultures" to describe this transition to modernity. "Wild cultures" designates the pre-industrial period of European history, when regional social arrangements and diverse cultural patterns persisted. The advent of industrial modernization disrupted this system, compelling European governments to acknowledge the need for a deliberate and effective intervention in the organization of society to promote stability and production, portending the contemporary "garden cultures" which are characterized by extensive, systematic control and cultural uniformity (Bauman, Z., 1986, Chapter 4).

Bauman, like Koselleck, is interested in the emergence and nature of modern intellectual work, in both its epistemological and political dimensions. His general portrayal of the dynamics affecting the formation of the modern state system is important because it explains the particular identity and functions (deliberate and inadvertent), imparted and relegated respectively to intellectuals by the State between the 17 th and 19 th centuries.

The orderly reconstruction and integration of society could only be conducted under the legislative auspices of the State, assisted by an efficient body of professional administrators. However, as Foucault's studies indicate, this process was accompanied by a systematic objectification of the population, and it was with this that intellectuals were expected to concern themselves. The State required intellectuals to

articulate conceptions of "the good society", to recommend and promote educational policies which would integrate society, standardize norms, foster stability, and promote obedience. The State considered intellectuals as an ancillary group which could expedite the formation of a modern society.

> Education was a desperate attempt to regulate the deregulated, to introduce order into social reality which had been first dispossessed of its own self-ordering devices. With popular culture and its power bases in ruins, education was a necessity.
>
> (Bauman, Z., 1986, P.69)

This was not at variance with the emphasis of 18 th c. Enlightenment thinkers upon the relationship between theory and practice, their aspirations for the rational reconstruction of society. For Bauman, such ambitions identify the 18 th c. philosophers as aspirant legislators, who wished to prescribe the construction of society to the existing political powers. Such a conception crystallized the discrepancy between the expectations of the State, and those of the intellectuals. The State required intellectuals to formulate notions of the "good society" and to recommend systems of education appropriate for a subordinate population, but the acceptance and implementation of their proposals remained a State prerogative. Consequently a mutually ambivalent attitude was generated between intellectuals and the State, for the State sought counsel, not prescription, whilst the intellectuals sought to legislate for the State (Bauman, Z., 1986, Chapter 5 & 7).

To an extent this tension abated as State power consolidated and intellectuals were increasingly relegated to civil society. This did not imply a reconciliation between the two but denoted the realization of a conclusive State hegemony, which however, did not entail the eclipse of intellectual work, but rather its confinement to the private sphere.

It is at this point that the analyses of Koselleck and Bauman converge, for one is now confronted by a consideration of intellectual possibilities once intellectual work is constrained by the limits of civil society. Koselleck's account describes how European rulers anticipated prolonged peace only if the convictions of the intellect were private affairs, which refrained from encroaching upon the political domain, whose primary concern was with stability within and between nations; Bauman indicates how the State sought to enlist the expertise, and control the aspirations, of intellectuals to organize society as it entered a modern, industrializing phase.

Koselleck's analysis ends with the French Revolution of 1789, while Bauman's extends to a consideration of the status and function of the contemporary intellectual. However, their respective accounts continue to sustain a complementary relationship, as Koselleck explores the enduring tension between morality and politics, and Bauman develops the concept of an interpretive intellectual who supercedes the legislative ambitions of his predecessors. These views provide us with a clearer understanding of what we may expect from ourselves as educators.

Koselleck develops his study of the tension between the State and civil society by identifying civil society as a sphere of consistent dissent in pre-revolutionary France. Pre-revolutionary civil society is characterized as the matrix for an emergent and assertive bourgeoisie, consisting of socially and economically powerful financiers, who were excluded from political control and stigmatized as upstarts by the traditional nobility; nobles who were incorporated into government as State functionaries enjoying considerable social status, but who resented their exclusion from substantial political power; intellectuals, whose capabilities and contributions were acknowledged, but who experienced social dislocation and endured official ambivalence (Koselleck, R., 1988, Chapter 5).

Koselleck acknowledges that there were antagonisms between these members of civil society, but emphasises that they were united in their opposition to the State. What interests him particularly is the form which this opposition assumed, and he pursues this through a consideration of the European "Republic of Letters" and the Masonic Lodges.

His main point is that during the 18 th c., the Enlightenment philosophers, who were members of the "Republic of Letters", and the members of Europe's numerous Masonic Lodges, all of whom were situated in the private sphere of civil society, disrupted the accord established between morality and politics when the emergence of the Absolutist European States effectively terminated the religious civil wars. As indicated above, this was achieved by insisting upon the subordination of morality to politics, the confinement of issues of spiritual and moral conscience to civil society, whose individual members could adhere to their beliefs and convictions without interference, provided that they did not try to translate these into public policy. The ineluctable diversity of these beliefs could only foster national conflict if they made simultaneous demands upon the public sphere.

