LIVESTOCK, GRAZING AND LAND REFORM IN MATABELELAND SOUTH, ZIMBABWE: DYNAMICS OF ACCUMMULATION AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines emerging patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation amongst land reform beneficiaries in dryland pastoral settings in southwestern Matabeleland Zimbabwe, where livestock production predominates. While there is a growing body of literature on class dynamics and agrarian change in land reform sites in Zimbabwe, less is known about how these processes play out in dryland pastoral settings where environmental variability is the norm. This is important because most discussions of class dynamics and agrarian change in Zimbabwe are based on case studies drawn largely from relatively medium- to high-potential regions, where crop farming has come to dominate.

Adopting an agrarian political economy approach, a critical realism methodology involving as suite of methods was employed to interrogate the socio-economic profile of the land reform beneficiaries, what they are producing and emerging patterns of accumulation and social differentiation. These ranged from archival, to ethnographic research and household surveys. Besides the agrarian political economy, the study also draws on the concepts of non-equilibrium rangeland and high-reliability theory to examine how livestock producers sustain their livestock in a highly variable environment.

The study has revealed that processes of accumulation and differentiation are occurring amongst land reform beneficiaries in all the three types of resettlement schemes studies: A1, A2 and self-contained farms. I found that some are engaging in 'accumulation from below', through local production (especially in A1 schemes) while others are engaging in 'accumulation from outside', often linked to off-farm jobs and/or self-employed businesses (mostly in self-contained and A2 farms). However, production and accumulation are disrupted not only by environmental variability, but also by the flow of capital from outside. As a result, paths of accumulation are not linear as is often assumed in classic agrarian literature.

In order to survive or accumulate in a variable and fragmented landscape, livestock producers employ a wide variety of opportunistic strategies, including various forms of mobility and provision of supplementary feeding in order to achieve reliable output. Another main aim of this research, therefore, is to explore how livestock farmers access pastures beyond the boundaries of their individual farm units and how these processes intersect with dynamics of accumulation and social differentiation. It shows how property rights and the specifics of

livestock production interact in complex ways. The results provide new empirical contribution about the experiences of land reform and livelihoods in livestock areas characterised by environmental variability. It is argued that any future interventions must incorporate the characteristics of flexibility, mobility and opportunism which typify present everyday practices.

KEY WORDS

Agrarian political economy, class dynamics, land reform, non-equilibrium dynamics, Zimbabwe

DECLARATION

I declare that *Livestock, grazing and land reform in southwestern Zimbabwe: Dynamics of accumulation and social differentiation* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

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Signature:  Date: 8 November 2023

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This thesis is focused on south-western Matabeleland, but ecological conditions are very similar to my home area. I was born and raised in an agro-pastoralist family in Msipani area of Runde communal areas in Zvishavane district (southern central Zimbabwe), where I spent a significant proportion of my childhood assisting my grandmother with agricultural and livestock-management tasks. As with Matobo district, the area is a typical semi-arid characterized by low rainfalls and recurrent drought. This background helped greatly in yielding a quick appreciation of farming in Matobo district. This thesis is for my late grandmother, who taught me the complexities of dryland farming and played an integral role in my upbringing: she often went hungry at night to ensure I was fed and attend school. It is to her that I owe my greatest debt.

So, I dedicate this to you!

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A1	Smallholder farming settlement (villagised/ self-contained)
A2	Medium-scale commercial resettlement type
AG	Asset Group
Agritex	Agricultural Research and Extension, Ministry of Agriculture
ARDA	Agriculture and Rural Development Authority
BIPPA	Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CCPJZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CPI	consumer price index
CPR	Common Property Resources
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CSC	Cold Storage Company (formerly Commission)
CSO	Central Statistics Office
CV	Coefficient of Variation
DA	District Administrator
DLC	District Land Committee
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FMD	Foot and Mouth Disease
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP	gross domestic product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
JOC	Joint Operations Command
LALR	Livelihoods After Land Reform
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation
LSCF	Large-scale Commercial Farms
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MP	Member of Parliament
MRDC	Matobo Rural District Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NRB	Natural Resources Board
NLHA	Native Land and Husbandry Act
ORAP	Organization of Rural Associations for Progress
PLAAS	Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, Cape Town
PRAs	Participatory Rural Appraisals
SG	Success group
SC	Self-contained farm
US	United States
USD	United States Dollar
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union
ZAR	South African Rand
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZIMSTAT	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZNWVA	Zimbabwe National War Veteran Association
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

GLOSSARY

Amasiso	loaning of cattle
amasimu	crop fields
Chimurenga	liberation struggle
Emlageni	cattle post
Gukurahundi	post-Independence violence
Ilima (pl. amalima)	work party
Inala	bumper harvest
Indaba	important meeting
Isigaba (pl. izigaba)	Chiefdom
Jambanja	period of chaos, confusion and violence
lobola	Bridewealth
Mlaga	seasonal transhumance of cattle
Mwali	High God
Nduna	Chief
Sobhuku	Headman
Ukulagisa	lease-grazing arrangement
Ukusisa	loaning of cattle
Vlei	low-lying valley wetland; *dambo*

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

While there is a growing body of literature on class dynamics and agrarian change in land reform areas in Zimbabwe, less is known about how processes of accumulation and differentiation play out in dryland pastoral (livestock) production settings. Pastoralists operate within a highly unpredictable and variable environment characterized by low, erratic rainfall and high inter-annual climatic variability. Under these conditions, agricultural production – be it dryland cropping or livestock – is characterized by 'boom-and-bust' cycles, with major implications for possibilities of accumulation. During good years (i.e., boom period), grass is plentiful, livestock herds expand rapidly and people harvest a bumper crop: this, allows farmers to sell and reinvest in production and beyond. In the bust period (i.e., bad rainfall years), herds decline and people harvest very little, if any, for consumption and/or sale. Because of this pattern, there is no simple, linear "path" of agrarian capital accumulation as is often assumed; or in other words, there is no simple "agrarian transition" towards a more intensive, capitalist agricultural production accompanied by rural proletarianization, but rather variable and non-linear paths of accumulation.

To survive or thrive in this highly variable landscape, livestock farmers pursue a variety of opportunistic management strategies, including various forms of mobility, diversification of income, provisioning of supplementary feeding and so on. Given a landscape that is characterized by environmental variability, access to off-farm income is vital for sustaining farm investment, production and accumulation. Despite land reform resulting in fragmentation of rangelands, this thesis shows that mobility – which takes many forms – remains an important strategy for tracking variability over space and time.

The thesis aims to explore how livestock farmers on land reform farms in south western Zimbabwe access pastures beyond the boundaries of their individual farm units and how these processes intersect with dynamics of accumulation and social differentiation. Land reform has created a new social landscape with new boundaries and property relations in the rangelands, with a more differentiated array of livestock owners and different types of herd management/livestock production. This now intersects with non-equilibrium rangeland dynamics. Although land reform was designed to transfer land to smallholder and medium-scale farmers, the question of how rangelands were to be addressed was not part of the debate.

Although my arguments are drawn from the fieldwork research in southwestern Zimbabwe, I believe some of them have a more general relevance.

1.1 Origins of the research

Broadly speaking, this PhD project builds on the "Livelihoods after Land Reform" (LALR) project, a comparative study of the impacts of land reform on livelihoods in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia and led by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS). In the case of Zimbabwe, the LALR study in Masvingo province led to the publication of the seminal book, "*Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities"* by Scoones and colleagues. This challenged five major "myths" about Zimbabwe's land reform: (i) that it has been a total failure; (ii) the beneficiaries of the land reform are largely political "cronies" of ZANU-PF; (iii) there is no investment in the new resettlement areas; (iv) agriculture is in complete ruins, leading to chronic food insecurity; and (v) the rural economy has collapsed. The study has also been reported in several journal articles (e.g., Scoones et al. 2011, 2012). A central theme of this research is the emergence of new patterns of accumulation and social differentiation amongst land reform beneficiaries. Although a few farmers are engaging in 'accumulation from above' through political patronage and corruption (especially in A2 farms), a generalised pattern is one of 'accumulation from below' rooted in petty commodity production by a significant proportion of beneficiaries.

Drawing on a livelihood typology propounded by Dorward et al. (2009) and Mushongah (2010), Scoones et al. (2010, 2012) identified four broad categories: those who are 'hanging in' (surviving but poor including crisis and survival strategies); 'stepping out' (diversifying away from agriculture, both locally and through migration); 'stepping up' (local accumulation largely within agriculture) and 'dropping out' (essentially destitute households, reliant on different forms of social protection and often in the process of exiting). The study revealed that 35% are 'stepping up', 21.4% are 'stepping out', 33.6% are 'hanging in' and 10% are 'dropping out'. In 2018, the LALR team extended this work to look at how similar dynamics play out in Mashonaland West province, a relatively high potential region where a lucrative crop – tobacco – is being successfully grown under contract (Scoones 2018). The same scholars found similar dynamics (Scoones et al. 2018).

Over the years, the LALR team, together with local researchers at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) then further extended the research to look at "how livestock

production articulated with land reform" in the semi-arid regions of Matobo district in Matabeleland South province (Scoones 2018: 2), a region that up until now has remained under-researched (Cliffe et al. 2011). This work is reported in Nel and Mabhena (2020). This thesis has aimed to complement this study by focussing on three key issues: firstly, processes of agrarian accumulation and social differentiation amongst different types of land reform beneficiaries in post-land reform landscapes, in the context of high variability and non-equilibrium rangeland dynamics; secondly, the relationship between land, property rights and livestock movements in the same settings; and thirdly, the role of the state in relation to land allocation processes. While the literature is replete with studies focussed on some of these themes in Zimbabwe (e.g., Scoones et al. 2010, 2017; Shonhe 2018), none have looked at how these dynamics play out in dryland pastoral settings. Similarly, recent studies in Matabeleland (e.g., Mabhena 2014; Nel & Mabhena 2019) have considered some of these themes, but none addresses these themes in a comprehensive, integrated way. This means that there is a significant gap in the literature: an analysis of trajectories of accumulation in dry livestock areas. This study aims to address this gap.

Why is this important and why does it matter? Pastoralists operate in an environment characterised by environmental variability over space and time. This creates conditions of uncertainty, where people do not know the likelihood of future outcomes (Scoones 2019). Recurrent droughts or flash floods can disrupt production and accumulation, sometimes with long-term negative effects on farmers' capacities to recover from such events. For example, during drought, crop production is wiped out and livestock populations decline. Those with no or limited access to off-farm income may struggle to recover following such an event.

This dissertation focusses on Matobo district, a semi-arid region that is characterised by low and unpredictable rainfall (less than 600 per annum), and persistent droughts that occur every two out of five years. Thus, the region exhibits non-equilibrium rangeland dynamics with high levels of temporary and spatial variability in grazing resources (Ellis & Swift 1987; Westoby et al. 1988; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). In such systems, opportunism is an essential part of dryland production (Scoones et al. 1996). This set these non-equilibrium or uncertain environments apart. Ecological conditions are therefore crucial to understanding the processes of accumulation and social differentiation in semi-arid, non-equilibrium environments. I begin with a view that processes of accumulation in dryland pastoral settings are likely to be variable over time and space and often interrupted due to such variability.

1.2 Understanding non-equilibrium or uncertain environments

Ecology matters in understanding patterns of accumulation in dryland pastoral settings. In order for it to be possible to undertake any meaningful and coherent investigation, it is therefore essential that we first clarify what is meant by a *non-equilibrium* environment, and preferably that we lay what our theoretical understanding of it is. This section highlights some of the main biophysical features of non-equilibrium environments, how these features influence production, and ultimately, how these features influence patterns of accumulation.

Non-equilibrium environments are those arid and semi-arid rangelands characterized by large annual fluctuations in rainfall. Ellis and Swift (1988) suggest that the threshold where non-equilibrium dynamics kick in is when coefficients of variation (CV) in annual rainfall are 33% or more (also see Behnke et al. 1993). In these rangelands, "livestock populations may decline because of a lack of fodder, but fodder is scarce because of too little rain than too many animals" (ibid: 9). Consequently, rangeland productivity is unlikely to be affected by livestock populations but rainfall. In addition, livestock populations in non-equilibrium rangelands crashes regularly because of major droughts and herd recovery is slow; hence, livestock populations remain well below the ecological carrying capacity (Behnke and Scoones 1993: 9).

These characteristics are clearly distinct from stable equilibrium systems, which exhibit "classic feedback mechanisms assumed in mainstream range management" (Scoones 1994: 1). Such settings are characterised by relatively high and reliable annual rainfall leading to predictable primary production (Behnke 2000: 142). In such systems, "vegetation change is gradual, following classical succession models … Livestock populations are in turn limited by available forage in a density-dependent manner, so that excessive animal numbers, above 'carrying capacity' level, result in negative effects on the vegetation" (Scoones 1994: 1). Such systems, "'fine tuning' for optimal output is possible because livestock renew themselves – reproduce, grow and produce meat and milk – at a rate determined by the availability of feed, which is inverse function of stock" (Behnke 2000: 142).

A key feature that distinguishes non-equilibrium systems from equilibrium systems is uncertainty, where probabilities of particular outcomes are unpredictable and unknown, and ignorance – where we don't know what we don't know (Scoones 2019, 2023). In these settings, uncertainty is part of pastoralist livelihoods, and "predictability and control are false hopes"

(Scoones 2004: 114). A slow-onset event such as drought can lead to substantial loss of crops and forage for livestock and consequently huge livestock losses.

Agricultural production, be it dryland cropping or livestock production, is often dominated by 'boom-and-bust' cycles – that is 'good' years followed by 'bad' years (see for example Scoones 1990). Good crop yields are obtained only rarely, and crop fails largely due to a lack of adequate rainfall. In years when rains fail altogether (i.e., "bad years"), livestock die-offs may occur due to lack of forage resources and some farmers might be forced to pursue off-farm activities. In this context, processes of accumulation are often interrupted and highly variable, and often requires outside inputs and access to diverse forms of rangelands during these cycles. Thus, one simply cannot predict what will happen in future with certainty (Scoones 1999), making embracing and navigating uncertainty essential (Scoones 2019). Indeed, pastoralists have always lived with, through and off uncertainty (Scoones 1994; Krätli & Schareika 2010; FAO 2021).

In navigating their way in unpredictable and variable landscapes, pastoralists must constantly adapt, innovate and be flexible to high variability in order to generate reliability. They adopt a wide range of strategies including various forms of mobility, supplementary feeding, herd splitting and diversification of income sources. A more detailed account of these strategies is provided in the next chapter.

1.3 Agrarian change in dryland pastoral settings

A key point of departure for this thesis is Scoones' (2021) seminal article published in the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, on dynamics of accumulation and agrarian change in peasant and pastoralist settings. He argues that classic debates about the peasantry and agrarian change, especially in the leading agrarian publications such as the *Journal of Peasant Studies*, "have frequently ignored livestock-keeping peoples across the world" (2021: 1). Most critical agrarian studies, as Scoones argues, have focussed on sedentary agricultural settings, where crop farming dominates (Scoones 2021), a trend that is also found in the Zimbabwean literature on land reform and agrarian change. Similarly, "much scholarship on pastoralism has ignored core debates in agrarian studies, frequently failing to address questions of social difference, class formation and dynamics of accumulation" (ibid: 2).

Nearly three decades ago, Samatar (1992: 103) echoed similar sentiments when he noted that "the utilization of political economic tools in the analysis of African agrarian change has been

largely confined to the transformation of the farming sector. The pastoral sector has remained marginal in political economic studies of rural Africa". That assertion has been as relevant today as then, regardless of how vast the existing body of literature on peasant studies and agrarian change. This is somewhat surprising, given that pastoralism is the economic mainstay in drylands, where crop farming is less feasible. Globally, it is estimated that pastoralism is a source of livelihoods for millions of people in more than 100 countries, involving production from about a billion animals, with extensive rangelands occupying between 25% and 45% of the world's total surface (Dong 2016). This means that pastoralists "should surely be central to the study of agrarian change" (Scoones 2021: 2).

Taking Marxist formulations of the classic agrarian question (AQ) as the starting point, Scoones (2021) offers a selective review of how dynamics of agrarian change play out in pastoral settings. His research demonstrates that the "three problematics" of the classic agrarian question – "production", "accumulation" and "politics" (Bernstein 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2016) – "apply as much to pastoralists as they do to peasants" (ibid: 2). Equally, much of the insights from pastoral studies, he argues, are of great relevance to settled agriculturalist settings. He believes that peasants and pastoralists today face similar struggles of enclosure, privatization and commoditization. Moreover, they also face similar uncertainties (ibid). In this vein, insights from pastoral studies can add to the conceptual toolkit of critical agrarian studies and vice versa. For Scoones (2021), a key question is therefore what can we learn from the world of pastoralism for wider agrarian struggles.

On the basis of his extensive regional literature review, Scoones (2021) identifies seven themes that are often associated with pastoralism but also applicable to settled peasants: (1) living with and from uncertainty, (2) mobilities, (3) flexible land control, (4) dynamic social formations, (5) reimagined communities and moral economies, (6) real markets and (7) networked politics. He points to the need to expand our analytical framework within critical agrarian studies to include perspectives from pastoral studies.

For the purpose of this study, I focus primarily on three aspects as they are most relevant in relation to the key findings of this study. The first one is living with (coping) and from (productive use of) variability. As with many drylands, variability is an inherent feature of livestock production in Matobo district. Second is the centrality of livestock mobility in living with and from variability. Historically, the Ndebele people have coped with variability by pursuing an opportunistic grazing strategy based on an extensive form of seasonal

transhumance (*mlaga*). Today, livestock farmers in resettlement areas have revived *mlaga* system, but adapted to modern property rights, in order to generate a reliable system in the context of high variability (Chapter Eight). The third and final aspect concerns flexible land control. Scoones (2021: 26) argues that pastoralists operating within highly variable environments require highly flexible property regimes as "restricted movement and demarcated property boundaries can massively undermine production and accumulation possibilities."

This thesis considers the experiences of land reform in southwestern Zimbabwe. The focus is primarily on how dynamics of accumulation and so class formation plays out in such settings characterised by non-equilibrium ecologies following a major land reform. Considerations are also given to the impacts of ecology and property rights and the role of the state on shaping these dynamics. These issues are analysed within the context of southwestern Zimbabwe but can to a large extent be generalised to other semi-arid regions of the world. The central theme is how processes of accumulation and social differentiation plays out in non-equilibrium rangeland dynamics in post-land reform contexts in Zimbabwe.

Although patterns of accumulation and differentiation in post-land reform settings are well documented (see for example, Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010, 2012, 2018; Shonhe 2017, 2019; Mazwi 2018; Shonhe et al. 2020, 2022), little is known about how such dynamics play out in extensive pastoral systems of Matabeleland regions. This is significant because, geographically, the bulk of the country's climate is semi-arid. Whilst some studies highlight how land reform has availed more land but not improved livelihoods of pastoral livestock producers in Matabeleland (Mabhena 2010, 2014), few studies have provided clear details on who is getting successful and who is falling behind, and why. There are exceptions. One is the work of Nel and Mabhena (2019) in Matobo district, similar to the present study's field sites.

In looking to understand the dynamics of accumulation in dryland livestock settings, this thesis articulates analysis from agrarian political economy (Bernstein 1977, 1979, 2010, 2016; Gibbon & Neocosmos 1985; Mamdani 1987; Cousins et al. 1992; de Janvry 1981; Byres 1986, 1996, 2003, 2012, 2016; Neocosmos 1993; Cousins 2010, 2013; Whitfield 2016) with insights from the "non-equilibrium theory" (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994; Vetter 2005) and "high-reliability theory" (Roe et al. 1998a, b; Roe 2020). The thesis first establishes its foundation within agrarian political economy, which concerns investigation of the social relations and dynamics of production, reproduction, property and power in agrarian social formations (Bernstein 2010). However, it starts from a simple premise that agroecological dynamics are

central to our understanding of processes of accumulation and social differentiation that are underway in the semi-arid regions of southwestern Zimbabwe. In seeking to theorise the role of agro-ecological dynamics, I draw on the 'New Range Ecology' (Ellis & Swift 1988; Westoby et al. 1989; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994) to highlight the implications of agro-ecology on processes of accumulation.

Using this perspective, Matobo district, where this research was conducted, is understood as a "non-equilibrium" environment. As discussed above, such settings are dominated by uncertainty and high rainfall variability. In order to survive or thrive in such settings, I argue that they must pursue two management strategies: "opportunistic" and "high-reliability" management. Also known as "tracking", opportunistic management "involves the matching of available feed supply with animal numbers at a particular site" (Scoones 1994: 9). Roe et al. (1998a, b) argue that pastoralists should be conceived of as "high-reliability seekers". This is in stark contrast to the mainstream pastoral literature, which sees pastoralists as "risk-averters" who avoid risks.

I also draw on Whitefield (2016) to highlight the importance of non-agrarian capital in establishing and sustaining operations in dryland pastoral settings. I further draw on wider debates on land tenure in Africa, including the work of Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) to highlight the emergence of 'vernacular land markets' that facilitate livestock mobility beyond farm boundaries in the new resettlement areas.

Box 1.1 Main themes examined

Socio-economic origins

- Processes of land reform
- Mechanisms of accessing land during FTLRP
- Household motivations of accessing land

Patterns and processes of accumulation

- Household income sources
- Patterns of asset ownership, investments and production
- Class formation
- Key drivers of accumulation

Livestock movement and property rights

- Types of livestock movements
- Mechanisms of accessing land outside formally allocated land

Role of the state

- Party-state's role in land allocation processes and its effects on processes of accumulation

Particular attention is paid to four broad themes that emerge from the broader literature: (i) the socio-economic origins of land reform beneficiaries; (ii) patterns of accumulation and social differentiation; (iii) spatial dynamics of livestock production and property relations; and (iv) the role of the state in the land allocation processes, asking how this influenced who ended up where. While all these themes have been explored in previous research in Zimbabwe, a sense of how these dynamics play out in dryland pastoral settings such as those found in Matabeleland region – where high levels of climatic variability exist – has not been attempted. I ask how different these processes are from more settled agrarian settings (and why), and what bigger lessons we can learn from them.

The few exceptions that exist to date tend to touch only marginally on some of these issues. This includes studies of land occupations (Alexander & McGregor 2001; Thebe 2017), youth and access to land (Nyamupingidza 2018), pastoral livelihoods after land reform (Mabhena 2014; Nel & Mabhena 2021), role of social capital (Ncube 2018) and politics of belonging (Mwandirangarira & Ye 2021; Ncube & Marewo 2022). Mabhena's (2014: 2014) research, undertaken in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts in southern Matabeleland concluded that the 'one size fits all' FTLRP biased towards crop production has failed to boost livestock production and improve livelihoods of beneficiaries on redistributed farms in Matabeleland

(116). In an A1 study from Umguza district in northern Matabeleland, Nyamupingidza (2018) reported that very few young people, particularly women, benefitted from land reform, while those older people that accessed land are under-capacitated, leading to under-utilization of land. Nel and Mabhena's (2021) study in Matobo district (similar to the present study's field sites) shows that A1 farmers are highly differentiated in relation to livestock ownership, assets, production and access to off-farm income. While these studies offer important departure points, they tend to focus on narrow issues.

1.4 Research questions and themes

Accordingly, the central question pursued in this thesis is:

How do processes of accumulation and differentiation play out in resettlement areas situated in highly variable environments?

Such a broad question must be broken down into empirically researchable and manageable themes. The main empirical chapters thus attempt to address the following core research questions in order to answer the central research question:

1) Who are the new land reform beneficiaries and what are their socio-political origins?
2) How do processes of social differentiation, class formation and agrarian accumulation play out in highly variable environments?
3) What strategies do the new land reform beneficiaries deploy to survive and accumulate in the context of a highly variable resource base and how are these strategies related to class and gender?
4) How have politics and power relations between the people and the state affected the outcomes of the FTLRP in relation to the allocation of farms in particular?

Thus, four main themes have oriented my research:

Social origins of land reform beneficiaries: Of particular importance here are the origins of land reform beneficiaries, as this provides an insight into long-term processes of agrarian change. Contrary to claims that the majority of land was taken by "ZANU-PF cronies", the thesis shows that the land reform beneficiaries came from diverse social and political origins, largely because of different land reform processes and land allocation. As I will show, land beneficiaries varied in how they gained access to land. Directly related are questions around

what motivated them to gain access to land and what they hoped to achieve. Twenty years have passed since the FTLRP was launched in Zimbabwe, and the country has a rich literature on land reform. Yet the debate about who were the beneficiaries of the FTLRP still rages on.[1]

Rural differentiation, accumulation and class (patterns and processes): A key concern of the thesis is to understand the emerging patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation across different types of land uses in a non-equilibrium environment. There is a large literature that indicates the emergent patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation in the new resettlement sites in the aftermath of land reform in Zimbabwe, but none of these studies have looked at how these dynamics play out in dryland livestock settings. By far the majority of these studies have been undertaken in Masvingo province (Scoones et al. 2010, 2012) and Mashonaland regions where, for the last decade or so, a lucrative cash crop (i.e., tobacco) is being successfully grown under contact (see Scoones et al. 2018; Shonhe 2018). It is hence not evident that the results of past land reform studies in better watered areas hold in dryland settings where climatic variability and uncertainty dominates.

The focus here is the dry parts of southwestern Zimbabwe. As mentioned earlier, the agro-ecology of this region, characterised by uncertainty and high rainfall variability, makes for very different processes of accumulation. Thus, this study is informed by the overall understanding of the character of agro-ecology in southwestern Matabeleland. Here uncertainty is part and parcel of everyday life. It is therefore difficult to accumulate in such unpredictable environment. However, even in these unpredictable landscapes there are some settlers who are beginning to accumulate, regularly selling surplus and reinvesting on the farm and outside agriculture. In good years, which generally equate to good harvests and abundant forage, households are able to accumulate assets especially livestock and other farm equipment. In bad years, which generally equate to drought years, crop and livestock production is constrained by drought, which decimates crop production and cause livestock mortalities. How and to what extent variability affects patterns and processes of accumulation and so differentiation in these non-equilibrium environments forms the major research issue.

[1] See Ian Scoones' blogs on this issue here: https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/who-took-the-land-more-on-the-crony-debate/; https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/four-myths-about-zimbabwean-land-reform.

Property rights and mobility: A key concern here is to understand how different types of livestock farmers deal with environmental variability in the context of a highly fragmented landscape. Successful and reliable management of livestock is a key requirement for agrarian accumulation in these settings. Empirical field studies on pastoralism stress the importance of livestock mobility as a strategy to overcome temporal and spatial shortages of forage and water resources (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1992a; Swallow 1994; Niamir-Fuller 1999; Adriansen 2006; Fernandez-Gimenez & Le Febre 2006; Gavin 2009; Turner & Schlecht 2019). In Matabeleland, seasonal transhumance has long been a key aspect of livestock management in communal areas (see Prescott 1961; Madzudzo & Hawkes 1996; Nyathi 2014a, b). This study shows the reinvention of this customary seasonal transhumance in the new resettlement schemes. A key question is how different types of livestock farmers negotiate over land and property rights in these settings, where land is notionally held as exclusive common or private property with defined boundaries. The relationship between livestock movement and changed tenure in post-land reform settings has received limited attention in the literature, and how these relate to class, power and politics is therefore unknown.

The role of the state: In many discussions of agrarian transition, as well as empirical studies about capitalism in Africa, the role of state institutions on shaping accumulation is highlighted – either as enabling or constraining accumulation (Byres 1996). In this study, I examine how the processes of accumulation and social differentiation have been shaped by the actions of the state, especially with regards to the land allocation process. As Scoones et al. (2011: 971) rightly put it, "processes of land allocation, rather than their administrative definition, have more importance in understanding who ended up on the land and what happened next."

These questions were examined through extended fieldwork in Matobo district of southwestern Zimbabwe, which combined "intensive" and "extensive" data in order to explore the processes of accumulation and their key drivers. The details of my research methodology are discussed in Chapter Three.

1.5 Fieldwork sites and research design

As Cliffe et al. (2011) draw attention to, there is lack of research exploring the experiences of land reform in Matabeleland regions. Instead, most literature on land reform in Zimbabwe tend to focus on Mashonaland regions, where crop production has come to dominate. This thesis thus focuses on a less-researched area of southwestern Matabeleland, a drier part of the country.

As a geographic, political, ecological and historical entity, Matabeleland is set apart from other regions in Zimbabwe in a number of significant ways. A first peculiarity of Matabeleland is the agro-ecology, which is characterised by high rainfall variability and uncertainty. Based on Zimbabwe's formal agro-ecological classification, the region is situated in Natural Regions IV and V, with an average precipitation of less than 650mm per annum (Vincent and Thomas 1960). Inter-annual variability is high (Dube 2008). Drought is a recurrent feature, occurring at least once in every three to four years. In this context, region can therefore be referred to as a non-equilibrium or uncertain environment (cf. Behnke et al. 1993; Westoby et al. 1988; Ellis & Swift 1987).

Because of these agro-ecological conditions, the area is officially designated as suitable for semi-extensive livestock production and dryland cropping is deemed unsuitable. Unsurprisingly, livestock production (notably cattle) is the mainstay of rural economy in Matabeleland. According to the most recent crop and livestock assessment (conducted in March 2021), Matabeleland South province has a total cattle population of 629 743, making up 11.5% of the total country population (MLAFWRR 2021). While the province rank fifth in terms of cattle numbers, the province has long been considered a 'cattle country' before and after colonisation. To a certain extent, this reputation has continued to be salient to this day.

While Matabeleland region shares the same agro-ecological characteristics with other regions in Zimbabwe, some features differ and are likely to influence the processes and outcomes of land reform. The most important distinct feature which sets this region apart is the troubled history of opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF government, which gave impetus to the state-orchestrated violent campaigns (known as "*Gukurahundi*") between 1982 and 1987 (Yap 2001), and left thousands of people dead (CCJP & LRF 1997). Since that time, the region has suffered persistent state neglect of its people and infrastructure. During Gukurahundi, "some development projects were held up when it was thought Matobo district sympathised with dissidents" (Ranger 1989:1666). Unsurprisingly, alongside harsh climatic conditions, a 'Cinderella District' was once used as an apt analogy to describe state neglect on people and development in the region in the 1990s (Ranger 1999). Crucially for my own research, Gukurahundi delayed the implementation of early land reform programmes until the 1990s (Ranger 1999; also see Chapter Four). After the 1987 Unity Accord, the government tried to impose a crop-based "Model A schemes", which were resisted by the communal areas farmers who were in favour of a livestock-oriented resettlement scheme that would address their felt

needs; i.e., access to additional grazing rather than human settlement (also see Alexander 1991, 2006; Robins 1994, 1998). This disagreement led to a years-long stalemate in which different actors (civil servants, politicians, the local state and residents) contested over which type of resettlement model to be implemented (Ranger 1999; see also chapter 3). As a result, by the early 1990s, there was no active resettlement scheme in Matobo.

In sum, with such historical, ecological and political characteristics, the district lends itself as an ideal case study for this research. In particular, the civil war of the 1980s, the long history of seasonal transhumance as a response to spatial and temporal shortage of forage and water resources, and the ecological conditions – all have had knock on effects on processes of land reform, and ultimately, on social differentiation (Chapter Four).

Further and more in-depth research was then carried in Ward 23, one of the six resettlement wards in the district. This Ward is located to the north-east of Kezi, the district administrative town. Situated around 17km north of Kezi and 60km south of Bulawayo, the ward is linked by a Bulawayo-Maphisa highway. There are a number of reasons why I chose this particular ward for as a focussed case study area to study in greater depth. The Ward lies in what was dubbed "Mapani veld", a block of large-scale commercial farms to the southwest of Matopos Hills (Ranger 1999). This area has been marked by a long history of land alienation, dating back to the 1900s when large-scale commercial ranches were surveyed and demarcated for white settlers (bid). Following decades of land reform, different land-use types now exist. These include remaining Large-scale Commercial Farms (LSFCs) owned largely by indigenous people and one white farmer, smallholder farms (A1 villagised), medium-scale commercial operations (designated A2 and "self-contained" farms) and collectively-held farms (designated as Three-tier/Model schemes). Given this high concentration of land uses, this area allowed me to look at different livestock systems and their interactions, especially during drought. Moreover, the proximity of existing communal areas (CAs) to the north provided a rare opportunity to explore interactions between land reform beneficiaries and those who remained behind.

This thesis adopted a combination of "intensive" and "extensive" research designs (Sayer 2000) at district, ward and household scales. This incorporated the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data for a period of fourteen months between December 2015 and November 2022. Fieldwork took place in four different 'phases': (a) an exploratory phase, (b) an intensive/qualitative phase, (c) a hybrid intensive/extensive phase, and (d) a more recent revisit

in November 2022. Specifically, the research design involved archival research, extended ethnography, household/ enterprise surveys, participant observation, life-histories, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Having managed to maintain contact with some of my research participants over the years, this was complemented by further updates through social media. The study uses the "household" as the unit of analysis. Thus, data collection was based at household level, whereby the "household head" was interviewed and spoke on behalf of the household. However, I am fully aware that the concept of household is fraught with limitations, and this has been widely acknowledged in the feminist literature (Guyer 1981; Guyer & Peters 1987).

1.6 Argument and main findings

The central empirical finding is that, as with the Mashonaland crop farming story, accumulation and social differentiation is indeed occurring in the dryland livestock settings of southwestern Matabeleland but that these processes are interrupted by climatic shocks such as drought. In other words, agrarian capital accumulation is characterised by "up-and-down" cycles. It is clear that some households are getting ahead, while others are falling behind. In the A1 scheme, most farmers are doing well, some of whom are engaging in "accumulation from below" through petty commodity production. In the A2 medium-scale schemes, the overwhelming majority have been markedly less successful due to lack of finance, while a few are doing well through a mix of "accumulation from below" and "accumulation from outside" (i.e., linked to highly paying off-farm jobs and off-farm businesses). Meanwhile, the majority of self-contained farmers are doing relatively well. An important question is why are some farmers prosperous, and others not? I argue that this differential success can be attributed to several factors: access capital from off-farm sources; the ability to manage variability; how farmers got selected; and political connections. Taken together, my argument is that the key lies substantially in the differential ability to manage climatic and other uncertainties.

1.7 Contribution to social science

This thesis contributes to filling two key gaps in the literature on agrarian change: empirical and theoretical. The balance is, however, tipped towards empirical analysis, which makes up the bulk of material presented here. Perhaps, the strength of this thesis is the extent and depth of empirical material. Empirically, this thesis provides rich empirical data on dynamics of agrarian change in dryland pastoral areas – a topic that has been relatively neglected in the

literature on agrarian change. As pointed out earlier, much scholarship on the peasantry and agrarian change focusses on crop production in relatively high-potential regions. More concretely, while some social science research has been conducted from the 1990s and onwards on land reform in southwestern Matabeleland, very little of it has addressed the issue of class formation comprehensively. This is the first comprehensive study of patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation among land reform beneficiaries in southwestern Zimbabwe.[2] I combine "intensive" (qualitative) and "extensive" (quantitative) data in order to unravel dynamics of accumulation among land reform beneficiaries.

On a theoretical level, the thesis presents an argument for the incorporation of perspectives from pastoralist studies, as proposed by Scoones (2021). As Scoones (2021) has argued, "pastoralists and peasants have more in common than we often think and insights from studies of pastoral settings can be useful in recasting questions, perspectives and approaches more broadly." In designing the study, I have heeded Scoones' (2021) call to overcome the false separation of peasant and pastoral studies. In addition, the study also bears out Jacobs (2018) argument that paths of accumulation are non-linear; nor there is no guaranteed agrarian transition to intensive capitalist production (also see Oya 2007).

1.8 Nomenclature

A note on the nomenclature used in this study is necessary. In other parts of the country, the term "self-contained" scheme is used to refer to a non-villagised version of the smallholder A1 scheme; but here, it is used to refer to formerly collectively-held "Three-tier" farms (formerly Model D schemes) that were subdivided into individual plots for exclusive use between 1999 and 2005. The "Model D" scheme is the first form of resettlement model to explicitly accommodate livestock production in the semi-arid regions in the early 1980s and in the late 1990s it became known as the "Three-tier" model. Regulated by Matobo Rural District Council (MRDC), these farms were meant to be used as additional grazing by adjoining communal areas. In 1999, the MRDC decided to subdivide these farms into individual units for exclusive

[2] A number of studies have from the 1990s and onwards on land reform in southern Matabeleland and a few comprehensive overviews have been provided (e.g., Alexander 1991; Robbin 1994, 1998; Mabhena 2010, 2014; Ncube 2018; Nel & Mabhena 2019). However, with few exceptions (e.g., Ncube 2018; Nel & Mabhena 2019), most studies almost focus on the politics of implementation of land reform programmes, without paying attention to social differentiation amongst the land reform beneficiaries.

use. These individual units are known as "self-contained" plots. The decision to subdivide these farms was motivated by the desire of the local state to halt perceived "under-utilization" and environmental degradation, to promote "proper" commercial ranching, to secure the farms from expropriation by outsiders and the central state, and to generate income from leases (Chapter Four). Note that these self-contained farms are still officially designated Three-tier/Model D schemes. The term "Three-tier" scheme is at times used at interchangeably with the term "Model D" scheme.

1.9 Zimbabwe's land reform in context

Before elaborating on the conceptual framework adopted for this study, the remainder of this introduction offers an overview of land reform in Zimbabwe and outlines the political economy of the livestock sector. The history of land reform in Zimbabwe has been described by Scoones et al. (2010), Moyo (2011b, 2013) and others and does not need a lengthy recapitulation. For example, Moyo (2011) identifies three phases of land reform covering the early 1980 to the present day: (a) the market sales of land led by state acquisition and redistribution from the early 1980 through to 1985; (b) acquisition of land by the state through appropriation and market mechanisms from 1986 through to 1999; and (c) the FTLRP from the year 2000 through to 2010 (Moyo 2011).

