

**CAN THE VIEW OF PERSONS AND SOCIETY THAT IS PRESUPPOSED BY
HIGGS'S ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS BE COMPATIBLE WITH A
CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION ?**



**A minithesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of M.Ed in the Department of
Philosophy of Education, University of the Western Cape.**

March 1993

ABSTRACT

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Yes, the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics can be compatible with a concept of democratic education. However, I shall argue that this is a charitable rather than a certain answer.

I shall firstly examine Carol Gould's thesis that every social and political theory presupposes, explicitly or tacitly, a social ontology. I critically reinterpret her conceptual tool of social ontology as "a presupposed view of persons and society", but retain some positive aspects of her argument.

Secondly, I provide an analytical summary and critical discussion of three recent articles by Professor Phil Higgs on the nature and task of Fundamental Pedagogics (FP). Consequently, I apply the conceptual tool of "a presupposed view of persons and society" to Higgs's account of FP.

The following steps of my argument are the development of an account of democratic education that is linked to agency, authority, reciprocity and participation; and the interpretation of the view of persons and society (VOPS) that underpins it.

In the concluding chapter Higgs's account of FP, together with its constitutive VOPS, is measured against eight criteria provided by the account of democratic education and its matching VOPS. My conclusion is that the VOPS that is presupposed by Higgs's account of FP can charitably said to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, given some adjustments, clarifications and elucidations. Finally, I consider some objections that Higgs might raise against the argument of this minithesis, and briefly respond to these.

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Ja, die persoon- en gemeenskapsbeeld wat veronderstel word deur Higgs se weergawe van Fundamentele Pedagogiek kan versoenbaar wees met 'n konsep van demokratiese opvoeding. Ek sal egter argumenteer dat hierdie liever 'n toeskietlike as 'n sekere antwoord is.

Ek sal eerstens Carol Gould se tesis, wat lui dat elke sosiale en politieke teorie, eksplisiet of by implikasie, 'n sosiale ontologie veronderstel, ondersoek. Ek herinterpreteer haar konseptuele werktuig genaamd 'n sosiale ontologie as 'n "veronderstelde persoon- en gemeenskapbeeld", maar behou sommige positiewe aspekte van haar argument.

Tweedens verskaf ek 'n analitiese opsomming en kritiese bespreking van drie onlangse artikels deur Professor Phil Higgs wat handel oor die wese en aard van Fundamentele Pedagogiek (FP). Vervolgens pas ek die konseptuele werktuig genaamd 'n "veronderstelde persoon- en gemeenskapbeeld" toe op Higgs se weergawe van FP.

Die volgende stappe in my argument is die ontwikkeling van 'n weergawe van demokratiese opvoeding wat gekoppel is aan agentskap, outoriteit, resiprositeit en deelname; en die interpretasie van 'n persoon- en gemeenskapbeeld (PGB) wat dit onderlê.

In die laaste hoofstuk word Higgs se weergawe van FP, tesame met die onderliggende PGB, gemeet aan agt kriteria wat verskaf word deur my weergawe van demokratiese opvoeding en die onderliggende PGB daarvan. My gevolgtrekking is dat die PGB wat veronderstel word deur Higgs se weergawe van FP toeskietlikerwys as versoenbaar met die weergawe van demokratiese opvoeding in Hoofstuk Vyf gesien kan word, gegewe sommige aanpassings, verduidelikings en ophelderings. Laastens oorweeg ek sommige besware wat Higgs mag opper teen die argument van hierdie minitesis. Ek reageer dan kortliks daarop.

Maart 1993

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DECLARATION

I declare that CAN THE VIEW OF PERSONS AND SOCIETY THAT IS PRESUPPOSED BY HIGGS'S ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS BE COMPATIBLE WITH A CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION ?, is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

SIGNED : **DATE :**

JEROME ALBERT SLAMAT



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

"Acknowledgements and citations are a matter of distributive justice, the currency in which we pay our intellectual debts."
- Michael Walzer.

I want to honour my debt in this currency towards my wife, Eleanor and my daughter, Anastasia, for their tremendous support, tolerance and understanding.

I also want particularly to acknowledge the counsel, guidance and enthusiasm of two persons who played a very important role during the whole project of the writing of this minithesis : Professor Wally Morrow, my supervisor and Ms Nelleke Bak, course coordinator for the Masters Course in Education and Democracy.

I am also indebted to Dr. Anthony Holiday, who introduced me to Wittgensteinian perspectives in education. In the process I might have become a greater conservative (in the positive sense) than he has bargained for.

I am compelled to mention the name of Professor Phil Higgs of UNISA whose articles on the nature and task of Fundamental Pedagogics made this critique possible. I hope that this minithesis can help to stimulate the much needed dialogue among educationists that Professor Higgs himself is a champion of.

A special vote of thanks to my fellow-students Steven, Barry, Nohma, Tracy, Tom and Ramzie for their friendship, support and commitment to hard work and discussion.

I also want to express my gratitude towards the Ford Foundation for providing financial assistance that aided the timeous completion of this minithesis.

Lastly, but most importantly, I want to declare publicly that I would not have been able to accomplish this task but for the abundant Grace of God.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Yes, the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics can be compatible with a concept of democratic education. However, I shall argue that this is a charitable rather than a certain answer. This kind of answer is made possible by Higgs's way of writing. His three articles reveal a number of qualifications, tensions and even contradictions. (This I shall show in Chapter Three.) This type of writing makes a definite answer on the question of its compatibility with democratic education very difficult. My response is thus that the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics might be compatible with a concept of democratic education, given some adjustments, clarifications and elucidations.

A critical interlocutor might at an initial perusal of the title of this minithesis ask how a view of persons and society is applicable to education and educational theories. The conceptual tool which I call "a view of persons and society" is important to education and educational theories because one's conception of what education is is inextricably linked to what one believes persons are or should be, and also to what one perceives the structure of society to be. The premise that I shall defend in this minithesis is that every educational theory presupposes, explicitly or implicitly, a view of persons and society. This means that for a theory to qualify as an educational theory, it

has to presuppose a view of persons and society. On this account, claims to neutrality and innocence in terms of prior commitments amount to self-deception or, even worse, the deception of others. A view of persons and society is a crucial conceptual tool because it searches the bases and presuppositions of educational theories. In this way it facilitates intellectual honesty and clarity in terms of theoretical commitments and assumptions. Some theorists are sceptical of an approach in which prior commitments are explicitly acknowledged. They reject this approach in favour of one that is 'unbiased', 'scientific' and 'objective'. The error that these theorists are making is to try to explain human behaviour in terms of the same logical form as events in the natural sciences. The type of explanation that is used is causal and mechanistic. This is in stark contrast to the purposiveness that I accord to human beings. Thus, I believe it is better to operate under an explicit acknowledgement of one's prior commitments. Another advantage that such an approach has (in addition to facilitating intellectual honesty and clarity) is that it minimises the area of critical attack or response in the sense that it eliminates a possible controversy about one's prior commitments. In this way, acknowledging the view of persons and society that one operates with, can aid the construction of more rigorous educational theories.

One can also establish, in terms of presupposed views of persons and society, which theories put forward as educational theories are in fact anti-educative. As was stated earlier, one's conception of what education is, is inextricably linked to how

one conceives of persons and society. If one, for example, has a view of education like the one developed in Chapter Five of this minithesis, one would dismiss educational theories that portray human beings as being in the clutches of 'objective forces', or, alternatively, others that view persons as being absolutely free, as anti-educative. The view of persons and society thus becomes a criterion for the comparison of different theories.

Our critical interlocutor might also question my use of the concept of democratic education. My response to this query would start with the fact that there is, at present, a clamour for democracy in all spheres of life in South Africa. One of the spheres where this clamour is at its most deafening is the sphere of education. Since at least 1976, schoolchildren in South Africa have played a leading role in the search for an alternative political and economic arrangement in this country. Specifically, they agitated vigorously for an alternative to the disgrace of Bantu Education, Apartheid Education, gutter education, etc. This alternative became known by just as many different names, for example People's Education, Alternative Education, Education for Liberation, Socialist Education, etc. What all of these had in common was a desire for a more humane and a more equitable educational dispensation within which every child, regardless of race, creed or social standing, could realise his or her full potentialities. The need to link this demand with others pertaining to the wider political and economic situation, was fully understood by students and pupils. Unfortunately, it was

precisely this linkage that resulted in concepts such as People's Education becoming conceptually damaged because of their association with acts of students that were widely interpreted as anti-educative, and their increasingly party political attachment. It is for this reason that I propose the notion of democratic education. This concept is not laden with the negative connotations that continues to hamper the force of concepts like People's Education. However, this concept should not be confused with political democracy with its constitutive element of equality. The account that I give of democratic education in Chapter Five is stripped of any ideas of romantic equality and full participation on the part of learners. I therefore believe it to be a highly realisable alternative to our present situation.

Our critical interlocutor might also question the general focus on Fundamental Pedagogics and the specific selection of the work of Professor Higgs. The focus on Fundamental Pedagogics is justified by the pervasive influence that it has on teacher training and educational research in South Africa. The overwhelming majority of colleges of education and other teacher training institutions in this country adhere to one or other version of Fundamental Pedagogics, while the bulk of educational research at Unisa, University of Pretoria, RAU and Stellenbosch is done within this framework. The appeal that this approach to education has for educational practitioners is rooted in its allegedly unbiased and scientific disposition. I shall explore this claim later in this minithesis.

The reasons for selecting the writings of Professor Higgs as focus of this minithesis are threefold. Firstly, I decided to concentrate on Higgs's work because it is the most recent defence and statement of the nature of Fundamental Pedagogics to my knowledge. I believe that a fair assessment of the compatibility of Fundamental Pedagogics with democratic education cannot be done if one ignores this latest statement on its behalf. Secondly, because Higgs is explicitly responding to the critics of Fundamental Pedagogics, he addresses some issues that are not dealt with by theorists in the tradition of Fundamental Pedagogics, eg. his criticism of absolutism and moral smugness, his linkage of Fundamental Pedagogics to the defence of universal human values, his proposal for the critical review of society's educational institutions, policies, goals and value systems as well as his avowed commitment to dialogue and critical encounter between proponents and critics of Fundamental Pedagogics. His writings thus are an important refinement of the traditional position of Fundamental Pedagogics and need to be considered in any writing about Fundamental Pedagogics at the present juncture. Thirdly, Professor Higgs extends an invitation to dialogue and critical encounter. By his own admission there has historically been a reluctance on the part of proponents of Fundamental Pedagogics to engage in dialogue with their critics. This, according to him, is one of the reasons why the nature and task of Fundamental Pedagogics was misrepresented in the past. Higgs is advocating a different approach that is characterised by scientific dialogue. He states it in the following way:

Every scientific endeavour that fails to promote and engage in dialogue, limits the contents, exchanges, communications and interactions by which experience is steadied while it is enlarged and enriched. The task of scientific endeavour is forever that of creation, which all people share and to which all contribute. Scientific dialogue involves an encounter among people with differing interests, perspectives and opinions - an encounter in which they reconsider and mutually revise opinions and interests, both individual and common. ... What matters is not unanimity or consensus but dialogue. (1)

In this regard, I am in agreement with Higgs. This minithesis is thus offered in the spirit of 'scientific dialogue'. It can serve the purpose of broadening the debate about the philosophical underpinnings of theorizing about education. It seeks to engage the ideas of a person associated with the framework of Fundamental Pedagogics from a perspective that is usually associated with the tradition of 'philosophy of education'. Also, this minithesis seeks to inject into this debate notions of respect, honesty and charity. This, I believe, would facilitate amicable dialogue and enhance the prospects of conceptual refinement. This definitely does not mean that the tools of rigour, logic and reason are subordinated. It merely means resisting the urge to construct caricatural versions of Fundamental Pedagogics when the evidence points towards conceptual refinement and reconsideration of positions in the light of earlier criticisms. The point of making the debate as

broad and tolerant as possible, is the potential development of an autonomous 'atmosphere' of thinking about education in South Africa. This can go a long way to counteract potential future restructuring of education in a unilateral way by the state to serve its ends. In short, I believe that a commitment to dialogue can facilitate a genuine collective investigation amongst theorists of education.

The argument of this minithesis develops in the following way: In Chapter Two I examine Carol Gould's thesis that every social and political theory presupposes, explicitly or tacitly, a social ontology. I critically reinterpret her conceptual tool of social ontology as a presupposed view of persons and society, but retain some positive aspects of her account.

In Chapter Three I provide an analytical summary and critical discussion of the main relevant points of three recent articles by Professor Phil Higgs on the nature and task of Fundamental Pedagogics. I present these three papers as a coherent theory of education.

Chapter Four involves the application of the conceptual tool of "a presupposed view of persons and society" to Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics. The purpose of this chapter is merely to state what explicit commitments Higgs makes with regard to persons and society; as well as to interpret what might be implicit. There is thus no critical intent here.

In Chapter Five I develop an account of democratic education that is linked to agency, authority, reciprocity and participation. This is the notion that Higgs's account will be measured against eventually.

The view of persons and society that underlies the concept of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five, is explored in Chapter Six. Because the view of persons and society is an integral part of the theory, this will also form part of the ideal against which Higgs's account will be measured.

In the concluding chapter (Chapter Seven) Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics, together with its constitutive view of persons and society, is measured against eight criteria provided by the account of democratic education developed in Chapter Five and its matching view of persons and society discussed in Chapter Six. The conclusion is that the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics can charitably be said to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, given some adjustments, clarifications and elucidations. In conclusion, I consider some objections that Higgs might raise against the argument of this minithesis and briefly respond to these.

CHAPTER TWO

THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

In this chapter I shall explore Gould's thesis that every social and political theory presupposes a social ontology.(2) Since educational theories are types of social theory, it follows that such theories, on Gould's account, also subscribe to one or other social ontology.

It is not Gould's project to provide an in-depth philosophical discussion of the idea of a social ontology. She is much more interested in using it as a conceptual tool to aid her theorizing about democracy. However, it would be useful to use her chapter as a basis for viewing this curious concept of a social ontology.

I shall begin by providing a detailed analytical summary of Gould's chapter entitled "Ontological Foundations of Democracy"; secondly, I shall interpret her account in terms of the purposes of this minithesis and finally, I shall critically discuss Gould's thesis, procedure and terminology.

I

The thesis that Gould sets out in the first line of the chapter in question, is that every social and political theory, explicitly or tacitly, presupposes a social ontology. She is adamant that a scrutiny of the underlying social ontology should be part of the philosophical examination of any social or political theory.

To support the thesis and to give direction to her eventual procedure, Gould makes the following additional claims:

- the ontological presuppositions of three prevailing theories of democracy have shortcomings and
- an alternative ontology that overcomes these shortcomings is possible.

The main aim of Gould's chapter is thus to consider what the ontological foundations of an adequate theory of democracy would be.

Gould employs the notion of social ontology as a conceptual tool to accomplish this main project. She proceeds by considering three prevailing theories of democracy, i.e. Liberal Individualism, Pluralist Political Democracy and Holistic Socialism, in terms of the following:

- a brief explanation of the main features of the theory
- identification of the theory with a social ontology that is internally consistent with it
- criticism of the social ontology
- practical consequences of the theory and
- positive features worthy of retention.

In the concluding section (pp.104-113), she proposes and explains her account of a social ontology that would underlie what she deems to be an "adequate theory of democracy". This ontology avoids the shortcomings of the others that she discussed earlier.

I shall now recount Gould's argument in more detail in terms of her definition of social ontology, evaluation of existing theories of democracy and her proposed alternative ontology.

