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Exploring cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands: Beitbridge and Kosi Bay

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by

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Degree confidentiality: None

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DECLARATION

I, **Inocent Moyo** declare that “*Exploring cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands: Beitbridge and Kosi Bay*” is my original work and that all sources have been accurately reported and acknowledged, and that this document has not previously, in its entirety or in part, been submitted at any university to obtain an academic qualification. I further that the following publications are direct results of this thesis.

- a) Inocent Moyo (2022) COVID-19, Dissensus and de facto Transformation at the South Africa–Zimbabwe Border at Beitbridge, *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 37:4, 781-804, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2022.2039267
- b) Inocent Moyo (2023) The vacuity of informal cross-border trade facilitation strategies in the SADC region, *Political Geography*, 101, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2022.102816>



DEDICATION

To the security of all people everywhere at all times



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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEC: African Economic Community
AfCFTA: African Continental Free Trade Area
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU: African Union
BMA: Border Management Authority
CBA: Collaborative Border Management
CBM: Coordinated Border Management
CoBM: Comprehensive Border Management
COMAF: Inter-ministerial Commission for the Sea and Borders
COMESA: Common Market for the Eastern and Southern Africa
COPRI: Conflict and Peace Research Institute
COVID-19: Coronavirus Pandemic
CU: Customs Union
DoHET: Department of Higher Education and Training
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo
EMA: Environmental Management Agency
EMU: Economic and Monetary Union
EU: European Union
FLS: Front Line States
FRONTEX: European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FTAs: Free Trade Areas
GwOT: Global War on Terrorism
IBM: Integrated Border Management
ICBT: Informal Cross-Border Trader
ICBTs: Informal Cross-Border Traders
IOM: International Organisation for Migration

NRA: New Regionalism Approach

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

RECs: Regional Economic Communities

RISDP: SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SADCC: Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

SANF: South African National Defence Force

SAPS: South African Police Service

SIVE: Integrated System of External Surveillance

STR: Simplified Trade Regime

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ZIMRA: Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

ZNA: Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)

ZRP: Zimbabwe Republic Police



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ABSTRACT

Cross-border migration within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region is regarded as a cross-border security issue that has often ignited anti-immigration sentiments in countries like South Africa. In particular, there is increasing debate in South Africa over the porosity of its borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique and how this has led, not only to cross-border security issues, but also threatens the socio-economic and political stability of South Africa. There is a perception that the porous borders provide a breeding ground for a plethora of criminal and illegal activities such as human smuggling and trafficking, cross-border transportation of contraband and violence which undermine South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity. These are legitimate concerns which have motivated border securitisation through the establishment of the Border Management Authority (BMA). South Africa, like other SADC nation-states and indeed any country in the world, has the constitutional responsibility to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity and securing borders is but one of the ways of doing so. However, this approach is a state-centric interpretation of the problem and it is compromised by limited research into the views of non-state actors. It is for this reason that this study examines security issues at the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay and the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge by focusing on the views and experiences of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities. The specific objectives of the study are to: (a) analyse the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations of these non-state actors in the study areas; (b) evaluate the link between the operations of these actors on the one hand and the entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security on the other in the study areas; (c) explore the perceptions of non-state actors concerning border management and cross-border security issues and (d) assess the implications of the Corona Virus pandemic (COVID-19) on cross-border security in the study areas. Through in-depth interviews with respondents, the study found that cross-border security issues in the areas under focus were more complex than what the state-centric paradigm suggests. For example, undocumented migration is not a problem but a symptom of deep-seated problems in the migrants' countries of origin. Similarly, some of the illegalities reported are little more than mere symptoms and results of sophisticated networks of corruption and neopatrimonialism at the borders. Based on this, the study proposes a regional

approach to these problems rather than the current ineffective focus on the symptoms which manifest at the borders.

Keywords: African borders; Cross border security; Migration, Southern Africa; Informal cross border trade; Cross border communities



CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Cross border migration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region has a long history and includes the migration of Mozambicans to South Africa in the late 1800s to work on farms in the then Cape Colony, currently the Western Cape Province of South Africa (Crush et al. 2005; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). Another example are migrant workers from present-day Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, who travelled to work in the mines in the then Southern Rhodesia which is now Zimbabwe (see Crush et al. 2005). However, it was the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in the 1860s and gold in the Witwatersrand in the 1880s which resulted in migration into South Africa from present day Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Eswatini and Zimbabwe in search of employment (see e.g. Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006; Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2014; Moyo and Moyo, 2021). The demand for labour in the diamond and gold mines led to the formal recruitment of migrant workers from South Africa's neighbouring states. The South African Chamber of Mines, formed in 1889, established, among others, the Rand Native Labour Association, which led to the institutionalisation of labour migration to South Africa from countries like Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Eswatini and Zimbabwe (see e.g. Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2014).

During apartheid, these labour migration patterns were strengthened by bilateral labour agreements between South Africa and several neighbouring states to supply labour to meet the labour needs of South African mines and farms (see e.g. Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). In the post-1994 period, the fact that South Africa is an economic hegemon has also meant that, for migrants from many SADC countries, it represents a destination of choice (see e.g. Moyo, 2017; Adepoju, 2010). The significant increase in the number of migrants from these countries to South Africa since the early 1990s should be seen as an extension of the long-standing historical patterns of migration in the region (Crush et al. 2005; Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006; Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013, 2014). It is this increased cross-border migration within SADC, particularly to South Africa, that has

raised several cross-border security matters including the illicit transportation of goods, instances of violence and human smuggling. These constitute the focus of this study which analyses the nature, dynamics and implications of cross-border security issues at two selected SADC borders, namely the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay and the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge. The study is an in-depth qualitative examination of the role of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities in cross-border security. The views of these non-state actors are regarded as vital in deepening our understanding of cross-border security matters beyond the state-centric model which regards the porosity of borders as the main problem. It is this view that is behind the securitisation of both borders and migration as amply indicated by the erection of border fences, for example. This study asserts that such a state-centric model obscures, more than it illuminates, cross-border security problems. By invoking the views and experiences of non-state actors, this study attempts a sophisticated analysis of the issues in the particular geographic areas.

1.2 Problem statement

Migration from SADC countries and others into South Africa is regarded by the latter as a cross-border and economic security issue (in terms of the transportation of illegal goods, among others) which has often ignited anti-immigration sentiments (Dodson, 2000). In addition, there is increasing debate in South Africa over the porosity of its borders with countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique and how this has led, not only to cross-border security challenges, but also how it threatens the socio-economic and political stability of the country (see e.g. Dodson, 2000; Neocosmos, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Crush and Ramachandran, 2014; Department of Home Affairs, 2017; Moyo, 2020).

There is a perception that the porous borders provide a breeding ground for a plethora of criminal and illegal activities such as human smuggling and trafficking, transportation of contraband, violence which undermine South Africa's sovereignty and territorial integrity. These are legitimate

concerns which have motivated the promulgation of the Border Management Authority Act (Act 2 of 2020) for the integrated management and enforcement of immigration law at South Africa's ports of entry as a means of addressing border security and related problems (see e.g. Moyo, 2020). In fact, South Africa, other SADC nation-states, and indeed any country in the world, has the constitutional responsibility to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity and securing borders is but one of the ways of doing so.

Notwithstanding, there seems to be limited research into the non-state actors involved in cross-border security in the SADC area. That is to say, there is a need for a study of cross-border security at SADC borders and borderlands, which moves beyond the state-centric top-down approach which promotes border securitisation without a sophisticated understanding of the complexities of the issues and the roles of the ordinary people involved. This is the context within which this study examines cross-border security issues at the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay and the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge through an exploration of the views and experiences of non-state actors like informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities. This goes beyond the state-centric approach which sees porous borders and undocumented migrants as security issues that can be stopped by simply militarising and securitising borders. Such an analytical stance raises the question; What do the people on the ground see as cross-border security issues, and how has the advent of the Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) affected these issues? It is anticipated that a deeper understanding of the views of non-state actors as defined in this study, together with the documented state-centric views on cross border security problems at the selected Zimbabwean and Mozambican borders with South Africa, may yield better understanding of the problems in question and thus inspire effective cross-border security policies.

1.3 Aims and objectives

1.3.1 Aim

The aim of this study is to examine the cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands.

1.3.2 Objectives

The objectives of the study are to:

- a) Analyse the nature and dynamic of the cross-border operations of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities in the study areas.
- b) Examine the role ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities in the entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security in areas under focus;
- c) Explore the perceptions of non-state actors on border management and cross-border security issues;
- d) Assess the implications of COVID-19 on cross-border security in the study areas.

1.3.3 Research questions

The overarching research question is: What are the cross-border security issues at the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay and the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge? Based on this, the following specific research questions arise:

- a) What is the nature and dynamic of the cross-border operations of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities in the study areas?
- b) What are the links between the operations of ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities and the entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security?

- c) What are the perceptions of non-state actors concerning border management and cross-border security issues?
- d) How has COVID-19 affected cross-border security in the study areas?

1.4 Relevance of the study and contribution to the discipline of borders and security studies

It was indicated in the problem statement that in the Southern African region cross border security issues and their analysis and understanding tends to be state-centric. There is an emphasis on the security of the state which manifests in the securitisation of borders, migration and pandemics like COVID-19. I consider the state-centric approach to cross-border security limited given that it fails to consider non-state actors who cross the borders frequently. I posit that the views of non-state actors like ICBTs and cross border communities among others are vital and should not be ignored if complex and dynamic cross border security issues are to be fully appreciated. The analysis of cross-border security, according to the Copenhagen school of thought on security (explained in detail in Chapter 2) needs to move beyond a state-centric paradigm and focus on the political, economic, environmental and societal threats right from the macro, meso and micro levels (on security (see e.g. Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Ul Hag, 1995). This approach makes it possible to analyse what non-state actors see and experience as security issues.

In other words, what are the cross-border security issues at the individual and community level in SADC borders under analysis? This study contributes to the body of knowledge by bringing to the fore an analysis and understanding of cross-border security issues from below and this departs from the general state-centric approaches. To the best knowledge of the researcher, there is no study focusing on the borders in question which has adopted this analytical position. The study interrogates the perspectives of the people and communities implicated in cross-border security issues. Although this is important in its own right, it is anticipated that it can also complement the state-centric perspectives and in the process deepen our understanding of cross-border security and inform fluent cross border security policy responses. This is all the more relevant taking into

consideration the current case of the so-called Mozambican terrorist attacks. It has been argued that, the current instability in Mozambique is more a case of disgruntled local people whose needs have been ignored by the Mozambican government and less of terrorism (see e.g. Munhende, 2021). In other words, the state has failed to understand the concerns of ordinary people.

1.5 Structure of the study

This study is constituted of seven chapters, as follows: Chapter 1 outlines the background of the study, the problem statement, aims, objectives and research questions. Chapter 2 discusses the analytical framework in terms of securitisation theory, neopatrimonialism, institutional liberalism and social constructivism. Chapter 3 is a review of relevant literature on borders and security and provides a context for the present study. Chapter 4 discusses the context and setting of the study as well as details of methodological procedures regarding data collection and analysis. In terms of context, Chapter 4 chapter shows that the selected borders are active areas of border research on cross-border non-state actors and hence this study builds on such scholarship by offering a nuanced analysis of cross-border security problems. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the data in response to the first three objectives of the study. It is argued that the operations of non-state actors and their impact cross-border security are complex. The situation defies the simplistic argument that borders are porous and that cross-border non-state actors are mere criminal elements bent on destabilizing borderland regions. Chapter 6 examines the implications of COVID-19 induced border closures on cross-border security. Chapter 7 provides a summary and conclusion of the study in addition to recommendations. The chapter highlights the need for transcending the state-centric approach to cross-border security issues.

1.6 Chapter summary

Chapter 1 has introduced the study by outlining its background as well as the problem statement, aims, objectives and research questions. Also discussed in this chapter is the relevance of this research, particularly its contribution to the discipline of border and security studies. The next chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks of the study.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Introduction

A theoretical framework is a worldview or lenses through the use of which a researcher thinks about and analyses their research (Grant and Osanloo, 2014). It is constituted of theoretical constructs which are useful in providing a guide for research and also assist the researcher in the philosophical, epistemological, methodological, and analytical positioning of a study (Grant and Osanloo, 2014). This necessarily means that a theoretical framework is linked to the research problem or problem statement and by extension also guides in the choice of research design and data collection and analysis procedures (Grant and Osanloo, 2014; Imenda 2014; Lester, 2005). This is the context within which Imenda (2014) correctly states that a theoretical framework provides direction to research to the extent that it assists in holding together the different parts of a study. In the light of this, this study applies four theories namely, the securitisation and governmentality of unease, neopatrimonialism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism in international relations. The discussion in this chapter therefore illustrates how these theoretical frameworks provide direction to this research as well as how they are linked to the problem statement and therefore the whole elements of the study.

2.2 Securitisation theory and governmentality of unease

The securitisation theory posits that threats or security matters which affect a nation-state for example, are constructs whose objective is to marshal support to legitimise any measures deemed necessary to deal with the threats (Wæver, 1995). Thus, securitisation can be seen as a political process that relies on the power of persuasion to invoke a security threat (Buzan et al. 1998). This involves the deployment of the "grammar of security" and "social capital" of the securitising authority as well as the invocation of material conditions which are used as evidence of the existence of a threat (Wæver, 2000: 252:3): Wæver argues furthermore that "security is the speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. The issue is securitized

– becomes a security issue, a part of what is ‘security’ – if the relevant audience accepts this claim and thus grants to the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind" (Wæver, 2000: 251). In this regard, the "construction of security issues does not make it necessary to have ‘objective threats’, but intersubjective ones. Issues can be saddled with ‘security’ implications irrespective of whether there is a ‘real’ threat or not, yet issues have to be labeled for them to have the status function of ‘security’" (Vuori, 2011: 10).

According to Huysmans (2006), the securitisation theory illuminates the extent to which the realm of political life can be modelled by the construction of political discourses based on existential threats and the need to survive (Huysmans, 2006). This means that "where an existential threat is ‘produced’ in relation to a referent object; an act of securitisation is to classify an issue as an existential threat which requires drastic measures" (Vuori, 2011: 10-11). In this regard, "if securitisation is ‘successful’, legitimacy or some other perlocutionary effect sought by the enunciator created through the widening social process, that consists of increased and possibly escalated instances of acts of securitisation, or securitisation moves, enables the speaker to ‘break the rules’ that normally constrict behaviour and policies" (Vuori, 2011:10-11). Consequently, "this allows the question to shift into an area of ‘special politics’ – the politics of utmost priority" (Vuori, 2011:10-11). Weaver (1999: 45) summarises the securitisation process as follows:

In naming a certain development a security problem, the ‘state’ can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one’s opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitisation of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so. (original emphasis)

2.2.1 Porous borders as a security issue and governmentality of unease

In the case of South Africa, the porosity of borders and increase in undocumented migration, human smuggling and trafficking have been seen as threats necessitating drastic action in terms of securing the borders. The audience, such as parliamentarians who should represent ordinary

people, have been convinced of these threats. This is indicated by the Border Management Act (Act 2 of 2020), which will lead to the establishment of the Border Management Authority. This body's core functions include the regulation and management of the lawful movement of people and goods within the border law enforcement areas and at ports of entry. The Department of Home Affairs will work in collaboration with other South African government entities and stakeholders involved in border law enforcement. These actions, given the projected scope and operation of the Border Management Authority, amount to border securitisation and militarisation (see Moyo, 2020a). In this logic, "securitization is characterized by a circular logic of defining and modulating hostile factors for the purpose of countering them politically and administratively" (Huysmans, 2006: 61). Put differently, "securitization constitutes political unity by means of placing it in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat" (Huysmans, 2006: 50).

South Africa's Border Management Act and proposed Border Management Authority should not be seen as only a move that breaks the rules or is extraordinary. If anything, the act and what it hopes to achieve can also be seen as an attempt to improve the management of immigration in South Africa. Although border securitisation and militarisation are important in this regard, they do not always mean the violation of rules or the invocation of states of exception. This is "partly because the assertion of sovereign exceptionalism does not necessarily mean a capacity for sovereign exceptionalism" (Bigo, 2005 cited in Neal 2009, 352). Thus, the projected coordination can *also* be seen as a "security continuum" not separate from that of "normal" politics (Huysmans, 2006, 72). This suggests that the notion of securitisation is limited in its emphasis on the politics of exception. This is why the notion of governmentality of unease (Bigo, 2002 cited in Neal, 2009: 352), is also useful in this study to the extent that it

offers a way to consider the linking of terrorism, security, migration and borders that does not assume the importance of a dramatic invocation of existential threats and exceptional measures. The linking of different policy areas can instead be considered as an effect of the dynamic relations

of a 'field' for the most part constituted through the practices of innumerable 'security professionals' often working out of the public eye (Bigo, 2002 cited in Neal, 2009: 352).

The notion of governmentality of unease "stresses the institutionalisation of links between different policy areas, such as external border control, asylum and anti-terrorism policy, that have formed not simply in the statements of politicians, but in the complex technologies, knowledges and techniques" of nation states (Neal, 2009: 353-354). All this brings to the fore the notion of border management. Border management can be defined as the "control exercised at a nation's borders and includes border security—preventing unauthorised crossings—and the facilitative side of border operations, which seeks to support rapid transit with minimal interference for authorised people and goods" (Gerstein et al. 2018:3-4). Nevertheless, in the processes of border management, "the challenge is to expeditiously and accurately determine which category a potential border crosser is part of and to have the resources necessary to deal with either" (Gerstein et al. 2018:3-4). Therefore, at the centre of border management are the interests of nation-states such as territorial integrity and enhancing cross-border economic activities. Such interests are never permanent, but keep evolving in response to changing geopolitical contexts. The important issue to highlight about border management is that it should involve different state agencies and relevant stakeholders which must co-ordinate and integrate their operations (see e.g. Gerstein et al. 2018).

Other notions linked to border management include Coordinated Border Management (CBM), Integrated Border Management (IBM), Collaborative Border Management (CBM) and Comprehensive Border Management (CoBM). These terms do not mean the same thing, but the overall emphasis is the coordination of cross-border governance to enhance operational efficiency and ensuring security (Polner, 2011). This necessarily means that border management operations involve many actors at many levels such as intra-organisation, inter-organisation and international interactions. The international dimension of border management has become necessary because the Westphalian nation-state based on the territorial sovereignty of a state and non-interference in the affairs of other countries (see e.g. Osiander, 2001) which emphasises the autonomy and

independence of nation-states in given territorial boundaries (see e.g. Chung, 2014; Krasner, 2001, 1995) has been challenged. This is precisely because some of the problems which face nation-states have become international, especially as a result of the increase in the scale and magnitude of cross-border transactions and security challenges (see e.g. Anderson, 2013; Krasner, 1995).

On the matter of intra-organisation, inter-organisation in border management, a case in point is that of Zimbabwe in which there were over 10 agencies involved in border management. These included Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Immigration Control, Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Transport, and Environmental Management Agency (EMA) (Shayanowako 2013). Mozambique has also set an inter-ministerial Commission for the Sea and Borders (COMAF) made up of ministries of defence, health, police, customs, immigration, mining, agriculture, and other agencies to manage its borders (Seda 2015). In South Africa, as well, border management is currently undertaken by several agencies including the Department of Home Affairs, South African Revenue Service, the South African Defence Force and the State Security Agency. This has motivated the promulgation of the Border Management Act (Act 2 of 2020) which provides for the establishment of a Border Management Authority (BMA) which will be a public entity under the Department of Home Affairs and whose primary function is integrated border law enforcement.

The setting up of the Border Management Authority is a result of the perception that borders, migration and immigration are not efficiently managed due to the different agencies involved in managing immigration and border control (see e.g. Moyo, 2020a). It is anticipated that the authority will lead to stronger policing and greater security of the porous borders and stop undocumented migration while enhancing legitimate trade and related cross-border commerce. It has been argued that the proposed authority will lead to border securitisation and militarisation in terms of the deployment of border guards with powers to arrest and detain any person deemed to have transgressed the new law. The border guards will have extensive powers. They will, for

example, be empowered to search any person, premises, goods, and vehicles and also question any person about any matter related to the passage of people, goods, or vehicles through a port of entry or across the borders (see e.g. Moyo, 2020a). The notion of border management is employed in this study to provide an analytical context for understanding the impact of the border management regimes of the three countries in question on cross-border security. We have the examples of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in each of which there are several agencies involved in the management of the border. The study seeks to find out the implication on security of the fixation with stringent border management approaches. In addition, it investigates whether securitised borders provide a fertile ground for neopatrimonial tendencies.

Thus, in spite of the limitations of the securitisation theory (see e.g. Balzacq et al. 2016, 2011a, b; Stritzel, 2007), it is still relevant to this study. It highlights the ways in which cross-border security measures, although carried out within the limits of the law or indeed demonstrating the governmentality of unease, the question of whether or not securitisation of the borders and migration is a security issue itself arises. To what extent does border securitisation and militarisation divert people's attention from legal crossing points to those which are not legal and thereby produce the security problem of undocumented and irregular migrants? This question should be considered against the reality that in the SADC region there is a long history of cross-border migration. Borders, no matter how securitised and militarised, have never been a hindrance to the movement of people (see e.g. Moyo, 2020b). If the securitisation of borders and migration worsens, rather than stops, irregular migration and other illegal activities, it is then possible to think of it as a security issue as well? This is the site which this study occupies.

2.3 Neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism can be defined as "a type of political domination which is characterised by *insecurity* about the behaviour and role of state institutions (and agents)" (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:105). This insecurity is predicated on the view that state institutions and/or their agents

operate along both formal and informal channels with the result that "formal state institutions cannot fulfil their universalistic purpose of public welfare. Instead, politics and policies are determined by particularistic interests and orientations" (Erdmann and Engel, 2007, 105). The distinctive feature of neopatrimonialism is that "officials hold positions in bureaucratic organisations with powers which are formally defined, but exercise those powers . . . as a form . . . of private property" (Clapham, 1985:48). This essentially means that state bureaucrats may use the law to operate informally for their own benefit (van de Walle, 2001; Chabal and Daloz, 1999), suggesting that neopatrimonialism "is a mix of two types of political domination. It involves a conjunction of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. The exercise of power in neopatrimonial regimes is erratic and unpredictable, as opposed to the calculable exercise of power embedded in universal rules" (Erdmann and Engel, 2007:105, 114). Therefore, "public norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their social practice is often personal and informal" (Erdmann and Engel, 2007: 105, 114) in terms of the diversion of the authority of a state to meet private needs and interests at the expense of the public domain (van de Walle, 2001).

The notion of neopatrimonialism was originally influenced by the Weberian analysis of domination and legitimacy and different types of authority. However, it was Eisenstadt (1966) who first introduced the concept of neopatrimonialism. The use of the term was limited to demonstrating the difference between patrimonialism in traditional and modern settings (Eisenstadt, 1966; Mkandawire, 2015). The concept of neopatrimonialism has come under very intense scrutiny especially in regard to claims that it is ambiguous and it is often conflated with other concepts and political and economic (mal)practices (see e.g. Erdmann and Engel, 2007; Mkandawire, 2015). In the case of Africa, neopatrimonialism has "become the convenient, all-purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for African governance" and this has often masked its uncritical use and/or lack of thorough research on and understanding of the African political economy (Mkandawire, 2015:563). In an extensive review, Mkandawire (2015) convincingly shows that neopatrimonialism has been used in a contrived way, and if nothing else, in a Procrustean style, to

explain many facets of life in African countries such as the failure of macroeconomic policies, bad governance, low savings, inflation, state expenditure, and revenue problems, foreign exchange and social policy problems. For instance, in cases where it has been used to explain economic failure in Africa, selective use of cultural characteristics obscures more than explains why African economic development is not successful. In short, the use of neopatrimonialism to explain the many facets of African politics and economy has been reductionist, but has unfortunately informed policy towards and perceptions of Africa. In this regard

many of the neopatrimonialist claims about causality are spurious and much of what is attributed to neopatrimonialism could, with equal justification, apply to other factors. Most specifically many features of underdevelopment in Africa are given a cultural twist that is not particularly informative and in a way is passé. A more comparative approach to Africa's experience would caution against such generalisations and stereotypes" (Mkandawire, 2015:601-602).

2.3.1 Neopatrimonialism and the analysis of cross-border security issues

Notwithstanding the valid critiques of the notion of neopatrimonialism around its problematic analytical *weltanschauung* and its lachrymose portrayal and monochromatic treatment of Africa as a continent riddled by endemically corrupt people, the concept can still be employed as a heuristic device. That is, to analyse how state bureaucrats such as immigration and other border officials interact with cross-border actors like the ICBTs and undocumented migrants (among others) at a local level, like a border and borderland. As Erdmann and Engel (2007) have argued, governance operates based on a legal, rational order in terms of elected/political officials (or politicians) and those who are administrative/in the bureaucracy. In this study, the focus is on the bureaucratic level in terms of cross-border officials and how and why they interacted with cross-border actors as they did, and with what consequences. Given that bureaucrats were appointed based on qualifications and experience to perform specific cross-border functions and were salaried by the nation-states in question, they were required to follow a certain and strict code of conduct (see e.g. Erdmann and Engel, 2007). If they (cross-border officials) used their offices to solicit bribes or to aid any illegal cross-border activities for personal gain, it would qualify as neopatrimonialism.

In other words, if the officials used their formally defined powers for obtaining another "salary" beyond that paid by the state it constitutes a classic example of neopatrimonialism. It approximates to what Clapham (1985:48) refers to as the use of bureaucratic powers as defined by the appointing authority, which is the government, "as a form...of private property". Thus, bearing in mind the definition of neopatrimonialism, the border officials, in this case, become the patrons, and the ICBTs and other cross-border actors are clients, meaning there is a *quid pro quo* between the former and the latter. The full implication is that as clients the cross-border actors who are the focus of this study are expected to offer financial or other rewards/benefits to the patrons.