Zimbabwe emerged as an independent state in April 1980 with a legacy of gross unequal distribution of land. After Independence, one of the main challenges facing the new government was to solve land inequities. Interestingly, in his book, *Land and racial domination in Rhodesia*, Robin Palmer (1977: 246) was remarkably prophetic in anticipating the problems of land reform in post-Independence Zimbabwe. His insight is worth quoting at some length:

> The most acute and difficult question confronting the first…Government of… Zimbabwe, whatever its ideological hue, will be that of land, bedevilled by its past use as a political and economic weapon by the whites and by consequent mythologies to which this has given rise. The problem will not be an easy one to resolve.

Indeed, land reform has proved to be a complex and difficult process in Zimbabwe. After all land inequality was one of the major reasons why the brutal liberation war was fought in the 1970s (Ranger 1985). The rural constituency, which actively supported the war, had the expectation that with Independence would come a land redistribution. Unsurprisingly, land reform was an issue of critical priority to the new government. The new government recognised

the need for redistribution of land in order to promote 'political stability' and to reduce socioeconomic injustices in the country.

At Independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean agricultural sector was characterised by a bimodal distribution of land, in which mostly white large-scale commercial farmers under freehold tenure and smallholder peasant farmers in communal lands co-existed. During this period, around 6,000 large-scale commercial farmers (mostly white) controlled 39% of the country's total arable land, constituting to 15.5 million hectares of land in well-watered regions, while 700,000 African households occupied 16.4 million hectares of land (41.4% of all arable land), most of which was situated in low-potential regions (Moyo 1995). Moreover, the whites "had been greatly assisted over the years by an extensive communications and marketing infrastructure and by massive state subsidies and loans" (Palmer 1990: 165). Since the declaration of independence in April 1980, the Zimbabwean government has embarked on land reform in order to address this imbalance. Land reform was seen by the new government as a key strategy to attain political stability and economic development (Moyana 1984; Kinsey 1983).

The first phase of land reform started in 1980, a few months after the end of the liberation struggle. In this first phase, the terms of land reform were dictated by the Lancaster House agreement of 1979, which protected the private property rights of white farmers from compulsory expropriation for redistribution by the new regime for a period of ten years. Under this agreement, land reform would only proceed through a market-based approach on the basis of the 'willing-buyer, willing-seller' principle. Expropriation of white-owned land was therefore out of the question. There was a general concern that land reform would lead to a reduction in agricultural productivity. Hence, the Lancaster House agreement mandated that only 'under-utilized' land could be compulsorily acquired by the government for resettlement or other public purposes in order to avoid a loss of agricultural productivity. However, such land had to be paid for immediately and at the full normal market price, and the compensation had to be paid in foreign currency (Palmer 1990: 166). In return for these conditions, the British government promised to meet half the cost of the resettlement programme. According to the Lancaster agreement, the government had the first right to purchase the land offered by the white commercial farmers. If the government refused to purchase the land, it would then issue the 'willing seller' (i.e., white farmer) with a "certificate of no interest" and such land would

then be offered for sale to private individuals. In fact, some blacks managed to purchase commercial farms in this way (Moyo 2000).

The provisions of the Lancaster House agreement meant that land reform would be disappointingly slow and more expensive than was expected. In fact, the agreement constituted a major obstacle to land reform for a ten-year period. Palmer described the agreement as a "crucial capitulation": "the hands of the new Zimbabwean Government were to a large extent tied by the Lancaster House agreement" (ibid: 166). Besides the Lancaster agreement, there were other factors that constituted major obstacles to land reform during this period. The final years of the liberation war had caused massive displacement of the rural people: hundreds of thousands of rural folks had fled from the rural areas into cities or neighbouring countries, or had been rounded up into the so-called 'protected villages' by the colonial government (Palmer 1990: 166-7). In addition, veterinary measures to control livestock diseases had also collapsed, leading to livestock mortalities. These factors severely disrupted production of African peasant farmers and their contribution towards food supplies of the nation. Thus, at Independence, the white commercial farmers were contributing around 90 percent of the country's marketed food requirements, and therefore seemed crucial to Zimbabwe's immediate economic survival (ibid: 167).

The white farmers' position was further reinforced by the advice given to the new Zimbabwean government by Mozambique, the country's "staunchest wartime ally". According to Palmer, "When Frelimo eventually fought its way to power in 1974/75, there followed a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers from Mozambique. Frelimo, which had done nothing to discourage this exodus at the time, soon came to regret it, and the very firm advice given to Mugabe's new government in 1980 was that it should strive hard to retain white expertise and skill, notably on the land" (1990: 167). In the wake of famines in the Sahel, it made more sense to generate foreign currency by exporting food than to spend it by importing it. Taken together, these factors led to a policy shift to an increasingly racial reconciliatory stance towards white commercial farmers. At this point, the white farmers, who were the subject of guerrilla attacks during the liberation war for their secondary role in the colonial government's security forces, became a "protected species" (ibid: 167).

Over the period spanning from 1980 to end of January 1982, only 6,400 farm households had been settled (Bush & Cliffe 1984). "This slow rate was, of course, due in part because of the teething problems of building up an organisation to handle resettlement" (ibid: 87). Regardless

of these constraints, this did not hinder the government from setting ambitious targets for resettlement: a target of resettling 18,000 families on 1.1 million hectares of formerly white commercial land within five years was set in 1980; the number tripled to 54,000 in 1981; which was once again tripled to 162,000 on 10 million hectares in 1982 over a period of three years (Alexander 1994: 333). This figure was seen as 'impracticable' and 'unrealistic' by the British government (Cusworth & Walker 1988, cited in Palmer 1990:169). In 1985, a target of 15,000 families per year over the period 1985-1990 was set. Initially, the land was redistributed to those displaced by the liberation war, the near landless and unemployed. "Those who had jobs were not considered eligible; and although women could apply with their families this was limited to 'widows'" (Bush & Cliffe 1984: 87). In class terms, the targeted beneficiaries of the land reform programme were "the near landless, and jobless poor peasants, a kind of 'sub-proletariat', and excludes the most numerous elements of the rural areas the dependents of migrants, the worker-peasants or semi-proletariat class" (ibid: 87). In addition, "settlers were also supposed to be married or widowed, aged 25-50 and not in formal employment" (Kinsey 2004: 1673). By 1982, there was a policy shift, in which redistribution also aimed to benefit the relatively better-off "Master farmers" from communal areas with agricultural certificates from Agritex (Kinsey 1983). Such a focus on this class of relatively better-off beneficiaries was aimed to increase productivity (ibid).

Initially, three 'resettlement models' were proposed for settlement: 'Model A1', 'Model B' and 'Model C' schemes. These models were concerned with crop production. Model A scheme was reminiscent of the colonial land use planning under the aegis of Native Land Husbandry Act of the 1950s and the Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture. Each beneficiary household of this scheme would receive 5 hectares of arable land plus communal grazing land, ranging from 20 hectares in Natural Region I and II up to 200 hectares in Natural Region V. The second resettlement scheme, 'Model B' schemes, were essentially co-operatives based on a 'socialist' ideology. Model C schemes involved the out-grower schemes often linked to state farms.

During this period, land reform was characterised by a bias towards crop production and the absence of livestock-oriented farms. Model D schemes, on the other hand, is a livestock-oriented model, which was later proposed for Matabeleland after a strong opposition from communal areas herdowners to the crop-oriented Model A schemes, which the government had imposed, because of their preference for additional grazing land (Ranger 1989; Alexander 1991). This model involved the acquisition of commercial farms and their transfer – without

subdivision – to residents of adjacent communal areas for use as additional grazing, while simultaneously reorganising the existing communal areas into linear villages for service provision and the introduction of grazing schemes. The Model D schemes were first piloted in Gwanda district in 1984 (Robin 1994), and later extended to other parts of Matabeleland. However, the implementation of this Model D schemes was disrupted in the mid-1980s by the civil war in Matabeleland (Alexander 1991).

Ten years later, in 1990, only 52,000 households had been resettled on 3.1 million hectares or 16% of the formerly white-owned land (Moyo & Skalness 1990; Roth 1994). During the same period, land reform had not changed the agrarian structure significantly due to various reasons, mentioned above. Even after the expiration of the Lancaster agreement in 1990, land reform proceeded at slow pace in the 1990s.

By 1996, 93% of all resettled households (71,000) were resettled on Model A schemes, less than 6% in Model B schemes and 1% in Model C schemes (Kinsey 1999). In addition, some 20,000 households were said to have benefitted from the Model D/ Three-tier model in the same period (ibid). Most of the land that was acquired during this period was marginal and often located in Regions IV and V. The government's goal of settling 162,000 families proved difficult to achieve. According to Herbst (1990: 45), such targets were "essentially ideological statements" from the new government without detailed plans and budget allocations.

In 1997, in its efforts to speed up land reform, the government gazetted a list of 1,471 commercial farms, constituting 4 million hectares, for compulsory acquisition. These farms were identified based largely on assessments of underutilisation. However, of these farms, 804 farms were later 'delisted' for diverse reasons in the following months (Moyo 2000). By 1999, nearly two decades after Independence, land reform had brought little fundamental change on the agrarian structure. The agrarian structure was still – as it was in 1980 – dualistic in character, although land reform proved only a modest success (Kinsey 1999). Nonetheless, calls for land reform persisted. There was great disgruntlement by war veterans with regards to the slow pace of land redistribution, which culminated in the land invasions of the year 2000. Even after two decades of land reform, the agrarian structure still retained a dualistic character by 1999.

The third phase of land reform began in the year 2000 following the rejection of the new proposed draft constitution in the February 2000 national referendum, and the modification of

the Land Acquisition Act, which was promulgated in April 2000 to effect the land designation and compulsory acquisition without compensation. In February 2000, President Robert Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF proposed a new draft constitution in the national referendum that included a provision for land acquisition without compensation for resettlement. That new draft constitution, however, was rejected. In March 2000, following the rejection of the new constitution, hundreds of land invaders led by war veterans occupied white-owned large-scale commercial farms. These land occupations would be subsequently regularized by the government a few months later, and become the 'Fast Track Land Reform Programme' (hereafter, FTLRP).

Two resettlement schemes were planned. The first would focus on smallholder production (so-called A1 schemes) under either villagised arrangements or self-contained farms. Medium-scale "A2 schemes", with an average holding size of 134 hectares, would be established following a technocratic process in order to spur commercial agriculture outside the large-scale commercial farms (Moyo 2011a, b). The state aimed to settle a class of 'yeoman' farmers, with adequate financial resources to engage in commercial agriculture. In addition, much larger A2 farms, resembling the former white-owned large-scale farms have also been carved out in later years (Moyo 2011a, b). The difference between A1 self-contained and A2 farms is, in practice, blurred (Scoones et al. 2010).

The FTLRP of the early 2000s resulted in a complete restructuring of the agrarian structure as over 4,500 large-scale commercial farms were replaced by smallholder A1 and medium to large-scale A2 farms. Approximately 11 million hectares of commercial farmland (mostly white-owned) has since been transferred to over 145,000 African smallholder farmers under the A1 scheme and over 22,000 medium-scale commercial farmers under the A2 scheme (Moyo 2011; Matondi 2012). To this must be added thousands of 'illegal' settlers who are yet to be formalised by the state. About 200 white commercial farmers are still operating across 117,000 hectares in the whole country (Scoones 2016). Of the 11 million hectares distributed, 3.4 million hectares of land is now occupied by A2 medium-scale farms, with an average holding size of 134 ha (Moyo 2011). Today, the agrarian structure in Zimbabwe can be described as a "trimodal agrarian structure", consisting of small-scale (including communal areas, old resettlement areas and A1 schemes); medium-scale to large-scale farms; as well as large agro-estates (state or private owned), conservancies and institutional estates (Moyo 2013; Moyo & Nyoni 2013).

The FTLRP led to falls in agricultural production of all crops, although production of tobacco has since risen again. With regards to the livestock, the sector mirrored the wider agrarian structure of the country before the FTLRP. It was highly dualistic in nature, consisting of large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs) and ranches geared to the beef export market and 'traditional' livestock systems on communal land (Scoones & Wolmer 2007: 46). This dualism had a racial character: white commercial ranchers dominated export-oriented, large-scale ranching (often making use of pedigree animals), while small-scale livestock production was the preserve of small-scale black livestock keepers. "These were two very different systems of production, with different management regimes. There were different breeds, stocking rates, range management approaches, and a range of uses of livestock" (Scoones & Wolmer 2007: 46). Dualism was a result of the country's colonial legacy of generous state support for white ranchers, alongside the historical dispossession of black livestock keepers (Phimister 1978; Samasuwo 2003; Scoones & Wolmer 2007.[3] Until the late 1930s, cattle ranching offered little promise of success without massive government subsidies. "A lack of capital, recurrent disease and poor market infrastructure hampered its growth" (Scoones & Wolmer 2007: 45). Like in the Americas, the commercial beef industry was established through a "protracted and violent process of primitive capitalist accumulation", which entailed the confiscation of cattle, historical land dispossession and exploitation of cheap labour from Africans in the early stages (Phimister 1978). A series of laws passed since the 1930s provided large-scale commercial ranchers with a range of incentives and subsidies (Samasuwo 2003). At independence in 1980, the livestock sector was 'dualistic' in character, as mentioned above. But all this changed following land reform in the year 2000.

The FTLRP brought about a profound change in the livestock sector in relation to the ownership, use and management of livestock, with major implications for how livestock production, disease management and marketing take place (Mavedzenge et al. 2006, 2008). The restructuring of land ownership has brought a major decline in the commercial cattle herd. In absolute figures, cattle numbers on commercial farms dropped from 1.66 million head in 2000 to 530 747 head in 2002 (Sibanda & Khombe 2006). Today, over 90% of the national herd is now in the hands of smallholder farmers in the old communal areas, small-scale commercial farms (former purchase areas) and resettlement areas (old and new). Some former

[3] For a detailed account of the historical development of the beef industry, we refer readers to Samasuwo (2003), Phimister (1978) and Scoones and Wolmer (2007).

white LSCFs have moved into abattoir ownership and meat processing. With the collapse of the Cold Storage Company (meat board) and its associated elimination of monopoly on marketing of livestock, which was a feature of the beef industry prior to land reform, small-scale and medium-scale livestock farmers are now locked into local circuits of sales and exchange (Mavedzenge et al. 2008).

Since the early 2000s, the processes, outcomes and consequences of the FTLRP have received a great deal of academic and media attention, and have been subject to much debate, on both academic and popular platforms, in Zimbabwe and internationally (Scoones et al. 2010). This thesis builds on at least two waves of scholarly attention. Firstly, the land occupations and the subsequent implementation of the FTLRP spurred fierce debates among scholars. To be sure, scholars did not always agree on the fundamental roots of the land occupations and the implementation of the FTLRP. In the first wave of scholarship, some saw the land occupations and the subsequent implementation of the FTLRP as a political ploy by the ruling party ZANU-PF to gain the support of the rural folk amid the emergence of a powerful opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and waning support base (Hammar et al. 2003; Raftopolous & Phimister 2004; Raftopolous 2006; Alexander 2006; Muzondidya 2007). Others saw this land reform as the 'end of modernity' (Worby 2003). For some, the FTLRP served to undermine the rule of law and property rights, and resulted in the 'collapse' of agriculture, industrial decline and widespread food shortages (Richardson 2004, 2007). Others have been more concerned with the displacement of farmworkers (e.g., Rutherford 2003; Sachikonye 2003) and the attendant focus on human rights (JAG 2008). Scholars such as Marongwe (2011) and Zamchiya (2011) have suggested that land reform, especially A2 and A1 self-contained schemes, benefitted the well-connected political and economic "elites". A report published by a 'ZimOnline Investigation Team' in November 2010, which captured both media and intellectual attention, claims that over half of the land was taken by top-level cronies. Others have pointed to the profound impact the FTLRP has had on agriculture, with some arguing that it has resulted in the destruction of agriculture (Bond 2008; Campbell 2008).

The second dominant narrative justifies the FTLRP based on moral arguments about redressing the historical injustices of land redistribution (Mamdani 2008; Moyo & Yeros 2005; Hanlon et al. 2013). Over the past decade or so empirical research has begun to challenge some of the widespread misconceptions about the FTLRP (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Mutopo 2011; Chambati 2011; Chiweshe 2011; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al. 2013; Mkodzongi 2013;

Chigumira 2014; James 2014; Mazwi 2018; Scoones et al. 2018; Shonhe 2018; Shonhe et al. 2020). For Moyo and Yeros (2005) the land occupations were part of a rural popular movement, which saw the people "taking back" their land through a bottom-up process (Hanlon et al. 2013). Scholars have begun to explore the histories of land occupations.

Chaumba et al. (2003), for example, contend that the post-2000 land occupations and the subsequent FTLRP were not universally violent and chaotic as some critics suggest. Similarly, the evidence from recent empirically-based studies on land occupations in Shamva and Bindura suggests that there is no single story of land occupations, and these differs dramatically over time and space (Bhatasara & Helliker 2018; Helliker & Bhatasara 2018). According these authors, the way individual occupations played out depended very much on particular local histories and how such histories were remembered by the occupiers. For the occupiers, the land occupations were motivated by completing the struggle for land that was so central to the liberation war. During the liberation war of the 1970s, many villagers in these areas were moved to "protected villages" (also known as keeps) by the Rhodesian state. While there, they were subjected to high levels of harassment.

Memories of colonial injustices, which included forced labour (*chibaro*), compulsory destocking and contour ridging, were also central motives in taking back land. Such memories not only motivated occupiers to participate in land occupations; they explains why particular farmers were targeted. The conduct of white farmers during the liberation and the relationship with neighbouring communal areas also played a large part in which farms were initially targeted. James (2014) has likewise shown how deep memories of occupiers and their experience of the liberation war (and sometimes retold by others) spurred them to take the land in Shamva and Hwedza districts. This shows that longer-term histories of particular places and people are important in shaping processes and outcomes of land reform, as others have argued (e.g., Ranger 2011). With regards to the role of party-state, the two papers found that the land occupations were not coordinated systematically by the party-state or the national war veterans' association.

The claim that land reform benefited cronies had earlier been disputed using empirically-grounded evidence, for instance by Chaumba et al. (2003), Scoones et al. (2010), Moyo et al. (2010), Matondi (2012) and Hanlon et al. (2012), who find that claims of widespread elite

capture does not hold.[4] Instead, these studies have shown that the smallholder A1 resettlement areas are largely occupied by landless/land-poor peasants from nearby communal areas and un/under-employed people from cities. With a few exceptions (e.g., Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011), this conclusion is shared by a growing number of Zimbabwean scholars (e.g., Mkodzongi 2013; Chiweshe 2016; Chigumira 2014; Shonhe 2018; Mazwi 2019; Ncube 2018), who completed their PhD studies in various parts of the country. While these studies do acknowledge that there has been a capture of land by government ministers and high-ranking officials through patronage, this was likely within the A2 medium-scale resettlement areas (also see Dekker & Matondi 2011). Even so, Shonhe et al. (2020: 609) remark that "within the A2 medium-scale farm areas, there is a mixed population, which includes well-connected elites, but nowhere near to the extent claimed." While the resettlement areas are generally seen as ZANU-PF strongholds, it is important to bear in mind that political allegiance is highly sensitive to investigate in Zimbabwe. Thus, there is little definitive proof to suggest that all land beneficiaries are affiliated to the ruling regime. In Mhondoro-Ngezi, Mkodzongi (2013: 51) remarks that "one did not need to be necessarily a ZANU-PF supporter or political elite to get land, especially in the A1 sector (village model). People's political identities were meaningless at the time [of j*ambanja*] since anybody who joined land occupation was by default believed to be a ZANU-PF supporter". He concluded that "ZANU-PF was 'performed' and instrumentalised by landless peasants as a way of gaining access to land and government subsidies" (p. 38).

Richardson (2004, 2005, 2007) argued that the FTLRP undermined property rights and consequently resulted in a massive decline in food production and the country's collapse. However, this claim has been dismissed by Andersson (2007), for example, who argues that the decline in food production is a long-term trend that is dated as far back as the 1960s. For Andersson, the expansion of maize production into low potential zones, increased reliance on smallholder farmers for food production and high levels of rainfall variability are key factors in explaining the decline. Based on empirical research in Masvingo, Scoones and colleagues (2010: 103) have shown that grain output varies with rainfall, and in good rainfall years, farmers are more than capable of producing a bumper crop.

[4] Many recent PhD students has also not found evidence of widespread captutre by elites. These include Chiweshe (2016); Mazwi (2016); Shonhe (2018); Chigumira (2016); Ncube (2018) and many more.

Most recent scholarship has shifted attention away from the processes of land reform towards a more nuanced understanding of the outcomes. The patterns of success have been mixed. Processes of accumulation and social differentiation are reported amongst the land beneficiaries. A first major contribution to explore these processes of social differentiation following a major land reform in Zimbabwe was undertaken by the LALR researchers in Masvingo province (Scoones et al. 2010, 2012). A total of 400 households were enumerated "along a north-south agroecological gradient across the province" (ibid: 38). Drawing on, among others, the work of Dorward (2009) and Dorward et al. (2009), they argue that patterns of accumulation and social differentiation are emerging in the new resettlement areas. They report that 35 percent of land reform beneficiaries are beginning to engage in 'accumulation from below' (denoted as 'stepping up'), regularly producing surpluses and selling, and reinvesting in their farms, while 21.4 percent are diversifying their livelihoods in order to maintain their reproduction ('stepping out'), with another 33.6 percent struggling to continue farming ('hanging in'), and another 10 percent exiting their land altogether due to infirmity or being too poor to farm. More recently, the same authors and others have built on this work, especially in the 'Highveld', where tobacco is being successfully grown under contract (Sakata 2016; Shonhe & Mtapuri 2019; Mazwi 2019; Scoones et al. 2018; Mudimu et al. 2020; Shonhe et al. 2020, 2022). Much of this work points to the increasing social differentiation, with some 'accumulating from below', while others are struggling to gain a foothold in farming, or exiting the land reform areas due to poor health or lack of assets (Scoones et al. 2010, 2012; Scoones et al. 2018; also see Shonhe et al. 2020; Shonhe & Mtapuri 2019).

What has often been lacking in this literature, I argue, is the explicit attention to dynamics of accumulation in uncertain or unpredictable environments. The present study hence aims to expand our understanding of agrarian change in marginal and harsh environments.

1.11 The structure of the thesis

The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two introduces the framework adopted for this study. It begins by providing a review of insights from the "new rangeland ecology" (Behnke et al. 1993) before highlighting some of the key concepts of Marxist political economy which have guided this research. It then defines key terms of agrarian political economy such as "simple/social reproduction", "capital accumulation", "petty commodity production" and "accumulation paths" ("from below", "above" and "outside").

Chapter Three lays out the research methodology utilised for this study. A critical realism research paradigm was employed, utilising both "intensive" and "extensive" research designs. This combines broadly more descriptive and representative data of the wider population with in-depth exploration of causal mechanisms (Sayer 1992). These included archival research, formal and informal interviews, participant observations, focus group discussions, life-histories, participatory 'success' ranking exercises with local knowledgeable informants and a standard quantitative questionnaire. As such, the study has tended toward both breadth and depth. The development and application of the research methodology was realised in four distinct 'phases'. The first 'exploratory' phase of the research process was concerned with introducing the research in the study sites, as well as, establishing rapport and contacts. This phase also provided a basis for selecting potential field sites, which were in turn visited in order to orient myself.

In the second 'intensive/qualitative/historical' phase, I realized an extensive qualitative data collection by moving around and interviewing people on diverse issues. I used these data to design my questionnaire. Concurrently, over the course of this phase, I had begun collecting archival material held in government offices and private possession in order to reconstruct a general history of land reform in the district, with a particular focus on the role of the state. In the third 'hybrid intensive-extensive' phase I realized an extensive quantitative and qualitative data collection concerning the socio-economic profile of the land reform beneficiaries, general livelihood background, farming enterprise (e.g., assets, production, sales inputs etc.), farm investments (purchases, buildings, equipment etc), gender and next generation. During the course of this phase, life-histories (Cheater 1984; Francis 1993; Oya 2007) with new farmers were also conducted to investigate causal relations. These life-history interviews focussed on the general socio-economic and political origins of the new farmers, farming enterprise, farm investments, perceived problems and so on. In the fourth phase, I briefly revisited the study area with the aim to update the data.

In Chapter Four I presented a historical overview of land reform in Matobo since Independence in order to understand the origins of the three land-uses examined in this thesis. My main focus in this chapter is the role of the state in land allocation and its significance in relation with relation to the differentiation process. I demonstrate that land reform programmes have resulted in a new 'tri-modal' agrarian structure (Moyo and Chambati 2013), which is largely dominated by smallholder and medium-scale farmers.

Chapter Five sets out the socio-economic profile of smallholder A1 settlers in two contrasting villages. These villages were selected in order to explore different patterns of accumulation and social differentiation. The villages were established through the land invasions and occupations of the 2000s, which were later regularised as part of the FTLRP. I discuss *who* these settlers are, *how* they acquired their land and *what* they are producing. The main emphasis is to demonstrate patterns of social differentiation. My analysis of patterns of social differentiation is based on data derived from participatory workshop-style session with a group of men employing the use of participatory "success" ranking exercise (Scoones et al. 2010). On the basis of this material, it was possible to categorise the A1 farmers into four 'success groups'. I show that these A1 farmers are not a homogenous class.

A parallel analysis of the socio-economic origins of the medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers is presented in Chapter Six. As in the smallholder A1 schemes, I discuss *who* these farmers are, *how* they acquired their land and *what* they are producing. Again, the main focus is on differential patterns of social differentiation across the medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers. In these two sectors, however, the deployment of participatory success ranking exercises was simply not possible because of the geographic distance between the farms and the absence of landowners. To lay bare the emerging social inequality among these land reform beneficiaries, I used a "price-weighted asset index", derived from data gathered through a household survey. Taken together, these two chapters set the scene for the ensuing analysis of processes of accumulation in Chapters Eight and Nine. In other words, the chapters are precursors to a more in-depth discussion of the causal processes that underlie such differentiation.

Chapter Seven focuses on the different types of off-farm income sources pursued by households in the study area based on field data, pointing to the importance of off-farm income as an important source of capital for farm investments and offsetting bust periods.

In Chapter Eight I examine diverse strategies employed by livestock farmers to sustain their livestock in the context of a highly variable resource base. The chapter demonstrates that livestock mobility remains a crucial part of extensive livestock production in Matobo district, despite the highly fragmented landscape. It explores how livestock farmers negotiate access to land and property rights in resettlement areas that are notionally held as exclusive private or common property.

In Chapters Nine I examine the complex processes and mechanisms of capital accumulation in the smallholder A1 farms. The chapter's main focus is to explore the underlying dynamics generating patterns of social differentiation described in Chapter Five. Using material from life histories of farmers, I classify the farmers into three broad agrarian accumulation trajectories: "dropping out/down", "hanging in" and "stepping in/up". With the exception of "dropping out/down" category, each of these categories had at least two sub-categories. These accumulation trajectories were in turn linked to class position and accumulation routes to getting there. From this categorization, I ask how these farmer categories are generated and what are the processes (political-economic) that creates these. Factors explaining these patterns of accumulation are then discussed.

A parallel analysis of the accumulation patterns in the medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms was presented in Chapter Ten. As in the smallholder A1 sector, I presented a typology of accumulation trajectories using material from life history interviews with farmers and discussed the underlying dynamics generating these accumulation patterns. The main emphasis is on demonstrating the differential success of A2 and self-contained farmers. The self-contained farmers were doing much better than the A2 farmers, in part because of a strict selection criterion that targeted those with large herds or "productive capacity" to invest in livestock ranching.

Chapter Eleven consolidates the findings of thesis, discusses its contribution to social science research, and provides suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2: FRAMING AGRARIAN CHANGE IN A "NON-EQUILIBRIUM" ENVIRONMENT

This chapter engages with a wide range of relevant bodies of literature, providing background and theoretical framing of the study. Drawing from quite a variety of disciplinary domains, including the non-equilibrium ecology, pastoral studies, property rights and agrarian political economy, I show how these scholarly writing usefully informs the framing of this study.

Beginning with a review of literature pertaining to non-equilibrium ecology, I demonstrate the highly variable and uncertain environmental conditions in which pastoralists are continuously having to adapt, change and innovate in order to generate reliability. Based on this premise, I argue that rangelands in Matobo district should be understood as "non-equilibrium rangelands" (Ellis & Swift 1988; Westoby et al. 1989; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994).

The chapter goes on to explore how pastoralists' practices make use of variability over space and time. The highly variable rangelands require strategies that can make use of resources that vary over space and time. This includes livestock mobility to track forage over time and space in a non-equilibrium landscape, which require a particular type of negotiation. These features are what distinguishes pastoralists from peasants.

Finally, I explore some of the key texts in agrarian political economy linking to the core focus of the study, the patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation among different types of livestock farmers in a new post-land reform landscape in dry areas. The chapter goes on to explore how other scholars have observed processes of rural accumulation and social differentiation in the Zimbabwean context.

2.1 Characterising pastoral areas

The characteristics of dryland ecosystems affect production and possibilities of accumulation in many ways (Scoones 2021). Rangelands in dryland regions can be understood as "non-equilibrium rangelands". Non-equilibrium rangelands emerged as a concept in rangeland science and management in the 1980s and 1990s, following the dissatisfaction with the mainstream view that dominated in this field (Ellis & Swift 1988; Westoby et al. 1989; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). Thinking about rangeland science and management, for the most part of the century, has been dominated by vegetation succession theory first developed by

Frederick Clements (1916) at the turn of the nineteenth century and rooted temperate grasslands of North America, where it was aimed to boost the cattle economy. In the context of dryland Africa, however, this equilibrium model (based on concepts such as "vegetation succession", "carrying capacity", and "land degradation") was rather considered to be inappropriate and damaging to livelihoods. Here, livestock populations are unlikely to reach the ecological carrying capacity, which will result in environmental degradation. Rainfall is one of the primary – if not the principal – factors that keeps livestock numbers below a number that would result in land degradation in the long-term (Behnke et al. 1993). However, bringing supplementary feed from outside can help to reduce mortality during drought periods and sustain artificially high livestock numbers, thus leading to overstocking and ultimately environmental degradation (Vetter 2005).

A key insight of the non-equilibrium rangeland theory is that rainfall variability, measured by the coefficient of variation (CV), is a key driver of rangeland dynamics. An interannual coefficient of variation of 33% or more has been proposed as a threshold above which non-equilibrium rangeland dynamics prevails (Ellis & Swift 1988). This resonates strongly in Matobo settings, where the average annual rainfall in Kezi town over the period 1993-2021 was 556mm per annum, with a Coefficient of Variation (CV) of 40% in Kezi, and frequent droughts (one every three to four years).

Some argue that pastoralism is a high-reliability infrastructure (Roe et al. 1998; Roe 2020), best suited for productive use of non-equilibrium rangelands (Behnke et al. 1993). High-reliability theory aims to understand "how institutions maintain their activities in circumstances where high-cost failure, error, and accidents are probable" (Roe et al. 1998: 39). High reliability organizations (HROs) include air traffic control systems, nuclear power plants, electricity companies and so on. Building from the non-equilibrium ecology theory, Roe and colleagues (1998) argue that pastoral systems share similar characteristics to these high-reliability institutions. Just as these high reliability institutions are seen as 'critical infrastructures' (Roe & Schulman 2012; Schulman & Roe 2016), the authors suggest that so too is pastoralism, which involves "the search and attainment of reliable performance through the use and management of a highly complex range and livestock technology" (Roe et al. 1998: 387; Roe 2020). They challenging the mainstream view in pastoral studies that often present pastoralists as risk-averse. Instead, they argue that pastoralism should be conceived of as a high-reliability institution.

Non-equilibrium rangelands "are never stable, always in flux" (Scoones 2023a: 2). Livestock production in these settings is subject to boom-and-bust cycles, whereby a good rain can lead to herd growth and an above normal rainfall can lead to increase threats of diseases, while poor conditions (e.g., prolonged drought) can lead to mass mortalities and have lasting effects on the livelihoods of pastoralists. This has implications for production and possibilities of accumulation (Scoones 2021). The process of accumulation in these settings, as Pappagallo (2023) has noted, is not linear or even, as livestock growth and decline is intricately tied to ecological, social, economic and political dynamics. Despite these challenges, pastoralism has persisted. A major reason why pastoralism has persisted for many centuries lies in pastoralists' ability to manage variability as part of their everyday practices in order to generate high reliable outputs from highly variable inputs (Roe 2020).

Today, pastoralists and peasant face similar challenges: dispossession and marginalization via resource extraction and land grabbing by global capital; climate change; limited access to land; globalised financialization and so on (Scoones 2021: 23). In Scoones' (2021) view, "the knowledges, practices, skills and forms of political-social organisation – both the social relations of production and productive forces – that we see among pastoralists are perhaps especially well-suited to deal with these features of the contemporary world, characterised by uncertainty, fragility and precarity" (Scoones 2021: 24). Thus, he has argued that pastoral and agrarian studies will undoubtedly benefit from each other. Based on this premises, he proposes "new angles of enquiry that are often not central to examinations of more settled agrarian settings that to date have dominated 'peasant studies'" (ibid: 22). This study takes up this call. Drawing from pastoral studies, he proposes seven themes: living with and from uncertainty, mobilities, flexible land control, dynamic social formations, reimagined communities and moral economies, real markets and networked politics. The section which follows discuss four themes germane to this study, especially those relating to how pastoralists respond to variability in order to generate reliability.

2.1.1 Living with and from variability

As mentioned above, a key feature of dryland pastoral areas that set them apart from settled agricultural settings is their variability, a characteristic manifestation of uncertainty. Pastoralists live with (coping) and from (making use of) variability (Scoones 1994; Krätli & Schareika 2010; Krätli 2015; FAO 2022; Scoones 2021, 2023b). Pastoralists make use of variability as a productive resource to generate conditions of successful production and

accumulation, while embracing uncertainty as part and parcel of life. To do this, various strategies are employed, including livestock mobility, livelihood diversification, herd splitting, breeding management and so on (Scoones 2021).

Sandford (1983: 38) distinguishes between "opportunistic management" or "tracking strategies", whereby "the number of livestock grazing [in a specific area] is continuously adjusted to the current availability of forage", and "conservation stocking strategy" whereby "a constant number of livestock graze an area through good and bad years alike" (ibid). Scoones (1994: 9) suggests four strategies of opportunistic management or tracking that pastoralists may pursue: (1) increasing the amount of locally available fodder, for example by improving fodder production (such as through managing bush cover or improving key resource sites), supplying fodder produced from elsewhere, lopping browse species or collecting pods; (2) "movement of animals in response to spatial and temporal variation in resource availability"; (3) reducing the animal feed intake during drought times, by changing watering regimes, reducing parasite loads or raising more hardy species and breeds; and (4) destocking animals through sales during periods of drought and restocking when forage becomes available after drought.

2.1.2 Mobility and livestock movement

Mobility is part and parcel of living with and from variability and managing uncertainty in extensive livestock production systems (Scoones 2021, 2023). According to Behnke et al. (1993: 15), "Herd management must aim at responding to alternate periods of high and low productivity, with an emphasis on exploiting environmental heterogeneity rather than attempting to manipulate the environment to maximise stability and uniformity". Pastoralists have long made use of variability in non-equilibrium rangelands dynamics to respond to environmental heterogeneity over space and time (Scoones 1994; Krätli 2019; FAO 2021). The importance of mobility has been well documented in the literature (Scoones 1994; Turner 1999; Turner & Scheldt 2019; Scoones 2023a, b). It is a crucial strategy for generating high reliability amidst variability (Roe et al. 1998; Roe 2020).

Livestock owners undertake several different types of movements ranging from daily routines, to classic forms of seasonal transhumance – often over large areas (e.g., in Western Africa) – that requires brokering with many different land users; to responsive movements especially in agro-pastoralist settings (e.g., Zimbabwe) in response to stresses such as drought, to day-to-

day movements in and around homes to improve the harvesting of nutrients in poor-quality grasslands (Scoones 2023b). Regardless of scale, these different types of movement strategies are aimed at offsetting the seasonal and interannual variability in both the quantity and quality of forage resources. Studies have shown that movements (both local and large-scale migrations) can increase the survival chances and productivity parameters of livestock.

Illustrating this, Scoones' (1990, 1992b) study of agro-pastoralists in southern Zimbabwe found that animals that were moved early to better grazing areas in response to drought had a better chance of survival. During the 1990s, several studies showed that herd survival during the three successive droughts (1982-84, 1986-87 and 1991-92) was 40% for households that moved their cattle early (before November), 23% for households that moved their cattle late and 3% for households that did not move their cattle at all (Scoones 1990, 1992b; Scoones et al. 1996). Initial movements involved moving cattle between key resource areas, which is from clay soil areas to sand soil areas in the miombo zones where wetlands provided a vital grazing resource. However, due to an influx of cattle into these key resource areas, fodder was soon depleted and cattle were moved out of the area. Firstly, cattle were moved to the outskirts of a residential area in Zvishavane town and some herds were moved south to abandoned farms where forage was still available. Some herds were moved to the northern parts of the communal areas, where they were then illegally grazed in commercial ranches. Very few lease-grazed from commercial ranchers, while others simply allowed herders to graze their herds for free.

In Matabeleland (where this study was conducted), characterised by low and erratic rainfall, seasonal transhumance has long been a key feature of extensive livestock production (Prescott 1961; Madzudzo & Hawkes 1995; Nyathi 2014). Known as "*mlaga*", this system "involves the seasonal movement of cattle from one area to the other, in order to extend the grazing range" Madzudzo & Hawkes 1996: 6). Madzudzo and Hawkes (1996) provides an idealized movement pattern in Bulilimamangwe district, wherein cattle owners or hired herders move cattle to "*emlageni"* (cattle post) from August to October, and make "*umlaga"* (i.e., temporary shelter), which they will abandon at the end of the season. According to Prescott (1961), this system is based on the distinction between sour-veld and sweet veld.

Several factors, including labour, access to capital resources, labour and social networks are essential for facilitating movements (Turner & Schlecht, 2019; Nori, 2019; Scoones, 2023b).