Although the 18 th c., as the 'age of enlightenment', was characterized by secular reformulations, the form of the 'age of reason' had universal aspirations. These structured the systems of critique, which emanated from civil society, and were levelled against the State. Koselleck skillfully demonstrates that the rational, secular, moral critique developed within the "Republic of Letters" and the Masonic Lodges became tribunals which subordinated the political realm to the allegedly universal criteria of moral evaluation generating a comparative assessment (between the moral ideal and the political reality) in which the State could only appear as profoundly deficient, and consequently illegitimate. (1988, Chapter 6 & 8).

In associating the "Republic of Letters" with the Masonic Lodges, Koselleck does not imply any identification between their perspectives, for the Masonic Lodges displayed a moral idealism and probity surpassing the aspirations of the philosophers in the "Republic of Letters". The Masons denounced the divisions between states, social strata and religion, in absolute terms. The philosophers of the

Enlightenment denounced the irrational structure of society, advocating its reform, but evincing the kinds of ambivalence and disagreement which has been considered in the first two chapters (1988, Chapter 7).

Despite their differences, these aspirant reformers confronted a common problem. They portrayed the State, the realm of politics or the public sphere, as imperfect and deficient in terms of their visions of rational moral reform. Their conception of politics was one which sought to erase the dichotomy between morality and politics by proclaiming that the political domain should embody and reflect the unity and reconciliation of a rational moral conception. For Koselleck, this yearning within civil society for the consummation of moral ideals in the political realm reflected civil society's torment and self-deception, because its moral aversion to conflict and division, its desire to sustain its own moral innocence, precluded a commitment to confrontation with the dominant political powers. Yet without this confrontation, the moral ideals, the quest for an erasure of the distinction between morality and politics, could not be pursued (1988, Chapter 8).

For Koselleck, these moral tribunals articulated a vision of pure reform which cannot be converted into political practice. He depicts a political ontology whose fundamental tenet is the tenacity and ineluctability of conflict and diversity in the social world. However, these visions of unity and reconciliation are politically significant, despite their repudiation of the debasement and compromise inherent in political conduct. Their political significance resides in their strategic value for oppositional alliances against existing powers. The coherence and integrity of these articulated alternatives, the cogency of moral critique, discredits existing regimes, deprives them of their legitimacy and induces a climate of political crisis.

In 1789, the violent confrontation deplored by some of the members of the "Republic of Letters", and by the European Masons, occurred in France. It was not led by these dissidents in civil society, but their critiques had contributed to the fomentation of recusancy and revolution. Their visions of reconstruction had inadvertently contributed to the formation of a powerful party to the processes of historical conflict and political confrontation. The exponents of virtuous reform had to acknowledge the political dimension of their proposals.

The political import of these proposals became even more conspicuous after 1789. For if rational, moral reform was identified with the pursuit of democratic self-determination, the projects associated with these aspirations generated the differences, disputes and conflicts, whose variations constitute the character and agenda of contemporary political developments. The cardinal point is that visions of the 'end of politics' (implicit in the desire for unity and reconciliation), contribute to the perpetuation of political conflict, once their proponents assume political power. Critical alternatives sustain their integrity only in conditions of political impotence. Once the opportunity for implementation occurs, compromises and modifications become imperative in new circumstances of political conflict, reproducing the situation formerly denounced by rational reformers.

Koselleck's analysis concludes with the insistence that intellectuals must appreciate the constraints of the political domain. Confined to the protected sphere of civil society, it is too simple for intellectuals to assume that they are responsible for the articulation of comprehensive alternatives to an existing order, particularly if their expositions contain visions of final unity and reconciliation. This is not an explicitly conservative injunction for civil society, and particularly intellectuals, to submit unreflectingly to the political decisions of existing rulers. It is an appeal for modern intellectuals to appreciate the compromises and constraints which constitute political life, to acknowledge the duplicity (albeit often inadvertent) involved in the processes of easy critique formulated in circumstances of political non-responsibility.

Neither do Koselleck's views imply a relapse into deluded notions of detached and impartial observation, a vindication of innocent neutrality. This becomes evident when we complement Koselleck's account with Bauman's. It is clear that the intellectuals in Koselleck's historical description, the members of the Lodges and "Republic of Letters" in civil society, were legislators in Bauman's terms, people who believed that their commitment to a rational and moral order privileged their perceptions and recommendations, and legitimated their proposals for a new society. This thesis has explored such aspirations in detail, indicating the problems which have beset this pursuit of freedom and reform through the promotion of reason, and defining the intricate relationship between knowledge and power. It has also explained the tense association between aspirant legislators and their political patrons.