Further, based on the fact that neopatrimonialism is a rentier order based on the privatisation and appropriation of state resources through clientelism and patronage (see e.g. van de Walle, 2001; Erdmann and Engel, 2007), the question of how this operated is investigated; also its implications for cross-border security. For instance, if cross-border officials encourage and solicit bribes, how does this illustrate neopatrimonialism in terms of a network of clients and patrons and which contributes to cross-border security issues? These are pertinent questions in that those who have paid bribes can transport anything across the border, while those who fail to pay bribes may be forced to use illegal points of entry and exit. In this respect, the relationship between neopatrimonialism and border securitisation becomes both implicit and explicit. The point is that cross-border officials may easily invoke border securitisation to recruit more people who can pay bribes. As people who enforce border securitisation, cross-border officials are in a position to stop and/or regulate the cross-border movement of people.

In other words, all cross-border actors have to go through cross-border officials, without whose approval entry/exit is denied. The more the cross-border officials enforce the securitised border or give the impression that the border has been securitised to the extent of their (cross-border officials') power, the more they attain the status of a Leviathan. The result is that it is the cross-border officials who can enforce or bend the rules of a securitised border. Bending the rules has to come at a cost to the cross-border actors and a benefit to the cross-border officials. In this, one can

see that border securitisation and neopatrimonialism are mutually reinforcing at a local and micro level in the borders under study. As the border is securitised people may find ways of crossing it through illegal means such as paying bribes; this also has implications for cross-border security.

That aside, it would be easy for the preceding discussion to be mistakenly taken for a narrative that describes only the *modus operandi* of corruption or corrupt networks within the bureaucracy at the level of cross-border management at a border, and not neopatrimonialism. However, it should be understood that there is an overlap between clientelism and corruption. The two are complementary in certain situations (see e.g. Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017). For instance, if the cross-border officials use their official positions to solicit and receive bribes; this means that there is a sale of "state-administered benefits ... to economic and social actors" (Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017: 265). This is a neopatrimonial relationship, bearing in mind that neopatrimonialism also involves state bureaucrats using state institutions for their benefit; consequently, those institutions fail to deliver their proper purpose of public benefit and welfare (Erdmann and Engel, 2007). The issue to be emphasised in this respect is that "clientelism and corruption are forms of benefit extraction *from* the state which presupposes the prior extraction of resources *by the state*. However, benefits can also be amassed by extraction *through* the state, when state actors draw material benefits directly from the private economy by taking advantage of their decision-making positions within public administration. Extractive actors receive bribes ...in exchange for preferential treatment in various decisions" (Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017:266).

In this study, the focus is on how cross-border officials extract benefits from cross-border actors *through* formal cross-border offices of the nation-states in question. Therefore, while fully cognisant of the debate around the relationship between corruption and clientelism (neopatrimonialism), in this study the former is treated as a component of the latter to the extent that it complements and is in turn complemented by clientelism in a mutually reinforcing fashion. In this sense, the reference to corrupt practices within the context of cross-border officials and their interaction and relationship with cross-border actors should be understood within the limits of the

focus of this research, as delineated in this section. Consequently, this study utilises the notion of neopatrimonialism to assess the extent to which cross-border officials have operated both within and outside the limits of *Rechtsstaat*, broadly defined, for personal gain. In other words, how and with what results do these officials use their formally defined powers for personal gain?

In this study, it is understood that the concept of neopatrimonialism is contested and indeed controversial. It is also understood that the concept has been 'abused' to the extent that “much of the scholarship tends toward a deterministically pessimistic view of development in Africa with the logic of neopatrimonialism unavoidably pushing the analysis toward ontological despair, hence its association with Afro-pessimism” (Mkandawire, 2015: 602). All this considered, there is no attempt in this study to pronounce on neopatrimonialism concerning macroeconomic dysfunction, market failures, inflation, and economic development, among others. This study does not condone the use of the notion of neopatrimonialism to paint a sad picture of Africa or as a policy guide to champion the neoliberal agenda. Rather, it is employed as a looking-glass through which the relationship and interaction between cross-border officials and actors like ICBTs could be analysed in terms of the implication for cross-border security at the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and the Mozambique border at Kosi Bay. In this sense, neopatrimonialism is a valuable theory that allows this study to demonstrate the complexity of cross-border security issues in the study areas.

2.4 Institutional Liberalism

The notion of Institutional Liberalism posits that “institutions and rules can facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation – within and among states. The social purpose of Institutional Liberalism is to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of a more peaceful, prosperous and free world” (Keohane, 2012:125-126). Such a social purpose presupposes that the rules which govern such institutions would provide room for appropriate actions and thus resolve problems that degrade the living conditions of people. The foundational

principle for Institutional Liberalism, therefore, is that both national and international institutions ought to provide a platform that advances human security and liberty. This suggests that institutions regardless of whether they are national or international should both enhance and protect the interests of all people, in which the former enhances or articulate into the latter (Keohane, 2012). At the international level like the SADC region , this suggests that the sovereignty of the member states should not be taken away, but there ought to be cooperation of member states for the betterment of the human condition based on the application of relevant national and international statuses which regulate intra-state and interstate actions. This is the context within which Keohane (2012:131) reminds us that “democratic forms of governance are based on and justified by moral principles, and the relevance of these principles hardly diminishes when democratic states project power outside their borders”.

However, Institutional Liberalism has faced many criticisms including the fact that it is utopian in terms of equating individual with state morality or morality on a global scale. In this regard, it should be remembered that “people do not accept the principle of individual equality on a global scale and therefore do not put the interests of the global community above those of their own nations” (Keohane, 2012:131). In addition to this is the argument that it is too simplistic to see institutions as capable of advancing social purpose without a deeper understanding of the power behind the legalism of these institutions. That is to say, “we need to peer through the veil of rhetoric and law, to discern the power and interest structures that lie below” hence another way to look at this is that “*institutions rest on power and changes in power generate changes in institutions*” (Keohane, 2012:135-136). This also suggests that existing institutions may be a product of power structures that do not necessarily favour social justice and vice versa. In this sense, it may be naïve to expect that institutions will always deliver on promises of justice, human security, and development without understanding the foundation of the institutions in question.

Despite the debates around Institutional Liberalism, in this study, the theory assists to ask whether or not there are institutions with a responsibility for managing borders both at national and

international levels in nation-states and the SADC respectively, and the extent to which these institutions protect and further human welfare and security. First, at the SADC regional level, there is no regional institution that governs borders and migration. The only effort is the 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC, which is the legal instrument that implements the provisions of the SADC Treaty regarding the movement of persons in the region (Declaration and Treaty of SADC, 1992). The overarching objective of the Protocol is the development of policies that will progressively eliminate obstacles to human mobility into and within SADC Members' territories (SADC, 2012). However, the Protocol is not in full force (it has not reached the required two-thirds majority threshold of Member State ratifications) because only six SADC States including Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia had ratified it (Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013). Second, and consequently, the management of borders and migration is implemented by individual nation-states. This is the context within which SADC nation-states promulgate disparate border management approaches which have a national and not regional focus (see Section 2.4).

Given the national character of these institutions which manage borders and migration, it is not surprising that individual SADC nation-states see borders as a source of insecurity to the extent that they (borders) are breached leading to many undocumented migrants in migrant-receiving countries. In the case of South Africa, this has motivated the promulgation of the Border Management Act (Act 2 of 2020), which will lead to the formation of the Border Management Authority to enforce the South African border and immigration laws. If the argument by Keohane (2012) that institutions are a product of power and not innocent and simplistic edifices that enforce the enhancement of human security and welfare is accepted, it is then possible to appreciate that the South African Border Management Authority, is a product of the power of stakeholders like parliamentarians who have called for the fortification of South African borders. There is no expectation that institutions like the Border Management Authority will always protect the rights of cross-border actors because that will be naïve, but to ask and respond to the question of whether such an institutionally driven border securitisation drive is not itself a source of insecurity. It is

posited that, if the power behind the rules which govern institutions fail to enhance human security, liberty and welfare for *all* people they become a source of insecurity, even as they purpose and purport to achieve the same. This is why in this study, non-state cross who cross the borders between countries like Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe were interviewed to understand if they subscribed to and felt safe as a result of or the move towards the securitisation of borders. To this degree, the theoretical purchase of Institutional Liberalism is that it assists to see how institutions within individual SADC member states see and respond to borders and borderlands and with what implications on cross-border security.

2.5 Social constructivism in international relations

Wendt (1999), argues that power politics is a social construction. That is, “there is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. *Anarchy is what states make of it*” (Wendt,1999:394-395). The important point in Wendt’s (1999) argument is that the state’s assessment and/or determination of threat is socially constructed. The point is that “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which. U.S. military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar “structural” positions, just as British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles” (Wendt, 1999:397). In this sense,

the distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depend on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the “distribution of knowledge,” that constitute their conceptions of self and other. If society “forgets” what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, “the cold war is over”. It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt, 1999:397).

To demonstrate that power politics is a social construction, Wendt (1999) advanced Lockean and Kantian notions. The former proposes the view that rival states are not necessarily enemies and can avoid war. This is the context within which economic measures like sanctions or soft power can be used to attain security. The latter advances that security can be achieved through international cooperation between states and the establishment of institutions to achieve this.

Based on the lens of social constructivism in international relations, it is possible to see that SADC nation-states construct borders as sources of insecurity and are thus in need of securitising and militarising. If this was not the case, there will be no need for countries to build walls and fences. An example of this is the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe at Beitbridge which is fenced and patrolled by the South African and Zimbabwean soldiers and plans are ongoing to further fortify the border. The same also applies to the border between Mozambique and South Africa at Kosi Bay for example. Through the prism of social constructivism, one can get to see SADC borders and borderlands as active areas of insecurity, which is a state narrative or construction of insecurity. This is relevant if “*anarchy is what states make of it*” (Wendt, 1999:394-395) and one can add that cross-border insecurity in the SADC regions is what states make of it or construct it.

More than this, the relevance of social constructivism in this research is that it assists one to think beyond the state narrative around what security is or should entail. For example, it is possible to think beyond cross-border non-state actors as not posing a security issue per se, but the reasons which make them engage in the cross-border activities. It is also possible to think that states in the SADC region in which cross-border migration has a long and entrenched history could “forget” thinking about it (cross-border interactions by non-state actors) as a security threat, but instead, concentrate on what causes them to migrate. This should involve rethinking the social ontology of the historical continuities around cross-border migration in the SADC. This study locates itself within these debates.

2.6 Chapter summary

This chapter outlined the theoretical frameworks of the study namely, the securitisation and governmentality of unease, neopatrimonialism, liberal institutionalism and social constructivism in international relations. The discussion demonstrates that the analysis of borders and the interactions that are integral to them should be multi-perspectival to understand the complexity and dynamism of these institutions. This is the context within which this study analyses cross-border security issues with a focus on the perspective of non-state actors. This is intended to go beyond the state-centric paradigm and lead to a nuanced understanding of the nature of cross-border security issues in the study areas. The chapter to follow is a review of literature relevant to borders and security.



CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

A literature review is a critical survey of previous research on particular themes and/or topics, which must be synthesised and then presented coherently. The synthesis and organisation must address research gaps or respond to a series of research questions to provide an accurate depiction of the state of knowledge in a particular discipline (Fink, 2014). Most importantly, a literature review must locate or show how the study being undertaken fits into the existing research or discipline (Fink, 2014). There are different types of literature reviews such as among others; argumentative, integrative, historical, methodological, systematic, and theoretical (see e.g. Sutton, 2016; Torracro, 2016, 2005; Kennedy, 2007; Petticrew and Helen 2006; Fink, 2005; Torracro, 2005. Hart, 1998). This chapter is an integrative literature review which “generates new knowledge about a topic by reviewing, critiquing, and synthesizing representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated” (Torraco, 2016). The chapter presents a review of literature on the notions of borders and security and their different interpretations and how they are used in this study. It also reviews literature on cross borders actors such as informal cross-border traders, informal cross-border transporters, and cross-border communities.

3.2 Borders and borderscapes

Borders are complex social institutions, not merely formal political markers of sovereignty (see e.g. Walker, 2010; Paasi, 2012). The full meaning of this is that the border "is by no means a static line, but a mobile and relational space" (Brambilla, 2015:22). This recognition has led to the advancement of the concept of borderscape (see e.g. Brambilla and Jones, 2020; Brambilla, 2018, 2015), the notion of which brings “the complexity of border processes as variously created, experienced, and contested by human beings back to the foreground” (Brambilla and Jones, 2020, 289). Borderscapes can therefore be taken to refer to the processual nature, complexity, deterritoriality, and multidimensionality of borders, which in turn allows the analysis of bordering

processes and interactions at various scales and locales and the social, economic, political, cultural, and other implications of such processes and interactions. The implication of this is that the notion of borderscapes has a double meaning in that,

on the one hand, they retain a derivative dimension from human landscapes and, more specifically, from the relationship that they have with the exercise of power in space, being a political tool for ordering reality (hegemonic borderscapes)", however, "on the other hand, they are a context from which discourses and practices of 'dissensus' can originate, through which it is possible to think of alternatives to the static exclusivity of landscapes of dominant power (counter-hegemonic borderscapes) (Rancière, 2010:149).

Against this backdrop, the notion of borderscapes suggests that every society is in a state of becoming, every political system is always contingent and the boundary between belonging and exclusion is floating and continually contested (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007: xxiv). Thus, the concept of borderscapes "also offers a good chance to investigate migration governance and governmentality practices and policies" and this is because the "concept shows the border as a fluid field of political, economic, social, and cultural negotiations, claims and counter-claims; as a geo-political-cultural margin that is never marginal but rather the engine of social organisation and change" (Brambilla, 2015:26). Through the use of the notion of borderscapes, it is possible to achieve a "productive understanding of the processual, de-territorialised and dispersed nature of borders and their ensuing regimes and ensembles of practice" (Brambilla, 2015:22).

This brings into focus the fact that "as multidimensional spaces and places, borders are sites of encounter and contest. The encounter and contest are between people, ideas and matter. They also include the new spatialities and transformations that borders bring about in their historical, social, economic and cultural contexts" (Laine et al. 2020:3). From this, it is clear that borders are in a continuous state of transformation, deconstruction, and reconstruction, with the result that they are not always successful in stopping the cross-border migration of people (Walker, 1993, 2010; Brambilla, 2015; Brambilla and Jones, 2020; Laine, 2016, 2018). This understanding of borders is

important in a study of this nature which examines the cross-border security issues that exist at selected SADC borders and borderlands. This is precisely because the notion assists the study to illuminate how and if at all the multidimensionality of borders as well as the contests and transformations that are essential elements thereto have security implications and the nature of these.

3.2.1 The violent foundations of borders

The borders that separate nation-states “are a key element of the sovereign state system, which is based on a binary framing (here/there, us/them, citizen/foreigner) that divides the world into separate bounded (sovereign) territories” (Brambilla and Jones 2020: 5). The very fact that borders are designed to include and exclude at the same time suggests that they are founded on violence and this is why Jones (2016:166) correctly observes that “borders and lines on maps are not a representation of preexisting differences between peoples and places; they create those differences”. The founding and maintenance of these manufactured differences is only possible through the use of violence (see Brambilla and Jones, 2020; Jones, 2016). This can be aptly demonstrated by historical and contemporary border enforcement practices like those during the Roman empire and what currently obtains in many states (Brambilla and Jones, 2020).

Elden (2009) suggests that the creation of borders to bound a particular territory has necessarily involved fighting and driving people away. It has been argued that the word territory (*territorium* in Latin) is derived from two Latin *territor* and *terrere* which can be translated as landowner and to frighten away respectively (Elden, 2009). Elden (2009) thus argues that the creation of nation-states bound by borders has therefore necessarily involved the use of violence to exclude, monitor, and punish those who transgress borders. This is even more relevant to Africa where colonial conquest led to the displacement of people and the construction of nation states.

As a result, the borders which define African nation-states illustrate what Blaut (1993) refers to as the colonizer’s model of the world. This model came from the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 where European powers ignored the existing socio-cultural conditions of African people and the

creation of states into which African people were parceled Procrustean style (Miles, 2014). That is, as the Greek legend, Procrustes or Polypemon/Damastes, who cut off the limbs and legs among other body parts of his victims so that they could fit on his iron bed(s), which led to such victims dying as they could not fit on the bed, African people who refused to fit into the newly portioned African states were “cut off” or killed. Thus, the creation and maintenance of these borders necessarily involved the use of force to convince people that they had become part of one country with those whom they have never been part of or became foreigners to those who had been family and community.

3.2.2 Borders as multidimensional and fluid spaces of claims and counterclaims

Borders denote “a conflict between the desire for freedom and the desire for control, between people who move around and people who want them to stay in place” (Jones, 2016: 10). However, the violent means of creating and maintaining borders have led to resistance by those who are excluded and this makes borders sites of struggle: “as in the focus of a magnifying glass, the border produces, contains, and is traversed by complex entangled tensions in a condensed form that make the border itself a prime field to advance understanding of violence and conflict” (Brambilla and Jones, 2020:3; see also Walker, 1993). In this regard

the spatiality of borders as ‘paradoxical structures’ – that are both ‘markers of belonging’ (i.e. a tool to exercise and perpetuate the exclusive political-judicial order of the modern Western nation-state power) and ‘places of becoming’ (i.e. a field traversed by resistance struggles) – offers the opportunity to grasp the ambiguous, dynamic Janus-faced quality of violence and conflict and their generative aspects. (Brambilla and Jones, 2020: 3)

This suggests that borders not only refer to physical lines but also sociocultural and other processes (see Paasi, 1998; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002; Newman, 2006; Johnson et al, 2011; Wastl-Walter, 2011; Laine, 2015, 2016). Seeing borders this way enables an analysis of the constitutive processes in terms of the interaction between sovereign power and resistance from those who are being controlled, ordered, or excluded. This is the reason why the notion of borderscapes is

discussed in the preceding parts of this chapter to understand and analyse borders. Thus, the notion of borderscapes facilitates an understanding of borders as sites of contestation between hegemonic, non-hegemonic, and counter-hegemonic imaginaries and practices (Gaibazzi, 2017). Therefore, using the notion of borderscapes to examine the cross border interactions in selected borders in the Southern African region allows this study to zoom into the actual border or boundary line and at the same time zoom out other socio-economic and political processes to achieve a “productive understanding of the processual, de-territorialised and dispersed nature of borders and their ensuing regimes and ensembles of practice” (Brambilla, 2015:22).

The point being made here is that the concept “border” is used in this study to refer to the physical lines which ‘separate’ nation states in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, as well as institutional and politico-economic processes which regulate the operations of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs). These processes may constitute symbolic borders in terms of either enhancing or limiting the operations of non-state actors like ICBTs. The ensuing contestations between sovereign power and jurisdiction on the one hand and the cross-border actors on the other can be illuminated through the notion of borderscapes. This is because “the borderscapes concept shows the border as a fluid field of political, economic, social, and cultural negotiations, claims and counter-claims; as a geo-political-cultural margin that is never marginal but rather the engine of social organisation and change” (Brambilla, 2015:26).

In other words, if the border is not a simple line but also a fluid field constituted of other processes, it is possible to understand how these impact cross border security. Such an analysis depicts the border as not just a line but also a space that is continuously created, recreated or shaped, and carved (Brambilla, 2015). It is these processes of creating, recreating, shaping, and carving which allow this research to illuminate cross-border security issues that are associated with non-state actors such as ICBTs, migrant workers, informal cross-border transporters, for example. If the non-state actors “transgress, reinterpret, and ignore sovereign power but do not necessarily rise to

the level of overt political resistance [...such that in these spaces] situated ways of being and knowing continue to exist” (Jones, 2012:698), what are the implication on cross border security?

To reiterate, using the notion of borderscape to analyse the border and cross border processes assists to gain an insight into the tensions and contests between sovereign power and resistance to it. This amplifies the point that “[b]orders do more than simply mark territorial margins [. . .] borders are epistemological and material sites with the power to shape subjectivities, differentiate and produce categories of ‘citizen’ and ‘migrant’, and trace inclusive and exclusive fields of possibilities, as well as limits” (Belcher et al., 2015: 2). For instance, if ICBTs and migrant workers defy formal cross-border processes, the question of how these impacts cross-border security arises. Likewise, if cross border interactions are characterised by claims and counterclaims between sovereign and power and those who should be governed, the impacts on cross border security arise and this is the focus of this study and to my best of knowledge, there is no study in the SADC which has adopted this analytical stance.

3.2.3 Borders, coloniality and security

The issue of the colonial borders in Africa is important to comment on, in a study of this nature which analyses cross border security issues. The starting point in this respect is to deepen the discussion initiated in Section 3.2.1 on the use of violence and/or terror to impose the Berlin borders on African people. The point which needs emphasis is that the European colonisation of Africa led to the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state in Africa. As Ajala (1983) has correctly observed, precolonial African borders and identities existed based on allegiance to rulers and religions and tribes and not defined territories in a Westphalian sense. This means that, although there were pre-colonial borders in Africa, these were fluctuating zones and points of cultural and political contact, interaction and coexistence, and not separation (Ajala, 1983). This means the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state on Africa is a legacy of colonial conquest and subjugation. This is the problem with colonial borders, to the extent that the creation of bordered or delimited nation-states was a European import, which was new to Africa and was culturally

alien (see e.g. McEwen, 1971; Engelbert, et al., 2002). Thus, while it is accepted that all borders are artificial (Asiwaju, 1993; Ramutsindela, 2017), it would seem that the African case becomes special, if nothing else unique on the strength of the subjugation of a people and the imposition of a Westphalian state system which was alien to them.

Of course, the argument has been advanced by some scholars (see e.g. Asiwaju, 1993, 1976) that there are close similarities between African and European borders and the processes which produced these borders. An example that has been advanced by Asiwaju (1993, 1976) is that of the Catalans on the Franco-Spanish borders in Europe and Western Yorubaland on the Nigeria-Benin border. In these two examples, the point has been made that the erection of Franco-Spanish border in the Cerdanya valley of the Eastern Pyrenees split the Catalans, just as the Nigeria-Benin border split the Yoruba into two countries, which are Benin and Nigeria (Asiwaju, 1993, 1976). It is for this reason that Asiwaju asserts that “for Catalans in the Cerdanya and the Western Yoruba, the border between France and Spain in the European case, and that between British Nigeria and French Dahomey in the African, could not be considered as indigenous any more or less than France and Spain or British Nigeria and French Dahomey would be so considered in the Cerdanya or Western Yorubaland” (Asiwaju, 1993:5). While this may be so, the fact of the disruption of the pre-colonial borders in Africa and replacing them with those which were European and alien makes the European partition and colonisation of and the borders in Africa unique. The issue, therefore, is that the partition and colonial conquest of Africa and the borders integral to this show that, “not only did colonization invent the colonised, it also disrupted the social patterns, gender relations and cosmological understandings of the communities and societies it invaded. In doing so, it rearticulated particular European understandings” of the world (Lugones, 2011; cited in Bhambra, 2014:118). The impact was the (dis)organisation of “the world into homogenous, separable categories arranged through hierarchical dichotomies and categorical logics” (Lugones, 2011; cited in Bhambra, 2014:118).

Therefore, the subjugation of African people and the imposition of a Westphalian state system resulted in manufactured nation-states. These invented borders and nation-states were maintained through terror and this has survived into the post-independence period (see e.g. Mbembe, 2017, Moyo, 2016; Moyo and Laine, 2021). Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2013) characterises this as the colonial present or coloniality. In other words, coloniality “must not be confused with colonialism. It survived the end of direct colonialism [...] it continues to affect the lives of people, long after direct colonialism and administrative apartheid have been dethroned” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 11). This why African people and states alike must be “vigilant against the trap of ending up normalising and universalising coloniality as a natural state of the world [...but also that] it must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed because it produced a world order that can only be sustained through a combination of violence, deceit, hypocrisy and lies” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 11). This is the context within which there have been calls for the decolonization of the African border and those of Southern Africa specifically. What is important for the present purposes is the extent to which the Berlin borders are implicated in cross-border security issues. For example, does the fact that many people disregard these borders contribute to cross-border security issues? Alternatively, is it the governance of the Berlin borders which contribute to cross-border security?

3.2.4 Legacies of colonialism and African borders

The first point to indicate is that African borders have many paradoxes (see e.g. Nugent, 2012; Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Herbst, 1989). One of the most notable paradoxes is that despite the artificiality and arbitrariness of African borders, which were imposed by European colonizers at the 1884-85 Berlin conference, they have been maintained. Another is that, globally, Africa is the most partitioned continent but this has not affected the stability of the Berlin borders-they have not been successfully contested. To this can be added the fact that in both the colonial and so-called post-colonial periods, institutions charged with enforcing the Berlin borders in many African countries have not been strong in terms of stopping the movement of people which started in the pre-colonial or per Berlin border era and yet despite this, the borders have endured. For instance, many cross-border communities have always successfully instrumentalised the border to continue

with their socio-economic and cultural activities *inter alia*, but this has not eroded the existence or legitimacy of the Berlin borders. Most significantly, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 decided to uphold the outcomes of the Berlin conference of 1884-85 which partitioned Africa. In other words, a conference constituted of leaders of the majority of newly independent states upheld the decision of the conference of the European colonizers in 1884-85 (Herbst, 1989) and this has strengthened the Berlin borders. The implications and/or impacts of these paradoxes on cross-border security are many, some of which are discussed in the following parts.