2.1.3 Key resources

Non-equilibrium rangelands consist of patches that usually account for a small proportion of the total area, but are critical to the overall productivity of the system (Scoones 1989, 1991, 1995). These patches are known as "key resources". They include areas such as drainage lines, 'dambos', swampy and river banks. These areas are critical for sustaining towards the end of dry season. During drought periods when nothing else is available, key resources constitute what can be considered as refugee grazing. In some cases, crop fields after crops are harvested constitute key resources during drought or dry season (Bayer and Water-Bayer 1995), as this study shows in Chapter Eight. In Matabeleland, the importance of major rivers as key resources has been acknowledged (Mabhena 2010). For example, in Gwanda, livestock producers tend to move their animals to Thuli and Shashe Rivers for winter grazing. In Matabeleland North, livestock producers send their animals to Gwaai river during the dry season.

2.1.4 Property rights and livestock mobility

This brings us to the question of property rights and land control in relation to livestock mobility in dryland pastoral settings. In highly variable environments, livestock mobility is vital for both production and accumulation. This requires a regime of property rights which provides "security of tenure while permitting flexibility of use patterns" (Behnke & Scoones 1993: 30). However, balancing the need to secure rights without reducing the flexibility in resource use is a difficult task. Fernández-Giménez (2002: 50) has described this as a "paradox of pastoral land tenure" in the sense that "pastoralists need both security and flexibility in resource tenure, and often require diversity as well".

Property regimes are generally classified into four types: state, private, common and open property regimes (Table 2.1). An influential guide for livestock and range management in dryland pastoral settings of Africa has been Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" thesis, which is where this discussion will begin. In his famous article "The Tragedy of the Commons", Hardin (1968) predicts that resources held in common will inevitably result in overexploitation in the long-term. While the "tragedy of the commons" was not written as a treatise on range management, it has had a profound influence on rangeland management in Africa and beyond. Using an example of a common pasture, Hardin argues that any "common property system" – which he defines as any resource without any well-defined property rights and used by different individuals – will be overused. "Picture a pasture open to all", writes Garrett Hardin, "it is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons" (Hardin 1968: 1244). For Hardin, such an arrangement may have worked reasonably well for

many centuries due to "tribal wars, poaching and disease [that would] keep the number of both man and beast well below carrying capacity of the land" (ibid: 1244). However, eventually, Hardin continues, it will come "the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired day of social stability becomes a reality". Hardin goes on to suggest that, from this point on, "the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy" (1968: 1244). He argued that the private benefit of grazing an additional animal on a commonly held rangeland exceeds the private cost because the costs of overgrazing are shared collectively between all the pastoralists. For Hardin, this gives an overriding incentive to overexploit and hence degrade the pastures. As Hardin (1968: 1244) puts it:

> Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to the herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

The solution to the tragedy of the commons, so the narrative goes, is to place the commons under private or state property regime (where access and use of the commons is regulated by the government).

Table 2.1: Four main types of property regimes

State property	Individuals have duty to observe use or access rules determined by controlling agency. Agencies have right to determine use and access rules.
Private property	Individuals have right to undertake socially acceptable uses and have duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. Others (called 'non-owners') have duty to refrain from preventing socially acceptable uses and have a right to expect only socially acceptable ones will occur.
Common property	The management group (the 'owner') has right to exclude non-members, and non-members have duty to abide by exclusion. Individual members of the management group (the 'co-owners') have both rights and duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of the thing owned.
Open property	No defined group of users or 'owners' and so the benefit stream is available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no right with respect to use rates and maintenance of the asset. The asset is an 'open access resource'.

Source: Bromley 1989: 872)

However, the 'tragedy of the commons' thesis has been increasingly questioned as a guide to policy making. Critics have argued that Hardin have failed to distinguish between open access and common property regimes (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975; Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990). The critics argued that the tragedy of the commons thesis was referring to open-access property, which refers to failed property regimes or an absence of property rights. Hardin (1991) himself later responded to the criticism and admitted that he was in error to label the "common property" as open-access resources. Open-access (*res nullius*) refers to the lack of property rights. In other words, it describes circumstances where no individual or group has the right to exclude others (Bromley 1989). According to Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975),

> Common property is not "everybody's property." The concept implies that potential resource users who are not members of a group of co-equal owners are excluded. The concept "property" has no meaning without this feature of exclusion of all who are not either owners themselves or have some arrangement with owners to use the resource in question (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975: 715).

Bromley (1989: 872) refutes the assumption that "everybody's property is nobody's property", and instead argues that "[i]t can only be said that everybody's access is nobody's property." Often, the term open-access is also used to describe the situation where property rights have not developed – what Loius De Alessi (1991) has called the "initial state of the world" (cited in Fitzpatrick 2006). Open-access also describes the circumstances that emerges when all other property regimes have collapsed. For example, Luma farm discussed in this thesis can be best described as open-access. Common property describes circumstances where resources rights are held by a defined group, and the rights and duties are specified (Bromley & Cernea 1989).

Besides open access and common property regimes, common pool resources such as rangelands can also be held as private property and state property (Bromley 1989; Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; Berkes 2009). Private property denotes a situation whereby resource use rights are held by private individuals or corporations. State property refers to circumstances where land is vested in the state, and where rules with regards to use and regulations are determined by the state agency (Bromley 1989). Examples of state property include national parks and game reserves. Taken together, some scholars have referred to these four types of property regimes as the "big four" (von Benda-Beckmann 2001; B. Turner 2017). These categories "are ideal, analytic types" (Feeny et al. 1990: 4). In practice, two or more of these property regimes can coexist in any one situation, and sometimes may be even in competition. For example, property regimes may overlap where features of two regimes are combined. In Zimbabwe, communal areas and smallholder A1 schemes provides examples for this. Here,

two different regimes are evident: the first with respect to arable land and the second for communal grazing. Arable is mostly private, although they might revert to communal property after harvest. With regards to grazing land, the features of common property are pronounced. Moreover, resettlement areas in Zimbabwe are state property, but land reform beneficiaries hold this land notionally as private or common property.

In the context of arid and semi-arid environments, characterised by high variability in the temporal and spatial distribution of resources, common property is seen as more appropriate, not only because of the low benefit-cost ration of building enclosure in low-potential regions but also because it facilitate mobility and flexible access at a lower than other alternative regimes (Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992; Scoones 1994; Peters 1994).

Some analysts have questioned the applicability of the "big four" typology to pastoral systems. Moritz (2016: 689), for example, argues that the current "big four" typology "cannot adequately describe a property regime that is found in mobile pastoral systems." He therefore suggested that a fifth property regime can be added to the existing "big four" typology: open property regimes. In this new property regime, he argues that "open access does not mean the absence of rules". Rather "it refers to the right that every pastoralist has to common-pool grazing resources" (Moritz 2016: 689). In other words, "open access is the rule" (Moritz 2016: 704). For Moritz (2016: 704), "open property regimes works as complex adaptive systems in which independent decision-making of highly mobile households results in an efficient distribution of the grazing pressure over available resources."

In cases, where rules of common property have broken or failed, Cousins (1996) highlighted three main outcomes, namely the increased incidence of resource degradation as the property regime moves towards open access; "*spontaneous enclosure*" or privatization; and the capture of the commons by a group of commercially-oriented producers who may pursue their own private accumulation strategies in the name of community development. All these outcomes are underway in Luma A1 resettlement, where rules of common property have failed (Chapter Eight).

Despite these criticisms, the use of the tragedy of the commons narratives to justify privatization and subdivision of the commons is particularly stark in the context of African range policy debates. For example, the continued influence of Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' can be seen in recent attempts to privatise and subdivide the commons in southern

Africa (see for example, Peters 1994 on Botswana). As far as the current study is concerned, the radical reordering of collectively-held "three-tier" farms also represent the continued influence of the tragedy of the commons thesis (Chapter Four). As we shall see, concerns over environmental degradation of the Three-tier farms, held as common property, have informed the view that subdivision of these farms into individual parcels for exclusive use is the answer. Since the early colonial period, the dominant environmental and development narratives or agenda, doggedly pursued by governments at the behest of foreign donors, has long presupposed that pastoralists are unproductive and represent a threat to the environment, emphasising the need for sedentarization, land titling programs and group ranches (Homewood & Rogers 1987; Peters 1994; Mwangi 2007). In the 1960s and 1980s, international donor agencies have invested tens of millions of dollars in a bid to improve the management of African pastoral areas in order to enhance productivity, welfare of the pastoralists and to combat rangeland degradation. However, these efforts were met with limited success, leading the scale down of activities or complete withdrawal by these major donors from dryland Africa (Scoones 1994: Oba et al. 2000). Rohde and colleagues (2006: 305) observe that for southern Africa, all these efforts were largely based on two influential environmental narratives – namely that of "land degradation" and the "tragedy of the commons" – applied to the modernisation model of development.

2.1.4.1 Privatisation and access to land: Recent trends

Unlike most of the world's classic dryland pastoral settings, rangelands in post-land reform settings in Zimbabwe are notionally held either as exclusive commons or private property. In many instances, land reform has involved the subdivision of large-scale commercial farms into small parcels and their assignment to individual or group beneficiaries. As land has been individualised and fragmented, movement of animals across these farm boundaries and land use types require a particular type of negotiation and collaboration among landholders. What then do livestock producers do in the context of privatisation and fragmentation of rangeland? What local institutions exist for facilitating livestock movements? The literature on pastoralism across the world is replete with examples of institutions and mechanisms that restore livestock mobility in fragmented landscapes.

Several studies in different parts of the world, often in highly fragmented rangeland landscapes (Hobbs et al. 2008), have reported a process of "re-aggregation" or "reassertion" of the commons (BurnSilver & Mwangi 2009; Mwangi 2007; Archambault 2016; Galaty 2016).

Based on her long-term ethnographic study in southern Kenya, Archambault (2016) found that Maasai households are recreating the commons by activating social networks, enabling them 'free' (non-financial payment) access to grazing and water resources. In particular, women's social networks (e.g., their kin, in-laws, friends or religion associates) play an important role in these arrangements. Mwangi (2007: 136-137) reports that in Kajiado district of southern Kenya, landholders in subdivided group ranches are "reaggregating their individualized parcels and pursuing joint pasturing and management of their herds. This reaggregation of parcels seems to be occurring among neighbours, or within families and in-laws, or in relatively few instances among friends whose parcels are not necessarily adjacent to each other." Sundstrom et al. (2012), in a study of Mailua group ranch of the Maasai, also found that landholders are engaging in collaborative and collective work in response to variability. Illegal access through poach-grazing in private property or protected areas is also common (Robinson & Flintan 2022). Formal negotiations between private landholders and groups of pastoralists to access pastures are emerging, which enables the private ranchers to protect their property from the wider groups of pastoralists by utilising one group as a "buffer" (Wade 2015). In other places, complex mosaic systems are emerging, whereby pastoralists make use of multiple grazing sites to overcome uncertainty (Robinson 2019).

A large body of research in Africa has documented the increasing prevalence of informal land markets in Africa, including purchase, rental and sharecropping, in the context of customary land tenure systems (Lund 2001; Andre 2003; Mathieu et al. 2003; Sjaastad 2003; Woodhouse 2003; Daley 2005a, 2005b; Chimhowu & Woodhouse). This has been described as a "vernacular land markets" (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). This thesis adopts this concept. However, the afore-mentioned papers have almost an exclusive focus on arable land tenure. Key driving forces of this process not only include population growth, but also include growth of markets for agricultural commodities such as horticultural products in towns, the impact of technology for water management, tree cropping and crop transport, increase in non-farm and wage income, population migration, and urbanization, and the emergence of land markets in the so-called 'customary' areas around towns and cities (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006: 353-356). This thesis, in contrast, focuses on resettlement areas, and in particular, pasture leasing as a response to spatial and temporal variation in pastoral resources (i.e., water and forage).

As will be shown in Chapter Eight, livestock farmers in these settings employ a suite of strategies aimed at both maintaining livestock survival and generating high-reliability. Through

practices such as seasonal movement, supplementary feeding and disease control, livestock farmers are able to control the highly variable environment to ensure that a stable flow of livestock services and products continue to support livelihoods (Roe et al. 1998). These are discussed in Chapter Eight.

2.2 Livestock production in communal and resettlement areas: Empirical research

The non-equilibrium debate that started in the 1980s was accompanied by a vast number of empirical case studies in the 1980s in Zimbabwe and beyond, challenging many of the assumptions on which mainstream view is based.

2.2.1 Multiple purpose herds

Several scholars have pointed out that flocks and herds in communal areas in Zimbabwe and within the region are not produced for sale as beef animals, but are kept for multiple purposes, including provision of inputs to arable production, as a source of milk and draft power, and as a store of value (Danckwerts 1974; GFA 1987; Scoones & Wilson 1989; Tapson 1991; Cousins 1996; Shackleton et al. 2005). These multiple flocks and herds are integrated into complex livelihood strategies. Donkeys are kept largely for draught and transport purposes, while goats are vital for meeting households' cash and meat needs, as well as provision of manure.

According to Cousins (1996: 181), several factors determine which livestock functions are important. One such factor is agroecology. Thus, livestock raising for sale enjoys pre-eminence in low-potential regions than high-potential regions. In Zimbabwe, for example, the provisioning of agricultural inputs (manure and draught power) is the most important function in high-potential regions (e.g., Mashonaland regions) where arable farming is favourable, whereas livestock sales as a source of income are more important in the drier areas such as southern Matabeleland regions (Sandford 1982; ARDA 1982). As a result, the annual beef offtake in Matabeleland South therefore forms a relatively high proportion of the total gross cattle income, unlike regions favourable for arable farming, where it forms a very small proportion (ARDA 1982).

The economic profile of the region is also important: cattle are an important source of draught power in areas where cropping is a viable option, and tractor services are unavailable and unaffordable. He also notes that milk production for home consumption is also important in most areas. In addition, livestock also continue to be an important source of savings (or 'store

of wealth') for migrant workers, although phases in the "developmental cycle" of the household must also be considered (ibid). Additionally, herd size and composition influence the decision to sell, although evidence from different regions is contradictory in relation to whether or not those with large herds have a greater propensity to sell animals for cash. Lastly, the function of livestock is also influenced by the class identity of the owner. In most areas, livestock is highly skewed, and often correlated to high levels of crop production and with higher levels of income from off-farm sources, and is therefore a sensible indicator of social differentiation (ibid).

Given the multi-functional nature of livestock in the smallholder sector, it has been argued that estimates regarding the livestock productivity and value of output have to consider the objectives of the household rather than measures derived from other farming systems such as growth rate or off-take used for single-purpose ranching systems (Behnke 1986; Scoones & Wilson 1988; Barrett 1992). In line with this thinking, estimates from replacement cost methods have highlighted that cattle herds have higher economic returns than in commercial sectors that are mainly single purpose production such as beef production or dairy (ARDA 1987; Scoones 1990, Barrett 1992). For example, Barrett (1992) revealed that cattle in the communal areas have high gross return of about USD3.5 per hectare compared to the gross return of less than US$2.4 per hectare for commercial sector. Using the replacement method, Scoones (1990, 1992a) found that the draught purpose was ranked first at ZW$462 per adult animal annually, followed by milk (ZW$180), transport (ZW$131), manure (ZW$13-26) and sales (ZW$15). He also calculated the gross returns per hectare of various cattle products and services, and found that it yielded a return of ZW$113.86 per annum. "In large part", Scoones (1992a: 17) argues, "the economic value of communal areas livestock is derived from the ability to stock at high levels and use a mixture of species for a variety of uses beyond those conventionally associated with stock – beef, milk, ploughing – to include such uses as transport and outputs like goat meat."

Livestock production in communal areas is so intimately bound up with crop production. Other studies reported a strong correlation between size of cattle herd and average maize yield per hectare (GFA 1987; Rukuni 1994). According to Sandford (1982), a minimum head of ten cattle is required to reproduce a draught team of two oxen. "These studies demonstrated … that, given existing circumstances of limited land availability, low herd sizes and a multiple use system, where livestock production was intimately bound up with crop production, not

gearing towards marketing (let alone export sales) was a perfectly rational position, despite all the policy and extension messages urging farmers to sell." (Mavedzenge et al. 2006).

2.3 The agrarian political economy

This thesis adopts a Marxist agrarian political economy in order to understand class dynamics in pastoral settings. In such an extensive field, my intention is not to be comprehensive but rather to introduce and summarise those themes that have direct relevance to this present study. This section now explores the core features of conceptual framework in more detail. The framework elaborated below draws from works and theoretical insights from scholars in Marxist political economy (Bernstein 1988; Bernstein 1996; Byres 1996; de Janvry 1981; Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985; Neocosmos 1993; Byres 2003; Cousins 2013; Scoones 2015b; Bernstein 2016; Whitfield 2016).

Agrarian political economy "investigates "the social relations and dynamics of production and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and contemporary" (Bernstein 2010: 1). In order to understand agrarian political economy in the contemporary era, Bernstein argues, we must therefore pay attention to the analysis of capitalism and its development (ibid: 1). Capitalism is understood as a historical system of production and reproduction predicated on a fundamental social relation between capital and labour wherein, capital exploits labour in its pursuit of profit and accumulation, while labour has to work for capital to gain its means of subsistence.

Bernstein (2010: 22-23) identify four core questions of political economy that are centred around social relations of production and reproduction. These are: (a) who owns what? (social relations of different 'property' regimes), (b) who does what? (Social divisions of labour), (c) who gets what? (social divisions of "fruits of labour"/ distribution of income) and (d) what do they do with it? (social relations of consumption, reproduction and accumulation). For Bernstein, these key questions can be applied at different sites and scales of economic activity ranging from households to "communities" to regional as well as national and global economic formations (ibid: 24) Recently, Scoones (2015b: 85), in what he calls "political economy of livelihoods", proposed two more questions to this list, focusing on social and ecological problems in contemporary societies. These are: (a) how do social classes and groups in society and within the state interact with each other? (social relations, institutions and forms of domination in society and between citizens and the state as they affect livelihoods), and (b)

how do changes in politics get shaped by dynamic ecologies and vice versa? (relates to questions of political ecology and, to how environmental dynamics influence livelihoods).

2.3.1 Key terminology and concepts

Concepts such as 'simple reproduction', 'social reproduction' and 'capital accumulation' are key to our understanding of how a capitalist mode of production works. Thus, before providing a brief review of the literature in the Marxist political economy field, it is important to discuss this terminology used in this study. The next paragraphs provide a rapid overview of the key concepts in this study.

Social reproduction can be understood as

> … activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis and intergenerationally…. (it includes) how food, clothing and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, the ways in which the care and socialization of children are provided, the care of the infirm and the elderly, and the social organization of sexuality' (Laslett and Brenner, 1989: 382).

Also known as "expanded reproduction", accumulation of capital can be defined as a process whereby money (M) is invested to make more money (M'), as illustrated by Marx's general formula, M-C-M'. It takes place when "capitalists do not consume their entire surplus value, but spend part of it buying additional means of production" (Fine & Saad-Filho 2004: 63).

The term 'simple reproduction' has been defined by Karl Marx (1976: 712) as a "mere repetition of the process of production, on the same scale as before". In other words, it refers to a process whereby producing units engage in production and exchange in order to recreate themselves as producers. As Fine and Saad-Filho (2004: 62) put it, simple reproduction takes place "if there is no technical change, and if the capitalists spend their surplus value on consumption and merely repeat the previous pattern of production, the economy can reproduce itself at the same level of activity".

2.3.2 The Agrarian Question(s)

Central to an analysis of agrarian change is the concept of "agrarian question" (AQ). The concept of agrarian question emerged in the late nineteenth century when "European Marxists saw the prolonged existence in Europe (apart from England and Prussia) of peasantries as constituting what Engels termed the 'peasant question'… These continuing peasantries were symptomatic of an incomplete transition to capitalism" (Byres 2012: 10). The actual term

"agrarian question" is credited to Karl Kautsky (1899[1988]) when it became clear that agriculture had not followed the English path described by Marx. Since then, the concept of agrarian question has been widely debated, and the debate still rages on to this day. Viewed broadly, the agrarian question can be understood as the "continued existence in the countryside, in a substantive sense, of obstacles to an unleashing of accumulation in both the countryside itself and more generally – in particular, the accumulation associated with capitalist industrialization" Byres (1996: 26). In other words, the crux of the agrarian question revolves around the role of agriculture in transition to capitalism, both within agriculture and the processes through which agriculture contributes to industrialization.

Drawing from the classic works of Engels (1894), Kautsky (1899), Lenin (1899) and Preobrazhensky (1926), Byres (1996) identifies three particular types of interrelated themes relevant to the agrarian question, which Bernstein (1996, 2006, 2009) terms "problematics" of the agrarian question: (a) politics, (b) production and (c) accumulation. These 'problematics' are based on a number of questions. For instance, the problematic of politics, posed by Engels (1894) just before his death, is concerned with the politics of the agrarian transition in which the peasants constitute the dominant class. The problematic is therefore concerned with the role of classes of labour in the struggle for democracy and socialism. The problematic of *production*, derived from Kaustsky's *the Agrarian Question* (1899) and Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899*), refers the penetration of capitalist relations into agriculture. While the last formulation, that is the problematic of accumulation that originated from Preobrazhensky's *New Economics* (1926), is concerned with the contribution of capitalist agriculture to industrial accumulation. Cousins (2013: 118) argues that class differentiation and its political implications are crucial in all the three formulations, as was in Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation in the rural parts of England, Lenin's analysis of Russian's peasantry and Byres' comparative analysis of paths of transition in different countries and historical settings.

The agrarian question dates back to Karl Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation that led to changes of feudal relations and the penetration of capitalist social relations of production in agriculture in the 16th century England. Karl Marx, in *Volume I* of *Capital* shows how the process of 'primitive accumulation' gave rise to agrarian capitalism. The concept encompasses the alteration of pre-capitalist ('communal' and/or feudal) agrarian relations of production to capitalist ones, and the formation of a capitalist class and proletarian agrarian labour. In

Volume I of *Capital*, he laid out how these processes led to the expansion of capitalist social relations in the countryside and industrial transformation in England. With the development of capitalism, it was hoped that the peasantry would simply disappear.

The concept of primitive accumulation, as developed by Marx in Volume I of *Capital*, refers to the "an accumulation which is not the outcome of the capitalist method of production but its point of departure" (Marx 1976: 873). For Marx, primitive accumulation is thus viewed as a prelude to capitalist accumulation. The "so-called primitive accumulation", argues Marx, is conceived as "nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production", creating a "free" class of workers (in Marx's double sense) that are free from the means of production and free to sell their labour power (Marx 1967: 874-875). Marx (1967: 876) however admits "the history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in different countries, and runs through various phases in different orders of succession, and at different historical epochs. Only in England, which we therefore take as our example, has in the classic form". Here, Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010a: 182) argues that Marx was simply indicating that there are diverse and different ways by which capitalist social relations of production could be established or consolidated in agriculture. It is argued that the agrarian question of capital can only be resolved when the transitions to capitalist agriculture and industrialization is complete (Byres 1996; Bernstein 1996). This transition, however, follows different pathways in different historical circumstances, as we will see below.

More recently, Bernstein (1996, 2004, 2006, 2016) distinguished between the agrarian question of *capital* and the agrarian question of *labour*. Bernstein (2004:202) argues that a "new agrarian question" has since emerged under the conditions of contemporary capitalism. He writes:

> With contemporary 'globalization' and the massive development of the productive forces in (advanced) capitalist agriculture, the centrality of the 'classic' agrarian question to industrialization is no longer significant for international capital. In this sense, then, there is *no longer an agrarian question of capital on a world scale*, even when the agrarian question – as a basis of *national* accumulation and industrialization – has not been resolved in many countries of the 'South'... (emphasis in original)". The reverse side of 'globalization' as a new phase of concentration, centralization and mobility of capital is that it intensifies the *fragmentation of labour,* that "pursues its reproduction in conditions of increasingly insecure and oppressive wage employment combined with a range of likewise insecure 'informal sector' (survival) activity, typically subject to its own forms of differentiation and oppression along intersecting lines of class, gender, generation, caste and ethnicity (Bernstein 2004: 204-5).

He goes on to argue that struggles over land in this era of contemporary globalization are driven by the fragmentation of labour and its consequences, coupled with contestations of class

inequality, and collective demands and actions for better living conditions. For Bernstein such actions – driven by the need to obtain land for farming as a basis of livelihood and reproduction – indicate the emergence of a new agrarian question of labour (ibid). Nevertheless, Bernstein's formulation is controversial (Cousins 2013), and his conclusion that there is no longer any agrarian question of capital in the contemporary era of globalization has generated critical responses. Byres (2016: 437), for example, is critical of Bernstein's formulation, and questions "whether globalization extinguishes so pervasively and effectively the agency of national (indigenous) capitals. Moyo and his colleagues (2013) are equally critical to Bernstein, accusing him for over-emphasizing industrialization, which is a cornerstone of "Eurocentric" notions of modernity. Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010a, b) identified seven different meanings of the agrarian question, and argue that the agrarian question is still very relevant in the era of contemporary neoliberal globalization.

2.3.3 Accumulation paths: "from above", "from below" and "from outside"

As noted above, the agrarian question of capital is resolved when transitions to capitalist agriculture and industry are complete (Bernstein 1996; Byres 1991). However, "there is not just one pathway through this transition – both its character and the outcomes are shaped by class relations and struggle, depending on the strength of contending interests of landed property and agrarian capital, agricultural labour in a variety of forms (including tenant peasants), and emerging industrial capital" (Cousins 2004: 319). In addition, the state also plays a significant role in agrarian transition (Byres 1996). This section discusses three paths of transition adopted for this study: the "Junker/Prussian" ("accumulation from above), "farmers/American" ("accumulation from below") and "merchant" path ("accumulation from outside"). Much of this two distinct possible 'paths' to capitalist development is summarised in Byres' 1996 publication '*Capitalism from Above and Capitalism from Below'*.

Byres, following Lenin (1956), draws the important distinction between "capitalism from above" in which feudal landlords dominated the process of transition and slowly transformed themselves into a capitalist class; and "capitalism from below" which saw the emergence of a capitalist class from within the peasantry itself. The former path is exemplified by the experience of Prussia and characterised by the retention of pre-capitalist elements. According to Byres (1996: 28-29), there are two important reasons why this path is referred to as "capitalism from above". The most obvious is, as noted above, it was the feudal landlord class that who transformed itself into an agrarian capitalist class. "The basis of the final

transition…to capitalism is the internal metamorphosis of feudalist landlord economy. The entire agrarian system of the state becomes capitalist and for long retains feudalist features" (Lenin 1956: 8). Secondly, as such, these features acted as a brake on the development of productive forces. Lenin saw this path as reactionary and least desirable because the landlords were able to retain semi-feudal elements leading in their own further enrichment, while the majority of peasantry remained pauperised. This had a bearing on the capitalist transformations not just within agriculture, but more fundamentally within the whole economy: on one hand, the home market for consumer goods remained constrained by the impoverishment of the peasantry en masse; on the other hand, the sluggish pace of development of productive forces, especially mechanisation, meant a limited market for the products of 'Department I' industries (Byres 1996: 28-29).

Accumulation from below (or the American path), on other hand, emerged as a result of class differentiation within the ranks of the peasantry, implying that the absence of precapitalist landlords (or a weak one existed), or alternatively, the decisive control and access over land and other resources was not expropriated from the peasantry. This path is exemplified by the United States. Lenin, famously, designated this path as the American path. This path leads to "far-reaching social differentiation among rural producers as the most enterprising and fortunate peasants as well as those who emerge from feudalism with more favourable endowments accumulate land and capital and hire labour power, whilst the majority suffer losses and are eventually converted into proletarians" (de Janvry 1981: 108). For Lenin, this was the most preferred path, politically or economically, for Russia because it involves "class-for itself action pursued by rich peasants/capitalist farmers", the growth of the capitalist and labour relationship, and the rapid development of production forces and the home market (Byres 1996: 30-32).

It is important to note that the distinction between accumulation from below and above is far from clear-cut. As Mamdani (1987: 220), argues "from the point of view of the peasantry, there is a sharp contrast between wealth accumulated through competitive market relations and that acquired through state connection. This, however, should not obscure the fact that the distinction between the two fractions of capital is a relative one. No Chinese Wall separate them."

Researchers have often framed paths of accumulation in the Global South in terms of accumulation "from below" and "above" (Neocosmos 1993; Cousins 2013). Nevertheless, in

the last couple of decades, new concepts have emerged such as "accumulation from outside", whereby "capital flows into the countryside, rather than accumulation occurring from above or below within the agrarian economy" (Whitfield 2016: 1). The phenomenon was first noted in Columbia and other parts of Latin America where a transformation that "results from the investment of local capital, generated in mercantile or other urban activities (in particular among the new petty bourgeoisie of professionals, military, and technocrats), in the purchase of agricultural land" was underway (de Janvry 1981: 76). "In this fashion, urban control is established over rural enterprise. Agricultural production in this road is generally modernized, on medium-sized farms and is characterized by absentee management. Accordingly, there is a high degree of reliance on wage-workers, and social relations of production are fully proletarianized" (ibid: 76). In other words, this transition involves urban capital flowing into the countryside to establish farms that are clearly capitalist in nature. According to de Janvry (1981), this path can be characterized as the "Merchant path". According to Bernstein (2010: 109), this phenomenon can be understood as ""agrarian capital beyond the countryside", that is, investment in land and farming by urban business (including politicians, civil servants, military officers and affluent professionals) as well as by corporate agro-food capital".

However, Byres (2003) cast doubt on this transition, questioning "how typical or widespread it is in any given poor country, and therefore, whether it is likely to constitute a path along an agrarian transition might proceed in any full sense" (Byres 2003: 76). He suggests that this is "likely to be strictly minority phenomenon existing in the interstices of one or other of the paths" (above or below), "and not to be singled out as a major tendency" (ibid.: 76). Contra to Byres' (2003) suggestion that this might be a minority phenomenon restricted to Latin America, similar processes of agrarian change have been observed in other contexts across the Global South (Anseeuw et al 2016; Jayne et al. 2016; Hall et al. 2017; Muyanga et al. 2019), even when it is not labelled as such, and it has also been described for parts of Europe (e.g., in southern Italy, Arrighi & Piselli 1987). In Europe, this transition has been termed "Migrant-peasant or Swiss path" (Arrighi & Piselli 1987: 652), driven by migrant workers, whereby "a good part of the income, derived from the sale of labour power in distant labour markets, was saved and eventually used in the purchase of land and other means of production". Whitfield, in her analysis of export pine-apple production in Ghana, points to the emergence of a class of capitalist farmers without 'agrarian origins' but rather relied on capital accumulated largely outside agriculture. Here, "well-educated urban residents in professions, trading businesses or

public sector salaried positions" invested in production using non-agrarian capital from these off-farm activities (Whitfield 2016: 2).

Moreover, recent studies in Africa have highlighted the rapid rise of 'medium-scale' farmers (defined as farms ranging between 5 and 100ha), variously depicted as 'emergent' farmers or 'investor' farmers (Sitko & Jayne 2014), 'domestic agro-investors' (Hilhorst & Nelen 2013) or 'home-grown' (Chapoto et al. 2013), in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. A recent study in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia estimates that these 'medium-scale' farmers now control 19%, 31.8%, 39% and 52.9% of farmland respectively (Jayne et al. 2016). A key finding in this literature is that most of these medium-scale farmers are largely not of 'agrarian origins', but rather relies on capital accumulated from outside agriculture. Drawing from the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, some have even framed the phenomenon as "stepping in", whereby "commercialization is driven by investments from outside agriculture, such as retirement funds, remittances or on-going urban employment" (Hall et al. 2017: 528).

Elsewhere, this accumulation strategy has been termed "straddling" (Kitching 1982). Kitching (1982: 3) defines straddling simply as "the use of off-farm income to expand landholdings and commercial agriculture." In the case of Kenya, Kitching (1982) suggested that the main source of such off-farm income was public sector employment (what he termed the state wage bill). For Kitching, straddling facilitated the emergence of "capitalism from below". Straddling allows people to spread risks and is a common strategy of making a livelihood in the context of uncertainties (Berry 1993: 62-63). This is especially true in dryland non-equilibrium areas, where (agro-)pastoralists are often confronted by climatic uncertainties. Off-farm income can help to support agriculture by enabling farmers to purchase inputs and support investment in agriculture and/or supplement agricultural income during periods of drought or even floods.

Research has shown that processes of accumulation are complex than the three clear-cut categories, i.e., "accumulation from above", "below" and "outside" (Hairong & Yiyuan 2015). Despite their value for conceptual distinction, in practice, there is considerable overlap between diverse accumulation paths (Mamdani 1987; Oya 2007; Shonhe et al. 2020). In reality, the three paths outlined above are general constructs and can hardly be separated as these can coexist within a household or enterprise. Recent research has also shown that there is no signs of simple 'agrarian transition' to capitalist agricultural production accompanied by the process of rural proletarianization as others scholars had predicted; nor any guaranteed emergence of a

class of small-scale capitalist producers (Oya 2007; Jacobs 2018). Instead, patterns of accumulation tend to be non-linear due to environmental, social and economic factors.

2.3.4 Petty commodity production and social differentiation

In Marxist terms, the use of the term "peasantry" or "peasant mode of production" in the contemporary era of capitalism is misleading and problematic. Since the 1980s, some Marxist authors have argued that small-scale farmers of the 21st century should be conceived as "petty commodity producers" rather than "peasants" who exist outside of capitalism and its particular class dynamics and contradictions (Gibbon & Neocosmos 1985; Bernstein 1996, 2003). According to this view, petty agricultural producers in agriculture combine the class "places" of both capital and labour within their households/enterprises: they possess means of production (i.e. capital in the form of land, tools, seeds and other inputs), unlike landless workers, and are in this sense, capitalists, but they also use their own labour (in the form of families/ households) in production (as opposed to capitalists, who hire in workers) (Bernstein 2003, 2009, 2010: 103). In other words, the producing agents of this form of production are petty capitalists and workers at the same time because they own or have access to means of production and employ their own labour. According to Bernstein (1988: 261), those involved in petty commodity production "are unable to exist and reproduce themselves outside circuits of commodity economy and divisions of labor generated by the capital/wage-labor relation and its contradictions."

According to Bernstein (2010: 103), petty commodity production "is a "contradictory unity" of class places for several reasons." First, "given the divisions of property, labour, income and spending", the class places of capital and labour are distributed unevenly within farm-households. For example, gendered divisions of labour within farm-households can lead to exploitation of female members and children by old men, who occupy the position of capital (directing production processes and appropriating proceeds). Second, "there is a contradiction between reproducing the means of production (capital) and reproducing the producer (labour)." These two imperatives, according to Bernstein (2010: 18-20), involve meeting the demands of four competing "reproduction funds": a *consumption fund* for food, clothing, shelter, rest etc., including for household members too young or unfit to work; a *replacement fund* for productive capital (e.g. land, seed, tools, livestock) – but also for labour, through generational reproduction in childbearing and raising, as well as care of the old and unfit; a *ceremonial fund*, for activities that 'create and recreate the cultures and social relations of farming communities, such as

rituals and festivities' (ibid: 20); and a *fund of rent*, where farmers make payments to others such as landlords, moneylenders or states. Meeting all these demands simultaneously is, however, a difficult task for small-scale farmers. As Bernstein (1986: 22) writes,

> In terms of the enterprise as a whole, and its fortunes, (reproduction, decomposition, transformation), its distinctive combination of class places can help explain the contradictions petty commodity producers often confront between reproducing themselves as labour (daily and generational reproduction) and capital (maintenance, replacement, and possibly expansion of the means of production). Reducing levels of consumption (and increasing or limiting numbers of children according to specific circumstances), in order to maintain, replace or expand the means of production (i.e. accumulation) is an expression of this contradiction.

Thirdly, these contradictions result in a tendency towards class differentiation (Bernstein 2010: 103). Some petty commodity producers maybe engage in diversified accumulation strategies (e.g., trading, transport, tractor renting) and invest in the means of production (e.g. irrigation equipment, expand livestock enterprises etc.), which enables them to produce more surplus, above what they need for simple reproduction and reinvest all or part of this surplus to further expand the means of production and hire more labour. If this happens, it means that 'expanded reproduction' has occurred. Others may continue to reproduce themselves as capital and labour at the same scale as before, what Marx calls simple reproduction (ibid). Some may become unable to reproduce themselves as capital, and as labour from farming activities, thus are subject to *simple reproduction squeeze* (Bernstein 2010: 104). Such households may "engage in wage labour and in the more marginal branches of non-agricultural petty commodity activities" (Bernstein 2003: 7).

In his classic analysis of social differentiation within the Russian peasantry, Lenin (1967 [1899]) famously identified three main peasant strata, namely "*rich*", "*middle*" and *"poor*" peasants (Lenin 1899/1964). According to this schema, the "*rich peasants*", which constitute the rural bourgeoisie, are able to engage in expanded reproduction, accumulating capital and perhaps producing at an increasing large-scale of production. Although they are not fully-formed capitalist farmers, they are on their way to becoming so.

This classical schema is, however, famously difficult to apply in southern Africa, given that development of capitalist agriculture involved the creation of 'native' reserves as well as the appropriation of large areas of productive land for the emerging (white) capitalist farming class, thereby suppressing the emergence of (black) petty commodity production (Cousins 2010, 2013: 122). In order to support the white capitalist agriculture and mining capital in southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), the colonial government introduced numerous political and

economic measures, aimed at squeezing (black) petty commodity producers out of the market and compelling them to sell their labour to survive (Arrighi 1970). The participation of rural households in labour markets during the early period of colonial rule was largely discretionary (ibid: 203). This was because the expansion of the mining industry and tertiary activities, coupled with a lack of a competitive capitalist agricultural sector created a demand for African's produce. Between 1890 and the World War I, most of the grain, livestock, vegetables and beer that entered in the commodity markets was produced by black petty commodity producers (ibid). Thus, attempts by agrarian and mining capital to mobilize African labour were resisted.