Bauman's description of the emergence of the modern state and the contemporary intellectual's relationship to it incorporates these issues. In defining and acknowledging the modern nexus of power and knowledge, the ambiguities of reason and the antinomies of freedom, he suggests that the limits of reason and the constraints of politics compel intellectuals to construe their status and function in terms of interpretation, rather than legislation. Bauman's concept of an interpretive intellectual is derived from an acknowledgement of the permanence of difference and diversity, an appreciation that the rational pursuit of social and political projects, - primarily concerned with freedom in the modern world, - inevitably produces the conflictual incompatibilities, dilemmas and tragedies which we explored in Chapters 3 and 5. The interpretive intellectual understands, rather than prescribes, effectively straddling perspectives and rendering them intelligible to one another, without the anticipation of a resolution between them. (Bauman, Z., 1986 Chapters 8 and 9).

In combining Bauman's and Koselleck's conclusions, one delineates a particular typology of the contemporary intellectual. She emerges as a figure who is situated within a powerful political structure, the State, whose hegemonic ascendance has relegated her to the confines of civil society. Within this social location, her appreciation of the limits of epistemological ambition, her realization that reason's complicity with power precludes any universalist and reconciliatory legislative activity, compels her to adopt an interpretive function. Koselleck's central point is that reflective thought can devise any number of coherent

and internally consistent schemes for a comprehensive and reconciliatory moral reformation of the world; their integrity (both logical and sincere) confers credibility and legitimacy upon these ideas in critical circles, but the diversity of human commitments perpetually defies the translation of any single proposal into a uniform and unifying practice. The intellect cannot defeat the tenacity of political fractures, and intellectual endeavour must acknowledge this constraint if it is not to frustrate itself with an infinite series of pernicious self-deceptions. The rationality of pre-Revolutionary critique denounced the conflicts and divisions in society, failing to realize that the pursuit of its own reformative ambitions necessarily engaged it in a conflict with the policies of its political adversaries. These rational alternatives became one of the deplored combatants, and even after the demise of the old order, the advent of the modern world perpetuated a new series of divisions, generating more proposals for resolutions.

Bauman's interpretive intellectual acknowledges the absence of answers; reason's reconciliatory promises are a delusion. However her position within civil society offers her an understanding of the limitations of her own expectations, which are now confined to an interpretive function. For the interpretive intellectual, reason, as a systematic articulation, both contributes to conflict and attempts to mitigate the consequences of its own effective assertion and presence. She offers provisional interpretations of political conflict, hoping that this will assist the contestants to clarify their differences and pursue compromises; she attempts to sustain the communicative processes which establish the transient equilibria of political agreement, - those systems, always imperfect, which Foucault describes (1982) as the alternative to annihilatory practices.

Contemporary intellectuals are interpreters without universalist ambitions, neither legislative, reconciliatory nor panacean. Having identified their social location and intellectual possibilities in the context of the modern world, can their interpretive activity be explicated in terms of Foucault's project of critique? Does such a synthesis illuminate the practice of an educator?

The Educator as a Genealogical Interpreter

Foucault concludes that Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" discloses a self-conscious preoccupation with contemporary identity. He suggests that the Enlightenment's concern for the promotion of freedom through the exercise of reason is a definitive influence upon the formation of the modern world, and claims that contemporary philosophy is a reflective pursuit for identity within the confines of this legacy. (See Chapter 8).

It is illuminating to transfer Foucault's conception of the task of modern philosophy to the philosophy of education. The latter then becomes a systematic reflection upon the identity of contemporary educators. The previous two chapters provided a detailed background for the development of this consideration. My

examination of the epistemological perspective propounded by Nietzsche and Foucault indicates how their writings radically problematize the emergence and impact of knowledge within human society.

Education is related conceptually to the transmission of knowledge, and we can infer from this that any transformation in our understanding of the nature and import of knowledge in human society must have fundamental consequences for any definition of a modern educator's identity. The Nietzschean-Foucauldian epistemological understanding presents the contemporary philosopher of education with a challenge to reformulate the future of educational tasks.

In the first part of this chapter, I have indicated how the category of 'the intellectual' under which I subsume educators, must be considered historically in relation to the emergence of the modern state. I suggested that the intellectual's location within the confines of civil society provides her with certain opportunities while simultaneously imposing particular constraints upon her. With these two considerations, I provided a portrait of the epistemological and political parameters within which a philosopher of education can construct the identity of a modern educator.

The epistemological perspective derived from Nietzsche and Foucault generates the rich concept of a critical genealogist. The synthesis of Koselleck's and Bauman's political analyses offers the notion of the intellectual as a modern interpreter who performs an important communicative function, while recognizing the limits inherent in her own position. This final section presents an argument that the identity of a contemporary educator is demarcated by the concept of a genealogical interpreter, one whose educational activities can be described appropriately as 'liberal'.