Social ontology

Gould defines social ontology as

... a conception of the nature of the entities and relations that constitute social life. (p.91)

and also as

... some conception of the nature of individuals or persons, of the social relations among them, and of the sort of reality that is constituted by such complex entities as social institutions and their processes. (p.91)

Later, in the same paragraph, she identifies social ontology as

... a systematic theory of the nature of social reality in terms of its basic entities, relations, and processes ...

She characterizes a certain type of relationship between social and political theory (henceforth I shall refer to these as theory) and social ontology. Ontology stands to theory in the relation of presupposition. In this sense, social ontology is an integral part of a theory.

Also, in her formulation, Gould makes it logically impossible for any theory to deny its ontological commitments by stating (in her main thesis) that every theory presupposes a social ontology.

Evaluation of existing theories

Liberal individualism

Gould associates the traditional theories of Locke, Jefferson, Bentham, James Mill and J.S.Mill as well as the recent formulations of Benn and Peters, J.R.Pennock and C.Cohen with this broad theoretical framework. The view of democracy proposed by theorists in this framework is

... a form of government in which the ruled rule themselves through their freely elected representatives. (p.92)

These representatives make the laws and the authority of such laws are derived from the consent of the governed.

Democracy is also seen as the

... protection of the individual against the arbitrary powers of government. (p.92)

In this model, the function of government is restricted to the protection of its citizens from harm or constraints that might be imposed on them by fellow citizens.

Democracy of this kind proposes universal equality of all citizens and affords all citizens equal rights as far as political participation is concerned. This view of democracy is characterized by Gould as the situation of "one-person, one-vote". (p.93)

Gould calls the social ontology that is presupposed by this theory of democracy one of abstract individualism. Individuals are seen as the basic entities that constitute social life. She

sees this view of persons as an abstraction because it attempts to identify each individual in terms of universal human properties only. It thus takes

... all individuals as equal in their basic liberties and rights. (p.93)

According to this framework, individuals are seen as existing independently of each other; related in external ways only. Gould has an atomist view of persons in mind here.

The individual is an isolated ego, acting entirely in pursuit of his/her own interest. The external relations between people means that their basic nature remains unchanged even in contact with other persons. The basic features that Gould ascribes to this essential human nature are freedom, rationality and self-interest. Freedom, in this context, is understood as the absence of external constraint (negative liberty).

The first criticism that Gould levels at this social ontology relates to the abstractness of individuals. She acknowledges the fact that human beings have certain characteristics in common, but claims that abstract individualism fails to capture the "particularity of real individuals". (p.94) In addition to this, it "disregards the concrete social differences among individuals." (p.94) She claims that without an understanding of these differences the actions of individuals cannot be explained adequately.

Secondly, Gould criticizes abstract individualism for portraying individuals as isolated egos related in external ways only. This account fails, in her view, to recognize that in social life, individuals are affected by their interactions with others. They are not isolated and what they are, they become through their social relations. Gould thinks it is only proper that the relations between persons be characterized as internal ones. The distinction between external and internal social relations in Gould's account seems to be that in the case of internal relations it does not make sense to talk of a person outside of a community; while in the case of external relations there is no such prior acceptance - individuals are seen as isolated entities. Internal relations give acknowledgement to elements such as reciprocity, interdependence and joint activity. External relations, on the other hand, posit the independence of individuals as a matter of primacy. If individuals are seen as isolated egos, the idea might arise that society is no more than an aggregate of externally related individuals. According to Gould, such a view neglects to account for the existence of common purposes between persons.

Thirdly, she criticizes this ontology for its portrayal of the nature of persons as given or fixed. Social definitions and roles have changed historically. In fact, Gould argues that even the concept of what a person is might also have changed over time.

Turning to the practical consequences of liberal individualism Gould analyzes the theory to be self-defeating because

... in failing to recognize in theory the relevance of economic and social inequities and constraints to the political sphere, this model tends in practice to permit them to intrude into the very political process that was intended to exclude them. (p.96)

Thus, despite its emphasis on equality, this model of democracy has often led in practice to rule by powerful minorities.

This might be attributed in large measure to the insistence of theorists in this model on taking as their premise individuals that are abstractly the same and only externally related. Even government is not seen as legitimately concerned with social and economic inequalities; its task is merely to guarantee freedom from interference. Freedom in this view, is seen as freedom of choice and not also freedom of development.

Despite the shortcomings of this model, Gould regards the following as positive features that are worthy of retention:

- the emphasis on the universality and equality of rights as well as equal representation in the political process
- the centrality of free choice and negative freedom and
- the emphasis on the ontological primacy of the individual.

However, this is not an uncritical take-over of terms. All of these elements are redefined in Gould's eventual proposal.

Pluralist Political Democracy

Gould cites Madison, Schumpeter, Dahl, Dewey and Berelson as proponents of this theoretical framework. This model has as its focus the aggregation of individual interests as group interests and the representation of these distinct and often conflicting group interests in the political process.

Political democracy is thus viewed as

... a system of governance that mediates these competing interests for the sake of maintaining social equilibrium.

(p.97)

This model acknowledges differences of interest primarily in terms of its expression as interest groups or political blocs. Groups are taken to be internally undifferentiated entities or wholes. Like liberal individualism, political pluralism sees democracy

... as a protection of the freedom of the individual against the unchecked power of a centralized state and thus as a condition for negative freedom from constraint. (p.98)

Such protection takes the form of representation of different interests through regular elections. Pluralism protects the free choice of individuals by preserving political alternatives in a political structure that seeks not to allow dominance by any group or party.

According to Gould, such a theoretical position is underpinned by a mixed ontology. While in one sense, the basic entity of social life is seen as individuals who choose amongst various

alternatives; in another sense ontological primacy belongs to the groups to which individuals belong rather than to the individuals themselves. The social relations that are of importance to this model, are those among groups. These relations are characterized as external. The reason why Gould portrays these relationships as external is the assumption that groups have fixed interests and are left unchanged in dealings between groups. Society is thus taken to be an aggregate of the groups who constitute social reality.

Gould's first criticism of this ontology is in regard to its identification of individuals only in terms of their group membership. According to her, this view fails to recognize the importance of concrete differences between individuals within a group.

In the second place, Gould charges this theoretical model with failing to recognize the internal relationships between individuals within a group. In her opinion, such recognition is essential for an understanding of the shared interests of group members. In the absence of this, groups are only aggregates of individuals with no reason for being together. This criticism also holds for the relationships between groups. Different groups are defined in terms of one another. If the relations between groups are not internal, the existence of groups would not be justified. Gould, thus, argues for an internal relationship not only between individuals in one group, but also between different groups in society.

The practical problems that Gould associates with this model revolve around the fact that it does not provide a basis for

... criticizing the inequitable relations of power and domination that may exist among individuals within a group, among groups and among individuals outside of their group membership. (p.100)

This model may in practice tacitly allow for the existence and reproduction of asymmetrical relations of power in the social and political sphere.

Gould does not deem it necessary to identify any positive features worthy of retention for her own account. This is maybe attributable to the fact that she regards its ontology as a mixed one.

Holistic Socialism

Gould identifies this model as one of a number of approaches with an emphasis on economic democracy that arise as a response to the theoretical neglect of social inequity in liberal individualism. Economic welfare is viewed as a condition of political democracy.

Gould distinguishes between a view that stresses more equitable distribution of goods and opportunities (which I shall call View 1) and a view that emphasizes control over production as well as distribution (which I shall call View 2). She further distinguishes View 2 into a situation where emphasis is on participation of individuals in decisions about economic as well

as political life (my View 2a) and a situation where the community or social whole has ontological primacy and political governance is seen as subordinate to economic life (my View 2b). In this part of the chapter, it is View 2b that Gould wishes to explore. According to this view

... society is essentially organized for the purpose of the production and distribution of goods to satisfy socially determined needs. (p.101)

The state or centralized authority, as an expression of the general will of individuals, is the instrument that directs and controls the activities of production and distribution. Decision-making is based on

... popular control of the economic system, either directly or through the state apparatus. (p.101)

It is in this sense that this model is held as a model of democracy.

On Gould's account of this model, the basic entity of social life is the whole or social totality. The social ontology is one of holism. Individuals exist as parts of the whole. They are defined in terms of the roles and functions that they perform in the societal whole. All relationships between individuals are of an internal nature.

Freedom, in this model, is defined by Gould as

... the freedom of the whole to actualize its potentialities through the activities of individuals.
(p.102)

The freedom that individuals experience is thus equal to their contribution towards the realization of the potentialities of the whole. According to Gould, this theoretical model is ontologically reductive because it portrays all forms of social activity as directed towards the satisfaction of economic needs.

Gould, firstly, charges this account with a disregard for the ontological status of the individual. Holistic socialism attributes agency to the social whole. The individual experiences only a reflected agency because of his/her contribution towards societal goals. Gould argues that intentionality is a condition for agency. Thus, to accord intentionality to the social whole is both extravagant and obscure.

A second, related criticism concerns the conception of the whole as a totality of internal relations. Gould is of the opinion that individuals are more than what is constituted by their social relations. They choose many of these relations themselves and also have the ability to change these.

Thirdly, she claims that this model views individuals and society in a one-sided and economically reductionist way. This fails to capture the many-sidedness of social life.

The main problem that Gould has with this model is that, despite its democratic intent, in practice it has a tendency to give rise to authoritarianism. Individual freedom is sacrificed in the pursuit of the general will and individuals are required to act in prescribed ways towards this end.

According to Gould

... the strength of this view lies in its emphasis on economic sufficiency as a condition for freedom. (p.104)

She considers some notion of economic democracy as an essential element for any adequate conception of democracy. It is needed to fill the silences of liberal individualism and political pluralism on this score. However, she does not agree with economic democracy interpreted in a holistic way that tends to lead to authoritarian practices.

Gould's alternative ontological foundation for democratic theory

The theories explored up to this stage in this chapter, represent only two basic ontologies, i.e. individualism and holism, since Gould indicated that pluralism is based on a mixed ontology. She is of the opinion that a mere combination of the elements of different ontologies explored thus far does not constitute a coherent ontology.

What she sets out to find, is an ontology that succeeds in capturing both individuality and sociality in a coherent way. She represents this third way as

... a coherent ontology in which individuality is given its full due but not at the cost of regarding individuals as isolated and abstract egos, standing in only external relations to each other; at the same time, in this ontology, internal relations are seen to obtain in a way that preserves the importance of sociality, but not at the cost of an overarching totality or whole of which individuals are mere parts or functions. (p.105)

This ontology avoids the shortcomings of those associated with the prevailing theories because it captures both free individuality and the importance of sociality for the development of individuals.

The basic entity that constitutes social reality in Gould's proposal, are what she calls "individuals-in-relations" or "social individuals". (p.105) All other social structures or groupings are derived from this basic entity. Individuals, thus, have ontological primacy, but the relations among them are seen as crucial elements of their being and not as separate from them. Individuals are who they are through their social relations. In this sense social relations are internal. But, Gould is at pains to point out that individuals are not wholly constituted by their relations. She argues that they choose and create many of the relations that they enter into. However, there are some relations that are given, eg. one's native language. Individuals are thus seen as

... agents who have the capacity for conscious choice ...
(p.107)

within a range bordered by reasonable constraints. A requirement of this ontology is both the absence of constraining conditions and the presence of enabling conditions.

Gould portrays the activity of individuals as often joint or common involving shared intentions. This is at odds with a view of persons as isolated egos or as parts of a whole. The agency of the individual is ontologically primary and the group or whole is seen as derived from it.

Social relations are not seen as only those between persons, but also as "objectified forms" such as the state and other institutions. Gould's view of these is that

... they have been brought into being by decisions and actions of agents and can also be changed by them. (p.113)

This ontology, according to Gould, would successfully capture both individuality and sociality and would further be a suitable social ontology to underlie an adequate theory of democracy.

II

Gould's whole project depends on her employment of the notion of a social ontology as a conceptual tool. Her main thesis is that every social and political theory, explicitly or tacitly, presupposes a social ontology. Since educational theories are types of social theory, the following points can be interpreted from her characterization of social ontologies in terms of educational theories:

Every educational theory is underpinned by a social ontology either explicitly or tacitly.

It is logically impossible for an educational theory to avoid subscription to a social ontology. Some theorists explicitly subscribe to such a view, others embrace it innocently while still others deliberately keep silence with regard to it for the sake of "objectivity". I would argue for an explicit statement of ontological commitments for the following reasons: firstly, because all theories are part of traditions that need to be

carefully scrutinized; secondly, it will have a humbling effect on theorists when they become aware of the logical entailments of their sometimes arrogant assertions and lastly, because it has the potential to counterpose blind allegiance and dogmatic thought.

Social ontology stands to educational theory in the relationship of presupposition.

The social ontology is not something separate from the theory that is associated with it. It is integral to, but also distinguishable from the theory it is associated with. It is, therefore, necessary to keep a strategic distinction between educational theory and social ontology.

The need for analysis and criticism of ontological commitments to be part of the philosophical examination of educational theories.

We need to put all our cards on the table. In their critical engagement with each other, philosophers of education need to be clear and honest about their commitments and presuppositions. This will not make them less "scientific" or less "objective"; in fact, it can be an aid in the construction of more coherent and rigorous theories.

What can be stated as a fact, is that we do not create "ex nihilo" or out of nothing. We are all part of different academic and philosophical traditions with their respective prohibiting and enabling features. To deny this when we construct our

theories, is simply pretentious. We need to examine the ontological commitments of every educational theory; but mostly we must spell out our own clearly, otherwise someone else will do it for us. This is the risk we take when we put our ideas and theories in the public sphere.

There is a conceptual coherence between educational theories and their respective social ontologies.

Gould states clearly that social ontologies are presupposed by theories. What does not emerge so clearly from her text is the question of how she derives the social ontologies from the theories that she considers. If it is explicitly stated in these theories, no uncertainty of any consequence is foreseen. But, if the ontological commitments are implicit, one is faced with the problem of how to derive them from the theory.

Some theorists might suggest a process of logical deduction. I would disagree with this because the process of deduction indicates a very precise and almost mathematical procedure. If the relationship between theory and social ontology was strictly logical, it would have been possible to deduce the social ontology underpinning a particular theory with mathematical precision. However, such clarity does not apply in this case because of the possibility of varying interpretations by different theorists. The relationship between theory and social ontology is at best conceptual. Although we cannot rely on the absolute clarity of logical deduction, it is still possible to derive a social ontology from a theory because of the relationship of conceptual entailment. The process by which this

is to be done is called interpretation. By this I do not mean any haphazard opinion. Legitimate interpretation has to comply with the requirements of academic rigour and coherent argumentation. Although we cannot pinpoint a social ontology associated with a theory with absolute exactness, I want to argue that we can achieve a high degree of correctness because of the fact that certain groups of theories are conceptually associated with certain social ontologies, eg. a theory of consumer choice in a capitalist society cannot be seriously associated with a holistic social ontology.

My claim is thus that it is possible to derive the social ontology from a theory by way of interpretation. This is possible because of the relationship of conceptual entailment between theory and social ontology. Also, a legitimate interpretation must be informed by rigour and coherent argumentation. The fact is that certain groups of theories display conceptual affinities to certain social ontologies. Interpretation is thus not as wide as mere opinion, but is restricted to a limited range of plausible possibilities.

Although it is not Gould's intention to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of a social ontology, she shows its use as a conceptual tool in philosophical analysis in a most illuminating way. Also, it is difficult to find fault with her proposal of a social ontology of "individuals-in-relations".

But, I am troubled by some aspects of her characterization of social ontology, her procedure of associating social ontologies with theories and the identification of her conceptual tool as a kind of ontology. It is to these matters that I now turn.