2.3.5 Social differentiation and class formation in rural Zimbabwe

How then have agrarian accumulation and class formation proceeded in rural Zimbabwe, and how have these processes by observed empirically by different authors? For reasons of space, I focus here only on a selection of studies, which have formed the starting point for much of this work. Cousins et al. (1992) used extensive review of the 1980s literature on rural differentiation in the communal areas of Zimbabwe to classify rural households into four distinct types, namely "petty commodity producers", "worker-peasants"; the "semi-peasantry" and "rural petit bourgeoisie". Based on this categorization, the petty commodity producers combine capital (i.e., means of production) and labour (derived mainly from family labour) in the farm enterprise. They reported that this group can meet a significant proportion of their simple reproduction needs from own production. They argued that this group of farmers has a potential to engage in expanded reproduction, but its capacity to sustain capital accumulation is constrained. Their situation contrasts with the "worker-peasants", who combine characteristics of the proletariat and petty commodity producers. The "semi-peasantry" represents the marginalised and impoverished, and have the largest proportion of female-headed households. Finally, the "rural petit bourgeoisie" appear to have moved beyond simple reproduction into sustained expanded production - producing a surplus, reinvesting in production, hiring wage labour and often have access to urban or business-based income.

The FTLRP of the year 2000 has also been accompanied by social differentiation. Here, the seminal contribution by Scoones and colleagues (2010) has been informative. Studying smallholder A1 farmers in Masvingo province, they found that processes of class differentiation are underway. Drawing on a livelihood typology propounded by Dorward et al. (2009), as well as by Mushongah (2010), Scoones and colleagues (2010, 2012), identified four

broad categories. These include those who are 'hanging in' (surviving but poor including crisis and survival strategies); 'stepping out' (diversifying away from agriculture, both locally and through migration); 'stepping up' (local accumulation largely within agriculture) and 'dropping out' (essentially destitute households, reliant on different forms of social protection and often in the process of exiting).[5] The study revealed that 35% are "stepping up", 21.4% are "stepping out", 33.6% are "hanging in" and 10% are "dropping out".

Mkodzongi (2013b) identified three distinct groups, namely 'rich peasants' or '*hurudza*', 'middle peasants or 'worker-peasants' and 'poor peasants' across 185 households in Ngezi Mhondoro district. The '*hurudza*' (5% of total) 'became successful' by using political patronage to access inputs and other government subsidies such as tractors. Such farmers were the 'first to join the land occupations' thus occupied influential positions in local ZANU-PF structures (ibid: 97). Other '*hurudza*' farmers, it is argued, had 'financial endowment' before settlement, hence used such funds to clear their land and to set up new businesses. 'Worker-peasants (89% of total) pursued diverse off-farm livelihood strategies, relied on family labour to clear land and start farming, but hired labour on a 'seasonal basis' using funds from other off-farm livelihood strategies, such as gold panning and wage labour. Off-farm income was also crucial for accumulating agricultural assets, since they lacked adequate financial resources at the time of settlement. Despite the fact that this group engages in diverse off-farm livelihood activities, 'agriculture remains a key part of their livelihoods' (ibid: 101). Lastly, the 'poor peasants' (11%) were mainly landless people, comprising of former farmworkers, widows and 'urbanites' who lost their jobs in cities. According to Mkodzongi, such people were still looking for land, and 'were living with relatives or friends while waiting to negotiate access to land', and relied on hiring out their labour power to better-off farmers (ibid: 105).

[5] In recent years, several other studies have since used similar approaches, albeit adapted to suit different contexts, including in South Africa (see Dubb 2013; Mtero 2015; Hornby 2015; Olofsson 2018; Falconnier et al 2015; Valbuena et al. 2015; Neves 2017; Vicol 2016). In his study of accumulation and social differentiation amongst small-scale sugar-cane growers, Dubb (2013, p. 188) has added another strategy, 'creeping back', denoting those growers who had dropped out or faced severe reductions but are attempting to incrementally restart or expand production. Likewise, Hall et al. (2017) also added the 'stepping in' category, focussing on commercially-oriented farms driven by investments from outside agriculture, such as retirement funds, ongoing wage employment and off-farm business.

More recently, in a study of smallholder A1 farmers in Mvurwi, Scoones et al. (2018) has identified four categories of farmers in the landscape of a cash crop, tobacco. These categories include, "accumulators", "aspiring accumulators", "peasant producers" and "diversifiers/ strugglers", with contract farming of tobacco important especially for "aspiring accumulators" lacking financial capital. Over 60% engaging in 'accumulation from below' through tobacco production. Based on a two-step cluster analysis, a similar study from Hwedza district of Mashonaland East province by Shonhe (2017) identified four emerging classes: "poor peasants" (most of whom were in the communal areas and prone to food insecurity); "middle peasants" (producing mainly food crops and hiring out their labour to supplement household farm income); "middle to rich peasants" (largely A2 medium-scale farmers holding 99-year leases and depend on contract farming for tobacco production), and "rich peasants" (mainly involved in the marketing of both maize and tobacco) (also see Shonhe & Mtapuri 2020).

Scoones et al. (2018) presents a fourfold classification of former Native Purchase Areas (now known as Small-scale Commercial Farming Areas) in Masvingo. They are "commercial farm" (characterised by a regular sell of surplus and reinvesting on farm); the "projectized farm" (mainly pursuing "projects" such as broiler, piggery, dairy and so on), and the "villagized farm" (largely conceived as a "family property") and "holding or abandoning the farm" (characterized by limited agricultural production). A similar approach is taken by Shonhe (2021) in investigating differentiation among land reform beneficiaries in A2 medium-scale sites. Based on qualitative-quantitative research in Mvurwi (a high-potential region situated north of Harare) and Masvingo-Gutu (in the drier south of the country), the authors has identified four different classes. They are "commercial farmers" (those who are producing large quantities of agricultural outputs for sale, and reinvesting proceeds on the farm); "aspiring farmers" (those who wish to become commercial farmers but lack capital to invest and engage in production), and "struggling farmers" (owning limited farm assets and engaging in limited production due to a variety of reasons). Within each of these categories, are to be found two sub-categories. According to the authors, access to finance is the most important factor explaining differentiation amongst these A2 farmers.

While these studies have shed light on the inequality among the farmers in rural Zimbabwe, with a few exceptions, most studies have been undertaken in relatively medium to high-potential regions, where crop production has come to dominate. Thorough systematic studies of agrarian accumulation and social differentiation following land reform in extensive pastoral

settings such as those found in Matabeleland are quite rare. The question is whether the processes of accumulation underway in other parts of the country are also underway in livestock settings.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have engaged with various bodies of literature, drawing from many different disciplinary contexts, including the non-equilibrium rangeland ecology, pastoral studies, property rights, and agrarian studies. These have informed what I feel is a holistic perspective on my subject of focus. Climatic variability is an inherent feature of pastoral production in drylands. This has important implications for production and possibilities of accumulation.

In the next chapter, I describe the methodology employed for answering the questions I sought to answer in this study. I explain the process of designing, developing and implementing a range of research techniques and methods, and identify the challenges encountered along the way.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCHING SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION IN NON-EQUILIBRIUM SETTINGS: METHODOLOGY AND CHALLENGES

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of, and justification for the research approach employed in this study, as well as to place it in a methodological framework consistent with Marxist political economy. First, the district where the study was undertaken is introduced and its key features discussed. Next, it then discusses critical realism as an appropriate approach to study processes of agrarian change in post-land reform settings Methodological approaches adopted for this study are then considered. The decision to combine intensive and extensive approaches is argued to be appropriate approach to generate understanding of emerging capitalist transformations in the post-land reform settings in Zimbabwe. Before focusing on these aspects, however, I will briefly introduce my case study sites to provide a better understanding of the context.

3.1 The case study sites

This section examines the key features of the study area that are particularly relevant for understanding the processes and outcomes of land reform. The fieldwork took place in Matobo district of Matabeleland South province in south-western Zimbabwe between the late 2015 and March 2018, and lasted on the whole thirteen months. The decision to undertake fieldwork in Matobo district was influenced by several considerations. First, it complements previous research in the district by the LALR and IDS (NUST) team, which culminated in the publication of two papers (Nel 2020; Nel & Mabhena 2020) by the later team. Further, my co-supervisor and the LALR team had already started working in the district, and had already established good contacts in the district. This proved to be a useful entry point, as gaining access to the new farmers and resettlement areas is perhaps one of the biggest challenges of land reform research in Zimbabwe, given its politicised nature. Second, there is some valuable historical work on contestations over land since the 1890s to the 1990s (Ranger 1999), as well as rich long-term archival collection in the National Archives. This extensive literature allowed me not only to understand contemporary dynamics, but to set this study against a solid historical perspective.



Figure 3.1: Map of Zimbabwe and Matobo district

Located in the drier south-western part of Zimbabwe (Figure 3.1), Matobo district is home to approximately 93,723 people (CSO 2012), most of whom speak isiNdebele and Kalanga. The Ndebele-speaking people predominantly inhabit present-day Matabeleland and parts of Midlands provinces and account for 18% of Zimbabwe's total population (CSO 2012). This makes them the second largest ethnic group in the country after the Shona-speakers. The district is one of the seven districts in Matabeleland South province, and spans a total surface area of 722,000 hectares. It is bounded to the north by Bulawayo town and Umguza district, to the east by Gwanda and Umzingwane districts, to the west by Bulilima and Mangwe districts, and to the south by Shashe River and Botswana-Zimbabwe border. It is located between 71m (in Shashe) and 1550m (in Gulati) above sea level (Matobo RDC 2014). In the northern part of the district are a series of mountain ranges forming Matobo hills – an important feature of the district – extending eastwards into Esigodini and westwards into covering an area of 3,100km^2, of which 424km^2 is a Matobo National Park (Makuvaza & Makuvaza 2012). These hills are recognised UNESCO World Heritage Site (Makuvaza 2012; Hubbard et al. 2016). The word

"*matobo*" is a Shona/Venda word meaning "rocks". As the name suggests, this part of the district is mountainous.

According to Zimbabwe's standard agro-ecological classification, the district sits in a semi-arid zone, which is classified as agro-ecological regions IV and V (Vincent & Thomas 1960). Rainfall averages around 550mm per annum, with a Coefficient of Variation (CV) of 40% in Kezi, suggesting non-equilibrium conditions. The district is also prone to persistent droughts. Rainfalls occurs between October and March, and is highly variable across space and time. Uncertainty is therefore pervasive. The natural vegetation is predominantly *Colophospermum* mopane woodland, with mixed *Combretum* and *Acacia*. The major soil types include heavy red (*isibomvu*) and black clay soils (*isidhaka*), but also sand (*itshebetshebe*) and sodic (*isikwakwa*) soils.

Making an agrarian livelihood in such an uncertain environment that is characterized by low rainfall and a high degree of inter-annual rainfall, is inherently a risky business. Farming in this environment is largely dominated by livestock production, although dryland cropping and irrigation farming is also important. However, households rely on multiple sources of off-farm income sources. These include off-farm work, harvesting of natural resources, self-employed businesses, artisanal mining, international migration, just to mention but a few. International migration to neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa has been particularly important in Matobo and Matabeleland region in general. Emerging from a long history of marginalization of Matabeleland, rising unemployment, harsh economic situation in Zimbabwe and continuing decline of Zimbabwean currency against neighbouring South African rand and Botswana pula, international migration has come to be seen as the "only available option for most of the people in this part of the country" (Maphosa 2007b: 127). A recent survey of remittance-receiving households in the neighbouring Mangwe district has shown that remittance from South Africa is important for social reproduction, but also farm investment (Maphosa 2007a, b).[6] In summary, off-farm income is critical, both for offering an alternative livelihood if farming fails, but also support farm investment.

Harsh climatic conditions and uncertainty in these areas makes agricultural or livestock production inadequate to sustain livelihoods. Agricultural output tends to be generally low,

[6] The data shows that 58.2% of remittance-receiving households used remittance income to invest in livestock, while 31.2% purchased agricultural inputs.

especially because of low rainfall and inter-annual rainfall variability. In 'bad years', farmers tend to harvest no crops at all. In 'good years', bumper harvests are reaped, allowing for some sales and replenishing of the grain stores. Main crops grown include maize, sorghum and millet. Given the climatic conditions that prevails in the district, extension officers, NGOs and donors alike have long advocated for drought-resistant small grains such as millets and sorghum. However, the uptake of small grains is still low as maize remains the dominant crop produced under dryland cropping. Livestock production is thought suitable to the ecology of the area. Main livestock kept include cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys. Cattle, goats, sheep and poultry are kept for consumption and sale, whereas donkeys are largely kept for draught and transport purposes.

The district is predominantly rural, and consists of twenty-five administrative wards under six traditional chiefs. Of these wards, nineteen are in the communal areas while the remaining six are in the new resettlement areas. Maphisa, a service centre and growth point, is the district capital, although other important administrative functions are still found in Kezi, a 19th century development. Previously known as Antelope, Maphisa 'growth point' is located some 115 km away from Bulawayo town. The growth point was established in the late 1970s as a town linked to the nearby Antelope Estate, which was then under Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Limited (TILCOR). "Post-Independence these early 'growth points' were incorporated into the wider spatial planning. The huge estate was taken over by ARDA (the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority), and for several decades Maphisa became intimately linked to the success of the estate, which employed up to 8000 people at the height of the 1990s cotton boom" (Scoones & Murimbarimba 2020). In the 1980s and 1990s, Maphisa was surrounded by white-owned commercial farms, engaging in cattle ranching and commercial gold mining (ibid). Despite this, "the impact of this largely white-owned farming-mining on Maphisa was limited, however, as economic linkages were not local. This all changed with land reform, with most farms taken over" (Scoones & Murimbarimba 2020). Today, Maphisa is anything but economically vibrant and bustling small town. Over the past two decades, the town has experienced rapid development of shops and other businesses, some of which are inextricably linked to wider cattle businesses on land reform areas (Scoones & Murimbarimba 2020). Over the same period, informal trading has also increased. Important, too, is artisanal mining.

Politically, the region has had a long history of opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF government (Alexander & McGregor 2001), has undergone violent campaigns (*Gukurahund*i) between 1982 and 1987 which was state's attempt to uproot "dissidents" (Yap 2001) that left an estimated 20,000 civilian people dead (CCJP & LRF 1997). The origins of *Gukurahundi* can best be traced back to the liberation war, which lasted from the 1960s to 1980. This liberation war was fought by two guerrilla armies: ZAPU's ZIPRA led by Joshua Nkomo and ZANU-PF's ZANLA led by Robert Mugabe. Despite ZANU and ZAPU having negotiated at the Lancaster conference as united Patriotic Front, "this unity only lasted during the conference. In the 1980 elections the party contested as independent organisations." (Yap 2000: 113). ZANU-PF won the election by a landslide, although ZAPU won the overwhelming seats in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands provinces that are generally inhabited by the Ndebele people. A wave of ostracism, beatings and disappearances from ZAPU ranks followed (Alexander 2000). This caused defections and the emergence of small bands of "dissidents". In February 1982, the government made an announcement about the discovery of army caches on a ZAPU property. The regime accused ZAPU of planning to overthrow the government and several ZAPU leaders were arrested on "charges of high treason and unlawful possession of arms" (Yap 2000: 142). In January 1983, the Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North. A wave of epidemic violence followed, and Ndebele civilians were accused of supporting ZAPU and its so-called "dissidents". Many were tortured, raped, beaten, and tens of thousands of others lost their lives at the hands of Fifth brigade (CCPZ & LRF 1998). The negotiated Unity Accord of 1988 ended the violence, but the impacts of Gukurahundi has been far-reaching. Since then, the region has suffered from political and economic marginalization. There has been, as a consequence extensive out-migration to neighbouring countries, especially South Africa (Maphosa 2008a, b; Matsa & Matsa 2011). In the context of land, Gukurahundi had significant knock-on effects on the land reform in the 1980s in Matobo district: this is discussed in the next chapter.

3.2 The case study areas

This study uses the case study approach to explore the patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation in southwestern Matabeleland following a major land reform. According to Yin (2003: 1), a case study approach is particularly useful "when "how" or "why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context." According to Flyvbjerg

(2006), acknowledges the importance of investigating complex issues and the explanation of how they relate to each other in a particular situation. In the context of this study, it makes it possible to analyse how patterns of accumulation and social differentiation plays out in different land use types in resettlement areas.

The actual case study research is centred on Ward 23, one of the six resettlement wards in the whole district. Being on the fringes of Matopos Hills, the ward sits on the south-west of Matobo National Park and Dema ward, within what is referred as "Mapani belt" (Ranger 1999). The area is bounded to the north by Matobo National Park and Khumalo communal areas, to the east Matobo-Gwanda border, to the west and south by other blocks of resettlement areas. Being in the north, the ward receives relatively higher rainfalls (ranging from 450-650 mm per year) than other wards in the south. For this reason, tens of thousands of cattle from the south trek to these northern wards during periods of severe drought in search of relief grazing.



Figure 3.2: Map of Ward 23 and its surroundings

This area was deemed appropriate for the purpose of this research for a wide range of reasons. First, the ward has a high concentration of different land use types, including A1 villagised, A2 and Three-tier/self-contained schemes, as well as few black-owned and remaining white-owned LSCFs. The area is also in close proximity to Matobo National Park. It was therefore felt that the area would provide a relatively good focussed and manageable site to look at different livestock systems and their interactions in the extensive settings, particularly during periods of drought. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of land reform recipients by ward and land use type. According to official statistics, Ward 23 accounted for over half of all A2 farms (53.8%) in the district by 2017, 18.2% of the formal A1 villagised farms and around 35.5% of all 'self-contained' farms. Here, 'self-contained' farms refer to all the individual plots that were carved out from formerly collectively held 'Model D' or 'Three-tier' farms. Second, the proximity of the area to communal areas (Khumalo to the north and Wenlock (Gwanda) to the east), allowed me to investigate any interactions and emerging conflicts between the communal areas farmers and land reform beneficiaries. Third, a survey of A1 villagised sites have been conducted in the area recently (Nel & Mabhena 2020); this provides preliminary picture of socio-economic profile and production, and a point of reference for comparisons and contrasts. Finally, the area is also easily accessible (with a 4WD/ SUVs) during both the dry and rainy seasons than other areas, with relatively good road networks. The specific case study sites are discussed below.

Table 3.1: Distribution of beneficiaries across property regimes/ land use types in

Property regime	***Wards***					
	20	***21***	***22***	***23***	***24***	***25***
A2 farms	0%	13.8%	0%	53.8%	23.1%	9.2%
A1 farms	0%	12.3%	0%	18.2%	39.4%	30.1%
Self-contained farms	2.6%	40.1%	21.7%	35.5%	0%	0%

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

During the nineteenth century, the area was not settled, but it served as pastures and hunting ground for the Ndebele indunas (Ranger 1999). Settlement of Mapani veld only began after colonial conquest in at the turn of the century, when some indunas and their followers – attracted by good grazing – moved to Mopani belt in a bid to escape colonial administrative pressures to the north. However, with the carving out of white commercial ranches and, ultimately, evictions, the indunas and their followers had to move back to the hills where

Rhodes and the subsequent commissioners worked so hard to remove them from (Ranger 1999). Today, land reform has radically altered the agrarian structure of the area. Following over forty-years of land reform, the area now largely consists of various types of resettlement schemes following forty-years of land reform. This thesis focusses on smallholder A1, medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms. These sites were chosen not only to enable meaningful comparison and contrast between different types of farmers and land uses, but also to explore the interactions between these farmers and land uses.

3.2.1 Smallholder A1 villagised sites

Fieldwork in smallholder A1 *villagised* sites focussed on two villages: Vimbi and Luma. Both settlements were established through the land invasions and occupations in the year 2000, and were both formalised as A1 villagised schemes during the course of the following year. However, although the two villages are located less than 20km apart, they the involvement of the state during the land occupations and regularisation differed.

The two villages were selected for two reasons. First, the two villages experienced very different processes of land reform: a "top-down" process in Luma and "bottom-up" process. The two the intention was to examine how these contrasting land reform processes have shaped patterns of production, accumulation and social differentiation in each village. During the land occupations, the Luma farm was invaded by a group of war veterans from Khumalo communal areas with support from state security officials, rather than the nearby Wenlock residents who were reluctant to occupy the farm because they wanted the farm to be utilised for grazing purposes rather than human settlement. After regularisation, it was officially decided that residents of Wards 16 and 17 in Matobo district would be the beneficiaries of the scheme, thereby excluding the nearby villagers from adjoining Wenlock communal areas in Gwanda who were seen as "outsiders" from another district, despite living a few metres away from the farm. This resulted in conflict between the new settlers and Wenlock residents, which is still ongoing to this day.

By contrast, the land reform process in Vimbi was more or less a 'bottom-up' process, with minimal, if any, state involvement during invasions, especially with regards to who should benefit from land reform. Land invasion and occupation was led by war veterans and virtually involved large groups of people from nearby Khumalo communal areas who aspired to obtain land. As the village is located near the road between Bulawayo and Maphisa (district capital)

and Kezi (administrative town), it was more appealing to potential land occupiers than Luma. opportunity to investigate how different long-term histories of places shape processes and outcomes of land reform (Ranger 2012).

Table 3.2: General features of the two A1 villages

	Vimbi	*Luma*
Farm size [a]	2576 ha	2849 ha
Previous owner	Ben van Vuuren	Andrew Connolly
Previous land use	Cattle and sheep	Cattle and wildlife
Location	Located on Matobo-Gwanda district border	Inner part of the ward
Year settled	2000	2000
Scheme type(s)	Mixed A1 and A2	Mixed A1 and A2
Size of A1 scheme [b]	2,101.07 ha	1,776.26 ha
Origin of A1 settlers	Mostly from Kumalo communal areas	Mixed nearby communal villagers and settlers from 'all over Zimbabwe'
Total A1 settlers (including, 'informal')	41	35
A1 Sample size	33	34

[a] Original farm size

[b] Excluding the newly-created A2 plots

Source: Author's compilation

Second, the two villages vary in their proximity to communal areas. Vimbi is situated at the inner core of ward 23, while Luma share borders with Wenlock communal areas in Gwanda to the east. Therefore, Luma has been plagued by conflicts over access to water and grazing resources, while this was not the case in Vimbi. The ongoing conflict in Luma has had significant implications for farm investments, production and, ultimately, accumulation. Moreover, the salience of the issue of formalisation of farmers seem to vary in these two villages. For instance, Vimbi was selected by the District Land Committee in 2015 as a pilot to launch A1 permit issuance programme, but the issue was less considered in Luma. In summary, all these contrasting factors can be used to compare and contrast impacts and outcomes of land reform in these two sites.

An effort was made to develop a list of land reform beneficiaries from which a sample could be drawn. Thus, a consolidated list of farmers was created from names obtained from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in Kezi and from the headman (ward

level) and village chairpersons. As shown in Table 3.2, the final list was made of 35 and 41 households in Vimbi and Luma.

3.2.2 Medium-scale A2 sites

A total of seven A2 farms were chosen: Toko North, Mapani Poort, Buluma, Damara Estate, Natisa, Maleme and Umfula. The choice was influenced by the desire to have some degree of geographical dispersion, but also the willingness and availability of farmers to participate in the research. Table 3.2 shows the general features of the farms. As in other regions, these farms were established through technocratic and administration process under the FTLRP from 2002 onwards. Damara Estate, Toko North and Natisa share borders with Wenlock communal areas (Gwanda district) to the east, while Maleme shares a border with Khumalo communal areas (Matobo) to the north. Being situated next to communal areas, most of these farms have been subject to contestation over access and control between the new settlers and the neighbouring Wenlock communal areas. By contrast, Mapani Poort, Buluma and Umfula are situated sits on the heart of the ward, hence; are not affected by disputes. These factors can therefore be used to compare one site against the other.

Table 3.3: The general features of selected A2 farms

Farm	Size (ha)	Previous Owner	Previous land use	Year Gazetted	DLC's reason for gazetting	No. of plots	Sample size	Location	Land disputes
Buluma	1537	PC	Cattle ranching	2002	Poor co-existence with new farmers	3	3	Inner core of ward	No
Natisa	2570	AM	Cattle ranching	2002	Maximum farm size	3	2	Borders with Wenlock	Yes
Damara	6355	RJC	Cattle ranching	2002	--	15	4	Borders with Wenlock	Yes
Umfula	1395	WH	Cattle ranching	2002	Poor co-existence with new farmers	2	1	Inner core of ward	No
Maleme	2588	PC	Cattle, ostriches	2002	Maximum farm size	3	3	Borders with Kumalo	Yes
Mapani Poort	1080	DL	Cattle ranching	2015	Elite grabbing	2	2	Inner core of ward	No
Toko North	1285	RDP	Cattle ranching	2002	Poor co-existence with new farmers	4	3	Close to Wenlock border	Yes

Source: Compilated by author

As in A list of 32 A2 farmers was obtained from the Ministry of Lands in Kezi spread across seven farms in Ward.

3.2.3 Self-contained sites

Within the council's self-contained farms, five farms were selected: Mampondweni, Wild East, Nsambani, Pagati and Halalie Estate. As with the A2 farms, the choice was also influenced by a desire to have a geographical dispersion. These self-contained farms stemmed from a very different origin from A1 and A2 farms. They were established in the late 1990s and were formerly set aside as collectively-held 'Three-tier farms' (formerly 'Model D' schemes), which were acquired during the early phases of land reform in the 1980s and 1990s. They were to be

used as additional grazing by adjoining communal areas livestock keepers, based on a commercial ranching model. In time, it came to be widely recognised that the planners' vision had not come to pass, with widespread 'vandalism', 'environmental degradation' and 'under-utilisation' dominating official reports. To combat these problems, the local rural council decided to subdivide these farms into individual units for exclusive use and assign to better off households who were presumed to be able to engage in commercial ranching. This reorganisation programme began in three farms – Mampondweni, Nsambani and Wild East – in the late 1990s, and later expanded to other farms in the early 2000s.

Table 3.4: General features of Council's self-contained farms

Farm	*Size (ha)*	*Previous Owner*	*Year Acquired*	*Year sub-divided*	*No. plots demarcated**	*No. settlers*	*No. Settlers interviewed*	*Location*
*Mampo.	2895	ADA/ 'State land'	1999	1999	18	19	14	Inner part of ward
W. East	3874	ADA/ 'State land'	1999	1999	23	17	13	Boundary with Gwanda
Nsambani	1284	Walmer Ranching Co.	1999	1999	9	2	1	Boundary with Wenlock
Pagati	2565	ADA/ 'State land'	1999	2005	4	3	3	Inner part of ward
Halale	2587	ADA/ 'State land'	1993	2005	6	6	2	Boundary with Kumalo

*Mampo refers to Mampondweni.

Source: Compiled by author from different sources.

Nsambani and, to a lesser extent, Wild East, share borders with Wenlock communal areas (Gwanda), making them prone to disputes over grazing between settlers and the communal areas herd owners. At the time when the reorganisation was implemented in 1999, a total of 10 plots at Nsambani farm were initially carved out, but many beneficiaries gave up on their plots

due to conflicts with nearby communal areas villagers, and this in turn prompted further aggregating the plots into only two larger plots. Halalie Estate is shares borders with Khumalo communal areas to the north, and is therefore plagued by land disputes between settlers and communal areas livestock owners. Lying further away from communal areas, Pagati and Mampondweni have been less affected by conflicts with communal areas.

As the case with A1 and A2 farms, an attempt was made to develop a list of self-contained farmers from which a sample could be drawn. A consolidated list was also made from names obtained from Matobo Rural District Council in Maphisa and from resident farmers. As demonstrated in Table 3.4, the final list contained 47 land reform beneficiaries across five farms.

3.3 Methodological approach

3.3.1 Critical realism in social science research and Critical Political Economy Approach

The methodological approach of this study is situated within the tradition of critical realism. A critical realist stance implies that there is a world that exists independent of the researcher's knowledge of it (Sayer 2000, 2010). This approach aligns with the critical political economy approach (Mtero et al. 2020). In his introduction to the *Grundrisse*, Marx famously described his method as follows:

> [The] method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in mind. But this is by no means by which the concrete itself comes into being… The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse (Marx 1973: 101).

While Marx did not go into more detail about his method, this description aligns with critical realism, which holds that world exists independently of our knowledge of it. As such, there is one world and one reality, often characterised by openness, necessity and contingency.

The overall aim of this research is to explore the patterns and processes of accumulation and social differentiation among land reform recipients across three land-use types in Matobo district.

3.3.2 Research design

This thesis combines "intensive" and "extensive" research designs. Table 3.1 offers major features of "intensive" and "extensive" research designs. The two approaches ask different sort

of questions, employ different methods, define their objects and boundaries differently (Sayer 2000, 2010). “Extensive research”, according to Sayer (2010:163), “is concerned with discovering some of the common properties and general patterns of a population as a whole.” By contrast, the primary questions are concerned with “how some causal process works out in a particular case or in limited number of cases” (ibid: 103). Extensive research deploys ‘quantitative’ methods for “descriptive and inferential statistics and numerical analysis (e.g., cross-tabulations) and the large-scale formal questionnaires of a population or ‘representative sample’ thereof”, whereas in contrast intensive research utilizes “mainly qualitative methods such as structural and causal analysis, participant observation and/or informal and interactive interviews.” (Sayer 2010: 164). For Sayer, these two types of research designs operate within different conceptual terms. Extensive research focusses on “formal relations of similarity”, establishing “taxonomic groups” and ensures “replication”. On the other hand, intensive research aims to investigate “substantial relations of connection” by taking into consideration how certain processes work, what different agents do and what and how changes are produced in causally connected groups.

Table 3.5: Key features of intensive and extensive research design

	Intensive	Extensive
Research question	How does a process work in a particular case or small number of cases? What produces certain change? What did the agents actually do?	What are the regularities, common patterns distinguishing features of a population? How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented?
Relations	Substantial relations of connections	Formal relations of similarity
Type of groups studied	Causal groups	Taxonomic groups
Type of account produced	Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events, though not necessarily representative ones.	Descriptive, representative generalization lacking explanatory penetration.
Typical methods	Study of individual agents in their causal contents: interactive interviews, ethnography, qualitative analysis.	Large-scale survey population or representative sample, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews, statistical analysis.
Limitations	Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be representative, average or generalisable. Necessary relations will exist wherever their relations are present e.g. causal powers of objects are generalisable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these objects.	Although representative of the whole population, they are unlikely to be generalisable to other populations at different times and places. Problem of ecological fallacy in making inferences about individuals. Limited explanatory power.
Appropriate tests	Corroboration	Replication

Source: Adapted from Sayer (2010: 243)

The aforementioned consideration of methodology ultimately led to a three-phased fieldwork, employing different research methods.

3.4 Intensive and extensive research strategies

The preceding section has presented the rationale of using intensive and extensive research design and deliberated the particulars of this research design. This section considers the methods selected for each phase in further detail. The research process proceeded in three main

overlapping ‘phases’: ‘exploratory’; ‘intensive/ qualitative and historical’ and ‘extensive and intensive’ phases. Although I have broken down my fieldwork into a series of phases, the research process was very iterative in nature.

Overall, the fieldwork took place over fourteen months between December 2015 and November 2022 in three main 'phases'. Methods consisted mainly of ethnography, archival research, surveys, life-histories of settlers (Francis 1992; Oya 2007), participant observations, as well as extended unstructured interviews and informal conversations with both local leaders, government officials and farmers. These were carried out in Bulawayo, Kezi, Maphisa, resettlement areas and communal areas as well as in Krugersdorp and Johannesburg in South Africa. The ethnographic methodology I used in each study site allowed me to deeply engage with farmers and farm workers in different sites and land uses.

3.4.1 Phase I: ‘Exploratory’/ ‘preliminary’ phase

For one year, prior to the commencement of the research proper, I embarked on extensive literature review of several key bodies of literature. This was done both individually, as well as part of the South African Research Chair in Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies reading programme on agrarian political economy for PhD students at PLAAS during 2015, which was coordinated by one of my supervisors, Professor Ben Cousins. This enabled me to build a strong understanding of the theoretical framework and current debates on agrarian political economy within which the study is grounded in. After a year-long reading programme and armed with a basic understanding of social theories guiding this study, I then set out to do fieldwork.

The first period of fieldwork began in December 2015, with a three-week exploratory or preliminary visit to Matobo. According Devereux and Hoddinott (1993), preliminary visit have numerous practical and methodological advantages. These include making personal contacts with relevant bureaucrats and academics; pinning down the research site; psychological (i.e., “reducing the fear of the unknown”; and provides “feedback into theoretical preparations, allowing ideas and research proposals to be sharpened and refined” (ibid: 10). During the preliminary visit, I was accompanied by both of my supervisors and other members of the

LALR team in the field for three days.[7] The aim of this phase was to become acquainted with the district, its history, people and relevant government officials and traditional authorities before engaging in specific research. In-depth interviews were conducted with local leaders, extension officers, knowledgeable members of the local communities, land reform beneficiaries, as well as a former white commercial farmer.[8] Data collected allowed for the sharpening and refining of research questions, and for the first reflections on the complexities of land reform programmes in the district. During these three weeks, I also managed to establish local contacts which allowed me to access farmers, and to identify a potential focused case study area to explore the research questions posed in this study. As mentioned above, I decided to focus on Ward 23 within "Mapani veld", mainly because it had a high concentration of different land use types.

After this trip, I returned to Cape Town where I finalised my proposal and submitted to the University High Degrees' Committee. In March 2016, I made a one-week visit to Gwanda (the provincial capital of Matabeleland South) and Bulawayo. During this visit, my objectives were: to introduce my research to the Provincial Administrator (PA) and other relevant provincial government departments and to get the relevant permission from the PA (the provincial gate keeper) that would allow me to conduct fieldwork in the next phases. Dr Clifford Mabhena of the Institute of Development Studies (NUST) accompanied me to Gwanda, where he introduced me to the provincial administrator (PA) and provincial veterinary officer of Matabeleland South province. The PA issued me with a permission letter, which I would take the district administrator (DA) of Matobo district, whom also issued me with another support letter. During this period, I also managed to do archival research at the National Archives of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo.

3.4.2 Phase II: Intensive/ qualitative/ historical research

Armed with support letters from the UWC and other relevant authorities in Zimbabwe, "intensive-qualitative-historical" research began in May-July and continued in October-

[7] These include, the now late B.Z. Mavedzenge, Felix Murimbarimba, Clifford Mabhena (IDS, NUST), Adrian Nel (now with University of Kwazulu Natal) and Kuda Ndlovu (Masters student).

[8] Some of these interviews took place in Bulawayo. I made several joint trips with Kuda Ndlovu, a Masters' student at the Institute of Development Studies at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) who was finalizing her fieldwork in the same area.

December 2016. In this second phase, my main objectives were: to complete the process of introducing the research and sought permission from relevant authorities at the district level, to finalise the appointment of research assistant, and to begin more substantive "intensive" research. The latter involved carrying out interviews with government and local council officials, local politicians, land reform beneficiaries and nearby communal areas farmers. In addition, while I had a fundamental understanding of isiNdebele language, this trip was an opportunity to also consolidate my knowledge of isiNdebele language and culture established during fieldwork for my Master's thesis in Matabeleland North province in 2013.

I decided to start in Maphisa and Kezi (17 km apart) for obvious reasons. As noted earlier, government offices are concentrated in Maphisa and Kezi.[9] In addition, some land reform beneficiaries, especially in medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms, are based in Kezi or Maphisa, where they work or operate own-account businesses. During the first two weeks of the May-June trip, I spent a great deal of time interviewing government and local state officials, local politicians and some land reform recipients based in Maphisa and Kezi. During this period, I also managed to collect rich archival material on Three-tier farms at Matobo District Rural Council's offices in Maphisa that allowed me to build a solid historical perspective of early land reform programmes in the district, while simultaneously laying the foundations of the context that I was about to enter. Data collected during this phase informed the choice of the specific Three-tier farms, where I would conduct detailed case study research. At a later stage, the material also enabled me to properly interpret contemporary material that I collected in the next phase of my research.

My initial idea was to stay in Kezi for a short period and eventually move somewhere nearer Ward 23, perhaps Natisa or Matobo National Park. I thought that this would allow me to access settlers more easily. However, I decided to stay in Kezi for the entire period (May-July) because Kezi was situated some 17 km away from Ward 23; hence, it could take up less than 20 minutes to arrive to Malundi or Damara turn-off, where the route branches off to Ward 23. Some few days while conducting interviews with Blasio Mavedzenge and Felix Murimbarimba in Maphisa, we discovered by chance that the assistant District Administrator was a son of Blasio Mavedzenge's a friend and former colleague, and hailed from Masvingo. Blasio and the

[9] The headquarters of Matobo Rural District Council are in Maphisa, while the district offices of the District Administrator, AGRITEX and Ministry of Lands are all in Kezi.

assistant DA's father had known each other for years and worked together at Agritex for many years. They were all both from Masvingo too. In this respect, Blasio asked him if I could stay with him while doing my field work as I had no research base at the time. Without hesitation, he readily agreed to stay with me in his official residence in Kezi, which would become my research base for the entire period of my fieldwork. Not only did living with the assistant DA in Kezi allow me to cut accommodation cost, but it also helped me to establish relationships with several government officials, some of whom were working in the Ministry of Lands, Agritex, and Veterinary services to give only a few examples, and explained what it was I was doing. I also established a good relationship with the DA (my host's boss), who gave me a great many insights about land reform issues in the district. I attended several social gatherings such as braais and watching football with government officials during weekends and evenings, where I would have informal conversations with them about a wider variety of issues. Not all of the discussions were directly relevant to my research, but it informed a general understanding of the wider socio-economic and political context of the district.

Good relations with government officials also enabled me to access archival materials held in their respective offices that contained sensitive information, which they referred as "hot files" ("*ma*-files *anopisa*"). These archives contained a variety of information on land issues including minutes of District Land Committee, letters from different government offices and white farmers, just to mention a few. I agreed with the government officials who gave me access to such files not to reveal the names of these files and the offices where they are held in my thesis. In the end, I decided to divide my day activities between visiting the farms during the day and working through these files during the night. Through these networks, I also managed to obtain the lists and contact details of land reform beneficiaries, which would later become my sampling frame. However, these lists were often not updated and included some land reform beneficiaries who had long been replaced or exited resettlement areas.

