# AUTHORITY IN SCHOOLING IN POST 1990 SOUTH AFRICA

VANESSA NATASHA KENNEDY

A minithesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of M.Ed. in the Department of Philosophy of Education, University of the Western Cape

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WESTERN CAPE

April 1998

Abstract

Authority in Schooling in Post 1990 South Africa

V. N. Kennedy

M.ED. minithesis, Department of Philosophy of Education, University of the Western Cape.

In Chapter One I explore Berlin's concepts of positive and negative freedom to (a) show that the concept <u>freedom</u>, is not transparent and (b) explain how divergent conceptions of freedom give rise to divergent conceptions of authority. Berlin, it would appear, prefers the concept of negative freedom because it fosters egalitarianism, whereas positive freedom promotes unequal relations between people.

In Chapter Two I show that Berlin's contrasting concepts of freedom are underpinned by the two contrasting ideologies of individualism and collectivism as described by Watt. I maintain that the idea of individualism is both familiar and appealing to us, because it sees the individual as sovereign - no outside force (authority) directs our actions. Thus, our preference for individualism reinforces our preference for Berlin's concept of negative freedom.

In Chapters Three and Four I pay attention to the idea of community (human grouping). This provides a starting point for an examination of the school as a specific kind of human grouping. In Chapter Three I examine Tonnies's concepts of natural will and rational will to show that the reasons for joining and staying in human groupings influence the characteristics of a group. These groups will be either predominantly <u>gemeinschaft</u> or <u>gesellschaft</u>, with a <u>gemeinschaft-type</u> group displaying the same unequal relations as those promoted by positive liberty.

In Chapter Four I explore different conceptions of community as analysed by Sandel, and I show that with instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community, the community is external to the aims of the individual, whereas a constitutive conception sees the community as a mode of the individual's self-understanding, partly constitutive of the subject's identity. I conclude, using works of Anderson and Morrow, that all communities are "imagined" (rather

than "naturally" given) since a community has to conceive of itself as a community in order to in fact be one. I regard this as empowering because it provides people with choices in regard to the kinds of communities they form. This has significant implications for our understanding of a school community, as I will show in Chapters Five and Six.

In Chapter Five I re-examine the concepts of positive and negative liberty, and find that the two concepts are interrelated, and not as distinct as Berlin would have us believe. This enables us to take on board, not just the choices of negative freedom, but also the unequal relations between people that the concept of positive liberty promotes. It is precisely unequal relations between teacher and learner that are necessary for authority relationships in schools. I also examine how communities gain understanding of themselves in a social setting. I say that we do not simply identify data; we also interpret them. Our interpretation is based on our experience, i.e. on what we already know and how we are already shaped by our society. I discuss this in terms of language and social practices, and human beings' self-understandings which are tied up in practices. I conclude that all communities are constitutive and this means that communities shape individuals while the individual's own understanding of that community is shaped by the community.

In the sixth and final chapter I draw attention to the school as an imagined community, constituted by the understanding of the members of that community. Part of our understanding of what a school community is, has to do with the concepts of teaching and learning. Using work of Dunlop and Strike, I show that teaching and learning are, logically, tied in with authority. Learning can take place only if the learner accepts the authority of the teacher. Teaching can thus take place only if the teacher exercises appropriate authority. This specific understanding of a school community needs to be part of our understanding of that community.

I conclude that schools cannot exist as schools, unless they retrieve an appropriate concept of authority, one which is inclusive of both of Berlin's concepts of freedom.

April 1998

Declaration

I declare that <u>Authority in Schooling in post 1990 South Africa</u> is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Signed

Vanessa Natasha Kennedy   April 1998

Contents

Introduction

In this minithesis, I present an argument in favour of a retrieval of a concept of authority. This argument is presented between Chapters One to Six. In this Introduction, I place that argument in the specific context of post 1990 South Africa. I discuss the issue of authority specifically in this time period because of the political changes that have and still are occurring in the country since February 1990. With a radical political change came changing educational policy.

I contextualise my argument in favour of a retrieval of authority in schooling by means of a brief discussion of each of the following :

(1) schooling in chaos, (2) reasons for the erosion of teacher authority due to the broader political picture, (3) democratisation of schooling as a specific reason for the erosion of teacher authority, (4) arguments contra democratisation of schooling, (5) on the nature of authority and (6) freedom and authority - an introduction to the argument presented in this minithesis.

(1)

There is a widespread understanding that schooling in South Africa is in chaos. Discussions about the schooling crisis are commonplace. And, schooling does appear to be in crisis. There are many concerns that need to be addressed. There is the problem of insufficient funding for education. There is the uncertainty that teachers suffer in their jobs. There is also the problem of the "lost generation", students who missed great chunks of schooling while the African National Congress (ANC) was pursuing its ideal

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of making the country ungovernable during the 1980's. I will return to this issue shortly.

That much of our schooling is in chaos can be gauged from the absence of almost any form of order and discipline in far too many of our schools. This absence of order and discipline might be attributed, at least in part, to the collapse of teacher authority.

(2)

How did this collapse of authority happen? In our recent past we had the National Party government almost at war with students even in the streets of our city centres. During the 1980s police and the army were so visible that we came to expect their presence just about everywhere. Armoured vehicles constantly prowled our townships in a display of brute military power. This was in response to escalating resistance to the government of the day.

Resistance had to escalate when dealing with a brutal and violent state. Eventually resistance of a particular kind reached schools. Class boycotts were common for much of the 1980s. Students, who were now involved in all kinds of resistance from mass rallies, to mass meetings, to consumer boycotts, were learning to ask questions regarding the legitimacy of the state. The net result was that students changed. They were not just becoming politically aware, they were also coming to see their own power as a destructive political force. Students had become key players in the resistance movement in the country.

Then came the calls for massive destabilisation of the country. The ANC called it, "making the country ungovernable". Students embraced this philosophy wholeheartedly. Student militancy escalated and students were venerated for their militancy.

But, students came to pay a dear price for their action. They learnt to question the state's legitimacy, but in the process, they learnt to question the legitimacy of authority. Authority was seen as power mongering. Those in government were perceived as abusing authority. The government really was more about state power than about state authority. The questions that were being asked were the kind of questions that are asked in order to undermine the state's legitimacy. These are the same questions that are still being asked in order to undermine authority in general. April Carter says, "If we press our questions to the point of radical scepticism then our demand for reasons is incompatible with the acceptance of authority."[1] That is to say, when we ask those kind of questions, our belief in the legitimacy of authority relations has already been eroded.

Even so, calls for democracy and democratic processes pulsated through South African society. We wanted a government that was democratically elected by universal franchise. In 1994, that almost miraculous ideal was achieved.

Then, in our concern that our newly, democratically elected government should not fall into the same trap that the previous government had fallen into, there was a cry for the democratisation of society in general. There were calls for transparency in all matters regarding state affairs.

Clem Sunter says:

> Modern-day values which emphasise the freedom and rights of the individual make authoritarian structures less and less acceptable. [There is] growing popularity of the principle of transparency in everything the state does.[2]

This way of thinking about transparency has found its way into schools. There have been demands that schooling be democratised and there is talk of democratic teaching practices. We apply the word 'democracy' in so many instances that its meaning has become unclear.

(3)

What is it that we mean when we talk of the democratisation of schools? On one interpretation, it means the democratic participation of learners in decision making in a school and it is this interpretation that has had far reaching consequences for schooling.

Educators are concerned about this state of affairs. A letter in a weekend newspaper from a school principal states that schooling is no longer about education, rather that schools are contested terrains of various "interest groups"[3]. In addition, he sees each interest group (teachers versus learners versus parents) as having a will and determination to entrench its power. However, for as long as we regard teachers and learners as equals engaged in power struggles, we cannot discuss teacher authority.

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The letter writer mentioned above recognises a need for a restitution of authority in schooling. He argues for a revitalisation of Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs). He says, "The democratically constituted PTSAs are the structures that enjoy credibility, legitimacy and authority."[4] He sees the PTSAs as being able to solve problems around teacher authority and the related problems of discipline in both learners and teachers, but sees this as happening through a particular sort of democratisation, whereby learners and teachers interact as equals with the aim of attaining mutually agreed on goals.

This idea is one that I will refute in the course of this minithesis, because it assumes that, when we speak of educating for democracy, we need our schools to operate like participatory or direct democracies.

I am not suggesting that a retrieval of authority in schooling will alleviate all problems within the schooling system. But, a retrieval of authority will be needed in the schooling system, with or without other changes we envisage, if schooling is to be effective. Authority, I will show in Chapter Six, is necessary if learners are to learn efficiently at school.

(4)

There are people who believe that student participation in decision making at schools can have many positive consequences. There are the ideas of Scrimshaw, as discussed by Dunlop[5], which have it that pupils will learn how to participate in a democratic society and the school will prepare them for their duties and privileges as citizens, and that pupils will develop an understanding of the political process and will be armed with democratic life

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skills. This participation, it is assumed, will initiate pupils into the moral culture of participatory democracy. This idea enjoys widespread appeal in many South African schools in this the latter half of the nineties.

There is of course the counter argument, so eloquently put forward by Francis Dunlop, that says democratic participation by learners may instead encourage learners to become power hungry and that participatory democracy provides a golden opportunity for unscrupulous people to impose their will on the scrupulous. This may include teachers imposing their will on either learners or parents, or learners coercing parents or parents coercing teachers, or some learners coercing other learners.

Dunlop argues, quite rightly, that participation in decision making at schools presupposes that learners enter into the relationship with benevolent and honest motives. But, for learners to be able to do that, they must already have been initiated into the moral culture of participatory democracy. I will discus Dunlop's position more fully in Chapter Six.

So, for this and other reasons which I am yet to discuss, I argue in favour of a retrieval of authority in schooling. Democracy, I will show, is inappropriate in some aspects of school life. Schools have a more important function to serve than to pretend to be democracies. This is especially evident now that the country has gone through a period of rapid transformation and we have a new government which has to make good on its promises in education.

(5)

I here aim to clarify a few things about the nature of authority. Authority, as I will show in Chapter One, is not incompatible with freedom. So, what then is authority? It has become difficult to describe authority since it appears that considerable confusion surrounds the concept, as I will try to show immediately below.

How can we start to think about authority? Authority can be thought of in terms of its function. Here we may turn to Hannah Arendt[6] who points out that how we view an object is closely tied in with the use of that object in any particular instance. Arendt says that we may use a shoe to hammer a nail into a wall. She says that we can then ask, "What does the shoe do?" The answer will be: the shoe performs the function of a hammer. In that instance, the shoe can thus be said to be a hammer.

So, how do we answer the question, "What does authority do?" We may say that authority is that which directs our actions in certain ways. But then, Arendt lets us see, there are many things that can be mistaken for authority. For example brute force, we know, cannot be seen as authority even though it can direct our actions. Furthermore, brute force is incompatible with freedom as will emerge from my discussion of freedom in Chapter One. Even so, brute force is able to make us do things and direct our actions in ways we may not have chosen to do ourselves.

Let us look, also, at the question of persuasion. I may be persuaded to do things. Whilst persuasion is able to direct human actions, it cannot be seen in the same light as authority. Persuasion is that which takes place between

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equals. An authority relationship is most definitely not a relationship between equals. In Chapter Six I present arguments in support of this claim. There I am concerned specifically with educative relations between teachers and learners, and with the question of how authority underpins educative relations. Meanwhile, I will briefly explore a different kind of unequal relationship between people in order to make explicit one of the kinds of confusions that surrounds the concept of authority.

Authority depends on an unequal relationship between people. But this inequality in relationship differs from the inequality in relationship that exits between a tyrant and those subject to tyranny. A tyrant has sole power over those who are subject to his tyranny. The latter, in turn, have absolutely no power. We may illustrate the relationship between tyrant and those subject to tyranny by means of the following diagram, where "subjects" refers to those subjected to tyranny.

Tyrant

Subjects   Subjects   Subjects   Subjects   Subjects

As can be seen, all the subjects share an equal status, that of being dominated by the tyrant.

If we are to think of schools in this way, we could have a principal being the tyrant while teachers, parents and learners are all equally powerless. Or, we could have the teacher as the tyrant and the learners as the subjects. In these two kinds of situations, tyranny has been mistaken for authority. Thus, while

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tyranny has been rejected, people have as a result viewed authority with suspicion. Indeed, we know now how the authority of principals as well as that of teachers have been seriously questioned, and even rejected.

Nevertheless, in certain situations (and I have in mind specifically schools) we cannot abandon the idea of unequal relations between people. Authority is per definition about unequal relations between people. An authority relationship is a hierarchical relationship. Persons on the same level of the hierarchy will command the same level of authority. Persons on any level of the hierarchy will enjoy more status than those on the level below them. In some instances people at the bottom may have no direct contact with people on the upper level of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, in order for the hierarchy to perform its function, each member of the hierarchy will understand and contribute to that function.