III

Gould's thesis is that social ontologies are presupposed by all social and political theories. There is, thus, a conceptual connection between social ontology and theory. The social ontology is integral to, but also distinguishable from the theory. Therefore, I propose that it is inconsistent with Gould's other two definitions (quoted earlier in this chapter) of social ontology when she refers to it in her orientation paragraph (an area where any theorist should be careful to get his/her terms straight) as "a systematic theory".

In my view, she should have spelt out the relationship between theory and social ontology more clearly; concentrating on the need to keep the concepts apart while still portraying the relationship of conceptual entailment between these.

A second problem I experience relates to the following question: How does Gould get from theory to social ontology in her evaluation of existing theories? As I have already indicated, this becomes a stupid question if the ontological commitments are explicitly stated in these theories. But, I have reason to believe that because of the rationalist and positivist preoccupation with modelling explanation in the social sciences

on that in the natural sciences, and the dominance of these paradigms in the realm of social and political theory, most social ontologies are not explicitly stated and would therefore have to be interpreted from the theories at hand. I have already argued that this is possible because of the conceptual coherence between theory and social ontology, but now I have to warn that the process of interpretation is a dangerous one. This is the case because of the following potential it has : it allows for the formulation of extremes and caricatured versions of social ontologies of especially those theories that one does not feel an affinity for. Of course one needs to be sensitive to the extremes (eg. abstract individualism and holism) and attack such views when explicitly expounded, but one should also have an awareness of the existence and possibility of refined versions, especially when the social ontology has to be interpreted. A little bit of charity can go a long way to enhance academic conversation. Charity in terms of the interpretation of others' theories involves opting for the most favourable account (in terms of the theorist) among the range of plausible interpretations. The best we can do is to urge theorists to make their view of persons and society explicit. This would provide a more sound basis for criticism.

Another area of concern to me, is Gould's use of 'social entities' and 'social relations'. She begins by putting both concepts on an equal footing in her account of social ontology. However, in her evaluation of the three prevailing theories of democracy, 'social entities' assumes theoretical primacy. It is

only in her proposal of 'individuals-in relations' that she returns to 'social relations'. Now it can be argued that 'social relations' is theoretically more primitive in the sense that whatever 'social entities' exist are constituted by 'social relations'. Also, the concept of 'entity' possesses a finitude that does not go well with Gould's own proposal which seems to stress joint and common understandings.

It is my opinion that she favours 'social entities' because of its linguistic affinity with 'ontology'. This leads us directly into my last objection against Gould's account, i.e. her characterization of her main conceptual tool as a kind of ontology. By doing this, she allows herself to be drawn into debates about ontology in general.

Ontology is by no means an unproblematic field of study. The investigation into the possibility of a science of being fascinated philosophers from Aristotle onwards. No easy solutions are offered. One convincing argument is launched by Quine (3) in the form of his thesis of ontological relativity. In short, this thesis states that in order to answer the question of what exists, one has to presuppose some system of classifying things. Thus, one's view of what ontology is will be determined by the theoretical frame of mind that one views the world with. Therefore, no necessary truths about ontology are possible. This thesis throws into disarray all kinds of attempts to provide bases for the existence of a general science of being. To quote Hamlyn:

This means, then, that ... what we can take both ourselves and others to take to exist is relative to the theory and language that we bring to the situation. (4)

When Gould identifies her main conceptual tool as a type of ontology, she walks right into this minefield.

I think that this can be avoided by identifying it as a 'presupposed view of persons'. This term is elastic enough to include both social relations and a sense of social individuals.

It does not provide entry into ontological debates because what a person is, I see as a social construct and not as a general abstraction or finite in any sense.

Thus, what Gould sees as a social ontology can be described in simpler and less problematic terms as a 'presupposed view of persons and society'. It is plausible that every theory is informed by a prior view of persons and society because of the previously stated fact that all theorists are part of traditions and not innocent of bias in terms of social arrangement.

Put in these terms, this is not a novel idea in philosophy. What is novel and illuminating is the way in which Gould employs it as a conceptual tool in the evaluation of different theoretical models, but an awareness of presupposed views of persons and society has been displayed by various philosophers, albeit not in these exact terms.

Isaiah Berlin, for example, in his widely acclaimed "Two concepts of liberty" (5), refers to "the essence of what men are". In his criticism of positive freedom, he interprets different 'views of persons and society' for the various instances of that kind of liberty. Similarly, the view of persons as autonomous human beings looms large in his defence of negative freedom. Another example is to be found in the work of Charles Taylor. In an exposition of the ideas of Hegel (6), Taylor examines the concept of "sittlichkeit". In essence, this conception of society and the place of persons in it posits that it does not make sense to talk about an individual outside of a community. This means that when Hegel formulated social theories, those were already informed by his prior adherence to the concept of "sittlichkeit". It thus constituted a presupposed view of persons and society. These are but two examples amongst many that illustrate the importance of an awareness of presupposed views of persons and society.

It is this primitive theoretical understanding of what the nature of persons and society is that I shall be referring to when I use the phrase 'presupposed view of persons' in the remainder of this minithesis. The thesis that I want to advance is that every educational theory, explicitly or implicitly, presupposes a view of persons and society.

CHAPTER THREE

HIGGS'S ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

In this chapter I shall deal with the account that Professor Phil Higgs gives of Fundamental Pedagogics as expounded in three recent articles by him on the nature and role of Fundamental Pedagogics.

I shall firstly provide a summary of the main relevant points of the three articles. I shall treat the three articles as a coherent theory of education and refer to them as H1, H2 and H3 in the main text to facilitate lucid discussion. (7) Secondly, I shall indicate the tensions and contradictions in Higgs's theory, and thirdly I shall critically discuss his argument.

I

The main claim of three recent (and almost identical) papers by Professor P.Higgs on the nature and role of Fundamental Pedagogics (FP) can be stated as follows:

The primary concern of fundamental pedagogics with the essential quality of human existence and those human values which constitute the fundamental nature of such existence has been obscured by ideologically based political, cultural and technological deformation. (adapted from H3, p.197)

Other theses that support the main claim are the following:

1. The misrepresentation of the nature and role of FP reveals a lack of genuine communication, dialogue and critical encounter between proponents and critics of FP. (H3, p.197)
2. The origin of the critical reaction against FP lies in the negation of its task as a science and its relation to an ideologically motivated system of education. (H1, p.148)
3. Linking FP and Apartheid Education is to commit the error of mistaking a science for an ideology. (H2, p.111 and H3, p.195)
4. Misrepresentation threatens the demise of FP in terms of its status as a human science and an academic discipline in its own right. (H2, pp.110-111)

Higgs aims to achieve the following with his trilogy of papers:

1. To provide a clear answer to the question: What is the nature and task of FP? (H2, p.111)
2. To demythologize FP in order to clear away misconceptions and to promote open and creative dialogue among educationists. (H1, p.148) He sees this as a challenge presented by the 'new South Africa'.
3. To set straight the misrepresentation of FP and to portray it as a critical pedagogics of human values seeking to provide a description of universal human values in the context of education. (H3, p.197)

Higgs begins his argument by drawing attention to the criticism of the nature and task of FP in the texts of Ashley, Beard and

Morrow, Enslin, Fouche, Horner, Kallaway, Lawrence, Morrow, Nel, Nicolls, Penny, Randall and Reagan (8). He states that such criticism took place in spite of various published works by proponents of FP on this topic, especially during the last decade. Higgs believes that the criticism is to a large extent misdirected because the nature and task of FP have been misrepresented by:

- misinformation arising in part from an unwillingness by proponents of FP to enter into debate with their critics;
- the politicization of education which has confused scientific endeavour with ideological dogma and propagation;
- naive culturalism which has focused on particular cultural values rather than universal human values; and
- technological prowess which has acclaimed the absolute pronouncements of positivistic and technocratic scientism.

(H2, p.110 and H3, p.195)

Higgs thus sets out to correct the misrepresentation of FP.

According to Higgs, the attack on FP has focused mainly on two areas, i.e. a charge of ideological pretension, and a charge of positivism.

He deals with the charge of ideological pretension in the following way:

Critics of FP maintain that the association between Apartheid Education and FP is clear and beyond dispute. Higgs portrays the case of the critics as being built on the following claims:

- The education system in South Africa reflects the influence of Christian National ideology and FP.
- FP is the dominant ideology of education in South Africa, an ideology inspired by another ideology, namely Afrikaner Christian Nationalism.
- Insofar as educational apartheid is an expression of political apartheid, it is possible to conflate the dominant ideology of education (FP) with the dominant political ideology.
- Also, because of its association with the policy of CNE, FP can be held responsible for the injustice of Apartheid Education in South Africa.
- The nature of FP and the role that it plays is that of a distinctively Afrikaner philosophy of education that stands in the service of Apartheid.

Higgs's response to the critics of FP on the charge of ideological pretension relies mainly on a distinction that he draws between science and ideology.

Higgs states that critical comment which associates FP with the political ideal of Apartheid commits the categorical error of mistaking a science for an ideology. Science and ideology are different activities. Science describes and is concerned with problem thinking while ideology prescribes and is concerned with

systems thinking. FP in its scientific orientation is concerned with problem thinking (scientific) and not systems thinking (ideology). Higgs sees the distinction between a thinking system and systems thinking as another important one. A thinking system is an open and flexible system of interpersonal dialogue characterized by a problem-centred orientation. Systems thinking has to do with fixed, rigid systems or webs of beliefs and practices. FP is portrayed by Higgs as a thinking system whose central problem is to answer the question: What is the essential nature of the human activity referred to as education?

Other reasons that Higgs advances to support his claim that FP is not ideologically pretentious are the following:

- FP is not exclusively an Afrikaner philosophy of education. It is practised at least in England, Germany and the Netherlands also.
- FP is not prescribed by the South African government as a compulsory subject in any South African university or college of education.
- FP does not espouse a Christian philosophy of life. It concerns itself rather with an essential description of the nature of education.
- Unlike education systems and ideologies which are by nature authoritarian and prescriptive, FP acknowledges human concerns and aspirations.
- FP is a human science whose practitioners in their practice of science do not advocate Apartheid as an ideology, either in the political or educational sense. (H3, p.195)

On the basis of this clarification, Higgs hopes to have dealt with the misrepresentation of FP as ideologically pretentious and to have cleared away the confusion of FP as a human science with the ideology of Apartheid.

The second area of attack on FP is the accusation that it adopts a positivist view of knowledge. Variants of this charge can be found in the writings of Grebe, Morrow and Nel (9). Higgs states the charge of positivism in the following way:

- A positivist view of knowledge claims that an objective, scientific rational approach to the world is the sole valid means of acquiring knowledge.
- Elements like commitment, imagination and values are considered significantly less important or ignored altogether.
- Such an approach emphasizes that the minimum requirements for the scientific character of all research are logical consistency, objectivity, verification and absolute freedom from all values.
- Higgs describes this type of scientific rationality as scientism. (H3, p.196)

Higgs's defence of FP against the charge of positivism relies mainly on the distinction that he draws between his account of science and the positivistic form of scientism.

According to Higgs, FP runs counter to any form of scientism. In its concern with the essential nature of education, FP directs

its attention at a hermeneutics of human reality (the problem of describing the nature of human existence). FP as a human science is essentially concerned with uncovering pedagogic essences within the context of human existence. However, Higgs is quick to add that this must not be confused with essentialism in its many varied forms of fixed rationality, objectivism, subjectivism and final answers. According to him, FP is critical of all forms of absolutism and moral smugness if this is taken to mean that one has an unquestionable hold on what is really or essentially true and right. FP is all too aware of the 'human qualities' of 'objective reality.' (H3, p.196) Higgs carries this awareness of the dangers of absolutism over into his accounts of truth and knowledge. With regard to truth, Higgs accepts that it is encountered in the dynamic nature of human reality and existence. The pursuit of truth for FP, then, is a way of living rather than a method of knowing. FP thus acknowledges the limits of human ability to achieve absolute truths.

Similarly, Higgs states that knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, but that these concepts themselves are rooted in intersubjective biographies. The scientific categories used by FP are never regarded as absolute descriptions of reality; they are always approximations of truth that can only be validated by being lived. In this sense, FP is not primarily concerned with solving conceptual problems but rather concerns itself with human problems in the field of education. In its scientific endeavour to reveal those universal human values which describe the essential nature of the human condition, FP

recognizes that such a description is subject to basic human concerns and aspirations in the context of education.

On the basis of these comments and arguments Higgs hopes to have shown that FP is a human science which 'acknowledges the mystery inherent in the human condition' (H3, pp.196-197) and that its critics have misrepresented it as unscientific scientism.

The concluding sections of all three papers deal with Higgs's view of the future and scientific mandate of FP. He argues that FP needs to rid itself of the myths of ideological pretension and positivism in order to be seen as a human science that studies education in terms of a hermeneutic of human reality. Also, both proponents and critics of FP must recognize the need for dialogue, openness and flexibility without which no scientific endeavour can be enlarged and enriched. He also sounds a warning to Fundamental Pedagogicians to guard against the elevation of logic to absolute methods of explanation. FP, as a critical pedagogics of human values, should seek to serve the cause of education by submitting to constant critical review society's educational institutions, policies, goals and value systems in order to safeguard universal human values. (H3, p.197)

In summary, I want to state shortly what FP is and is not according to Higgs.

Higgs defines FP in the following ways:

A human science of open possibilities whose scientific mandate is derived from the nature of human reality and whose field of investigation is centred on the human act of education. (H2, p.115 and H3, p.197)

... fundamental pedagogics as a human science is essentially concerned with uncovering pedagogic essences within the context of human existence. (H2, p.114 and H3, p.196)

... fundamental pedagogics is fundamentally and existentially concerned with the problem: what is the essential nature of the human activity referred to as education? As a human activity, education is not perceived as an abstract concept in need of analysis but as a distinctively human act in need of fundamental description. (H1, p.148 and H2, p.115)

... critical of all forms of absolutism and moral smugness (H3, p.196)

Fundamental pedagogics is a human science which attempts to describe the universal nature of education in home and school context. (H3, p.197)

According to Higgs FP is not linked to the ideologies of Afrikaner Christian Nationalism and Apartheid in the obvious and

unproblematic ways suggested by its critics. It can also not be pronounced positivistic on Higgs's account of positivism as unscientific scientism. Higgs's whole defence of FP turns on the distinctions he draws between science and ideology and between (human) science and scientism.

II

In this section I briefly want to draw attention to four areas in Higgs's theory where there exist at best a tension and at worst a contradiction.

Firstly, Higgs states that FP

... concerns itself ... with an essential description of the nature of education. This description strives to be independent of assumptive frameworks or viewpoints; ... (H3, p.195)

but elsewhere he states that

Somehow human beings have become aware that they cannot describe reality without making choices between alternative categories, models and strategies. (H3, p.196 and H2, p.114)

There is at least a tension between the idea of a description of education that strives to be independent of assumptive frameworks and the realization by human beings that they cannot describe reality without making choices between frameworks of thinking.

Further, if it is logically impossible for a person to describe education without prior commitment, it is unintelligible that

someone should strive to do it. For any striving to make sense, there must at least be a possibility of success.

Secondly, in his endeavour to further his argument that FP is concerned with universal human values, Higgs accuses the critics of FP of

... naive culturalism which has focused on particular cultural values rather than universal human values; ... (H3, p.195 and H2, p.110)

Yet, he states elsewhere that

In its scientific endeavour to reveal those universal human values which describe the essential nature of the human condition, fundamental pedagogics recognizes that such a description is subject to basic human concerns and aspirations in the context of education. (H3, p.196 and H2, p.115)

His second statement seems to allow space for the very particular cultural values that he described as 'naive' and 'transient' in the first place.