A modern educator's practice can be associated with the genealogical perspective explored in Chapter 8, because the latter identifies a particular relationship to an understanding of the status and impact of contemporary knowledge. I have indicated how this understanding has been developed by the works of Nietzsche and Foucault, emphasizing that their preoccupation with the relationship between knowledge and power is a detailed response to the problematic association of freedom and reason, the Enlightenment legacy, whose parameters continue to define the task of modern philosophical thought. The contemporary educator, situated within this complex and disorientating nexus, derives her identity from this perspective, constructing the details of her task accordingly.

Nietzsche's epistemological analyses emphasize that knowledge is an organizational imperative, an attempt to stabilize reality, to impose 'being' upon 'becoming'. The vast bodies of knowledge accumulated in the history of human society all contribute to these processes. Nietzsche's perspective can be described as 'metaphysical', not in the sense that he posits a concept of immutable being behind ephemeral phenomena (a concept which he repudiates explicitly), nor in the sense that he attributes an integrative and teleological tendency to existence. The latter is a deluded feature of classical Christian (and

Marxist) metaphysics. But it is metaphysical in that it claims to understand "how things are". His perspective implicitly proclaims insight into the impulse behind the formulations of human knowledge, and an appreciation of the profound, diverse and ambiguous impact of this knowledge upon human experience.

A contemporary educator who situates herself within the parameters of Nietzschean-Foucauldian critique is similarly metaphysical. She recognizes the status of knowledge, and appreciates its ambiguous consequences; it enables people to organize and structure the world, empowers them as agents within an adverse environment, but, the will to truth as the will to power can also inflict and compound the miseries which the rational exponents of emancipation seek to eradicate. The latter's failure to comprehend the ambiguous quality of their own agency can confound their own efforts, and they become contributors to the circumstances which they deplore. Innocence and good intention transmute into inadvertent culpability.

If one accepts this depiction, then the educator occupies a very particular location within a pedagogic process. The educator is a teacher in that she participates in the transmission of accumulated and historically consolidated bodies of knowledge from one generation to the next. However, as an educator she subjects this knowledge and pedagogic activity to a close scrutiny which is informed by the metaphysical insights of the genealogist. Foucault adopts the cardinal Nietzschean concept of the genealogist, and explicates it in terms of a concern with 'origin', 'descent' and 'emergence' (See Chapter 8). One recalls how Foucault's study emphasizes that nascent bodies of knowledge are generated within conflictual circumstances. Their development occurs within continuously contestatory situations, and an examination of the effects of knowledge discloses how fraudulent is the idea that knowledge progresses consistently for the benefit of 'Man', liberating him from his afflictions in a salutary dialectic of freedom and reason. Struggle and ambiguity characterize the history of knowledge, belying portrayals of it as a harmonizing and objective influence upon the development of society.

The critical practice of a genealogical educator is 'liberal' in the sense that she is concerned with the relationship between freedom and reason as it is reflected in the implications of the development of knowledge for the exercise of power. She is 'liberal' because the issue of freedom is a formative and contextualising influence upon her educational projects and practices, as indicated by the terms of Foucault's characterization of our epistemological and political present. As a purveyor of knowledge, the modern educator is sensitive to the political effects of the transmission of knowledge, aware of the exclusionary and oppressive consequences of the formation of knowledge, whose empowering capabilities are acknowledged simultaneously.

There is a clear affinity here with the views and concerns of writers like Berlin and Hall, whose liberal perspectives emphasize the peremptory quality of positive freedom (with which the development of

knowledge is necessarily implicated). Their concentration upon the 'antinomies of freedom' through an exploration of the tension between negative and positive liberty produces a determination to mitigate the detrimental and oppressive effects of the inevitable projects of positive freedom, or collective commitments to self-determination.

As a critical genealogist, the educator displays a similar preoccupation. When this concern is translated into educational practice, it reinforces her 'liberal' identity, because it provides a substantial account of the notion of autonomy, traditionally associated with the pursuit of liberal aims. In his genealogical explications, Foucault refers to the practice of transgression, an important concept in his Nietzschean understanding of the status of contemporary knowledge. A transgressing genealogist is one who appreciates the Nietzschean insights into the organizational impulses behind the formation of knowledge, recognizing the inevitable limits and constraints which our bodies of knowledge reflect and impose upon us. However, she also recognizes that the provenance of these systems resides in the contingencies of human agency, endowing them with both a transient and mutable quality. The transgressive genealogist emphasizes continually that the limits of knowledge formation, its systems of constraint, can be violated, and our autonomy consists of this capability. This activity of transgression provides one with the hope for and the responsibility of freedom, because not only does it offer the prospect of alleviating the oppressive, detrimental and exclusionary consequences of existing knowledge formations, but it also demands a consistent concern with the negative products of any supercessionary alternatives. This is an expansive liberal focus on the issue of knowledge and power, a formative preoccupation with the inheritance and direction of emancipatory aspirations. Its purview incorporates the anxieties of writers as diverse as Berlin and Horkheimer, who, as members of distinctive political traditions, nevertheless share a primary interest in the question of domination, and our agonizing efforts to alleviate it.