The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical authority relationship within a school setting, where the top end of the pyramid forms the members of the school leadership:

<u>Leadership</u>

Principal

Senior staff

Teaching staff

Prefects, monitors, SRC

Senior learners

Other learners

<u>Lowest in authority</u>

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
Teachers and learners, while being in constant contact with one another, will not share a level in the pyramid hierarchy of the school. Also, the teacher will not be all powerful; there are those on levels above the teacher, who will be in direct contact with the teacher to offer advice and guidance. Furthermore, there is some scope for mobility between levels with learners and teachers able to attain higher levels within the hierarchy.

In this minithesis I argue that a human grouping such as that described above is desirable within a school setting - that it in fact promotes educative relationships.

(6)
Now that I have sketched reasons for advocating a more traditional sense of authority, I will move on to a justification of an authority relationship at schools.

All of what I have said thus far may be considered to be what I regard as "other" reasons for a retrieval of authority. What I want to illustrate in this minithesis is that authority in schooling is not incompatible with freedom, neither is it incompatible with accountability in education.

I will start by discussing the idea of freedom.

In Chapter One I present two contrasting views of freedom, and I show the social consequences for each. Also, I show that we have developed specific understandings of freedom in post 1990 South Africa. I show that we have

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developed these understandings because of social circumstances. This led to the formulation of a particular interpretation of authority. And this in turn impacts on our acceptance or non-acceptance of authority in South African schooling. This is so because certain concepts of freedom view authority relationships between people as a threat to freedom or at the very least a serious compromise to freedom.

I will now take a closer look at freedom.

Chapter One

Positive and negative liberty

In South Africa, especially within the context of schools, people have ambivalent feelings in respect of authority. On the one hand, there is growing awareness of the consequences, for education and schooling, of the breakdown of teacher authority (as pointed out in the Introduction). On the other hand, we understand authority as being something that will limit our freedom, and our freedom is something that we do not want compromised. But, Isaiah Berlin in <u>Four Essays on Liberty</u>[7] will have us know that the concept of freedom is not an easy concept to understand. Freedom, according to Berlin, is open to various conceptualisations.

In the above mentioned work, Berlin discusses two such conceptualisations, namely positive and negative freedom, or to use Berlin's terminology, positive and negative liberty.

In this chapter I will first discuss Berlin's notions of positive and negative liberty then I delineate the implications for authority within each notion.

1.1 Positive liberty

Positive liberty[8] is concerned with the source of control. It asks the question, who or what controls me? Positive liberty aims to maximise my self-mastery, to maximise my freedom. Positive liberty declares, "I am slave to no one!"

Self-mastery introduces the notions of a higher and a lower self, in that it wants to know what within me controls me. It wants to identify the source of control. For positive liberty, to be really free is to be in control of the higher self. So we have the idea of the true self. The true self is in turn governed by reason.

But, what is the true self?

Can someone else, like a parent or the government, know better than me what my true self is? If it is possible that someone else can know the "truth", then they have an obligation to show the less informed what the "truth" is. Does this not open the door to indoctrination? This is a fear that Berlin expresses and that many South Africans feel, also in respect of schooling, because of the familiarity of this scenario: until very recently schooling was perceived to be about indoctrination and control.

Berlin explores at least four avenues along which we might achieve self-mastery and avoid the corruptions of positive liberty. These involve what I interpret as <u>abnegation</u>, <u>self-realisation</u>, <u>collective rationality</u> and the <u>search for status</u>[9]. I will now give a summary of Berlin's argument regarding this.

1.1.1 Abnegation

This involves what Berlin calls "the retreat into the inner citadel". This is a deliberate attempt at self-transformation, the aim of which is self-determination. It is a retreat into an inner sanctum where you can feel safe

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and secure, free from outside forces or persuasion or coercion. One can in effect deny oneself what can be perceived as the trauma of the outside world.

Given this approach, a person might obey laws because she believes in the validity of those laws. She in effect internalises those laws.

She is free from gross wants, because she chooses to alienate herself from them. If one no longer identifies with a specific need, one will no longer feel that need, thus making one free from it.

On the positive side we can see how an addict can draw away from his addiction to a place inside him where he can create the space to dissociate himself from his addiction. Or, there are people who can escape from severe stress by meditating, thus being able to draw on an inner calmness and peace. This has to be seen as positive action.

But is this freedom?

Surely, a man in a prison, no matter how released he feels from the world or how little need he has for being out in the world, cannot be said to be free. What is created is in fact the antithesis of freedom. This is really self-denial which may be an avenue of inner strength, serenity or integrity, but it cannot truly be called freedom. There thus has to be another way of achieving self-mastery. Berlin explores another avenue, that of self-realisation.

1.1.2. Self -realisation

This is what happens when your identity is shaped by your understanding. This means that if one understands a practice, one can participate in that practice, for example, mathematics. Once one understands the principles that govern mathematics, one can then do mathematics, and one can then be said to be participating in the practice of mathematics. The understanding of mathematics thus makes a person free to do mathematics.

Self- realisation may strike one quite by surprise and can be experienced as a sudden realisation, without one actively or deliberately pursuing it. The thinking that underlies this idea is this: to understand the world is to be liberated. To have understanding is to be freed from irrational fears. For example, the fear of thunder may be eliminated once you know that it is just the sound of colliding air masses. Berlin says, "Knowledge liberates, as Epicurus taught long ago, by automatically eliminating irrational fears and desires."[10]

So, self-realisation is the pursuit of rationality. The rational person is the free person. But, how is rationality gauged? How do I know that I am rational? And, is it enough for just one person to be rational? Berlin next explores this question.

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1.1.3. Collective rationality

In this regard, Berlin asks the pertinent question, "What's wrong with positive liberty?" What follows are Berlin's reservations in respect of positive liberty.

If one is rational, you have to accept that others also have a right to freedom. The problem lies in how to coalesce my rational freedom with that of others. How are we to relate to one another? Surely, it is not enough for just me to be rational; those around me must also be rational. Berlin says, "For if I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reasons, be right for others who are rational like me."[11]

This of course means that what we believe has to be agreed upon by everyone else in the society in which we live. There can thus be only one right way of doing things. There exists in effect a common good that is communally accepted, and more importantly, it is accepted to be rational.

Resistance to the accepted laws of society come to be viewed as irrational and the more rational members of society have to offer the less rational members of the society guidance, in order for them (the less rational members) to become rational like everyone else in that society.

Coercion, so the argument goes, is merely the moulding of the individual into what he would have chosen to do himself anyway if he were more rational. Thus, one can be forced to be rational, if you are not rational or wise enough to know what rational decisions are. Rationality is after all freedom, if only

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from ignorance. I will explore this more fully in Chapter Six of this minithesis.

Furthermore, if there is only one common good, then there is no need for free thinking. In this regard, Berlin refers to Auguste Comte[12] who says that in biology and in chemistry, there are experts who can be consulted if one has a problem in those fields of knowledge. These experts, although they may not know the solution to all the problems of biology or chemistry, will know the proper procedure for finding solutions to problems in their fields of knowledge.

Berlin then applies this theory to morals and politics. Since we have collective rationality, there thus exists a common good. Therefore, there will be experts of morals and politics, who know what the common good is. Thus, any action has to be authorised by an expert, who knows what the facts are, or the truth is, or what the proper way of doing things is, so that we may have an expert who is an authority on morals and politics.

Berlin concludes that this search for liberty leads to conformity, tyranny and despotism.

1.1.4. The search for status

Another way in which Berlin tries to expand upon the concept of positive liberty is by way of the human search for status. Berlin says that we tend to equate liberty with equality and fraternity. Herein lies a conflict between on the one hand, the collective need for equality and fraternity and, on the other

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hand, the individualistic notion of freedom in which freedom is understood as freedom from the interference of others. The search for status is a quest for a resolution of this conflict. In other words, the search for status is a person's quest for positioning herself in respect of either collectivism or individualism.

Equality and fraternity are important because they are part of being human. This is so because people are social beings. That is to say, our actions affect the lives of others around us as the actions of others affect us. This is but one side of the coin.

On the other hand, the desire to be recognised as a unique individual and not merely as part of a collective, is one that persists, even though we realise that we are social beings.

So, when I say that I want to be free, what I want is to be recognised as a responsible, independent being with desires and a will of my own, in accordance with which I will act. This is what makes paternalism so distasteful to us. According to Berlin:

> Paternalism is despotic, not because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because it ignores the transcendental reason embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with (not necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes and above all, entitled to be recognised as such by others.[13]

The same sentiments exist when one is a member of an unrecognised or insufficiently respected group. One will then wish for the liberation of your entire group. This may lead to a situation where people accept the leadership of an inappropriate leader, simply because he or she is a member of their group, and thus sees them as equals and as relevant beings. Berlin says:

> It is the desire for reciprocal recognition that leads the most authoritarian democracies to be, at times, consciously preferred by its members to the most enlightened oligarchies, or sometimes causes a member of a newly liberated Asian or African state to complain less today, when he is rudely treated by members of his own race or nation, than when he was governed by some cautious, just, gentle, well-meaning administrator from outside.[14]

But, according to Berlin, what we have here is not freedom; it is more closely related to fraternity and solidarity.

We can clearly see Berlin's reservations regarding positive liberty. I will now examine Berlin's understanding of negative freedom - a conception of freedom which Berlin, it appears, finds more acceptable.

1.2 Negative liberty

Negative liberty is understood by Berlin as a freedom from interference or force. Negative liberty asks the question, "what is the extent of freedom from interference?" This type of freedom serves to limit or curb the control of

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others over me. This vision of freedom has found widespread favour in South Africa. The idea of non-interference in at least some spheres of one's life is an appealing one to us.

However, the concept of negative liberty raises questions such as the following: How then is this freedom to be assured to everyone? Does freedom here mean the freedom to do what we want to do, when we want to?

Surely this will lead to some people extending their right to freedom over the wills of others. So, we have to limit the freedom of others over us.

This in turn creates a paradox in that we have to limit freedom in order to have freedom. We therefore have an area of regulation - laws - so that we can have a safer and fair environment. This is to ensure that the weak can have as much freedom as the strong, and to protect us all against the abuse of power.

Less interference broadens one's available choices, and this in turn means increased decision-making. Increased decision making in turn means increased responsibility. For example, post Apartheid South Africa presents a parent with a much wider range of schools to choose from than was the case previously. But this means the parent now has an added responsibility to make the best possible choice from the widest possible range of options.

Freedom has to be freedom from coercion. "Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act."[15] So a disability, while preventing me from doing a great many things

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that I would otherwise have done, cannot be said to make me less free, or to be interfering with my freedom.

Berlin now puts forward a case in favour of negative liberty. He recognises the problems generated by the concept of negative freedom, but he argues that it is a better concept than positive freedom because negative freedom is more flexible and thus more suited to a changing world.

Negative freedom, he says, has space for pluralism, divergence and flexibility. Berlin says that, "it is more humane because it does not (as the system builders do) deprive men in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of much that they found indispensable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings."[16] It can be seen that, for Berlin, the individual is sovereign.

While Berlin sees the individual as sovereign, there is a contrasting collectivist ideology, which I referred to under 1.1.4. According to this collectivist ideology, freedom is not attained by an individual. Freedom is attained through collective self-direction. This of course means that all members of a society must be involved in the operation and the decision-making of the group. There is of course the danger that the sovereignty of the people could destroy the sovereignty of the individual. In other words, in order for democracy to be maintained, some freedoms of individuals have to be curtailed. Berlin asks, "But if democracies can, without ceasing to be democracies, suppress freedom, at least as liberals have used the word, what would make a democracy truly free?"[17] This shows that there is no simple

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correlation between democracy and freedom, and that the concept <u>freedom</u> is by no means transparent.

1.3 Freedom and authority

I now examine the relation between the concept <u>authority</u> and each of the concepts positive and negative freedom. Negative freedom seeks to curb authority whereas positive freedom would have authority placed in one's own hands. Berlin says, "These are not two different interpretations of a single concept [freedom], but two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life."[18]

South Africans find themselves with the same reservations as Berlin does. We too fear the logic of positive liberty, because it has been used and believed before. Many of those beliefs still live in the hearts and minds of a great many South Africans. The Apartheid government was massively successful in convincing us that there was only one correct culture and one correct way of life that we had to aspire after. The legacy of that thinking remains still. On the one hand, we have people who are dissociated from their culture, some gladly others reluctantly. On the other hand, we now find ourselves very aware of the need to try to avoid the errors of the past.

When we talk of our degraded sense of authority we know that it was the very abuse of authority that necessitated the kind of action that eroded the previous government's authority. Along with that, it created suspicion of all forms of authority. And, we know that the authority of the past was based on the beliefs that are captured in the concept of positive liberty. An example of

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this would be the idea that someone else can know better than me what is in my own best interest, like what kind of schooling I would need to equip me for a specific place in society.