At ward-level, fieldwork began by recruiting a research assistant. I decided to recruit the extension officer of Ward 23, who had previously worked with the NUST-team, to be my research assistant. Of mixed race himself, Sydney Jones is a very interesting and knowledgeable figure. He grew-up in the neighbouring Khumalo communal areas and also gained access to an A1 plot in one of the farms in ward 23. His father's family once owned a large-scale commercial farm in the area too. He is well known and respected locally, so he would make introductions for me. He is also relatively knowledgeable about the history of land

reform in this area. During my fieldwork, he has become one of my sources I could triangulate information from interviews, particularly when in the car visiting our next interviewees.

Over the course of this phase of fieldwork, I had several trips to the new resettlement areas within Ward 23. A number of possible case study sites under different land uses and property regimes were initially identified using government data. These sites were then visited to gather further information. With respect to A1 study sites, I visited a total of six farms: Senungu, Sibuntuli, Holi, Luma, Vimbi and Woodlands. With respect to Council's self-contained farms (subdivided Three-tier farms), a total of five farms were visited: Halale Estate, Pagati, Mampondweni, Nsambani and Wild East. Seven farms designated as medium-scale farms were also visited: Buluma, Toko North, Damara, Mapani Poort, Umfula, Bon Accord and Natisa farms. Armed with facts and information gleaned from archival sources and interviews with government officials, the main aim of these trips was to begin interviewing and talking with the new settlers, and to introduce my research. Across these sites, various in-depth interviews were conducted with A1 farmers and local leaders such as the ward councillor, headman and village chairmen of each farm. In addition, I attended an *indaba* concerning a long-standing land dispute between the A1 settlers and villagers from neighbouring Wenlock communal areas in Luma village. This meeting was an opportunity to have first-hand observations of the views of these two groups in issues relating to the dispute. In most cases, interviews and focus group discussions were audio taped with my digital recorder with permission from the research participants.

Although the information garnered from these initial trips forms part of my study, the main value of these trips was an introduction to different types of livestock systems that have emerged across the three types of land use mentioned above in the aftermath of land reform.

I also made several trips to the Kumalo communal areas during which I conducted two focus preliminary group discussions with grazing committees involved in management of Three-tier farms and in-depth interviews with livestock owners. I gathered information relating to past management of Three-tier farms, the decisions and procedures of subdivision in the mid-2000s and the conflicts over access to access to these nearby farms after post-subdivisions and post-FTLRP. I also made a further one-day trip to the southern part of the district towards Zimbabwe-Botswana border. This visit focussed on the Sear Block of Three-tier farms (ward 20) that are used as *"emlageni"* (cattle posts) by livestock keepers from nearby communal areas. Several interviews with herd owners, government officials and hired herders were

conducted concerning livestock ownership and management, especially during drought periods. While most of the information gleaned from this trip do not form part of this study, the value of this trip was that I was able to observe the traditional *umlaga* (transhumance) system in practice.

During these trips, I was accompanied by my research assistant. With the exception of Sear Block, Jones was familiar with the visited sites, having either grown up in Kumalo communal areas or worked in ward 23 (resettlement areas) as an extension officer for many years, as discussed earlier. This made the process of gaining entrée relatively easier. Jones introduced me to both farmers and local leaders, and explained what it was I was doing and the benefits he hoped the research will bring to them. In addition, I used LALR's small booklets that summarises the findings of earlier work in Masvingo and Mvurwi (Mavedzenge et al. 2016).[10] These booklets, the 'blue passports', as we call them, were useful in explaining what I was trying to do and to explain what the LALR team found in other parts of the country. During interviews, I always explained that the information that I was gathering would enable me to write a similar book about their aspirations, successes and failures as the 'new' farmers in Matobo district. I found out that most interviewees were particularly interested in knowing how other 'new' farmers elsewhere were faring, and what kind of support they were getting from the government (if any). Given that the booklet is littered with photos of other farmers, most farmers were keen to have their photographs taken so that they can also be used in future publications, such as the blue 'passport' when my research is finalized.

In July of 2016, I returned to Cape Town after two months of intensive fieldwork. I then compiled a note of preliminary research findings, drawn from archives, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions participant observations outlined above, and shared it with my supervisors. The preliminary findings informed the choice of specific study sites and the design of a household questionnaire in order to collect primary household data on certain features. Perhaps the main value of writing the research note was that it enabled me to identify key insights into the wider political economy with its particular Matabeleland character for further research. While the thrust of my thesis was to investigate dynamics of accumulation and social differentiation, my supervisors and myself agreed that I needed to balance my efforts in a way

[10] See, (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b2a9274e5274a18fa9d3a62/Land_Booklet_small.pdf).

that would not exclude the historically-informed, rich ethnographic material I hinted at in the note. At this stage, we realized how important an understanding of the earlier historical background of land reform and land use in contextualising processes of accumulation and differentiation among different types of resettled farmers in the post-land reform period.

Having immersed myself in the local context and identified sites I wished to study my next task was to develop a questionnaire instrument. The design of my questionnaire was largely informed by LALR and later Agricultural Policy Research in Africa instruments that I adapted to suit my own settings and extended for my own research. In other words, my survey tried to replicate the LALR survey as much as possible in order to allow for comparisons between the studies, while also including some additional questions that were relevant to my study. To summarise, the LALR questionnaire included: the general livelihood background of household (including ownership of assets beyond the farm such as houses in town), farm enterprise (assets, production, sales, input use, labour and other costs), next generation and gender, the relationship between the farm and other non-farm activities etc. However, the LALR instrument was supplemented by additional questions about livestock production, specifically: cattle ownership and holdings, input use, drought management strategies (including movements). The questionnaire was then pre-tested in October and November of 2016 in sites that were not selected as case study sites: six A1 farmers in Holi and three medium-scale A2/ self-contained farmers. In pre-testing, I checked for ambiguities and any missing elements. At this stage, it was recognized that the questionnaire was quite long and took a long time to administer, hence quite testing for informants. This was especially challenging for A2 and self-contained farmers who were not easily accessible, and if accessed, would not agree to a very long interview. These observations led me to cut down my questionnaire. Moreover, I decided to design two versions of the questionnaire: one questionnaire for A1 farmers; and even shorter and focussed version questionnaire for A2 and self-contained farmers.

I made another trip to Matobo in October and November of 2016. The objectives of this trip were: to begin piloting the questionnaire instrument, and to follow-up and go deeper on key issues that had been withdrawn from the earlier fieldwork trip. Like the previous trip, this trip involved moving about and interviewing new settlers, government officials and traditional authorities. I visited the National Archives of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo to complement this qualitative and consolidate the archival material that I collected during the previous trips. From the National Archives of Zimbabwe, I obtained material relevant to historical issues on the land

question in the area. These issues included fencing and boundary issues in the colonial (1970s) and post-colonial period (from 1980s to 1990s), drought and livestock management, and land reform policies of the 1980s and 1990s. This qualitative and historical work further informed a better understanding of the complexities of land histories of the area.

In the days prior to returning to Cape Town in early December of 2016, my co-supervisor and the LALR team (Blasio Mavedzenge and Felix Murimbarimba) visited my study area and meet up with me in the field on a two-day trip. This enabled me us to have a detailed discussion of my research and how it was progressing. Perhaps more importantly, I was able to discuss the dilemmas of researching A2 and self-contained farmers with my co-supervisor, Blasio Mavedzenge and Felix Murimbarimba, who were also grappling with the same problem in Mvurwi and Masvingo, but had considerable research experience of conducting rural surveys. Their suggestions on the final version of the A2/self-contained questionnaire were helpful and constructive. Once I returned to Cape Town, I tidied up the two versions of the questionnaire in preparation of the second round of pre-testing and final administering of the instruments in phase III. These questionnaires were shared with both of my supervisors, who provided useful suggestions. It had become clear from fieldwork at this stage that the qualitative material would be the most revealing. In this regard, they suggested that more time be expended in collecting qualitative material as well. In order to enable this, they suggested that I allow blank spaces on the questionnaire for the recording of comments, discussion and additional qualitative information.

3.4.3 Phase III: Hybrid intensive-extensive research

The third phase of fieldwork began in February and March of 2017 and continued over 2018, and a three week visit in 2022. For the sake of simplicity, this phase of fieldwork consisted of: fieldwork with A1 farmers; fieldwork with A2 and self-contained farmers. In-depth interviews with hired herders were also conducted with hired herders, especially in A2 and self-contained farms, to cross-check the information gathered from farmers, while permitting a glimpse into the working conditions of these herders. However, a high workforce turnover meant that some interviewees were relatively new to their positions and were unable to discuss some issues in any depth. In third phase my main objective was to complete the process of collecting "intensive" and "extensive" data in selected case study sites.

The ‘household’ was used as a unit of analysis. I recognise the long, “unsettled debate” about the use of the concept of “household” in rural surveys (O’Laughlin 2013), and that there is no single accepted or adopted definition of what constitutes a household. The concept of household has long been recognised as a problematic and contested unit of analysis (see Guyer 1981; Peters 1983; Guyer & Peters 1987; O’Laughlin 2013). A key challenge with regards to the use of the concept of a household revolves around who exactly to be included in this group and who is not. A commonly used definition of household is that of co-residence or “eating or cooking from the same pot”. In this study, a household was defined as a settler and his/her wife or husband and their dependents regardless of their place of residence. Dependents included children living in or outside the household and other family or non-family members who were deemed to have consumption and production links to the household head. The choice of defining a household this way was made on the basis that a significant number of settlers, especially in A2 and self-contained farms are absentee farmers and owns multiple houses spread over multiple locations where they work and/or operate self-employed businesses. Even in A1 cases, where settlers were living permanently on the farm, household members living and working away from the farm were considered as very much part of the household.

There is also tension between interviewing individuals and then extrapolate to household context as the respondent sometimes speak on behalf of the household and sometimes only on his/her behalf. Another common challenge of using the household as unity of analysis is the inherent inability to gain insights into gender and intergenerational issues from household census when often a single household is interviewed for the survey. One way of overcoming this challenge is to interview multiple people within the household. However, this was not possible for me as data collection at household and individual level is not feasible for one researcher as the process is time consuming.

(a) Fieldwork with smallholder A1 farmers

In A1 schemes, the third phase of fieldwork took place in February and March of 2017 and continued into early 2018. The first few weeks of this trip were dedicated to the logistical preparations of the A1 survey, including a second round of pre-testing of the questionnaire instrument and to find families to live with in the two A1 villages selected for this study. Seven pre-testing interviews were undertaken in nearby Woodlands A1 scheme and the questionnaire was fine-tuned accordingly.

As noted above, main fieldwork in A1 schemes took place in two contrasting villages: Vimbi and Luma. Although I had visited the two villages tens of times during the previous phases of research, I anticipated that my ethnic identity (as a Shona-speaker) could cause small problems during the main phase. However, my previous Matabeleland fieldwork had taught me the importance of living with research participants. I think this strategy helped me to gain entrée and rapport. As Devereux and Hoddinott (1993: 12) notes, "showing willingness to live among the community also breaks down barriers and reduces the extent to which the fieldworker is perceived as an outsider." Thus, I decided to stay with families in each village. In Vimbi, I stayed with a relatively young Moyo family, whom I related to because he was relatively young and also shared the same totem *("isibongo*"). In Luma, I lived with the Mpofu family, whom I considered my 'uncles' because of my mother's totem. Totems remain an important aspect of Ndebele culture and people use such totems to address each other (see Lindgren 2004). While I never hide my Shona identity, I consciously made a decision to introduce myself with my "Moyo" totem, which is also a popular totem among the Ndebele people, as a strategy to ease my acceptance by research participation. Strategies of this nature by people of Shona origins living and/or working among people of the Ndebele origins in Matabeleland are not uncommon (Lindgren 2004). For instance, an A2 farmer of Ndebele origins in my sample who had entered into a partnership with a Bulawayo-based businessman of Shona origins told me how she deliberately introduced him to the locals as "Ncube" (an equivalent of his "Shoko" totem in ChiShona) rather than his long ChiShona family name. "The local people will develop an attitude the moment you mention such a long Shona surname", she says.[11]

I decided to begin my A1 fieldwork in Vimbi, in part, because I had managed to establish some friendship with some families there. Despite this, right at the start of my fieldwork in Vimbi, I found that there was suspicion of my identity and the purpose of my research. Some farmers suspected that I was working under cover for the government. The following excerpt from my field notes after two days in the village captures my reflections.

> Only two days after my arrival in Vimbi, rumours started to circulate. Whilst most farmers remembered me from my last visit in November 2016, some farmers suspected that I was working under cover for government and doing a land audit. Speaking to my research assistant today, he explained how this suspicion arose partly because of my association with him as an extension officer: "This morning, when I was coming here, I met a group of villagers *("izakamizi")* who were clearing the road. They stopped me and asked me about you. They wanted to know more about you and what you want to use the

[11] Interview with Nomazwe Dube, 29 August 2017, Maleme farm.

> information for. They said, "Jones, we take you as our son and we trust you. Please tell us who this guy is? What is he doing here? Is he working for the government?" I told them that you are student doing research but they asked why I was working with you if you not employed by the government. Some said that they won't release any information." Speaking with my host later that day, he also told me a similar story but because he knew why I was in the village, told the villagers that I was just a student. "I told them that maybe something good will come out of this research", he says.
>
> (Personal field notes, March 17, 2017)

Clearly, my association with my research assistant, an extension officer in the area, had a double-edged effect in gaining access and trust in this village. Thus, this presented me with a dilemma: how to gain the villagers' trust before I begin administering the survey. In the wake of this challenge, I sought to find a balance between seen to be approved of by the government officials on one hand, and being distant enough from them to enable me to hear critical views from my research participants. My aim was also to gain the trust and confidence of the farmers in order to obtain as much accurate information as possible. For instance, I was already aware that the issue of leasing-out pastures during the 2011-12 drought was sensitive.

Whilst both my research assistant and host defended and explained my position to villagers, it became clear that more effort was required to gain their trust. With this in mind, I decided to delay the administering of the questionnaire. During the early days, Sydney and myself would spend several hours visiting and talking to villagers as he conducted his extension services duties. Sydney would make an introduction for me. While living in the villages, I also accompanied my hosts to meetings, funerals, work parties ("*amalima*"), cattle dipping and castrating activities. Again, my hosts would make introductions for me. Depending on the encounter, I would explain the purpose of my research, and give out some of the LALR team's small booklets (the "blue passports"), which summarises research findings from Masvingo. In most cases, I would say, "I am working with Sydney. I am writing a book on land reform and how it has (or not) improved your lives and the challenges you are facing in farming". This proved effective as suspicions about my identity soon subsided and a degree of trust began to emerge, as illustrated in the following excerpt from the field notes:

> The second week of my stay in Vimbi was very interesting. While the first few days of my stay during the first week of my stay in the village was filled with suspicion, the second week was different. It seems like all the suspicion had subsided and, many villagers were keen to speak with me. They referred to me as *"umlimisi"* (extension worker). Each household, it seemed, was waiting in expectation of my arrival and each time I met a villager whom I had not as yet visited, he/she would frequently ask that "which households are you visiting tomorrow and when are you visiting me." It seems that they are gaining trust in me.

(Personal field notes, March 25, 2017).

This trust became key to my fieldwork. The trust established meant that I would comfortably ask any question and expect to get a fairly true response. In the end, I was judged on my personality, eagerness and willingness to learn about their daily life, as well as my work ethic rather than my positionality as an "outsider" of Shona origins. By the time I begin the fieldwork proper, my ethnic origins had become the subject of an ever-growing array of light-hearted jokes and jibes, such as "*ungaphi umuShona*" (where is the Shona guy today?) or "*ungaphi umabalani"* (secretary).

Once suspicions concerns had subsided, the rest of my fieldwork in Vimbi proceeded without any challenges. It was easy to arrange and conduct with the A1 settlers. All the interviews for this study were conducted by myself, with the help of my research assistant in the in the first weeks of the fieldwork. As time passed, when the villagers grew used to my presence, I realized that I could conduct the survey alone, allowing interviewees to open up on issues that were deemed sensitive to be discussed in the presence of a government official. My relationship with my hosts was key to my fieldwork too. The mutual trust we established meant that I would go to them to help me explain certain issues or events in the village, providing an opportunity to triangulate information gathered from other villagers. For instance, I found out that some households under-reported the number of cattle they gained through the leasing-out pasture arrangement of 2011/12 drought.

Initially, I had planned to interview around 70% of the farmers in the village (25 in total). However, after a discussion with host, a decision was made to interview every household in the village. Given that most farmers had by the time of administering the questionnaire had gotten eager to participate in research, he explained that "no-one wants to be left out" and leaving out some households would "cause trouble" (*kuzavusi msindo*). In the end, 34 out of 37 households in Vimbi made up the survey proper. However, I decided to leave out one household that I had surveyed in the final analysis, mainly because the family also owned a self-contained plot and was therefore part of the self-contained sample. Whilst the official list of beneficiaries held at the Ministry of Lands had only 29 households in Vimbi by 2015, I found that the village had 37 households. Of these 37 households, only 35 had occupied and developed their plots, while two of the households had not established or occupied their plots. When I queried this with the headman, he said that "*bazabuya*" (they will come). However, my

efforts to trace these two settlers were futile. The actual undertaking of the survey proved easier largely because most farmers could be found at their homes much more easily.

During this first trip, I spent two months living in Vimbi before returning to Cape Town. This period of fieldwork in Vimbi was then followed by a period of fieldwork in Luma village. In July and August of 2017, I conducted fieldwork in Luma. As had been the case in Vimbi, I sought accommodation with a family in the village. Unlike in Vimbi, there was less suspicion of my positionality and purpose in Luma where there is a long-standing land dispute and was granted access with ease. This was because I was already known at this stage, and had visited and stayed in the village on several occasions. During this period, the charismatic village chairman had enthusiastically introduced me to the villagers and explained what it was I was doing and the benefits he hoped it would bring. Given the fact that village is plagued with a long-standing land dispute, both the village chairman and the villagers had their expectations that my research would help them in their struggles. The village chairman granted me access to his private archival materials, frequently commenting that "anyone who says your research findings are invalid would be mad". The chairman's willingness to share his personal archival material with me was because of the good relationship that existed between him and my research assistant, as he remarked: "I had to be honest, if you had not come with Jones and asked me to give you this information, I would not have given you this material." In June 2016, he invited me to attend an *indaba* that was held in the village between the A1 villagers and villagers from neighbouring Wenlock about the erection of a boundary fence. In such cases, he would occasionally reveal his own agenda for inviting me to such events or why my research was important for their own cause.

As had been the case in Vimbi, a decision was made to interview every household in the village, but this proved much difficult than in Vimbi: a substantial number of households were absentee farmers who were living in town or their communal areas homes and difficult to trace. In the end, a total of 36 households were interviewed, but two were later excluded in the analysis, because both owned either a self-contained or A2 plot elsewhere, and were part of these samples.

In both villages, interviews were either conducted at their homes or in the crop fields, while guarding crops against animals. Only two absentee farmers were interviewed in Bulawayo and South Africa, while two other absentee farmers were interviewed telephonically after having collected detailed information relating to the farm from farm worker or resident relative. In

most cases, interviews were audio-taped and transcribed verbatim. Each interview lasted between two and three hours. While the thrust of the fieldwork at this stage was to collect quantitative data, I soon realised that it was an effective strategy to allow interviewees to deviate from questions posed sometimes, allowing them to drift backwards and forwards in space and time.

In December of 2017 up until March 2018, after the initial surveys, I then spent several weeks in each village gathering additional qualitative data. I conducted life histories with virtually all the farmers in my sample. As it was the final field trip, I revisited households several times for updates, clarity and additional information.

Finally, within each A1 village, participatory research approaches to conduct "success" ranking exercices (cf. Grandin 1983; Scoones 1995a; Scoones et al. 2010, 2018) were conducted with groups of men and women were conducted at the end of my fieldwork in March 2018 in order to understand local perceptions of 'wealth' and 'success'. Generally employed as focus group discussions, they are very simple to use and interactive, gaining insights into the local understanding of what it means to be "successful". Scoones (1995: 85) discovered that combining "weath ranking produced by local people with insights genereated from survey material and a statistical cluster method can be a useful way of exploring the dimensions of differences in rural societies." This method acknowledges that local people know most about patterns of social differences and can best identify appropriate wealth indicators. Scoones suggests that "stratification is thus based on local perceptions and understandings of 'wealth' and not on arbitrary survey indicators chosen by the researcher or clusters imposed by statistical rules" (ibid: 86). Scoones (1995) found wealth ranking exercise effective for revealing gaps in survey data, assisting in the identification of appropriate wealthy indicators, and complimenting conventional surveys. Wealth ranking exercises have been employed successfully by researchers in rural studies (for example, Scoones 1995; Scoones et al. 2010, Scoones et al. 2018).

More recently, Scoones et al. (2010) took a participatory approach in order to gain insights into the nortion of "success". Using this same method, I thus explored local understandings of "success" and the emerging socio-economic inequality among farmers. In a first step, I listed all the farm household and the names were then written onto a card. I held three workshop-style participatory "success" ranking exercises separately with knowledgeable groups of men and women in the two villages (Grandin 1988; Scoones 1995; Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones et

al. 2018), helped by a research assistant, in order to get a sense of local understanding of "success" and social differentiation. These were aimed to solicit local farmers' perceptions of 'wealth' and 'success'. In Vimbi, two ranking exercises were conducted with women and men separately. However, in Luma only one workshop was conducted with a large group of both women and men. Initially, I had planned to conduct two wealth ranking exercises with a group of women and men in each village. However, in Luma, the village chairman, whom I had asked for permission to undertake the workshop and provided with a list of potential participants, invited all the two groups at the same time. In the end, I decided to conduct the wealth ranking exercise with both groups simultaneously. Each group was given an opportunity to place a household in a specific group, as well as the opportunity to debate its placement. This enabled me to establish what indicators were emphasized by a particular group and any disagreements between women and men. The rankings were therefore recorded separately for each group. This activity resulted in the identification of four "success groups" (SG) that acted as "taxonomic groups" for stratifying settlers into groups.

a) SG1: the most successful ('*abaphumelelayo'*)
b) SG2: those who are 'trying' ('*abazanayo'*)
c) SG3: those lacking resources/ assets ('a*baswelayo'*)
d) SG4: those with nothing ('*abangela lutho"*).

For the purposes of simple analysis, the ranking from both men and women were then combined to come up with an overall rank.

In sum, my fieldwork experience was enjoyable in the two A1 villages. During my several stays in the two villages, I accentuated the fact that I was a "rural boy", with a long-standing love for livestock. At the end of the fieldwork, the headman in Vimbi suggested that I should approach the Lands office to get my own "stand" in the village. Since then, I have maintained contact with several households. In sum, the A1 farmers were generally pleased to share their experiences of land reform with me.

(b) Fieldwork with medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers

Given their socio-economic and political profile, some observers have casts recipients of A2 and self-contained schemes as "elites" (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011). The term "elite" is challenging to define precisely, but according to Marongwe (2011: 1088), "it was members of the governing elite and the local elite who received most A2 farms". He uses the term "governing elite" to describe those A2 beneficiaries who occupy senior positions at national or

provincial level for government, the private sector or ZANU-PF party at national or provincial level (ibid: 1079). He suggests that the governing elite included both serving and former cabinet ministers, provincial governors, ZANU-PF provincial chairpersons, senior officials in the army and successful businesspeople. The "local elite" category, on the other hand, "includes civil servants based at either the provincial or district levels, with a few based at the national level" (Marongwe 2011: 1081).

In my own study, most beneficiaries of A2 and self-contained schemes occupied senior management and board level positions in government, private sectors and governing party, while others are self-employed successful businesspeople. Thus, given this socio-economic and political profile, I found that researching these two groups of farmers was notoriously challenging, and therefore required the adoption of careful decisions and strategies. While the two types of farms originated from different backgrounds, they can be described as medium-scale farms. Gaining access to these farms was a challenge, as some scholars have reported elsewhere. Dekker and Matondi (2011: 7), for example, found that A2 farmers in Mashonaland "were difficult to access and at times uncooperative". The A2 and self-contained farmers in my study sites were no exception. There are various reasons why it is difficult to gain access to medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers in my study sites. For example:

i. One obvious reason is the fact that they are quite mobile and straddle between multiple localities. Most of the A2 and self-contained hold their land *in absentia* and in many cases left the day-to-day management of the farm to hired herders or managers. In fact, most are still in full-time employment or off-farm businesses in nearby cities or abroad, where they live with their families. This absentee ownership and 'cell phone farming' makes these farmers very difficult to trace.
ii. They are more likely to turn down interviews because of the general suspicion towards researchers, especially A2 farmers. This is in part, because of the contested nature of land in these areas. The farmers who were generally struggling to put their farms into production, and leasing out all or part of their land were probably unlikely to agree to be interviewed.
iii. From an enumerator's point of view, medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers are difficult to study because of the complexity of their farming operations and livelihoods in general, and that they are not a single household but are often spread over many places with businesses in town, relatives in different houses and so on.

This has also been observed by other researchers in other countries, for example, Oya (2002), who noted that "the variety of types of household organization of large-rich farmers makes the construction of the household roster rather complicated, particularly in cases where there are different residential units (at least on for each wife) and the household head moves between these sites" (p. 141-42).

iv. The farms themselves are geographically dispersed over large territories, with some farms difficult to physically access because of their remoteness.

Further, my fieldwork period (2017-18) coincided with a mooted land audit, which made it even more challenging for me to persuade A2 settlers to participate in my research. Some thought that I was a government employee undertaking the land audit; hence, were reluctant to be interviewed. In such cases, the A2 farmers felt that they had not invested enough on their land, or their farms were not as productive as they wish them to be. This meant that some 'struggling' A2 settlers were less keen to be interviewed. A number of these 'struggling' A2 farmers, whom I later managed to interview, expressed their fear at this juncture. For example, RM, a 'struggling' farmer, expressed her anxieties at this time: "We heard there is a land audit coming, and I need to start buying cattle and make the farm as productive as possible. At the moment, I am struggling and they (government officials) may suggest that my farm need to be downsized or even repossessed". In summary, setting up interviews caused many time-consuming difficulties.

To address these challenges, I adopted various strategies in order to secure access to both A2 and self-contained farmers during both the pilot study and phase III of my fieldwork. Before starting the fieldwork, I obtained lists and contact details of A2 and self-contained farmers from the Ministry of Lands and Rural District Council, respectively. However, the lists were not updated and included names of beneficiaries who had relinquished or exited and replaced by new settlers, some of whom did not appear on these official lists. To address this, I would verify these official lists 'on the ground' by cross-checking them with the lists held by local leaders at the farm level. In some cases, the registered owners had been dead for years and the inheritance remain unresolved. All these issues meant that the list of farmers had to be pieced together 'on the ground' to build a more accurate list.

In order to dispel any possible (mis)perceptions that my research was part of the government's land audit, I decided to write a "letter of introduction to anyone suspicion" on the University of the Western Cape letterhead – inspired by Harris (1993: 144) – briefly explaining my

research, asking whether they would be interested in participating in the research and my contact details. This letter was accompanied by an introductory letter from the university, as well as 'permission' letters from the Provincial Administrator (PA) and the District Administrator (DA). Prior to contacting the farmers, I spent a great deal of time interviewing herders to understand the background of the farmers, including their occupations, place of residence, production and general livestock management practices. I decided to stay in Wild East with my uncle (*sekuru*), a recipient of the self-contained plot himself and former senior veterinary who used to work in the district. My *sekuru* is a well-respected locally, and often spends most of his time at the farm. He often knew most of the A2 and self-contained farmers or their workers in the area, so he would make an introduction for me. We would spend hours cycling around the farms and interviewing herders. I would often leave the introductory letter from the university, permission to conduct research from the provincial administrator and district administrator, "letter of introduction to anyone suspicious" and the 'blue passport' at the farmers' homesteads with my mobile number, as they were always not there, although they rarely called back. My uncle's homestead also neighbours one self-contained farmer who is operating a tuck-shop, bar and grinding mill services. As far as I know, this place was the only place where farm workers in the area could buy food supplies, alcohol and have their maize-meal grinded. Thus, workers often congregate at this place, both day and night. We would spend hours talking to herders about livestock management and their working conditions. Sometimes (more so on weekends) we would chance upon the farmers themselves, so my *sekuru* would make an introduction for me. Depending on the encounter, I would arrange a meeting later during the week in Bulawayo or conduct an impromptu interview.

Having spent a great deal of time talking and interviewing hired herders in the A2 and Self-Contained farms, I was knowledgeable about their socio-economic background (such as occupation, war veteran status etc.) and production of potential interviewees before I even met them, which proved valuable in working out strategies that I thought could help me secure interviews. My next task was then to contact the farmers themselves by telephone to explain the nature of my research and ask for an interview. Once the contacted farmers expressed willingness to participate in the research, a date and time would be set for the interviews. Although most agreed in principle, and despite my best efforts to schedule interviews beforehand, I had several incidences where some farmers cancelled such meetings at the last minute when I appeared at the designated meeting place, and on numerous occasions they did not turn up at all. This meant I had to re-arrange the meetings if the farmer was still willing to

take part in the research or give up on the interview after several attempts altogether. In sum, it generally took much effort and time to secure interviews with these farmers than I had initially anticipated. In most cases, the farmers said that they were "too busy". Thus, a major challenge was how they could accommodate me in their busy schedules. In this context, it was up to me to convince them that I was happy to meet them at whatever place that was convenient to them, including when they are visiting their farms and participate in any farm work they would be undertaking at the time. For this reason, interviews would take place in the farmers' cars when travelling to Bulawayo or to the farm, at the farms during weekends, pubs, restaurants and houses in Bulawayo, Maphisa or South Africa.

On occasion farmers would ask me where I had obtained their contact details or who had given me their contact details without their consent. During such phone calls, the prospective interviewees sound tense, such that I was nervous about potentially compromising my own safety. This happened when I contacted ET, a ZNA brigadier general, who owns an A2 farm. The phone call started awkwardly and the provisional respondent sounded disinterested:

> **Tapiwa**: Hi, Brigadier… My name is Tapiwa Chatikobo and I am a PhD student in South Africa. I am conducting research about livestock and land reform in Matobo, and believe you have a farm there.
>
> **ET**: Where did you get my number [interrupts].
>
> **Tapiwa**: I got your contact details from the Lands Office in Kezi.
>
> **ET**: Why did they gave you my number without my consent? [silence]… What is your research about?
>
> **Tapiwa**: It's about livestock and land reform, and the challenges you are facing as new farmers…
>
> **ET**: What will you do about it even if I tell you, my challenges? [laughing sarcastically] I don't like to be asked questions in the form of a questionnaire my dear, but I am happy to have a chat….

After this encounter, I felt it was better for me to back off and decided not to pursue this farmer any further. However, I must admit that I was left with a sense of dissatisfaction that I didn't push hard for an interview. It was sometimes necessary to be persistent without annoying the potential interviewees. It is also important to note that this example was an exception rather than the rule, and was the only case where an interview had to be abandoned.

In some cases, farmers agreed to take part in the research because they empathised with the fact that I was a student, and they, too, had children who were also pursuing post-graduate degrees abroad (including the UK). This was most notable in the case of one self-contained

farmer and businessman in Maphisa who, after realising that his neighbour (also a businessman) had refused to grant me an interview, remarked: "My son is studying his Masters' degree in the UK, and soon he would have to undertake research as part of his degree. So, I will never refuse to be interviewed because I also have a son who needs to interview other people elsewhere in order to complete his degree. If you refuse someone else's child to do an interview, your own child would also be denied access by those people".

As the research progressed, 'snowballing' became a key strategy to contact A2 and self-contained farmers. As I made friends with an increasing number of A2 and self-contained farmers in the area, they in turn put me in contact with their friends and relatives who were also A2 or self-contained farmers in the area. Baglioni (2009) stress the importance of approaching potential interviews by demonstrating links with other farmers in the area, especially if they are also influential. She found it much easier to set up interviews with potential interviews whenever she could mention somebody already known to this person. I found this strategy particularly helpful as I gradually build my social network. This strategy, however, is not unproblematic since, as Baglioni (2009: 122) suggests, "if the researcher mentions someone who is not 'appreciated' by the interviewee and therefore be associated with a hostile party".

Once I managed to locate and sit down with the farmer, I would start by explaining confidentiality and, in line with 'informed consent', asking if they wished to take part in the research, and asking for permission to record the interview. At the beginning of the interviews, I would explain the purpose and aims of the research; I habitually began conversations by showing the interviewees the small booklets ('blue passports') and the book – *Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths and Realities* – which focusses on work by the LALR team. During these conversations, I would say my research is aimed to complement that of the LALR team. This proved to be an effective ice-breaker before every interview, and farmers were eager to know how the 'new' farmers elsewhere were faring. Soon, the ice-breaker that got us chatting would turn into a two to three-hour-long conversations about their own enterprises.

Interviews were conducted as a conversation and, I always carried a notebook to record qualitative material. The questionnaire was generally shorter; I made a conscious effort to keep the questionnaire as short as possible because I felt that these farmers would not agree to a very long interview. An ice-breaker question was one asking the respondents to rate their "success" as being "doing well", "doing Ok" or "doing badly", and if they responded, "why was this the case?" As a rule of thumb, more sensitive questions were held back until the latter stages of the

interview when rapport has been created (cf. Harvey 2010, 2011). Often 'struggling' farmers were reluctant to speak about land-leasing for fear of farm repossession.

Each interview lasted between one and two hours. Initially I had planned to carry out at least two interviews with each farmer; the first one involving the collection of quantitative data through a questionnaire and the second one, focussing on qualitative data through 'life-histories'. However, given that setting up interviews was so often complicated, I quickly realised that it would be unwise to opt for a two-part interview schedule as the second interview may have never materialised. The best strategy proved to be to collect both qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously as much as I could.

To conclude, conducting fieldwork among the A2 and self-contained farmers caused major methodological challenges. To navigate some of these challenges, I pursued numerous strategies for gaining access, setting up interviews and conducting interviews. As McDowell (1998: 2135) observes, the success of gaining access to elite subjects depends very much on serendipity, social networks and particular circumstances. A 'flexible' approach with regards to dates and timings of conducting interviews is also crucial (Harvey 2011, 2021). Despite my efforts, I still struggled to meet my targeted samples, especially in A2 farms. This explains why my sample of A2 farms is small (n=18). My initial plan was to interview at least twenty-five of the thirty-four A2 farmers in the ward (representing around 74% of the A2 farmers in the ward). However, researching these farmers proved immensely difficulties, in part, because owners were often absent or were reluctant to be interviewed amid threats of audit. I think that such difficulties of researching A2 farmers represent a finding itself (Cramer et al. 2015). While the A2 quantitative dataset collected during this research was relatively small and by no means statistically representative, when combined with a qualitative approach, it nevertheless helped to uncover patterns and identify trajectories.

3.4.4 Phase IV: A short revisit

In November 2022, I made a three-weeks revisit to the study area. The aim was to update the data and cross-checking some of the findings. However, not all the households were revisited. A total of three A2, five self-contained and twenty-five were revisited and interviewed during this period.

3.5 Data analysis

With regard to survey data, SPSS 25.0 and Excel were used for both data management and analysis. The analysis followed several steps. Following Pallant (2014), I first developed a "code book" based on my questionnaire schedule that I administered to A1, A2 and self-contained farms. After developing the code book, I then entered the data in Excel spread sheets for each land use type. I then checked and cleaned the data by randomly selecting 10% of the sample for each data set and cross-checking for errors. The data was then imported to SPSS for further analysis. I then undertook additional cleaning by calculating descriptive statistics using SPSS.

To further examine patterns of social inequality among settlers within each land use type, quantitative data was analysed in different ways. The asset-based index approach has become one of the most widely used quantitative data techniques for studying patterns of social inequality. This is largely because of the problems around using traditional income metrics, which include the sensitivities of collecting household income and low levels of literacy and numeracy (Wall & Johnston 2008). A "price-weighted asset index" was used as a proxy for wealth to classify households into different "asset groups" in A2 and SC farms. This involved determining the "total value of assets owned" by a household by multiplying the value of each asset and the number of specific assets owned by each household.[12] The index measured the total value of assets based on my survey's asset register: a predefined list of key domestic, agricultural, transport and water assets owned by a household. The total value of all assets owned by households in each scheme was arbitrarily split into three equal "asset groups", with "AG1" being the poorest households and "AG3" representing the richest. Relationships between key variables were established through cross-tabulations and Pearson correlation. In the absence of household income or expenditure data, asset-based index approach has become a popular proxy for measuring household socio-economic status (Filmer & Pritchett 1999, 2000; McKenzie 2005; Johnston & Abreu 2016; Howe et al. 2018).

[12] To generate estimate values of assets, all asset prices were adjusted to 2018 constant dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). Historical CPI data was obtained from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/pdf/cpi.pdf.

Table 3.6: Distribution of households by overall success rank in Vimbi and Luma

	Vimbi (n=33)		Luma (n=34)		Overall (n=67)	
Success Rank	N	%	N	%	N	%
SG1	11	33.3%	7	20.6%	18	26.9%
SG2	11	33.3%	5	14.7%	16	23.9%
SG3	9	27.3%	17	50.0%	26	38.8%
SG4	2	6.1%	5	14.7%	7	10.4%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

As mentioned above, a participatory "success ranking exercise" was also conducted within each Al village. Four "success groups" were established, according to the steps outlined below. Table 3.6 shows the breakdown of households according to these success groups.

I then used these groups to cluster farmers into four groups based on the notion of success (Scoones et al. 2010). As was the case for A2 and self-contained farms, data analysis made extensive use of cross-tabulations. Qualitative data analysis did not differ across the three land use types. As mentioned above, most qualitative interviews were recorded and transcribed. During this transcription process, I checked for errors and inconsistencies.