Thus, this section emphasises how Berlin borders have become a serious source of cross-border and national instability in many countries. Some examples (although overall there are few cases) among others can be used to illustrate this fact, such as that of secessionism which involves groups of people breaking away from a so-called post-colonial state. This is illustrated by the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970 in which the predominantly Igbo provinces in south-Eastern Nigeria attempted to break away from Nigeria and form an independent republic called Biafra (Zezeza, 2008). The seeds of the war were planted at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 in which many nations such as the Yoruba in the West, Muslim Hausa in the North and Igbo in the East, and several other smaller ones, were suddenly manufactured as one nation-state, Nigeria (Mazrui, 2008). Another example is that of irredentism in which people have fought to be reunited with a country with which they share ethnic or cultural and historical links. For example, the Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya desire unification with Somalia showing that it was the partition of Africa that split nations into separate countries and the affected people want to correct that colossal historical tragedy through means which are unfortunately violent (Mazrui, 2008; Zezeza, 2008). In any case, the historical tragedy was created through violence and it should not be surprising that attempts to correct this history are violent. This is why some scholars have suggested a link between colonialism and the current violence in Africa (Fanon 1963; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). To this extent, the violent history of African borders means that they can only be maintained through the use of violence. This is why the army and the police are deployed to monitor borders in many states in the SADC and this involves unleashing violence on those who

illegally cross the border or are poised to do. Differently stated, Berlin borders were violently created and they can only be maintained and enforced through the use of violence and this has security implications on cross border actors, bearing in mind the definition of security (see Chapters 1 and 2) which this study adopts.

Therefore, my objective in discussing cross-border security issues in Africa within the context of the legacies of colonialism is to demonstrate two aspects. First, that African borders are a colonial imposition that has the potential to cause cross border security problems, unless African countries confront the issue of how these borders are governed. This brings into sharp focus how borders are governed in the study areas, and this is one of the areas of focus in this study. Second, it is limited to only focus on external borders separating individual African countries only without an understanding of the internal ones because the former and latter are dialectically constituted and reinforce each other. For instance, DRC experiences cross-border security challenges which are fuelled by internal instability predicated on internal borders which manifest in antagonistic ethnicities. Likewise, in the SADC region, there is a need for understanding cross-border security issues beyond a state-centric gaze on the line which separates countries. Seen, thus, undocumented migration may not always signal that the people involved in this are criminal elements. Thus knowing what causes movements may deepen understanding of the problems which manifests at the borders. That is to say, crossing borders illegally is only a manifestation or symptom of an underlying problem. It may be that the people have failed to cross legally because of stringent immigration processes or because of problems in their countries of origin which force them to engage in this type of migration. It is posited that grasping these nuances may provide a deeper understanding of cross-border security issues in the areas under study.

3.2.5 African borders: On conduits and opportunities

Some scholars (see e.g. Nugent, 2002; Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996) have argued that beyond posing constraints, African borders also provide opportunities and can also act as conduits for local level economic and other activities. For instance, focusing on the Ghana-Togo border, Nugent (2002)

shows that local cross border actors welcomed the existence of the border to the extent that it provided opportunities for local level cross border activities from which they benefitted. As a result, smuggling across the Ghana-Togo border was not necessarily a resistance to the state border by the informal local actors, but also amounted to a consolidation of the same (Nugent, 2002). This is because the border also created opportunities for local entrepreneurs who used it as a resource to grow and entrench their informal cross border economic activities, or what Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) refers to as arbitrage economies.

In this sense, the border in question did not necessarily pose a constraint but was a conduit for cross border activities whose sustenance depended on the border in question. This essentially means that such economic activities existed because of the border, which provided a conducive environment for human agency in the context of cross border economic activities to thrive (see e.g. Horstmann and Wadley, 2006; Nugent, 2002). For the present purposes, whether or not the border was a constraint or presented an opportunity and conduit has security implications. Therefore, it is of interest in this study to understand if the cross-border actors who are the focus of this study regarded the borders in question as providing an opportunity and conduit for the economic and other activities and with what implications on security.

3.3 Security

3.3.1 Realist foundations of security and its critiques Realism, neorealism and security

A useful way to start an analysis of the evolution of the notion of security and related security studies is through the lens of the realist and neorealist schools of thought in international relations. There are different strands of realism (Fiammenghi, 2011) and it is not within the scope of this study to delve into those but to indicate that what appears to be the main proposition of realism is that states play a leading role in the international state system driven by the need to maintain their survival and security. For instance, proponents of offensive realism argue that for states to attain security, they must obtain as much power as they can, whereas defensive realists assert that the attainment of more power by a state may have a negative impact as rival states may respond by

doing the same. In other words, if a state increases its military machinery, this will attract attention from rival states who will also increase their military arsenal (Glaser, 1997). Both offensive and defensive realism has been criticised for being simplistic. A case in point is that, concerning offensive realism, it is not true that states always seek more power. In some cases, a state may seek to maintain its relative position to others (Fiammenghi, 2011; Greco, 1988). Defensive realism fails to account for why some states may increase their power even in the absence of competitors (Fiammenghi, 2011). These limitations have led to structural realism or neorealism which postulates that the international system is a structure which influences the operation, behaviour and security needs of individual states. The important point to raise in this respect is that both realism and neorealism emphasised the security of the state which needed to be secured through military buildup.

3.3.2 Liberalism, neoliberalism and security

In the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s, the proposition of realism and neorealism on security were contested by other explanations, such as liberalism and neoliberalism. One of the major proponents of neoliberalism is Keohane (1984). The main argument of neoliberalism is that “interstate cooperation will create institutions and regimes for the peaceful settlement of conflicts” (Simon, 2007:5). An example that has been used to illustrate this point is that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is made up of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In this regard, the main difference between realism and neoliberalism is that the former emphasised “the building of individual state military capabilities” to attain security, and the latter argued that the creation of international organisations was vital in the attainment of security (Simon, 2007:5). In any case, it can be argued that the building of regional communities like ASEAN and SADC does not represent ordinary people.

Seen through the Gramscian and NeoGramscian perspectives, such regional blocks including SADC may be representative of the hegemony of the economic or global order which does not

promote the security of ordinary people, but the dictates of the market. The origins of the notion of hegemony are linked to Antonio Gramsci, an Italian theorist whose ideas were inspired by Marxism. Gramsci's ideas (neo-Gramscian theory) such as counter-hegemony have been applied in the wider social and political discourses to challenge prevailing political, economic, social, and other hegemonic orders, including the construction of knowledge itself (Heywood, 1994). Thus, the dictates of the market may trample on or destabilise the security of the people leading to their (ordinary people) insecurity. This is precisely because "hegemony is more than dominance. Hegemony is a form in which dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence to this whole as if it were the natural order of things" (Cox, 1994:366). In this sense hegemony denotes "the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" (Gramsci, 1971: 145). Considering the Gramscian and NeoGramscian perspective on hegemony, liberalism and neoliberalism (with its promotion of regional economic blocks as promotion of security) are also trapped in the state-centric conceptualisation of security, like realism and neorealism. That is, security was defined and seen through the state whether it was attained through international organisations or military buildup, the center of focus was the state. In this research, the focus on security goes beyond the SADC nation-states themselves to the ordinary cross-border community members as well as those who crossed the border for a variety of socio-economic and other reasons.



3.4 Copenhagen and Aberystwyth schools of thought on security.

Beyond among others, liberalism, neoliberalism, social constructivism as critiques of the realist and neorealist theories on security, there have also emerged what is called the Copenhagen and Aberystwyth schools of thought on security.

3.4.1 Copenhagen school of thought on security

The origins of the Copenhagen school of thought can be traced to the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in Copenhagen in the 1990s. The major proponents of the Copenhagen school of thought are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The three aspects of security

as postulated by the Copenhagen School of thought are sectors of security, regional security complex theory, and securitisation theory. On the question of regional security complex theory, Buzan (1991a:187), states that “security is a relational phenomenon. Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded”. This essentially means that the relationship between states varies along a continuum and includes alliances, friendship, and fear and this may be predicated on among others, ideological differences/similarities, historical and ethnic factors. The suggestion is that the security of a state is dependent on the security of other states at the micro and macro levels. This is the logic within which the notion of the security complex arises because “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”, suggests a security interface beyond a nation-state (Buzan, 1991b:190). This is the context within which Buzan (1991b:189) advanced the “amity and enmity among states” relationship, to illustrate that a security complex within which a state finds itself may be favorable or unfavorable respectively, which demands the determination of a state’s security in relation to a regional complex.

The case of Mozambique and the SADC can be used as an example to demonstrate this point. This, because the security of the country (Mozambique in which currently there is instability) is linked to the SADC regional complex and the opposite is true. This means that if the current instability worsens, that will have regional implications in the SADC. Another example is that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The security of the country is linked to that of the SADC and the Great Lakes region and the opposite is also true. Therefore, the notion of regional security complex assists to show that the security of a country is linked to the micro, meso, and macro levels. The relevance of the notion of regional security complex theory to this study is that it assists to interrogate the extent to which cross-border migration management policies in the SADC countries have a regional outlook. For example, if countries manage borders and

migration in isolation, that could have a cross-border security implication taking into consideration the regional security complex setup.

The second aspect of the Copenhagen School of thought is securitisation theory, as discussed in Chapter Two. Notwithstanding the proposition of securitisation theory as propounded by the Copenhagen School of thought (see e.g. Buzan, 2006; Wæver, 1995), there is the further argument by Wæver (2007), that there is a need to desecuritize problems and politics so that the need to see security as positive thing does not arise. In other words, security denotes a negative situation because it suggests a failure to deal with issues so that they are not a threat. In fact,

elites frequently present their interests in “national security” dress. Their actions are then labeled something else, for example, “class interests,” which seems to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct reference to the “people”. This is, in a word, wrong. All such attempts to define people’s “objective interests” have failed. Security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice; by elites. All of this can be analyzed, if we simply give up the assumption that security is, necessarily, a *positive* phenomenon (Wæver, 2007:75).

The point is that there is a need for desecuritisation which “further implies moving from a positive to a negative agenda, in the sense that the dynamics of securitization and desecuritization can never be captured so long as we proceed along the normal critical track that assumes security to be a positive value to be maximized” (Wæver, 2007:75). Therefore, “by working with the assumption that security is a goal to be maximized” there is the elimination of “other, potentially more useful ways of conceptualizing the problems being addressed. This is, [...] because security: insecurity are not binary opposites. As soon as a more nominalist approach is adapted, the absurdity of working toward maximizing “security” becomes clear” (Wæver, 2007:75).

The problem with the current debates on security suggests a scenario of “the object playing around with the subjects, the field toying with the researchers. The problematique itself locks people into talking in terms of “security,” and this reinforces the hold of security on our thinking, even if our

approach is a critical one. We do not find much work aimed at *de-securitizing* politics which, I suspect, would be more effective than securitizing problems” (Wæver, 2007:75). The issue which comes to the fore from Wæver’ (2007) argument is that securitising politics and problems sometimes limits other solutions which can be implemented. In other words, problems can be addressed without placing them in the realm of security threats. In the context of this study, these insights are useful in terms of providing a background for analyzing how and to what extent cross border mobility in the SADC region has been securitised and if at all other potential strategies can be implemented to deal with cross border challenges without escalating them to a security matter calling for border militarisation and securitisation. The views of the non-state actors will assist to shed light on this. That is, what do they (non-state actors) see as security challenges and how could these be addressed. It is assumed that the views of the non-state actors could broaden our understanding and (re)thinking of cross-border challenges or security beyond the state-centric securitisation paradigm. In this regard, (re)thinking cross border security should transcend what Gramsci (1971) referred to as statolatry or the glorification and exclusive focus on the state in international relations debates and analyses.

The third aspect of the Copenhagen School of thought is on the issue of sectors of security. Buzan (1991a, b) identified the five sectors as follows; political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. Military security relates to the interface between the military offensive of a state and its defensive abilities. Political security refers to the systems of and organisational structure of a government as well as and the ideologies on which the government is grounded and thus functions. A related issue is whether or not such an institutional edifice has legitimacy. For instance, if there are contestations on legitimacy, that can create political security problems. Economic security relates to matters of access to among others economic resources necessary to sustain the welfare of people. Societal security refers to the freedom of people to practice and “reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom within acceptable conditions for evolution” (Buzan, 1991b:433).

Environmental security revolves around the sustainable exploitation and use of environmental resources based on that such resources provide an important foundation for the existence of people. These “five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkage” (Buzan, 1991b:433). As an example, the security issues related to the military can have political, economic, and environmental consequences. Likewise, if there are environmental problems such as environmental degradation in the form of pollution of land and air, this may affect economic productivity as well as the quality of life among others. Of course, these propositions by Buzan (1991a, b) have been criticised by some authors like McSweeney (1996:85) who assert that its propositions are limited.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the expansion of the concept of security beyond the military focus by the Copenhagen School of thought is important as it allows focus on non-state actors such as the cross-border actors in this research. This is the context within which

security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the 'security' label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures, including the use of force) and becomes part of the everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept (Buzan, 1991b:432-433).

The evolution of the concept of security in the post-Cold War era, from a state-centric emphasis to include other aspects such as environmental, socio-economic, and political events as posing security threats (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998) is important in this research because it shows that it is necessary to conduct security research which goes beyond the state-centric gaze. This is why the focus of the present study is on the non-state actors which cross the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and the Mozambique South Africa border at Kosi-Bay. In other words, with

the Copenhagen school of thought on security in mind, security should “be interpreted as security of people, not just territory. Security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment” (Ul-Hag, 1995:115). Since this study refers to cross-border security, this term (cross-border security) should be taken to mean activities or circumstances linked to non-state actor operations and cross-border networks which pose a threat to the SADC nation-states as well as to the people involved in cross-border trade and cross-border communities, among others.

3.4.2 *The Aberystwyth School/Welsh School of security studies*

The Aberystwyth School/Welsh School of security studies which is also referred to as Critical Security Studies traces its origins to Marxism and employs critical social theory in its analysis. Its main proponents are Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones (Floyd, 2007). The central argument of the Welsh school of thought on security studies is that security must be defined and understood beyond a state-centric paradigm. In this regard,

the key concept in thinking about security in this approach is 'emancipation'. Emancipation should be given precedence in security thinking over the traditional realist themes of power and order. The trouble with giving a privileged position to power and order is that they are at somebody else's expense, which means that they are potentially unstable. The absolute power and therefore security of one state implies the absolute impotence and therefore insecurity of all others. Likewise, absolute order implies no change; and where there is no allowance for change there is unlikely to be justice, and without justice there is the potential for conflict. True security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it (Booth, 1991a:539).

On the aspect of defining security as emancipation, Booth (1991a:539) asserts that “emancipation means freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do, of which war, poverty, oppression and poor education are a few”. It is evident that the main proposition of the Welsh school of thought is that in matters of security “people should be treated as ends and not means (which automatically rules out 'totalitarian

utopias' as a contradiction in terms). States, by contrast, should be treated as means and not ends. States are unreliable, illogical and too varied in their nature to be thought of as the primary referents for a satisfactory theory of security on a world scale. People should be the primary referent, not states” (Booth, 1991a:540).

This suggests that a state-centric understanding of security is limited because it is this state-centric system of security which is the source or cause of insecurity (Booth, 1991b) or as Jones (1991:310) argues, “the sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity: it is part of the problem rather than the solution”. Of course, the Welsh school of thought has been criticised for making normative propositions around what security is and how it can be attained (see e.g. Floyd, 2007). That notwithstanding, the interest in reviewing the Welsh school of security was to illustrate that its emphasis on security which transcends the focus on the state generally resonates with the proposition of the Copenhagen school of thought. This critical approach to the study of security as advanced by the Welsh school of thought amplifies the focus of this study on non-state cross-border actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants, and cross-border communities. In this regard, there is an emphasis on individual people and communities in the analysis of cross-border security issues.

3.5 Informal cross-border trade

In consideration of cross border informality, there is a need to state from the outset that in general the notion of informality is contested and difficult to define (see e.g. Chen 2005, 2007). For example, some scholars have used the numbers of employees, others have framed it around the size of the business enterprises, whereas others have used lack of government regulation to characterise this phenomenon (see e.g. International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2013; Heintz, 2012 Sinha and Kanbur, 2012). Notwithstanding these contestations, this thesis accepts the definition by Kesteloot and Meer (1999) that informality refers to all legal economic activities that are operated by people for survival, profit, or both but fail to comply with legal criteria in terms of, for example, manufacturing and distribution rules. In the light of this, the focus of this thesis is

on the cross-border dimension of these legal economic activities. Thus, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) refers to the movement of people across borders to buy and sell processed or non-processed goods (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012). ICBT involves trade in legally produced goods and services that escape the regulatory frameworks and so avoid certain taxes and other requirements such as paying duty set by governments at the border (Schneider 2006; Lesser and Moise-Leeman, 2009). To this degree, this study neither condones nor tolerates any illegal economic activities. What is currently referred to as ICBT existed in the pre-colonial period as people travelled over short and long distances for purposes of trade among others, but there were no cross-border restrictions. There was a certain degree of impermanence and fluidity of borders in precolonial Africa and as discussed in Section 3.2.3, such borders were predicated on allegiance to rulers and not the Westphalian statehood which was imposed by the Berlin partition and the resultant European colonies (Ajala, 1983). This suggests that cross-border movement for socio-economic, political, cultural, and other reasons was relatively unlimited. Therefore, the scramble for Africa which culminated in the Berlin conference of 1885-85, led to the imposition of borders and the dividing of the African continent into colonial possessions by different European countries.

Although the partition of Africa and the requirement for travel documents was an essential part of the new colonial state, this did not always stop the migration patterns which had existed before colonial conquest. This is particularly the case in the Southern African region in which there is a long and established history of migration (Crush et al. 2005; Wentzel and Tlabela 2003), suggesting that people moved for purposes of trade and this was largely based on the availability of commodities, population density, and good weather conditions (see e.g. Crush et al., 2010; Olivier, 2012). The point being made here is that the colonial conquest and partitioning of Africa resulted in the introduction of measures that regulated movement at the borders of the newly manufactured African states (see e.g. Asiwaju, 1993, Miles, 2014). Such measures are not always respected by cross-border actors like ICBTs (see e.g. Moyo, 2016a,b,c). This is the context within which ICBTs operate in so-called post-colonial African states, in which they must produce legitimate travel documents and the relevant permits in order to import and export goods (see e.g.

Peberdy, 2002; Nshimbi, 2017a, b; Moyo, 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2017). Those who do not have such documents have had to resort to other means of crossing the borders (Moyo, 2017).

3.5.1 Informal cross border trade, borders, migration and socio-economic development

Currently, ICBT activities are found in all parts of Africa and contribute 30-40 percent of total intra-regional trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)¹ and about 40 percent in the Common Market for the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)² region. In other parts of Africa, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, ICBT contributes significantly to intra-regional trade (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012). This means that ICBT plays an important role in importing and exporting goods between African countries (Peberdy 2002; Moyo 2017; Nshimbi 2015, 2017, 2018). This imports and exports of goods in ICBT brings into sharp focus the border in both its materiality and symbolism and its implication on the cross border activity under discussion.

In the Southern African region, the cross migration by ICBTs has received considerable commentary. For instance, Moyo (2017) extensively examined how the ICBTs who crossed the Botswana-Zimbabwean border at Ramokgwebana operated. The study revealed that the ICBTs' operations, frequency and patterns of crossing the border depended on the quantity, type of and demand for goods which were being traded. For instance, Zimbabwean ICBTs who traded in goods which were in high demand back home frequently crossed the border to the extent of the demand. Another example is that those who bought large quantities of goods at any given time stayed for a longer period of time before travelling back to Botswana for replenishments. The studies by Peberdy (2000, 2002), highlighted the hurdles which ICBTs faced in crossing many SADC borders. These hurdles ranged from bureaucratic requirements to the difficult conditions which

¹ SADC member states are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

² COMESA member states are Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland (Eswatini), Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

were faced by ICBTs. In a study of the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe at Beitbridge, Pophiwa (2017, 2021) also demonstrated the operations of, and the challenges faced by the Zimbabwean ICBTs who used this border to buy goods from and sell at Musina, which is a South African border town near the Beitbridge border. Likewise, in borders between countries like Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, ICBTs used borders as resources in terms of buying goods from one country and selling them in another (see e.g. Nshimbi, 2015, 2018). The use of the border as a resource as described in this section is consistent with the conduit and opportunity proposition advanced by Nugent (2002) and Nugent and Asiwaju (1996) discussed in the preceding parts of this chapter.

These activities and operation of ICBTs have a socio-economic development impact in terms of providing livelihoods to many people (Umnotho Wamazwe, 2008; Makombe, 2011; Peberdy, 2013; Southern Africa Trust, 2013, Moyo 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2017). For example, it was in the processes of buying and selling goods across the borders that ICBTs were able to meet family and to a certain degree community needs. A case in point was that ICBT assisted all of the people who were involved in it to send their children to school and university as well as sufficiently meet other needs (see e.g. Moyo, 2017). Differently stated, ICBT had a socio-economic development impact at individual and household level. More than that, ICBTs also contributed to the bottom-up process of regional development and integration. This can be shown by those economic activities between border towns such as that of Plumtree in Zimbabwe and Francistown in Botswana and Beitbridge in Zimbabwe and Musina in South Africa were connected and integrated by the activities of ICBT based on a supply-demand relationship (see Moyo, 2017). In some cases, ICBT has led to the physical growth and economic development of borderland regions. This can be illustrated by the example of the Beitbridge-Musina borderland. Musina which is a South African border town has physically grown and there has been an expansion of economic activities in the form of the growth of retail and wholesale shops in response to the growing demand generated by ICBTs mainly from Zimbabwe.

This growth was most predicated on the economic collapse in Zimbabwe which led to many people relying on ICBT as a livelihood activity. In addition to this, the economic collapse in Zimbabwe led to many people frequently travelling to Musina for purposes of shopping (see Popphiwa, 2017, 2021). This developmental role of ICBT brings into focus policies which have been implemented or not implemented, to support or not support this economic activity. At a continental level, there is the Agreement for the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its Protocols on Trade in Goods and Trade in Services. A good starting point in this regard is to consider continental and regional integration in Africa briefly.

3.5.2 Continental and regional integration in Africa

Regional integration means different things in different contexts (Söderbaum, 2014; Hurrell, 1995). The most prominent definition is that it involves the coming together of countries in pursuit of common interests, requiring common policies and regional institutions (Aniche, 2020). This means that regional integration is a state-centric project aimed at the reorganisation of regional spaces in ways that are politically and economically defined by nation-states (Tshimpaka et al. 2021). Indeed, several scholars have demonstrated that the state-centric conceptualisation of regional integration in Africa follows the European Union (EU) model which may not always apply to other contexts such as Africa and Asia (Acharya, 1997, 2001, 2007; Draper, 2012. Söderbaum, 2014; Bach, 2016; Aniche, 2020). Some studies (e.g. Walther, 2018) have shown the mismatch between regional integration as an institutional project and the everyday practices and realities of regional integration in Africa. This is the basis for the emergence of other definitions of, or approaches to, regional integration such as the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) (Hettne 1999, 2003; Hettne and Inotai, 1994; Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998, 2000; Mittelman, 1999; Mistry, 1999; Söderbaum, 2003). The NRA approaches regional integration as complex, fluid and multidimensional and involves many state and non-state actors (see e.g. Hettne 1999, 2003; Mittelman, 1999; Mistry, 1999; Söderbaum, 2003).

Although the debate on regional integration is outside the scope of this study, it is important to demonstrate that in Africa, regional integration follows the state-centric model in which economic integration through state institutions is paramount. This completely excludes other non-state actors like ICBTs who operate outside state institutions. My interest in providing this brief review of regional integration was to illustrate that at a continental level integration is assumed or scheduled to occur through formal institutions. This can be shown by the scheduled formation of the African Economic Community (AEC) in 2028 of which essential phases include among others the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in Rwanda in 2018 (African Union 2018). The main objective of AfCFTA is to form one continental market with free movement of goods and services including business personnel and investments (African Union, 2018).

Likewise, at the level of RECs, as in the case of SADC, which is the focus of this paper, regional integration is statecentric project. This model of regional integration (formal institutions) is thus exclusive in that non-state actors like the ICBTs are not included in the integration agenda, because they operate outside formal settings (institutions) as they cross borders from one country to the other. This can be shown by the Protocol on Trade in the SADC (1996) which does not include ICBT. In cases where there are attempts at the inclusion of the ICBTs, such as the Simplified Trade Regime (STR) (Soprano, 2014; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 2010), these are either not implemented in full or domesticated by nation-states

The point being made here is that it is fully understood that neoclassical economic integration logic fails to capture or accommodate the activities of ICBTs and yet SADC nation-states enforce this regional integration paradigm. In this, we can see that the hegemony of the state-centric paradigm in the organisation of economic activity is the pervasive-the state is considered to be the main player in international relations and matters of the political economy. This hegemony of the state which is taken as common sense needs to be displaced and/or challenged so that the cross-border

activities involving ICBTs and the security implications essential to this can be fully grasped. In this lies the NeoGramscian counterhegemonic approach which this study adopts.

3.6 Informal cross-border transporters and undocumented migrants

Informal cross-border transporters (*omalayitsha*) are people who transport people and remittances between South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example. These informal cross-border transporters play an equally important role in the human smuggling phenomenon at the same border and the same borderland (see e.g. Araia, 2009; Moyo, 2020b). Their operations included transporting undocumented migrants to the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge, from which they (undocumented migrants) illegally crossed with the assistance of *impisi*³ (people hired by *omalayitsha*) into South Africa across the Limpopo River and through the border fences which "separated" the two countries. After crossing into South Africa, the informal cross-border transporters picked up the undocumented migrants at agreed points along the freeway from Beitbridge to Johannesburg. The undocumented migrants (whose views should assist this study in deepening our understanding of cross border security/insecurity issues on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay) were then transported to their different destinations like Musina and Johannesburg (see e.g. Moyo, 2020b). In all this, *omalayitsha* themselves crossed the border at the formal immigration points. The operations of *omalayitsha* are analysed in terms of the extent to which they are linked to border management, securitisation and neopatrimonialism and the implication of their operations on cross-border security.