We are now struggling to cast off the restraints and the ways of thinking of our past. The concept of negative freedom appeals to us. The need to choose, which is built into the concept of negative freedom, is very important to us, precisely because our choices have been so tightly controlled in the past. We want to exercise our freedom of choice in choosing where to live, where to send our children to school, what we do for recreation, where we work, our sexual orientation and also our partners for life. Many of these choices were previously terribly restricted. So now that we have them we are careful to preserve them. We do not want to hand over control of our lives to any external authority. We find the idea that someone else may know better than me what is in my own best interest more than just a little offensive. So, like Berlin, we reject the concept of positive freedom because we recognise that that type of authority can be seriously abused.

With negative freedom, authority is placed in laws and not in people. We know that laws are needed, as Berlin tells us, to assure the equal freedom of all.

1.4 Freedom and schooling

One is able to draw different conclusions about schooling from the respective concepts of positive and negative freedom. I will now explore these two

contrasting concepts to see what their respective impacts on schooling will be.

1.4.1 Positive freedom and schooling

Positive freedom is closely related with South Africa's bleak past. We had a system where Verwoerd, as Minister of Native Affairs, was proudly paternalistic in a speech to parliament in 1953, with reference to what he called the duties and responsibilities of white South Africans regarding the country's native population groups.[19] This, to use the language of positive liberty, was to help guide the less rational members of society, in order to make them more rational. We had a government that cherished only one culture, and anything that deviated from that ideal was deemed to be irrational. So, we can see how a government in the grip of positive liberty, saw it as its duty to be paternalistic to what it viewed as 'savage' population groups in the country.

In education, this trend was obvious. The more knowledgeable white race would help the rest of the country to become more rational. School curricula were just handed to schools, as were syllabi. Teachers were never consulted regarding those decisions, because the 'experts' took care of everything.

In schools, positive freedom has no need for input from learners or from parents, because the staff are the experts, who get to make decisions about the running of the school. There is most definitely a top-down distr''
the ability to exercise authority, with learners being righ+
parents rarely consulted. There is in positive freedom ι

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method of doing things. The rigidity is built into the system, as is the unequal relationship between people.

That is how post 1990 South African society views positive liberty. So there is a natural tendency to gravitate towards negative liberty, because we want to be free from the restraints of our past that tried to control our thinking.

1.4.2 Negative freedom and schooling

Negative freedom in education is more flexible and entails greater choice in making decisions, because there is not simply one correct way of doing things, just better and worse ways of achieving ends. It therefore has cognitive space for input from the community and other interested parties in making decisions. This idea enjoys widespread appeal, because negative freedom has no scope for an expert, who will dictate to us what to learn, how to learn and how to behave. It promotes the idea of equality between people.

Teachers will be educational facilitators who will create a suitable environment where learners can experience learning for themselves. For example, there are moves underway in mathematics whereby teachers no longer teach learners methods of calculation. Rather, teachers pose problems to learners who then try to solve the problems using whichever method they can. In the process, learners experience the method of calculation for themselves. Since all experiences are equal and we all are given the opportunity to gain experience, we can assume that all people are equal. There can thus be no rational grounds for teacher authority in schools.

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Also, in negative freedom, the running of schools will not be left in the hands of the experts, in this case the school staff. The community also has a stake in the running of the school, because it, too, will be affected by the decisions taken at schools. We view this as the necessary democratisation of schools. The school will have to be accountable only to the community that it serves. Furthermore, the community in which the school finds itself will have a reciprocal responsibility relationship to the school. This reciprocal relationship serves to further promote the idea of equality. The end result is that authority becomes an increasingly foreign concept.

I used the work of Berlin and his concepts of positive and negative liberty to show that the meaning of freedom is not self-evident. I then showed that there is currently in South Africa a widespread confidence in the concept of negative liberty as it was expressed by Berlin. Along with this belief is the tendency to view positive liberty with suspicion, as Berlin does, for the same reasons that Berlin does. Those reasons, as explained, are tied up with the apparent rigidity and control that are encapsulated in the concept of positive liberty, as expounded by Berlin.

When Berlin asks the question, "What's wrong with positive liberty?" he answers it by saying that even though he recognises the shortcomings of the concept of negative liberty[20], a belief in the concept of positive liberty leads to a rigid faith in the accepted norms and conventions of society, even if the norms and conventions of the society are in need of a change or are oppressive to the members of the society.

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Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberty suggest two distinct types of social groupings in which each of these two concepts will operate. In Chapter Two I examine two ideologies that underpin the formation of human groupings. I do so in order to clarify authority relations which hold within each of the two groupings underpinned by these ideologies. To this end, I look at the ideas of John Watt.

Chapter Two

Individualism and collectivism

Watt[21] identifies two ideologies which underpin the formation of human (social) groupings. These ideologies affect the way people relate to one another, also in respect of their understanding of the existence or non-existence of authority relations. Watt calls these ideologies <u>collectivism</u> and <u>individualism</u>.

He explains an ideology as a particular way of thinking, an approach to life that is shaped by a set of assumptions, ideals and so on. It influences what we find intelligible. An ideology, he says, is not reached by reasoning about it and coming to a mutually agreeable final solution. Furthermore, we cannot, through reasoning, prove that one ideology is more correct than another.

In most cases an ideology determines the point at which an argument starts; certain assumptions are already made and certain beliefs are already in place. Put another way, the ideology is already adopted. This means that another society or age might approach the same problem from another position, with other underlying assumptions.

But, since we are all steeped in a certain ideology, we experience our ideology as common sense. It is thus difficult for us to accept that another ideology can exist, along with another interpretation of things, and with another interpretation of reality.

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I will now briefly examine Watt's interpretation of <u>individualism</u> and <u>collectivism</u> as specific ideologies.

2.1 Individualism

If we think back to Berlin's concept of negative freedom, then the idea of a certain type of society emerges. Since the idea of negative freedom is an attractive one to us, we should then, by deduction, aspire after a certain type of society, which will be informed by a particular ideology. Negative freedom is about choice. In order for people to make decisions about their society, they have to be free thinking human beings. This idea is captured in the ideology of individualism as John Watt describes it. On the basis of this ideology an independent person can choose if she or he wants to belong to a certain human grouping. This is a fine example of Rousseau's contract theory, to which I refer under section 2.3.2

At this point I wish to claim that Berlin's concept of negative liberty is underpinned by what Watt identifies as individualism. The reason why I say this is because, in order for an individual to recognise the need for freedom from another, she must already have recognised herself as an individual and sovereign being. For an individual to be able to view herself in this way, she must already be embedded in an individualistic ideology.

Watt goes on to illustrate an alternative and contrasting ideology to that of individualism. The point that he is trying to make is that individualism is not the only possible ideology and that it is not as inescapable as it seems to us.

Watt uses the work of the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile to illustrate a strongly collectivist view.

2.2 Collectivism

Watt uses Gentile's collectivist view because its strong expression of a collectivist ideology contrasts most sharply with the individualistic ideology to which we are accustomed. Furthermore, from Gentile's collectivism, we make inferences about the characteristics of individualism in a structured way. For example, we can start to think about the implications for schooling that each of these ideologies presents, especially in regard to authority relationships.

2.2.1 Gentile on the individual and society

Gentile rejects the notion that an individual can exist outside of a society. For Gentile the existence of a state is not dependent on the fact that rational individuals, who exist prior to the states' existence, have deliberately socially contracted to form it, in a Rousseau-ean fashion.

For Gentile, an individual cannot exist apart from her social context. Gentile sees the state as a reality and the individual as an abstraction of that reality. Watt anticipates that we will find this unintelligible, because we are embedded in an individualistic ideology that prizes negative freedom and the idea of the individual as a decision making entity.

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Gentile sees the relation between people, and between people and their environment as internal relations, essential and constitutive of the individual. So, issues cannot be understood in isolation. That is to say, you cannot understand the individual if you examine her in isolation, apart from her social context. You would have abstracted her from her environment and you will miss important elements about her character, her nature and about the whole that she is. Gentile says that individual people exist as members of a society. If they are not members of society they are not, for Gentile, individual people either.

This he illustrates by using the example of language use and language acquisition. He says that we share a tradition of speech and thought. It would be erroneous to believe we create our own language or that we have a say as to its usage. We merely acquire it from our society. It is not possible for an individual to reject the concepts, assumptions and the evaluative orientations which underlie a language, while still continuing to use that language. He is not suggesting that we are all meek conforming beings and that we should all strive to be alike. On the contrary, it is our mastery of our language that allows us to be creative and imaginative and also enables us to disagree with others who share our language. But, first we have to absorb the language of our society, along with its underlying concepts and assumptions, before we are free[22] to display any type of individuality.

We thus need a communal tradition in order to have any form of individuality. Put another way, we need a communal tradition in order to be human.

Gentile then uses the work of Immanuel Kant to further illustrate his point that we do not exist as individuals. Kant uses the example of a man needing money. The man considers borrowing the money and making a promise of repayment which he knows that he cannot make.

This action he can only justify if everyone else is able to do the same thing. But, this creates a tricky paradox. If everyone else could "borrow" without intending to repay, then the concepts "lending" and "borrowing" become meaningless, and the social practices of lending and borrowing would no longer exist.

Gentile uses this example to show that we decide on what would be rational action, by comparing it to the actions of others in our society. In short, we gauge the universal validity of our actions by comparing it to the actions of others in our society.

This, Gentile says, is how we decide what we should do, what action is appropriate, as opposed to just taking impulsive action. He is saying that we try to act the way other rational adults are acting and that we judge the correctness of our actions in relation to the norm.

For Gentile the state has an unlimited scope. It includes even religious beliefs and practices. This is because the state is what gives the individual all that he is. The state does not strive to fulfil the aggregate of the wills of individuals, nor does it portray a common personality of many individuals. The state has a will of its own and a personality of its own. There is no talk of preserving individual wills, because individuals do not have wills outside of those of the

state. Liberty does not belong to an individual, who is an abstract anyway, but to an entire society.

For Gentile the society is a single organism, of which an individual is a cell. Society must be viewed as an organic whole. Society is like the anthill in Eugene Marais's "Siel van die mier"[23] while individuals are like the ants who cannot survive independently of the anthill or apart from the queen, the core of the society. For Gentile an entire human community operates as a single living organism.

At this point we may, together with Watt,[24] distinguish between **ontological** and **normative** categories and formulate, on the one hand, the ontological, and on the other hand, the normative justification for individualism and for collectivism so that we may further progress in understanding the acuteness of Gentile's belief in collectivism.

The ontological justification for individualism consists in that **individual persons** are <u>basic entities</u>; **communities** (or nations, societies or states) are aggregations of individuals. Communities are dependent on individuals for existence.

The normative justification for individualism consists in that only **individual people** and their interests have <u>ultimate importance</u> and value; social organisations have value only to the degree that they serve the interests of individuals. The basic rights of an individual are independent of the community to which the person belongs.

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Gentile rejects both the ontological and normative justifications for individualism, because he views the state as both a fundamental and an ultimate reality, which is understood independently of the existence and interests of individual citizens.

For Gentile, the ontological justification for collectivism consists in that **communities** are the <u>basic entities</u>; **individuals** are "abstractions". "It is impossible even to conceive of an individual person existing apart from a social context".[25] (Individuals are dependent on communities for their very existence.)

The normative justification for collectivism consists in that the **community** (nation, society, state, etc.) has <u>ultimate value</u>, and it is the source of the value and significance of individuals. If need be, the individual should be sacrificed to the survival of the community. Individuals must be brought up to be prepared so to sacrifice themselves to the community by seeing that their identity, and their rights, are dependent on that community. We can see how this idea is expressed in some forms of nationalism (and nation-building).

How are individuals then to be brought up to be prepared for their role in a community, given the way Gentile envisages "community"? This question of course brings me back to the issue of schooling, which is my main focus.

2.2.2 Gentile on schooling

Schooling should serve the ideals of collectivism, according to Gentile[26]. To him that meant promoting the Italian state, teaching learners to see

themselves as Italians, to act like Italians. Teachers, Gentile believed, should promote this national identity by concentrating on Italian history, geography, etc.

We are tempted to ask, where does teaching end and indoctrination begin? But, for Gentile that question would not be intelligible, because indoctrination into your own society is unintelligible since it is your society which in fact describes you and gives you meaning and through which you understand yourself.

For Gentile, this connectedness to others only stretches as far as the borders of a nation, and we are separate from other nations. This is only logical when we think of a nation as a single entity, because we can surely not be the same as another organism/ nation.

Watt states clearly that he has only extracted the collectivist aspects from Gentile's work, and that there is much more to Gentile's work than just the collectivism being discussed here, and a far richer mind to be explored.[27]

Gentile is not the only anti-individualist, but Watt discusses his ideas because his (Gentile's) collectivism contrasts so sharply with individualism. There are other people with anti-individualistic viewpoints to which we are more accustomed, although there the contrasts are not so sharply drawn as in Gentile's work.