3.6 Ethical considerations

The fieldwork for this thesis was approved by the research ethics committee at the University of the Western Cape, prior to the commencement of the fieldwork. Ethical issues in this thesis were related both to the interviewing of people and the collection of archival data. As noted above, during the first phase, I followed numerous steps to properly introduce my research to the relevant authorities. Starting at the provincial level, I first approached the Provincial Administrator of Matabeleland South province to seek approval of my research. Once the letter of approval was issued, I proceeded to Matobo district and presented the letter to the District Administrator of Matobo district, who in turn issued me with his own letter of approval. Once in possession of these letters, I approached the District Lands Officer, who was responsible for providing me with a list of land reform beneficiaries and other relevant information. I also approached Matobo Rural District Council in order to gain access to beneficiaries' list of subdivided three-tier farms. Moreover, I also approached the Police and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in Kezi in order to explain the purpose and aims of my research. Following this, I then approached the local chiefs, headmen, ward councillors, and

village chairpersons in potential research sites, who were responsible for approving my research on the ground.

My research assistant, Sydney, played a key role during the introductions and early stages of the fieldwork. In the early stages of fieldwork, respondents felt uneasy in the company of an outsider, especially given my Shona origins. Sydney's presence, however, helped to dispel these apprehensions. Indeed, in the early stages of my fieldwork, respondents had the suspicion that I was a government official who was carrying out a land audit.

Before each interview or survey commenced, I fully explained the purpose of the research and my background to respondents in the language of the respondent's preference.[13] Respondents were encouraged to ask any questions with regards to the research and its aims. In keeping with the 'informed consent' rule, only those respondents that had given full and informed consent were interviewed. I also explained that respondents could pause or withdrawn from the interview process at any time should they wish to. Moreover, respondents were advised that I would collect some personal information during the interview, including their age, gender, education attainment, as well as information relating to their livelihood and income sources, and made sure that they were comfortable with this. Also, all respondents were guaranteed anonymity of their responses, and were informed that the final results of the study would be made available in the public domain. In addition, all respondents are referred to only by their code names throughout the thesis. Moreover, what are more specific positions and workplaces are not directly attributed to respondents in this thesis to protect their anonymity.

The issue of the research safety was also acknowledged (Lee 1997). A recent paper by Cramer et al. (2015), for example, illustrates some of the challenges and threats faced by fieldworkers during fieldwork, posed by local political forces, multinational companies and organizations that may feel threatened by the research findings. The political instability and violence that has characterized Zimbabwe over the last decade and the sensitivities of land reform meant that I had to tread carefully when pursuing some certain topics during the fieldwork. Particular care was taken in handling of sensitive personal information. For that reason, notebooks containing interview transcripts, field notes, archival material, as well as completed questionnaires were at all times either securely stored in a locked suitcase or carried on person. As mentioned above,

[13] Most respondents spoke isiNdebele, although there were few cases where respondents spoke ChiShona or English, with the later involving mainly government officials.

I managed to access some sensitive archival material that was not in the public domain. I only managed to access these files through good relations with officials, and after promising them anonymity. This makes reporting of such data ethically problematic. In an attempt to protect the people who gave me access to these sensitive files, I decided to reference the places where these files were found as "anonymous".

Some respondents asked about the benefits of participating in the research. I was therefore clear that there were no immediate or personal benefit, but that the research could represent an opportunity for their challenges to be heard at a higher level. However, it is possible that my attempts to explain the impact of the research to respondents and its links to the wider research programme could have raised expectations. To navigate this concern, I am planning to convene a dialogue focusing on the key findings of the research in November 2023, and this will include farmers, local leaders and (local and central) government personnel.

3.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the study site, its history and explained why I chose to conduct my fieldwork there. I have outlined the research design and methods of empirical enquiry, my positionality, and the data analysis I adopted. I have further discussed the "phases" of fieldwork undertaken, as well as the challenges encountered while doing fieldwork and the strategies that were adopted to navigate these challenges. Although I have described the research process in a series of stages, I have at the same time attempted to emphasise its iterative nature.

In the following chapter, I introduce Matobo district as a case study by presenting some of its key ecological features, as well its history. It then traces the history of land reform in the district from Independence in 1980 to the present, highlighting how these key features have affected land reform processes in the district over this forty-year period, and ultimately, shaped processes of accumulation and differentiation.

CHAPTER 4: LAND, LIVESTOCK AND LIVELIHOODS IN MATOBO: ECOLOGY, HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS

The premise of this chapter is that history matters, and that to understand contemporary processes and outcomes of land reform in Matobo district, a historical perspective is useful. It provides important context and background on Matobo district. It begins with a general discussion of the ecology of Matobo and the climatic uncertainties that impact on farming in this region. The second section presents a general overview of the history of colonisation and land dispossession in Matobo. The final section traces the history of land reform from 1980 to present, and illustrates the impact ecology, longer-term histories of people and places (e.g. seasonal transhumance, colonial land alienation, conservation, contested post-Independence politics and *Gukurahundi*) has had on processes and outcomes of land reform in Matobo.

4.1 Ecology of Matobo

From an ecological point of view, Matobo district can be characterised as a non-equilibrium ecosystem (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). As already noted, Matobo is located in the drier south-western part of the country. Based on Zimbabwe's standard agro-ecological classification, the district sits in a semi-arid zone, which is classified as agro-ecological regions IV and V (Vincent & Thomas 1960). The semi-arid environment of this region makes it a distinct socio-ecological space compared to the better-watered regions in the 'High-veld'. This has particular implications for land use, land reform and patterns of accumulation.

The analysis of rainfall data from 1993 to 2017 period confirmed an annual precipitation of 548mm, with a coefficient variation (CV) of 40% for Kezi, suggesting a non-equilibrium environment. The precipitation pattern is characterised by a high degree of intra-seasonal and inter-seasonal variations (Dube 2008). The district is subject to frequent drought, low rainfalls and high variation in rainfall from year to year. Without a doubt, this is an environment which is dominated by climatic uncertainty and unpredictability. Here the probability of future events is unknown and sudden shocks (e.g., drought) can occur, which wipe out crops and livestock. As a consequence, it is not known for example whether herd owners will have adequate forage supplies for their animals next season. With regards to cropping, it is unknown if the household will produce enough grain to feed itself until the following season or not. Sudden events such as mid-season dry spells or floods are a common occurrence, which may destroy crops or forage

for livestock. In 2015-16 season, for instance, there was a mid-season drought which led to crop failure in the study sites, but did not severely affect livestock. In some cases, the region does occasionally receive excessive rainfall, leading to bumper harvest (*inala)* in some areas, although high rainfall might lead to waterlogging and ultimately crop failure in some areas. In 2016-17 season, for instance, there were excessive rains thanks to Cyclone Dineo; hence, a total annual rainfall of 1096mm was recorded (Zimbabwe Meteorological Services Department Unpublished data, Kezi). As a consequence, most farmers repeated a bumper harvest, although waterlogging destroyed crops in some areas. Severe drought can provoke high livestock mortalities, and it may take years to recover. Thus, uncertainties – related to drought, floods or diseases – can affect patterns of production and accumulation and must be central to any understanding of agrarian change in pastoralist settings.

4.2 Matobo in historical context to 1980

This section briefly discusses the history of Matobo, beginning with an overview of the precolonial Ndebele economy, followed by an outline of land dispossession in Matobo. Thereafter I address the complicated history of land reform in Matobo, concluding with a very brief discussion of the new agrarian structure following twenty years of land reform.

4.2.1 The pre-colonial Ndebele economy

Hundreds of years ago, the Ndebele-speaking people migrated northwards from Zululand (South Africa) into south-western Zimbabwe, where they settled and began practising a range of productive activities, including agriculture, livestock rearing, hunting, metal work and trade. A common view of the pre-colonial Ndebele sees them as aggressive raiders who fed off the Shona peoples and whose economy was primarily based on cattle. However, Cobbing has challenged this view, arguing that "the primary branch of production was cultivation and the main part of Ndebele diet was grain rather than beef" (ibid: 153-4). Beach (1982) suggests that the myth of Ndebele rest on actual occurrence, although frequency and form were exaggerated. Moreover, this popular image of conflict between the two groups obscures the Ndebele and some Shona people co-existed harmoniously and symbiotically in some places. In Gokwe to the north-western part of the country, for example, the Shangwe successfully produced tobacco, which they used to pay tribute to the Ndebele people; hence, relations between the two groups under King Lobengula's reign was considered "friendly" (Kosmin 1977: 272).

That the Ndebele were able to differentiate between different types of soils indicates that they paid as much attention to agriculture as their Shona counterparts in other parts of the country. They favoured light red soils called "*isibomvu*", while sand soils ("*tshebetshebe*") were avoided (Cobbing 1976). "*Ihlabati*", which are both light in texture and colour, and heavy black soils called "*isidaka*" were also utilised (ibid). The main grain crops grown were millets, sorghum, maize and rapoko, as well sweet potatoes, water melons, pumpkins, dry melons, beans and tobacco.

The unit of production was a "household" rather than a village or community (Cobbing 1974). Although the use of manure was common, the main form of cultivation was shifting cultivation. "A group of men be sent out during the winter to select the new site, which was then visited by the *isangoma* [traditional healer] who sprinkled the area with medicines" (ibid: 154). A household that had opened the land first would remain the owner of that land as long as it is in use. Both men and women worked in the fields during growing season. Work parties were conducted regularly to weed and to guard against birds. The crops were harvested between March and mid-July, of which "people practically lived in the field" during this period (ibid: 155). Given that fields were sometimes two or three miles away from "*imizi"* (homestead), makeshift shelter ("*amadumba*") were constructed at the fields, where women would take their cooking utensils and stay there with their children to ward off wild animals. After harvesting, the grain was placed on a framework called "*ingalane*" awaiting threshing. Threshing was mostly done by women, but those with large quantities of grain could also sought the services of boys and men, as well as drinking beer parties. Once threshed, the grain would then be stored in air-tight grain storage for several years.

The second most important pillar of production, argues Cobbing, was cattle-rearing. Cattle played a major role in their economy because they were an important form of social status and wealth. "In the higher social grades cattle passed as lobola [bridewealth], and the more cattle a man had the closer he could get to the chiefly and even royal lineages" (Cobbing 1974: 156). Equally, cattle were also important for various types of ceremonies, including marriage, birth and death ceremonies, as abodes of ancestral spirits and so on. Thus, cattle played a major role in "ceremonial fund" (cf. Bernstein 2010).[14] Furthermore, cattle also provided meat, milk, fat

[14] According to Bernstein (2010, pg.20), this "refers to the allocation of the products of labour to activities that create and recreate the cultures and social relations of farming….for example, rituals performed in

and manure to improve soil fertility, while their hides were used to make shields, skirts and whips. Moreover, cattle were also traded for grain, as well as guns and powder with Europeans. Cattle were also used to pay traditional healers ("*zangoma*") for their medical services. The view that the Ndebele people were aggressive raiders who fed off the Shona people as mentioned above has come under criticism by Cobbing who has argued that the raiding of the Shona people was an ecological adaptation strategy that enabled the Ndebele to "replenish or increase the national herd" (1974: 157). Cobbing has depicted this as a "cattle-imperialism". Essentially, there were two distinct types of cattle ownership: the "*izinkomo zamathanga*" ('private' cattle) and "*izinkomo zebutho*" ('regimental' cattle) or "*izinkomo wenkosi*" ('king's cattle') (Cobbing 1974). A false assumption that all the Ndebele cattle were communally owned, and therefore ultimately owned by the King justified the confiscation of the Ndebele cattle by the European settlers.

The livelihoods of the Ndebele also involved hunting, trade, gathering of wild fruits and raiding – the latter a splendid way of restocking after an epidemic (Cobbing 1976). "An epidemic could wipe out a man's cattle in a moment depriving him of much of his wealth, lobola payments etc." (ibid: 170). Cobbing's informants "related the frequency of raiding to cattle shortages. Thousands of cattle were lost during the lung-sickness of 1861-2, for example in spite of the strict quarantine placed by Mzilikazi on traders' oxen at Tati. The Ndebele war on the Ngwato in 1863 has been linked to this outbreak."

To cope with ecological uncertainty and high variability of the forage resource base, the Ndebele pursued an opportunistic grazing strategy based on an extensive form of seasonal transhumance called "*umlaga*" or its related verb "*ukulagisa*". While we know little about pre-colonial Ndebele grazing systems, there is considerable evidence that seasonal transhumance has been a key aspect of livestock production since the nineteenth century. Scoones and Wilson (1989: 109), among others (e.g., Nyathi 2014a, b), suggest that the historical roots of transhumance may run much deeper than among the southern Shona people. According to Pathisa Nyathi (2014a, b), a local autodidact historian, the Ndebele adopted the transhumance

preparation for cultivation and festivities after harvest. Other examples include celebrating rites of passage (e.g., birth, marriage), building home for a new household, and marking the death of a community member (e.g., wakes, funerals)".

practice from the Tswana/Sotho sub-group called the Babirwa who occupied the Shashe-Limpopo basin in the 19th century. Linguistic evidence confirms this hypothesis.

More recent archaeological studies agree that transhumance in the Limpopo-Shashe basin originated during the pre-colonial times (e.g., Smith 2006; Smith et al. 2010). According to Nyathi (2014a: 124), the word "*umlaga*" (transhumance) comes from a Sotho-Tswana term "*moraka*" (plural: *meraka*) meaning cattle post (see also Parsons 1977; Molosiwa 2016; Ndobochani 2020), while the locative (i.e., the place where the cattle post is located) is called "morakeng" (pl. *morakeng*). *Meraka* are often located far away from human settlement and agricultural fields; such places are called "*morakeng"*. The Ndebele indigenized both terms into "*umlaga*" and "*emlageni*". *Umlaga* refers to the movement of cattle from one place to another in search of pastures and water resources (Nyathi 2014a). The term *emlageni* refers to the location of the cattle post: these were often distant from human settlement and agricultural fields. From an environmental perspective, the practice allowed the Ndebele people to exploit environmental heterogeneity at the macro-scale.

Transhumance or movement between "sweetveld" in the dry season and "sourveld" during the wet season was a "form of quasiveld management whereby they were able to augment their cattle holding without destroying the grazing area of the heartland" (Cobbing 1976: 148). During the pre-colonial era, the Ndebele controlled and managed a considerable territory, including that of the Shona of southwestern Zimbabwe "through a series of rather enforced alliances" (Scoones & Wilson 1989: 103). In other words, access to pastures distant from the settlement was derived through enforced political allegiances. As Cobbing (1974: 169) points out, "Ndebele sensitivity about political allegiance of surrounding tribes sprang from the necessity to move cattle from summer to winter pastures on the outskirts of central settlement, usually between June and September." Cattle posts were usually "temporary establishments searching out good grass (*uhatshi*)" (ibid: 169). Winter grazing was carried out in present day Mberengwa, Gwanda, Plumtree and Tsholotsho districts (Cobbing 1974). These Ndebele-dominated lands were mainly managed as common property. "The cattle were accompanied by young men, who took grain prepared by their womenfolk to keep them through the winter" (ibid: 170).

Circumstances changed after 1893, when following the conquest, large tracts of land was set aside for European settlers. The extensive pastoral system of the Ndebele was constrained by colonisation and racial-segregation (Scoones 2021, 2022). Nevertheless, transhumance

persisted in dryland mixed farming systems. There are a number of examples of this practice in Matabeleland where herdowners responded to the spatial and temporal shortage of forage and water resources, moving stock from villages to distant places where forage and water resources would be more plentiful during the dry season. Such patterns of livestock mobility are contingent to local geographies.

4.2.2 The colonial period: Land alienation and its impact on African agriculture

In Matobo district, the process of land alienation and the establishment of white commercial agriculture was long and gradual, and not without resistance from the Africans who inhabited the land. Prior to the colonial period, much of the population in the district was concentrated in Matobo hills. Several different ethnic groups had settled in the hills, including the Banyubi, Kalanga and Ndebele (Hubbard et al. 2015). According to historian Terrence Ranger, "the fruits of the Matopos attracted cultivators and stock keepers as well as hunter-gatherers" (1999: 17). However, the first people that could be identified as farmers were the Banyubi, whose descendants remain in place to this day. They have settled in the Matopos hills for over four hundred years ago. These Banyubi were attracted to the hills because they provided the inhabitants with a wide range of wild fruits (e.g., marula (*mapfura*)), which provided a valuable supplement to their nutrition. Wild fruits were particularly important in drought years, when crop fails or when there was insufficient and food (ibid: 17).

The Banyubi relied on intensive crop cultivation and animal husbandry (Ranger 1999). The small springs of water (*sipiti*) in the hills provided good pastures, which allowed the Banyubi to keep large herds of cattle (Munjeri 1986, cited in Ranger 1999: 18). Intensive crop cultivation was confined to *vleis* and valleys. "Vleis farmers used bedding and ridging systems in order to retain moisture and prevent flow and gully erosion. This involved 'an enormous investment of labour' largely performed by young men. Control of wet lands and of the labour of young men was the basis of differentiation of wealth and power. Young men worked for their fathers-in-law rather than paying bride-price: elders demanded 'the manual labour rather than the goods of the intended husband who, has in most cases, to till the ground of his future father-in-law for years'" (ibid: 24). The use of these vleis and wetlands was controlled and regulated by the Mwali cult (High God). Based on the "Mwali rotation", cattle were allowed to graze on vleis during the dry months (May – July), whilst cultivation of crops such as green mealies, pumpkins, vegetables and rice would begin in August "when water begins to run from the rocks" (Ranger 1999: 24). During the rainy season, from November onwards, the vleis

become water-logged and dryland, rainfed cultivation therefore would commence on dry lands and the cattle would be moved to summer grazing areas. Not until the next August, after the harvest, that cattle would again be moved from the vleis to graze on cereal stalks in the dryland crop fields (ibid). Thus, this was a loose form of rotational grazing, of which, failure to observe these rules and regulations would result in culprits (individuals, households or communities) punished by the aggrieved spirits (Makuvaza 2008). In short, "there existed in the nineteenth-century Matopos", notes Ranger (1999: 25), "a vision of landscape and an ideology of land use".

After 1893 and immediately following the uprisings of 1896, waves of Ndebele *izinduna* (chiefs) and their followers moved from Matabeleland highveld (*Intaba ZikaMambo* and surrounding areas to the north of present-day Bulawayo) to Matopos Hills, "where they knew it would be difficult for the colonial regime to evict them" (Nyathi 2014: 14). Among the *izinduna* who infiltrated into the hills is Hole Masuku who was married to King Lobengula's favourite daughter Famona, and his descendants are still living in present day Natisa area (the serving chief of the area is the grandson of Hole). This movement of the *izinduna* and their followers into the hills was treated as a matter of high state security concern by Cecil Rhodes and white settlers (Ranger 1999). Put very simply, the movement brought a sense of unease and insecurity among the white settlers. The hills were seen as a "dangerous" place in need of pacification (Ranger 1999). To quell any further uprisings by the indunas, Cecil John Rhodes proposed a series of strategies since 1897. These include a proposition to resettle the Mfengu people from South Africa who were seen as reliable allies, persuading the Ndebele *izinduna* to come out of the hills into 'the open' and pacifying izinduna with meeting their grievances (ibid: 70). The M'fengu delegation was taken by the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland in 1898 toured see the hills and discuss the resettlement plan, but was "not enthusiastic either about the general terms offered or about the Matopos as a site of entrepreneurial agriculture" (Ranger 1999: 72). In the end, Cecil John Rhodes pacified the *izinduna* in the hills with a promise of security of land tenure if they come out of the hills into the "open", a promise that would fuel nationalist movements in the later decades.

After Rhodes' promise, "Mapani veld" to the south of the Hills saw a major influx of people and cattle. Prior to colonial conquest in 1893, this area was largely unoccupied, but was under the control of *induna* Faku. The area was primarily used for grazing and hunting by the Ndebele *izinduna* (Ranger 1999). This would change significantly, however, in the late nineteenth

century. With conquest and the advent of colonial rule some *izinduna* moved into the area following evictions from the then newly designated European farms in the north. *Induna* Hole was the first *induna* to move into Mapani veld in the late 1800, where he occupied what is now Lana farm (ibid). Besides Rhodes' promise of security of tenure, there were undoubtedly other push-pull factors for the observed movement. Movement into the area, largely from the hills, intensified in 1900 not only because of baboon menace and locusts but also because of access to more virgin and fertile soils for crop farming (ibid). Moreover, the growing missionary influence in the Hills, which denounced the Mwali cult, provided an additional incentive to move out of the hills into Mapani veld where they continued to rely on Mwali cult (Ranger 1999: 87). The movement was also an important strategy to escape forced labour and rent on white-owned land (ibid).

After the 1896 uprising, the inhabitants of the hills (mainly Banyubi) enjoyed a degree of prosperity as grain producers (Ranger 1999). "By 1899 the grain trade was in full swing in the hills" (ibid: 44). Surplus grain was marketed in distant places. By 1900, the Banyubi travelled in groups "for as many as 20 miles 'carrying baskets of maize, millet, pink mountain rice, groundnuts, sweet potatoes, and onions for sale at distant stores and mines'" (ibid: 44). Between 1901 and 1902, most grain was also sold to traders, especially white traders. Crop production was done by both men and women, mostly using a hoe, as they had lacked access to the plough. Thus, these were mainly petty commodity producers as they depended mainly on family labour. After 1902, problems began to emerge. First, disarmament exposed the Banyubi to the scourge of baboons. Second, the problem of land shortage for cultivation in the hills began to emerge (Ranger 1999). Disputes over fallowed or unused land also intensified. Although large tracts of land had been demarcated and allocated in Mapani veld, most white ranchers had not taken up their farms, hence the Banyubi were able to move into Mapani veld. Despite increased depredation caused by disarmament and competition over land, most Banyubi men were able to satisfy their cash needs through successful petty commodity production. Indeed, in 1906, the Native Commissioner of Matobo reported that the "Banyubi men greatly preferred to farm than to go out for work and that 'good wages do not compensate for the loss of produce in the fields'" (Ranger 1999: 44–45). Successful petty commodity production was premised "on a mixture of long-established methods and carefully judged innovation" (ibid: 45). Given that the Banyubi men did not pay *lobola* for their brides, the young men had to work for their fathers-in-law in exchange. The 'big men' held work parties (*amalima*) during harvesting time. Participants of *amalima* were offered beer and food.

After the death of Rhodes in 1902, some Ndebele *izinduna* and their followers who were once settled at Rhodes Matopos Estate to the north of Matopos Hills began to also make their way into Mapani veld following evictions by white settlers. For example, in 1904, one of the notables – Chief Nyangazonke and his followers – moved to Mapani veld and occupied what is now known as Dope farm (Ranger 1999). Similarly, Chief Maqina moved into Mapani veld and occupied what is now known as Kezi farm. However, the movement into Mapani veld provided no more than a temporary respite for these *izinduna* and their followers as forced evictions began to accelerate after 1913. In 1913, for example, chief Hole moved to the newly created Shashani reserve for African settlement, further south of Mapani veld.

A significant process of social differentiation and class formation, based on uneven cattle holdings, began to emerge. But who were the new cattle barons? Many were the Ndebele *izinduna* whose roots lay in "pockets of precolonial accumulation which had survived the upheavals of the previous decade" (Phimister 1988:72). As Phimister explains, "several chiefs, especially those who collaborated with whites, came through rinderpest and the Risings with 'a fair number of cattle'. In March 1898, the 'loyal Induna Faku', for example, had more than 200 cattle. Over the next two decades, these and the herds of other Ndebele notables grew rapidly through purchase and natural increase" (ibid: 72). Three *izinduna* – Nyangazonke, Hole and Maqina – owned a combined total of 10,000 cattle between them by the World War II (Phimister 1988: 72; Ranger 1999). According to Phimister, "it was not unknown for chiefs and wealthy commoners to sell up to 600 head at a time" (1988: 72). They sold cattle and send their children to South Africa to attain education (Ranger 1999). These *izinduna* monopolized grazing land in the reserves.

Until the 1930s, many white settlers, especially those of Afrikaans origins who occupied Mapani veld, were heavily under-capitalized and inefficient (Ranger 1999). They struggled to set up their farms. The constraints on production and capital accumulation were too many. The white settlers faced severe cattle loses due to severe drought, and grappled unsuccessfully to produce finished beef carcasses in such a marginal environment with an unpredictable climate. This was the case of one early settler named W. S. George, a Scotsman from Aberdeen who leased Holi farm in 1908. Over the next years, George struggled to set up a commercial farming operation (ibid: 132). "The land was boulder strewn and heavily covered with bush", Gorge complained in 1914, "as is the whole of the adjacent land" (cited in Ranger 1999:132). Between 1910 and 1914, there were three droughts that resulted in crop failure. He also lost forty herd

of cattle, while a further ninety was sold at a loss (ibid). In subsequent years, George experienced almost insurmountable difficulties in servicing his debt such that by 1932 he was seven years in debt. These challenges led George to remark to the secretary of Lands, that "for four years in order not to become hopelessly involved, I have been living on practically a kaffir standard" (cited in Ranger 1999: 133). The area's harsh and unpredictable climate made crop farming difficult. By contrast, livestock production was considered a much suitable land use; hence, the area was often portrayed as "cattle country" (ibid).

To respond to both environmental and financial challenges, the white settlers had to adopt specific strategies to make a living in such a harsh environment. These strategies included extracting rent from Africans living on their farms, as well as, illegal hunting and selling fire-arms to Africans. For example, F. J. Peel who owned Lana, Luma and Umfula farms (located in the same area as Holi farm) resorted to cattle trading and collecting rents from Africans living on their farms. For nearly four decades, many white settlers, especially of Afrikaans origins, failed or were badly crippled financially to continue farming in the area. As the Land Inspector, H. T. Wood put it, "they have no capital with which to farm. They refuse to pay their natives a fair wage. They continually break the game laws and some of their numbers have been convicted of selling arms to natives. Their standard of living is deplorable and the Government for the most part has to feed and educate their children" (quoted in Ranger 1999: 133). These settlers' inability to develop their farms and inefficiency of these farms undoubtedly drew a great deal of criticism from colonial officials. Despite this, these so-called "inefficient" farmers remained on the land. In 1949, the first National Park Ranger who was appointed to manage the natural resources of the area, J. H. Grobler, noted that:

> The farms adjoining the Park seem to be occupied by people who have been there for about 30 years and I cannot see any improvement that they have made to their farms. I don't know if they are not interested in farming or if they are disappointed with the part of the country. They have done no improvements. They have not even put a pig-sty down or a cattle kraal… Government should do something to improve their farming methods, otherwise it will be quite impossible to teach the Natives because they will just tell me what the next door farm is doing (J. H. Grobler cited in Ranger 1999: 133-4).

In sum, although lack of capital was an important constraint on white settler production, it was compounded by ecological uncertainties. Today, the new land reform beneficiaries have endured similar hardships. These new farmers – especially A2 farmers – have been accused of under-capitalisation and inefficient use of their new land, and just as in the late 1930s getting the farms going in a marginal environment with limited resources is proving exceptionally

difficult (Chapters Six and Ten). In addition, the land reform has led to an even greater fragmentation of the rangelands as large numbers of households had to be accommodated on these former white-owned farms. As a consequence, fragmentation has diminished the ecological carrying capacity of the farms in a context where forage availability is spatially and temporarily variable (cf. Behnke & Scoones 1993). The former white commercial farmers adapted seasonal transhumance through multiple farm ownership. They were also allowed periodic access in the National Park during times of drought, while Africans were not allowed (Ranger 1999). Prior to the 1930s, both African livestock farmers and white commercial ranchers were running large herds of "scrub" cattle, "which constantly clashed over grazing and water" (Ranger 1999: 134). Not surprisingly, disputes were often resolved in favour of white settlers.

Momentum towards alienation of land increased from the 1930s, in part, because of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The vast majority of these Africans had moved south into Shashani and Semokwe Reserves, while others returned to Matopos hills, which was by then declared as Rhodes Matopos National Park (Ranger 1999). Others moved east to Wenlock farm – what is now Wenlock communal areas in Gwanda district – where they were charged grazing rent. Chief Nzula (chief Hole's successor) and his people moved back to western part of Matopos hills, where some of their descendants still live today. "During the 1930s and 1940s the hills began to fill up again with people and stock. The Native Department itself settled families there in 1924 and 1934" (Ranger 1999: 135). During the same period, the movement of people evicted from the Rhodes-Matopos Estate (to the north) into the hills also accelerated. In the end, "[t]he great operation of bringing Africans out into the open and on the flat, which Rhodes had taken so seriously, was being reversed" (ibid: 135). By 1938, the eviction of Africans from Mapani veld was almost complete.

Furthermore, the creation of Rhodes Matobo National Park also impacted the livelihoods of Africans who lived in and around the hills. In 1926, the colonial government proclaimed 224,000 acres of land in order to create Rhodes Matobo National Park and a game reserve where some African agro-pastoralists would be allowed to remain, while others had to be evicted (Ranger 1999). Beginning in the early 1950s, Africans were forcibly removed in large numbers to make way for the park, a process which was completed in 1962. The evictees, who had offered a long and dangerous opposition to the colonial government, were forcefully moved to Prospect Ranch, which became Mbongolo Tribal Trust Land, in the dry southern part

of the district[15] (Ranger 1989b; 1999). Others made their way into the already overcrowded Shashani and Semukwe reserves (Ranger 1992).

4.2.3 Livestock movements after colonial period

The alienation of large tracts of land for European settlers and for protected areas, as well as the implementation of draconian land policies drastically changed the transhumant seasonal systems. Notwithstanding the impacts of land alienation for European use and conservation, seasonal transhumance persisted in one form or another and remained a key aspect of livestock production in Matabeleland. Prescott (1961), for example, suggests that the practice of transhumance in the native 'reserves' during the colonial period was driven by shortage of grazing land. He describes the seasonal transhumance in Nyamandlovu and Gwanda as follows:

> In the southern sector of Nyamandlovu SNA the Nata River floods during the period January to April before draining south-westwards to Bechuanaland. After the floods have subsided the majority of the cattle from northern Nyamandlovu are brought into the valley, for winter grazing, by a number of selected families. The cattle graze there until immediately before the onset of the first rains, when they are driven back to their home kraals so that the herders can prepare their farms. A similar system is also practised by people in Gwanda SNA "D", "E" and "F", who move their cattle into the recently flooded portions of the Shashani and Tuli valleys during winter (1961: 216).

"This system impressed the Natural Resources Board, Native Enquiry in 1942" (Scoones & Wilson 1989: 108). In some communal areas, this practice remains vital even today. One of the best descriptions of the seasonal transhumance practice in communal areas is Madzudzo and Hawkes' (1995, 1996) description of the system in Bulilimamagwe. During the rainy season (November to April), cattle are grazed near the villages because water and forage resources are plentiful. During the winter period (May to July), animals are grazed in crop fields to consume crop residues after harvest. Lastly, from August to October, animals are then moved to distant places where pastures and water will be still in abundance. At this time, herders live in temporary shelters (*imishasha*), which they will destroy at the end of the cycle.

In Matobo, African stock owners resorted to cut fences and poach-grazing their animals in white-owned ranches, especially during the drought periods. They complained that the reserves set aside for them were inadequate, and "overshadowed and hemmed in by farms owned by Europeans, who impounded their stock" (Ranger 1999: 134). Archival records are replete with

[15] In the 1940s, the Africans organised rural protest movements to resist evictions and conservation measures in the hills. The leaders of these movements were largely "progressive" Christians.

evidence of white ranchers nearest to communal areas complaining about cutting of farm fences, livestock trespassing and illegal grazing, particularly during times of drought when pastures dwindle in the adjoining reserves. These trends particularly intensified during the liberation war (1965-1980) and continued well into the post-Independence era. In response, the white ranchers adopted several strategies, including the infamous strategy of pounding and charging fines under Pounds and Trespasses Act. Other white ranchers saw little value in impounding of trespassing animals as such a strategy tended to jeopardize their relations with the neighbouring villagers. For instance, the farm manager Goodwin of Boomerang farm, highlighted in 1978: "We believe we have always had good neighbourly relations with the Tribal Trust Land and obviously wish to preserve these"[16]. Besides the effects of impounding system on the neighbourly relations, Goodwin also expressed reservations on the ineffectiveness of impounding as a deterrent to poach-grazing and livestock trespassing: "I recently impounded livestock from the Tribal Trust Land (after consulting the Police at Matopos) and things will improve for a short while. However, as has happened previously, we will again experience illegal grazing in the near future". After Independence in 1980, the Pounds and Trespasses Act was later repealed, but some white ranchers continued to adopt unpopular measures, such as shooting trespassing animals.

Poach-grazing continued unabated after Independence, especially during the 1991-1992, leading to tensions between white-commercial farmers and communal areas farmers around access to pastures. For instance, O.G Connolly gained notoriety for shooting trespassing animals. Even the DA complained of his response to poach-grazing during the 1991-1992 drought: "The reaction of commercial farmers [to the problem of poach-grazing], particularly O. Connolly has been rather harsh, which could easily sour relations between farmers and the local authority"[17]. Such brutality of these white farmers on their African neighbours were later used to justify land invasions in the early 2000s, as we shall see further below.

Not all white commercial farmers adopted hostile strategies, however. Others adopted more pragmatic and generous solutions such as, allowing communal areas livestock farmers to graze in their farms during drought periods, ostensibly to protect boundary fences. In 1980, for

[16] A letter from the Managing Director of Boomerang farm to the District Commissioner, 31 May 1978, File: BLG 15/7/6, National Archives of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo.

[17] Monthly report to the Provincial Administrator, 3 February 1992. File: Anonymous.

instance, J. A. Rossenfells of Vashu Ranching Company informed the then District Commissioner of the company's decision to allow "Africans from Semokwe Tribal Trust Land, in the Sontala area, to graze cattle in the border paddocks of that property. In return these people have agreed to clear the fence line and help re-erect the boundary fence with the Tribal Trust Land"[18]. Such informal arrangements, or "gentlemen's agreements", as they are colloquially known, influence current struggles over access to grazing land between the neighbouring communal areas people and the new beneficiaries after land reform. In the words of the lands officer in Matobo, "these gentlemen's agreements are very powerful. The new farmers are having big problems because of these agreements"[19]. As I will show in the next section, these arrangements are now consciously deployed by livestock farmers from communal areas to stark their claims over land.

4.3 Land reform in Matobo district

In order to fully understand emerging patterns of social differentiation and accumulation in resettlement areas in Matobo district, it is necessary to trace the history of land reform since Independence in 1980 to the present. The following account derives from rich archival materials[20], interviews I conducted with local government officials, community leaders and local farmers themselves, as well as focus group discussions around the district.

[18] A letter to the District Commissioner (Plumtree), 1 October 1980. National Archives of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo.

[19] Interview, 2016, Kezi.

[20] While some of these archival materials were found at the National Archives of Zimbabwe in Bulawayo, the bulk of the materials were obtained from files in local government offices (in Kezi and Maphisa). In most cases, such files were described as "hot files" (*ma-files anopisa*) by government officials, based on the premise that they contain "sensitive" information and are therefore not available to members of the public. I only managed to access these files through good relations with officials, and after promising them anonymity. This makes reporting of such data ethically problematic. In an attempt to protect the officials who gave me access to these sensitive files, the places where the files were found will be referenced here as "anonymous". Other archival material was held in private possession by individuals; hence this material is referred to as "material in private possession".

Table 4.1: Timeline overview of land reform in Matobo

1980 **Independence**	First phase of land reform in Matobo district. Due to shortages of grazing land in communal areas, livestock-oriented resettlement schemes were advocated
1981-1982	Around 64,035ha of white-owned land was acquired by government for resettlement but remained unoccupied because of a **stalemate between local state & central government** over type of resettlement scheme
1983-1987 **Gukurahundi**	Land reform serious hampered by **civil war (g*ukurahund*i**). Poach-grazing was rampant in these farms during this period
1987 **Unity Accord**	With the return of peace, high anticipation that the issue of land reform would be resolved
1988-1993	Still no active resettlement schemes because of the **stalemate** between the local and central state over what type of resettlement scheme to be implemented in the acquired farms.
1994	In the absence of agreement, land grabs of farms earmarked for resettlement by senior politicians and their relatives under the so-called "Tenant Farmer Scheme"
1995-1997	Implementation of "Model D" resettlement scheme began but reports of widespread vandalism, environmental degradation and theft of fencing materials emerged
1998	Second phase of land reform in Matobo district and Matabeleland South province is launched
1999 **Reorganisation of Three-tier farms** into different land-use type began	Local state officials note "under-utilisation", "vandalism" and "degradation" of Three-tier farms (formerly Model D schemes). Subdivision of Three-tier farms into "self-contained" plots and allocation to those with large herds or productive capacity to curb perceived "*under-utilisation*", "**vandalism" and "environmental degradation"**
2000 Land invasions and FTLRP	Land invasions started slowly.
2004 **Reorganisation of Three-tier farms** into different land-use type continued	Subdivision of the rest of Three-tier farms. Self-contained plots allocated to better-off herd owners

Source: Compiled by author

4.3.1 Land reform, seasonal transhumance and civil war, 1980s and 1990s

With the advent of Independence, the newly elected government pursued an ambitious land reform programme aimed to redress the racially-based land dispossession of the colonial era and a highly skewed ownership of land (Chapter One). As discussed in Chapter One, a variety of different 'resettlement models' were proposed in the early 1980s: 'Model A; 'Model B', and 'Model C'. Of these models, 'Model A' – a crop-livestock based model – dominated the resettlement landscape. However, the implementation of 'Model A' resettlement scheme was met with widespread resistance in Matabeleland. This led to the proposal of a livestock-oriented 'Model D' resettlement scheme, whose principles and assumptions are framed around 'commercial ranching'. Early scholars of land reform in Matabeleland indicated that this model was resisted, not least because it did not address the people's felt needs: additional grazing (Alexander 1991, 2006). The targeted beneficiaries argued that the agro-ecological conditions are best suited to extensive livestock production rather than crop production. The agro-ecology created a need for peculiar adjustment of land reform and settlement in Matabeleland. Thus, a livestock-oriented 'Model D' was proposed. The 'Model D' was first introduced and piloted in Gwaranyemba communal area in Gwanda district in 1984 (Robins 1994) and it was then extended to the rest of Matabeleland. Its aim was to provide additional grazing to the neighbouring communal areas. In other words, it involved the acquisition of commercial farms and their transfer, without subdivision, to residents of adjacent communal areas for use as additional grazing. In return, these adjacent communal areas were to be reorganised into a linear pattern of settlement locally referred to as 'ama*line*', although there was little support among the wider population for reorganisation of communal areas. In fact, the ethnographical studies of Model D schemes in Gwanda have suggested that there was less popular support of this model, in part, because it disrupted existing social systems (Robins 1994, 1998).