3.7 Cross-border communities

Meeks (2007) conceives defines cross-border communities as people on the borderlands who, among other hardships, suffer stringent immigration controls that limit their claims to citizenship.

³ *Impisi* means hyena. Given that hyenas generally hunt at night; it can be suggested that the actors in question are referred to as such because the border crossings usually occurred at night. They knew the 'safer' routes to and from illegal cross-border points.

This places such people on the peripheries of states. Referring to the Yaquis, Tohono O'odham, and ethnic Mexicans on the US-Mexico Border, Meeks (2007) argues that these have become border citizens “both because of restrictions imposed on them and because they were redefining what it meant to belong to the U.S. nation-state from its borderlands. In the process, they helped to redefine what it meant to be Mexican, Indian, and Anglo. The relationships that these groups formed with one another and with the political economy substantially influenced how they identified themselves over time (Meeks, 2007).

In this regard, a “border citizen is therefore a category co-produced between states and citizens, where people who are often perceived as marginal enact alternative forms of citizenship, using its mechanisms to make strategic claims on both of the states whose overlapping sovereignty constitutes the non-post-colonial third space ...” (Shneiderman, 2013:34-35). For example, as a result of the partition of Africa and the erection of colonial borders, communities were split between countries. Such communities have had to articulate an alternative category of citizenship taking into consideration the imposed colonial border. In the SADC region, there are many examples, but for the present purposes, a study of the Venda-speaking people on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe by Moyo (2016) demonstrates the case of cross border communities.

The Venda-speaking people were split into two countries, which are South Africa and Zimbabwe as a result of colonial conquest. These are found on either side of the Limpopo River, which is the border between the two countries. In this regard,

both the South African and Zimbabwean governments have been blind to the fact that before the colonization process, people across the Limpopo River lived as one community separated by a simple river and bound by the same Venda language and culture. Today, the town of Mussina (Messina) and the Vhembe district of South Africa and the rural areas and the town of Beitbridge in Zimbabwe is largely populated by the same cultural and linguistic populations (Moyo, 2016:428).

The important issue about the Venda-speaking people is that they "have challenged this bordering and separation by adopting double identities—they refuse to recognize what they consider an imposed border, as their lives straddle the border in a way that no law or security forces can stop or contain" and this qualifies them as border citizens/border communities (Moyo, 2016:428). Therefore, in this research, "border communities" refers to people who inhabit the borderlands on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay and their perception and experience of cross-border security will assist this study to understand cross-border security issues outside the state-centric model.

3.8 The COVID-19 pandemic

Like many countries in the rest of the world, many Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries including South Africa and Zimbabwe, responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by declaring lockdowns which included the closing of borders and suspension of international travel (Moyo, 2020a; Chutel and Dahir, 2020). However, there were exceptions for freight movement and the repatriation of deceased people between South Africa and its neighbouring states. Although there has been a relaxation of restrictions, it is instructive to note that the period of the hard lockdown had serious consequences for people, socially, economically, culturally and politically (Mbele, 2020; Chutel and Dahir, 2020). For example, in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, the lockdowns negatively affected both the formal and informal economy, which led to a loss of income and livelihood for many people (Chutel and Dahir, 2020; Gukurume and Oosterom, 2020; Mbele, 2020). This is an issue on which there is considerable commentary and which is also beyond the scope of the present study (see Gossel and Koelble, 2020; Gukurume and Oosterom, 2020; Seleka, 2020; Valodia and Francis, 2020).

Considering this context, the focus of this thesis is on the cross-border interactions/activities by people like ICBTs, among others between South Africa and Zimbabwe and Mozambique and South Africa. The aim is to examine the impact of COVID-19 on these cross border actors. The argument is made that for cross border actors who used the SADC borders in question as a resource

in terms of for example buying and selling goods, the closing of borders was a direct threat to the livelihoods of ICBTs as it affected their movements and the transfer of remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe for those who worked and were based in South Africa. From the point of view of people affected by the lockdown, COVID-19 was not the real danger, but the disruption of their livelihoods leading to destitution. This led to various strategies by which the people successfully contested the border to continue their ‘normal lives’. This raises the issue of the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic implicated on cross-border security in the areas under study. The following questions are therefore asked and addressed in the analysis chapters: How, and to what extent, do the COVID-19 border closures feed into the global trend of securitising migration, borders, and pandemics? What are the implications for cross-border security?

3.9 Transnationalism

Transnational social formations refer to “sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across the borders across multiple nation states ranging from little to highly institutionalised forms” (Faist 2000:189). These ties and networks include “a whole gamut of economic, political and social initiatives ranging from informal import-export businesses to the rise of binational professionals, to the campaigns of home country politicians among their expatriates” (Portes et al. 1999:271-218). In this way, transnationalism challenges the assumption that national-states are the exclusive category for the expression of identities. This challenge has been strengthened by developments in transport and communication technology which have transformed the notion of what home and host countries are as these are inextricably connected given that the lives of migrants are multi-sited (IOM, 2010).

It is neither the intention nor the focus of this chapter to offer an extensive review of transnationalism, but to indicate that research on transnationalism has evolved and now includes several aspects. Transnational networks are not only limited to sending remittances, but also include activities like tourism, trade, transportation, telecommunications and transfers of donations or what Orozco (2013) refers to as the 5Ts. In this respect, some studies have focused on

transnational solidarity (Gould, 2007) which is an analysis of the supportive relationship migrants have or establish with their countries of origin. Examples of this include the transnational response of the Japanese diaspora to the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011 (Takeda, 2015) or the transnational humanitarian networks by Haitian migrants to assist their home country in times of crisis (Orozco and Burgess, 2011). Other studies on transnationalism have examined the meaning and implication of this phenomenon on families and how transnationalism has fundamentally changed the meaning of family and familyhood, because biological parents do not live with and take care of the daily needs of their children, whereas, immediate family members like grandparents, aunts and uncles take care of the children as if they were the biological parents and this has complicated the meaning of family. This has led to calls for migration policies which are attentive to the needs of families who live in a transnational context (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2013).

Notwithstanding, some scholars have expressed scepticism over the assumed extent of transnationalism. For example, Waldinger (2015) suggests that transnational ties which migrants may have with their countries of origin wane and dissipate over time, which implies that transnationalism is overrated. Furthermore, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004:1177) argue that “what immigration scholars describe as transnationalism is usually its opposite: highly particularistic attachments antithetical to those by-products of globalization”. Others like, Kivisto (2001), also contest the notion of transnationalism to the extent that they do not see it as depicting a uniquely new phenomenon in cross-border migration, but a simple subset of assimilation of immigrants in host societies. Kivisto argues that the “relationship between transnationalism and assimilation ought to be seen in the same light as the relationship between assimilation and ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism” (Kivisto, 2001:571).

While these divergent views are acknowledged, several studies suggest that the notion of transnationalism facilitates understanding of the cross-border ties and networks (see Tshimpaka 2020; Takeda, 2015; Orozco, 2013; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2013; Orozco and

Burgess, 2011; Bauböck and Faist, 2010; Vertovec, 2001, 2009; Bauböck, 2003; Faist, 2000; Portes et al. 1999; Nina and Georges, 1998; Nina, 1997, 1999). This is different from strategies of assimilation of migrants in host societies although there may be an interface between the two.

Granted that research on transnationalism has grown to include a focus on several dimensions of transnational networks as suggested in this section, in this study one whose objectives (4th objective) is exploring the responses to the COVID-19-induced closure of SADC borders such as that between South Africa and Zimbabwe, the focus is on the cross-border interactions by among others, individual ICBTs and informal cross-border transporters and migrant workers. This is precisely because an analysis of “activities of individuals is the most efficient way of learning about the institutional underpinnings of transnationalism and its structural effects” (Portes et al. 1999:220). Considering the cross-border interactions of ICBTs, migrant workers and informal transport operators as transnational is useful for this study’s mission to probe the aims, operations and impact of these actors on border security especially in the context of the COVID-19 lockdowns.

3.10 Chapter summary

This chapter set out to undertake a literature review of authentic scholarly sources of information on themes of borders, cross border management, migration and security to provide perspectives and frameworks within which this study is situated. In pursuit of this, the chapter discussed the notions of borders, borderscapes, and security in relation to the research problem. In addition, the chapter also discussed informal cross-border trade, continental and regional trade facilitation initiatives, cross-border communities the COVID-19 pandemic and transnationalism to provide an expanded context of this study. This literature review suggests that research on cross-border security in Africa in general and Southern Africa specifically suffers from a state-centric fixation, which occludes more than illuminates cross-border security issues in their complexity and dynamism. It is in an effort to move beyond a state-centric paradigm in the study of cross border security in the study of borders in the Southern African region, that this research focuses on cross

border non-state actors, such as informal cross border traders, informal cross border transporters, and border communities (who also frequently cross borders), among others and their experiences and views on cross border security. The rationale in doing so is to deepen our understanding of cross-border security issues in the study areas. The next chapter discusses the study setting and methodology.



CHAPTER 4: STUDY SETTING AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research process and it starts by describing the study setting, in terms of outlining the geographical location and characteristic features of the two study areas. This is followed by an analysis of the research paradigm which informed the reached design and the relevant data collection and analysis procedures. This leads to a discussion of ethical considerations as well as study limitations.

4.2 Study setting

This research is based on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and the Mozambique-South Africa at Kosi Bay.

4.2.1 South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge

The Limpopo River forms the boundary between South Africa and Zimbabwe. What is noteworthy about the Limpopo River is that the Zimbabwean side has steep slopes on the edge of the river which is supposed to deter the movement of people. The South African side is characterised by tight security such as the heavy presence of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South African Police Service (SAPS) in addition to a barbed-wire fence. Although there are two official border posts between South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is only the Beitbridge post, which is fully functional (Araia, 2009). It is this Beitbridge border that is the focus of this study (Figure 4.1). The origins of the border can be traced to the Pretoria Convention of 1881 and later the London Convention of 1884, which established the boundaries of the South African Republic or the Transvaal Republic (Olson and Shadle, 1991). When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the South African Republic was part of it whereas Beitbridge was part of the then Southern Rhodesia (see e.g. Moyo, 2016).




Figure 4.1: Study areas

The Beitbridge border itself was constructed in 1929 and lies at the intersection of the South African N1 highway and Zimbabwean A6 highway (see e.g. Moyo, 2016). The nearest border towns are Musina and Beitbridge in South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. The borderland would therefore refer to the areas near and along the border as well as between these two towns. By extension, the border communities are the people who inhabit this borderland. A good example of cross-border communities /border citizens in this borderland is the Venda-speaking people who live on both sides of the South-Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.7).

In addition to the border communities who frequently crossed the border were also other actors. For example, undocumented migrants from SADC countries and beyond also crossed the border to South Africa. A characteristic feature of this undocumented migration involved the utilisation of human smugglers (*omalayitsha*) as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.6). The human smuggling industry at the Beitbridge was rife as much as it was dangerous because research has shown the people were killed and women raped (see e.g. Moyo 2020b). For instance, in the process of crossing the border through swimming across the Limpopo River, people either drowned or were eaten by crocodiles. Those who survived the crocodiles were either killed or raped by marauding gangs of criminals on the banks of the Limpopo River (see e.g. Moyo, 2020, Araia, 2009). However, all this was not enough to stop the human smuggling industry and undocumented migration. For instance, the smuggling of children between South Africa was also rampant.

This can be illustrated by a study by Moyo and Moyo (2021), which explored how Zimbabwean child migrants were smuggled to and from South Africa using the services of human smugglers. These children mostly travelled during the school holidays. That is, when Zimbabwean schools were closed, the children travelled to South Africa using human smugglers to visit their parents, most of whom were also undocumented in South Africa. Linked to this, is that young children who were born in South Africa to undocumented Zimbabwean migrants (or those who had fraudulent South African identity documents) were sent to Zimbabwe to acquire identity documents and attend school. These children regularly travelled between South Africa and Zimbabwe using the services of human smugglers (Moyo and Moyo, 2021). A related issue was that of couriers and transporters who were largely responsible for the smuggling of contraband across the Beitbridge border. Several examples abound, which illustrate this fact, but common ones included the smuggling of cigarettes worth several millions (South African Rands) from Zimbabwe to South Africa (Muleya, 2021). An extreme case of this involved the transportation of cigarettes from Zimbabwe in an empty fuel tanker (Head, 2020).

Beyond these human smuggling operations, this border was chosen for this study because, it is one of the busiest borders in Southern Africa (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012) and connects South Africa to Zimbabwe and other SADC nation-states (Ndlovu, 2021). The fact that the border is the busiest can be illustrated by that much vehicular traffic passes through it and it is estimated that on average about 25 000 people pass through the border daily (see e.g. Ndlovu, 2021). It is also this busy character of the border that provides an appropriate site for a study of this nature which examines cross-border security issues in which cross-border non-state actors like ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, and undocumented migrants are the focus.

4.2.2 Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay

The Kosi Bay border is located in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal (one of the nine provinces in South Africa) and it is supposed to separate Mozambique and South Africa (Figure 4.1). What is currently referred to as Kosi Bay or Manguzi (eManguzi) was in the past known as Thongaland or Tembeland because the area was part of the precolonial Tsonga kingdom. It was the colonial conquest of Africa that led to the area being split between South Africa and Mozambique or the then British and Portuguese colonies respectively. This explains why on both South African and Mozambican sides of the border a significant number of Tsonga people can be found (see e.g. Mathebula, 2002; Rawson, 1913). On the South African side of the border, the nearest border town is Manguzi. In Mozambique, the nearest border town is Ponta do Ouro located about 15km from the border and it lies South of Maputo at the Southern part of the Mozambique Channel (Rawson, 1913). Just like in the case of Beitbridge, the borderland will be taken to mean areas near and along the border as well as between these two towns of Manguzi and Ponta do Ouro. Additionally, the border communities (as discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.7), are the people who live in this borderland.

Migration from Mozambique to South Africa has a long history that was predicated on the political economy of the colonial period as well as the post-independence political instability of the country.

For instance, in the period 1898-1975 (colonial regime) the Portuguese engaged in a development strategy in which large scale plantation commercial farming in the central and northern regions of Mozambique was undertaken and the southern parts depended on exporting labour to the South African mining industry and this was institutionalized through bilateral agreements on labour as from about 1902. The impact of this is that most Mozambicans in the southern parts of the country depended on circular migrations to South Africa and this migration was governed by short-term contracts which compelled intermediary return by migrants to Mozambique (First, et al. 1998). Unfortunately, the bilateral agreement meant that the incomes of Portuguese migrant workers in South Africa were in the main appropriated by the Portuguese colonial government, with the result that migrants and their families received very little (see e.g. Mercandalli et al, 2017; Gasper, 2006). Although Mozambicans from all parts of the country migrated to South Africa, the differentiation of the country as explained in the preceding illustrates why southern Mozambique, particularly provinces like Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane have a unique and well-established migration history to South Africa, which has been sustained to the contemporary period (see e.g. First et al, 1998, De Vletter, 2006; Pendleton et al, 2006; Mercandalli et al, 2017).

In addition to the historical political economy is the civil war in Mozambique which ravaged the country from 1975 to about 1992 and which also led to migration to South Africa (see e.g. Gaspar, 2006; Mercandalli et al, 2017). Notwithstanding, currently there is instability in Mozambique in which the local communities in Cabo Delgado in northern parts of the country are disgruntled about the neglect and marginalization of the region while local resources such as gas have been exploited to the benefit of elites and foreign companies to the total exclusion of local people. This instability has led to the deaths of people, for example, the attack on the town of Palma in March 2021 led to the displacement and deaths of several people (see e.g. Mukpo, 2021). Although this may also contribute to migration, its implications on cross-border migration especially to South Africa have not been explored.

Further, in the post-independence period and particularly with the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, it is important to stress that, migration has continued, if not increased. This has been predicated on the liberalisation of economic activities as well the fact that the democratic dispensation in South Africa has generally created conditions for people to engage in cross-border migration (see e.g. First et al, 1998; Mercandalli et al, 2017). What is particular about the civil war and the migration of Mozambicans to South Africa and Kosi Bay specifically is that many Mozambicans migrated to KwaNgwanase in the Kosi Bay borderland (Kloppers, 2005). In the case of Southern Mozambique, such migration is a continuation of historical patterns. The point being made here is that migration from Mozambique to South Africa is therefore very entrenched and the Kosi Bay borderland provides a suitable site to analyse the cross-border interactions by non-state actors as such interactions are predicated on a long and well-established history and pattern.

4.3 Research paradigm

A research paradigm is a way of understanding the social or natural reality of the world being studied. This means that it is a basic belief system with assumptions on ontology, epistemology, methodology (see e.g. Mittwede 2012). There are several types of research paradigms, like positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, and pragmatism. This research employs constructivism/social constructivism. This is a paradigm which states that people understand or seek to understand the world based on interaction with others to develop their particular meanings according to their experiences (Jung 2019; Creswell 2014; Lincoln 2011). Constructivism can also be described as “human consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie 1998, 856). This suggests that “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler 1997, 322). In this regard, constructivism advances “the dialectical constitution of knowledge and reality” (Pouliot 2007, 364).

This philosophical stance of constructivism is important in this research which explores cross-border security issues in a Southern African setting, given that security is a social construct created by states, leading to the mobilisation of audiences that support such constructs. It also follows that non-state actors may understand security issues differently from the states' conceptions. This is where a constructivist reading and analysis of the cross-border security issues from the perspectives of non-state actors like ICBTs, undocumented migrants, and cross-border communities becomes important. In other words, what do non-state actors regard as cross-border security issues, which may be different from the views of these states, and what are the implications of these insights for policy and socio-economic development? This means this study accesses the views of the people involved in the cross-border activities and how they experience them (experiential realities) and construct knowledge around cross-border security. Viewed thus, it would seem that the advantage of constructivism for research of this nature is based on illuminating the “ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge” as well as the “epistemological and methodological implications of this reality” (Adler 1997, 323). The exploration of experiential realities of non-state actors in this research means that this is a qualitative research project, suggesting that the paradigmatic orientation of the study influences the research design and approach, issues which are discussed next.




4.4 Research design

A research design is a framework within which a study is executed. It outlines the required data as well as the methods employed to collect and analyse such data in response to the aim of the study (see e.g. Creswell 2014). This study utilises a case research design, which is described as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin 1994, 13). A case study aims to achieve an in-depth exploration of social reality for an adequate understanding of real-life events, experiences, and perceptions (Yin 1993; 2003). In this sense, case studies are essentially qualitative and exploratory in terms of utilising data collection methods

such as interviews and direct observations (Yin 1994, 2003; Healy and Perry 2000). The case studies in this research represent the South Africa- Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge and the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay, while the units of analysis are the cross-border non-state actors such as the ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, cross-border communities, and undocumented migrants. The phrase "units of analysis" refers to what or who is being studied and explored (Babbie 2007).

An in-depth study of the views, experiences, and perceptions of these non-state actors is expected to deepen our understanding of issues of cross-border security involving the two borders in question. In other words, the meanings which these non-state actors deduce from or attach to cross-border security are equally important and may enrich the top-down state-centric understanding of cross-border security issues. The explanations are necessary to the extent that "meaning making is key to scientific endeavour: its very purpose is to understand how specific human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds" and given that "sense making is always contextual, a concern with 'contextuality'-rather than 'generalizability' motivates research practice and design" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 10-11).



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4.5 Research approach

The preceding discussion on research paradigm and design suggests that this study follows a qualitative research approach. This is because social constructivism (study paradigm) is based on how people construct knowledge according to their experiential realities, and a case study design is mostly exploratory because of the deployment of data collection techniques like interviews, which are qualitative research approaches. Lincoln and Guba (2000) define qualitative research as naturalistic and state that it challenges the ultimacy and substantiality of social reality advanced by the quantitative process (Creswell 2014; Creswell and Plano Clark 2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009; Iosifides 2011). It (qualitative research) is exploratory and assists in gaining a deeper understanding of social reality (Creswell 2014). This point is amplified by Burns (2000,

388), who asserts that "social reality is the product of meaningful social interaction as perceived from the perspectives of those involved and not from the perspective of the observer. Qualitative methods attempt to capture and understand individual definitions, descriptions and meanings of events". In research that attempts to understand the experiential realities of cross-border non-state actors, it was determined that the qualitative approach is the most suitable to the extent that it focuses on how people understand and interpret social reality (Burns 2000; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009; Iosifides 2011).

4.5.1 Qualitative research methods

In this section, there is an explanation of the sampling, data collection, and analysis procedures within the qualitative research paradigm.

4.5.2 Sampling

This study follows non-probability sampling procedures in the determination of a sample size of cross-border non-state actors who were interviewed. Babbie (2007) states that non-probability sampling involves the determination of a sample without following the probability sampling theory. It relies on many sampling techniques, like quota, snowball, and purposive sampling. In this study, purposive and snowball sampling were followed to select cross-border non-state actors. Purposive sampling involves the selection of research participants based on predetermined criteria which assist in responding to the aim of the study, whereas snowball sampling involves the recruitment of respondents to assist in the identification of other respondents (Mertons 2010). In other words, there are no rules for determining sample size in qualitative research, which means that samples are based on clearly defined and carefully selected informal sampling frames (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011).

Nonetheless, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) observe that although there are no established rules for determining qualitative samples, the general guidelines are the experiences of the researcher(s) as well as some sample sizes in previous qualitative studies such as those in journals. A case in point is that phenomenological research projects recommend a sample size of between 6 and 10

respondents. In this study, ICBTs, cross-border communities, informal cross-border transporters, and undocumented migrants were selected on the basis that they were constantly involved in cross-border activities and were also associated with and/or implicated cross-border insecurity. Based on this, 59 ICBTs were selected (40 at the Beitbridge border and 19 at Kosi Bay), 10 cross-border community members (5 in Beitbridge and 5 in Kosi Bay), 13 undocumented migrants (10 in Beitbridge and 3 in Kosi Bay), 7 informal cross border transporters (*umalayitsha*⁴) at both borders (5 at Beitbridge and 2 at Kosi Bay), 10 local informal transporters (7 at Beitbridge and 3 at Kosi Bay) and 5 migrant workers.

It is important to note that cross-border officials were not selected, because the views and perceptions of the nation-states in question about cross-border security issues are known and in the public domain. As discussed in the theoretical framework section (Chapter 2) and Literature review (Chapter 3), the states in question blame porous borders for cross-border security issues; their solution is to securitise and militarise the border. For purposes of this research, it was, therefore, considered pointless to interview cross-border officials who would simply regurgitate the already-known official government position. It is the views of the non-state actors in the entire cross-border security debate which are neither fully known nor have been subjected to an in-depth scholarly examination. That is, an understanding of cross border security issues and challenges from the perspective of non-state actors. Table 4.1 below is a summary of the qualitative sample.

4.5.3 Instrumentation and data collection

This study utilised in-depth interviews to collect data from the respondents as indicated in Table 4.1. The actual data collection involved face-to-face interviews (which were recorded) at the selected borders. Interview lasted between one and several hours. The in-depth interviews were also complemented by personal observations (non-participant observations) by the researcher.

⁴ *Umalayitsha* is singular and *omalayitsha* is plural.

This included observing where the ICBTs bought their goods, the operations of local informal transporters and couriers and so on. It needs emphasis that the researcher was trained on and is aware of the COVID-19 Protocols around research and data collection as detailed in the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) GUIDE to planning, preparing for, and conducting fieldwork in the context of COVID-19. Therefore, these COVID-19 Protocols on data collection were followed in full during data collection. An interview protocol was followed by the actual interviews.

Table 4.1: Summary of qualitative sample

Sampling method	Respondents	Number of respondents	Reasons for selection
Snowball	ICBTs	59 (40 in Beitbridge and 19 in Kosi Bay)	Involved in the cross-border buying and selling of goods. Also crossed the border at undesignated points. This has security implications.
Purposive	Cross-border communities	10 (5 in Beitbridge and 5 in Kosi Bay)	Lived on the borderland and had first-hand experience of cross-border security issues.
Snowball	Migrant workers	5 (Beitbridge)	Exploring how migrant workers remitted during COVID-19 cross border restrictions
Purposive	Informal cross-border transporters	7 (5 at Beitbridge and 2 at Kosi Bay)	Involved in the cross-border transportation of goods as well as the smuggling of undocumented migrants.
Purposive	Local informal transporters	10 (7 at Beitbridge and 3 at Kosi Bay)	Understanding the function and importance of informal networks in the cross border transportation of people and remittances during the COVID-19 restrictions
Purposive	Undocumented migrants (couriers/porters)	15 (10 at Beitbridge and 5 at Kosi Bay)	Understanding how and why people transported goods on their heads across illegal border crossing points
Total		106	

This is essentially a guide to how the interview proceeds, such as the introduction of the researcher, a statement of the purpose of the research as well as ethical issues on informed consent, anonymity, and confidentiality (Creswell, 2014). In-depth interviews were considered to be the most appropriate data collection technique because they are "a means of gathering critical information about the social world" and they assist in understanding "possible underlying, casual mechanisms". They "can be powerful means for interpretative understanding of participants' points of view, lived experiences, preferences and perceptions". This is precisely because "interview data may be appropriate not only for understanding agential perspectives but also for explaining them, assessing their adequacy, relating them to wider social contexts and using them to identify casual mechanisms operating at different levels of social reality, depth interviewing always tells us something about social reality and its real casual powers" (Iosifides 2011, 178-179). On this basis, it is posited that beyond the state-centric interpretation of cross-border security issues there may be other deeper meanings and issues. Stated differently, "there is a world existing independently from our knowledge of it; independence of objects from knowledge immediately undermines any complacent assumptions about the relation between them" (Sayer 2000, 2).