Thirdly, Higgs states that

Knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, but these concepts are themselves rooted in intersubjective biographies. (H3, p.196 and H2, p.114)

However, he later states that FP is not

... primarily concerned with solving conceptual problems ... Rather than being concerned with a particular philosophical problem, fundamental pedagogics is concerned

with what Dewey ... refers to as 'the problems of men'.
(H3, p.196 and H2, pp.114-115)

If FP is linked to the attainment of knowledge about education, and knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, Higgs's second statement is at least at odds with the first one. What is also implied here, is a prioritizing of reality over concepts and an assumption of independence between the two categories. This I shall explore further in the next section of this chapter.

Fourthly, Higgs states that FP

... as a human science is essentially concerned with uncovering pedagogic essences within the context of human existence. (H3, p.196 and H2, p.114)

but elsewhere he asserts that

Truth is encountered in the dynamic nature of human reality and existence. (H3, p.196 and H2, p.114)

Although Higgs explicitly pleads that the first statement must not to be confused with essentialism and absolutism, the notions of 'uncovering' and 'essences' create the idea of a fixed human existence that stands in need of discovery. This idea is compounded by Higgs's position that there is a mystery inherent in the human condition. (H2, p.115) This is in contrast with human existence portrayed as dynamic and open to view.

Having drawn the attention of the reader to these tensions and contradictions, I shall now turn to a critical discussion of Higgs's argument.

Science vs. Ideology

A key distinction in Higgs's defence of FP against the charge of ideological pretension is that between science and ideology. On the basis of this distinction he accuses the critics of FP of committing the error of categorical misplacement.

I think that to draw such a distinction is fruitful only if one accepts certain interpretations of the concepts of science and ideology. I also think that the purpose and the manner in which it is used by Higgs is not particularly successful. Let me explain.

J.B.Thompson distinguishes between two uses of the concept of ideology in current literature. On the one hand, the term is used by authors

... as if it were a purely descriptive term : one speaks of 'systems of thought', of 'systems of belief' of 'symbolic practices' which pertain to social action or political projects. (10)

This is what Thompson calls the neutral conception of ideology. On the other hand, some authors perceive ideology as

...essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power - that is, to the process of maintaining domination. (11)

Thompson refers to this as a critical conception of ideology. In terms of the neutral conception, ideology is present in any system regardless of its aim or content, but in terms of the

critical conception a system can only be ideological if it serves to maintain relations of domination.

I shall prefer the critical conception firstly because it captures the negative connotation that has historically been attached to the concept of ideology and secondly, because I want to make a case for the possibility of science being ideological.

The way that Higgs draws the distinction, implies that the categories of science and ideology are logically independent of each other, i.e. what is scientific cannot be ideological and vice versa. I want to challenge this assumption.

Even if one employs Thompson's neutral concept of ideology, 'science' as a system of thought and belief, is necessarily an ideology. If, however, one employs the critical conception, the question as to whether or not science is ideological is something which needs investigation. Such investigation should ascertain whether or not the specific conception of science is essential to maintaining relations of domination.

It is a matter of fact that science can be, and often is, misused for ideological purposes, i.e. maintaining relations of domination. Examples of this is the misuse of nuclear physics in the production of nuclear weapons, chemistry in the production of weapons of chemical warfare, biology in the sabotage of food crops, psychology in the process of indoctrination, etc. In the same way some political and economic systems which were initially

based on some form of scientific findings or theories, ended up as being used in ways that maintain relations of domination. Examples of these are communism in the former Soviet Union, social democracy in Hitler's Germany and apartheid in South Africa.

The point of my argument is that science is not necessarily neutral in respect of ideology, therefore Higgs's categorical distinction between science and ideology in his defence of FP as a science, is not performing its intended function of unburdening FP of ideological pretension. He cannot unproblematically assume that the two categories are logically independent of each other.

The only way in which science can rid itself of ideological pretension is to adopt an explicit anti-ideological stance. Higgs's suggestion that

FP should seek to serve the cause of education by submitting to constant critical review society's educational institutions, policies, goals and value systems in order to safeguard universal human values (H3, p.197)

is an attempt to approximate such a stance. Unfortunately such critical review did not form part of the traditional accounts of FP in South Africa and is at least at odds with a neutral science that does not comment on ideological matters. Whether or not FP is ideological cannot be established on the basis of the claim by its authors that it is not, but only by ascertaining whether or not it serves to maintain relations of dominance in practice.

What I hope to have achieved, is not to show that FP is necessarily ideological, but only to show that the way in which Higgs uses the categories of science and ideology does not provide a fruitful way of defending FP against the charge of ideological pretension.

Concepts and reality

In a section quoted earlier in this chapter, Higgs claims that knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, but that these concepts are themselves rooted in intersubjective biographies. Later he makes the seemingly contrasting statement that FP is not primarily concerned with solving conceptual problems, but that its primary concern is rather with 'the problems of men'. The tension can be formulated in the following way: If FP seeks to establish knowledge about education, and knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, how is it intelligible that Higgs can play down the importance of conceptual analysis?

My opinion is that Higgs assumes a logical distinction between concepts and reality; and that he prioritizes reality over concepts. This is already apparent in the first reference where concepts are contrasted by the use of the word 'but' with 'intersubjective biographies', or put more simply, 'the real lives of people'. In the second reference it is manifested even more clearly in the contrast between 'solving conceptual problems' and 'the (practical?) problems of men'. I shall argue that this distinction between reality and concepts, and the prioritization of reality is unsound.

Although it might sound appealing for someone to argue that he or she accords more weight to practical issues, it is to be disputed whether one can have access to reality without concepts. This is so because reality (or practice) is itself a theoretical or conceptual notion. In Hamlyn's distinction between behaviour and movement (12), 'behaviour' is conscious, intentional, deliberate and purposeful as opposed to movement that need not involve these things. What Higgs surely wants to describe is 'behaviour' in the sphere of education, i.e. actions that are deliberate, purposive and intentional. To engage in educative behaviour is thus to have intentions, reasons or purposes. These intentions are conceptual or theoretical

... in the sense that they are at one remove from the actions: the intentions or purposes are not themselves actions, rather they govern our understanding of what the actions mean. (13)

There is thus a conceptual connection between our concepts about education and our educational reality. Our understanding of educational reality depends on the concepts that we have about education as a purposive practice. One cannot have access to educational reality except via concepts; in which case the investigation of these concepts is a key task of any theory that sets out to make sense of educational practices.

It is in this light that I believe that it is not correct of Higgs to assume a logical distinction between concepts and reality, and that his implication of the possibility of being practical "ex nihilo" is found unintelligible.

Truth, essences and knowledge

Another area of concern in Higgs's articles, is his account of truth, essences and knowledge in his defence of FP against the charge of positivism.

He appears sceptical of positivist rationality and does not see it as applicable to the human sciences. In fact, he describes it as unscientific scientism. He portrays FP as:

- critical of all forms of absolutism
- aware of the human qualities of objective reality
- aware of the limits of human ability to achieve absolute truths.

He states that truth is encountered in the dynamic nature of human reality and existence and that knowledge is always attained by conceptual means.

In spite of all these sound commitments, Higgs still maintains that FP is concerned with uncovering pedagogic essences. Higgs is quick to add that such a search for essences must not be confused with essentialism. The problem still remains: how are the notions of uncovering and essences to be understood?

The choice of the word 'uncover' is an unfortunate one since it conjures up ideas of absolutes that are hidden somewhere. Surely, this is not the sense in which Higgs wants to use the concept given his rejection of absolutes. It would thus be better for him to eliminate the notion from his vocabulary.

Similarly, Higgs does not want to be associated with essentialism when he uses the notion of essences. But, yet again, he owes his readers an explanation of how this is to be understood. One way of explaining Higgs's essences is in terms of Kovesi's formal element (14) or Putnam's organizing principle.(15) These two ideas are roughly the same and can be explained in the following way: because of the fact that people have to make sense of the world and all the objects in it, they find ways of sorting reality into categories of sameness and difference. What allows one to see an action or object as of a certain kind, is the organizing principle or formal element involved. But this formal element or organizing principle does not remain fixed because concepts can change over time. If Higgs has something like this explanation in mind, it is best for him to get rid of this notion of essences as well. It is part of a vocabulary that he wishes to avoid and it does not fit into what he is attempting to advance.

Universal human values and particular cultural values

According to Higgs, under positivism

... elements such as commitment, imagination and values are considered significantly less important or ignored altogether. (H3, p.196)

He further states that

... fundamental pedagogics is concerned with universal rather than cultural values for cultural values are transient by nature. (H3, p.197)

He argues that FP cannot be pronounced positivistic because it acknowledges the 'mystery' involved in the human condition and because of its concern for human values.

My opinion is that to talk about 'values' is to slip back into a positivist trap because of an implicit acknowledgement of the fact/value dichotomy. I think that it would be more appropriate to talk about 'moral principles' because this concept does not contain the baggage that the concept of 'values' does.

A further criticism of Higgs's account of values is that his attempt to put his theory on a more sound basis by linking it to 'universal human values' may in fact end up to be a less sound move. This is so because it ignores the particularity that might be of prime importance in understanding why people act in particular ways. It can be linked to Gould's account of abstract individualism (see Chapter Two) in the sense that it portrays people as essentially the same and fails to capture the particularity of real individuals.

Still further, one can question Higgs's assertion that particular 'cultural values' are so transient by nature that they can be regarded as theoretically unimportant. Those 'values' represent forms of agreement that are relatively stable because all people need more or less stable frameworks within which to live their lives. They are not open to haphazard change as can uncharitably be interpreted from Higgs's portrayal. Yet they are flexible depending on the needs and physical surroundings of the people

involved. One can thus conclude that the particular 'cultural values' can perform the function that 'universal human values' were supposed to perform with a high degree of success while still capturing the particularity of real persons.

Dialogue

On a more positive note, Higgs's insistence on the need for dialogue, openness and flexibility is most welcome coming from an academic community that, by his own admission, has displayed an unwillingness to enter into debate with its critics. Also, his insistence that FP should subject to scrutiny societal structures and systems in accordance with universal human values, is sound as long as he also allows space in his account for human differences.

My overall impression of Higgs's position is that it is a richer account of FP than the traditional accounts, but that the force of the new arguments is often impeded by the use of terms that are associated with the language of absolutism.

I hope to have evaluated Higgs's account of FP in the spirit of scientific dialogue and to have charitably drawn attention to some of the problems inherent in his position.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE VIEW OF PERSONS AND SOCIETY IN HIGGS'S ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS

The aim of this chapter is to apply the conceptual tool that I called a 'presupposed view of persons and society' to Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics (FP). I shall probe the three articles by Professor Higgs (seen as a coherent theory of education) for explicit statements and presuppositions about the status of persons and society and attempt to construct a view of persons and society on that basis. There is thus no critical intent here. That I shall deal with in Chapter Seven.

I shall firstly focus on explicit commitments and subsequently attempt to offer an interpretation of what is implicit in the theory. Such an interpretation allows for a range of possibilities which is not unlimited but does not guarantee an indisputable result.

I would like to emphasise that the phrase 'view of persons and society' is the one in terms of which I shall conduct my investigation. It is not a phrase used by Professor Higgs nor does he write with such considerations specifically in mind.

I

The most explicit comment that Professor Higgs makes with regard to the status of persons is the following :

People are not merely playthings of forces that are always working behind their backs nor are they creatures who can gain complete and absolute control over their destinies.

(H3, p.197 and H2, p.115)

What Higgs is unmistakably saying here is that human beings are purposive beings that possess the capacity to be responsible for their own lives. People should not be thought of as being in the clutches of forces beyond their own control. The first part of the quotation is thus a plea for free and purposive human action and an expression of concern that people should be the authors of their own destinies.

At the same time, Higgs, in the second part of the quoted section, states that people cannot gain complete or absolute control over their destinies. He sees their agency as limited in some way. Higgs seems to acknowledge that human actions are not completely arbitrary because of something that prevents them from being such. However, he does not clearly identify what these boundaries are. Different explanations of what acts to constrain agency can be offered.

Firstly, Higgs might be referring to contingent limits, eg. climatic conditions, physical limitations, technical capacity, etc. These are the limits at the boundaries of the sphere of freedom. One would not, for example, insist to exercise your freedom to sunbathe on an overcast and rainy day or attempt to jump unaided over a three metre high fence because of one's understanding of the role that contingent limits play. Reasonable

people acknowledge that freedom cannot be completely unconstrained in terms of contingent factors. My question would thus be : If this is uncontested, why would Higgs find it necessary to refer to these constraints?

Alternatively, Higgs might be referring to the requirements for the intelligibility of human behaviour in terms of frameworks of common meanings that serve to constrain action in ways that are acceptable to the people involved. People seem to accept these frameworks as a pre-requisite for their actions. It is not seen as a pre-requisite in the sense that it is removed from the actions themselves, it is seen as the terms in which their actions are intelligible. This resembles Gould's account of individuals-in-relations in which individuality is given its full due but where completely arbitrary action is constrained by the internality of social relations. (see Chapter Two)

The view of persons and society that emerges from the initial quotation of Higgs is one of purposive agents that have the capacity to act within a wide range of possibilities, but which range is constrained in some way. However, it is not clear how Higgs views the constraint on human action.

A second explicit reference that Higgs makes with regard to persons and society is the following:

... ontology has relevance for human beings, independent of their particular epistemological paradigms. (H1, p.149; H2, p.115 and H3, p.196)

At this stage, one might rightly be confused about what Higgs is meaning here. Is he merely meaning that a study of being in general has value or worth for human beings, or is he talking of human beings as basic ontological entities?

In the sentence that follows immediately after the quoted section Higgs adds that

Such an ontology is directed at the fundamental quality of human existence. (H2, p.115)

This is an indication that Higgs is using 'ontology' in a restricted sense as applied to persons. He is referring to a specific type of ontology. According to this ontology we can think of human beings as basic ontological entities.

What Higgs is saying here, is that we can think of human beings in a sense of what is basically and fundamentally human. All people are seen as being fundamentally similar in certain crucial respects. According to Higgs's position, people are basically and fundamentally the same once stripped of 'particular epistemological paradigms'.

It is this presupposition that allows Higgs to make statements like the following:

... fundamental pedagogics is fundamentally and existentially concerned with the problem : what is the essential nature of the human activity referred to as education? (H3, p.196) (my emphasis)

and

Fundamental pedagogics, in striving for an ever-increasing verisimilitude by attempting to uncover pedagogic essences and so approximate truth, is therefore validated by being lived. (H3, p.196) (my emphasis)

The individual, stripped of historical and cultural particularities, would be the irreducible form of being human, i.e. the phenomenon of the human being in its onticity.

This position is usually associated with the view of persons and society that Gould refers to as abstract individualism. (see Chapter Two) The view of persons and society that is conveyed by this quotation from Higgs is that all persons are basically the same (and by implication equal) and that society is made up of these essentially similar beings.



II

In this section I shall discuss the view of persons and society which seems implicit in Higgs's theory. I shall consider his references to issues such as the human condition or existence as the object of FP as a human science, the task of FP as the critical review of societal structures, universal human values, the human crisis marked by uncertainty and anxiety as well as his reference to the status of children.

Higgs refers to FP as a human science in the following two sections:

... fundamental pedagogics as a human science, is essentially concerned with uncovering pedagogic essences

within the context of human existence. (H3, p.196, H2, p.114 and H1, p.148)

and again,

... fundamental pedagogics is a human science which acknowledges the mystery inherent in the human condition.

(H3, p.196 and H2, p.115)

The object of study of this human science is human existence or as Higgs alternatively terms it, the human condition. However, it is unclear what the nature of this human condition is. In both the above quotations Higgs seems to express a somewhat fixed notion of human existence. This is shrouded in mystery and stands in need of discovery or demystification.