Such a conception of autonomy not only appreciates the nature of the intellectual legacy to which it addresses itself, but also realizes some of the important limits within which the genealogical educator must work. A critical limit is an acknowledgement that freedom can not and must not be depicted as a destination or formalized set of social relations, primarily because such a characterization contains a dangerous notion of permanent stabilization, a conceptual and organizational ossification whose political consequences are oppressive. It is for this reason that a critical genealogist must repudiate, for example, the classical Marxist idea that 'the proletariat' is a privileged historical agent, which can direct society to the destination of a 'classless society'. For the genealogist, the static quality of this conception, a reconciliatory point of arrival, has a profoundly dangerous political import. The critical genealogist, as a liberal educator, postulates a functional limit by acknowledging that,

> Liberty is a practice. So there may, in fact, always be a certain number of projects whose aim is to modify some constraints, to loosen, or even to break them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure that people will have liberty automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee them.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.245)

For the genealogical educator, this view represents a notion of autonomous limits, because it repudiates any claim to a total understanding, and renounces any aspiration towards comprehensive prescription for others. As a transgressive practice, liberty assumes the quality of Foucault's 'history of thought', a series of questions and exposures which pose 'problems for politics'. Such a liberal educator respects the specificity of historical conflict, manifested through particular relationships of knowledge and power, conceding that historical agents (amongst whom are her own students), must strive to establish and express their own political identity, having been alerted to the complex processes which contribute towards the definition of such identities. This point is relevant to a consideration of the educator as an interpreter too, but I shall develop this subsequently.

This perspective on the genealogical educator concurs with the views of Pat White. Her concern with the 'public good' emerges from a traditional liberal preoccupation with the curtailment of individual freedom by legitimate political impositions (See Chapter 6). The idea of the 'public good' is invoked by some theorists to justify the curtailment of liberty, to render certain restrictions and interferences legitimate. She evinces a definitive liberal concern with the issue of freedom, located within the familiar problematic attempts to reconcile negative and positive liberty. Her scepticism about the existence of a 'public good' inclines her to accept a residual position, which emphasizes the importance of alerting one's pupils to the spectrum of quandaries which she confronts. For Pat White, such an educational practice constitutes the rudiments of a participatory democracy, primarily concerned with the diminution, if not the eradication, of domination. Her theoretical perspective is enhanced by the supplementation of a genealogical practice, whose detailed concern with the development of knowledge, its political effects, and the limits of its own exercise, provides her concept of 'participatory democracy' with additional substance, retaining a central focus on the issue of liberty and oppression.

The contemporary genealogical educator is situated within the confines of a particular understanding of the constitution and effects of modern epistemology. This defines the trajectory of an educational task, which is aware of its possibilities and limits. She alerts her students to the dilemmas of knowledge, so acutely perceived and articulated by Nietzsche - to proceed collectively, we construct multiple bodies of knowledge which effect a temporary and expedient stabilization of meaning. Inherent within these are the benefits of empowerment and the dangers of oppressive affliction. The genealogical educator neither resolves nor prescribes, but systematizes and problematizes the inherited array of knowledge into which her pupils seek initiation. She introduces her students to an encounter with knowledge, continually aware of the inextricable association between knowledge and power, thought and action, theory and practice, the dimensions of which appreciation inform the choices and identities of pupils as agents. The genealogical educator enunciates the issues and questions so clearly expressed by Foucault when he claims:

> I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the 18 th c. has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practising a rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by intrinsic dangers? One should remain as close to this question as possible, keeping in mind that it is both central and extremely difficult to resolve.
>
> (Foucault, M., 1984, P.249)

The genealogist's epistemological perspective contributes towards the development of a complementary notion of the educator as an interpreter. Informed by a genealogical understanding, the educator is one who acknowledges the impossibility of any final resolution to any particular dispute, of any closure in the related issues of thought and action. Her Nietzschean perspective recognizes the provisional and temporary nature of theoretical agreement and practical implementation. She realizes that the nature of knowledge is one which contains the permanent possibility of challenge and transgression, and promotes the freedom inherent to such an understanding.

Confronted by the perennial experience of dispute, controversy, conflict and contradiction, the genealogical educator becomes an interpreter whose task it is to translate an infinite array of strident and cacophonous claims and demands into audible and intelligible ones. This is a difficult project, requiring imagination, versatility and an interdisciplinary breadth which enables her to comprehend the contexts, assumptions, and 'background practices' from which particular claims and demands emanate, translating these into terms which are intelligible to participants in disputational processes. She delineates the trajectories of 'origin', 'emergence' and 'descent', articulates the consequences of decisions, identifies the specific relationship between thought and action, theory and practice. If her Nietzschean epistemological understanding emphasises the inevitability of an infinite series of perspectival comprehensions, her educational practice strives for modified and enlarged perspectives which contribute towards the realization of provisional and temporary agreements.