Indeed, there is criticism of qualitative research approaches, including data collection methods like in-depth interviews. Such criticisms may not be warranted, as it must be remembered that "when we try to elicit someone's subjective beliefs, we could say that we are trying to objectively represent their subjectivity. That something is my subjective belief does not entail that it cannot be true. Subjectivity also refers to the subjective quality of all knowledge – that it can be of and for subjects, and is situated and embodied, even though it is mostly about objects" (Sayer 2000:60). This observation endorses in-depth interviews as an authentic data collection technique that can yield rich and useful information to respond to research objectives such as those of this research, and by these means dismisses any critique which may attempt to render qualitative research 'unscientific'.

4.5.4 Data analysis

Creswell recommends that qualitative data analysis should follow an inductive approach in terms of assisting to "build patterns, categories and themes from the bottom up, by organising the data into increasingly more abstract units of information" (Creswell 2009, 176). Following this recommendation, this study followed a thematic approach in the analysis of data. This involved raw data (from the in-depth interviews and field notes and transcribing the audio recordings). This raw data was prepared for analysis by reading through the data to make sense of it, followed by its coding. The latter entailed assigning labels to or establishing common themes to interview data on issues of cross-border security. In this regard, coding involved reducing interview data to categories based on the use of labels or specific terms which responded to the aim of the research. This coding led to the identification of themes, the description of these themes as well interrelating these and their meaning and implications for cross-border security in the study areas (Creswell 2009, 2014). Figure 4.2 below summarises the steps of qualitative data analysis which were followed in this study.




Figure 4.2: Steps in qualitative data analysis (Creswell 2009)

4.5.5 Validity and reliability of qualitative data

In general, reliability means the repeatability of measured variables while validity is defined as the true value of research results (Babbie 2007). In particular, “qualitative validity means the researcher checks for the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures, while qualitative reliability indicates that the researcher’s approach is consistent” (Gibbs 2007, 190). Based on the recommendation of Gibbs (2007) and Creswell (2009, 2014), the researcher spent three weeks on each border collecting data. This ensured sufficient time in the field to understand the cross-border security issues at the borders in question. In addition, interview data was triangulated with field observation. In terms of reliability, the researcher carefully read through all collected data by checking the transcriptions against recorded in-depth interviews to ascertain that the information was correctly transcribed (Gibbs 2007; Creswell 2009).

4.5.6 Ethical considerations


Ethical considerations in research refer to correct and best practices when carrying out any study (see e.g. Montello and Sutton 2006; Silverman 2006; Beihammer et al. 2013; Giorgini et al. 2015; Roberts 2015). The researcher applied for and obtained an ethical clearance certificate from the University of the Western Cape (HSSREC Reference Number: HS21/5/64). The researcher explained the study to participants and highlighted their rights on matters of informed consent and participation. It was also explained to the participants that involvement in the research was voluntary and that no monetary incentives were offered. To ensure confidentiality, the information collected cannot be linked to particular individuals, because in both the interviews and the writing of the thesis, fictitious names of research participants were used. COVID-19 Protocols and regulations detailed in the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) guide for planning, preparing for and conducting fieldwork in the context of COVID-19 were followed during data collection.

4.5.7 Limitations of the study

The practical limitation is related to the COVID-19 restrictions on among others, social distancing but the researcher was trained on conducting research during COVID-19 and knew how to safely interact with research participants. As a result, the researcher was able to interview all the required participants. Furthermore, due to COVID-19 restrictions, the researcher was not able to cross over to the Zimbabwean side of the border as it was closed and there were also reports that the Zimbabwean border was under renovation. Nevertheless, the researcher did interact with all the research participants from the Zimbabwean side of Beitbridge and other parts of the country who provided all the information which was relevant for this research.

4.6 Chapter summary

This chapter has described the research process followed in this study in terms of study setting, analysis of the research paradigm and design, as well as data collection and analysis procedures. The chapter to follow examines the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations of non-state actors and assesses how these are linked with cross-border security issues in the study area. This responds to the first three study objectives.



CHAPTER 5: NON-STATE ACTORS, CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

5.1 Introduction

The question of the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations by non-state actors like ICBTs (who bought and sold processed and unprocessed goods), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants, and cross-border communities in the study areas relates to how and why these actors engaged in their cross-border activities and with what consequences on cross border security. In the light of this, this chapter discusses the findings of this study in response to the first, second and third objectives of the study. In sequential order, these objectives sought to (a) analyse the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations of non-state actors, (b) evaluate the link between the operations of these non-state actors on the one hand and entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security on the other in the study areas and (c) explore the perceptions of non-state actors concerning border management and cross-border security issues, respectively.

5.2 Demographic characteristics

Before a discussion of the findings, it is important to describe the demographic characteristics of the respondents as this provides an important context for the results of the study. At Beitbridge, all the sampled ICBTs were Zimbabwean, whereas, at Kosi Bay, there were 14 Mozambicans, 1 Nigerian, 2 Swati and 2 Zimbabweans. In both study areas, the informal cross border transporters were male and they were Mozambican and Zimbabwean citizens. As for the undocumented migrants at both Beitbridge and Kosi Bay, they were Zimbabwean and Mozambican respectively. Cross border communities in both Beitbridge and Kosi Bay, were citizens of the three countries, which are Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Table 5.1). In the case of Beitbridge, the high number of Zimbabwean ICBTs can be explained by, first, the geographical proximity of the two countries. Second, the economic and political problems which have afflicted Zimbabwe for the past two decades are well documented (see e.g. Moyo, 2018a; Moyo, 2017; Moyo and Nicolau, 2016; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Raftopoulos, 2006). And these have led to many people resorting

to informality in general and ICBT specifically to secure livelihoods. As a result, many Zimbabweans engage in ICBT by buying goods from the South African border town of Musina for resale in Zimbabwe (see e.g. Pophiwa, 2017, 2021). This is corroborated by a 2017 study by Pophiwa which suggests that cross border shopping between Beitbridge and Musina has reconfigured the retail space in the latter predicated on an increased volume of mostly Zimbabwean shoppers and informal cross border traders who patronise the South African border town.

Table 5.1: Demographic characteristics of sampled informal cross border actors

Demographic characteristics of sampled ICBTs					
Nationality	Study area	Frequency	Gender	Age	Education
Mozambican	Kosi Bay	14	Female (8)	20-50 years	Primary education (2)
					High school education (4)
					Tertiary education (2)
			Male (7)	18-55 years	Primary education (1)
					High school education (4)
					Tertiary education (2)
Nigerian	Kosi Bay	1	Male	38 years	Tertiary education
Swati	Kosi Bay	2	Female	25-35 years	High school education
Zimbabwean	Kosi Bay	2	Male	32 years	Tertiary education
Zimbabwean	Beitbridge	40	Female (24)	18-60 years	Secondary education (5)
					Tertiary education (19)
			Male (16)	20-50 years	Secondary education (2)
					Tertiary education (14)
Demographic characteristics of sampled undocumented migrants					
		10	Female (3)	18-50	High school education (2)
					Tertiary education (1)
			Male (7)	18-50	Primary education (1)
					High school education (5)
					Tertiary education (1)
Mozambican	Kosi Bay	5	Female (1)	18-50	High school education
			Male (4)		
Demographic characteristics of sampled informal cross border transporters					
Zimbabwean	Beitbridge	5	Male	20-50	High school education
Mozambican	Kosi Bay	2	Male	20-50	High school education
Demographic characteristics of sampled cross border community members					
Zimbabwean	Beitbridge	4	Male (3)	35-60	High school education
			Female (1)		
South African	Beitbridge	1	Male	35-60	High school education
Mozambican	Kosi Bay	4	Male		
South African	Kosi Bay	1	Male		
Demographic characteristics of sampled local informal transporters					
South African and Zimbabwean	Beitbridge	7	Male	20-60	High school education
Mozambican	Kosi Bay	3	Male		
Demographic characteristics of migrant workers					
Zimbabwean	Beitbridge	5	Female	38	Tertiary education
			Male	20-55	Tertiary education

Consequently, to meet the growing market provided by Zimbabwean shoppers, many retail and wholesale shops have sprung up in Musina and which have thus changed the retail landscape altogether. This growth of retail activity has also led to an increase in related activities such as informal cross border workers and informal cross border transporters for example. This is because the cross-border shoppers and traders required the services of couriers and transporters to transport their goods to the border and the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge (Pophiwa, 2017).

In the case of Kosi Bay, the high number of Mozambican ICBTs is not surprising because of the contiguous border and an established pattern of migration between the two countries, more especially after the 1994 democratic dispensation in South Africa (see e.g. First, et al. 1998; Gasper, 2006; Mercandalli et al, 2017). As for Nigerian, Swati, and Zimbabwean nationals, they were based in South Africa, especially in the province of KwaZulu-Natal towns like Durban from where they frequently traveled to Mozambique to buy and sell a variety of goods. In terms of gender, there were on average more women than men and this resonates with previous studies (see e.g. Ndlela 2006; Bamu, 2017; Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2017). However, there is a growing trend in which men are also being involved in ICBT such that this economic activity is no longer a preserve and monopoly of women. Another important demographic characteristic is that a clear majority (66%) of the ICBT held tertiary qualifications, 29% held high school qualifications and the remainder (5%) had attained primary school education (Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Education levels of sampled ICBTs

These educational characteristics illustrate that informality in general and ICBT specifically is no longer only undertaken by the uneducated and/or unskilled people, but also includes those who have tertiary qualifications like Bachelor's degrees and Diplomas. These findings resonate with that of Chikanda and Tawodzera (2017), who established that ICBTs were generally educated people who held high school and post-high school qualifications. The cross-border community members who participated in this study were predominantly men. In Beitbridge 4 men and 1 woman were interviewed whereas in Kosi Bay only 5 men were interviewed. The ages ranged between 35-60 years and they had lived in the borderlands in question since birth. The majority of undocumented migrants who participated in this study were men. That is, 10 men and 5 women (7 men and 3 women in Beitbridge and 4 men and 1 woman in Kosi Bay). In Beitbridge, some of these undocumented migrants functioned as individual couriers hired to transport goods across illegal border cross border points. In terms of age, they were between the ages of 18 and 50. All the 6 informal cross-border transporters in both study areas were men between the ages of 20 and 50 years (see Table 5.1 above). The picture which emerges from the demographic characteristics of the cross-border actors under consideration is that they had the relevant experiential realities to respond to the research questions. For example, cross-border community members had lived in the

borderlands since birth. Likewise, the survival of undocumented migrants depended on illegal crossing of the border, just like the informal cross-border transporters frequently crossed the borders in question. Such experiences provided rich insights for this research - issues which are discussed in-depth in the following parts.

5.3 The nature and dynamic of the cross-border operations of non-state actors

This section of the data analysis starts with a brief overview of why the people engage in ICBT. Consistent with several other studies (see e.g. Raeymaekers, 2009; Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012; Makombe, 2011; Moyo, 2017, 2018, Moyo and Nshimbi, 2017; Nshimbi, 2015, 2017, 2018, Peberdy and Crush, 1998; Peberdy, 2002, 2013) on the drivers of ICBT, the respondents indicated that they engaged in this economic activity because it was a livelihood strategy. Most asserted that the income from ICBT supported their familiesⁱ. This also included meeting a variety of needs ranging from providing food to paying for tuition fees for childrenⁱⁱ. One ICBT even stated that based on cross-border activities, he had been able to achieve what some people in formal employment in his community had not been able to do; this included buying land and building a big house. For this and related reasons he would continue engaging in this economic activityⁱⁱⁱ.

In fact, one informal cross-border trader asserted that, given the state of the economy in Zimbabwe, engaging in informal cross-border trade was the best economic venture that she had ever engaged in “because it had assisted me to continuously get money including foreign currency. This was based on that, sometimes I exported goods from Zimbabwe to South Africa to sell from which I was able to obtain foreign currency in the form of South African Rands”^{iv}. This foreign currency was utilised for many purposes including buying goods from South Africa for resale in Zimbabwe, or indeed buying food and other household items which sustained families and were utilised in Zimbabwe. This is consistent with the observations made by Peberdy (2002). All this considered, the focus of this paper is not why people engaged in ICBT but this brief overview leads to a consideration of challenges which faced these actors and the nature and dynamic of the operations

of these non-state actors and others like cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities in the study areas.

In the process of crossing SADC borders for the purposes of buying and selling goods, ICBTs faced several challenges, chief of which was the unfavourable policy regime both at the SADC regional and country levels. In this regard, the ICBTs complained that policies such as immigration regulations in SADC member states were not favourable to their operations. This is the context within which one ICBT stated that “in countries like South Africa, it is nearly impossible to secure a long-term residence visa, with the result that one relies on the 90-day a year visa applicable to SADC citizens. However, this is totally inadequate because one has to make several trips in a year which in total exceed 90 days”^v. Beyond these immigration bottlenecks, ICBTs also indicated that securing permits for small business was “nearly impossible as well because of the requirements for one to qualify for these permits”^{vi}. Some SADC countries also imposed stringent regulations on ICBTs. A good example of this is Zimbabwe, which in 2016 imposed Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016, on the basis of which the country banned the import of certain South African goods. These banned goods included coffee creamers, camphor creams, white petroleum jellies, plastic pipes and fittings, builders’ products, baked beans, cereals, bottled water and second-hand tyres (see Moyo, 2016a). It should be remembered that Zimbabwe also has the Zimbabwean Exchange Control (General) Order, 1996 S.I. 110 of 1996, which sets high standards for the nature and quantities of goods that ICBTs can import (see Exchange Control [General] Order, 1996 S.I. 110 of 1996).

At a regional level, there was no regional migration framework by which priority was accorded to ICBTs, let alone other citizens from the SADC, who were also limited to the 90-day per annum. Long term visas or work permits were difficult to secure in any case (see Moyo, 2018b, 2020). To this can be added the Protocol on Trade in the SADC (1996) which does not contain any provision for the ICBTs. This can easily be seen from the objectives of the Protocol (Article 2) as well as the other Articles of the Protocol on the elimination of duties and non-tariff barriers (Protocol on Trade

in the SADC, 1996, Article 3, Article 4, Article 5 and Article 6). The full meaning of this is that in the SADC, both at national and regional levels, the policies or regulatory instruments *generally* exclude the ICBTs. This effectively means that the existing policies and regulatory mechanisms favour actors in the formal economy (registered companies, big and small) at the expense of the ICBTs (see Moyo, 2017; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2017). If this is viewed through the prism of liberal institutionalism, it can be suggested that the absence of institutions which promoted ICBTs was problematic at many levels. A case in point is that it created a site in which the ICBTs were criminalised, or subalternised (Moyo, 2018a), or harassed and excluded (Moyo, 2018c; Nshimbi et al. 2018a, b). This manifested in, among others, different forms of harassment and abuse such as the confiscation of the goods from ICBTs, which undermined this economic activity by these actors. This led to ICBTs to employ other strategies so as to cross the border. These included creative packaging of goods (which literally means hiding goods and evading legal declarations at formal checkpoints) (Bamu, 2018; Moyo, 2017). In some cases, the ICBTs offered bribes to cross-border officials to attain the right to transport their goods across borders^{vii}. This case of ICBTs on the one hand 'working together' with state officials who were complicit in or paying a blind eye to unregulated cross border activities aptly illustrates not only the fluidity but also the codeterminancy of state and non-state actors' operations based on the *quid pro quo* traditions. One is reminded of Raeymaekers' s (2009) study of the Semliki Valley on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)–Uganda border. In this border, Raeymaekers (2009) established that the privatisation of the authority of the state had reconfigured cross border interactions because of the "ambiguous role, of hidden smugglers with open official ties, of “rebel” entrepreneurs seeking high political protection" which sustained cross border interactions (Raeymaekers, 2009:55).

If all this is seen through the prism of neopatrimonialism as discussed in the theoretical framework (Chapter 2, Section 2.3) one detects the use of the official positions by cross border officials at Beitbridge and Kosi Bay borders for private and personal gain or what Erdmann and Engel (2007: 105) refer to as the use of the state bureaucratic machinery as private property. That is to say, the

cross-border officials diverted and informalised the authority of the state for private gain by promoting a culture of corruption and bribery and in the process prejudicing the state (van de Walle, 2001). When ICBTs paid bribes to cross-border officials they effectively became the clients of the latter who were patrons in a rentier-based operation, resulting in the establishment of a private economy in which state officials sold their decision-making powers (see e.g. Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017). This corruption and clientelism meant that cross-border officials extracted benefits through the state by selling decision-making powers around the granting of permission to cross the border. The implications of this on cross-border security include the fact that people could transport anything as long as they had the money to bribe officials. The case of ICBTs transporting anything through formal cross-border channels based on paying bribes illustrates a cross-border security challenge which was the product of a complex interplay of the state officials as much as the cross-border actors, in this case, the ICBTs. Those who crossed through formal means by paying bribes posed a cross-border security challenge to the extent of transporting contraband. This suggests that it is too simplistic to view cross-border security problems as illustrating ICBTs as people with a criminal element without understanding what caused them to do so and who else was involved and why.

In cases where it was not possible for the ICBTs to bribe cross border officials or bend the formal cross border requirements, they (ICBTs) were compelled to cross the border at undesignated points of entry and exit^{viii}. It is at these points that ICBTs reported being “robbed of both their goods and money by criminals who waylaid them along the routes to or at the illegal cross-border points”^{ix}. Nonetheless, ICBTs have learnt to survive by recruiting people who were familiar with the informal cross-border routes and networks. It is these people whom “we hire to transport goods. This works as follows: I pay the person to transport the goods from Musina to Zimbabwe, but I cross the border through the formal immigration channels. I then meet them and collect my goods in Zimbabwe. In this way, I am protected from physical harm by the criminals. In many cases this worked well, but there were isolated incidents in which the hired people were also robbed”^x.

Although the system of hiring people to transport goods across the border on behalf of the ICBTs was based on trust built up over several interactions, there was the suspicion that at times “the hired people actually faked being robbed and took the goods for themselves. But the most difficult part is actually proving that they were also victims of crime; as a result, we just soldiered on and hoped that whenever one requested the services of people to transport the goods a loss would not occur”^{xi}.

Another dimension to the hiring of people to transport goods on behalf of the ICBTs is that beyond using unofficial cross-border points as described here, some actually used the formal immigration points to transport the goods across the border. In this regard, another ICBT stated, “I pay these guys to transport my goods and how they do it is entirely upon them. If they cross the border with my goods through the formal channels, it is great and desirable, but if they use the informal channel although undesirable, it’s fine as long as I receive my goods”^{xii}. Some ICBTs have even gone to the extent of buying goods in Musina and hiring people to transport such goods and deliver them to their (ICBTs) houses and/or shops in different parts of Zimbabwe. The following testimony is revealing in this respect; “these goods which I have bought here will be transported by people that I have hired. I will cross the border at a formal point and the hired people will deliver my goods to my shop in Bulawayo. And so, the next time I will see the bags full of goods is in Bulawayo. How they get there is not my ‘concern’ because I have paid for these to be delivered to my shop”^{xiii}. The important point to amplify in this respect is that, despite all these challenges, the ICBTs still continued with their operations.

From the point of the view of the interviewed ICBTs, the fact that SADC states had not seriously implemented policies to promote and facilitate their activities was a security issue. This is because the lack of a supportive regulatory regime made operations difficult or risky-a security issue at various levels. First, the livelihoods of the ICBTs were threatened^{xiv} and second, the fact that the livelihoods were threatened forced these actors to engage in various

operations such as illegal crossing of the border. When ICBTs were made to conceal their goods from the cross-border officials or paid bribes to them, it is a security matter. People felt threatened, forcing them to hide the goods under their clothes or pay bribes. In other words, the ICBTs felt that their livelihoods were in danger, which forced them to protect their goods. Resorting to crossing the border at unofficial points at which the ICBTs were either attacked or exposed to violence and danger is a security issue, which led to their hiring people to transport goods across the borders. The hired people were also not dependable, in the sense that sometimes ICBTs lost their precious goods; causing anxiety and lack of a sense of peace - a security issue. To this extent, the illegal crossing of the border by ICBTs should not be reduced to a simplistic characterisation of these actors as lawless and criminal people, without an understanding of what has caused them to do so in the first instance. From the views of the ICBTs, the lack of SADC policies which *practically* and *actively* promoted ICBT was a security issue.

Of course, it can be argued that there was no evidence (in the policy) that there have been some *deliberate* efforts by states to exclude or make it difficult for ICBTs to operate in the region. Such an argument is too simplistic and if nothing else an uninformed critique, because the evidence is provided by the experiences of ICBTs who have found it difficult to operate, and this is why they resorted to informal cross-border channels. Thus, there is no better evidence than the experience of ICBTs on how they operated under difficult conditions – ICBTs could not have chosen difficult conditions if there existed a better alternative. The issue, therefore, is not as simple as that requiring all ICBTs to use formal channels of traveling and moving their goods across borders, existing policy frameworks force them (ICBTs) to use informal networks, but it is about what these formal requirements demand of the ICBTs. That is, ICBTs cannot be treated like and subjected to the same level of formal requirements as formal, big and registered companies, but there must be specific policy frameworks which cater for their needs. In the absence of this, any formal programmes which exist are empty or vacuous and hostile to the extent that the ICBTs do not

benefit. In this regard, the point being made here is not that SADC member countries should promote ICBTs' use of informal channels of cross-border trade and cross-border mobility in the region, but rather, that there should be policies and practical programmes in the formal cross border processes which cater for the ICBTs so that they do not end up engaging in informal and even illegal networks.

The corollary is not that ICBTs cease to be so if they used formal channels when crossing borders, but that the formal cross-border processes must create conditions for ICBTs to flourish in their informality. Creating conducive conditions for ICBTs should not be confused with promoting tax evasion and customs duties defiance among other formal requirements that regulate cross-border movements of goods and people in the region. Rather it must be seen as a critical and careful understanding of the political economy of cross border trade in an African context. That is, informality is an integral part of the economy in the Global South and particularly in Africa (see e.g. Roy 2005; Banks et al, 2019) and the fact that it could not be formal suggests that it is its uniqueness which drives it and thus, there must be specific policies which meet this informal uniqueness, without attempting to make it formal. After all, it is the failure of the formal economy which has contributed to the growth of informality in general (see e.g. Rogerson, 1996, 1997; Potts, 2005; Mubita et al. 2017).

Furthermore, by depicting the SADC as a case of neo-classical integration (see Chapter 3) in which nation-states are the main players resulting in empty policies for non-state actors, this paper does not overlook the elephant in the room. That is, the stalled implementation of key agendas in SADC regional integration is due to the procrastination by member-states as well as that the governance of some SADC member-states is a major source of problems for ICBTs and ordinary people. Rather, it is an illumination of the problematic governance of ICBTs. The point is that, even if the regional integration processes had been quicker, in its current conceptualisation the outcome would be the same-statecentric focus and policies which favour formal registered businesses. Quicker or

stalled regional integration which followed neoclassical integration theory does not make a difference because they follow the same template. Therefore, a CU or EMU in 2010 or 2030, which is founded on neoclassical integration logic as discussed in the earlier parts of the paper is not helpful as long as there were no particular or specific provisions for ICBTs. To use an analogy, the time when the bus departs is not really the main question, but if everyone else is on board and that the seats meets their needs, that is those of the young, old, male female and able bodied etc. It is pointless for the bus to leave early with only the young and able bodied, but leaving behind the other categories, who may have to walk or use other dangerous methods of transportation. On the second issue, some states are indeed authoritarian or failed, such as Zimbabwe, which has uprooted many of its citizens-a major political and economic issue. However, even if ICBTs came from a relatively stable country, the cross-border policies on ICBTs were the same.

This is why the ICBTs on the Mozambique-South Africa border had similar problems as those on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border. By the same token, it does not mean that ICBTs on the Botswana-South Africa border, which are relatively stable countries were treated any better. Thus, it is not *simply* about the country of origin of ICBTs, but how they (ICBTs) were governed. Back to the need to develop policies that respond to ICBTs, the STR is a good example that has recognised this, but the problem is that it is not implemented in full, and herein lies the vacuity of any attempts and unwillingness of SADC nation-states to promote ICBT operations. Similarly, the AfCFTA is now in operation and yet the ICBTs who were interviewed expressed ignorance of it and/or its benefits. In other words, for ICBTs, nothing has changed^{xv}. In this context, the AfCFTA could be leaving behind ICBTs and this makes such a trade facilitation policy empty in terms of failing in responding to the needs of such cross-border actors. Nonetheless, these ICBTs still played an important role in the import and export of goods between countries in the SADC.

This is important to emphasise because in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2 and in the section preceding this, the point was made that the SADC countries followed neo-classical regional integration logic

in which the nation-states were supposed to be the only players in which regional integration occurred only through state institutions. Nevertheless, the ICBT activities through these informal networks still managed to connect economic activities in the region. A case in point were the businesses and shops in South Africa and Mozambique and South Africa and Zimbabwe. For example, interview data shows that ICBTs bought goods from the South African border town of Musina for resale in Zimbabwean shops in Beitbridge, Bulawayo and other towns and areas. Even accepting that the goods were transported through illegal means in terms of the informal networks, there was the cross border connection of economic activities by these means between the countries in question and this is an important dimension or aspect of regional integration. After all, it was impossible to differentiate between the goods transported across the border through formal means and those which were transported across the border on donkeys or donkey carts when these were displayed on shelves in shops. There was no tag on the goods indicating that a donkey or commercial vehicle had been used to get them to the shop.