A seemingly opposite view of the human condition is put forward by Higgs when he states that

Truth is encountered in the dynamic nature of human reality and existence. (H2, p.114 and H3, p.196)

There is an apparent tension between the two different views of human existence: according to one human existence is seen as dynamic and open to view, and according to the other it is perceived of as fixed and standing in need of being uncovered or demystified. This is a tension that I have identified in the previous chapter.

The following statement by Higgs also has bearing on a view of persons and society:

As a critical pedagogics of human values, fundamental pedagogics seeks to serve the cause of education by submitting to constant critical review society's educational institutions, policies, goals and value systems in order to safeguard universal human values. (H2, p.112 and H3, p.197)

The implication here is that educational institutions and societal policies, goals and value systems are not seen as foundational, they can be questioned and the purpose of such questioning is seemingly to bring about changes where a departure from 'human values' is detected. This is consistent with Gould's discussion of 'objectified forms' in society as constructed by the actions of people and thus also able to be changed by people. (see Chapter Two) Higgs's claim encourages a constant critical disposition towards 'objectified forms'. People are here viewed as critical and purposive.

Higgs further claims that

... fundamental pedagogics is concerned with universal rather than cultural values for cultural values are transient by nature. These universal values have to do with fundamental human rights which are descriptive of the community of humankind. (H3, p.197 and H2, p.112)

The appeal to universal human values is consistent with Higgs's assertion that ontology has relevance for human beings in the sense of basic sameness. Every human being, described in terms of sameness, is the bearer of fundamental human rights. In Higgs's account this includes respect for the dignity and worth

of every individual person regardless of gender, race, colour or creed; freedom and self-determination. Such values are respected and subscribed to by all human beings. There is universal agreement on the desirability of these values. This is the sense in which Higgs talks about values. Because he regards cultural values as transient by nature he sees them as theoretically unimportant. By implication this means that Higgs sees universal values as more stable and permanent.

Viewing persons as subscribing to a uniform set of universal values is linked to viewing people as essentially the same. These views express a commitment to what Gould calls abstract individualism. (see Chapter Two)

In another section Higgs portrays humankind as facing a crisis marked by uncertainty, anxiety and choice. He states that

Fundamental human values are threatened by a technocratic mentality that attests to the death of permanence, even the permanence of human values. In a universe of open possibilities, humankind, however, experiences an inextricable mixture of the stable and the precarious. (H3, p.197)

Here Higgs seems to want to draw attention to the contemporary attack on and questioning of what is stable and the appearance of forms of thinking that is hostile to essential humanity seen as opposite to thing-likeness. This results in a disorientation that leads to uncertainty, anxiety and a need for choice. Because of the crumbling of stable forms of understanding and existence,

Higgs sees people as living in a state of constant 'angst' and in need of more stability. His appeal to 'universal human values' seems to be an attempt to provide such stability.

The only reference that Higgs makes to the status of children is the following:

... every child is free to do what he or she ought to do to become an adult worthy of being called a human being. (H1, p.148)

This is an opaque statement that needs some clarification. When Higgs talks about freedom in this regard, he does not wish it to be equated with political liberty. (See the sentence immediately before the quoted section in the original text.) So, one can at best deduce that this type of freedom is different from political freedom. In what ways it is, Higgs does not spell out.

The 'ought' in this statement can be interpreted as a 'natural ought' - prescribed by the 'essential' path from childhood to adulthood. Adulthood is seen as the aim of education. It is the destination at the end of a journey of education. But Higgs adds to the aim of adulthood the following qualification:

... worthy of being called a human being.

Surely, he does not want to imply that children are not human beings. It seems as if he has an idea of what a human being in the full sense is and that children have not yet reached that stage, probably because of underdeveloped agency and capacities.

Because of the various contradictions and tensions in Higgs's theory referred to in this and the previous chapter, it is difficult to construct a comprehensive view of persons and society from the theory. I shall therefore simply summarize the view of persons and society that I have interpreted from Higgs's theory. This will reflect some of the tensions that operate in the theory.

Professor Higgs's theory presupposes a view of persons as free to act, but yet constrained in certain (unspecified) ways. Persons are seen as fundamentally and basically the same once stripped of all historical and cultural particularities. They are seen as all subscribing to a uniform set of universal values and capable of criticizing social structures and other objectified forms that compromise those universal human values. Yet they are seen as living in a state of crisis marked by uncertainty, anxiety and choice that derives from the attack on and crumbling of permanency.


Regarding the nature of human beings, there are two views operating in Higgs's theory: one sees humans as having a fixed nature that needs to be uncovered, and the other views humans as having a dynamic nature that defies final definition.

Children are seen as free to follow naturally prescribed paths to adulthood and to a full sense of being human.

Society is seen as consisting of a collection of essentially similar human beings with its implication of equality. There is no serious account of reciprocity or shared purposes in society in this theory.

The different epistemological paradigms that people espouse, the different convictions that they hold and the different cultural forms that they acknowledge as important to their daily lives, are seen as variations on the theme of the 'universal individual'. These elements are superseded in theoretical importance by the fundamental sameness of human beings in Higgs's theory.

This is the view of persons and society that can charitably be interpreted from Higgs's theory of education.



CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

The main project of this minithesis is to ascertain whether the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics can be compatible with a concept of democratic education.

In this chapter I shall explore the contested concept of democratic education. Indeed some have argued that education cannot be democratic.⁽¹⁶⁾ The responsibility is thus on me to show that this is possible.

I shall begin my argument in defence of a notion of democratic education by locating it in a pluralistic view of society. On this view, different kinds of material arrangements can satisfy the criteria for democratization in different spheres of society.

Secondly, I shall consider democracy in the sphere of politics in terms of its associated concepts of equality, reciprocity, participation and agency.

This shall be followed by a section on the nature of education as a distinct social sphere that is nevertheless interrelated with other spheres. Here I shall focus on the particular requirements for the democratization of education and how it differs from democracy in the sphere of politics. I shall warn against the wholesale import of notions of political democracy into the educational sphere.

Next, I shall attempt to state clearly what I mean when I employ the concept of democratic education in the remainder of this minithesis.

In conclusion, I shall briefly explore the linkages between political democracy and democratic education and defend the need not to regard democratic education as a tautology.

I

One of the most common beliefs in philosophy is that society is like a jigsaw puzzle in which all the pieces fit snugly together. This is an ailment of vulgar historical materialism with its constitutive element of economic reductionism, but many conservative and liberal theories also suffer from the same general sickness.

Often some virtue is singled out by theorists as being of paramount importance to the continued existence of humankind. This is done by measuring different virtues on the same scale or by the same set of criteria. At the end of this process, the theorists are left with one virtue that seems to be crucial to continued human existence. Happiness, piety, freedom and democracy are some examples of what served as central virtues during the course of history. This does not mean that the remaining virtues are discarded. In fact, they are seen as contributing to and instrumental in the realization of the supreme virtue. Social theories are thus constructed that accord theoretical supremacy to a single central virtue and project the

view that society is a whole in which all other virtues work in harmony to realize the central virtue.

This kind of thinking is referred to by Isaiah Berlin as monistic thinking. Although he asserts that

... the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of man can be harmoniously realised is demonstrably false (17) ,

he admits that this position is fairly popular because it is satisfying both to the intellect and to the emotions. This probably relates to the sense of harmony and its accompanying sense of certainty. To believe otherwise, i.e. to believe that some virtues are in conflict with each other, is to admit that complete human fulfilment is impossible.

Berlin's refutation of this position involves the notions of freedom of choice and agency. According to him, the centrality that people accord to freedom of choice derives from the fact that the ends that they pursue are diverse. They are not in harmony with each other and thus choice is necessary. If this were not the case, i.e. if no human ends were in conflict, the necessity of freedom of choice and its accompanying agony would vanish.

Berlin prefers pluralism in social theory (the opposite of monism) because it recognises

... that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. (18)

Also, it represents persons as free agents because it does not deprive them, in the name of some remote ideal, of what they need to conduct their lives at the immediateness of the present. Nor does pluralism represent the moral decisions of people as

... an operation which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform. (19)

A pluralistic view of society thus allows theoretical space for tensions, incompatibilities, incongruencies and contingencies.

The way in which a notion of pluralism is important to my project in this chapter, and ultimately in the rest of this minithesis, is the following: I want to resist the temptation to view society as a monistic whole in which all good things work harmoniously towards some single end. With regard to education and democracy, I want to give an account of how the two concepts can reasonably be seen as compatible, but not at the cost of omitting the tensions that exist between them. I want to advance the position that society consists of different spheres, each with its own central defining conditions. I also want to assert that different kinds of material arrangements can satisfy the criteria for democratization in different spheres of society. To these ends, I shall situate my discussion of democratic education within the pluralistic framework provided by Michael Walzer in his book on distributive justice called Spheres of Justice. (20)

As part of the sixth proposition of his theory of goods, Walzer says the following:

Every social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate. (21)

By way of example he states that the good of money is inappropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical office, whereas piety might be very appropriate. Money is again appropriate in the marketplace, but piety would make no headway in that sphere. By stating the problem of distribution in such a way, Walzer avoids attempts to describe society in a monistic way. Therefore he is able to say

I shall set aside, then, all claims made on behalf of any single distributive criterion, for no such criterion can possibly match the diversity of social goods. (22)

By this Walzer does not mean to posit that the different social spheres are completely separate from each other. In fact, he says

What happens in one distributive sphere affects what happens in the others; we can look, at most, for relative autonomy. (23)

It is clear that he does not mean 'relative autonomy' in the way that Althusser and other Marxist thinkers who adhere to the doctrine of 'determinism in the last instance' do. What he is saying is simply that we can think of social spheres as having an 'atmosphere' or 'character' of their own, but also that happenings in any one sphere might influence others. They are thus interrelated while still maintaining some measure of autonomy.

According to Walzer, it is not inappropriate for one good to have the monopoly in terms of importance or desirability in any particular sphere of life. But, when that good is converted into other goods that hold the proper monopoly in other spheres, this monopoly becomes dominance. Walzer argues that

To convert one good into another, when there is no intrinsic connection between the two, is to invade the sphere where another company of men and women properly rules. (24)

but that

Monopoly is not inappropriate within the spheres. (25)

According to him

... we should focus on the reduction of dominance - not, or not primarily, on the break-up or the constraint of monopoly. (26)

This is so because he believes that dominance of goods makes for the dominance of people.

The way in which Walzer's framework is of relevance to my project is the following: I see education as a distinct social sphere with knowledge as its constitutive good. Politics is another distinct sphere with political power as its constitutive good. These two spheres are interrelated, yet each has its own central defining conditions. Democracy is a concept usually associated with the political sphere. It has to do with the way political power is distributed. It is usually expressed in terms of participation, freedom, equality and agency.

The main argument I want to pursue is that one cannot have an uncritical transplant of the notion of political democracy onto the distinctly different sphere of education. Education, as a social sphere in which knowledge is distributed, has its own appropriate internal conditions. It provides material arrangements for democratization that are different from those appropriate in the sphere of politics.

But, Walzer's framework also provides a way of characterizing the relationship (as opposed to distinctness) between the spheres of politics and education. He states that

... political power is a special sort of good. It has a twofold character. First, it is like the other things that men and women make, value, exchange and share ... And, second, it is unlike other things because, however it is had and whoever has it, political power is the regulative agency for social goods generally. It is used to defend the boundaries of all the distributive spheres, including its own, and to enforce the common understandings of what goods are and what they are for. ...In this second sense, we might say, indeed, that political power is always dominant - at the boundaries, but not within them. The central problem of political life is to maintain that crucial distinction between 'at' and 'in'. (27)

Dominance of political power at the boundaries of other social spheres, including education, is entirely acceptable within the setting of political community, but inside these boundaries it constitutes tyranny. Within these boundaries other goods hold the legitimate monopoly.

II

Having claimed that political democracy is different from democracy in the educational sphere, I now want to spell out briefly what I consider political democracy to be. One way of doing this is to give a formal definition in which one endeavours to capture all those elements that seems to be of relevance. Another is to provide an elucidation of the concept of political democracy by exploring its relationship to other related concepts. It is the second path that I choose to take because it will allow me to evade making foundational claims. There is not one absolute concept of political democracy. It depends on how one thinks about it and with what concepts it is associated. Macpherson (28), for example, considers liberty and equality as crucial to democracy. Gould (29) stresses agency, participation and reciprocity, while Barber (30) sets great store by participation and conversation (talk).

Some of the concepts that are usually associated with political democracy are equality, participation, agency, reciprocity and freedom. Proponents of direct democracy stress agency (i.e. the ability of individuals to act and decide in meaningful ways) and participation more than those favouring representative political democracy. Representative democracy stresses the competence, ability and wisdom of representatives in order for them to best serve those whom they represent. Bobbio (31) argues that these two types of democracy need not be seen as opposites and that they can, in fact, coexist peacefully. He distinguishes between two methods of representation; one in terms of which the

representative can only act in terms of the specific mandate of the represented (system of delegation) and another in which the representative has the freedom to interpret his or her orders and is able to act without first consulting the represented (fiduciary system). The first is usually favoured by proponents of direct democracy and the second by proponents of representative democracy. The way Bobbio overcomes this tension is to suggest that a system of delegation is appropriate in matters of specific interest (eg. trade unions, professional associations, student councils, etc.) and that the fiduciary system can be considered appropriate within the realm of general interests (eg. the representation of persons as citizens).

However, what all conceptions of political democracy have in common, is a commitment to some sense of equality. It derives from a moral perspective that accords equality to all persons by virtue of their being persons. Persons are seen as bearers of equal rights and entitled to equal treatment. Political democracy typically is opposed to any form of repression and discrimination. Persons are seen as fully and equally agential and capable of participating in the political process in ways that are reasonably uncompromised.

III

How is democracy in the sphere of education different from democracy in the political sphere?

Political power is instrumental in establishing the boundaries of the sphere of education. By deliberation and discussion the political community develops agreement about where these boundaries can legitimately be drawn. These boundaries should not be viewed as fixed, because they are the subject of continuous political deliberation. But neither are they arbitrary in the sense that they can change with every whim and fancy of whosoever has an interest in redrawing them. The character that I want to give to these boundaries is one of relative stability but flexible enough to change when change is called for by a reasonable majority of the political community.

Any intrusion of political power beyond these boundaries should be viewed as tyranny. Inside these boundaries the appropriate monopoly is in terms of knowledge. The authority of men and women in the sphere of education is derived from their possession of the good of knowledge. Here arrangements different than in the sphere of politics are valid. According to Rorty

... the word education covers two entirely distinct and equally necessary processes - socialization and individuation. (32)

Although Rorty is thinking about formal education in this instance, it is equally appropriate for other types of education. R.S.Peters's view of "education as initiation" (33) into worthwhile knowledge coupled with questioning and critical thinking is compatible with this, as is Winch's idea of "primitive authority". (34)

The argument is the following: in order for human beings to become educated, they first need to be inducted into the store of worthwhile knowledge that society has to offer (socialization); this provides them with the basis for subsequent criticism and questioning of the very society that they are part of (individuation). The idea is that doubt comes after belief (35), that the terms of later questioning make use of concepts belonging to a context in which a great deal was not questioned (36), or, to put it plainly, that we cannot be critical beings out of nothing. Both socialization and individuation are necessary for education.