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2.3 Other anti-individualistic viewpoints

Watt presents Karl Marx and Rousseau [28] as anti-individualists, even though both their work possesses characteristics that can be viewed as individualistic. Against the background of the work of Marx and Rousseau, we can start to think about specific societies that will display characteristics of either a collectivist or an individualist ideology.

2.3.1 Karl Marx

Marx and Gentile have much in common with each other in respect of the starting points of their arguments. Marx sees the contract theory of society as a myth, to be categorised alongside the fable of Robinson Crusoe. Marx cites the development of speech as indicative of man's collectivist nature and judges the idea of a private language to be preposterous. That is to say, a language that only one person understands and speaks is not a language at all, it is nonsense.

For Marx, man's nature is not one of isolation or of independence, nor is the social order artificially and deliberately created. Individual human nature is socially constructed. An individual can be understood only in his natural environment which, for humans, is the society in which we live.

Up until this point Marx and Gentile have much in common. But, Marx does differ markedly from Gentile in regard to his concept of alienation. For Marx, the experience of working within a capitalistic society is experienced as something alien to the worker, because the worker has no interest in the

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product of his labour. Rather, the worker sells his labour for a wage. Marx finds this objectionable because workers are reduced to items, mere objects in the production process, much like machinery.

People, he feels, should be ends in themselves and not the means to other people's ends. However, in clamouring for the self-directedness of individuals Marx veers towards individualism.

But Watt explains Marx's view as follows:

> But if the individual person's activity is to be self-directed in a social setting (spontaneous and free in his words) the social setting must be one of voluntary co-operation and equality, in which nobody is subordinated to anyone else, and all participate in setting group goals.[29]

So, it can be seen that, for Marx, the rights of the individual are affirmed by her being part of the collective.

As noted above (page 34), the ontological justification for individualism has it that individual persons are the basic entities while communities are aggregations of individuals. Marx's rejection of the ontological justification for individualism is illustrated by his criticism of the social contract myth.

But, while Marx is critical of the ontological justification for individualism, he appears to accept the normative justification for individualism. On page 34 (above) I described the latter as the understanding that individual people and

their interests have ultimate importance. Marx accepts that there are bad societies. These societies for him are those wherein the individual's activity is not derived from their own intentions or their own natures. Individuals are alienated from their labour. This stance of Marx shows that he places high value on the interests of the individual. This we can see is very closely related to the normative justification for individualism.

2.3.2 Rousseau

Rousseau, although he is an individualist, has sharp criticism for one facet of individualism, namely egotistic individualism.

> According to [egotistic individualism] individuals are and ought to be concerned only for their own advantage. Further, the community ought to direct and restrict their self seeking activities as little as possible, because the best set of consequence flow from the unimpeded interaction of all those self- interested individuals in a free market environment.[30]

As can be seen, there is no notion of a common good.

Rousseau legitimates political power by means of his social contract theory. Laws, he says, have a legitimate claim to people's conformity because of individuals' continued involvement in the political process. So, Rousseau is not as individualistic as he first seemed. For Rousseau, once an individual has agreed to the social contract, that individual is involved in collective decision-making.

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There is no talk of a private sphere once the community/collective, has been formed; a collective sentiment then exists. There is then talk of a general will and a common good. So, with Watt, we can see that "Rousseau laid some of the foundations of modern individualism, but in other ways, he presents a sharply conflicting approach to the ideal relationship between individual and society."[31] One can say that, for Rousseau, an individual loses her individualism when she enters into a social contract to become part of a collective. Furthermore, as for Marx, the individual's rights are gleaned by way of being part of the collective.

2.4 Ideological status of "autonomy in belief"[32]

My examination (above) of aspects of Gentile's work uncovers the ideological status of individualism. That is to say, we can now see that there are conceivable intelligible alternatives to individualism. Also, we came to see that individualism is not a single unified body of beliefs, but rather a large family of beliefs, values and so on. How else could an individualist like Rousseau criticise aspects of individualism?

But, there is one aspect of individualism that we believe to be constant throughout, irrespective of one's particular ideology. It is what Watt calls "autonomy in belief." This is the idea that nobody ought to hold any particular belief without having first assessed the evidence supporting that belief for himself. This we accept as fact. It appears to us to be a fundamental principle of rationality and that there can exist no alternative point of view.

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But, Watt goes on to show that even this aspect of individualism has an ideological status, and that it therefore can and does have intelligible alternatives. To illustrate this point, Watt refers us to some of J. H. Newman's claims in his <u>Grammar of assent</u>.[33]

Newman's book seeks to defend a commitment to Catholicism as it existed at the end of the 19th century. This involved the idea that individual judgement be subordinated to the authority of the church. It is obvious that Newman does not subscribe to the idea of individual autonomy of belief.

Newman asserts that, "It is often necessary to act on beliefs which rest for the individual on incomplete foundations, such as partial memory, hearsay, authorities and so on."[34] Newman sees this as unavoidable, which he asserts must make it reasonable.

Since Newman is concerned with Catholicism, he can explain this as being completely acceptable because one can trust the authority of the church because the church is infallible. Many find this idea strange when relating to religion, but then find themselves subscribing to this belief when thinking of science.

In short, Newman says that if one has good reason for believing a person or a group to be a reliable authority on some issue, one will have good reason to believe what that authority says on that issue. For example, we watch the television weather report to see what the experts say, rather than simply looking out the window.

We often operate in this way regarding the sciences. We believe, not because we have assessed or even examined evidence for ourselves, but because of what Newman calls 'implicit faith' in the acknowledged authorities. So in the end Newman is not rejecting the idea of rationality. What he does reject is the idea of rationality being personally constructed by an individual. What Newman relies on is a collective conception of rationality. For Newman, "Knowledge is a social rather than an individual achievement."[35]

Assessing evidence on all matters is thus not the responsibility of each individual person separately. It is carried out collectively in, for example, scientific institutions, on our behalf by specialists in the field, like meteorologists.

We can see how this collectivist view fits in with schooling. Teachers impart knowledge and teach learners skills in schools. In the school, it is the teacher who is the expert and the learners who are the novices. Teachers do not expect learners to painstakingly reinvent knowledge that we already have.

Teachers give their knowledge to learners freely, that is the nature of teaching. The learner has to just accept the benefit that is to be obtained from the teacher's specialist knowledge and skills. The learner does not have to construct rationality for himself; he just has to learn, from the teacher, what is rational.

I will argue in Chapter Six of this minithesis, that it is the belief in the teacher's authority that makes this transfer of knowledge possible. I will show that, if the teacher does not enjoy an authority position in the

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classroom, this natural transfer of knowledge is impeded, if not made totally impossible.

So now I want to go back to what I referred to at the start of this chapter, that is, that according to Watt, one's ideology is the starting point of argument. Now that I have identified two possible starting points, I will outline the two corresponding views of authority.

Also, we have to heed Watt's warning and not compare an ideal with reality. We must either compare reality with reality or ideal with ideal. Collectivism and individualism both have virtues and weaknesses, but if we are going to explore the virtues and weaknesses of individualism as they occur in practice, we must compare these to the virtues and weaknesses of collectivism as they occur in practice, and not to an ideal collectivism.

At this point it is useful to look at Watt's comparison of the virtues and weaknesses of individualism and collectivism in an ideal state.[36]

I summarise this by means of the table on p 43:

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	Individualism	Collectivism
Virtues	Higher tolerance of dissenting opinion More freedom for individuals to develop their own special distinctiveness Protects the rights and interests of individuals, especially of weaker ones	A sense of involvement with other people A reduction of alienation or isolation A greater tendency to take collective responsibility for weaker[37] members
Weaknesses	Self interest Competitive egoism Lack of compassion, fellow-feeling or concern for weaker members of society Runs the risk of atomisation	Conformism in belief and behaviour Intolerance and suppression of difference or dissent within the group Lack of concern for individual rights Aggression towards outsiders Protects the ruling elite from rational opposition by suppressing "critical thinking"

We can use this table to try to understand how authority operates within each ideology. We can also read from the table the respective fears that people harbour regarding an ideology that is alternative to their own. That is to say,

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if I am an individualist, I might be keen to see the virtues of individualism and the weaknesses of collectivism.

2.5 Authority in schooling

I will now try to gauge how each of these two ideologies translate into the specific social practice of schooling. Each of these ideologies will prize either the individual or the society as sovereign. This will have divergent consequences for schooling, specifically in respect of the authority relationship between teacher and learner. I deal with individualism and authority in schooling first.

2.5.1 Individualism and authority in schooling

There are significant points of contact between, on the one hand, a concept of authority derived from an individualistic ideology and on the other hand Berlin's concept of negative freedom. Here the individual, being prized above the society, has to be able to make choices for herself.

We act in accordance with universal rules and laws. Those people who are in authority are put there, not to make decisions, but to implement the laws to which we all agreed. We will all make decisions for ourselves.

In a school, teachers will have the authority to enforce rules, but not to make rules independently. Learners will also be able to give input into the making of these rules. And, that input will be made by learners as individuals and not as a student body or via student representation. In fact, true individualism

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will place the idea of representative bodies in jeopardy; after all, what exactly is being represented when learners can represent themselves?

Furthermore, teacher authority in intellectual matters need not be accepted willy- nilly. Learners can decide for themselves if they will accept the validity of the teacher's lessons.

This is a sentiment that has gained widespread appeal in South African schooling. We want learners to discover things for themselves. We do not want learners to accept everything they are told unquestioningly, as this runs against the current of the critical thinking we are trying to cultivate in our schools. We want questioning and exploration to take place. We want learners to construct their own knowledge, but this does not imply that we want them to construct all knowledge. I will elaborate on this subject in the next chapter.

But, even here we can see what will happen if we have too much of the proverbial good thing. Student heckling and debating ad nauseum may never lead to any kind of consensus when controversial issues are discussed. This can lead to student confusion and teachers may choose to avoid discussions on controversial issues.

2.5.2 Collectivism and authority in schooling

If we believe in collectivism, we accept that the young have to be socialised into our society, so that they can be functioning members of their society. Schooling is what will perform that function.

Collectivism makes a strong case for rigid authority. For a collectivist, authority makes for incredible efficiency in learning. The learner accepts the authority of the teacher, because there can be no other way; that is just the way things are. The learner is just not able to conceive of a different way of operating, because she is in the process of being embedded in the ideology of the society.

Opposition to this idea will be seen to be irrational, and is to be dealt with in the same way that irrationality is dealt with within the framework of positive liberty, as discussed in Chapter One of this minithesis. Also, it is inconceivable for the learner that there can be any intent of malice on the teacher's part. In a collectivist society, the teacher imparts knowledge to the learner, which the latter can accept to be correct, because of the authority of the teacher. There is no need for learner participation in decision making; the teacher can be left with that responsibility because it is the teacher who has that specialised knowledge.

The learner has a responsibility only to learn the rules along which society operates so that she, too, can function optimally in that society and play a meaningful role in that society. An individual is but a unit of the society and each person's contribution to its smooth functioning is important to the special character of the whole.

In the classroom, on an intellectual level, the teacher imparts knowledge to the learners about how the different disciplines, for example mathematics, operate. Once that student knows how to operate within that discipline, she can participate in the practice of doing mathematics.

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But, we need not see authority in a collectivist setting as being stifling, because once the learner knows the rules of mathematics, her freedom in mathematics is ensured and she is at last free to be creative with her mathematics. This is what Kenneth Strike[38] calls the import of received ideas, and it relies on the authority of the teacher, as I will outline in Chapter Six of this minithesis.

The learner simply has to trust the teacher until she herself knows the rules of the game. The teacher's authority is complete. Other issues that don't relate to intellectual pursuits are also left in the teacher's hands, because the teacher is the expert on social matters too and has more experience of the ways and wiles of society than the learner.

The problem arises in that both ideologies can be corrupted one way or the other, and we, like Marx, can opt for what Watt calls ideological inconsistencies. This is a system whereby we can draw the virtues out of both systems, but that can also set us up to accept the corruptions of both systems. Analytically, it is easy to keep individualism and collectivism apart, but we do not have that privilege in practice.

Before I proceed to the next chapter, I want to emphasise the distinction between an ideal and reality. Individualism and collectivism have to be recognised as separate, even though they are not necessarily so in practice. Individualism in practice has as much corruptions as collectivism in practice. We must bear in mind that our own opinions are informed by the individualistic ideology that we prescribe to, and that it is not the only ideology that there is.

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To summarise: I have shown that Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberty are underpinned by two differing ideologies. I claim that negative liberty is underpinned by the ideology of individualism, while positive liberty is contrastingly underpinned by the ideology of collectivism, as expounded by John Watt.

Watt, I explained, goes on to say that it is difficult for us to see outside our own ideology, because we experience our ideology as common sense. Since we are seeped in an individualistic ideology, Watts presents the collectivist ideology as described by Giovani Gentile to show an extremely collectivist ideology, to which we are mostly unaccustomed.