Therefore, the operations of ICBTs, particularly the use of informal networks, when formal channels proved difficult or impossible to use aptly demonstrate that, where neo-classical economic regional integration programmes failed to accommodate the informal non-state actors, these (informal non-state actors) used informal networks, which still managed to connect cross-border economic activities. This is a case of regional integration from below or regional integration through unconventional means (see e.g. Moyo, 2017, 2018a, c; Moyo and Nshimbi, 2017; Nshimbi, 2018; Nshimbi et al. 2018a, b). The fact that regional integration from below actually happened in spite of policies and regulatory mechanisms which stifled and punished the operations of ICBTs, should be seen as a call for the need to reimagine the approaches to regional integration. There is thus, the need to see regional integration through the prism of the NRA, which considers the role of a multiplicity of actors, including state and non-state in the regional integration journey.

5.3.1 Informal cross-border transporters

The nature and dynamics of the operations of informal cross-border transporters who were interviewed in this study corroborated existing studies. For example, they transported goods and migrants, including those who were undocumented through both formal and informal channels^{xvi} and this resonates with previous research (see e.g. Araia, 2009; Moyo, 2020b), which shows that informal cross border transporters were key in the human smuggling machinery at Beitbridge in that they were also involved in the transportation of undocumented migrants to the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge, from which the undocumented migrants illegally crossed with the assistance of *impisi* (people hired by *omalayitsha*) into South Africa across the Limpopo River. Likewise, at Kosi Bay there existed informal cross-border transporters who transported people and remittances between Mozambique and South Africa^{xvii}. In terms of the transportation of migrants, informal transporters used formal and informal (illegal) cross-border points of entry and exit. In the former, this involved negotiating with and bribing cross-border officials with whom the informal cross-border transporters had a "working relationship". This working relationship meant that the time when the informal cross-border transporters crossed the border had to coincide with when immigration and other officials with whom they worked were in office^{xviii}.

To this extent, one informal cross-border transporter asserted that "the border is made and controlled by human beings like you and me. Therefore, as human beings, we talk and negotiate such that the law and regulations can be undermined and this is something which we have been doing for several years such that nothing can stop us"^{xix}. This finding corroborates that of Tshabalala (2019), who suggested human smuggling at the Beitbridge border should be seen as a product of the interface which exists between border management regimes and the everyday struggle by cross border actors. Using the notion of *ukutshokotsha*, which generally refers to negotiation strategies by human smugglers and/or their hired functionaries for undocumented migrants to successfully cross the border into South Africa, Tshabalala (2019) shows that undocumented migration at the Beitbridge border is indicative of historical continuities (also see e.g. Musoni, 2020) in illicit cross border negotiations as well as the shifting everyday encounters

and agency of many actors including the border officials themselves and the human smugglers. As a result, the fact that the interface and encounters between these cross-border actors is unpredictable as much as it is a lasting feature of cross border practices, suggests that *ukutshokotsha* can also be seen as border struggle and/or resistance, which is in a continuous state of flux (Tshabalala, 2019). Based on this, migrants could cross the border from Zimbabwe to South Africa, for example, at formal points without documents or with those which were fraudulent.

When it was not possible for this to happen and for instance, this was the case when there were sudden changes in the working shifts of cross border officials like immigration officials or when there were anti-corruption monitors, informal cross border transporters required their passengers (undocumented migrants) to use illegal points of entry and exit^{xx} (also see e.g. Araia, 2009; Tshabalala, 2019). At any given time, the informal cross-border transporters *omalayitsha* themselves crossed the border at the formal immigration points^{xxi}. In the transportation of goods particularly from South Africa to Zimbabwe, *omalayitsha* had established networks with cross-border officials such that the type and quantities of goods which they transported were not checked. It is to this extent that all the informal cross-border transporters who were interviewed in this study indicated that the physical border and its control were not a deterrent to their activities^{xxii}. This was particularly the case on the Zimbabwean side of border control at Beitbridge where they were required to pay duty for certain types of imports. These networks with cross-border officials meant that *omalayitsha* were able to circumvent the regulations and this is why one man asserted that he was able to transport anything from South Africa to Zimbabwe. In this sense, neopatrimonial relations between the informal cross border transporters and the cross-border officials implicate on cross border security. The fact that cross border officials diverted potential state revenue into their pockets and thus turned a blind eye to potentially illegal activities including the transportation of stolen goods transformed the border into an unsafe place-a security issue even the level of individual cross border travelers.

On the question of why *omalayitsha* transported undocumented migrants or bribed officials, they explained that it was because the border controls were unnecessarily stringent. One informal cross-border transporter explained that they assisted people to cross the border illegally because it was difficult for them to get work and other permits in countries like South Africa^{xxiii} (also see Moyo, 2020b). In this one can see that the more stringent the cross-border formalities are, that diverts the movement of cross-border actors to illegal networks (see e.g. Jones, 2016; Moyo, 2020b). In other words, the problem lies not with the people who engage in various forms of smuggling, but what causes them to engage in that activity in the first instance. This is the context within which Jones has argued that the; "hardening of the border through new security practices is, indeed, the source of the violence, not a response to it" (Jones, 2016:5). Although the focus of this study is not borders and violence, the argument by Jones (2016) is useful to the extent of amplifying the point that, if it is not possible for people to cross the border through formal channels, they will resort to other means, including human smuggling. Human smuggling may come across as criminal and perhaps even violent, but that is simply a response to the hardened border. Thus, it is not possible to think of human smuggling as being criminal without seeing and labeling what caused it in the same way.

Taken together, the activities of *omalayitsha* aptly illuminate that the Beitbridge and Kosi borders can be conceived as borderscapes. This is precisely because the contestations and defiance of the border depict it (border) not as a static line, but a space that is continuously created and recreated or shaped and carved (Brambilla, 2015) as non-state actors like informal cross border transporters resist and struggle against the production, enforcement, and maintenance of sovereign power and jurisdiction. Simply put, the border becomes a site of struggle (Walker, 1993; Brambilla and Jones, 2020). But beyond this, the example of *omalayitsha* and how they contested and carved the border brings into light complex cross-border security issues and/or challenges. One of these is that the people who used informal channels of crossing the border were those who failed to do so formally. In other words, illegally crossing the border became necessary because formally doing so was out of the question. Seen in this light regard, *omalayitsha* and human smuggling are a direct product of the failure of people to legally cross the border.

5.3.2 Undocumented migrants

The case of undocumented Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants who were interviewed in this study suggests complex security issues. For instance, out of the 10 undocumented Zimbabwean migrants interviewed at Beitbridge 9 had passports without visitor's visas (their passports indicated that they had exited South Africa) and 1 did not have a passport^{xxiv}. The former had legally crossed the border and after exhausting the 90-days visitor's visa applicable to SADC citizens and finding the requirements for work permits nearly impossible to meet, they had used the services of bus drivers and *omalayitsha* who had contacts with immigration officials to stamp in the passport that they had left South Africa. The passports were then brought back by the same bus drivers and *omalayitsha* to South Africa. If they had to go back to Zimbabwe, they illegally crossed the border and used the same means back into South Africa. Concerning the latter, they stated that they did not have the passport and had illegally crossed the border using the services of human smugglers^{xxv}. The experiences of these undocumented migrants amplify what was explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.6) on how undocumented Zimbabwean migrants crossed the border to South Africa through the use of *omalayitsha* who dropped them off at Beitbridge border town from different parts of Zimbabwe from where *impisi* took over and guided them to cross the Limpopo River and walk through the bush and jump the South African border fence into South Africa (see e.g. Moyo, 2020b). Similar patterns were also observed at Kosi Bay, concerning the 5 undocumented Mozambicans 3 of whom had expired visitor's visas and the remaining two did not even have passports. These illegally crossed the border to South Africa^{xxvi}.

The conversations with all the undocumented migrants who had passports, but without the legitimate visa to be in South Africa suggested that they found the requirements for the application of work permits impossible to meet^{xxvii}. If all this is seen through the notion of border management and related immigration policies as discussed in Chapter 2, it becomes evident that SADC nation-states are fixated on the securitization of borders, and this results in the problem of undocumented migrants. The point being made here is that the 90-day visitor's visas per annum which apply to all SADC citizens are insufficient for the cross border and livelihood activities of many people and

yet the application for work permits is impossible and this yields undocumented migrants (also see e.g. Moyo, 2020b, 2020c). It is fully understood that nation-states like Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have the constitutional right and sovereign responsibility to maintain and protect their borders, but doing so, unfortunately, leads to undocumented migrants who pose a security challenge. Thus, it is not just a simple matter of having undocumented migrants in countries such as South Africa but why there are these undocumented in the first instance.

Of course, this raises the additional question of whether and if South Africa for instance has the responsibility of documenting these migrants. To respond to this question, it can be posited that what is needed in the SADC is a regional (institution) migration management approach that would deal with and respond to the challenge of migration (see also Nshimbi and Fioramonti 2013, 2014). After all, this is what the SADC regional integration project hopes to achieve through the 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons in the SADC (SADC Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons, 2005). Consequently, the suggestion I am advancing here is neither naïve, utopian nor new. Thus, before a regional migration management is implemented countries should by all means maintain their borders, but in doing so, securitisation should not be seen as the solution. As argued elsewhere (see e.g. Moyo 2020a), Africa's borders are a colonial creation, which separated people who had always lived together. The result is that, these contiguous borders have always been ignored and contested. The full meaning of this is that "no amount of border militarisation and securitisation can stop irregular migration" (Moyo, 2020a:1) and to this extent, it may be pointless for countries like South Africa to securitise and fortify its borders as people will continue to breach them.

By suggesting that the border management regimes of SADC countries are not progressive, there is no attempt to condemn the immigration policies of these countries, especially that of South Africa. Rather, the attempt is to problematize it in relation to the SADC regional integration project on the score of managing migration and enhancing human mobility. In any case, it not is not only South Africa that requires work permits for SADC citizens but several other countries including

Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and so on. For instance, if Namibia was an economic hegemon, the problem of undocumented migrants would be rife because work permits cannot be granted to all people and yet the 90-day SADC visitor's visa is not for work purposes. All this brings to the fore the reality that border management and immigration policies implemented by SADC nation-states are inward-looking and countries focus more on securitizing their borders which produces undocumented migrants, rather than a regional approach that could deal with the migration in a coordinated and regional manner. Seen this way, the problem of undocumented migration is not as simple as that people do not want to be documented or that they are criminal elements, but the immigration policies/system reject them - they do not qualify for work and business permits.

Linked to this is that the problem is not with the undocumented migrants *per se*, but the conditions in the countries from which they come. For example, all the Zimbabwean migrants at Beitbridge explained that the economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe were unbearable and this is why they opted to migrate to and stay in South Africa without the required immigration document. What made them cross the border at great risk to their own lives is that they could not survive in Zimbabwe-they were threatened by economic and political problems^{xxviii}. They would have loved to stay in their country without migrating to South Africa if the economic and political conditions were favourable^{xxix}. To be sure, this undocumented migration by Zimbabweans has caused cross-border security challenges, a good example of which is that they illegally crossed both Zimbabwean and South African borders. But, focusing on only the illegal crossing of the borders and the cross-border security challenges such as among others crime is limited, if there is no consideration of what caused the people to engage in this illegal crossing of the border. That is, the illegal crossing of the border is an outcome of an economic and political problem in Zimbabwe that needs a regional solution, otherwise, undocumented migrants may likely continue to flow from Zimbabwe to South Africa. This is an issue that I will return to in the following parts of this chapter and the conclusion of this thesis.

5.3.3 Cross-border communities

The experiences of cross border community members on both the Mozambique-South Africa and South Africa-Zimbabwe borders at Kosi Bay and Beitbridge respectively had mixed views on the matters of cross border security. This section therefore starts by discussing the views of the cross-border community members who stated that cross border activities were a security threat, followed by those whom argued that there was no security problem in the cross-border activities.

5.3.4.1 Cross border activities as a threat

Some cross-border community members, mostly those who did not engage in ICBT at Kosi Bay were of the view that the cross-border activities involving ICBTs and other categories of cross border actors had led to the community feeling very unsafe. They stated that;

this area is now a place for criminals, and they can do as they please. The Mozambican police can be paid R50 to allow people to cross the border into South Africa with all sorts of goods and unlicensed firearms. From South Africa into Mozambique, it's the same story: people can bribe officials and cross the border at illegal points. What is even distressing being that criminal elements are working together with some community members to terrorise the community. The end result is that we don't feel safe at all. Some people wake up in the morning to find their cars and other goods and possessions stolen never to be recovered because they are taken through the bush and across the border into Mozambique^{xxx}

The views of this community member suggest that the criminal activities had penetrated the local community to the point of recruiting some of its members to be functionaries of criminals. Also important is the involvement of state officials like Mozambican soldiers and/or security personnel responsible for patrolling the border. They were accused of accepting R50 bribes to allow people including some ICBTs to cross the border at unofficial points. In this sense the criminals working together with border officials and some members of the community led to the creation of an environment in which the cross-border community in Kosi Bay felt exposed and unsafe. Similar sentiments were expressed by cross-border communities at Beitbridge. A good example is the sentiment by cross-border community members in Beitbridge who stated that;

it is scary to think that some of the criminals actually live among the community and that reality makes one feel both vulnerable and unsafe, because we don't have the guns like them. What is even more worrying being that when these people commit crimes in South Africa, they cross over to Zimbabwe and vice versa^{xxxii}.

The effect is that these criminal elements were really untouchable, because they “could literally do anything without being brought to account because they used the border as a shield, that is committing a crime in one country and illegally crossing to the other to hide, which made arrests difficult. In the case of the Mozambique-South Africa border, this is why in 2018 the community engaged in a peaceful march so as to bring this to the attention of the authorities, but nothing has really changed”^{xxxiii}. From the point of view of cross-border community members, it was difficult to distinguish honest ICBTs from criminals; this led to tension between these stakeholders particularly on the Mozambique-South Africa border at Kosi Bay. The complexity of the tension is that some of the cross-border community members were involved in ICBT and there was evidence that such people obtained their income and socio-economic improvement through honest hard work^{xxxiii}.

In this lies a security issue, as there were cross-border related criminal activities associated with ICBT, and at the same time there was evidence that the majority of ICBTs were not involved in these criminal activities. The entanglement is that cross-border community members who were involved in ICBT had no way of proving their innocence; cross-border community members who were not involved in ICBT were suspicious of the former. Both the former and the latter were convinced that there were criminals involved in cross-border crime, yet these criminals were neither easy to identify nor to prosecute because the border provided a safe zone which they (criminals) controlled - and so the insecurity persisted. This insecurity had penetrated the community including the borderland territory right up to the homes of the people and this appeared to be beyond the gaze of the states. In this zone, anything was possible, including theft, murder, and the transportation of illicit and stolen goods among others. This is a security issue affecting

the ICBTs, the cross-border communities and the SADC nation states at whose borders and borderlands this occurred.

This discussion suggests that cross-border security challenges as experienced and expressed by the cross-border community members were complex. For instance, cross-border officials like the army and police solicited for and accepted bribes to allow people to illegally cross the border into and out of South Africa. In this case, the cross-border security challenges were not as simple as the porous borders, but also that of corruption and neopatrimonialism. The point is that, even if the border were not porous, the existence of neopatrimonial tendencies by state officials would always allow people to illegally cross the border and terrorise cross-border communities. To this extent, it is limited to see cross-border problems of crime and the transportation of contraband as an outcome of the actions of only the cross-border actors as this ignores that this operates within a network that implicates the state officials.

More than that, Critical Security Studies (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4.2) also teaches us of the need to see security as emancipation (see e.g. Booth, 1991). This means that there is a need to eradicate those conditions or situations such as poverty which force people to engage in activities that causes insecurity. To this extent, it's vital to confront the challenges which lead to cross-border officials soliciting for and accepting bribes as much as there is a need to respond to the problems which lead to many people engaging in the illegal crossing of the border. People may illegally cross the border because of poverty or oppression as is the case with Zimbabwean migrants. Seen thus, people illegally crossing the South Africa-Zimbabwe or Mozambique-South Africa borders is a symptom of a bigger problem, and labelling a symptom as the problem is missing the point. If the political and economic problems in a country like Zimbabwe are not addressed through a SADC driven initiative-people will continue to illegally cross the border and cross border officials will continue to solicit for and accept bribes.

5.3.4.2 Cross border activities as opportunity and gain

Other cross-border community members, mostly those who engaged in ICBT or interacted with and/or benefitted from ICBTs did not see a security issue or feel threatened by the cross-border activities. Conversations with cross-border community members on both the South African and Zimbabwean sides of the borders at Beitbridge revealed that cross-border community members had a cordial and good working relationship with cross-border actors. A case in point is that the cross-border community members hired their donkeys and makeshift canoes to ICBTs to transport their goods across the Limpopo River^{xxxiv}. In this regard, what was seen by some community members and nation-states as a security challenge or cross-border insecurity was perceived as an opportunity to earn a livelihood. People who hired their donkeys for transporting the goods across the Limpopo, therefore, regarded the cross-border activities by ICBTs and undocumented migrants as most welcome and good to the extent that they earned money to support their families. In other words, this was a decent and legitimate source of income to the extent that they earned livelihoods, which sustained families – another dimension of security.

In addition, the relationship between the cross-border community members and cross border actors was not just at the level of an economic transaction, but there were cordial relations in which compassion and care were practiced in the form of for example assisting the cross border actors to successfully cross the border at a minimal or no cost^{xxxv}. From this point of view, there was no cross-border insecurity which nation-states like South Africa or even Zimbabwe were always talking about, "because I have never assisted criminals here, but ordinary and hardworking people who aim to provide for their families. I work together with informal cross border traders as we assist them to transport their goods across the border"^{xxxvi}. In response to the question that assisting people to illegally cross the border was a crime (see detailed commentary on this in Section 5.4.1 below), the cross-border community member was adamant that "at a practical level here, there is no border - the border does not exist and we have always lived this way even before and during the apartheid"^{xxxvii}. If the cross-border community members who interacted with cross-border

actors did not see or experience any insecurity suggests that cross-border insecurity or security challenges were a construct of the state. That is, for the SADC states under consideration, the porous borders were a security issue regardless of whether or not such activities sustained people and communities. If this discussion is seen through the Copenhagen school of thought on security (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4.1), it becomes evident that security can be politically constructed such that something becomes a security issue, if states decide so and the opposite is true (Waeber, 1995). In this way, security then becomes an institutional issue driven by elites and which is limited. This suggests that SADC nation-states like South Africa and Zimbabwe need to have a deeper and sophisticated understanding of cross-border security problems which includes the views and experiences of the people involved in the cross-border activities or living in the cross-border regions like that at the South Africa-Zimbabwe borderland at Beitbridge.

5.4 Perceptions of non-state actors: Commentary on the complexity of cross border security

In a very direct response to the third objective of this study which explores the perceptions of non-state actors concerning border management and cross-border security issues, it is important to provide a summary of the perceptions of respondents. As discussed in Section 5.3, the ICBTs thought that the cross-border security issues were complex. For example, there were restrictions at the border to both their movement as well as the type and quantity of the goods which ICBTs could transport^{xxxviii}. It was the perception of these respondents that this meant they could not easily engage in an economic activity that sustained their families. This was a security issue to the extent that the ICBTs were then forced to either bribe officials to cross the border or indeed use informal channels. In this vein, the ICBTs did not regard themselves as responsible for cross-border security problems like corruption. Of course, this should not be taken at face value to mean that the ICBTs were passive victims at the mercy of vicious cross-border officials, because it is known that they were active or willing participants in these transactions. Interview data from cross-border communities also validates this agency of ICBTs and other cross-border actors (see Section 5.3.4.1). However, it assists to demonstrate that the cross-border security problems linked to the

ICBTs were deeper than is commonly presented in which ICBTs were criminal elements. Linked to this is that ICBTs stated that they engaged in this cross-border economic activity because of the significant unemployment employment challenge and other harsh conditions in their countries (Mozambique and South Africa)^{xxxix}.

In particular, the ICBTs from Zimbabwe stated that there were economic and political problems in that country and engaging in cross-border informal trade was a way through which ordinary people took matters into their own hands to provide for themselves what the government had failed in doing^{xl}. They indicated that by engaging in cross-border informality, they were responding to a bigger economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe^{xli}. The testimony of the ICBTs was corroborated and amplified by that of undocumented migrants who had to engage in dangerous human smuggling journeys to and working in South Africa without any documentation. This is because the situation in Zimbabwe was "worse than living and working in South Africa without any documents"^{xlii}. Indeed, nearly all the undocumented migrants who were interviewed thought that it was far better for them to be live in South Africa and evade law enforcement agents every single day than live in Zimbabwe where it was difficult to earn a livelihood^{xliii}.

This can be taken to mean that the many Zimbabwean ICBTs and undocumented migrants who were seen crossing the Beitbridge border into South Africa to buy and sell goods and living and working in South Africa without documents, respectively, were a manifestation of a deeper crisis in Zimbabwe. The Beitbridge border, therefore, becomes a mirror (see e.g. Parmar, 2020) which assists to see the economic and political problems in Zimbabwe as the problem which manifests itself at the border. Seen thus, Zimbabwean ICBTs and undocumented migrants crossing the border in larger numbers and some of them doing so illegally is not the cross-border security problem *per se*. The cross-border security problem is the deepening economic and political problems in Zimbabwe and to a certain degree Mozambique which have forced the people to engage in ICBT and undocumented migration in the manner that they do. Therefore, merely labeling the people crossing the border as the cross-border problem hides the actual problem, which is the crisis

bedeviling countries like Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In naming undocumented migration as a threat and not what causes it, leading to the securitisation of borders, SADC nation-states may illustrate the point that elites determine what they choose to call a security issue (see e.g. Buzan, 2006; Waever, 2007). As Buzan, (2006:1102), reminds us, states “like people, can be paranoid (constructing threats where none exist) or complacent (ignoring actual threats)” (Buzan, 2006:1102). Therefore, by focusing on the illegalities which obtain at the borders and ignoring to what causes them to do so, SADC nation-states may be missing the point about the real cause of the cross border security problems. This is precisely because the ramification of the problems in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe becomes manifest at the border as people attempt to cross to South Africa.

Nonetheless, there is no attempt here to suggest that even if the people who were seen at the border were displaced by the macroeconomic economic, and political problems in countries like Zimbabwe, such people were innocent of any wrongdoing like illegally crossing the border. They may be illegally crossing the border or paying bribes, but there is a greater push that makes them do so. While indeed this can be illegality, it is not the real problem. This is not to suggest that illegalities at the border should not be highlighted, quite to the contrary this study argues that the identification of illegalities at the border while necessary is also superficial and limited because it hides than illuminates the real problem. Stopping at the identification of illegalities at the border and constructing them as the cross-border problem is not enough. It allows nation-states to try solving the wrong issues such as securitising borders and leaving out the fundamental problems unresolved.

The example of ICBTs and undocumented migrants from Zimbabwe suggests that the real problem is the economic and political impasse in Zimbabwe which has led them to cross the border to South Africa and engage in some activities which contravene both the South African and Zimbabwean immigration law. Thus while what transpires at the border may be illegal and unlawful, the real problem that leads to that are the economic and political conditions which obtain in Zimbabwe,

which if not resolved may continue to see more and more sophisticated illegalities or people drowning and being eaten by crocodiles in the Limpopo River. Stated differently, focusing on the illegalities at the border while a legitimate thing to do and indeed a requirement of the immigration law, hides more than it illuminates that the problem is the economic and political quagmire in Zimbabwe. What is seen at the border is just a symptom.

5.4.1 The security of the state versus that of the people

Although some cross-border community members felt that there were cross-border security challenges like crime, which were linked to cross-border activities, others thought that border management regimes were the problem and not the people crossing the border. That is to say, community members asserted that the main issue was how the border was governed. They argued that the border needed to be governed taking into consideration the needs and circumstances of the people it separated and this could reduce the tag of criminality that was attached to their livelihood activities. Some of the crossborder communities' livelihoods were based on cross border economic activities (see Section 5.3.4.2) and these communities believed that any government programme which was implemented to stop such cross-border movement was the real threat as it would lead to a loss of income. To this extent, cross-border communities did not see any cross-border security threat associated with their cross-border activities and interactions. However, it can be argued that the cross-border community members in question derived their income from illegal activities in the form of assisting people to illegally cross the border. Thus, the claim by community members that there were no security problems can be undermined by the fact that such communities were conflicted and could not see a threat as they benefited from people illegally crossing the border. This also makes such income a proceed of illegality. However, this is further complicated by the claim by the cross border community members that if assisting people to illegally cross the border was illegal, a more illegal if not criminal matter was the violent imposition of the border as a result of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, which separated communities which were and are still one people^{xliv}. In this regard, the people felt justified in their actions of contesting the border.

All this leads to several questions such as whether or not illegal activities like aiding people to illegally cross the border should be accepted because they sustain people or whether indeed the ordinary people like the cross-border community members who were the focus of this research could tell their nation-states how to control and govern borders. This study does not purport or promise to have answers to these questions, but it highlights them to underscore the reality that cross-border security is a complex issue, which should not be reduced and limited to a state-centric understanding. It is accepted that physical borders ideally demarcate the sovereign jurisdiction of nation-states. More importantly at the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the Berlin borders were upheld based on the international law principle of *uti possidetis juris*. This has led to the rigid maintenance and enforcement of borders in the form of their securisation and militarisation in the name of security. However, the people on the ground do not always feel that such securisation and militarisation led to their security, but quite the opposite-insecurity. What could be seen by nation-states as a security issue needing drastic action like militarisation, does not actually lead to the security of the people, but makes them more insecure. This was further highlighted by cross-border community members on the Mozambique South Africa border at KwaPhuza (Kosi Bay).