As with other parts of Matabeleland, Matobo had a complex history of early land reforms. As we shall see, the district did not benefit from the early 1980s land reform programmes until the 1990s (Ranger 1999). The problem of lacking of grazing was well recognised by local government officials in the district. Unsurprisingly, soon after Independence in 1980, local government officials urged the government to adopt land reforms that would address the shortage of grazing in communal areas. For instance, in 1981, the then acting District Commissioner of Matobo district, P. L. Butchart, argued that "there is an urgent need for

additional land … for additional grazing areas adjacent to all the communal lands, for the existing areas in many cases are virtually grazed out". [21] This was based on the premise that the people from the region "rely on almost solely on income from stock sales to survive". However, the new government did not heed calls by local government officials to implement a resettlement scheme that would expand grazing land. Rather, the land reform policy at this stage was biased towards Model A resettlement scheme, beneficiaries would be allocated an individual arable land and shared grazing in a village set-up.

Between 1980 and 1981, the government acquired all the farms in Sear/ Shashi block to the south of the district – bordering Botswana – totalling 64,035 hectares for redistribution in 1980 and 1981. However, these farms remained idle thanks to a stalemate between the central government and Matobo Rural District Council over a type of resettlement model to be implemented (Ranger 1999). The rural council wanted a resettlement that would address a shortage of grazing in communal areas to be implemented on those newly acquired farms.[22] Such a resettlement scheme was based on the long-standing Ndebele seasonal transhumance system, locally known as *ukulagisa* (Ranger 1999). Central to this system is the non-equilibrium dynamics of rangeland management (Behnke et al. 1993). On the other hand, the government opposed this demand on the grounds of class-based inequalities that surrounds cattle ownership (Ranger 1999: 280). Thus, "government was recommending that settlers who moved into Model D scheme should be restricted to 20 head" (ibid: 280).

Land reform was also seriously hampered by the civil war (*gukurahundi*) which lasted from 1983 to 1987. During this period, development projects – including land reform – were suspended because residents were accused of sympathizing with 'dissidents' (Ranger 1999). The civil war and the arrival of Fifth Brigade in the area also curtailed any possibility for participation and consultation of a suitable resettlement scheme (Alexander 1991). Due to drought in the same period, communal livestock keepers took the opportunity to graze their cattle in these vacant ranches, but the council was against this. Instead, they advocated for "controlled grazing", and 8 male workers were hired by council as "care takers" of these

[21] A letter from P. L. Butchart to the secretary of Local government and Housing, 3 November 1981. File: BLG15/1/15. NAZ (Bulawayo).

[22] Ibid.

farms.[23] Despite this, archival sources are replete with evidence that shows incidences of poach-grazing in these resettlement farms, as well as abandoned commercial farms (see Alexander 1991). Contrary to other parts of the country where cropping dominates, there were very few reports of squatting occupations on either these unoccupied resettlement farms or abandoned commercial farms, although there are few exceptions.[24]

When peace returned in Matobo, following the amnesty and Unity Accord of 1987, there was high anticipation that the question of land reform would be finally resolved. By 1989, a total of 23 commercial farms had been acquired for redistribution, including some farms in the *Mopani veld* on the southern fringes of Kumalo communal areas (Ranger 1999: 279). Despite this, there was still no resettlement scheme in the district at that time. "The stalemate was still in effect" (ibid: 280). In 1991, the then District Administrator expressed his frustration about the slow pace of resettlement:

> Could the issue of state farms be addressed seriously in 1991? Local authorities have requested that model D be tried in most of the state farms in Matobo but it would seem Agritex is still waiting for a Model that is recommended to its Head Office – Harare. The waiting business is delaying the aspirations of most people in the district. It would seem as if people in this district are refusing to utilise state purchased land yet the disagreement is what method is going to be used against the models that have been proposed by Agritex.[25]

At last, the implementation of 'Model D' scheme began in Matobo in mid-1994. The then DA lauded the government for coming up with "a programme which would assist the community to escape the vicious circle of poverty, through livestock production".[26]

But not all villagers saw Model D as the ideal resettlement model, however. Young people and urbanites without own homesteads were opposed to Model D resettlement scheme because they wanted the land to be used for human settlement rather than for grazing purposes, which

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[23] A letter from DA Ndlovu to Resettlement Officer, 25 April 1983. File: BLG15/1/15. NAZ, Bulawayo.

[24]One case of squatting was reported at Manyoni farm bordering Kumalo communal areas, which was abandoned during the liberation war. These squatters were later removed by the state. Another wave of illegal land occupations in Matobo was only reported later in 1996, when 200 households led by "Nqama Settlers Group" and the Affirmative Action Group occupied state land near Matopo Research station, which they argued had been underutilized since 1952.

[25] *ibid.*

[26] A letter from the DA to PA, December 1994: File: Anonymous.

would benefit the local petty bourgeoisie owning large herds of cattle. This view was summarised by the then DA as follows:

> There is the view mostly from *working class and youngsters* who feel the land could have been better used by resettling people, especially those with no homes of their own in the communal areas and more often than not, they do not own any livestock. This school made of mostly the urban elite believes this scheme will benefits the local based *petit bourgeoisie* who *invariably own more livestock* and have already well-established homes in the district at the expense of majority who are poor.
>
> The other view which is supported by the generality of the people is fully supportive of the scheme, as it offers the opportunity to increase their herd which was heavily decimated by the 1992 drought (emphasis added).[27]

Clearly, this view involved class and generational fault lines. The quotation above clearly shows that the targeted beneficiaries were conscious of class differences that existed in their societies, and the implementation of Model D would further exacerbate inequality and social differentiation within the communities. Nevertheless, the then DA was quick to dismiss this view, arguing that "the concerns of young generation as regards to need for land for human settlement" would be "far outweighed by the benefits likely to be derived from implementing" the Model D scheme.[28] Thus, this widely accepted claim of deriving benefits through livestock production obscures the issue of class dynamics. As one participant commented during a focus group discussion explained: "The problem is with differences in cattle ownership. Some owns sixteen, some two, others none. So, there is unfair use of pastures. We were never told how persons with 16 and 2 cattle were supposed to use and benefit from the three-tier farms."

Returning to the implementation of Model D scheme, the communities were provided with fencing materials by the government to fence and divide the farms into paddocks for proper management of livestock, in line with commercial ranching system. However, implementation process slowed down again by end of 1994, barely a year after its inception phase. The reasons for this were many. First, the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) – a government agency responsible for coordinating resettlement activities – was disbanded as part of the market-oriented economic reforms (ESAP). Second, the situation was "further aggravated by reported thefts of fencing materials by some members of the Development team." Some of

[27] A letter from DA to PA, 4 November 1994. File: Anonymous.

[28] ibid

these members of the so-called development team were later arrested and appeared in court, but the fencing materials were never recovered.

There was also allocation of farm homesteads to well-connected politicians, senior civil servants and military personnel through the so-called "Tenant Farmer Scheme" in 1994 by the central government (see Moyo 1995). This led to 'land grabs' of farms earmarked for resettlement by senior politicians and their relatives[29]. This Tenant Farmer Scheme received criticism from the local council, councillors and the district administrator. Allocation of these homesteads was officially done by the central government at provincial or Head offices, and took place without the knowledge of the DA, local council and the 'beneficiary' wards. Most of the beneficiaries allocated farm homesteads were senior politicians and civil servants "who otherwise would not be able to benefit from resettlement land in this district". A retired council official recalled, how politicians who had inside information on farms that were acquired at the time acted quickly to acquire farm homesteads: "During this time, white farmers were offering their farms to government. It was willing buyer, willing seller. So, most of these politicians would quickly know that such and such farms have been acquired. They will then quickly inform their friends".[30] For example, Pagati and Mampondweni farms were leased out to the then MP of Matobo, Vote Moyo and then Minister Thenjiwe Lesabe, respectively.

Given the general confusion that was created by the 'Tenant Farmer Scheme', some local white farmers even recommended that the farms such as Mampondweni and Wild East be leased out to them, a recommendation that was rejected. According to the then DA, "some of the leasees/ applicants these homesteads are just using this scheme as a ruse to gain rights to graze their livestock in the farms, which are earmarked for the communities" (ibid). He cited one applicant who "indicated that he is going in there for ranching as he intends moving a sizeable herd which cannot be accommodated in the "land within the vicinity of the homestead" as indicated in the application form. This development brings in a totally different dimension to the whole concept of the three-tier scheme, as was explained to the community at the launching of the model". The DA argued that a "clear-cut policy position on this matter is urgently needed. If it is government's intention to come up with a settler tenant scheme, let it be done openly, as this would create less problems for us who deal with the community" and that "the land issue is a

[29] Monthly report, 4 July 1995.

[30] Personal communication, 3 April 2020.

very touchy and politically loaded subject that needs to be handled with utmost care to avoid unpalatable consequences".[31] Indeed, this Tenant Scheme led to great suspicion by council officials and targeted communities alike of the central government's commitment towards land reform in the district. Councillors and other community leaders began to express their dissatisfaction with the scheme too, blaming politicians for not taking the interests of the local people into account.

Given that the land issue is emotive and political, government officials including the DA who were stationed in Matobo and involved in the implementation of Three-tier model at the time were also precariously positioned in this context. For instance, the DA complained: "To simple direct the D.A and staff to explain this development, is putting the concerned officers in an extremely insidious position". In a full council meeting held in August 1995, aimed to discuss this Tenant Scheme, councillors accused civil servants of "conniving with senior people in government to grab land from the communities."[32] During the same meeting, some councillors went as further as calling for "all senior civil servants in the district who are not sons of the area, should be removed as they do not have the development interest of the district at heart".[33] The DA further noted: "There is this mistaken belief that civil servants born in Matobo would care much would care much about the development of the area". Such perceptions are still harboured by many in present-day Matobo, especially with regards to the role of non-local civil servants in facilitating development in the district as we shall see below[34]. With most of the civil servants being from Mashonaland, such views are usually expressed along ethnic lines. Anti-Shona sentiment is a long-standing issue in Matabeleland (see McGregor 2002).

It seems that some of these problems were created by the ambiguous roles of the central and local state in the implementation of the Three-tier scheme. The central government mandated the RDC to manage the farms, but it never specified any specific regulations. This created

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Monthly report, September 1995.

[33] Monthly report, December 1995.

[34] During an informal conversation, a friend of mine who works as a senior government official in the district once told me how, at a community development meeting, the people who were in attendance ululated when government officials with "Ndebele surnames" were introduced, while the same people would remain quiet when officials with a "Shona surnames" were introduced. According to him, "this was a real sign that Ndebele people don't want us here".

tensions between the council and central government over control and use of these three-tier farms. According to the DA, the role of council in implementation of Model D resettlement was unclear, hence leading to challenges.

Some urban investors also begun to take matters into their own hands by moving their herds into the farms without permission from authorities. For example, in 1995, PFM, a successful local businessman at the time, moved his 120 head of cattle to Mampondweni farm, which was initially leased to Minister Thenjiwe Lesabe, "without consulting anyone".[35] Another livestock owner, Jeff Dube, from neighbouring area called Mawaza area in Gwanda who employed armed men on horses to look after his cattle, moved his large herd of cattle into Champion farm in Sear block, without seeking permission from the authorities.[36]

By end of 1995, there was widespread reports of illegal grazing, wildlife poaching, illegal wood cutting for sale and illegal gold panning in some of the farms. District Administrator reported in September 1996 that most of the three-tier farms were still "under-utilized", and this could be attributed to three factors: (a) the "lack of water resources and enabling infrastructure such as proper paddocks, dip tanks and watering tanks"; (b) "the dwindling numbers of livestock owned by communal areas farmers", and finally, (c) the unwillingness of "those who have a few cattle to move their livestock into the farms for fear of cattle rustlers".[37] "Due to the absence of *proper users* of these farms, the cutting of trees and breaking of fences and other illegal activities are being perpetrated by lawless members of the community."[38] Over the years, reports of vandalism of farm infrastructure and environmental degradation on these farms increased. Let us see how the local state attempted to redress this.

4.3.2 Second phase of land reform and Subdivision of Three-tier farms in the late 1990s

In September 1998, the 'second phase' of land reform and resettlement programme (LRRP II) in Matabeleland South province was launched at Manyoni farm in Matobo district by former President Robert Mugabe and the then leader of Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association (ZNLWVA), Chenjerayi 'Hitler' Hunzvi. By this time, the 'Model D' scheme had

[35] A letter from DA to PA, September 1995.

[36] A letter…. 'illegal occupation of Champion Ranch in Matobo District', 7 November 1996.

[37] A letter from the DA to PA, September 1996.

[38] Ibid.

been revised and later renamed as 'Three-tier' model. More farms were purchased by the government during this phase for the purpose of redistribution under this model in Matobo. As with Model D model, the Three-tier model was designed for the semi-arid regions of the country "where ranching is the only suitable form of land use in the absence of irrigation development" (GoZ, 1998). As its name suggests, the model consist of three-tiers: (a) "first-tier" consisting of a cluster of villages, arable land and social services; (b) "second-tier" – also known as the "near grazing area where each benefitting household keeps 5 livestock units (LUs) for day-to-day use" and lastly, (c) the acquired adjoining commercial farm used as pastures for "commercial purposes" serves as the "third-tier", perhaps the most fundamental (ibid). The objectives of the model were to: (a) "provide land for commercial grazing and thus increase communal herd" and (b) re-organise communal areas in line with the three-tier structure of the model" (GoZ 1998), that is "internal resettlement" or "villagization". However, villagization was never pursued in Matobo district because of lack of funding. The District Development Fund (DDF) and the DA's office again played a key role in the implementation process during this phase.

By the late 1990s, a total of thirty-one commercial farms, totalling some 122,448 hectares, had been acquired by the government for redistribution under the Three-tier/ Model D schemes in Matobo district. However, there was a general consensus among the local state officials that the Three-tier model had not been successful in meeting its stated objectives: promoting commercial cattle ranching amongst the communal areas livestock farmers. Official reports pointed time and time again that the farms were subject to "under-utilisation", "vandalism" and "environmental degradation". In response to these claims, the rural council resolved to subdivide the first three farms (Mampondweni, Wild East and Nsambani farms) on the eastern border, which were located farm from beneficiaries' homes, into individual "self-contained plots" for exclusive use in 1999. Prior to subdivision, Nsambani and Mampondweni farms were "illegally" grazed by neighbouring communal farmers from Wenlock and local businesspeople, respectively. The council officials deployed frontier imaginations of "under-utilization" as rationale to justify its decision to subdivide the three farms formerly held under common property to plots for individual use. According to the rural council, the farms "are more than 35km from the nearest villages hence not easily accessible for daily use"[39], leading to "rampant

[39] A letter from the CEO of Matobo RDC to the Provincial Chief Lands officer, "RE: Utilization of three tier grazing farms", 27 February 2012. File: Anonymous.

vandalism and theft of farm equipment".[40] With assistance from Agritex, a total of 50 individual plots (referred to as "self-contained" farms) were created out of the reorganised Three-tier farms. The recipients were to be issued with "99-year leases". From the Council's point of view, "the move while seeking to cultivate and promote commercial farming enterprise in our community and make for full utilization of every grazing patch in Council's vail, is seen also as going to go a long way in curbing destruction of the property – theft/vandalism of farm fencing and infrastructure being order of the day in the properties lying unused".[41]

In terms of land allocation process, Council resolved that 40 out of the 50 plots would be allocated to beneficiaries from all the nineteen communal areas wards in the district, meaning each ward was allocated two plots. These wards were then tasked with selecting two people from their respective wards who would occupy the new plots. The council laid down the criteria for eligibility for beneficiary selection: allocation was biased towards big herd owners. In line with the government's war veteran 20% quota system, the remaining 10 plots were handed over to the district war veteran association for allocation to its members. The selection criteria at ward level were as follows: all the villagers would meet, a handful of individual farmers would be nominated as beneficiaries, these individuals would then be voted for, thereafter two of these individuals who would have accrued many votes would be nominated as beneficiaries, and thereafter the individual's names would then be submitted to council (by councillors) for the final approval and allocation. As I will argue in Chapter 8, this selection process shaped dynamics of accumulation and differentiation in the self-contained scheme.

4.3.3 Continued reorganization and subdivision of Three-tier farms in the early 2000s

Calls to reorganise all the remaining Three-tier farms continued into the 2000s. In 2001, the rural council carried out an "evaluation exercise" of all Three-tier farms around the district. A document entitled, "An assessment report on the utilization of some three-tier resettlement scheme farms", dated July 2001, stated that main objective of this evaluation exercise was to find out "the extent [these] farms are being used by respective communities and to come up with proposals if any on how to fully utilize these farms for grazing purposes".[42] One of the

[40] A letter from the CEO of Matobo RDC to the District Lands Officer, 4 July 2014.

[41] A letter from E.O. Administration to the governor and resident minister S. J. Nkomo, 18 June 2001.

[42] Farm Manager "An assessment report on the utilization of some three-tier resettlement scheme farms", 26 July 2001. File: Anonymous.

key findings of this exercise was that these farms were "very much under-utilized", and there was "haphazard grazing", "random cutting down of trees" and "vandalism" of farm infrastructure. "All this", it was argued, "risked the farms being taken over by the Central Government and leaving the beneficiary wards without places to graze their cattle".[43] The evaluation report also identified the presence of individual large herdowners, mostly businesspeople (described as "emergent commercial farmers") "who now for the numbers of stock they hold qualify for commercial farmland holdings".[44] Some of these large herdowners described in this report owned more than 300 head of cattle. However, these farmers were still viewed as "squatters", who had no official permission to use the farms. It was also believed that the white commercial farmers were resisting the FTLRP by "highlighting the failure of people to fully utilize the farms acquired for earlier resettlement programmes".[45]

In light of these findings, the report recommended the reorganisation of these farms in order to ensure the "full utilization" of the farms through "proper" commercial ranching, and to halt vandalism and environmental degradation of the farms widely regarded as a "scarce commodity and a sound resource to the Council and the district at large".[46] This reorganisation involved the subdivision of Three-tier farms into individual parcel and the allocation of those plots to individual households for exclusive grazing purposes, known as "self-contained plots". Doing so was a complex endeavour and involved a series of steps, beginning with undertaking ward-level consultations. The local chiefs and headmen were tasked to lead the revitalisation process in their respective wards. In particular, councillors had to sought acceptance of subdivisions from communities. Indeed, some beneficiary wards questioned the idea of subdividing the farms into plots for exclusive use by selected individuals. In such cases. Councillors played a significant role in convincing skeptical villagers that subdivision was a measure to secure them against expropriation by the central government or outsiders.

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[43] A letter by the CEO of Matobo to the CEO of Gwanda RDC, 24 February 2010.

[44] A letter from Executive Officer for Administration at Matobo Rural District Council to the Governor and Resident Minister, S. J. Nkomo, 18 June 2001.

[45] A memorandum from the Chief Executive Officer of Matobo Rural District Council to Ministry of Lands, 2014.

[46] A letter from the Chief Executive Officer of Matobo Rural District Council to the Provincial Chief Lands Officer, Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, "RE: Utilization of Three-tier grazing farms". 27 February 2012.

The rural council laid down careful selection criteria for eligibility. It adopted strict requirements for settler applicants: allocation was biased towards households with "large herds of cattle" or with "productive capacity" to engage in "proper commercial ranching". However, the actual selection of settler applicants was carried out by beneficiary wards. Aside from big herd owners, Council also resolved that all local headmen and chiefs would to "be allocated land in their respective wards". In one farm, Devondale, a large proportion was allocated to a group of twenty businesswomen as a co-operative project. In sum, the council sought a particular class of livestock farmers for settlement on the newly created plots. As we shall see in the next chapters, these requirements ensured that settlers in the self-contained plots were better financed and resourced than those in A2 or A1 villagised schemes. The large-scale commercial ranching model dominated planning and thinking about the subdivisions of these farms (Cousins & Scoones 2010). Any other attempt to deviate from this Council's vision was discouraged. The hope was that the new settlers would move their stock from "the first and second-tier to the third-tier thereby opening up grazing in the first two tiers".[47] The new settlers were "forced to put up infrastructure as per the ideals of proper ranching".[48]

Wards held elections to determine who to allocate plots, and councillors would compile lists of settler applicants based on the results of the elections. These names would then be submitted to council for final allocation. In some cases, wards developed their own "constitutions", stating their expectations from settler applicants and the lengths of leasing contract. In Vulindlela ward, for example, a "constitution" was drafted by villagers, which stated that the new plot holders would occupy the farm for a period of 5 years only, and that they would sell heifers to the villagers within the ward.[49] In Dema ward, the constitution stated that the new settlers' "produce would be sold to us [villagers] first before moving to their respective markets".[50] The constitution also stated that the new settlers would also provide the ward with fencing materials to fence a portion of the farm that would be used by the villagers for grazing. In practice, however, these constitutions were never made official by the council.

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[47] A letter from the Chief Executive Officer of Matobo Rural District Council to the Chief Executive Officer of Gwanda Rural District Council, RE: "Use of Anthony, Sweet Grass farms and Shashi Block of farms (Champion, Nasby, Dube and Sidube)", 24 February 2010. File: Three-tier farms: Matobo Rural District Council.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Vulindlela ward minutes, 11 May 2009.

[50] Dema ward minutes,

Not all wards agreed to subdivide their three-tier farms, however. In some wards, villagers openly resisted subdivision of their farms or deployed "everyday forms of resistance" (Scott 1985). In Dzembe ward, for example, villagers openly rejected the idea of subdividing Champion farm into plots for individual use, arguing that they "want to enter Champion Ranch as one with no division [between] commercial and communal [livestock]". Despite the councillor's efforts, villagers countered Council's proposal by opting to re-fence and re-paddock the farm themselves. It was suggested that "each household and everyone with cattle dip will pay a total sum of ZW$105,000" in June 2004. This money was to be used to buy and transport fencing material. Similarly, in Beula ward, the community also rejected Council's calls to subdivide their farm into individual units. Instead, they "agreed to work tirelessly in erecting the boundary fences" of the farm. The community also resolved that each household would make financial contributions towards buying fencing materials based on cattle holdings. For example, households with 0 to 19 cattle were expected to pay ZW$10,000; 20 to 49 cattle were expected to contribute ZW$20,000 while those with over 50 cattle were expected to contribute ZW$50,000. In April 2004, the community announced that it had managed to procure 31 rolls of barbed wire and "quite a number of standards and droppers".

In Malaba ward, villagers responded to subdivisions with similar tactics. They vowed to refurbish their farm "that was made derelict by *povo*". As with other wards, households were expected to make financial contributions depending on the number of cattle they own to buy fencing material: those with 0 to 5 were expected to contribute ZW$200,000; those with 6 to 19 cattle were expected to pay ZW$300,000; 20 to 49 would pay ZW$400,000 and lastly, those with over 50 cattle were expected to pay ZW$500,000. It seems that these strategies were aimed to prevent council's strategy to subdivide the farms into plots for individual use. In the end, only four plots were created in Nasby East farm. Today, these farms continue to be used as open property regimes (cf. Moritz et al. 2013; Moritz 2016).

While obtaining accurate data is a challenge, an estimated total of 110 self-contained plots were carved out across 19 three-tier farms, with an average size of 335.8 hectares (min: 100; max: 1484 ha).[51] This subdivision has led to the expansion of medium-size farming sector in the district. The new settlers are not allowed to construct permanent structures, especially houses,

[51] These figures are based on my own calculations from various Council reports. Also, note that these figures do not include the 50 plots at Mampondweni, Wild East and Nsambani farms.

because they are widely regarded as "care-takers" who are "only looking after the farms" on behalf of the beneficiary communities.[52] If a beneficiary leaves the allotted plot unoccupied or lying idle for a long period, the land reverts to the originating ward and can be reallocated to another settler, of which the process of land allocation outlined above is followed.

4.3.4 Land invasions and the FTLRP in the early 2000s

The land invasions and occupations

In February 2000, land invasions and occupations, led by war veterans and others, began in Matobo district. Initially, land invaders targeted white farmers who were renowned for their harshness and bad relations with neighbouring communal areas. PC was one of the white farmers renowned for his harshness and toughness. Thus, occupations and invasions started at his three farms, namely Woodlands, Vergenoeg and Dope farms. The logic of starting at his farm, according to one war veteran and leader of occupation, was simple: "Since he was the harshest in the district, we decided to start with him because we knew that this would frighten all white farmers thereby making our task easier". One of the remaining white commercial farmers I interviewed admitted: "You can't even talk to him. He can't even talk to a black man. He is a kind of white person who gave everybody [white farmers] a bad name. He is mad!". In addition, there were also reports of mistreatment of his farmworkers. In Woodlands, the occupiers camped on big rock outcrop on the western part of the farm. The early occupiers told me how he used to come and fire gunshots on the water tank, close to where the occupiers were camping as a strategy to scare them off (Figure 1). In sum, the conduct of the white farmers in relation to their contact with communal areas played a large part in which farms were targeted. These findings echo results from research conducted elsewhere in Mashonaland (Bhatasara & Helliker 2018; Helliker & Bhatasara 2018).

[52] Interview with Council officials, 2016-2017.

***Figure 4.1:** A tank with bullet holes fired by white farmer PC to intimidate land occupiers in Woodlands*

While most of the invaders came from nearby communal areas and towns, occupiers at Woodlands farm were largely farmworkers from Matopos Research Station, numbering around thirteen families. Of these ten families gave up and left due to lack of water and continuous intimidation by the former white owner (which continued for many years until the white farmer finally gave up the fight in 2013). These settlers were then replaced with settlers from Kezi, town and other nearby places. Similarly, Vimbi farm was initially occupied by people from Halale village in Kumalo west. However, many occupiers gave up because of water challenges, and a second group of occupiers arrived from Natisa area. The vast majority of land occupiers were men.

In some instances, land occupiers were supported by the state security forces, who acted as "negotiators" between the landowners and the occupiers. In general, land occupations went relatively peaceful and were less confrontational as compared to other parts of the country, with few exceptions. Violence erupted in Sibuntule farm after the white farmer and the occupiers failed to "co-exist". The occupiers forced the white farmer and his workers to vacate the farm. Following the violent clash, he vacated the farm, and too many of his cattle and wildlife succumbed to starvation. Prior to land occupations, the white farmer owned three farms (Sibuntuli, Holi and Betseba Estate), which were under game (Sibuntuli) and livestock. At the time of the land occupations, the farmer owned 232 and 136 cattle at Sibuntuli and Holi farms, respectively. Most of these cattle "disappeared", and the white farmer later succumbed to stress and died in the following months. It is alleged that some war veterans took the cattle for themselves, which then formed the basis for current accumulation. As in other parts of the country, the period of *jambanja* was very short-lived as the government took control of the

land reform by regularizing the occupations. This became known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).

The FTLRP

In July 2000, the land occupations were officially regularized and became known as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). Most farms that were initially occupied by invaders during the land occupations were formalised to become A1 schemes. The District Land Committee (DLC), comprising of government officials, war veterans, security agents, ZANU-PF members and traditional leaders (i.e., chiefs), was formed. Agritex team was dispatched to survey and peg plots. Official pegging and allocation of A1 'villagized' plots were based on the notion of 'carrying capacity'. Initially, each household was allocated 100 hectares, consisting of 0.49 hectares for residential 'stand', five hectares of arable land and the remaining hectares were allocated as communal grazing.[53] But, as demand for land continues to grow, the size of communally-owned grazing was later reduced by half to 50 hectares per household. Of important note is that, unlike other parts of the country, no A1 "self-contained" plots were pegged in the district during the FTLRP.

Initially, there was a low uptake of land in A1 sites. People were reluctant to take up land in the A1 schemes, in part, because some wanted a land reform model that would address shortage of grazing, as was the case with previous land reform policies (see Alexander 1991). A further rationale sometimes advanced for communal areas farmers' reluctance to access land in the new resettlement is opposition politics. It was often suggested to me by those who settled in the resettlement areas that most communal areas were strongholds of MDC during the early 2000s, hence people were anti-land reform. As one war veteran who was the district chairman of war veterans' association and leader of the occupations put it, "people thought land reform was a political gimmick, but they are now regretting. Some are even buying land, making the government officials corrupt." Another war veteran who also participated in the early land occupations also said that "land occupations coincided with the rise of MDC to prominence in this area. So, a lot of people were affected by politics but they are now regretting. They thought this was a political move. They thought the fast track was just a campaign".[54] Yet a senior CIO

[53] Given that the area lies in agro-ecological region IV and V, this was based on the fact that one LU requires between 10 and 12 hectares of grazing per year.

[54] Interview with StD, 16 August 2017, Luma

official and war veteran who worked in the district during the *jambanja* period said "people were scared that they will be arrested if they get into the farms".[55] For others, taking the leap into the unknown was not ideal, especially with resettlement areas riddled by several challenges as lack of access to drinking water and, in some cases, harassment and intimidation by the former white owners. Resettling thus entailed a level of risk that most local people were unwilling to take.

In response to this low uptake during the early years of FTLRP, senior security services officials in the district played a key role in encouraging the local people to take up new land. As one senior CIO officer explained:

> People were scared to get into the farms. So, I had to approach influential local guys like BT and ET (senior officials in the army) to help. We were the first people to get into the farms here. I didn't want a farm in Matabeleland. I wanted to get a farm in Mashonaland (where he is originally from), not here. I got a farm here in order to set an example to local people – that they won't be arrested if they occupy farms. We were so much under pressure from the Head Office in Harare. We were constantly asked if the programme was going well.

However, "initially there was great suspicion between civil servants and war vets. The war vets were not convinced that the civil servants had the resettlement programmes at heart at its inception – however with time these suspicions have been reduced to a minimum".[56] Civil servants were cast as MDC supporters with no commitment to land reform (McGregor 2002). According to occupation leader at the time, "civil servants were not interested because they were MDC supporters. They have now started to see the light."[57] In 2000, the then Provincial Administrator of Matabeleland South province fled from her office in Gwanda because war veterans were threatening "to beat her up" for "not favouring ZANU-PF supporters when allocating land"[58]. In fact, the situation was so bad that she later left the country and sought refuge in the UK (see also Alexander 2007).[59] In Matobo district, a total of twenty-three civil servants from several government departments, including three senior officials of Matobo

[55] Interview with BM, Natisa farm, 10/03/2018.

[56] End of year report by the then DA, undated.

[57] Interview with JC, 25 July 2017, Kezi.

[58] Financial Gazette, 21 September 2000. 'Nkomo recalls Dube".

[59] I met her at the BZS in 2016, and managed to briefly discuss some of her experiences at the time.

Rural District Council, were suspended by war veterans for "allegedly frustrating the government's land reform programmes".[60]

While there was there was low interest in land during the early years of the FTLRP, it appears that there was a sudden surge in interest in land in the A1 schemes from 2008 onwards. By 2017, there were 901 registered A1 farming households in the district and nearly 650 A1 informal households.[61] As will be shown in the next chapter, the overwhelming majority of A1 settlers came from nearby communal areas and cities.

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In 2002, the demarcation and allocation of medium-scale A2 farms also began, parallel with the reorganisation of three-tier farms, in Matobo district. Unlike the A1 farms, these farms were not established through invasions and occupations and the subsequent formalisation, but through a process of legal land acquisition and allocation under the Land Acquisition Act of 2000. By mid-2000, most of these farms were still occupied by former landowners. Thus, a legal procedure of land acquisition and allocation in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act of 2000, had to be followed in order to acquire them. In theory, to paraphrase this legal procedure, the landowner is first issued with a Section 5 notice of acquisition. Once issued with the Section 5, the landowner was given a chance to contest the notice within 30 days. If the landowner opposes this notice of acquisition, the case would then be referred to the Administrative Court for final decision. In cases where the notice was not contested, the landowner would then be issued Section 8 Order of eviction. However, in practice, some researchers have shown that this legal procedure was complex and cumbersome to execute (Chamunogwa 2019). In my own study, there was one case of illegal land acquisition of a white-owned commercial farm, involving a well politically-connected woman, as shall be discussed further below.

The DLC used several factors as justification for appropriation, ranging from "poor co-existence" with new farmers, to land ceilings, through to "multiple farm ownership". [62] For

[60] Financial Gazette, 11 July 2002. 'Zimbabwe: War veterans seize Council offices'. https://allafrica.com/stories/200207110045.html

[61] Official statistics obtained from the Ministry of Lands in Kezi, while figures on informal settlers was collated from different sources.

[62] Letter from the DLC chairperson to the Provincial Land Committee, 09 October 2002, File: Anonymous.

those white farmers with multiple properties, the rule of thumb was that they be allowed to retain only one property but "downsizing" would apply if the farm size did not conform to "maximum farm size" regulations. In addition, other factors such as the ability of the farmer to "co-exist" with new settlers and long-term relations with adjacent communal areas, were also vital. As noted by the National Task Force, "The committee [DLC] was advised that if co-existence is not prevailing then they can take the whole remaining property. They were also reminded that the minimum farm size can be zero".[63] Indeed, some white farmers' "attitude" and inability to "co-exist" with their new neighbours proved decisive in the DLC's decision to gazette all their properties, as we shall further below.

In response to FTLRP, former white farmers employed a range of strategies to maintain hold of their land with varying degrees of success. Nel (2020) distinguishes between several different types of strategies employed by white farmers. These range from "pushing back" against land reform, "dropping out", "adapting" and "accommodating". My findings support Nel's (2020) observations, but goes beyond to examine the impacts of some of these strategies to A2 production and farm development, especially those who resisted land reform. Resistance took several forms. In some, it involved resisting eviction orders in court. This dragged for many years, with some farmers only giving up the fight after the 2013 elections. As a result, a significant number of A2 farmers experienced a delay of up to 10 years in taking occupation of their farms.

One of the white farmers who overtly resisted eviction is PC mentioned above. Prior to the FTLRP, the Cloete family owned four contiguous farms – Buluma, Vergenoeg, Woodlands and Dope farms – totalling 6,929 hectares. With the invasions and formalization of the early 2000s, three of these farms (Vergenoeg, Woodlands and Dope) were invaded and were formalized to became A1 villagised schemes, leaving the family with only Buluma farm (1,537 hectares in extent). Despite the formalization of these farms as A1 schemes, PC continued to harass and intimidate the new A1 settlers. One A1 farmer in Woodlands recalls the conflict with the white farmer: "People would hide in their houses when they hear the sound of his car approaching. People were too afraid of him. If our cattle trespasses into his paddock he would load them in a trailer and dump them far away. I had a very nice bull at the time, but he castrated it when it trespassed into his farm".

[63] Minutes of meeting: General Land Committee, 3 October 2002. File: Anonymous.

Archival records are replete with complaints about how he would harass A1 villagers while fetching water and firewood, shoots the A1 settlers' dogs, accused them of poaching, take away poles which villagers had cut to fence up their homesteads and fields, and destroying their makeshift houses. These on-going intimidations and harassments of A1 settlers by the farmer, therefore, created a turn-over of settlers. Due to the continuing reports of intimidation and harassment, "the committee [DLC] felt Cloete was terrorizing" and, therefore, recommended that his remaining farm (Buluma) be gazetted and served with Section 8 Order in 2002. As noted in the DLC minutes of October 2002, "The only farm [Buluma] left for him is to be gazetted and pegged for A2 resettlement. The farmer has been very arrogant and disrupting people next to Buluma. The committee has agreed that [PC] be removed completely from the district and be allocated land elsewhere. This person has proved to be unable to co-exist with the local community. The farm is 1537 ha and will be pegged for medium scale."[64] The farm was designated as an A2 scheme and three plots were carved out. However, despite having being served with Section 8 Order, the white farmer stayed on the farm. The then DA wrote in October 2002 stated that, "[PC] is resistant and will not comply with Section 8 served on him. The Land Committee feels that this farmer should be disarmed".[65] Despite the DLC's efforts to evict him, PC would go on to stay put at Buluma farm until 2012, towards the run-up to the 2013 elections. Although these three A2 beneficiaries were allocated land in 2002, it was not until 2013, that they were able to occupy their allocated farms. This meant that, for approximately 10 years, these farmers were unable to invest on their plots.

Similarly, RdP, another white farmer, owned two contiguous farms (Toko North and Bon Accord) prior to the FTLRP. His farms were not invaded and occupied during the invasions. In 2002, however, he was issued Section 8 Order of eviction on one of his properties: Toko North. The DLC cited "poor co-existence" as a reason for acquisition of the property. The farm was then pegged and subsequently subdivided into four A2 plots, which were then allocated to their beneficiaries. In 2002, when one beneficiary attempted to take occupation of his plot, RdP forcefully droves out the beneficiary's cattle and workers out of the farm, arguing that he was "the legal owner and has tittle deeds".[66] In 2007, because of this ongoing resistance, the farmer was then issued with another Section 8 Order for his remaining farm, Bon Accord farm. Despite

[64] Minutes of emergency land committee, 16 October 2002. File: Anonymous.

[65] A letter to the Provincial Administrator, October 2002.

[66] Ibid.

this, he remained put on the two properties until his death in 2012, after which his family finally vacated the farm.

These white farmers denied new A2 settlers physical access to land that had already been allocated to them. Thus, all the A2 beneficiaries who were allocated plots at these two farms experienced delays in occupying their farms. While this study will not go into a detailed analysis of these strategies, with reference to A2 schemes, a cursory conclusion is that such delays stymied both production and farm development.