I then claimed that we find an individualistic ideology more appealing because it encapsulates the concept of negative freedom with its inherent flexibility and the idea of equality between people. Collectivism on the other hand is understood to be rigid and it justifies an unequal relationship between people, from which we would be able to justifiably extrapolate an authority relationship between people.

But, how is it that people come to form either kind of human grouping and what causes the continued cohesion of these groupings? In Chapter Three I examine what it is that draws people together into groups and accounts for the continued cohesion of such groups.

Chapter Three

Natural will and rational will

The problem with individualism as outlined by Watt (see Chapter Two) is that one is not sure what to do with it. What, for example, is the ultimate consequence of individualism? Surely, if we take it to its extreme, it seems that we are to become competitive with one another to the point of reclusiveness.

This cannot be what Watt had in mind. Even he recognised that man by nature is a social being. In this chapter I try to uncover the motivation for people forming human groupings and for remaining there. To this end I will examine Tonnies's[39] ideas on human groupings. Tonnies is concerned with what it is that draws people together and induces joint action. However, the issue of what motivates joint action falls outside the scope of this minithesis. What I am interested in is Tonnies's concern with the reasons that underlie the formation and continued cohesion of human groupings. In order to present these ideas, Tonnies formulates the concepts of <u>gemeinschaft</u> and <u>gesellschaft</u>. <u>Gemeinschaft</u> and <u>gesellschaft</u> are to be understood as types of relationships between people, instead of as names for human groupings.

My main object in this chapter is to uncover what Tonnies understands by <u>gemeinschaft</u> and <u>gesellschaft</u> groupings and then to explain what implication this understanding has on our social lives, including especially authority in schooling.

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Tonnies first identifies the two concepts, natural will and rational will. While they may be contrasted with each other, nevertheless, they have this in common: intellect and reason belong to both natural will and rational will.

Rational will is mostly conscious and is associated with making decisions based on reason. Rational will is also more closely related to the concept of individualism as outlined by Watt, in that the individual makes decisions for what is perceived to be in her own best interest.

Natural will on the other hand is, as the name implies, more naive and emotional. It relies less on reason than on deep emotional motivation. It is related to the concept of collectivism as explained by Watt, in that it calls on the collective consciousness and on such ideas as the common good, to which I will return shortly.

I present the main differences between natural will and rational will schematically as follows. The table on p 51 perhaps oversimplifies matters, but it makes for clarity.

Rational will	Natural will
Associated with individualism	Associated with collectivism
It is tied to manufacturing	It is tied to creating
Operates in terms of forging plans and intrigues	Plans are made to solve specific problems
Formulates deliberate means and ends	Plans and actions are motivated by needs
Presupposes negotiation and contracts	Family is the model; it is a strong conception of community
Presupposes individual will	Presupposes collective will

Tonnies calls those human groupings in which natural will predominates, gemeinschaft and those human groupings in which rational will predominates, gesellschaft.[40]

These two concepts, Tonnies says, signify the model qualities of the essence and the tendencies of being bound together. What he means by this is that even though human groupings won't conform strictly to these standards, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft do provide the models by which we may understand human cohesion.

Gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are not types of human groupings in themselves, like religious or educational groups. They refer to the characteristics that are displayed by these human groupings. The essence of both gemeinschaft and gesellschaft is found interwoven in all kinds of human groupings, as I will show below when I discuss Tonnies analysis of human groupings. Also, bear in mind

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that no human grouping is purely <u>gemeinschaft</u> or <u>gesellschaft</u>, though one tendency normally predominates.

3.1 Tonnies on human groupings

Tonnies differentiates human groupings into:

1) social relationships,

2) collectives and

3) social organisations and corporate bodies.

All the human groupings that Tonnies names can be either <u>gemeinschaft</u> or <u>gesellschaft</u>. This will have different implications and consequences for the specific types of groupings, as I will show shortly.

It is important to bear in mind that Tonnies differentiates between, on the one hand, the above sets of human groups, and, on the other hand, a collection of people that can be described as a crowd and have no association with one another, other than proximity. Tonnies has no concern with the latter because for him a crowd does not constitute a human grouping.

3.1.1 Social relationships

This is the simplest social entity, but also the deepest, because here the connection between people is the most intimate and most direct. We can look here to natural relationships like those between family members, or those between ourselves and people with whom we have a strong link - our friends or

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enemies. In this relationship, people might trust each other, feel sympathy with each other and wish each other well, or mistrust each other, and so on.

There exists within the social relationship both gemeinschaft and gesellschaft-like relationships between people. "Gemeinschaft-like relationships differ [from gesellschaft-like relationships] to the extent that [with the former] there is assumed ... a real, even if not complete, equality in knowledge or volition, in power and in authority on the part of the participants, and [with the latter] an essential inequality in these respects."[41]

In a gesellschaft-like relationship, on the other hand, people will share values, and mutual action often results from this relationship, even if the relationship is only between two people. People can expect and demand this action from each other. "Herein lies the embryo of 'rights' which each claims for himself but also concedes to the other, as well as 'duties' to which one feels obligated but which one puts upon oneself knowing that the other party wills that he be and considers that he is so obligated"[42] So we can see that this mutual obligation is what makes a gesellschaft-like relationship so acceptable to us.

We also interact with other people to obtain things that we need. In a gemeinschaft-like relationship, I obtain things that I need by earning them through labour, service or money which I would have obtained through previously selling my labour or delivering a service. This is a social relationship of a different kind from that explained above because it serves a different purpose. It sets the scene for a barter exchange type of relationship. This is not the same as being obliged, but the results of this relationship is mutually beneficial and fulfilled by mutual performance.

On the other hand is the contract relationship into which people enter to meet certain predetermined ends. People enter into this kind of relationship as strangers to each other. The principle that underlies this relationship is, <u>Do, et des</u> I give so that you will give. Tonnies calls this the simplest form of the rational will.

I bear this in mind when I later turn my attention to schools, because in schools we deal with people on both levels. Teachers want to be treated and seen as equals when relating to each other and to those in authority positions, like principals and such, and have certain rights attached to that, while on the other hand, teachers cannot see learners as equals in terms of many things.

According to Tonnies both <u>gemeinschaft</u> and <u>gesellschaft-like</u> relationships exhibit what he calls the <u>fellowship</u> and the <u>authoritative</u> type relations. He then shows how these operate within <u>gemeinschaft-like</u> and <u>gesellschaft-like</u> relationships respectively.

The *fellowship type* of relationship is represented best by a pair that lives together in a harmonious, friendly and comradely manner. Tonnies refers to this as a brotherly relationship and gives examples of great friendships in Greek writing. But two brothers are for Tonnies the most natural and probable pair of friends, because of their origin rather than for their motive.

The *authoritative type* of relationship is the relationship of father to child and it is found throughout human societies. The father role is that of protection over the weaker child. With this protection is linked authority, because the child has to

follow the directions and the commands of the protector. The tendency to change this authority into force is controlled by the love and tenderness that the father feels toward the weaker members of his family. The authority of the father is the authority upon which all gemeinschaft-like authority is based. We can see numerous examples of this in religion and more recently in the state, which portrays itself as the father of the nation.

The *mixed type* of relationship is where the two are mixed with characteristics of both a fellowship and an authoritative relationship existing. Tonnies here gives as an example the lasting relationship between a man and a woman.

The fellowship and authoritative relationships exist in a gesellschaft-like relationship too. Authority here is based upon a free contract by individuals or by an agreement to place a person or body in a position of authority and to recognise that person or body as being in authority. People can also agree whether to follow that authority conditionally or unconditionally.

In the modern state authority is attained by the difference in power between political parties. This is however an unequal relation but it is judged to be legitimate because permission is granted by the individual by accepting a constitution and participating in the political process, for example by voting, or even choosing not to.

This is also the authority upon which peace treaties are signed between the victorious and the conquered countries. To quote Tonnies: "Apparently it is a contract, but in actuality it is coercion and abuse."[43] This is so because the conquered country doesn't really have an equally strong bargaining position.

3.1.2 The collective

A collective is more evolved than a mere social relationship, but it does not yet have the sophistication of a social organisation. It too is comprised of many individuals who are held together so that common feelings and ways of thinking emerge, but a collective is not capable of volition as long as it is not organised into a social organisation.

In the case of a collective, the concepts of a gemeinschaft and gesellschaft also apply. The social collective appears to its members to be a naturally occurring phenomenon. In this respect it is a gemeinschaft-like relationship.

The most obvious example of this is the Indian caste system, where people believe that they are born into a certain position and to perform a certain function unquestioningly. This belief in a system is so completely embraced that "a complete emancipation from the social relationships established at birth seldom occurred and was often impossible"[44]

But even so, there can exist even within this system scope for positive self-identity. The entire group sees itself as possessing special superiorities or virtues. There is thus an intellectual base for coherence to a group that is revered for, for example, its art, its skill or craftsmanship.

The Indian caste system which I used as an example above, also serves to alert us to the danger of gemeinschaft-like relationship. People in that situation have

come to take their lack of status as a social 'given' and thus they never push the boundaries of their society and socially given roles.

3.1.3 The social organisation

The social organisation, Tonnies says, is capable of creating a definite unified will and it can constrain individuals to act in conformity to that unified will[45]. The members of a social organisation have to be aware that they are entering into such a relationship and that it is their very membership that makes the organisation exist and gives the organisation its impetus to act. This mass membership gets refined into social organisations and corporations.

The social organisation or corporate body is never a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is a completely social phenomenon and must be understood as comprising of several individuals. But it is identifiable by its capacity to make unified decisions, volition and actions, much like an individual.

3.2 Schooling and human groupings

Since the different types of human groupings that Tonnies identifies can all be either gemeinschaft or gesellschaft, it would seem to indicate that a human grouping can choose the reasons for their existence and thus the characteristics it displays. So, a human grouping like a school cannot only choose what type of school community it wants to be, but it can change its characteristics. There are people who feel that schools have already made the change to a gesellschaft-like relationship, as I show below.

If the school is viewed as embodying a predominately gemeinschaft-like relationship, then the learners, being of a lower status, will have to respect the teacher's authority position. Teachers, while enjoying an authority position, will have the task of not only equipping learners with academic skills, but also with the task of embedding learners in the culture and language of the community in which they live. We can see Gentile and his wish for learners to be taught their national identity, fitting quite comfortably into this gemeinschaft-like relationship.

Furthermore, teachers will be seen as nurturers and guiders of learners in the school. They will be seen as both ensuring the continued well-being of society as well as guiding learners towards the position that they need to maintain as rational adult members of society.

In South African schooling a shift has taken place away from a gemeinschaft-like relationship, to a gesellschaft-like relationship. In Apartheid South Africa we have seen gross abuse of authority in attempts to guide learners towards specific, racially classified jobs in society. Education and schooling were no longer about nurturing and guiding. Gemeinschaft-like relationships came to be about paternalism and racial domination.

However, with the emergence of democracy we have a situation where a gesellschaft-like type of relationship is now being endorsed at schools. This was a concrete choice that was made. Learners are now coming to be seen as equal partners in their own education. This view places extra responsibilities on the learner. But, at the same time it also serves to erode the idea of teacher authority.

If schooling is in fact underpinned by a <u>gesellschaft-like</u> type of relationship, then that means that the members of a school body interact as a free association of equals who have socially contracted, with specific aims. One aim might be simply to form a school. Teachers, being as equally socially contracted as the learners, can make no claims to authority in the classroom. If the teacher is to enjoy any authority, it has to be decided upon in the original social contract.

If a school then is a <u>gesellschaft-like</u> grouping then we have to accept that the teacher's authority is subject to debate and that the nature of that authority has to be agreed upon by all interested parties. This is an idea that enjoys widespread favour in South African schooling and schools now have numerous meetings to decide on issues that were formerly decided upon by the school staff or principal. This participation by all the relevant role players is viewed as a democratic practice, in a country that sees itself as a fledging democracy preoccupied with protecting the democratic rights of all its citizens. There is no scope for the idea of a school as a <u>gemeinschaft-like</u> grouping, because the latter conflicts with our ideas about democracy.

In this chapter I explored the reasons why people form and maintain human groupings. To this end, I discussed the work of Tonnies who ascribes social cohesion to either rational will or natural will. Different types of groupings are driven by predominantly either one or the other. He calls those groupings in which natural will predominates, <u>gemeinschaft-like</u> groupings, while those groupings in which rational will predominates, he calls, <u>gesellschaft-like</u> grouping.

Tonnies says that people enter into a <u>gesellschaft-like</u> relationship in order to gain something out of the collective, like security, collective strength or companionship. A <u>gesellschaft-like</u> relationship is perceived as a contract type relationship, where people interact as equals. In a <u>gemeinschaft-like</u> relationship on the other hand there is scope for an unequal relationship between people, as a result of the group not being chosen or formally socially contracted by the members of the group.