From the above it can be seen that the relationships that are necessary for education are different from those in the sphere of politics. There are those who are already inducted into the store of worthwhile knowledge and thus in a position to reason critically as well as others at various intermediary stages of induction and questioning. Here one cannot simply assume a view of persons as unproblematically similar and equal. I want to advance a position that views unequal relationships as constitutive of the sphere of education. I am in complete agreement with Morrow when he argues that

... educative relationships cannot be relationships between equals because no person can contribute to another person's education unless he knows or understands something which the other does not. (37)

It needs to be stressed that the only inequality that is essential to educative relationships is an inequality in

knowledge and expertise in which the teacher is superior and the learner is lacking. Although other inequalities might exist in practice, this seems to be the only sense in which inequality is essential to and constitutive of the enterprise of education. The essentiality of inequality in this sense, is a positive and enabling feature in that it is one of the central conditions for an educative practice to exist in the first place. Inequality, in this sense, is stripped of any negative connotation that might otherwise be attached to it. If, then, I state that I agree with the position that educative relationships are unequal, I mean it in this positive sense and not in any other negative or abusive way.

Keeping the above in mind, I now want to claim that democratic education is essentially a form of education. Unequal epistemic relationships are constitutive of the sphere of education. Since democratic education is a type of education (and not a type of political practice) it too is constituted by unequal epistemic relationships. Any notion of complete equality must therefore be abandoned in the context of education. Equalities might exist in practice (such as equality in human dignity) but cannot be extended to include equality in terms of knowledge and expertise. There is no tension between the concept of democratic education and unequal educative relationships. In fact, unequal relationships (in terms of my earlier explanation) seem to be a crucial condition for the existence of democratic education. Therefore, one needs to be very careful of unproblematically importing notions of political democracy into the distinct sphere

of education. By this I do not mean to draw a categorical distinction between education and politics. In fact, I need to emphasize again, like Walzer, that the different social spheres can be viewed as interrelated, but that simultaneously the different defining conditions of each sphere need to be allowed for. Complete equality is appropriate in the political sphere, but not in the sphere of education.

IV

How, then do I see democratic education?

While it was necessary earlier to distinguish between political democracy and democracy in the sphere of education, it should be borne in mind that they are members of the same family, i.e. they have the same formal root, namely democracy. In order for me to proceed with a characterization of democratic education, I shall now consider what can be termed plausible resemblances between the two material manifestations of democracy.

In an account of democratic education, the notion of complete and essential equality has already been ruled out. The notions of equal agency and full participation (usually associated with direct political democracy) also have to be excluded, in the sense that we cannot conceive of learners as being equal agents with teachers and as participating in all decisions affecting them. If this was not so, we would

... see education as presupposing insights, capacities, and virtues which are an outcome of education. (38)

Morrow (39) argues that the learner's agency is compromised by the inequality of educative relationships. However, the notions of participation and agency, even in their compromised form, are crucial to a concept of democratic education. This is important because it allows the learner to be viewed as an active participant in the educative process, as opposed to a passive absorber of knowledge. The learner can now be seen as a participant in the reciprocal conversation of democratic education. The now redefined notions of participation, agency, reciprocity, conversation and critical exchange between learner and teacher conjure up visions of educative practices that are vibrant, exciting, questioning and rigorous.

Amy Gutmann (40) adds to these notions three other central principles of democratic education, i.e. non-repression, non-discrimination and deliberation. In her account of democratic education, she presupposes a pluralistic democratic society. In order for that kind of society to re-produce (as opposed to replicate) itself consciously it must be non-repressive and non-discriminatory. Non-repression applied to education means that education should not be used

... to stifle rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good. (41)

Non-discrimination, when applied to the education necessary to prepare children for future citizenship of a pluralistic democracy

... becomes a principle of non-exclusion. No educable child - regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sex, parental interest (or disinterest) - may be excluded from an education adequate to participate in democratic politics.

(42)

Thirdly, Gutmann states that an education that is termed democratic should prepare children for self-governance while they are being governed. This can be taught by participation in practices of democratic deliberation and decision-making. This could only serve the cause of nurturing those abilities that might be vital to functioning in the context of a political democracy. This is the way that compromised agency and participation are crucial to the preparation of the learner as a democratic citizen.

Democratic education is, thus, a type of education that views the learner as an active participant in the educative process, although his or her agency and participation is admittedly compromised by the inequality of educative relationships. The relationships in democratic education are participative, reciprocal, non-repressive and non-discriminatory. Teacher and learner are bound by a spirit of critical enquiry, but ever mindful of the appropriateness of the authority of the teacher. This authority does not translate into manipulation, because democratic education cannot afford to be undemocratic in its means.

This is the sense in which I want to talk of education as being democratic. I believe that it is a totally reasonable, as well as realisable project. One can imagine that in some highly exceptional cases all these criteria are met, resulting in vibrant educative practices. Others, sadly, are lacking, either because of a lack of enthusiasm or a clinging to outdated modes of teaching.

v

Some critical interlocutor may at this stage argue that the concept of education is a developmental, illuminating and emancipatory concept in its own right and that to talk of democratic education is simply superfluous. She would thus argue that the concept of democratic education is a tautology.

I want to propose a counter-move. I want to argue for the maintenance of the concept of democratic education for the simple reason that all education is not democratic education. It requires no strain on the imagination to conceive of educative practices that are not democratic. Consider our earlier reference to socialization: learners can be inducted into the store of worthwhile knowledge in ways that show no resemblance to the concepts of non-discrimination, non-repression, deliberation, participation, reciprocity, etc. Even critical thinking can be taught in ways that border on indoctrination. The point is that democratic education cannot be undemocratic (as defined in the sphere of education) in its means.

It seems plausible to believe that some educational practices exist that do not concur with the characterization of democratic education in the previous section, just as it is to believe that in some highly exceptional cases these conditions are actually met. Therefore, I argue for the maintenance of the concept of democratic education. I stated earlier that democratic education is a distinctive type of education. Now I want to go further and characterize democratic education as a state of affairs in which education achieves its full meaning. On the continuum between poorer and richer accounts of education, democratic education represents the richest and most developed form of education, setting a normative standard for all other educative practices.

I initially drew a strategic distinction between political democracy and democracy in the educational sphere. Later I explored the resemblances between the two material manifestations of democracy. What remains to be done now, is for me to give an account of the nature of the relationship between these two concepts.

The belief that I share with Gutmann is that the relationship between democratic education and political democracy is a reciprocal one. She states that

... democratic government depends on democratic education for its full moral and political strength. (43)

In another place she argues that

The end of democratic education is to create democratic citizens ... (44)

Morrow is consistent with this when he claims that

... one of the central aims of education is to generate democratic agents. (45)

In the context of this chapter, what he is saying is true *par excellence* of democratic education, but not of all education.

We can thus conclude that the nature of the relationship between democratic education and political democracy is the following: political democracy makes the conditions for democratic education possible and democratic education serves to sustain political democracy. Yet, it should be remembered that different material conditions exist for the democratization of the different spheres of education and politics.

I hope to have given an account of democratic education that is not overly idealistic. It is intended to be a sober and realistic account that is devoid of any romantic ideas of simple equality and unrestrained freedom and participation on the part of learners. It recognizes the uniqueness of the sphere of education and respects its central defining conditions. For anyone who is serious about democracy in general this is an extremely viable concept.

Secondly, I hope successfully to have appealed for caution with regard to the uncritical transplant of political models of democracy onto the sphere of education, but simultaneously to have provided some idea of how the notion of democratic education is related to education and (political) democracy.

CHAPTER SIX

WHAT VIEW OF PERSONS AND SOCIETY UNDERLIES THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION DEVELOPED IN CHAPTER FIVE ?

There is an internal link between democratic education and political democracy. Democratic education can only be fully realised within the context of political democracy because political democracy creates the conditions for democratic education. However, this does not mean that people in repressive societies cannot lay claim to educational practices approaching the characterization of democratic education given in Chapter Five. But, these practices will invariably be in conflict with those prescribed by the rulers of such a society. The reason for this is that democratic education, in its association with the principles of non-repression and non-discrimination, as well as other concepts such as agency, participation, reciprocity, critical investigation, etc. is radically opposed to any form of domination or manipulation. Therefore, one can expect that the ideal conditions required for educational practices to be termed democratic educational practices will not be present in a society in which the rulers have an interest in maintaining asymmetrical relations of power. But, lest the hope despair, the historical record shows that even in the most repressive societies people found space for challenge and resistance. This in some cases even led to the overthrow of these unjust regimes and their replacement with more representative and democratic forms of government.

What happened in these cases, was that people succeeded in the end of creating democratic agents even in the absence of completely ideal conditions.

Thus, I shall firstly argue that ideally the concept of democratic education presupposes a political democracy. I shall characterize such a society as a pluralistic political community associated with the concepts of agency, authority, equality, reciprocity and participation.

Secondly, I shall spell out the view of persons that democratic education presupposes. I shall specifically pay attention to a characterization of democratic agents, learners and teachers.

I

The type of society that ideally is presupposed by the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, is a political democracy.

A critical interlocutor might interject at this stage that such a claim does not amount to much since (as was argued earlier) democracy can be understood in association with various, and sometimes opposing, concepts. I shall thus be more specific and characterize this type of political democracy as a pluralistic political community associated with the concepts of agency, authority, equality, reciprocity and participation.

The view of society that is presupposed by a concept of democratic education is that of a political community firstly, because it envisages no unreasonable constraints on entry and secondly, because the members of such a community are seen as bound by common agreement. The members of this community adhere to societal forms of agreement, not because they were party to the original decisions, but because they accept these forms of agreement as reasonable ways in terms of which to act, identify and live their lives. The authority that these forms of agreement have can be thought of as theoretically primitive. The initiation (socialization) process in education serves to induct the young of society into these forms of agreement.

This does not mean that people are determined by these forms. People are not seen as powerless and uncritically accepting of traditions and rules that are handed down to them. Knowledge of how society works provides the framework for questioning the very society that one is part of. This is the process of individuation or critical thinking. Winch says of this

... the terms of any later 'questioning' would make use of concepts belonging to a context in which a great deal was not questioned. (46)

If space is allowed for criticism of these forms of agreement, it must also mean that space for change is also allowed. Therefore, the democratic community has institutions of deliberation whose purpose it is to effect public choices. All the members of the democratic community have equal participation in these institutions. These institutions are thus not seen as

reified or objectified. They are creations of people and can be questioned and even changed by people.

This does not, however, mean that social agreements are open to haphazard change. This is so because people need a relatively stable frame of reference within which to live their daily lives. Without relatively stable forms of agreement communication is not possible.

So, the characterization of these forms of agreement is that they are relatively stable, yet flexible enough to allow for change if this is what is desired by the majority of the members of the political community. This characterization of the forms of agreement and the institutions in a democratic political community has implications for how persons are viewed. They are seen as agents, i.e. people who have the ability to make decisions for themselves and to act on these. They are seen as being the best judges of what is in their real interests and, therefore, they do not need others to act and decide on their behalf. Yet, their agency is constrained in two important ways. Firstly, it is constrained by contingent factors, eg. their physical limitations, technical capacity, climatic conditions, etc. Any reasonable proponent of human agency will accede to this. Secondly, the possibilities of human action are constrained by the requirements for agency to be intelligible in the first place. Pre-existing forms of agreement and primitive notions of authority are seen as necessary for people to even start thinking about agency in the first place.

But, these constraints are also enabling and not just disabling. Those constraints provide the framework in terms of which persons can express themselves, since people cannot be seen to exist 'ex nihilo' or out of nothing. In this scheme, both agency and authority are thus appropriate.

Further, the type of society that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five is pluralistic in two ways.

The first sense in which the view of society that is presupposed by democratic education is pluralistic, is that it conceives of society as consisting of different social spheres, each with its own constitutive good. However, following Walzer (47), one has to realize the uniqueness of the good of political power. Political power is always dominant at the boundaries of the different social spheres, but never inside these boundaries. Put in clearer terms, in the context of a political community, where the boundaries of the different social spheres ought properly to be drawn, is a matter of constant political deliberation. These boundaries, because where they are drawn is also a form of agreement with its own historical development, are, like other forms of agreement, relatively stable yet flexible enough to allow for change. Any future change in where the boundaries have to be drawn has to take the historical development into consideration.

Because of social agreement on where the boundaries are to be drawn, one is able to distinguish between monopoly and dominance in these spheres. Therefore one is able for example to say, "This is education" and "That is indoctrination". There is nothing wrong with monopoly inside the social spheres, but when one good is converted into other goods that holds the proper monopoly in other spheres, it amounts to dominance. If, for example the relative of a person who is powerful in the sphere of politics is appointed to a teaching post merely because of that person's authority in the sphere of politics, it amounts to dominance. One good, namely political power was converted into another, namely a teaching appointment. Dominance should be rejected since it places unfair constraint on the agency of others. If one disclaims the fact that contemporary society has many centres of power then one would tolerate dominance in one's social theory.

The view of society that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five is a pluralistic one because it acknowledges the existence of different, but interrelated spheres, each with its own central defining conditions. This is the first sense in which it is pluralistic.

A second sense in which the view of society that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education is pluralistic, is that it allows space for differences in terms of culture, religion and tradition because of a recognition of the importance that those categories have for the way people conduct their lives. This recognition and tolerance of different cultures, religions and

traditions is only possible once one presupposes a political community bound by common political agreement. This I have done in the early part of this section.

One way of representing people as equal is to assume that they are all fundamentally similar and to assume that difference is not theoretically important. But, to admit to this is to limit the scope of one's theory and one's understanding of human behaviour. One will thus not have theoretical space for important frameworks of thinking in terms of which people identify and act. However, it should be noted that when I plead the case for the recognition of difference, I do not open the door for dogmatism in terms of one specific religion, culture or tradition in theorizing about democratic education. I simply propose space for recognition and tolerance of different cultures, religions and traditions. Theorists tend to ignore difference because they think that by assuming sameness it is easier to argue for equality. What we need to do, is to delink equality from sameness and to realize that it can legitimately be linked to difference. The religious, cultural or traditional affiliations of a person need not be incompatible with her equal membership of the political community.

Only in a society that acknowledges both difference and equality can Gutmann's principles of non-repression and non-discrimination be reasonably seen to operate. According to Gutmann a democratic society, in order to reproduce itself consciously, must be non-repressive and non-discriminatory.

The view of the type of society that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education is pluralistic, in the second sense, because it acknowledges differences in terms of culture, religion and tradition. However, difference in this sense is compatible with equality.

II

I shall now turn to the view of persons that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five. This was already touched upon briefly in the previous section. I shall specifically pay attention to a characterization of democratic agents, learners and teachers.

Democratic agents

As was claimed in Chapter Five, the aim of democratic education is to generate democratic agents. The reason why these persons are seen as agents and not mere subjects, is because they are able to act and decide autonomously. However, this ability to act autonomously is framed in terms of existing social agreement that is itself relatively stable yet flexible enough to be questioned or even changed if need be. Agency cannot be assumed out of nothing nor can it be conceived of as being without limits. Reasonable constraints on agency are imposed by the primitive authority of pre-existing forms of agreement as well as other contingent factors, eg. the physical surroundings that agents find themselves in. Unconstrained agency exists only on paper or in the minds *laissez-faire* fanatic.

The following features characterize democratic agents :

Democratic agents participate equally in the institutions of democratic society. These institutions are not only of a political nature. Persons need not frame their whole lives in terms of politics. They are free to participate in what they regard as areas of primary identification or where they form part of the appropriate monopoly group.

Because of their adherence to common forms of agreement and identification as well as their common physical location, which necessarily involves reciprocity, democratic agents cannot be thought of as isolated egos. Persons are constituted by their society, but not determined by it. Within constraints people are able to act. These constraints should be seen as enabling.

Democratic agents, according to Morrow (48) are characterized in terms of their autonomy, capacity for critical thinking, discovery of what is in their real interests and the development of moral and political sensibility.

Gutmann links democratic citizenship with the idea of governance. She portrays the democratic citizens as people who are

... willing and able to govern their own lives and share in the governing their society. (49)

Learners

Educative relationships are unequal relationships because of the monopoly that teachers have over the good of knowledge. The

agency of the learner is thus compromised by the inequality of educative relationships.