In this borderland, the cross-border community members did not see the need for securitising the border because their lives were inextricably linked to the cross-border interactions. For instance, the lives of cross-border community members were inseparably linked to that of ICBTs and informal local transporters. This can be illustrated by that the ICBTs crossed the border daily from Mozambique to the South African border town of Manguzi where they bought goods for resale in Mozambique^{xlv}. Some of the community members were dependent on the ICBTs for the supply of goods^{xlvi}. Local informal transporters depended on transporting the ICBTs and cross-border communities from the border to Manguzi on the South African side of the border and likewise in Mozambique, they transported people from the border to other parts of the country. There was a report that some Mozambican children attended school in South Africa but lived in Mozambique, which entailed making daily trips across the border^{xlvii}. At KwaPhuza (Kosi Bay) the border

between Mozambique and South Africa is a fence and people cross many times in a day^{xlviii}. Some ICBTs had trading stalls on both the Mozambican and South African sides of the border at KwaPhuza and these cross-border actors did not understand the concern around strengthening/securitising the border^{xlix}. This can be illustrated by one ICBT who was interviewed at KwaPhuza on the South African side of the border and stated that her sister was in charge of another trading stall on the Mozambican side of the border. In such a situation some of the cross-border community members and ICBTs thought it pointless securitizing the border as it would destabilize their lives and communities^l.

If these perceptions of the respondents are seen through the prism of the Gramscian and Neo-Gramscian theory on hegemony and counter-hegemony it is, therefore, possible to argue that some of the border management strategies by SADC states under consideration while purporting to ensure security may be a security issue themselves. Regarding counter-hegemony, Gramsci (1971), teaches us of the need not to take for granted hegemonic orders, which are determined by the elites. By not taking for granted the hegemonic orders around how borders are managed and governed and bringing into conversation what the cross border actors themselves have to say on cross border security issues as discussed in this section specifically and the whole chapter in general, it is possible to see that the governance and management of borders between states like Mozambique and South Africa and South Africa and Zimbabwe lead to the insecurity of people, even when it is intended to attain their security. For instance, the people thought that by building a wall or fence and securitising the border, would shatter livelihoods and communities- a security issue.

Nevertheless, some community members expressed concern that there were instances of crime such as car hijacking but argued that the focus should be on crime and not securitising the border. They did not think that securitising the border was tantamount to dealing with the issue of crime. Although the people had been told that securitising the border and building a wall would reduce the number of stolen cars of which they pass through KwaPhuza, they thought that the problem

was not necessarily with the border but corruption in both Mozambique and South Africa which made criminal syndicates thrive^{li}. For example, one community member shared that in September 2021, some stolen cars were transported across the partially completed border wall at KwaPhuza. The criminal elements erected steps/ladders on which they drove the cars across the border wall into Mozambique. It was in the process of driving the cars over the ladders across the border wall between Mozambique and South Africa, that some stolen cars fell off the "bridge" and got damaged. Such cars were set on fire by the thieves^{lii}.

The community member contended that the organisation and execution of the whole process took time and could not be a case of random criminals but an organised network deeply entrenched in corruption and neopatrimonialism. The fact that cars were driven over a border wall which was controlled by the army showed that border securitisation does not work. Thus, taking further the argument that the border is the mirror of society, it can also be posited that corruption and neopatrimonial relations which obtain at the border are also an indication of what obtains in the wider society in countries such as Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. To this extent, there was the acceptance by the cross-border community members that there were criminal activities at the border, but these were deeply rooted in neopatrimonialism and this made the cross-border security challenge an issue that could not be addressed by a border wall or army or both.

5.5 Chapter summary

This chapter has suggested that the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations by non-state actors like informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants, and cross-border communities in the study areas were complex. This means that how and why these actors engaged in their cross-border activities and implications on cross-border security is deeper than the state-centric paradigm which suggests that porous borders or the cross border actors themselves are the problems. For example, the ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, and undocumented migrants on the one hand and cross-border state officials on the other co-determined each other's operations in neopatrimonial ways. Linked to this is that although some cross border communities felt that cross border non-state actors led to security

problems, others thought the same cross border actors contributed to security in terms of providing a basis for livelihood activities. Thus, in response to the first three objectives of the study, it needs reiteration that the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations of non-state actors and how these impacted cross border security, is not as simple as that the borders were porous or cross border non-state actors were criminal elements bent on destabilizing the borderland regions. Rather, what appeared as cross-border problems was symptomatic of deep-seated problems around how borders were managed as well as what caused people to migrate in the first instance. For example, undocumented Zimbabwean migrants on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge were not the problem *per se*, but the real problem is what uprooted them in their country forcing them to engage in undocumented migration.



CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC FOR CROSS-BORDER SECURITY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the cross-border dimensions of economic activities and migration involving among others ICBTs, migrant workers, local informal transporters, informal cross border transporters and undocumented migrants. In doing so, the intention is to respond to the fourth objective of this study, which is to assess the implications of the Corona Virus pandemic (COVID-19) on cross-border security in the study areas.

6.2 Context of border resistance strategies by cross border actors

As a precursor to the actual analysis of the data, it is necessary to provide a background context to other types of border closures, their impacts and how cross border actors have responded to these. A study by Pophiwa (2021) analysed how ICBTs in the Zimbabwean border town of Beitbridge resisted the 2016 imports ban of goods from South Africa. Briefly, in 2016, the Zimbabwean government implemented Statutory Instrument 64 (SI 64), in which Zimbabweans were banned from importing goods like coffee creamers, camphor creams, white petroleum jellies, plastic pipes and fittings, builders' products, baked beans, cereals, bottled water and second-hand tyres (see e.g. Moyo, 2016c). This mostly negatively affected ICBTs (as they did not have goods to sell in their shops/stalls, leading to loss of income) who resisted this ban by blockading the Beitbridge border post and setting on fire a Zimbabwean government revenue warehouse (Pophiwa, 2021).

The importance of Pophiwa's (2021) study is that it illustrates that the ban of imports from South Africa to Zimbabwe had negative impacts in terms of threatening the livelihoods of ICBTs. It is fully understood that the import ban was not a physical closure of the border, but an open border in which ICBTs could not import goods is as good as a physically closed border. The point being made here is that the border was open to the extent that ICBTs could import and export their goods. If this did not happen as was the case with SI 64, the open border was effectively closed to ICBTs

resulting in negative consequences on the business activities of these actors. Thus, in Beitbridge, border closures, physical or otherwise have devastating ramifications on the informal cross border economy and actors involved in it. With this in mind, it is important to understand the implications of the COVID-19 border closure on the cross-border actors who are the focus of this study.

6.3 COVID-19 and informal cross border trade

People involved in ICBT were compelled to cross borders, because of the nature of their economic activity. This means that, in the event of border closures as was the case with the COVID-19 lock down and the closure of the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge for example, they had to "choose between certain death from starvation than COVID-19"^{liii}. Although they had been told that COVID-19 was fatal; they did not regard it as serious a threat like not being able to provide for their families. This is why one ICBT asserted that;

if there is no food and money, people definitely die or have to steal food which is not an option. But with this flu, one can survive and the chances of survival are better when there is food. You can imagine, if one is attacked by this corona and there is no money or food ... that is extremely serious, but if one has food and money chances of survival are better. If I catch the flu and die, that would be unfortunate, but as long as that has not happened, I will cross the border by any means possible and nothing and not even the fear of corona will stop me^{liv}

The views of this ICBT are representative of all who were interviewed and illuminate the reason why they had to cross the border at undesignated points of entry and exit on the South-Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge during the COVID-19 border closure. What is suggested from this is that the border was not a hindrance to these actors. Also striking about the views of this ICBT is the casual reference to the COVID-19 virus as a simple flu (and that no amount of information from different forms of media had changed this view). These ICBTs had their own explanations about the availability or unavailability of food and COVID-19 related deaths. The bottom line is that the interviewed ICBTs would not cease their cross-border activities because of a COVID-19 induced border closure. This is an important point to raise because out of the 40 ICBTs who were interviewed, 28 came from different parts of Zimbabwe and 12 lived in the border town of

Beitbridge. This suggests that regardless of the closure of the border, the majority of the ICBTs still traveled long distances to Beitbridge and forged ahead with their cross-border economic activities. It should be remembered that at the time of this research, lockdown restrictions in Zimbabwe led to limited mobility. However, these actors still made it to Beitbridge and Musina for periods ranging from half a day to a few days or more and back to where they lived and operated. In the case of Kosi Bay, the ICBTs also came from different parts of Mozambique, more especially the cross border regions. Consequently, the ICBTs were unmoved and unapologetic about two things: first the unlawful movement during the lockdown, and second crossing the border at undesignated points. What is even more striking being the reference by the ICBT to such a crossing as an “essential activity because it was about raising money and feeding people, without doing which lives would be lost”^{lv}.

Furthermore, the ICBTs actually thought it pointless for countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe to close their borders for people like them, because "what does it help to close the borders when many people are dependent on the informal economy like buying and selling goods between South Africa and Zimbabwe?"^{lvi}. In the opinion of the ICBTs, the real danger was not COVID-19, but the closure of borders which threatened their livelihoods, which is why they had to cross the border in question illegally. Thus, to the same extent that crossing the borders by people like ICBTs during lockdown was seen by nation states in the SADC as spreading the COVID-19 virus which would kill many people, the closing of borders leading to stoppage of ICBT, the loss of income and lack of food was seen by ICBTs as a pandemic leading to the death of many people, based on their loss of income and inability to provide food for many families. In this case, there were two “pandemics which was the corona and the stoppage of ICBT leading to food shortage and death of people and of which the second is more serious and this is why we have continued with our activities”^{lvii}. The perception that prohibiting ICBTs from their activities was also a pandemic which was more serious than corona was the source of the feeling that using the latter to close off borders was a ruse "to hide the true intentions of the nation states and that intention has always been to prohibit us poor people from crossing the border. I mean, this is how I earn a living and when the border is

closed and we are told that is meant to protect us from being killed by a disease does not make sense. This is because by closing the border these governments are throwing us ICBTs into a deep pit of hunger and that is dangerous, even more dangerous than this corona. That is why I cross the border illegally"^{lviii}.

From the reference to the COVID-19 induced border closure as a ploy to curtail the movements of the poor (ICBTs), one can read this to mean that the pandemic has given the opportunity to nation states to *easily* implement draconian cross border policies which mostly affect the cross-border actors in question. This can be taken to mean that, in general cross border policies, including those on migration, seem to target the needy and poor, so that they are restricted from crossing borders as they are considered as the unwanted who could overwhelm the host societies. In this context, the COVID-19 pandemic appears to magnify the historical obsession by nation states' migration policies against those considered to be undesirable- mostly the poor. By invoking the lenses of institutional liberalism and social constructivism (see Chapter 2), it can also be stated that the institutions which governed the borders under consideration did not always enhance the security and welfare of all people. More importantly the fact that there is no regional cross border and migration framework in the SADC meant that there were disparate national responses, which were inward looking. This led to the state-centric construction and understanding of security leading to the closure of borders and thus the insecurity of actors like the ICBTs who depended on crossing the border. However, these categories of people have refused to accept such cross border restrictions as aptly illustrated by the defiance which is captured in the interview excerpt above. In all this, it becomes evident that the border becomes a site of struggle and resistance which has a creative potential in terms of shaping subjectivities and agency (Brambilla and Jones, 2020). In real terms, these actors actually "opened" both the Beitbridge and Kosi Bay borders and forged ahead with their economic activities. The corollary is that the border therefore becomes among others a place of "transformation for those who imagine, materially establish, experience, inhabit as well as cross, traverse but also challenge and resist" them (Brambilla, 2018: 178).

Indeed, one telling effect of crossing the Beitbridge border at undesignated points as a result of the COVID-19 lockdown is that it opened possibilities for some ICBTs who had always used legal immigration points where they were exposed to "harassment and other forms of abuse and delays", to consider "avoiding the formal border control altogether from now going forward, because I cannot always transport as much goods as possible without any regulation from anybody"^{lix}. At Kosi Bay, the ICBTs continued to cross the border at illegal points of entry and exit such as KwaPhuza and they stated that the COVID-19 border restrictions were not a factor^{lx}. What this suggests is that, far from restricting the movement of ICBTs, the lockdown restriction *magnified* the ineffectiveness of the Beitbridge and Kosi Bay borders in stopping people from migrating from one country to the other. Those ICBTs who had not illegally crossed the border in the past, then discovered it was possible to do so and hoped to continue this way and in this lies the transformative potential of the COVID-19 border closure resistance strategies by the cross border actors under consideration.

The question of why before COVID-19 ICBTs preferred to cross through the official points, and therefore why they might not revert to these after the lifting of restrictions is answered in the preceding interview excerpt. That is, the interviewed ICBTs suggested that they had tasted an equally good alternative (even if it was illegal) to formally crossing the border. In this alternative, there was no regulation on what and how much they could move across the border – a cross border security problem. Thus, the lockdown of the border exposed them to the reality that it was possible to illegally cross the border and transport whatever they wanted. Of course, the utilisation of illegal cross border points was accompanied by several risks such as among others, physical harm/injury and theft of merchandise and this is a security issue. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that crossing at illegal cross border points was organised/planned as ICBTs pooled resources to hire cars to and from illegal cross border points (this is further explained in the following section on local informal transporters).

All this considered, the point being made here is that, the COVID-19 lockdown and closure of the Beitbridge and Kosi Bay borders concomitantly opened and weakened (the regulatory function of borders was undermined) the same further. In this regard it is important to emphasise that, although the COVID-19 pandemic closure of borders, as the case of Beitbridge shows, feeds and responds to present-day global drives by nation-states to securitise migration, borders and pandemics, the people affected by such state-driven initiatives are not helpless victims. Such actors are dynamic, agentive and capable of totally operating in parallel to the state-driven cross-border governance regimes (see e.g. Moyo 2016b). Thus, the the closure of the borders in question as a result of COVID-19 did not completely stop cross border migration of the actors under consideration, but it pushed them to use illegal points of entry and exit -in this lies the resistance to the COVID-19 induced border closure. It is accepted that the interviewed ICBTs incurred costs by hiring porters and some of them lost goods through theft and/or robbery, but the fact that they still continued to engage in their activities is taken as evidence of the resistance to and endurance of the COVID-19 induced border closure. To this extent, this relatively undermined the whole idea of a lockdown and the closure of the border to contain the spread of COVID19. The security implications of this are manifold. They range from the unregulated flow of goods (some of them stolen) between countries to the possible spread of COVID-19 (which effectively meant undoing all the efforts of the nation states at curbing the spread of the disease).

In the case of the Beitbridge border, the views of the ICBTs as presented in this section are actually corroborated by a June 2020 report which showed that many Zimbabweans were illegally crossing the Beitbridge border daily to buy food from the South African border town of Musina (Bosch, 2020). This report was accompanied by a video of Zimbabweans carrying goods on their heads and walking across the Limpopo River. In this context, the *modus operandi* of the ICBTs during the COVID-19 border closure involved them crossing the border at undesignated points and then, once in South Africa, they hired local informal transporters to Musina. After buying the required quantities of goods, they also hired the same local informal transporters to reach the border at the undesignated points of entry and exit from where they carried the goods on their heads across the

Limpopo River to Zimbabwe^{lxi}. A similar pattern was also operational at the Mozambique-South Africa at Kosi Bay^{lxii}.

An added dimension to ICBTs illegally crossing the border with goods on their heads is that of hiring people to carry goods on behalf of the ICBTs. At Beitbridge border, these people were referred to as *Zalawi*⁵. In other words, some ICBTs did not cross the border carrying goods on their heads but hired *Zalawi* to do so on their behalf. The researcher spent a considerable period of time at the Beitbridge border towards the end of August to the beginning of September 2021 and observed that the *Zalawi* were always waiting for "employment" to transport goods across the border. This waiting actually occurred at both the official and illegal cross border points. When a local informal transporter loaded with goods from Musina parked their car, the *Zalawi* jostled to get the job of transporting goods across the border on their heads. What was relatively sad was seeing the *Zalawi* desperately jostling for 'employment' from the ICBTs whenever the car driven by an informal local transporter arrived at the South African side of the Beitbridge. Some of the *Zalawi* were relatively young women⁶ who were seen carrying heavy loads of goods on their heads and disappearing into the bush to illegal points of entry and exit on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge. After several hours these *Zalawi* came back for more work. They did this several times in a day and as a result by late afternoon on any day, one observed tired-looking *Zalawi* some with dusty feet or very torn shoes or both. The *Zalawi* reported that they liked the border to remain closed because that allowed them to earn a living.^{lxiii} However, the *Zalawi* also reported that they suffered abuse and attacks. The former was because some ICBTs exploited them and sometimes did not pay and in the latter, criminal elements robbed and beat them up^{lxiv}. When the author arrived at Beitbridge towards the end of August 2021, one *Zalawi* had been shot dead

⁵ *Zalawi* (singular) *Zalawis* (plural). This is the name of trucking company (*Zalawi*) which transports heavy goods across the SADC region. People were referred to such because they carried heavy loads of goods, just like a *Zalawi* truck did. The *Zalawis* were all undocumented Zimbabwean migrants.

⁶ Some of the young women had children and whenever they secured the task of carrying goods on behalf of ICBTs across the border, they left their children in the care of friends. This is why the researcher saw some children who were sleeping under tree shades by the sides of the Beitbridge -Musina road under the guard of men.

by criminal elements in the preceding week, but that did not stop the activity. One Zalawi explained that on the day that one Zalawi was shot dead, several of them walked past the corpse carrying goods as if nothing had happened^{lxv}.

Overall, the police could not control the activities of the *Zalawi*, all of whom were undocumented. This is because the police benefitted from bribes and also because the *Zalawi* were too many and arresting them was pointless^{lxvi}. At Kosi Bay, the equivalent of Zalawi was not widespread because most of the ICBTs carried their own goods across the border. The implication of the activities of ICBTs as described in this section in cross border security is twofold. From the point of view of the ICBTs, operating during the COVID-19 induced border closures (although costly and sometimes dangerous) ensured that they were able to get money to sustain their families-a security issue^{lxvii}. Both the same ICBTs were aware that the nation-states which included Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe considered this as a breach of security and violation of immigration law and thus a security problem. To this extent, the ICBTs had a completely different understanding of cross border security to that of the nation-states.

6.4 Informal cross border and local informal transporters

A good starting point for a discussion on local informal transporters is a brief background on how informal cross-border transporters operated at the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge. Informal cross border transporters (*omalayitsha*) are people who transport people and remittances between South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2). It is within this informal cross-border transportation context that the movement of both goods and people by local informal transporters during the COVID-19 lockdown occurred. As the name suggests, local informal transporters did not cross the border during COVID-19, but they transported the undocumented migrants (including ICBTs) from the Beitbridge border town in Zimbabwe to known illegal crossing points on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border and back. The same processes also occurred on the South African side of the border, i.e. the local informal transporters collected ICBTs and other undocumented migrants from illegal border crossing points on the Beitbridge

border to the South African border town of Musina and back^{lxviii}. Similarly, at Kosi Bay, informal local transporters were responsible for transporting ICBTs and undocumented migrants from places like KwaPhuza to the South African border town of Manguzi and back. On the Mozambican side of the border, the informal local transporters also transported people from the border to nearby towns and back^{lxix}.

What is evident in all this is that the activities of cross border actors (like ICBTs) with the assistance of local informal transporters and *Zalawis* were well organised so that illegal crossings of the border were successful^{lxx}. This also implies that there were informal ways of protecting both goods and people. In an assertion which summarises the views of all the informal transporters one of them (a South African man) declared that it was good business for their customers (including ICBTs and other undocumented migrants) from Zimbabwe to “successfully across the border with their goods, because if that did not happen, I would suffer serious financial losses. As a result, I really don’t care about the border, because the more people illegally crossed to buy goods in Musina and back to Zimbabwe was profitable for me. I can say that the COVID-19 lockdown and the border closure was profitable for me, because more people than ever are relying on my transportation services”^{lxxi}. In the processes described in this part, not only does one see a complete replacement of the formal cross-border operations with those which were informal and even illegal, but also by these means a successful resistance to the COVID-19 induced border closure. This successful resistance by these cross border actors will be difficult to reverse because "even if things become normal, we will continue operating this way and no border control/fence will stop us"^{lxxii}. This has several implications on cross border security, the most obvious one of which is the blatant disregard of immigration requirements. This is complicated by that the informal local transporters thought they were justified in doing what they were doing because they were earning a living.

6.5 Migrant workers and remittances during the COVID-19 border lockdown

The migrant workers (interviewed in this study), were based in South Africa and their families were based in Zimbabwe and this suggests that they were transnational (see detailed discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.9). These migrant workers had lived in South Africa for periods ranging from five to fifteen years. As a result, they had homes in both countries, and this required frequent cross-border journeys between the countries in addition to the remittances which were sent from South Africa to Zimbabwe. Remittances are goods and money sent to the families of migrants (see e.g. Pendleton et al. 2006; Moyo and Nicolau 2016). The transfer of remittances between Zimbabwe and South Africa is not a new phenomenon, but has been a feature of cross-border migration between these two SADC nation states for a long time (see e.g. Maphosa, 2005, 2007, 2009; Tevera and Chikanda, 2009; Ncube and Gomez, 2011; Von Burgsdorff, 2012; Moyo and Nicolau, 2016). Before a consideration of the implications on the activities of among others, migrant workers, of the closure of the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge as a result of COVID-19, it is important to briefly explain how Zimbabwean migrant workers based in South Africa transmitted their remittances to Zimbabwe. The starting point in this respect is to emphasise that, in the southern African region, remittances are generally sent through informal channels predicated on a long history of this practice as well as the fact that this (using informal channels) ensures quicker transmission of remittances to recipients (see e.g. Nzima, 2017). Research such as that of Makina (2007) established that over 80 percent of Zimbabweans used informal remittance channels. The views of all the migrant workers with whom I had conversations confirmed that they used informal channels, although of course they were aware of formal channels like mobile money remittance channels^{lxxiii}.

These informal remittance channels included the utilisation of *omalayitsha* and bus companies which transported both goods of different varieties and money to Zimbabwe. When the borders were closed as a result of COVID-19, *omalayitsha* operations were prohibited. This complicated the situation of Zimbabwean migrant workers based in South Africa who could neither legally travel to Zimbabwe nor fully utilise the services of *omalayitsha*^{lxxiv}. It should be remembered that

the Zimbabwean migrant workers were transnational citizens and it was "not an option for them not to either travel to Zimbabwe and/or send remittances and the full meaning of this is that, there had to be a way of at least sending remittances to Zimbabwe if one could not travel"^{lxxv}. This is why one Zimbabwean migrant worker declared that "I had to find ways of sending goods and money to my family in Zimbabwe. And this was not difficult because through the *omalayitsha* networks whom we use under normal circumstances, we were linked to freight transportation companies (the interviewees referred to these as commercial transporters) who were allowed to engage in cross-border travels. It was then possible to send remittances through these cars"^{lxxvi}. This explains why one Zimbabwean migrant worker asserted that "while I understand that there was and still is the COVID-19 pandemic, I really continued sending money and food to my family in Zimbabwe and the lockdown did not hinder me in that respect. My family in Zimbabwe is fully dependent on me and quite frankly, I had to do what was possible to ensure that they had money and food"^{lxxvii}

In other words, the Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa were still able to send their remittances despite the lockdown regulations which effectively outlawed this. What was even more interesting during data collection was the revelation that "some bus companies and *omalayitsha* actually bought and used commercial vehicles so that they could be allowed to cross the border"^{lxxviii}. Also noteworthy is the ability for bus companies and *omalayitsha* to quickly switch to commercial vehicles which were compliant to COVID-19 lockdown cross-border regulations in terms of among others registrations and meeting other requirements related to commercial cross-border vehicles. Equally fascinating is that far from transporting commercial freight, these vehicles were a new channel of transferring remittances from South Africa to Zimbabwe. An added dimension to commercial vehicles, which one referred to as trucks, is that some of the *omalayitsha* who could not afford to buy, actually hired these commercial vehicles from established companies and these allowed them (*omalayitsha*) to effectively carry on their businesses during the lockdown^{lxxix}. This actually demonstrates that whenever a border (physical or otherwise) is erected, people will find one or another way to cross it (Laine, 2020) and the

"higher the wall – be it of concrete or paper – the higher the stakes" (Moyo and Laine, 2021: 96). Therefore, the securitisation of the corona virus leading to the strengthening of borders exposes the reality that such moves are not always successful, as borders are not fixed and given. They are continuously constructed, contested and remade (see e.g. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007; Brambilla and Jones, 2020; Laine et al. 2020, 2018, 2016a, b; Moyo and Laine, 2021).

While on the subject of crossing borders by any methods possible and/or necessary, some Zimbabwean migrant workers used cars from funeral parlours in South Africa (which were allowed to repatriate dead people from South Africa to Zimbabwe) to send remittances. This involved packaging corpses together with groceries^{lxxx}. Given that many people died of COVID-19, during the lockdown period this actually meant that the virus was easily transmitted from the dead people to the groceries and there are many cases in which people were infected with the COVID-19 and died by these means^{lxxxi}. Related to this is that some Zimbabwean migrant workers who were based in South Africa and died there due to COVID-19 were smuggled back (especially those who were undocumented) to Zimbabwe through illegal points of entry and exit^{lxxxii}. Media reports suggest that such dead people who were smuggled back to Zimbabwe were packaged together with groceries and on reaching Beitbridge were carried through the bushes, over the border fences and across the Limpopo River (Sibanda, 2020). Indeed, there were several people who had been caught smuggling dead people across the Limpopo River and by July 2020 over 30 people had been arrested for this (Sibanda, 2020). Granted the numbers of those who had been arrested and that the soldiers who were guarding the border were easily bribed (Sibanda, 2020), it is possible that the actual numbers of dead people who were smuggled to Zimbabwe was higher.