Bauman contrasts the role of the interpreter with that of the legislator, indicating that the latter's historically prescriptive role has been subverted irrevocably by the evolution of contemporary epistemological perspectives. This does not imply that the interpreter, performing the mediatory function described above is committed to any attempt to separate theory from practice; her genealogical understanding precludes this. Although an interpreter necessarily repudiates a specifically prescriptive function her educational practice contributes significantly towards the adoption of a particular identity by her students. The genealogical practices of an interpretative educator expose her students to an intensive reflection upon the relationship between theory and practice, thought and action in their pursuit of an understanding of the formation of knowledge and its implication in the exercise of power. The initiation of pupils into the processes of dispute, their exposure to the dilemmas and quandaries encapsulated in the 'antinomies of freedom' and the 'ambiguity of reason', impel them towards the assumption of an identity whose details are not prescribed by the interpreter.

The genealogical interpreter's acknowledgement of a limited educational efficacy is a prerequisite for autonomy, qualifying her activity for a 'liberal' epithet. Her concern for autonomy is clear in a number of senses. Firstly, the continual practice of interpretation and perspectival expansion is a transgressive one, which refuses the stabilization of meaning, and any quest for closure. Secondly, by alerting her students to the inherently difficult procedures of choice, she constructs a contemporary notion of autonomy which concurs with John White's thoroughly secular analysis. This is a concept of autonomy which emphasizes the absence of any notion of the 'inherent aims of education' structured around a notion of the 'good for man'. Consequently, pupils must confront the problems of choice, while depending upon sets of criteria which are themselves controvertible. Autonomy consists of this vertiginous recognition, and of the attempt to forge an individual and political identity despite it. The educator assists with the student's embarkation upon this quest, without prescribing the destination. As an interpreter, she offers some conceptual clarity, without proffering "answers" or "solutions", none of which can be presented in abstraction if one adheres to the particular focus of a genealogical understanding.

The latter comment is an acknowledgement that if identity consists of a particular synthesis of thought and action, a specific project of self-determination, in either an individual or collective sense, the educator can only initiate the student into the processes of reflection, including an awareness of the dilemmas attending the synthesis of theory and practice, which culminate in the assumption of individual identity. This of course, consists of personal, professional and political dimensions, and precisely because of their contextual specificity, the educator cannot prescribe them, only expedite them as a genealogical interpreter.

The educator's activity is however circumscribed by one general consideration, central to the whole notion of a genealogical interpreter. This is her (metaphysical) insistence that the pursuit of finality and closure is dangerous and potentially fatal. Her educational efforts are directed towards the evaluation and promotion of systems of power, in the sense articulated by Foucault (1982 - See Chapter 7), who contrasts the precarious, temporary and mutable equilibria of political relationships with the exertion of annihilatory force. Foucault's Nietzschean analysis emphasizes continually the ineluctability of politics, the inscription of power-full relationships in our language and interaction. As a genealogical interpreter, the educator operates at the boundary between power and force, politics and violence, striving to sustain processes of mediation, whose eclipse denotes the advent of confrontation and cataclysm. This of course does not imply that the educator performs such a literally dramatic role, but it does stress the educator's responsibility for alerting her students to the multiple dimensions and consequences of the construction and pursuit of reason and knowledge, language and power, considerations which are fundamental to the establishment of individual and political identity through the synthesis of theory and practice, thought and action.

Without referring explicitly to 'genealogists' or 'interpreters', Stuart Hampshire (1989) incorporates these perspectives into his reflections upon justice in his book Innocence and Experience. His analysis of procedural justice provides an analogous illustration for the activity of the educator. Hampshire tries to restore the concept of justice to a central place in political philosophy. His attempt emerges from a consideration of the kinds of epistemological and political concerns around which this thesis has been organized. He claims that the evidence of historical diversity and experiential heterogeneity precludes specific prescriptions for particular societies. It is not that such prescriptions cannot be formulated, but efforts to implement them must be impositional, coercive and violent. The acknowledgement of these conditions inclines him towards a notion of procedural justice, a formally instituted practice which attempts to admit as many perspectives as possible into a debating forum. It is a liberal proposal which respects and tolerates diversity, without assuming that it can resolve particular historical problems. It is a formal concept of justice concerned with the institutional structure of social relations (Hampshire, S., 1989, P.54-57).

Hampshire recognizes that this formal definition tries to accommodate a profound tension, between 'reason' and 'imagination'. The former refers to hopes for a species-wide concept of a prescriptive good, one which recent philosophical and historical experiences expose as both futile and destructive. Such a notion is best superceded by a concept of procedural justice, which respects the rich complexity of culturally and linguistically diverse social 'imaginations' (1989, P.58-62).