Although relationships between equals provides the standard for participatory relationships, not all participatory relationships are relationships between equals. Thus, educative relationships can also be participatory relationships. This has important implications for how one views learners. According to Morrow

One implication of the claim that educative relationships are participatory relationships is that the learner needs to be conceived of as an agent in her own right and not merely as an instrument of the teacher's agency. (50)

This is the most important implication for our purposes. If we want to claim that educative relationships are participatory relationships, we need to see the learners as active participants with their own projects although their agency is admittedly compromised.

But, interjects our critical interlocutor, when does the learner become a democratic agent? This is a difficult question. One possible answer is that the learner becomes fully agential (given the reasonable constraints on agency that were noted above) when she has been successfully inducted into the forms of agreement of society and when she has learnt to assess things critically. But, interjects the interlocutor, does this not assume a foundational view of knowledge? The best answer that one can give to this question is that the knowledge in question relates to democratic agency in the sense that one can say, using Morrow and

Gutmann's characterization of democratic agents as requirement, persons are said to be fully agential when they can act autonomously, think critically, discover what is in their real interests, display moral and political sensibility, willing to govern their own lives and to share in the governing of their society. These requirements do not appeal to independent grounds for justification and are surely not related to some fixed content. It is the upshot of critical discussion and deliberation between teachers and learners. It can thus not be said that this view of knowledge is foundational.

Teachers

For persons to be regarded as teachers they must at least fit the requirements for democratic agency that were spelt out above, i.e. autonomy, capacity for critical thinking, etc. The knowledge upon which the teacher's authority is based, is related to democratic agency. This does not involve a foundational view of knowledge (as stated above). Knowledge in this sense is the upshot of critical interaction between teacher and learner.

In addition to the requirements for democratic agency, certain moral requirements, eg. a commitment to non-repression, non-discrimination and critical deliberation, are also applicable to teachers. It is because of the responsibility of the task of teaching that certain codes of conduct (explicit or unspoken) are attached to teachers. In a democratic educative practice teachers are entrusted with the future of democracy. It is only in terms of these criteria that it can be ascertained whether a person is fit to be a teacher.

The authority that the teacher has on the grounds of superior knowledge does not translate into domination because democratic education is anti-manipulative and because the view of knowledge that is associated with it requires reciprocity.

It is thus necessary for the teacher to accept the learner as a participant in the educative process, even though she might be less knowledgeable. The inequality of educative relationships does not exclude reciprocity.



CHAPTER SEVEN

CAN THE VIEW OF PERSONS AND SOCIETY THAT IS PRESUPPOSED BY HIGGS'S ACCOUNT OF FUNDAMENTAL PEDAGOGICS BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION DEVELOPED IN CHAPTER FIVE?

I have, in the preceding chapters, provided a clarification of the conceptual tool termed a presupposed view of persons and society; a summary and criticism of the main relevant points of Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics and the view of persons and society that is presupposed by it; an account of democratic education, as well as the view of persons and society that is presupposed by the concept of democratic education.

With this framework in place, I am in a position at this stage to attempt an answer to the question : Can the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five? I shall consider Higgs's account in terms of the following features of democratic education:

- Agency, authority and reciprocity
- Sameness, difference and equality
- Democratic agency as an end of democratic education
- The view of learners as active participants
- The autonomy of the sphere of education
- An anti-ideological stance
- The dynamic nature of human existence and
- Dialogue and deliberation.

In conclusion, I shall consider possible objections that Professor Higgs might raise against the argument of this minithesis, and briefly respond to these.

I

Agency, authority and reciprocity

The concept of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five has agency (i.e. the ability of people to make decisions for themselves and to act on these) as one of its most important conditions. Yet, agency was portrayed as being restricted in two ways. Firstly, agency was said to be constrained by contingent factors, eg. physical limitations, climatic factors, technical capacity, etc. Any reasonable person would acknowledge that these factors do place restrictions on what humans can do. Secondly, constraints on agency that arose out of the requirements for agency to be intelligible, were noted. I provided an account of how primitive notions of agreement and authority were necessary for one to even start thinking about agency. People were portrayed as not existing out of nothing and as framing their thoughts and concepts according to pre-existing forms of understanding.

Because people identify and act according to common frameworks, there is of necessity an element of reciprocity in all human endeavours in a society. People are not isolated egos acting entirely on their own. They are seen as constituted by social relations, but these relationships do not determine them. It is

in terms of these forms of social agreement that people express their agency.

Higgs is clearly pleading the case of agency when he asserts that

People are not merely playthings of forces that are always working behind their backs ... (H3, p.197)

What he is saying amounts to an appeal for free human action that is purposive and that runs counter to any idea of control or determination. However, he does acknowledge that such free agency is not totally unrestricted when he says immediately thereafter

... nor are they creatures who can gain complete and absolute control over their destinies. (H3, p.197)

While his support for the notion of agency is clear (except, perhaps, for an account of how it is to be understood in the case of learners), his reasons for asserting that agency is compromised are not clear. One is not certain whether he is referring to the contingent factors that I have referred to earlier, whether he has something like pre-existing forms of agreement in mind, or whether he is able to give a totally different explanation. This is a silence in Higgs's theory that, I suspect, flows from his endeavour to provide a universal account of education.

However, he touches on concepts approaching the forms of agreement that I have explained in Chapters Five and Six in two sections of his articles.

In the part of his writing where he is dealing with the nature of knowledge and truth, he states that

Knowledge is always attained by conceptual means, but these concepts are themselves rooted in intersubjective biographies. (H3, p.196)

The concept of intersubjectivity relates to a framework of common meanings. This is Higgs's way of saying that concepts do not assume any arbitrary meaning that one wants to attach to them, but that they arise out of a common frame of reference or agreement.

In another section, where he is explaining the difference between doctrinaire thinking and critical thinking, he identifies critical thinking as

... a thinking system which is dependent on judgement in particular cases; such judgement is not a private matter but is dependent in some way on interpersonal agreement. (H2, pp.111-112)

Although it seems that for him, the act of 'interpersonal agreement' is not a primitive concept, he does show an awareness of a link between judgement and agreement. He does not, however, spell out this link clearly.

These tentative moves that Higgs makes show some resemblance to the primitive forms of agreement and authority I have explored in earlier chapters. However, they take place on the periphery of his portrayal of persons and society and are not referred to explicitly when he is specifically dealing with the nature of

persons or human existence. In those sections he prefers to think of persons in their onticity, stripped of what he terms 'assumptive frameworks'.

In order for Higgs's account of persons to be compatible with the notion of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five, he has to spell out much more clearly what he sees as compromising the agency of persons while simultaneously promoting reciprocity amongst them. Special attention has to be given to the case of learners.

Sameness, difference and equality

In Chapters Five and Six the centrality of the concept of equality in the context of a democratic political community was stressed. It was also stated that one way of thinking of people as equal, is to assume that they are fundamentally similar. I opposed this and proposed that, instead of linking equality to sameness, one can legitimately link it to difference or diversity. I argued that differences in culture, religion and tradition can coexist peacefully with political equality. I opened up theoretical space to account for difference, but not for dogmatism or dominance in terms of any particular culture, religion or tradition.

Higgs chooses the first way, i.e. seeing people as essentially the same. He attempts to allow for accounts of difference, but not very convincingly. This is because of the theoretical primacy that he accords to sameness. When Higgs says that

... Fundamental Pedagogics also emphasises that ontology has relevance for human beings, independent of their particular epistemological paradigms. Such an ontology is directed at the fundamental quality of human existence.

(H2, p.115)

He means that one can think of human beings in a sense of what is basically and fundamentally human. In this scheme all people have dimensions in which they are fundamentally similar. Once they are stripped of their different ways of seeing the world, they are basically and fundamentally the same, according to Higgs. There is a sense in which this is appealing and another in which it is to be rejected.

If to accord some being the status of a human being in the universal sense means to evoke a moral response from others, i.e. a recognition of certain rights, treatment and capacities, it is to be welcomed. But, this does not necessarily relate to sameness as much as it relates to a need to regard persons as equals. What is at issue here is equality of treatment. This need not be conflated with sameness.

But, a critical interlocutor might argue, it is true that all persons eat, drink, love, feel pain, etc. While I acknowledge this as true, I want to argue further that those actions might be done differently by people with different conceptual schemes. Because of this there is a need for us to build specificity into our theories, otherwise their applicability becomes so wide that they do not do much to illuminate specific actions and practices.

Quine's thesis of ontological relativity that was mentioned in Chapter Two is also of relevance with regard to the statement of Higgs that is under consideration now. Hamlyn summarizes it in the following way:

... what we can take both ourselves and others to take to exist is relative to the theory and language that we bring to the situation. (51)

If the subject that is to be studied in its onticity is a human being, one has to ask who the beholder is. It can only be another human being that by Higgs's own admission

... cannot describe reality without making choices between alternative categories, models and strategies. (H3, p.196)

There is at worst a serious tension between this statement of Higgs's and his statement on the applicability of ontology to human beings independent of epistemological paradigms. If ontology has relevance for human beings it can only be in a relative sense (not independent of epistemological paradigms).

Margetson summarizes the argument that I have developed in a fitting way that is worthy of being quoted at length:

... there is no way in which one can understand a phenomenon 'as it is', since it is only in terms of the concepts one has that one can begin to understand anything at all. That is, one does not first perceive something and then 'conceptualise' about it; rather one sees the thing as something (as falling under some concept) in the first place - to see something is already to have seen it in terms of some concepts. Consequently the claim to have

described something 'as it is', can only be understood as a persuasive expression of the claimant's belief that his view of a matter is more adequate in some sense than views put forward by others. His description of the thing 'as it is' is always mediated by his concepts; his description can amount to no more than the view which his concepts enable him to take. (52)

Higgs's attempt to describe human beings 'as they are' is not sustainable in the light of the above.

What is needed in order for Higgs's view of persons to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, is a recognition of the theoretical importance of difference over sameness and a delinking of equality of treatment from actual sameness.

One has understanding for Higgs's hesitation to stress difference against the background of the charges of ideological pretension against Fundamental Pedagogics. He wants to rid Fundamental Pedagogics of its ideological baggage and to portray it as a modern, non-discriminatory and scientific theory with universal application. For him to introduce notions of difference and diversity would be fatal given the alleged association between Fundamental Pedagogics and apartheid education. Such notions have become 'damaged' and immersed in the grammar of apartheid. Culture, for example, is seen as exclusively bad or restrictive by large sections of the South African population.

I believe it is necessary to introduce a notion of difference in terms of human beings. In that way we create theoretical space to explain why people think differently. But for difference to be a key element of a theory of democratic education, it must be situated in a grammar that is linked to equality of treatment and that is radically opposed to any form of domination or irrational discrimination.

Democratic agency as an end of democratic education

In the account of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five one of the most important ends of democratic education was seen as the development of democratic agents. Democratic agency was associated with autonomy, capacity for critical thinking, discovery of what is in one's real interests, the development of political and moral sensibility and a willingness to govern one's own life and to share in the governing of one's society. Democratic agency was seen as based on an anti-foundational view of knowledge.

The nearest that Higgs comes to talking about the ends of his account of education is to say that

... every child is free to do what he or she ought to do to become an adult worthy of being called a human being. (H1, p.148)

Here, the end of education can be seen as adulthood. To the aim of adulthood he adds the curious phrase "worthy of being called a human being". It seems as if Higgs is operating with some conception of what it is to be human in the full sense and that

according to him children have not yet attained this state of fulfilment. Also, it seems as if he assumes the progression from childhood to adulthood to be natural and unproblematic. Another implication of this statement is that some adults might not be worthy of being called human beings.

If this addition to the aim of adulthood has as its point of force that to be a human being in the full sense has some moral requirements and implications attached to it in the sense that it relates to how one perceives of oneself and others as persons, it is not incompatible with democratic agency. However, in order for this view on the end of education to be compatible with a concept of democratic education, the moral requirements and implications of what it is to be fully human need to be spelt out more clearly by Professor Higgs.

The view of learners as active participants

A case was made for viewing learners as active participants, even though their agency was said to be compromised. The argument was the following : Educative relationships are not relationships between equals. The agency of learners is compromised by the inequality of these relationships. Although relationships between equals provide the standard for participatory relationships, all participatory relationships are not relationships between equals. In a monarchy, for example, different classes of people are found. The relationships between different people might be highly unequal. But, for its continued existence the monarchy is dependent on the participation of all layers of society and the

recognition thereof as a sensible way to lead their lives. If, thus, all participatory relationships are not relationships between equals, this creates the space for portraying educative relationships as types of participative relationships. This was seen as necessary to view the learner as an active participant with her own agenda, as opposed to a passive recipient of knowledge in the foundational sense. Also, participation and critical engagement of learners were presupposed by the anti-foundational view of knowledge that was expressed in Chapter Six.

Higgs's only reference to learners/children is the following passage that was also quoted earlier:

... every child is free to do what he or she ought to do to become an adult worthy of being called a human being. (H1, p.148)

In the previous section I commented on the supposed end of adulthood. Now I want to draw attention to Higgs's view of children/learners.

When Higgs talks about freedom with regard to learners, he does not want it to be equated with political liberty. (H1, p.148) From this one can understand that the freedom that is accorded to the learners by Higgs is at least different from political liberty. How different this freedom is, can be seen from the use of the seemingly opposite 'ought' in the phrase quoted above. The use of the word 'ought' acts to place a constraint on the freedom of learners. However, this can be understood in two different ways. Firstly, it can be understood as meaning that there are certain

things that children must do in order to become adults that are acceptable to society. These things are not questioned by them and the rest of society. One can thus accept that the actions that children must perform are viewed as natural by society. Secondly, children might be ordered to do certain things that are prescribed to them by the rulers of society. These things might be questioned by them and other sectors of society. They might perceive of the actions to be performed as external compulsion. The distinction is thus between forms of agreement that are viewed as legitimate and acceptable and others that are seen as coercive.

The second scenario is incompatible with the concept of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five. The first one can be considered as compatible if Higgs spells out clearly how agency and participation fit into the scheme. This I have done in Chapters Five and Six.

For Higgs's account of learners to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, it needs to comment clearly on the nature of agency in the case of learners, how this agency is constrained, and the status of the 'ought' in the claim about children. Higgs must be able to show how learners can be active participants in the process of education.

The autonomy of the sphere of education

In Chapters Five and Six a view of society was presented in connection with democratic education that was pluralistic in the

sense that it acknowledged the existence of different, distinct spheres of social life. Each sphere was seen as having its own constitutive good, eg. knowledge is the constitutive good of the sphere called education. Although the different spheres were seen as being distinct, they were also regarded as interrelated, eg. matters in the sphere of politics might have repercussions in the sphere of education.

But in a democratic society this interrelatedness does not allow space for dominance in one social sphere of persons who are influential in another sphere. In each social sphere a different group of persons legitimately rule, depending on their participation in the goods that have the appropriate monopoly in that sphere.

Higgs shows some sensitivity towards the idea of different social spheres. Proof of this is his scepticism towards Penny's alleged conflation of the dominant political ideology (apartheid) with the dominant ideology of education (Fundamental Pedagogics) (H1, p.147) ; his assertion that

... fundamental pedagogics as a science does not equate freedom with political liberty. (H1, p.148) ;

and his claim that

... the politicisation of education ... has confused scientific endeavour with ideological dogma and propagation. (H2, p.110)

What I pleaded for in my portrayal of the spheres of society is a delicate balance between respecting the distinctness of the

different spheres and acknowledging the interrelatedness of these different spheres. To veer too much towards either end can be theoretically dangerous. If one only stresses the interrelatedness of spheres, one might end up with a theory of society that tolerates dominance and determinism. On the other hand, if one only stresses the distinctness of the societal spheres, one might end up with a theory of society that does not allow space to explain why happenings in one sphere influence the conditions in others.