The reasons which led to the use of illegal ways of repatriating dead people to Zimbabwe are centered around the bottlenecks associated with doing the same through formal channels in both South Africa and Zimbabwe (Sibanda, 2020). In this one can see that the more the stringent the cross-border formalities are, the more that the movement of cross-border actors is diverted to illegal networks (see e.g. Jones, 2016; Moyo, 2020b). In other words, the problem lies not with the


people who engage in various forms of smuggling, including that of dead people, but with what causes them to engage in that activity in the first instance. Thus, it is not possible to think of human smuggling including that of dead people as being criminal without seeing and labelling what caused it in the same way.

Taken together, the maintenance of transnational networks by migrant workers and other cross border actors discussed in this part aptly illuminate that the Beitbridge border can be conceived as a borderscape. This is precisely because the contestations and defiance of the border depict it (border) not as a static line, but a space that is continuously created and recreated or shaped and carved (Brambilla, 2015) as non-state actors (ICBTs, migrant workers, informal cross border transporter etc.) resist and struggle against the production, enforcement and maintenance of sovereign power and jurisdiction. Simply put, the border becomes a site of struggle (Walker, 1993; Brambilla and Jones, 2020). It is this site of struggle which has security implications. However, it must be remembered that, as the views of the respondents in this study show, security means different things to different people. It is on record that nation-states like South Africa and Zimbabwe regard any illegal crossing of the border as a violation of the law and thus a security threat. A social constructivist (see Chapter 2) reading of this suggests that nation-states regard borders as a source of security, hence the creation of institutions whose purpose is to militarise and securitise borders. However, the cross-border actors who were the focus of this research, thought that placing limits on human mobility as was the case with the COVID-19 induced border closure led to their insecurity hence they (cross border actors) had to find ways of crossing the border so as to regain/and or attain their security. All this amplifies the point which has been made in this thesis-the complexity of cross border security.

6. Chapter summary

Similar to other parts of the world, the COVID-19 induced closure of borders by SADC nation-states had and continues to have multidimensional implications. In the case of cross border migration, border closures changed the nature and dynamic of encountering and contesting the border in a southern African context. Cross border actors devised new strategies which allowed

them to continue the cross-border operations and also send remittances. Some of these strategies involved illegal crossing of the border leading to security implications for the cross-border actors themselves and the nation-states concerned. Others involved culturally alien methods. For example, in southern Africa and perhaps even other countries in other parts of the world, culturally, food cannot be transported in a coffin even if there was no corpse. But COVID-19 led people to suspend this cultural or ethical and moral standard leading to the packaging of dead people together with groceries like bread and meat in a coffin- death as opportunity to send remittances to Zimbabwe. As people defy borders, death and corpses cease to be sacred as they can be used as arsenals or resources to ensure that the defiance is successful. This demonstrates how, and the extent to which, the COVID-19 pandemic and particularly its securitisation provides a mirror through which the everyday processes of bordering and rebordering and resultant struggles, resistance and changes are magnified and become clear; likewise, the cross-border security consequences arising from this. This amplifies the need for borderscaping leading to a biopolitical analysis of borders so as to grasp the full meaning and impact of how the everyday struggles by ordinary people configure and reconfigure borders and how this implicates on cross border security.



CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Overview of the study

The thesis has seven chapters. Chapter 1 provided a background to the study in which the following were outlined - problem statement, aims and objectives and significance of the research. Chapter 2 focused on the theoretical frameworks covering securitisation and governmentality of unease, neopatrimonialism, border management, borderscapes, Gramscianism, and neo- Gramscianism. Chapter 3 provides a critical review of literature on notions of borders and security, transnationalism, informal cross-border traders, informal cross-border transporters as well as cross-border communities. Chapter 4 discussed the setting of the study and the research methods adopted. This study focuses on the Beitbridge border between South Africa and Zimbabwe and the Mozambique-South Africa at Kosi Bay.

In terms of methodology, the study followed a case study research design and qualitative research approach to collect and analyse data from cross-border actors including, ICBTs, undocumented migrants, informal cross-border transporters, and informal local transports, among others. Chapter 5 presents the data analysis regarding the nature and dynamics of the cross-border operations of non-state actors, an evaluation of the link between the operations of these non-state actors on the one hand and entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security on the other in the study areas and explore the perceptions of non-state actors concerning border management and cross-border security issues, respectively. Chapter 6 is a continuation of the analysis of the data but in response to the fourth and final objective of this research which is to assess the implications of the COVID-19 on cross-border security in the study areas. From the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, the following issues emerged.

7.2 The nature and dynamic of the cross-border operations of non-state actors

The nature and dynamics of the operations of cross-border actors who were studied in this research who included ICBTs, informal local transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border

communities were complex. The fact that these actors depended on frequently crossing the borders in question led to a contestation with the state-led governance and regulatory regimes resulting to complex cross border security challenges.

7.3 The link between the operations of cross border actors and cross border security challenges

In this summary, it is not possible to document all the categories of cross border actors as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, but the example of ICBTs and undocumented migrants discussed here illustrates the point that an understanding of cross border security issues and problems in the areas under study requires moving beyond a state-centric interpretation which is limited because it occludes than illuminating the real cross border problems. ICBT operations involved them crossing the border at both formal and informal points. The reasons for this included unfavorable formal cross-border requirements or harassment and victimisation at the formal cross-border points. As a result, some ICBTs offered bribes to government or immigration officials so that they could pass through the border and this resulted in a strong network of corruption and neopatrimonialism. As for those ICBTs who could not break into the network of neopatrimonialism, they were pushed to use informal channels. Neopatrimonial relations had implications on cross-border security because it meant that contraband could be transported as long as bribes were paid.

This is a cross-border security problem and likewise, those who crossed through illegal points of entry and exit which were not regulated such that any types of goods including those which were stolen were transported. A deeper analysis shows that this cross-border security problem was not caused by ICBTs, but included government officials who sold their decision-making powers resulting in the establishment of a private economy (see e.g. Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017: 266). Another case was that of undocumented migrants who used the services of human smugglers to cross the border. The human smugglers have networks with immigration and other officials, which meant that people could cross borders without travel documents. Indeed, this is a cross-border security issue, but conversations with undocumented migrants show this to be a product of among others stringent immigration requirements and corruption in South Africa and Zimbabwe. To this

extent, the cross-border security problems are not undocumented migrants but what produces these undocumented migrants. Therefore, it is too simplistic to see undocumented migrants as a cross-border security problem or indeed to blame porous borders, because some undocumented migrants actually use formal channels and not porous borders.

7.4 Perceptions of non-state actors on border management and cross-border security

The perceptions of the informal cross-border actors illustrated deeper insights on issues of cross-border security. ICBTs on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border at Beitbridge stated that they engaged in ICBCT because of the declining economic and political problems in Zimbabwe. This is the reason why some had to pay bribes to cross the border or to use illegal points of entry and exit because they had no choice. From this point of view, the ICBTs had a greater push from their country of origin which continues to be gripped by an enduring economic and political crisis. Similarly, those on the Mozambique-South Africa border engage in ICBT as a result of socio-economic challenges and problems in their country of origin. It was seen as a cross-border problem that these ICBTs illegally crossed the border and/or hired people to transport their goods through illegal points of entry and exit. It is also seen as a cross-border problem when the ICBTs had to pay bribes which allowed them to transport their goods. The same can also be said about undocumented migrants and other cross-border actors who engaged in illegal activities and thus leading to cross-border security problems. However, there is no contradiction in stating that a deeper reading of this suggests that the illegal crossing of the border and other illegalities at the border are not the problems but what caused these.

For instance, the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe gave many people no choice except to illegally cross the border to South Africa. To be sure, that led to symptoms of cross-border security problems on both South African and Zimbabwe borders. However, the real problem is the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. The people who are seen illegally crossing the border and/or swimming across the Limpopo River are indicative of a deeper problem in Zimbabwe and that is the real problem and not the symptom in the form of undocumented migrants. If the border

is a mirror of society (Parmar, 2020), which it is, it shows us that people illegally crossing the border is symptomatic of problems that caused them to do that. To this extent, nation-states in SADC must deploy a polyvalent perspective of borders including the views and experiences of people involved in cross border migration to fully grasp what the cross border problem is.

After all the Copenhagen School of Security (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.4) teaches us that security is complex and multidimensional. Similarly, the Aberystwyth School/Welsh School of security studies (Chapter 3, Section 3.3.42) also requires us to see security as emancipation which means the removal of conditions that deprive people of happiness leading to involuntary actions like swimming across a crocodile-infested river. Furthermore, Wendt (1999), challenges us to think deeper about what security is or involves. With this mind, the perceptions of the cross-border actors who were the focus of this study suggest that they are not the cross-border problem *per se*, but the economic and political conditions in their countries of origin which force them to engage in the economic activities and migrations that they do. The views of the cross-border actors who were the focus of this study also suggest that some cross border policies which were implemented by nation-states were the security problem even as they sought to address cross border problems.

For example, they thought that border securitisation far from ensuring their security also led to their insecurity as it destabilized livelihoods and communities. In this case and as Jones (1991:310) argues, "the sovereign state is one of the main causes of insecurity: it is part of the problem rather than the solution". This is the context within which Buzan, (1991b:432-433) reminds us that "the bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence". In any case, "true security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it" (Booth, 1991a:539). Thus, the implementation of border securitisation programmes without a fuller understanding of what the cross-border actors feel and think suggests that cross border problems were seen and defined from the perspective of the nation-state or what Gramsci (1971) refers to as statolatry

and this is also one of the cross-border problems. The problem with statolatry is that it elevates power and order at the expense of ordinary people and in this lies their instability and source of insecurity (Booth, 1991a:539). Stated differently, the analysis of data in response to the third objective of the study revealed deeper issues on security and which challenges us to move beyond statolatry to grasp cross border security as it is seen and affects individuals and ordinary people. That is "people should be the primary referent, not states" such that nation-states are the means and not the ends (Booth, 1991a:540).

7.5 Implications of COVID-19 on cross-border security in the study areas

The implication of the COVID-19 pandemic on cross-border security is that it led to an increase of unregulated cross border activities which affected both the cross-border actors themselves as well as the nation-states. An example of this is the packaging of groceries together with corpses, some people of whom had died of COVID-19. This means that the COVID-19 virus could have been easily spread to many people who may have died. Another example is that the illegal crossing of borders by many people also possibly led to the movement of contraband and other dangerous goods. Thus, the COVID-19 induced border closure led to a shift and/or configuration and reconfiguration of strategies of resisting the borders by the cross-border actors under consideration all of which increased cross border security problems.

7.6 Areas of possible future research

The study was limited to a particular scope and therefore other elements encountered during the study fell outside of the study's limits. Consequently, the following are suggested as possible areas for future research;

7.7.1 The issue of neopatrimonialism and the entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border security was a major point of conversation during data collection. It would be interesting for future research to engage with this issue to understand its nature, depth, and implication. This would also entail exploring the views and experiences of immigration and other cross-border officials.

7.7.2 During data collection it was apparent the cross-border communities had an impact on cross-border interactions and the related cross-border security issues. Future research is required on the role of cross-border communities in cross-border security in the SADC borderlands.

7.7. Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study which are summarised in the preceding, the following are recommended;

7.7.1 Rethinking of cross border policies

The fact that non-state actors successfully challenge and "open" closed borders and continue with their activities, provides a potential policy laboratory for the refinement of cross border policies (including responding to emergencies), which transcend a state centric fixity or statolatry. In this regard, SADC nation states such as Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe should consider policies which for example recognise the role of informal cross-border trade in poverty reduction and food security in the southern African region generally and border regions in particular, by implementing strategies which facilitate these operations especially during pandemics. There are good examples of this, such as that of Rwanda in which informal cross border traders have been encouraged to join cooperatives which has assisted in the transportation of their goods using trucks during the COVID-19 lockdown of borders (Behar and Abiodun, 2020).

The point being made is that, the strategies of *dissensus* by cross border actors discussed in this thesis should be a site which can be utilised to think of better cross border policies given that every society is always in a state becoming (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007), suggesting that better and alternative futures are possible from the remains/ruins/lessons of COVID-19 cross border lockdown induced dissent. After all, whether or not states recognize the dissensus by non-state actors, the fact still remains that such dissensus had transformed and continues to transform the border in question *de facto* style and this has cross border security implications.

7.7.2 Regional approach to the cause of cross border security problems

This study suggests that what is usually identified as the cross-border problems are just symptoms. For instance, the cross-border actors from Mozambique and Zimbabwe suggested that what pushed them were economic and political problems in their countries of origin. In particular, those from Zimbabwe asserted that it was the worsening economic and political problems that led them to illegally cross the border. To this extent, the undocumented migrants were not the problem, but the worsening human rights and other economic problems in Zimbabwe. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, arresting and deporting undocumented migrants will not stop them from migrating to South Africa. This suggests that the Zimbabwean economic and political problems must be resolved first. This is where SADC as a regional block must take a decisive stand against known human rights violations in Zimbabwe which displace its citizens to neighbouring countries like South Africa. By making these propositions, I could be labelled as being normative or utopian or even moralistic because of failing to grasp the dynamics and power behind regional institutions. However, it must be remembered that institutions must exist for the furtherance of human welfare and security. More than that, reality on the ground suggests that something must be done to confront the *real* problem and not the symptoms which materialise and dematerialise at the border, which as I have argued in this chapter is ineffective.

In any case, the notion of the regional security complex as discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.4.1) suggests that it is impossible for one or two countries to achieve security (including cross border security) in isolation of other countries. This is the reason why SADC states must deal with problems in countries like Zimbabwe so that the out-migration of its citizens (Zimbabweans) will not affect the security of other countries. For as long as the economic and political problems in Zimbabwe continue that will unavoidably spill to its neighbours like South Africa in the form of undocumented migration and human smuggling. Border securitisation may not stop such undocumented migration but may lead to more sophisticated and underground strategies of crossing the border and thus generating more complex cross-border and national security problems. Seen thus, the problem is not undocumented migration and human smuggling and/or

other illegalities at the border, but what causes people to do this. The notion of the regional security complex teaches us that, it is in the interest of SADC and regional hegemons like South Africa to either assist in resolving the problems in Zimbabwe, than concentrating on border securitisation and militarisation or work on a SADC migration approach which will respond to the migration problems and cross border security.

The SADC has the structures through which this can be done. For example, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (2001) provides a platform for the SADC to protect people by promoting stability, law and order, peace and security among others in neighbouring SADC states. If this is not done, arresting and deporting undocumented migrants from countries like South Africa will not stop people who illegally cross the border as long as the conditions which force them to do so remain. Similarly, securitising the border and building a fence cannot stop undocumented migration if the conditions which trigger them are unresolved. Pouncing on the weak and undocumented migrants should not be seen as the solution because it does not stop the migration. It is tantamount to addressing the wrong issue and leaving the fundamental problem untouched.

While it is necessary to know and take account of the illegalities at the border, that should not be the focus, but what causes those illegalities. Perhaps, we should be reminded of what is happening in the Mediterranean Sea. Several people have died trying to migrate to Europe. Several boats have capsized leading to drowning and painful deaths. Likewise, there are several arrests and deportations which continue to be carried out. But that has not stopped undocumented migration from Africa to Europe and the European Union. As Laine (2020) observes, whenever a border (physical or otherwise) is erected, people will find one or another way to cross it (Laine, 2020) and the "higher the wall – be it of concrete or paper – the higher the stakes" (Moyo and Laine, 2021:96).

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Appendix A: Information Sheet and Interview Guide



Title of Study: Exploring cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands: Beitbridge and Kosi Bay

Researcher: Inocent Moyo

Dear Participant

You are invited to participate in a research project of which the following information sheet will provide you with all the relevant details of the study. This is to ensure that you have all the information before you choose whether to participate or not. You are encouraged to ask any questions that you might have about the study or your participation therein.

Purpose of the research: The purpose of this study is to explore cross border security issues from the perspectives of non-state actors such as informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities who are involved and/or implicated in cross-border security matters or related concerns.

What you will be asked to do in the research: In this study, you will be required to voluntarily respond to the questions presented to you by the researcher.

Anonymity and confidentiality: In this study your identity as a research participant will be kept anonymous in that no identifying information like names can be traced to the respondents. For

example, in the write up, the actual names of the research participants will not be used. In terms of confidentiality, a pseudonym will be used to ensure your anonymity is maintained, unless you choose otherwise. Accordingly, information which is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. That is, in accordance with legal requirements and/or professional standards, information will be disclosed to the appropriate individuals and/or authorities if information comes to our attention that are of concern and might be harmful to you or others. In an event like this, you will be informed that we have to break confidentiality in order to fulfil our legal responsibility to report to the designated authorities.

Risks and Discomfort: This study will follow to the letter the COVID-19 Protocols around research and data collection as detailed in the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) GUIDE to planning, preparing for, and conducting fieldwork in the context of COVID-19. Therefore, these COVID-19 Protocols on data collection will be followed in full during data collection. If the physical interviews were not possible, virtual/telephonic interviews will be conducted. An interview protocol will be followed in the actual interviews. This is essentially a guide to how the interview proceeds, such as the introduction of the researcher, a statement of the purpose of the research as well as ethical issues on informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality. Furthermore, there may be some risks from participating in this research study. All human interactions and talking about yourself or others carry some amount of risks. I will nevertheless reduce such risks and act promptly to assist you if any discomfort is experienced during the process of your participation in this study. Where necessary, an appropriate referral will be made to a suitable professional for further assistance or intervention.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the research is completely voluntary and you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to continue participating will not influence your relationship or the nature of your relationship with the researcher.

Withdrawal from the study: You may stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. In the event that you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible.

Informed Consent: Your informed consent is needed before I proceed with the interview process. I have thus included a consent form for you to fill in should you wish to participate in this research.

Audio recording and notes: The interview will be recorded for accurate data capturing purposes and for use within the research project itself. However, if you choose not to be recorded, I will only make notes of your answers during the interview. All records of the interview will be safely kept with only the researcher and supervisor having access to them. The records will be destroyed after five years.

Questions about the research: Should you have any further questions or concerns regarding the interview process or the topic of this research, please contact me, my supervisor or the Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee. See the details below.

Researcher: Innocent Moyo

Email: moyoi@unizulu.ac.za

Cell: 0639579674

Supervisor: Dr Namhla Thando Matshanda

UWC Political Studies Department

Tel: 021 959 3228



If you have any questions about this ethics process, or about your rights as a participant in the study, you may contact the Ethics Social Science Committee at UWC: Research development

Tel: 021 959 4111

Email: research-ethics@uwc.ac.za

Thank you for considering participating in this research.

Appendix B: Consent form



RESEARCH TITLE: Exploring cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands: Beitbridge and Kosi Bay

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by **Inocent Moyo** towards the Masters Programme in Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape.

This study has been described to me in a language that I understand and I freely and voluntarily agree to participate. My questions about the study have been answered.

I understand that my identity will not be disclosed unless otherwise requested and was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time by advising the student researcher.

I.....(full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

I consent / do not consent to this interview being audio recorded. (Please circle your preference)

.....

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE.....

Thank you for considering participating in this research.

Contact information for: Human and Social Science Research Ethics Committee, Tel: 021 959 4111 alternatively email: research-ethics@uwc.ac.za



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Appendix C: Interview Instrument



Project Title: Exploring cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands: Beitbridge and Kosi Bay

Researcher details: Inocent Moyo

Email: minnoxa.m@gmail.com

Cell: 0639579674

Participants



I am doing this research so as to understand cross-border security issues at selected Southern African Development Community (SADC) borders and borderlands, which are Beitbridge and Kosi Bay from the perspective of non-state actors, who are the informal cross-border traders (ICBTs), informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities. I hope investigating the issue will lead to a better understanding of cross border security challenges in the selected border regions. If some of the questions are difficult for you to answer, you have the right to withdraw or to skip any issues that you do not want to discuss. When and where necessary, I will translate our discussions. In doing so, your active participation in giving ideas, commenting, and engagement is essential for the completion of this research. Your participation is voluntary and you reserve the right to withdraw from the same, should you so wish.

KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Part A: Nature and dynamic of the cross-border operations of non-state actors

- a) Please describe your cross border operations?
- b) What is the frequency of these cross border operations?
- c) How do you engage in the cross border operations?
- d) Why do you engage in the cross border operations?
- e) Please share any information you may have on the nature and dynamic of your cross-border operations

Part B: The link between the operations of ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities and cross-border security

a) There is evidence that ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, and undocumented migrants illegally cross the border. Why do you do this? In other words, what causes this or pushes you to cross the border in this way, when there are legal points of border crossing?

b) Explain to me how the crossing of the border at illegal points work.

c) Are you aware that crossing the border illegally contributes to cross border insecurity? What is your understanding of cross border security and insecurity?


d) There is the assumption that crossing the border illegally leads to the entrenchment of informal cross-border networks and cross-border insecurity. Explain how these informal cross border networks work in terms of the main actors involved and strategies and activities.

e) What is the involvement of cross border communities in all these informal cross border networks and illegal border crossing?

f) In your view and based on your experiences, what do you think is responsible for cross border security issues at this border/borderland?

g) Please share any issues/thoughts on the link between the operations of ICBTs, informal cross-border transporters, undocumented migrants and cross-border communities and cross-border security.

Part C: Perceptions of non-state actors in relation to border management and cross-border security issues

- 
- The logo of the University of the Western Cape is centered in the background. It features a classical building with a pediment and columns, with the text 'UNIVERSITY of the WESTERN CAPE' overlaid in a serif font.
- a) What do you think is the role of cross border management (formal) to cross border insecurity?
 - b) There is the perception that cross border officials demand bribes from cross border actors. Please explain fully, your views and experiences on this.
 - c) Do you think there is a connection between border management and cross-border security issues?
 - d) Please share any information you may have on border management and immigration on cross border security issues

Part D: Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) and its implications on cross-border security

- a) How did COVID-19 affect your cross border operations?
- b) Explain to me how you operated during the COVID-19 lockdown?
- c) How do you think your operations during COVID-19 contributed and continue to contribute to cross border security challenges?

End Notes

- ⁱ Interview with ICBT August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ⁱⁱ Interview with ICBT August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ⁱⁱⁱ Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{iv} Interview with ICBT August, 2021, Beitbridge
- ^v Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge.
- ^{vi} Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ^{vii} Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ^{viii} Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ^{ix} Interview with ICBT Beitbridge, August 2021
- ^x Interview with ICBT Beitbridge September 2021
- ^{xi} Interview with ICBT Beitbridge September 2021
- ^{xii} Interview with ICBT, Beitbridge, August 2021
- ^{xiii} Interview with ICBT, Beitbridge, September 2021
- ^{xiv} Interview with ICBT, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay;
- ^{xv} Interview with ICBT, Beitbridge, September 2021
- ^{xvi} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview informal cross border transporters, September 2021 Kosi Bay
- ^{xvii} Interview informal cross border transporters, September 2021 Kosi Bay
- ^{xviii} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xix} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xx} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xxi} Interview with informal cross border transporter, September 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xxii} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview informal cross border transporters, September 2021 Kosi Bay
- ^{xxiii} Interview with informal cross border transporters, August 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xxiv} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xxv} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xxvi} Interview with undocumented Mozambican migrants, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{xxvii} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean and Mozambican migrants in Musina and Kosi Bay August and September, 2021 respectively
- ^{xxviii} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xxix} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xxx} Interview with cross border community members, Kosi Bay September 2021.
- ^{xxxi} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge, September 2021.
- ^{xxxii} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021.
- ^{xxxiii} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021.
- ^{xxxiv} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge August 2021.
- ^{xxxv} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge August 2021.
- ^{xxxvi} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge August 2021.
- ^{xxxvii} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge August 2021.
- ^{xxxviii} Interview with ICBT August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay
- ^{xxxix} Interview with ICBT August 2021, Beitbridge; Interview with ICBT, September 2021 Kosi Bay
- ^{xl} Interview with ICBT August, 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xli} Interview with ICBT August, 2021, Beitbridge
- ^{xlii} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xliii} Interview with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Musina, August 2021
- ^{xliv} Interview with cross border community member, Beitbridge August 2021.
- ^{xlv} Interview with ICBT, KwaPhuza, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{xlvi} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{xlvii} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{xlviii} Personal observation, KwaPhuza, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{xliv} Interview with ICBT, KwaPhuza, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^l Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{li} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{lii} Interview with cross border community member, Kosi Bay, September 2021
- ^{liii} Interview with ICBT, September 2021
- ^{liv} Interview with ICBT, September 2021
- ^{lv} Interview with ICBT, September 2021
- ^{lvi} Interview with ICBT, April 2021

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- lvii Interview with ICBT, September 2021
lviii Interview with ICBT, September 2021
lix Interview with ICBT, September 2021
lx Interview with ICBT, Kosi Bay, September 2021
lxi Interview with ICBT, August 2021
lxii Interview with ICBTs, Kosi Bay, September 2021
lxiii Interview with Zalawi, September 2021
lxiv Interview with Zalawi, September 2021
lxv Interview with Zalawi August 2021
lxvi Interview with Zalawi, August 2021
lxvii Interview with ICBTs at Beitbridge and Kosi Bay, August and September 2021.
lxviii Interview with informal transporter, September 2021
lix Interview with local informal transporter, Kosi Bay
lxx Interview with informal transporter, August 2021
lxxi Interview with informal transporter, September 2021
lxxii Interview with informal transporter, August 2021
lxxiii Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxiv Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxv Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxvi Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, September 2021
lxxvii Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxviii Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxix Interview with bus driver, August 2021
lxxx Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker September 2021
lxxxi Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021
lxxxii Interview with Zimbabwean migrant worker, August 2021



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