I will return to this issue in Chapter Six when I look at the work of Francis Dunlop in order to establish whether schools are in fact more appropriately <u>gemeinschaft</u> or <u>gesellschaft</u>, also in respect of our ideas about democracy and the school as a community. This of course will have important consequences for our understanding of authority in schooling.

In Chapter Four I look at conceptions of community as expressed by Michael Sandel, in order to better understand what kind of community we live in. Tonnies has already shown that we use either rational will or natural will when we form human groupings. With Sandel I return to Watt's ideologies of individualism and collectivism and I place them in a social setting. In this way I can identify different types of communities with either an individualist or a collectivist ideology. This way of looking at communities will shed new light on how authority fits or does not fit into the social setting. With this new information about both authority and communities, I will be in a better position to make more informed choices in regard to our communities, the schools within them and the sense of authority in them.

Chapter Four

Conceptions of community

In South Africa, the word <u>community</u> is being used as though it is a panacea to all our problems. We call for community involvement in a whole host of projects; we say that we need community support and that we do things for the benefit of the community. But what is it that we mean when we talk of community, and what is it that makes us part of a community? What in fact is the essence of community? What I am asking is: What makes a community a community?

Michael Sandel[46] presents an interesting angle on where individuation and collectivism (which he refers to as communitarianism) fit into the debate about what a community is.

4.1 Individualistic and collectivist conceptions of community

In this chapter I explore the three conceptions of community that Sandel presents.

Sandel's three conceptions of community are[47]:

1. the instrumental
2. the sentimental, and
3. the constitutive

conception of community.

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4.1.1 The instrumental conception of community

With this conception, individuals regard social arrangements as a necessary burden and they co-operate only for the sake of pursuing their own private ends. When individuals participate in group ventures, they ask the question: What's in it for me?

This conception, however, takes for granted the self-interested motivations of individuals. It relies on and presupposes the individualistic ideology as identified by Watt and which I discussed in Chapter Two of this minithesis.

4.1.2 The sentimental conception of community

This conception is one that Sandel derives from Rawls[48]. With this conception, individuals, or participants in the community, have certain shared final ends. Their interests are not uniformly antagonistic. This means that individuals are not necessarily in constant competition with one another.

In fact, individuals may even have complementary and overlapping interests. These are the convergent interests that Charles Taylor[49] talks of. Participants here ask the question, "What ends shall I choose?" which, Sandel rightly says, is a question directed to the will.[50] I will later return to this issue, because the sentimental conception of community has no way of explaining where our wills come from.

Both the instrumental and the sentimental conceptions of community are individualistic, but they are so in different ways. In the instrumental conception, the subjects of co-operation are assumed to be governed by self-interested motivation alone.

With the sentimental conception of community, the community is partly internalised, because it reaches the feelings and the sentiments of those engaged.

Sandel says that neither the instrumental nor the sentimental conceptions of community as put forward by Rawls, given that both presuppose individuation of the subject,

> can offer a way in which the bounds of the subject might be
> redrawn; neither seems capable of relaxing the bounds between self
> and the other without producing a radically situated subject.[51]

Sandel maintains that a deeper conception of community is needed to attain this, because it would need to penetrate the self more profoundly than even the sentimental view permits.

Sandel can see that an alternative conception of community is needed. Furthermore, for my purposes in this minithesis, an alternative conception is needed. The instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community offer no way of justifying an authority relationship of any kind. Furthermore, they offer no way of understanding authority in a community; authority is just not possible with a competitive and individualistic conception of community. I, therefore, also need

an alternative conception of community. Sandel presents us with this alternative conception. It is called the constitutive conception of community.

4.1.3 The constitutive conception of community

The constitutive conception of community sees the community as a mode of self-understanding, partly constitutive of the subject's identity. Participants ask the question, "What am I?"

The community describes not just what the participants have, but also what they are. This is not a relationship that is chosen (as in a voluntary association of equals) but rather, an attachment that is discovered by the participants. The community is not merely an attribute of the participants, rather it is constitutive of their identity. This can be likened to a gemeinschaft type of association. The participant, through time, by participating in his community, is participating in the constitution of his identity.

Let me here return to the question of the will I spoke of in trying to understand Rawls's sentimental conception of community. Rawls saw the need for free association of subjects and they were able to choose their associations. But, how was this choice to be made? It was seen as a question of trying to attain shared goals. There was no question of a common good; that lies in the domain of collectivism whereas Rawls is individualistic.

Thus, the sentimental conception of community does not explain the continued cohesiveness of a community. Nor does it explain why members of a community may have shared interests if the community is comprised merely of a random

grouping of people who came together solely in order to reach shared goals. So it would seem that the sentimental conception of community that Rawls presents in fact presupposes a constitutive conception of community.

4.2 Communities as imagined

The question which drives this chapter is, How do we define a community? In Chapter Three I showed how Tonnies made a distinction between a crowd of people and a distinct human grouping. From that it can be deduced that a community is a distinct and identifiable form of human grouping.

Community is a much used word in South Africa in the 1990's, especially in regard to schooling. There is a commonly held belief that there should be community involvement in schooling. Furthermore, people speak of education being accountable to the community. But, what is it that constitutes a community? On page 61 of this minithesis I asked the question: what is the essence of community? I wanted to know what it is that makes a community a community.

The first problem with having no fixed description for community is that the concept becomes vague. This creates problems in that some unscrupulous people might be able to make community mean what they need it to mean in specific situations[52]. This can be done by adjusting the meaning of the word community to make it suit specific and maybe selfish needs.

Also, while we don't have a clear description of a community, we have no way of recognising conflicts of interests between various communities[53]. So what do we mean when we talk about the community?

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In South Africa, there is much emphasis on the issue of accountability in education. We want the education that a child receives at school to be relevant and useful for the child's life in the community, and also for the community at large. This position precludes the possibility of a malicious or a truly evil community. From this we can conclude, that when we talk about community, we understand a community to be "good" and that the term only applies to benevolent human groupings.

Also, we understand that a community is not limitless in size. A community has to have boundaries. If this were not so, then it would not be possible for other communities to exist. This would mean that we all would have to belong to the same community and the idea and the word "community" would cease to exist. Since we acknowledge that there are other communities, it must then be apparent that our own community must have boundaries.

Having discussed three conceptions of community, as presented by Michael Sandel, I now turn to some ideas of Benedict Anderson on community. Anderson presents a different approach to understanding the concept of community. He introduces the idea of community as "imagined."

Benedict Anderson says that "In fact all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined".[54] Anderson explains that by imagined he means that even though members of a community do not personally know each other, in the minds of the individual people, there is an image of their community. He is careful to not align his 'imagining' with invention and fabrication and ultimately with falsity. This is Anderson's main criticism of Gellner, who interprets imagining as fabrication and

falsity. Anderson sees a community as "imagined", in that there is no brute identifiable data. By brute identifiable data is meant physical observable proof.

But Wally Morrow[55] has a criticism of Anderson's view. Anderson, he says, is seduced by the idea that a primordial village of face-to-face contact is a "real" community, whereas everything else is an imagined community. The primordial village is for Anderson still the model upon which communities are constructed. Also, it can then be the real model with which imagined communities are to be compared and contrasted. This, according to Morrow, is a mistake.

Morrow says:

> To bring this point into the open we can say, polemically, that all communities, large or small, are 'imagined'. To be 'imagined' is the mode of existence of communities as such.[56]

In Morrow's view, Anderson made only a half hearted concession to the idea of the mental conception of the primordial village. But, Anderson should have committed himself to the fact that all communities are imagined.

This then means that even the primordial village of face-to-face contact is an imagined community. Individuals within communities thus have to conceive of, i.e. understand, themselves as belonging together.

Such self-understanding is constitutive of their being a community.[57] But, it is possible that an individual can imagine a community on his/her own. Imagining will most likely be an individual activity. This is not what makes a community a

community. In order for a community to be recognised as such, it can be said that a community needs a shared understanding of its being a community, in order to in fact be a community. The act of imagining a community, cannot thus be an individual pursuit. The imagining of a community has to be done collectively, if the community is to exist. Since this happens in the mind of individuals it is not brutely identifiable.

Another consequence of communities being imagined is that people are thus capable of shaping the kind of community they want, since the community is a human construct. This will have important consequences for authority in schooling.

The instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community cannot justify authority in schooling. I have pointed out (see p 63) that these conceptions of community in fact offer no way of justifying an authority relationship of any kind. Neither do they offer any way of understanding authority in a community. Therefore, I argue for a constitutive conception of community in schools, underpinned by the idea of a community as imagined. The different conceptions of community (as discussed under 4.1 above) too have an impact on the authority relationship that may or may not exist in the school. I now turn to this matter.

4.3 Conceptions of community and schooling

The school that the learner attends constitutes his identity. The learner also recognises that he is a novice and that the teachers are the experts and the teachers work for the sake of the common good and that they, the learners, are

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being socialised into the social order. There can be no idea that teachers work to attain their own ends, be they benevolent or selfish.

Teachers teach for the good of the entire school community. Herein lies the teacher's claim to authority in the classroom, rightly so I think. The constitutive conception of community is a strong conception of community. Learners belong to this community and are thus described by it. Because learners are described by their community, they should strive to partake in and bolster the reputation of the community.

The school operates much as a family in the sense that there are almost natural authorities, as opposed to just other participants in the community, trying to impose their will on learners. The teacher is an expert in not just academic pursuits, but also in the ways of society. Learners respect the teacher's authority so that they may gain advantage from the teacher's specialist knowledge.

I justify these claims about authority and teacher expertise in Chapter Six, the final chapter, of this minithesis. I here used the work of Sandel and Anderson, and the understanding of individualism and collectivism that I had gained from John Watt in Chapter Two of this minithesis. Sandel offered three conceptions of communities, those types being the instrumental, the sentimental and the constitutive conceptions of community. I said that in the instrumental conception of community, people participate for their own private ends. In the sentimental conception of community people participate to reach shared final ends. So, both those conceptions of community can be seen to be individualistic, since the

individual enters into the community which is external to the aims of the individual.

The constitutive conception of community I claim, sees the community as a mode of self-understanding, partly constitutive of the subject's identity. Also, I claim that it is only in a truly communitarian collective where authority can be justifiably exercised, because it can be recognised to be for the common good. The idea of the common good is, I've explained in chapter two of this minithesis, not conceivable in an individualistic ideology.

So, in South African schooling, it is the constitutive conception of schooling that we need to promote, if we are to justify teacher authority. If we can conceptualise the community as a constitutive community and therefore collectivist, the teacher's authority will be seen as natural authority and as a matter of course.

Furthermore, the teacher will be regarded as an expert in not just academic matters, but also in regard to the teacher's greater experience in the community and the ways of the community. This includes the practices and the language of a community, which a child at school should acquire in order to not only be a contributing member of that society, be also to be able to partake in the practices of the community in which she lives.

The essence of a community is, I said, to be "imagined". Since a community is imagined and exists in the minds of the community members, people thus become the driving members. People, though not as individuals, but as a human collective can thus imagine the type of community that they want to form.

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In Chapter Five I refer to work of Charles Taylor and explore how we gain knowledge of ourselves in a social setting and how it is possible for social theory to not only comment on social practice, but also to change it. A discussion of Taylor's ideas also throws more light on the idea of community as "constitutive".

Chapter Five

Social theory and social practice

In Chapter One I explored Berlin's concepts of positive and negative freedom. It can be recalled that, according to Berlin, positive and negative freedom are not two different interpretations of a single concept. Rather, he said, they are two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life. He thought that one has to subscribe to either one or the other, depending on the ideology of the society in which one lives. By using the work of Charles Taylor[58] I will show that this is not so.

I will here again discuss the distinction between positive and negative liberty, but this time I will not use Berlin's perspective. I will refer to Charles Taylor's "What's wrong with negative liberty?" As can be seen, he asks the contrasting question to Berlin's "What's wrong with positive liberty?"

5.1 Exercise and opportunity concepts

Taylor argues that there are different approaches when it comes to defining the concept of freedom. He says that there are those who define freedom exclusively in terms of the independence of the individual from interference by others. This is what Berlin called negative liberty. Then, there are those who believe that freedom resides at least in part in collective control over the common life. This is what Berlin called positive freedom. Taylor then quotes Bentham and Hobbes as the model exponents of negative freedom . This is crudely put as the absence of external physical or legal force.

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Taylor sees this as a shallow view of freedom, because it ignores other internal factors, like lack of awareness, false consciousness or even phobias. On the other hand, proponents of positive freedom can be found to be guilty of everything that Berlin feared they would be.

Taylor realises that this is a crudely caricatured view of the two concepts of freedom, but he is not overly concerned with giving elaborate descriptions of positive and negative liberty. What Taylor is concerned with displaying with these two examples is that positive and negative liberty can go badly and sadly wrong in practice. He is not interested in showing one concept of freedom to be better than another.