While Higgs's writings seem to indicate the need to respect the central defining conditions of the different spheres of society, the distinctions that he draws seem to be of too categorical a nature. It seems as if politics and education, and science and ideology are names for mutually exclusive activities.

The distinctions are so sharp and categorical that they do not allow theoretical space for the interrelatedness of different spheres.

For Higgs's view of society to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, it must explicitly allow space in the theory for the interrelatedness of social spheres and abandon the categorical distinctions that give rise to the inflexibility and rigidity in the theory.

An anti-ideological stance

In the critical assessment of Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics in Chapter Three reference was made to J.B.Thompson's critical conception of ideology. Ideology, in terms of this conception, is

... essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power - that is, to the process of maintaining domination. (53)

I preferred this conception of ideology over the neutral one which portrayed ideology as systems of thought or belief.

In Chapters Five and Six, as well as earlier in this chapter, democratic education was presented as a concept that is in sharp contrast with ideology as defined in the critical sense by Thompson. Democratic education was thus portrayed as explicitly and vigorously anti-ideological.

In Chapter Three I have already indicated that I have problems with Higgs's use of the concept of ideology. At that stage I questioned the usefulness of his central distinction between ideology and science. Ideology was presented by Higgs as almost a label of a body of content that is characterised by its adherence to a specific life and world view. I showed, using Thompson's critical conception of ideology, that even science can be ideological in instances where it is instrumental in maintaining domination. This was the case arguing the inadequacy of drawing a categorical distinction between ideology and science as a defence against charges of ideological pretension.

The nearest that Higgs comes to a commitment to an anti-ideological stance, is the section of his writing where he states the following:

As a critical pedagogics of human values, fundamental pedagogics seeks to serve the cause of education by submitting to constant critical review society's educational institutions, policies, goals and value systems in order to safeguard universal human values. (H3, p.197)

If one understands universal human values as being in opposition to any form of domination, this is an anti-ideological statement *par excellence*. However, this is not spelt out clearly by Higgs.

For Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics to be compatible with the concept of democratic education that was developed in Chapter Five, we would need a clarification of the view of ideology that is being taken. An explicit commitment to an anti-ideological stance (in Thompson's critical sense) would dispel any notion of 'ideological pretension' and increase the usefulness of the concept of ideology.

The dynamic nature of human existence

I have argued in my account of democratic education (in Chapter Five) that human existence is characterised by agency and purposiveness. It therefore cannot be explained in terms of fixed rules nor can it be perceived of as being in the clutches of external forces. The authority of primitive forms of social agreement is firm, but flexible. The view of human existence that was taken in my account of democratic education is that it is

relatively stable yet dynamic and open to change, although not haphazard change.

In Chapter Three I drew attention to the fact that Higgs seems to hover between two conceptions of human existence. On the one hand he talks about the necessity of 'uncovering' the essences of human existence that are shrouded by mystery, but on the other he stresses the dynamic nature of human reality and existence. (Both views to be found in H3, p.196) Although one cannot blankly accuse Higgs of absolutism (54), his idea of uncovering essences that are shrouded in mystery conjures up the vision of a fixed nature of human existence that stands in need of discovery.

In order for Higgs's view of human existence to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five, it has to rid itself of the concepts of 'uncovering' and 'essences'. These concepts are associated with the language of absolutism and fixed rationality that Higgs is anxious not to associate with Fundamental Pedagogics. Neither is the nature of human existence boundlessly dynamic. It is relatively stable because of the recognition by persons of primitive forms of agreement, yet it is open to change when the historical needs and conditions of people demand it.

Dialogue and deliberation

In Chapter Six I was at pains to portray the learner in a democratic educational situation as an agent with her own

projects. Although the agency of the learner was said to be compromised, I attached importance to the idea of critical dialogue and reciprocity between learner and teacher, especially in the field of higher education. I argued that it is important to view the learner as an active participant in the process of education; that it was the responsibility of the teacher to cultivate knowledge linked to democratic agency; and that the process of dialogue between these parties is essential.

Higgs is a champion of dialogue between educationists of different persuasions. In all three of his papers he pleads with proponents and critics of Fundamental Pedagogics to commit themselves to dialogue and theoretical refinement. His striking conclusion is that

What matters is not unanimity or consensus but dialogue.

(H3, p.197)

This is the stance for which I have commended Higgs in both Chapter One and Chapter Three. Higgs thus has no qualms about dialogue between 'equals'.

A question that arises in connection with Higgs's position, and one that remains unanswered, is whether he would be willing to extend this plea for dialogue to the relationship between teachers and learners. It was already stated that this cannot be a dialogue between equals.

I believe that for Higgs's concept of dialogue to be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter

Five and especially with the view of learners in Chapter Six, he has to extend his support for dialogue between educationists to the admittedly different relationship between learner and teacher. The alternative is to view the learner as a passive recipient of foundationalist knowledge. This runs counter to the concept of democratic education and the view of learners that is advocated in this minithesis.

It is my conclusion that the view of persons and society that is presupposed by Higgs's account of Fundamental Pedagogics can be compatible with the concept of democratic education developed in Chapter Five given the above adjustments, clarifications and elucidations.

II

In conclusion I shall mention possible objections that Professor Higgs might raise against the argument of this minithesis, and briefly respond to these.

Firstly, Higgs might claim that this minithesis appraises his writings unfairly because he does not write specifically with a view of persons and society in mind. He might argue that, had he known this beforehand, he might have been in a better position to spell out his views concerning persons and society more clearly. My argument is that every educational theory presupposes a view of persons and society, whether explicitly or tacitly. On this score, even if one is not consciously writing with a view of persons and society in mind, one cannot escape adhering to

one. One can make explicit pronouncements on this matter without even focusing directly on it, or a specific view of persons and society can be interpreted from the other elements of one's theory.

Even if Higgs is not writing with a view of persons and society specifically in mind, it does not mean that he is not committed to some conception of persons and society. In the case of his explicit statements on the status of persons and society there is less chance of interpretations that are at variance with Higgs's original intention, provided that it is stated clearly. However, he might have problems with what I, as an interpreter of his work, have seen as being implicit in his writings. Throughout this minithesis I have applied the principle of charity (i.e. to give the most positive interpretation), but it might still be possible that Higgs will experience problems with my interpretations of his work. In this regard he is welcome to respond in the spirit of 'scientific dialogue'. While he might have reservations with some of my interpretations, I doubt that he can find fault with my thesis that every educational theory, explicitly or tacitly, presupposes a view of persons and society.

Secondly, Higgs can attack the idea of giving primacy to a notion of difference. He might argue that to stress differences in culture, religion and tradition can be divisive and that to give primacy to difference constitutes, in the educational arena, a return to Apartheid Education. He might further argue that these religions, traditions and cultures all represent different claims

to knowledge that can only be fully satisfied by the provision of separate schools and other educational institutions.

This charge I shall counter by reiterating that the knowledge that I see as constitutive of democratic education is linked to democratic agency. The criteria that were provided by Morrow and Gutmann are the ideals that democratic education aspires to. The primary responsibility for the education of the members of a democracy lies with the state. It is its responsibility to ensure conscious social reproduction while avoiding repression and discrimination.

But, Higgs might argue that my account of pluralism is presupposing prior political agreement amongst all members of the democratic society. To this charge I shall plead guilty. A workable proposal for pluralism can only be realised once one recognises prior political agreement. It is not my business in this minithesis to spell out how such political agreement is to be realised. It is a subject for another investigation. It is a difficult problem to which there are no easy solutions, as we are all too aware in South Africa. But, what I am sure about, is that such a situation will not miraculously come to pass nor can it be managed into existence by officials and politicians. Such political agreement develops over time and the best that we can do is to point to the institution of all manner of procedural means that can help to create conditions that are conducive to the development of such primitive political agreement.

So, the idea of according theoretical primacy to difference is not far-fetched. The proposal for pluralism is workable given prior political agreement. In the sphere of education this will mean a commitment to knowledge linked to democratic agency that is facilitated by the state, while leaving people free to pursue their different religions, traditions and cultures in any other way.

Thirdly, Higgs might accuse me of subjectivity and relativism. This might be so because he claims to be proceeding scientifically. This would include notions of objectivity and being able to test one's findings against independent grounds. My argument might be considered subjective because of my explicit adherence to particular views. It might be considered relativist because of the way I portray different spheres and communities.

I offer no excuse for explicitly advancing certain positions. As I stated in earlier sections of this minithesis, I believe that intellectual honesty is necessary and that it is impossible not to adhere to some or other prior commitment. On the charge of relativism I believe, with Rorty (55), that it is necessary to transcend the language of Enlightenment Rationalism and only seek to redescribe social phenomena in the absence of independent grounds. This does not mean that one has to abandon all concepts of objectivity. Putnam (56) argues that if people find themselves without things that they need, they sooner or later find ways of making those very things (or some approximation) that will answer their needs. If one thus finds oneself without recourse to

independent grounds, one will sooner or later find something that will stand in good stead. I believe that such an alternative can be found in the primitive forms of social agreement that I outlined in Chapter Five. These forms of agreement are relatively stable and are good enough to perform the job that independent grounds would have done. Objectivity is thus redefined as intersubjectivity and is definitely not equal to arbitrariness.

Fourthly, Higgs, while he might be acknowledging the appropriateness of different, distinct spheres of social life, may accuse me of vagueness on the subject of social spheres. He might argue that I do not give full account of what legitimately qualifies as a separate social sphere and how many spheres there are in society. To this I plead guilty. But, I want to motivate my choice not to do so in the following way : It is not my intention to give a categorical taxonomy of social spheres. My purpose is merely to defend the idea of different spheres, each with their own constitutive good and central defining conditions as well as to counter any idea of improper dominance across spheres. It is also to defend the idea that in each sphere of social life a different company of men and women legitimately rule. It is my contention that it is better to leave the question of the number of spheres open and to leave it to others to defend the legitimacy of spheres that they regard as important. Complete agreement in terms of what and how many social spheres there are may not be possible. It is surely not my place to dictate to others in this regard.

Fifthly, Higgs might attribute my criticism of his articles to a poor understanding of 'the phenomenological method'. I do not claim great depth of understanding about matters concerning phenomenology. But, I want to argue with Margetson (57) that there does not exist anything like 'the phenomenological method'. Like 'the scientific method' it is simply a crude way of referring to a particular kind of epistemological stance.

Further, I want to reiterate my claim that one does not have direct access to reality, but that it is always mediated by concepts.

These are some of the objections that I think Professor Higgs might bring in against my argument. There might be more objections to the argument of this minithesis by him and others. This is important to keep alive the debate about the philosophical underpinnings of educational theory. I welcome any response, negative or positive, to my argument.

Even if the argument of this minithesis is found to be unconvincing or lacking in some way, I think that it constitutes a contribution to the educational debate in South Africa that is worthy of serious consideration because of its support for the idea of collective investigation and dialogue amongst educationists; its introduction of the notions of charity, honesty and respect in the educational conversation; its use of the idea of a presupposed view of persons and society; and the stress that it puts on the need to talk about democratic education.

NOTES

1. P. Higgs "Fundamental pedagogics and human values - a reply to its critics" in South African Journal of Education vol 11 no.4, 1991, p.197
2. Refer to Carol Gould "Ontological foundations of democracy" in Rethinking Democracy Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988. Henceforth I shall refer to this chapter only by means of page references in the main text. These references correspond to the numbering in the original text.
3. See D.W. Hamlyn "Ontology" in Metaphysics Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 34-59
4. D.W. Hamlyn op.cit p.44
5. Isaiah Berlin "Two concepts of liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty London : Oxford University Press, 1969
6. Charles Taylor "Hegel : History and Politics" in M.J. Sandel (ed) Liberalism and its Critics Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1984
7. The three papers by Professor Higgs are the following :

P.Higgs "Fundamental Pedagogics and the myth of ideological pretension" in South African Journal of Higher Education vol 5 no.1, 1991 (hereafter referred to in the main text as H1)

P.Higgs "The nature and task of Fundamental Pedagogics - a fundamental response" in Educare vol 20 no.1, 1991 (hereafter referred to in the main text as H2)

P.Higgs "Fundamental Pedagogics and human values - a reply to its critics" in South African Journal of Education vol 11 no 4, 1991 (hereafter referred to as H3 in the main text)
8. For full references consult Higgs's bibliographies in H1, p.150; H2, pp.116-118 and H3, pp.197-198.
9. See note 8 above.
10. See John B. Thompson "Conceptualization of ideology" in Studies in the Theory of Ideology Cambridge : Polity Press, 1984, p.4
11. John B. Thompson op.cit p.4
12. Refer to D.W. Hamlyn "Behaviour" in Philosophy vol 28, 1953, pp.132-145.

13. D.B. Margetson "The absurdity of 'practicism'" in Journal of Education vol 11, 1979, p.14
14. J.Kovesi "Between good and yellow" in Moral Notions London : Routledge, 1967
15. Ruth Anna Putnam "Creating facts and values" in Philosophy Vol 60, 1985
16. See for example Wally Morrow "Democratic schooling and the continental nuisance" in Chains of Thought Johannesburg : Southern Books, 1989, pp. 147-150
17. Isaiah Berlin op.cit p.169
18. op.cit p.171
19. op.cit p.171
20. Michael Walzer Spheres of Justice Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1985
21. Michael Walzer op.cit p.10
22. op.cit p.21
23. op.cit p.10
24. op.cit p.19
25. op.cit p.19
26. op.cit p.17
27. op.cit p.15 (footnote)
28. C.B. Macpherson The Real World of Democracy Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1960
29. Carol Gould Rethinking Democracy Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1988
30. Benjamin Barber Strong Democracy Berkeley : University of California Press, 1984
31. Norberto Bobbio The Future of Democracy Oxford : Polity Press, 1988
32. Richard Rorty "Education without dogma" in Dialogue no 88 February 1990, p.45
33. R.S. Peters "Education as initiation" in R.D. Archambault (ed) Philosophical Analysis and Education London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968, pp.87-111

34. See Peter Winch "Certainty and authority" in Phillips Griffiths (ed) Wittgenstein Centenary Essays Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, especially pp.231-237
35. Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (trans) Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1977, par.160
36. Peter Winch op.cit p.233
37. Wally Morrow op.cit p.147
38. op.cit p.148
39. op.cit p.148
40. See Amy Gutmann "Democracy and democratic education" Keynote Address , UWC, 1990
41. Amy Gutmann op.cit p.7
42. op.cit p.7
43. op.cit p.12
44. op.cit p.1
45. Wally Morrow op.cit p.149
46. Peter Winch op.cit p.233
47. Michael Walzer op.cit
48. Wally Morrow op.cit p.149
49. Amy Gutmann op.cit p.1
50. Wally Morrow op.cit p.148
51. See D.W. Hamlyn "Ontology" in Metaphysics Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.44
52. D.B. Margetson "Pedagogics in South Africa : The mystification of education?" in P.N.G. Beard and W.E. Morrow (eds) Problems of Pedagogics Durban : Butterworths, 1981, p.200
53. See J.B. Thompson op.cit p.4
54. In H3, p.196 Higgs tries to distance himself from such a position by "not denying that differences are encountered in human experience" and stating that "fundamental pedagogics must not be confused with essentialism in its many varied forms of fixed rationality, objectivism, subjectivism and final answers". It is also portrayed by him as "aware of the human qualities of objective reality".

55. See Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony and Solidarity
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.44
56. Ruth Putnam op.cit p.4
57. D.B. Margetson "Pedagogics in South Africa: The
mystification of education?" in P.N.G. Beard and W.E.
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