Procedural justice acknowledges that a single common good cannot be ascertained in any society. It is independent of specific conceptions of the good, but promotes the representation of as many particular perspectives as possible. It renounces any prescriptive or legislative ambitions, conceding that the participants themselves must strive for a viable definition of just practices in their society (1989, P.72-78). The only universal claim which an advocate like Hampshire can make, is that all societies are confronted by the issue of diverse formulations and aspirations. All attempts to deny or suppress this must have violent and destructive consequences, and the formal notion of procedural justice seems to be a viable proposal for the mitigation and alleviation of these effects. An acknowledgement of these inherent epistemological and political problems, and a commitment to accommodating them to minimize the destructive effects of confrontation, becomes a criterion for the classification of a society as 'just'.

An educator is similarly involved in a process of sustaining the institutional structures which permit and encourage the articulation and examination of diverse and conflicting claims, many of which have necessary consequences for social and political relations. Examination and evaluation is conducted from a genealogical perspective, while interpretation seeks to preserve the intelligible accessibility of various understandings. An insistence upon the recognition of ineluctable diversity, and upon the maintenance of tolerance identify the practice of genealogical interpretation as 'liberal'. It is clearly reminiscent of the liberal values championed by Mill and a contemporary educational exponent like Charles Bailey, but is

qualified by the disillusioned realization that if all are heard, the truth will not emerge. The genealogical interpreter is concerned with intelligibility and compromise, rather than with the truth and solutions. She does not evince a naïvety that if we can only communicate, all will be resolved.

Having adopted Bauman's and Koselleck's respective views on the status, function and limits of the interpreter and intellectual - to clarify a conception of the identity of the modern educator - it is clear that I am locating educational practice within the sphere of civil society. How does educational activity relate to the political problematics articulated by Koselleck, to the maintenance of the dichotomy between the State and civil society, from which it derives part of its self-understanding?

This question redirects attention to the fundamental issue of the relationship between theory and practice. The genealogical interpreter whose identity is constructed around a particular understanding of a Nietzschean inspired epistemological perspective, must address the implications of particular reflections for action. As a genealogical interpreter, the educator promotes and defends the negative liberty of educational institutions, insisting that these provide an open forum within which diverse and conflicting claims can be articulated and evaluated. Such tolerance is a prerequisite for educational activity as the genealogical interpreter envisages it. She acknowledges that the students' exposure to the dispute and danger inherent in the construction and acquisition of knowledge, to the 'antinomies of freedom' and the 'ambiguity of reason' contributes to their assumption of identity which directs their subsequent conduct or action. Since the educator's genealogical understanding precludes the expectation of reconciliation and harmonization, the hope for resolution through open communication, doesn't she contribute to the proliferation of disputes and differences, the expression of which constitutes the substance of political conflict and turmoil? Couldn't the educator, as a genealogical interpreter, be accused of fostering and perpetuating the multiplicity of perspectives whose political manifestations were considered so disruptive by the 18 th c. rulers that they insisted upon the primacy of order, and the confinement of dispute to the relatively innocuous limits of civil society?

Such anxieties seem to inform two familiar retorts. Firstly, that there must be a definite continuum between the educational and political domain, so that the former buttresses and legitimates the established political order. In this way, a stabilizing consistency and uniformity is promoted in society; a particular perspective is consolidated to regulate thought and action in a compatible manner to diminish social conflict. For the genealogist, this is a completely unacceptable reversion to the ossification of stabilizing totalization, a comprehensive claim to knowledge, whose oppressive political consequences have been analysed so perceptively by writers like Adorno and Horkheimer. As a genealogist, situated within the legacy of reason's interaction with freedom, the educator must expedite a process of continuous agitation as an interpreter, to promote a project of individual and collective autonomy. In this way, she contributes to resistance to the constricting, oppressive and exclusionary results of arrogant and totalistic thinking.

Secondly, these anxieties foster the view that education must be practised as an insular activity, one whose "objectivity" is preserved by a claim to an innocent neutrality, whose detached impartiality reviews and assesses the accumulated and elevated products of the human intellect, knowledge itself. The political realm is a contested one, whose participants have the experience and expertise to conduct these conflicts responsibly. The autonomy of educational institutions, their freedom from interference by the State, depends upon their commitment to refrain from active intervention in political affairs.

The genealogist clearly repudiates this understanding of the objectivity and innocence of knowledge. Her epistemological analysis in terms of origin, descent and emergence rejects this view as deluded on the basis of her understanding of the implication of power in knowledge. However, this does not imply that she disagrees with her epistemological adversaries' conclusions about the desirable immunity of educational institutions from direct political interference.