Taylor accepts Berlin's view according to which theories of negative freedom are concerned with the area in which the subject should be left without interference, whereas the doctrines of positive freedom are concerned with who or what controls me. Taylor puts this another way and says that positive freedom is concerned with the <u>exercise</u> of control over one's life. On the other hand, negative freedom is concerned with the <u>opportunity</u> to do things.

So, positive freedom is an exercise concept while negative freedom is an opportunity concept.

So, given the concept of negative freedom, freedom is the opportunity to do that which you want to do. This concept seems to have a backing in common sense. It is only logical to want to have no obstacles in the way of your actions and of achieving your desires.

The concept of positive freedom is, contrastingly, about the capacity that we have to realise. So we can see that even if one has met all the requirements of negative freedom, which is having the opportunity to act, one is not necessarily free, because it is possible to still have internal obstacles.

I will use the rather extreme example of agoraphobia. An agoraphobe is not able to socialise, so that that person's lifestyle is affected and the very ability to be human is restricted. This is so because socialising is a large part of what it is to be human; we are after all, social creatures.

What does this translate to in schooling? If we use the concept of negative freedom, we can pass laws that say that learners can choose which schools they want to go to. The obstacles to a free choice have been removed. But, is the learner really free to go to any school he chooses if he does not know that there are other schools in his area?

Another example would be a child at school. We cannot say that the learner is being educated because she is at school. The learner has to be able to partake in her schooling. Being at school presents the learner with the opportunity to be educated, while partaking in her schooling is to make use of, that is, to exercise that opportunity.

So we can see that the two concepts of positive and negative freedom are inter-related. You cannot exercise in a practice if you do not have the opportunity to partake in that practice.

So Taylor shows us that negative freedom and positive freedom are not as distinct and separable as would appear at first glance. They are in fact co-dependent concepts.

It goes even further than this. In order to recognise an opportunity, you need to already have exercised that practice. This I will discuss more fully, in relation to language and intersubjective meaning, when I return to Charles Taylor later in this chapter. Suffice to say that an unrecognised opportunity is no opportunity at all, literally.

So what does this do with our conception of authority in South African schooling? We can now see how the strong belief we in South Africa have in the virtues of negative freedom is slightly misaligned. We cry for opportunity and our freedom, because we believe it is our right. But, now Taylor makes us see that we are asking for one side of a coin. A one sided coin is no coin at all. So, when we take the exercise concept of positive freedom on board, we have to take all the baggage of positive liberty on board too.

Positive liberty of course has scope for unequal relations between people, a situation which is totally absent in negative freedom. Positive liberty has the cognitive space for experts, who have more knowledge and even more experience than the learner.

In the case of schooling, it will be the teacher who has more knowledge and experience and will thus have the role of expert, whereas the learner is the novice who will learn from the teacher, the language, norms, practices and ideology of

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his society. This is not peculiar to school, but for the purposes of this minithesis, schooling is my main concern.

Since there is no way that positive liberty can be dropped out of the South African schooling landscape, we can now attempt a wider view of the landscape. It appears that our fears of positive liberty were ungrounded, but that does not mean that our desire and demands stemming from our belief in negative freedom were ungrounded. Negative freedom is an equally important part of the picture. By the same token that an opportunity you can't exercise is no opportunity, taken from the other side reads, you can't partake in a practice if you aren't given the opportunity.

Taylor took Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberty and unlike Berlin, Taylor asks, "What's wrong with negative liberty." Taylor shows that negative and positive liberty are not concepts that are independent of each other.

Taylor says that negative liberty is an opportunity concept, while positive liberty is an exercise concept. This inextricably links the two concepts and changes our understanding of freedom and of the possibility of authority relationships.

Thus, it can be seen that Berlin's two concepts of freedom are truly co-dependent.

Furthermore, in retrospect we can see that it is not really plausible to support one concept of freedom over the other, since the two concepts cannot operate in isolation of each other. Neither can one concept in isolation of the other form the basis of an ideology on which to base a society. But, since it is clear that the two

concepts of freedom are inseparable, we can accept that unequal relationships exist between people in society and in the forming of societies. This is inherent in Berlin's concept of positive liberty as has been shown above, especially in Chapter One. It is this unequal relationship between people that is necessary for an authority relationship.

5.2 Social theory as practice

In Chapter Four I looked at conceptions of community as discussed by Sandel. Now I want to explore how we gain understanding of such matters, in a social setting.

The natural sciences model has a firm grip on how we approach research of any kind. There is also "the widespread view that the natural sciences can provide us with paradigms for the methods and procedures of social science".[59] I now want to argue that it is this very model that is partly responsible for the breakdown of authority in schools.

The natural sciences model is based on a distinct view of knowledge. This view says that we acquire knowledge though experience. This means that things have to be observable and not interpreted. Since everyone has an equal chance of experiencing things and observing brute identifiable data, we all are equal as far as the acquisition of knowledge goes. This makes for a powerful argument for the equality of all people. There can be no experts in a field and the teacher can thus have no justifiable grounds on which to demand authority in the classroom, since she is thus not an expert.

But is knowledge acquired solely by way of observing or experiencing things?

I will now argue that it is not so. I will start by stating that theorising about social matters is a different kind of activity from theorising about the natural sciences. The current view that supposes that theorising about social and the natural sciences is the same activity, is one that we need to abandon. Furthermore, the natural sciences model is an attractive one because it is easy to prove or disprove a theory since there are principles of verification in place, that social theory does not enjoy.

So there is a conception that social theory is not as valid as natural science theory and that the social sciences must strive to attain the same levels of precision that the natural sciences enjoy if they are to enjoy the same level of prestige.

Social sciences are concerned with answering the question: "What's going on?" That is a question that cannot be answered by mere observation. In order to find answers here, you need to interpret what is being seen. Furthermore, you need to know the practices of that society. Taylor uses the example of negotiation[60]. He says the practice of negotiation presupposes an understanding of that practice. We also understand things like breaking off negotiations and negotiating in good or bad faith, because we are familiar with the practice of negotiation. The use of these terms show that we know how negotiation works and what constitutes negotiation. We have a language to describe that practice. So we can see that there is a link between understanding a practice and engaging in a practice and in using the language of a practice. This reality, of negotiation, is a practice that cannot be identified in abstraction from the language that we use to describe it

(negotiation). So, the social reality and the language we use to describe that social reality, are not separable.

Political behaviour, Taylor says, cannot be observed in a detached way like natural phenomena can, because there is no brute identifiable data which is independent of interpretation. An example of this is voting behaviour. One can clearly see the person raising her hand to vote in a meeting. If one is unsure of the person's reason for raising her hand, you can always ask her to clarify her actions.

But, voting in this way can only make sense in a society that actually votes in this way. A society that just does not vote will just not have an action for it, nor will they have words to describe the practice of voting.

Intelligible behaviour (such as voting) is possible because of what Charles Taylor calls "intersubjective meaning"[61]. What this means is that the meaning of words is shared by everyone in that community. It is not the same as a convergent meaning. A convergent meaning is reached by the consensus of individuals in that individual people make a decision regarding the meaning of a word. On Charles Taylor's interpretation of intersubjective meaning, meaning cannot be attributed to single individuals because the words and practices in a community must be coherent to everyone in a community.

The members of the society will already know what it is that they are doing, they do not need the social theorist to tell them what it is that they are doing. They already have the practices that are being observed and they have a language for it.

It would seem that if I am insisting on this shared meaning, and the shared language, I am implying we create a society where no conflict exists, as we all agree on everything. But, this is exactly what I am not implying. A shared agreement is not a consensus.

Figuratively speaking, we must speak the same language if we want to dispute things. We must both mean the same thing by the words that we use, if we are to disagree with each other. Great cleavage in a society is only possible if that society has a common vocabulary, beliefs and customs. There has to be some common ground.

There are also rules that constitute practices in a society. I want to make a quick example here of what constitutive rules are. The game of soccer has many rules. There is a rule that says that when the soccer ball crosses a certain line in front of the goal post, then a goal is scored and a point is earned. If that rule did not exist, then the game of soccer would not exist as we know it. Maybe another similar game might exist, but it would be folly to call it soccer. Now a soccer player already knows all these rules and how to play the game.

Social settings operate in the same way. Taylor explains as follows:

> There is always a pre-theoretical understanding of what is going on among the members of a society, which is formulated in the descriptions of self and other which are involved in the institutions and practices of that society. A society is among other things a set of institutions and practices, and these cannot exist and be carried out without certain self-understandings.[62]

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Taylor is thus saying that there are constitutive rules that describe the practice. I have already illustrated this with the example of negotiation and the game of soccer. Participants in a practice must be aware not only of the rules of a practice, but also the role that they play in that practice. That is, the participants' self descriptions are needed in the practices of their society.

I want to reflect here on Sandel's views on conceptions of community (see Chapter Four). According to Sandel, on the constitutive conception of community, the community is a mode of self-understanding, partly constitutive of the subjects' (participants') identity.

Now, we can see that it is the practices in the community that are constitutive of the participants' identity. It would thus appear that Sandel was incorrect in identifying different conceptions of community, as all communities now appear to be constitutive communities.

Since all communities can be seen as constitutive communities, what does this mean for authority in schools?

In order for children to participate in their community, they have to learn the intersubjective meanings of their community and the social practices and the constitutive rules of the practices in their community. At school, the teacher will be the expert while the student will be the novice. This is true not just of purely academic pursuits, but also in matters of social and political importance.

Most learners can accept that teachers have more knowledge than they do when it comes to things like mathematics or whatever it is that the teacher teaches. But,

in decisions about how to distribute funds or who gets to make decisions about school discipline, the matter becomes less clear. But, teachers have more knowledge than learners here also, by virtue of them having more experience and thus knowing the constitutive rules of the society better than the learners.

This uneven relationship between teacher and pupil is thus unavoidable and the teacher's authority position in the classroom is justified. This echoes what I said earlier in this chapter about the unequal relationship that exists between people when we accept Berlin's concept of positive liberty. Bear in mind that Taylor's views of the concepts of positive and negative liberty do not allow for positive liberty to be adopted without, too, adopting negative liberty, which acts as a *sheriff* to rampant authority.

Taylor is concerned with how we understand social practices and how social theory affects our social practice. For example, now that we have an alternative understanding of freedom, we are able to alter some social practices around that understanding.

Most significantly for me in this minithesis is the social practice of schooling, especially authority in schooling. How do we understand a social practice?

Taylor says that we don't just identify data, we also interpret it. Our interpretation, he says, is based on our previous experiences and how we are already shaped by our society in which we live.

So, what Taylor says is that we understand a practice by interpreting what we see, based on what we already know. Social theory, he says, has a language

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which is embedded in a social practice. The language of a practice has meaning only if you understand the practice. Also, participants' self-descriptions are tied up in practices, so that practices of a community are constitutive of the members of that community. This means that all communities are like Sandel's constitutive community that I looked at in Chapter Four of this minithesis.

So, this means that for children to participate in their community, they have to first learn the language of their community and also the social practices of their community. This they learn from people who are already embedded in the social practices of their society, for example parents and teachers, who are more knowledgeable and more experienced in ways of society. The teachers then, as experts in the society, are thus justified in their authority positions and learners aspire to reaching the same level of expertise as their teachers.

Furthermore, Taylor also says that one of the most significant ways in which social theory differs from scientific theory, is that social theory is itself capable of changing the actual practice, while this is not the case with theorising about natural phenomena. This latter point (about theorising about natural phenomena) can be easily illustrated by pointing out that the moon would still exist and rotate around the earth at its own pace and trajectory, even if there were no people to theorise about it.

But this is not an option for social theory. Social theory is about people. As such, we are capable of understanding our practices. If, while trying to understand our practices we discover alternative methods of doing things, we are quite capable of changing things. Looked at in this way, social theory can be viewed as having a more legitimate purpose and method than scientific theory, but this is an idea that will draw much criticism from empirical scientists.

When I discuss the importance of an authority relationship in schools in Chapter Six of this minithesis, I do so in the light of this possibility, that we will seek to change some aspects of the social practices of teaching and learning.

In the next and final chapter (Chapter Six) I argue why this uneven relationship between teacher and pupil is necessary. I show how Francis Dunlop argues that the educative relationship is by nature an unequal relationship based on authority and on trust, like the unequal relations that exist in a family.

Chapter Six

Authority in schooling

In this chapter I want to answer the question: "Should we try to retrieve a sense of authority in South African schooling?" I have already argued, by exploring the concept of freedom and a particular conception of community, that a sense of authority is justified and necessary in schooling.

By now I trust that it is clear that I am in favour of a retrieval of authority. To start with, I want quickly to say what authority is not.

Authority is not to be linked to the use of force or brute displays of power. De Jouvenel says," Having to resort to force shows a failure of authority."[63]

Furthermore, respect for authority does not imply blind faith. We should never be able to reach a stage where our respect for authority is used to replace our rationality. We can't ever stop thinking, just because the teacher said so.