This argument is balanced precariously, and revives a consideration of the conservative implications of Koselleck's account of the division between the state and civil society. Koselleck's insistence that intellectual responsibility and maturity consists of an acknowledgement of the complexity, compromise and imperfection which characterizes political conflict and conduct, and of an attendant realization of the futility of trying to impose elaborate and comprehensive programmes of rational reconstruction upon the political domain, does not imply submissive and detached acquiescence to the directives of the political domain by the civil one. Such an injunction could only be a philosophical pretext for the practice of unrestrained tyranny. A genealogical interpreter could certainly not accept such inferences, for they are tantamount to a capitulation to a totalizing order which violates her epistemological convictions.

As a genealogical interpreter, the educator appreciates the delicate dialectic between the state and civil society. She realizes the political dimension of knowledge formulation, and identifies her educational task as the exposure of her students to the complex dimensions of this issue. She also acknowledges that this educational process must contribute to the formation of her student's political identity, but her concept of autonomy precludes the espousal of a prescriptive political direction. The educator cannot attempt this (unless she relinquishes a genealogical perspective) because she acknowledges that political identity is not simply predicated upon a set of precepts which can be conveyed in an educational context. Her students' political projects will be formulated according to their particular situations within the broader context of society. The educational task is to induct students into the processes of thought and its relationship to action as delineated in the genealogical project of critique.

It is clear from this that an educator, as a genealogical interpreter, must insist upon the negative liberty of educational institutions. Without this, the consideration of heterogeneous, incompatible and conflictual claims is impossible. Without this, the educators cannot expose their students to the 'antinomies of freedom' and the 'ambiguity of reason'. To perform this task, educational institutions cannot constitute

themselves either as politically prescriptive voices, nor as the recipients of specific political directives from the state. They must be free from such constraints to contribute to the promotion of an autonomy which is both the inheritance and burden of the genealogist's epistemological understanding.

Such an autonomy, as freedom from interference and freedom to challenge and transgress the particular formulations and articulations of contemporary knowledge, may certainly contribute to chronic state of agitation and conflict in society. However, the genealogical educator considers this as an inevitable product of the pursuit of knowledge in society, of the inextricable relationship between thought and action. Her educational practice is an embodiment of the Nietzschean dilemma which recognizes the necessity for epistemological stabilization, but realizes the oppressive risks inherent in this process. Chronic dispute and agitation may generate a disconcerting sense of uncertainty and insecurity, but these processes of challenge and transgression are the ones which defy and combat the exclusionary and dominatory effects of a specious uniformity and consensus.

It is from this understanding that a genealogical interpreter derives her concept of a functional and contemporary liberal educational practice. It is liberal in its respect for freedom, recognizing and accommodating the perennial tension between negative and positive liberty, sustaining and promoting the practice of autonomous transgression in a continuing attempt to mitigate the oppressive effects of exclusionary perspectives. Her acknowledgement of the profound dangers of attempted closure constitutes her commitment to democratic procedure, which insists upon maintaining open institutional forums within which conflicting claims and disputes can be articulated and interpreted.

As a genealogical interpreter, the educator realizes the hubris implied in any explicit attempt to legislate or prescribe for her students. She envisages the inculcation of a genealogical awareness and interpretive capability as an important contribution to the preparation of her students for participation in the specific social and political conflicts in which they will be immersed, once their personal, professional and political identities have been formulated and consolidated. Such conduct denotes an educator's respect for the autonomy of her students, a freedom to pursue an identity through the practice of challenge and transgression, despite the confusion and dilemmas which this may induce, as reflected in John White's reconstruction of a contemporary notion of autonomy.

Equipped with these genealogical appreciations and interpretive capabilities, a liberal educator's students may be considered as endowed with the attributes of citizenship. The educator has not encouraged them to articulate expansively rational programmes of reform and reconstruction from one of the enclaves of civil society, but alerted them to the pervasive experience of conflict and dispute, to the implication of power in the formulations of knowledge, to the relationship between thought and action. The liberal educator's efforts enable her students to straddle the conceptual distinctions between the state and civil society, enjoining them to comprehend the complexity and compromise which attends the spectrum of conflict.

These reflections and arguments have tried to associate the activities and self-understandings of a genealogical interpreter with those of a liberal educator. In conferring such an identity upon a liberal educator, they have also sought to delineate the limits of educational practice. This characterization of a liberal educator emphasizes the necessary exemption of educational institutions from direct and explicit political pressure and prescriptions, simultaneously acknowledging the arrogance and futility of promoting political solutions within this autonomous sphere of civil society. Educators promote an exhaustive reflection upon the spectrum of epistemological, moral and political disputes, in all their complex interconnections, insisting upon the formal autonomy which is a prerequisite for this reflection. Yet having acknowledged the inextricable association between thought and action, educators cannot try to assume control over specific translations of theory into practice. They can only relinquish this to the conduct of the social and political domain, to which they have made a thorough preparatory contribution with the practice of genealogical interpretation.

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