But, this is not what I want to say in this chapter. I do not want to define or redefine authority. All I want to achieve in this minithesis, is to say that we should retrieve authority in schooling.

I have already explained how communities are, through their practices, constitutive of their participants' identities. I then justified the unequal relationship between teacher and learner in terms of an expert and novice relationship. With this I said that the expert would share his knowledge with the

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novice and embed the novice into the moral culture of his community as well as impart the language and norms of that community.

I now want to clarify what I mean when I speak of a novice and an expert. I will use the terms the way Kenneth Strike[64] uses them. In schools, the learner is the novice. The novice is the one whose expressed aim is to learn. The novice learns from the expert. The expert in the school setting is the teacher.

The learner in school has to learn many things that he is not yet capable of understanding. Think for example of the young child learning to count. The child cannot be expected to understand the intricate mathematical complexities of our number system. I doubt that many people need ever have such a deep understanding of mathematics. But we, like the child starting school, accept that our numbers run in the way we have been taught. Later, we accept formulas and theorems, without asking for proof.

This does not mean that learners are to be unthinking. Learners will eventually, once they have mastered the practice of mathematics, find that the formulas and theorems they were taught, to be true.

In her book Authority and Democracy April Carter quotes Carl Friedrich as saying, "Authority is not an alternative to reason but is grounded in it."[65] He is talking both of authority pronouncements made by those who have authority, as well as the credibility of those in authority. What we are being warned of by Friedrich is exactly what is happening in South Africa. Carter says, "But if we press our questions to the point of radical scepticism then our demand for reasons is incompatible with our acceptance of authority."[66] This means that when we

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start asking the kind of questions that are intended to undermine authority, we have already lost our belief in authority.

What does this mean for schooling and where does teacher authority find its justification? I will turn to the work of Francis Dunlop[67] for help in this regard.

Dunlop uses Tonnies's <u>gemeinschaft</u> and <u>gesellschaft</u> groupings and applies them to a specific kind of human grouping. The grouping that Dunlop uses is a school. We can use his view to gain a better understanding of the school as a particular type of human grouping. Furthermore, we can see the implications for authority in schooling in this particular instance.

Dunlop defines <u>gesellschaft</u> as a voluntary association of human beings. This association, he says, is born from the realisation that some important human aims can be more easily realised in association with other human beings. This kind of human grouping presupposes that members of the group are rational, intelligent beings who are free to join or withdraw of their own free will. An example of this kind of grouping is a running club, where we can decide to join or not to join.

A <u>gemeinschaft</u> grouping is defined as a human grouping where membership is not voluntary, and where the relationship between people is hierarchical. The best example of this is the family, where membership is so natural that its members need never pause to question its validity, nor do they choose to which family they wish to belong to.

Dunlop says that no human grouping exists which is either purely <u>gemeinschaft</u> or purely <u>gesellschaft</u>. But, this is not the point that Dunlop is trying to make.

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Dunlop wants us to understand that some relations are more appropriately gemeinschaft than gesellschaft type of human groupings.

For Dunlop a school is one of those groupings that is more appropriately a gemeinschaft type of human grouping.

For Dunlop, the school would not be able to meet its educative function if we are to see the school as a voluntary association of free, rational beings who could withdraw from the relationship if they choose to. We know that in South Africa all children are legally obliged to go to school, so I need not enter into the controversial debate about whether there is a justification for compulsory education here.

Trust and authority, says Dunlop[68] are central to the relationship between teacher and learner. These are characteristics more readily found in a gemeinschaft type relationship than in a gesellschaft type of relationship.

I will now discuss, using the work of Kenneth Strike, why the learning relationship is essentially one of trust and authority and why learners and teachers cannot be seen as equals.

Strike[69] says that the novice has to accept the information that they get from the experts. It is only once the learner has mastered the basics of a practice, in this instance mathematics, that the learner can partake in the practice. In short, if the learner cannot count and use mathematical theorems and formulas, there will never be any scope for the learner to find creative answers to mathematical problems that he wishes to share.

Strike calls this the authority of received ideas. The learner has to accept the validity of the ideas that he receives, if that learner is to partake in the practice of mathematics, or any other practice for that matter.

In order for the learner to accept the authority of what the teacher is saying, the learner has to have unswerving trust in the teacher. The teacher's authority in the classroom cannot be disputed. If the teacher is not trusted, then what the teacher is saying cannot be accepted as truth. The learners then are not able to gain all that is available to them in the school. Things that the teacher cannot explain successfully, will not be accepted as true. This will also be true if the learner cannot understand what is being explained. The learner, by not recognising the authority position of the teacher, is being deprived of the opportunity to learn efficiently.

This constitutes a massive injustice to the learner. The actual result of our misguided clamouring for the democratisation of schooling is, in fact, limiting the learner's opportunity to learn. But, if we limit the learner's opportunity to learn, we also limit the learner's ability to learn. Since the learner is being limited and thus the learner is not free from restrictions, we can say that the calls for democratisation of schooling are in fact interfering with the learner's claims to negative freedom. I cannot overemphasise that the school has a more important function to serve than to pretend to be a democracy.

What I, and Strike, am asking for, is that the teacher's authority be recognised, so that the teacher may be freed of the burden of proving or justifying all that he

says. If this would happen we can all get back to the hard job of learning and teaching. This is something that many feel this country sorely needs.

At this point I want to reiterate what I've said at the beginning of this chapter. Authority does not mean blind obedience to those in authority, and those in authority positions prove that they have lost authority, by resorting to force.

This throws a different light on the authority of the Apartheid state, that was so hated and feared. Our past has given authority its bad reputation. But, if we understand authority in this way, we can see that the state had very little authority, but a vast amount of violent force that it had no qualms about unleashing on the general population, in an attempt to hold onto power.

Also, we can now recognise that there was no sense of a community or a unified whole in our old system. There was no single practice that was constitutive of everyone in the community because of the divisive state policy. The idea of a constitutive community was reserved for only a few citizens, with the intentional exclusion of others. The country could not have been seen as a whole; that view was closed to us.

Communities were seen as small and exclusive to the point of being stifling. Maybe, this is why we were so eager to embrace conceptions of community, other than a constitutive one. Also, the abuse of so many necessary institutions, like the police, courts and even the schools, has made many people want to distance themselves from them. So I can understand the difficulty in accepting that these institutions are expected to be embraced as part of the community that is constitutive of us and described us.

But, in shaping a new country, this is our opportunity to redefine not just ourselves, but also our communities. Charles Taylor said that theorising about social matters is different in nature to theorising about the natural sciences. Theorising in the natural sciences is capable only of changing our understanding of natural phenomena. Social theory, on the other hand, is capable of changing not just our understanding of a practice, it can change the actual practice. This is exactly what Berlin spoke of when he spoke of the power of ideas. So, social theory can change not just how we understand schooling; it is capable of changing schooling itself.

Thus, theorising about schooling opens up, for us, the possibility of conceptualising the school as a specific type of community - as I have attempted to do over the last few chapters. And this particular conceptualisation of the school requires a specific interpretation of and place for authority in school. Authority in schooling, once better understood, may change our perception of it as a great mean manipulative force, to something more benevolent.

In this chapter I aimed to show that an authority relationship in an educational setting is necessary. Also, I wanted to show that an authority relationship is not to be confused with dominating or abusive relationships, because authority and force are not at all comparable concepts. But, I am not concerned with defining authority. All I wanted to achieve in that chapter is to show that the educative relationship is by definition and by necessity unequal and authorative one. This is so because the learner is what Kenneth Strike calls the novice, while the teacher is the expert.

Conclusion

There is an important element that needs to be taken into account when talking about authority. It is something that I may have not given enough attention to in the course of this minithesis. That element is, for me, the element of choice.

I will now very briefly point out not just our rightful claims to choice, but also how we have used it and how we now can use it to creatively change schooling.

In this minithesis I have presented contrasting conceptions (eg. of freedom and of community). These contrasts, though they differ from each other sharply, are mostly only analytically different from each other. Such contrasts are not always self-evident in our daily lives. However thinking in terms of these analytical differences, does define problems more sharply. The difficulty is, however, that contrasts are not self-evident in our daily lives, and we may make uninformed choices. These choices of course impact upon our ideas about schooling and authority in schooling. For example I have said that I can understand that the concept of authority has a bad reputation. I have shown that this has happened because of a radical separation in our thinking between the concepts of positive and negative liberty, and our rejection of the one (positive liberty) and allegiance to the other (negative liberty).

But an analysis of these contrasting concepts shows that negative freedom and positive freedom are not just interrelated, but integrally connected to the point where they are inseparable. This means that although positive freedom gives us the scope to have an unequal relationship between people, which is necessary if we want to recapture a sense of authority in schooling and in society in general,

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the advantages that we gain from negative freedom are not lost. The most integral part of negative freedom is that it allows choice.

I can understand completely why we now shy away from the concept of authority in especially schooling, but, I trust that I have shown that there exists a conception of freedom and of community that can embrace the idea of authority in schooling. I feel that in our haste to free ourselves from the restrictions of the past, we now find ourselves in a position where we are in danger of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bath water. But, we will have to retrieve our baby called authority in our schooling system, if schooling is to fulfil its main educative function. This is a choice that we have to make if schooling is to be effective.

Notes

1   April Carter, "Defining Authority" in <u>Authority and Democracy</u>, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p 24

2   Clem Sunter, "Evil people and a lack of authority a lethal mix" <u>Sunday Argus</u>, Cape Town, August 3 - 4, 1996

3   Sonwabo Ngcelwane, quoted in <u>Saturday Argus</u>, November 9 - 10, 1996

4   Ibid

5   Francis Dunlop, "On the democratic organisation of schools" from <u>Cambridge Journal of Education</u>, Volume 9, 1979

6   Hannah Arendt, "What is Authority?" from <u>Between Past and Future</u>, New York: The Viking Press, 1954, p 92

7   Isaiah Berlin, <u>Four Essays on Liberty</u>, London: Oxford University Press, 1969

8   I will use the words <u>liberty</u> and <u>freedom</u> interchangeably.

9   Isaiah Berlin, op cit, p 122

10   Ibid, p 142

11   Ibid, p 145

12   Auguste Comte was a French philosopher associated with positivism. Positivism is a theory of knowledge that confines genuine knowledge within the bounds of sciences and observation.

13   Berlin, op cit, p 157

14   Ibid, p 157

15   Ibid, p 122

16   Ibid, p 171

17   Ibid, p 165

18   Ibid, p 166

19   E. Rose and R. Tunmer, "C.N O Beleid", <u>Documents in South African Education</u>, Johannesburg: A.D.Donker, 1975

20   Berlin, op cit, p 166

21   John Watt, <u>Individualism and Educational Theory</u> (further details of publication unknown)

22   I use the word <u>freedom</u> deliberately to remind us of Berlin.

23   Eugene Marais, <u>Die Siel van die Mier</u>, Cape Town: Human and Rousseau, 1970

24   John Watt, op cit, p 54

25   Ibid, p 54

26   Ibid, p 55

27   Ibid, p 56

28   Ibid, p 56

29   Ibid, p 61

30   Ibid, p 63

31   Ibid, p 65

32   Ibid, p 66

33   Ibid, p 66

34 Ibid, p 67

35 Ibid, p 68

36 Ibid, p 237

37 Weaker in terms of physical, mental, or monetary aspects.

38 Kenneth Strike, <u>Liberty and Learning</u>, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982, p 17

39 Ferdinand Tonnies, "Introductory article" from <u>Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft</u> (Translated by C.P. Loomis as <u>Community and Association</u>) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955, pp 3 - 29

40 Ibid, p 19

41 Ibid, p 19

42 Ibid, p 21

43 Ibid, p 23

44 Ibid, p 23

45 Ibid, p 23

46 Michael Sandel, "Three concepts of community" from <u>Liberalism and the Limits of Justice</u>, London: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp 147 - 154

47 Ibid, p 147

48 Ibid, p 147

49 Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of man" from <u>Philosophy and the Human Sciences</u>, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p 28 - 40

50   Michael Sandel, op cit, p 153

51   Ibid, p 149

52   Wally Morrow, "Education and community in South Africa", mimeo, 1989, p 5

53   Ibid, p 5

54   Benedict Anderson, <u>Imagined Communities - Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism</u>, London: Verso, 1983, p 15

55   Wally Morrow, op cit, p 15

56   Ibid, p 16

57   Ibid, p 17

58   Charles Taylor, op cit, pp 211 - 229

59   Ibid, p 92

60   Ibid, p 33

61   Ibid, p 29

62   Ibid, p 93

63   Bertrand de Jouvenel, <u>The Pure Theory of Politics</u>, London: Oxford University Press, 1963

64   Kenneth Strike, op cit

65   April Carter, <u>Authority and Democracy</u>, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979

66   Ibid, p 24

67   Francis Dunlop, op cit

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68   Ibid, p 52

69   Kenneth Strike, op cit, p 34

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