Not all farmers adopted militaristic forms of resistance, however. Rather, some were cautious about how they positioned themselves, in most cases, forming alliances with local chiefs and villagers from adjacent communal areas, often rooted in long-term good relations, to prevent their land from being acquired. PeC of Maleme Ranch is one case in point. Prior to the FTLRP, the farmer owned only one farm – Maleme ranch – which was 2,588 hectares in extent. The family had very good relations with villagers from nearby Khumalo communal areas. In 2002, the farm was listed for acquisition and designated as an A2 scheme. However, the local chief (Chief Masuku) and his followers were against acquisition of the farm. During a meeting with the DLC in January 2003, Chief Masuku and his followers argued that the white farmer was "co-operative" (assists villagers during funerals by ferrying firewood using his own transport); created employment for locals; assist in development of the local school (Nduna primary); takes care of orphans and send them to school and assist the local church.[67] They also argued that the white owner allows herd owners to graze their cattle in his farm during drought periods. At a higher level, some prominent politicians such as vice president Joseph Msika strongly opposed the appropriation of Anglesea and Maleme farms. He issued a verbal directive to the DLC, instructing them to delay the allocation of Anglesea and Maleme allocation, a directive which did not sit well with some DLC members.[68] Such a "message", they argued, "should have come as a written circular instead of verbally".[69] The Vice President argued against acquisition of the farm on the grounds that it would disrupt ostrich egg production both on the farm and out-grower scheme with adjacent Khumalo communal areas. Despite all this, the DLC recommended that the farm should be gazetted and a portion be pegged into A2 plots in order

[67] Minutes of meeting, 27 February 2003.

[68] Minutes of land meeting, 23 January 2003.

[69] Ibid.

to comply with maximum farm regulations, while the farmer would retain 1,000 hectares. Indeed, three A2 farms were carved out and allocated to three beneficiaries who were all part of the DLC at the time, while the white farmer was left with 1000 hectares to this day. Although these three beneficiaries received "offer letters" as far back as 2002, it was not until 2012 that they were able to occupy their farms because some "big guns" also targeted the farm.[70] JC, a war veteran, leader of occupations and district chairman of war veterans association in the early 2000s, was one of those beneficiaries who could not access his plot. He gave the following account:

> I struggled to get this farm. The government officials wanted to divert the farm to another guy we did not know. We found that my name was even there in the old minutes but this guy's name was not there. I ended up enlisting the services of a lawyer and the lawyer threatened them [civil servants] with corruption charges. So, I used a lot of money to get this farm. I only managed to occupy the farm in 2012.

In 2015, a senior official from the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in Kezi was allocated the remaining part of the farm (1000ha), which was initially left to the white farmer. This prompted open resistance from the local chiefs, community leaders and villagers from Khumalo communal areas, forcing the security agent to withdraw following intervention by vice president Mphoko at the time. These contestations, to which I will return below, are still-ongoing to this day (Chapter Seven).

Other ranchers used race to prevent their farms from acquisition. For instance, the MO family of Natisa farm – of mixed-race origins – saw their holdings reduced from 2,070 hectares to 1,070 hectares after part of the farm was designated into three A2 plots of 500 hectares each in 2002. Because of a relatively perennial river running through the farm, these plots were occupied by well-connected party-state elites, who chose good land for themselves.

In most instances, the allocation of A2 farms followed a bureaucratic procedure. Applicants for A2 farms needed to submit a business plan, five-year cash flow projection and proof agricultural training. In the early 2000s, the initial application was made to the Agritex offices because the district had no lands officer at the time. The applicants were then interviewed by Agritex officials and the application would then be evaluated by a "scoring system". The names of those with high scores would then be submitted to the DLC chaired by the DA for the final selection, before being passed to the Provincial Lands Committee (PLC) for final

[70] Interview with three beneficiaries, 2017/8.

recommendation, which in turn forward the application to the Ministry of Lands head offices in Harare for generation of "offer letter". In most cases, the PLC would then "rubber stamp" the DLC recommendations.[71] Despite this technocratic procedure, some A2 farmers received land through political connections or war veteran status, especially from 2010 onwards.

The new waves of eviction and A1 subdivisions in the 2010s to the present

In recent years, there has been a growing number of 'land grabs' by powerful figures, particularly during election times. This period saw the eviction of several remaining white farmers who were initially recommended to remain, in most cases, to pave way for the politically-connected elites or resettle more people to gain votes (see also Scoones et al. 2010, 35 for 2008 elections). The Emmett family of Woollendale East of East Farm Of (colloquially known as Fox farm), for example, was one of the white farmers who was initially recommended to stay by the DLC, but saw their farm invaded by a group of some twenty people, led by war veterans, in June 2008. Because of its proximity to Bulawayo, these invaders were largely from Bulawayo. Determined to remain on the farm, the white farmer brokered a deal with a group of war veterans to create 101 A1 villagized plots, which would serve to help the white farmer protect his property from the wider group of potential invaders with the selected group acting as a "buffer zone" between the two.[72] Each household was set to receive two hectares of land for arable cropping, along the edges of the farm. With the 101 households settled around the edges of the farm, the white farmer believed that he had at last found "security" and he would remain on the farm. But the arrangement was short-lived and soon "back fired", as one government official put it. War veterans began to settle more people on the farm, thereby gradually pushing the farmer out of the farm. In 2008, the DLC attempted to have the illegal settlers evicted, but failed because of politics: "We were told to stop because it was election time", one senior government official told me.[73] In 2009, the white farmer was found dead at his farm under very controversial circumstances. It is allegedly that he was killed by the war veterans. Since then, the Jealous Dube, the war veteran, has been resettling people in return for money and cash. In 2018, when I finished my field work, the farm had 301 "illegal" settlers. This farm has since become a hotbed of disputes over authority and legitimacy.

[71] Interview with a senior government official, 2017.

[72] A letter from R. A. Emmett "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN", 21 October 2008.

[73] Interview with government official, Anonymous. 2016.

Other ranchers, like the Emmett family, who were initially recommended to retain their holdings, saw their remaining holdings acquired to make way for politically-connected elites in the years leading up to the 2013 elections or afterwards. For instance, the Crawford family, despite losing four contiguous farms (Victory I, II, II and Remainder) through invasion and later designated as A1 schemes during FTLRP, initially managed to hold on to the 1,968 hectares of Sala Lot 1 (1069ha) and Sala Remainder (899ha) on the basis that the farms were primarily used for wildlife ranching. However, "due to politics"[74], in 2014, the family was issued with section 8 Order and the farms were designated as A2 farms. Two A2 plots were carved out at Sala Remainder, while Sala Lot 1 was allocated as a whole to the current ZANU-PF MP of Matobo South constituency. The two other A2 plots that were created in Sala Remainder were allocated to a war veteran who works as a lecturer at Esigodini agricultural college, while the other plot was allocated to a local businesswoman from Kezi. However, the white farmer went to court to challenge the acquisition order on the basis of legal "technicalities". In addition, the white farmer also enjoys a wide backing from the local chiefs and nearby A1 settlers.

Similarly, in 2015, the owner of Maleme farm (above) was issued with an eviction notice to make way for a senior CIO official. This, however, sparked massive protests by the local people who are benefitting from the white farmer's contract broiler project, local chiefs, activists and opposition parties. "Maleme Ranch No!", "Maleme Ranch our heritage. Respect it", "Respect our asset", "We want development. Maleme is our asset. Yes": so, stated the graffiti on rocks along the dirt road leading to Maleme Ranch. It provoked the memories of *Sofasihamba* and *Sofasonke* movements of the colonial times, against evictions in and around Matopos Rhodes National Park. Twelve men were arrested during the protest and spent one night in prison in Kezi. To quell the protests, the then Vice President, Phekezela Mpoko, intervened and ordered the senior CIO officer to vacate the farm and be allocated farm elsewhere. The white farmer was then issued with an "offer letter" by the Ministry of Lands in 2016, although the CIO agent is still determined to take over the farm. Further north from my focused case study sites, the owner of Mhlahlandlela of mineral King was evicted to make way for the then serving MP of Matobo North constituency, Never Khanye. However, the white owner approached the courts and Never Khanye lost the case due to "legal technicalities".

[74] Interview with anonymous senior official, February 2018.

Other ranchers who were initially "recommended to stay", however, were not so fortunate. BE of Vreigevicht South (now Lookout Masuku), was initially recommended to retain 500 hectares, with the remaining 801 hectares having been occupied by twenty-four A1 households in 2002. However, in 2010, the BE saw his remaining 500 hectares gazetted as an A2 plot and allocated to the High Court judge of Bulawayo. This did not augur well with the A1 villagers, who derived a lot of benefits from the white farmer. The decision forced the A1 villagers to petition the DLC for redress the situation. "Madam [District Administrator], it was you who told us to co-exist and work harmoniously with Mr [BE]", protested the A1 settlers in 2011. "For the past 8 years he has done a sterling job, assisting us with whatever problem has faced us. Our cattle grazed peacefully together with no boundary. He has donated food and funds for many national events such as Independence Day celebrations. He has provided a tonne truck as transport, paid school fees for our children when there were tough times. Assisted with water and free transportation to town when required it, and is an assert to this farm. Why then did you ask us to co-exist?".[75] For the A1 villagers, the eviction of the white farmer represented a reorganization of the landscape that had consequence for the way they graze their animals. "Mr [CD] has now introduced boundaries and his workers instruct us not to graze our cattle south of the dam or mix with his. In particular, he does not want our Bulls to mix with his".[76] They also complained that he had another farm in Umguza district. Despite these protests from A1 villagers, the Enslin family was evicted and the judge stayed put on the farm.

Similarly, despite the DL family of Mapani Poort being initially recommended to retain its holdings, the farm (1,080ha) was later acquired to make way for the proportional representative Member of Parliament (MP) of Matabeleland South province. According to the then Minister of Lands Douglas Mombeshora the legal proceedings leading to the acquisition of the farm was not adhered to (*Southern Eye*, 2014). Despite controversy surrounding the acquisition, two A2 farms were carved out and the largest plot (800ha) was allocated to the MP while the small plot (281ha) was allocated to a senior district official at the Ministry of Lands.[77] In a last-ditch attempt to save his land, it is rumoured that the DL paid a bribe of up to US$7,000 to two senior

[75] A petition by the villagers of Vreigevicht South to the District Adminstrator, RE: "Petition against Maphios Cheda", 3 January 2011. File name: Anonymous.

[76] Ibid.

[77] See https://www.southerneye.co.zw/2014/09/19/matobo-farm-allocation-procedural-minister/. According to the then Minister of Lands, the acquisition of the farm was "not procedural".

government officials from Harare and Gwanda, but to no avail. Unfortunately, he later succumbed to stress and passed away in 2015.

Due to increasing demand for A2 land to settle the politically connected elites, some A2 plots were carved out in farms that were initially designed as A1 villagised schemes. A total of five farms now incorporates both A1 and A2 schemes. In Luma, for example, three A2 farms were carved out and allocated to a local chief, member of ZANU-PF Central Committee and a retired senior army official in 2012. However, a dispute ensued between the A1 settlers and the new A2 beneficiaries, prompting two new beneficiaries to withdraw. In Vimbi A1 scheme, 800 hectares of land to the eastern side was demarcated as an A2 plot and allocated to a local chief.

In summary, the vast majority of land reform beneficiaries in the A2 schemes from the 2010s, were politically-connected elites and chiefs with access to the state or occupying influential positions in government (Chapter Six).

4.4 The new agrarian structure

One major consequence of nearly forty years of land reform that started at Independence in 1980 through to the present in Matobo, as in other parts of the country, is the reconfiguration of the agrarian structure. Today there exists a large spectrum of farm types, from smallholder farms to medium-scale farms and large-scale farms. This is what Sam Moyo has called the "tri-modal" agrarian structure (Moyo 2011). Prior to the year 2000, Matobo district had a total of 206 large-scale commercial farms, covering 371,278.1 hectares. This has changed significantly at the present day. By 2015, a total of 58 white large-scale commercial farms, covering up to 115,389.50 hectares, were acquired and transferred as part of the FTLRP to both A1 and A2 beneficiaries, according to official figures. A1 schemes only consisted of 'villagized' plots, with no 'self-contained' plots. Of the 58 farms, a total of 31 farms, making up 75,059.52 hectares, were designated under the A1 model, while the remaining 27 farms (making up 40,329. 98 hectares) are under A2 scheme. Thus, 65 per cent of the total acquired land was allocated to A1 small-scale farmers, while the remaining 35 per cent was allocated to A2 medium-scale commercial farmers.

Table 4.2: An overview of land-use ratios in Matobo district, 2017

Land use	Area (ha)	Percentage of total area
Communal areas	353,400	49.2%
A1 resettlement scheme	72,060	10.0%
A2 resettlement scheme	40,330	5.6%
Self-contained farms (Council)	4,400	0.6%
Three-tier farms (formerly Model D)	109,300	15.2%
Large-scale commercial farms	95,510	13.2%
National Parks	44,000	6.1%

Source: Compiled by author from different sources (Matobo Rural District Council, Ministry of Lands)

With regards to land use, nearly half of the district's total area (49.2%) is classified as communal lands, followed by resettlement areas under various types of 'resettlement models' (31.4%), large-scale commercial farms (mainly indigenous-owned) (13.2%) and the national park (6.1%). As shall be seen in the subsequent chapters, these different types of land use and property regimes interact, especially during periods of droughts.

Table 4.3: Number of beneficiaries by scheme

	Males		Females		Total	
Scheme	N	As % of Total	N	As % of Total	N	%
A1	777	86,2%	124	13,8%	901	100%
A2	52	81,3%	12	18,8%	64	100%
Total	829	85,9%	136	14,1%	965	100%
Gender distribution*		85,9%		14,1%		100%
Informal	nd		nd		637	

Notes: Calculated on the basis of official figures (nd = no data); *This denotes gender distribution across all formal schemes.

According to official figures, 901 households (777 male-headed and 124 female-headed) from diverse origins benefitted under the A1 scheme (admittedly rough figures). In addition, an estimated total of 717 households (admittedly rough figures) have also settled in 'informal' resettlements such as Cyrene, Adams farms and Woollendale East Farm 17 of (Fox farm) and are yet to be formalized. Today, it is estimated that Fox, Cyrene and Adams farms have 384, 124 and 129 'illegal' settlers, respectively. If those who had settled informally are included, the total number of beneficiaries is approximately 1,466 households. These figures have been

increasing in both formal and informal schemes as more households are illegally allocated land by war veterans and traditional leaders, in most cases involving informal payments. This means the total households who benefited from land reform is considerably higher than official figures. These new A1 farmers constitute the 'small-scale farmers', together with 20,546 households across nineteen communal land areas (CSO 2012: 32).

In addition, a total of sixty-five medium-scale A2 farms were created and carved out in the district by 2015, with a mean size of 486.07 hectares (ranging from 40.2 to 1947 hectares). Of these, 64 farms were allocated to individual beneficiaries, while one was still unallocated at the time of the fieldwork. In addition, the three-tiers farms of the 1980s and late 1990s had also been subdivided by the local authority into 'self-contained' plots that were later allocated mainly to the 'middle-class people' with "capacity" to engage in "proper commercial ranching". Today, there are around 150 council-managed "self-contained farms" in the district. These self-contained farms bear a strong resemblance to the A2 farms. The chapter has shown that the reorganisation of Three-tier farms has massively expanded the medium-size farm sector – which now include A2 farms – in the district. Although large amounts of white-owned land were redistributed, there are still few white-owned commercial farms in the district. Most of these farms have been reduced, far smaller in size than what went before. These white-owned farms generally range in size from 4 to 2640 hectares. About 46 black-owned commercial farms, amounting to 36,860.34 hectares also remained under its original ownership.

Implicitly in this chapter, I have also described the role of the state in the allocation of land. In self-contained schemes, the allocation of land favoured large herds owning business elites and the rural petit bourgeoisie. In other words, the allocation process was in itself a differentiating exercise, which weeded out those households with insufficient resources to effectively farm. In sum, the mechanisms that governed the allocation of land in the new resettlement areas have led to a mixed population. An historical account of the land allocation process of the individual plots facilitates an understanding of dynamics of accumulation and differentiation among these settlers.

4.5 Post-settlement support

As in other parts of the country, post-settlement support in the new resettlement areas in Matobo district has been inadequate. The government has failed to give the post-settlement support that land reform beneficiaries required after land has been transferred (Moyo et al.

2009; Scoones et al. 2010). The A1 farmers did not benefit from the Farm Mechanisation Programme of 2008. Major government interventions such as "Command Agriculture" was largely absent in the district given its agro-ecological conditions. A variation of this program called "Command Livestock" aimed to provide cattle loans to farmers in dry areas was yet to be implemented by the end of my fieldwork in 2018.

Recent government interventions in the smallholder A1 resettlement schemes include the Presidential Input Scheme, through which farmers receive free inputs such as chemical fertilisers and improved seed varieties, although many farmers complained that this was inadequate.[78] More recently, this scheme has been phased out and replaced by a version of conservation agriculture known as *Pfumvudza/ Intwasa* programme that has been vigorously promoted by the party-state, particularly since 2020.[79] A fixed package of inputs are provided to the farmers for free in return for adopting conservation agriculture.[80] Unlike the Presidential Input Scheme, the *Pfumvudza/Intwasa* programme is tied to digging plots, and involves a very close supervision by the extension officers. This programme is highly politicised, with patronage politics being played out around it. Moreover, the failure to demonstrate support by not taking up the recent party-state initiative risk the possibility of being victimised.

By contrast, donors and NGOs have generally shied away from the new resettlement areas for political reasons (Scoones et al. 2010). However, there has been a few exceptions. In 2014, with financial support from FAO, a local livestock farmers' association known as Matobo District Livestock Development Trust established a feedlot in Ward 23. According to a senior government official, its objective was "to eliminate the middlemen and to ensure value addition and get good prices, but also encourage destocking during droughts in order to reduce losses to the farmers."[81] Farmers were given building materials to construct feeding pens and store

[78] During the 2017-18 survey, each household in A1 villages would receive a 10kg bag of maize seed, 50kg bag of basal fertilizer and one 50kg of top-dressing fertilizer.

[79] See, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2021/04/26/conservation-agriculture-latest-experiences-from-zimbabwe/ (accessed 17 May 2021).

[80] The package includes chemical fertilizers and improved seed varieties. Each farmer gets one 50kg bag of compound D, one 50kg bag of top dressing and one 50kg bag of lime. In Matobo, the package of improved seed varieties includes 5 kg of sorghum, 2kg pearl millet, 2kg groundnuts, and no maize seed since it's a dry area.

[81] Interview with government official, 2018.

rooms, while they provide labour themselves. However, this initiative was not yet operational by the end of my fieldwork in March 2018. According to the government official, this was because the "community is not cooperating in the construction of the feedlot. There are just too many delays." Another NGO known as 'My Beautiful Home' is also active in the area. The aim of this initiative "is to encourage the cultural practice of decorating traditional huts using the same craft that has been practiced for hundreds of years".[82] This project is dominated by women and involves a competition whereby finalists will receive prizes such as small storage tanks, wheelbarrows or ploughs. Recently, the NGO also installed a borehole (hand-pump), which communities are using to water their small gardens during the dry season.

In terms of livestock support, only two households across the two villages reported receiving heifers from the government. One farmer received two heifers in the early years of settlement, while another farmer received three heifers in 2018 as part of the "Command Livestock" programme. Overall, given the limited post-settlement support from the state, farmers were predominantly self-reliant for capital to invest in inputs and farm equipment.

4.6 Conclusion

The material presented above makes it clear that agroecology and longer-term histories of places and people have significant implications for processes and outcomes of land reform. Understanding this historical context is therefore key to the understanding of patterns of production, accumulation and social differentiation in resettlement areas. Clearly, agroecology had a huge influence on what type of land reform was implemented. The Ndebele have always lived with and off uncertainty (cf. Scoones 2021; Krätli & Schareika 2010; Scoones 1994). In the context of a highly variable resource base, the Ndebele practiced a form of seasonal transhumance (*mlaga*), which involved moving animals from one area to another in search of pastures and water. In the pre-colonial times, the Ndebele controlled large tracts of grazing land held under a common property regime, and had forced alliances with neighbouring Shona tribes to the south. This enabled them to exploit environmental heterogeneity across a much wider landscape (cf. Behnke et al. 1993). However, this all changed with the advent of colonial rule in the 1890s. The extensive pastoral system of the Ndebele, like the Himba and Tswana, was severely constrained by "colonisation by white settlers and the creation of racially-segregated populations" (Scoones 2021: 12). Through a process of land dispossession, the

[82] https://www.mybeautifulhomezimbabwe.com/.

Africans were forcibly removed from the areas they had always used and moved into overcrowded reserves. Vast areas of valuable grazing land were lost to white commercial ranching. Nonetheless, into the colonial era, seasonal transhumance persisted in the reserves, despite the loss of large tracts of grazing land to white settler ranching. The African livestock keepers resorted to fence-cutting and poach-grazing in neighbouring commercial ranches, risking impounding and shooting of animals by some harsh white commercial ranchers. This trend continued into the post-Independence era. In some cases, negotiated arrangements were established between landowners and the neighbouring communal areas.

At independence, the government set out a land reform programme to address the colonial injustices of land ownership of the past. But it was not for another decade, until the mid-1990s, that land reform programme began to be implemented in Matobo. The slow and contested process of land reform that emerged over the course of the 1980s and 1990s was as a result of many interconnected factors. First, the land reform programme was largely biased towards crop production; thus, it soon became the focus of intense local resistance in Matabeleland as communal areas livestock wanted a resettlement model that would address their perceived needs, that is, additional grazing (see Alexander 1991). The communal areas livestock keepers wanted a land reform that would facilitate seasonal transhumance rather than hinders it. However, such calls were at odds with the state ideals of modernization due to discourses associated with 'modernity' and environmental degradation (Robins 1998). The outbreak of *gukurahundi* also delayed the implementation of land reform in Matobo.

After a long stalemate between the central and local state over what kind of resettlement model to be implemented in Matobo, it was finally decided that a livestock-oriented 'Model D resettlement scheme' would be implemented. These farms were to be held and used as common property by neighbouring communal areas livestock farmers under the authority of the local state. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, these farms were later reorganised by the local state into "self-contained plots" for exclusive use by the elites amid concerns of "under-utilisation", "vandalism" and "environmental degradation". In addition, the FTLRP, as elsewhere, has radically altered the distribution of land effectively reconfiguring the agrarian structure in favour of medium-scale and small-scale farms in Matobo.

In the following chapter, attention is drawn to the ways by which land reform beneficiaries accessed in two contrasting A1 villages, the social origins of these beneficiaries, and how they are differentiated.

CHAPTER 5: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE 'NEW' SMALLHOLDER A1 FARMERS IN MATOBO DISTRICT

This chapter presents the socio-economic and political origins of land reform beneficiaries in two contrasting smallholder A1 villages within Ward 23, with an emphasis on patterns of social-economic differentiation. The chapter aims to answer the following questions: Who these 'new' smallholder A1 farmers are? How did they gain access to land? What it is that they are producing? How have they fared in terms of production and general livelihoods? Are there any notable differences in this regard between Vimbi and Luma villages? If so, how can we explain the differences? To answer these questions, this chapter draws on data obtained during the fieldwork from late 2015 to March 2018 in Luma and Vimbi villages, ongoing updates via WhatsApp with those who have cell phones and subsequently during a short visit in November 2022.

The findings indicate that very local politics and conflicts can and does shape outcomes in relation to land access and ownership in ways that are very different, even between villages in close proximity to each other. This makes sweeping generalisations of processes of land reform and its outcomes problematic. Secondly, the different processes of land reform have significant implications for patterns of accumulation and social differentiation. This chapter is intended as a necessary precursor to further analysis of processes of accumulation and class formation among these A1 farmers (Chapter Nine). This chapter first introduces the two villages and their histories of land reform. It then discusses the emerging patterns of social differentiation among the farmers in the two villages.

5.1 Two villages: Histories of settlement

Located less than 20km apart within Ward 23, Luma and Vimbi are characterised by similar agro-ecological conditions, and fall under the jurisdiction of (late) Chief Malaki Masuku. The two villages came into being as a result of land invasions in the year 2000, and were subsequently regularized by the state around 2001. There were, however, some differences in terms of the land reform process in each village and the level of state intervention in such processes. The land reform process in each village was, in part, contingent to the local politics of each area. As I will demonstrate, the process of land reform in Luma was subject to a "top-down" state intervention, whereas in Vimbi it followed a more or less "bottom-up" approach.

These land reform processes have had huge impacts on the social origins of land reform beneficiaries.

Luma

Luma village, situated on the Matobo-Gwanda border in far east of Bulawayo-Maphisa highway, lies some 80km south-east of Bulawayo, and approximately 20km east of Natisa business centre. Prior to the FTLRP, the farm was owned by AC, who also owns a wildlife sanctuary in Gweru. It is 2849 hectares in extent. Before land reform, the farm was under both cattle and wildlife ranching. The latter was closely connected to the wildlife sanctuary and the former white-owner would take his hunting clients on hunting and photographic safaris to the farm. According to the first settlers, the white farmer had over 230 head of cattle on the farm at the time of its occupation.[83] While the white farmer was able to remove most of his cattle, it is said that about sixty "wild" cattle disappeared during land occupations. Informal conversations indicate that some war veterans who were leaders of the occupations helped themselves to some calves, which they hand-raised privately.

With the support of officials from Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), a small group (about five war veterans) from Khumalo communal areas moved onto Luma around March 2000. War veterans who took part during the occupation of the farm said the process was relatively peaceful. As one war veteran (KNM) put it:

> Here there was no *jambanja* - we came in peace. We first met with the CIO guys from Harare who then came with us to the farm. Upon arrival at the farm, the CIO officials then went to speak with the white farmer. They told him not to chase us away or beat us because we had been resettled by the government. We camped near the white farmer's homestead.[84]

This comment echoes the work of Alexander and McGregor (2001) who found that land occupations in Matabeleland were relatively peaceful and less violent than in other parts of the country. The white farmer in Luma actively helped the settlers by providing them with clean water for drinking. However, some of the leaders resisted the white farmer's kind gesture, citing fears of poisoning.

[83] Interview with HS, 26 February 2017, Halale farm.

[84] KNM, 2017, Luma.

Once the farm was fully occupied, the white farmer then moved out of the farm (perhaps out of fear of violence) and tried to negotiate with the DLC to retain part of his farm. He emphasized that Luma was the "only full farm" he ever owned. [85] He also tried to invoke a sense of belonging by suggesting that his mother, father and sister were buried at the farm. Further, he stated that he was "willing and prepared to co-operate and co-exist with my communal [areas] neighbours and assist in any way that I can with grazing for cattle, community projects, assisting in joint and cultural tourist projects and ploughing of land" (ibid). Despite all his efforts to justify his stay, the farm was gazetted and designated as an A1 scheme.

In 2001, government officials arrived and pegged twenty-seven A1 plots in a linear pattern, in what is now known as the "Old line". This number of plots was conceived by Agritex officials to be within the "carrying capacity" of the farm. In line with this notion of "carrying capacity", each household was initially set to receive use rights to approximately 100 hectares of land. Of these, 5 hectares were to be privately-owned arable land, 0.49 hectares for residential "stand", while the remaining hectares were to be used as common grazing. In keeping with the official ecological "carrying capacity" of the area set at around 8 hectares per livestock unit (LU) per year, livestock holdings were stipulated at 15LU per household. Of the 27 plots, it was officially agreed that fourteen plots would be allocated to beneficiaries from Ward 16, while the remaining thirteen would be allocated to beneficiaries from Ward 17 in Matobo district. However, the plots were not taken up by significant numbers of settlers, especially those from Ward 17. Reasons for low uptake ranged from preference to be geographically nearer to their ancestral homes and the Bulawayo-Maphisa main road, to people's needs for grazing land not land for cropping, to reticence about joining a land reform with unknown outcomes, and to being sceptical about what land reform would hold, given that this area was a stronghold of MDC at the time.

Not long after settlement, the farm became the subject of a bitter dispute between villagers in Wenlock communal areas and the new settlers. Embedded in this dispute were questions about how this newly acquired land should be used and who should be the beneficiaries. It appears that the war veterans and traditional leaders in Wenlock who also happened to be the more wealthy and large herd owners wanted the farm to be used for grazing purposes under a three-

[85] A letter from Andrew Connolly to the DLC, 22 September 2002. File: Anonymous

tier model, while the majority of poor households wanted land for human settlement and mixed farming (Chapter Eight). The conflict was exacerbated by the fact that, before the FTLRP, livestock-owning households in Wenlock had a "gentlemen's agreement" with the white farmer dating back as far as the 1960s, which allowed them to graze their animals in periphery paddocks during the drought periods in exchange of maintaining boundary fences. However, the new land reform beneficiaries are not prepared to compromise on allowing the herder-owners from Wenlock communal areas to access grazing and water resources, despite the officials encouraging them to do so.[86]

Owing to the reluctance of Ward 17 residents to take up land their plots, it was decided that the unoccupied plots would be allocated to beneficiaries from Wenlock communal areas in Gwanda in order "to quash or quell the temperatures".[87] However, as with beneficiaries of Ward 17, "very few households from Wenlock took up their allocated stands. Only four took up their stands, while another three just fenced theirs and never took up residence".[88] In other words, most of the settlers from Wenlock were absentee landholders. Most of these farmers wanted the farm to be used for grazing rather than for human settlement, it is argued.

By 2010, it is claimed, the farm was still occupied by very few households who were fulltime residence. This, according to the village chairman, made it "impossible or very difficult to police the farm".[89] As a consequence, the village leadership in consultation with chief Masuku and ward councillor, decided to resettle additional households along the boundary with Wenlock communal areas (Gwanda) on the eastern side of the farm, what has become known as the "New line" in 2010. This solution, it was thought, would both "boost farm security" and provide a "buffer zone" between the farm and Wenlock communal areas. This time the village leaders decided that any prospective settler who come "seriously" seeking land would be eligible to gain access, regardless of his/her place of birth. The "new line" was aimed to prevent villagers in nearby Wenlock from accessing natural resources such as fuelwood, poles and

[86] See for instance, the resolution by the District Land Committee on the conflict https://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/chronicle-zimbabwe/20161116/281638189788149 (accessed 20 April 2017).

[87] A letter from the village chairman to the Provincial Administrator, "RE- Luma/Sibuntule resettlement A1 farms", 17 October 2014. Held in private possession.

[88] *Ibid*.

[89] Ibid.

more importantly pastures and water for livestock from the farm. This led to an ongoing conflict over access to and control of land, and as Chapter Eight will show, this conflict is about how the new land should be used and who should benefit from it. These same questions informed debate about land reform in general in Matabeleland during the early phase of land reform soon after Independence (Alexander 1991; Robbins 1994).

In 2018, Luma A1 scheme had a total of 47 households: 27 formal households in the "Old line" and around 20 informal households in "New line", many of whom were yet to receive "offer letters". In the years leading up to the 2013 elections, amidst rising demand for land, three A2 plots were created on the farm. These farms, situated on the western part of the farm and occupied a total of 1073ha among them, were all allocated to well-connected political elites. However, two of the three beneficiaries withdrew following very strong opposition and threats of violence from the A1 settlers, who argued that this would substantially reduce their grazing land (Chapter Seven).

Vimbi

Vimbi village, presents a somewhat different case. It lies in the inner part of ward 23, just on the east of the Bulawayo-Maphisa highway. Compared to Luma, the village is not adjoined by communal areas; hence, there are no conflicts with communal areas. The village is located 2 km away from the highway, 65 km away from Bulawayo and 37 km from the district capital (Maphisa). Prior to settlement, the 2576-ha farm was owned by Ben van Vuuren, a white farmer of Afrikaans origins who engaged in cattle and sheep production. This farm was among the first farms to be targeted for occupation in the district in 2000, in part because of his hostile attitude to neighbouring communal areas. Unlike in Luma, there was an influx of occupiers from Khumalo communal areas. The good soils provided a magnetic attraction to prospective land reform beneficiaries from nearby communal areas. As one land reform beneficiary explained, "Many people chose Vimbi because it has fertile soils. Our fore-fathers used to live here before they were removed by the whites."

The farm was invaded by a group of people from Halale village in Kumalo communal areas, which was led by now the late CD, a war veteran. Upon arrival, the first invaders occupied the eastern part of the farm, where they constructed makeshift structures near *Madwaleni* (rock outcrop) in an area referred today as '*Mutorashanga*' (meaning a faraway place in

Mashonaland), a local name used to signal its farness from Bulawayo-Maphisa main road.[90] However, many early occupiers decided to return back to their communal homes due to water challenges. But CD stayed put. Later, a second wave of occupiers from other villages around Natisa areas arrived at the farm. Most of these new occupiers who subsequently occupied the farm are related through family or acquaintance. One A1 farmer related, "Vimbi is full of relatives and friends". Therefore, the village can be described as a closely-knit network of relatives and friends. These social networks have become vital sources of social capital in the context of limited external support.

In 2001, the government officials arrived to peg plots. They found only CD who was living fulltime in his makeshift house near "*Madwaleni*" area. A total of twenty-four A1 plots were subsequently pegged. Residential plots were initially pegged near *Mutorashanga* area, but were found to be very far away from water sources and crop fields, making guarding against animals a difficult task. Following several complaints to the officials, the villagers were later allowed to set-up homesteads in or near their crop fields.

Today, the number of settlers has increased from twenty-four in the early 2000s to 37 in 2018 thanks to settlement of additional settlers by government officials and traditional leaders. Of these 37 settlers, two had not as yet established homesteads or had abandoned their plots and were living elsewhere.[91] While it seems that these two beneficiaries had "dropped out", the *sobhuku* insisted that these two settlers "will return some day" ("*bazabuya"*) to occupy their plots.

Most of the newcomers were settled around 2013. Prior to 2013, the villagers wrote a letter to the Lands Officer, asking for permission to resettle some of their own adult children (*abantwana*) and relatives (*izihlobo*) who had married and were now seeking for land on their own right. According to the villagers, this move triggered an influx of settlers as the government officials and the late Chief Masuku took the opportunity to allocate land to other people from outside the village who were seeking land. "This move sent a message to the officials that land was available in Vimbi", the village chairman told me. "They [government

[90] Mutorashanga is a place Mashonaland, which is deemed very far. Because of the fact that the eastern side of the farm is far away from Bulawayo-Maphisa Road, it was said that Clever Dube decided to call it 'Mutorashanga'.

[91] Interview with headman.

officials and the local chief] saw it as an opportunity to settle their own people. All land seekers were now sent to this village by the officials. The land seekers were told "land is abundant in Vimbi, go there!"[92] In the end, a total of ten new households were settled in 2013. Of these 10 new households, four were allocated land by the local chief, three by the District Lands Officer, while the remaining three were allocated land by village authorities as "adult children" of original settlers. In theory, those to be settled as "children" were supposed to be the offsprings or immediate relatives of the original settlers. Of those three settlers who were settled as "children" of original settlers, two were indeed sons of original settler, whereas one was a prophet *("madzibaba"*) who was "helping" the *Sobhuku* to banish evil spirits at his homestead and living with him. As a result, the villagers were unhappy with this outcome, claiming that insufficient consideration was given to their land needs of their own children.

In 2010, as in Luma, one A2 plot – 800 hectares in extent – was also created by the Ministry of Lands on the eastern part of Vimbi farm and then allocated to a local chief from further south of the district. However, unlike in Luma where A1 settlers openly resisted the creation and allocation of A2 plots within the scheme, the settlers in Vimbi did not do so. But the existence of this A2 farmer is deeply resented by A1 farmers, who feels "used" by the chief to evict the white farmer. In the words of one villager, "We were used like caterpillars and bull dozers. These machines are needed to open up a road, but once the road is opened, they don't want to be seen on the roads because they will damage the same road that they had opened. We were the caterpillars!".

In sum, the process of land reform in each village allowed a wide range of social classes to gain access to land, with access to capital, political influence and networks. This, in turn, had profound effects on production and accumulation among these smallholder farmers.

5.2 "Fingers are not equal, just like fingers on the same hand are not equal"[93]: Local understandings of 'success' and socio-economic inequality

Turning to the empirical findings, the quotation above comes from one of the seven male participants in Vimbi who took part in the workshop-style participatory "success ranking exercise" in Vimbi. It is this *inequality* that I sought out in the two A1 sites that I studied.

[92] However, two of the homesteads were not built, but the headman insisted that the 'stands' exist. Interview with village headman, 2016, Vimbi.

[93] Mr AS, men focus group discussions, Vimbi, March 2018.

Following Scoones et al. (2010: 60), the workshops began with a discussion of the term 'success' in resettlement areas, "aimed at eliciting criteria of livelihood success and generating discussion." As discussed in Chapter Three, a card sorting method based on a list of all households provided by the village chairman in each village was deployed to sort farmhouseholds into groups. Local key informants were then asked to name the criteria which they had used in their decisions to place each household in a particular group. There were animated debates among participants on the subject, with some households generating more heated debates that others. However, there were cases where agreement could not be reached in relation to household rankings. In such cases, the cards of such households were placed aside and were later revisited towards the end of the workshop sessions. All the discussions were audio taped and later transcribed by the researcher.

The term 'success' was understood in local parlance as "*ukuphumelela*" (to succeed) or "*ukuthuthuka*" (development/ progress) in isiNdebele. The word "*umnotho*" is used to describe 'wealth'. Being 'rich' was various described as "*ukuthola*" (literally means, getting or obtaining) or "*ukuzuza*" (to get) (also see Oxford IsiZulu Dictionary, 2014).[94] The poor were described as "*abaswelayo*", which literally means, "those without anything" or "*abahawulayo*" (destitute).

5.2.1 Debating the indicators

The benefits of land reform were well recognised among the participants of success rankings. BdN, a war veteran and widow who participated in women's group in Vimbi, says that "in the reserves I had no houses with iron zinc roofing, cattle, goats or donkeys, but I now have all these things". Another woman, SoN, reports that land reform has allowed her to buy domestic assets: "now I have DVD, TV, radio and a solar panel". LtD, one of the male participants in Vimbi, also reports that "some people have managed to buy cars and to build good homes through farming". In sum, both women and men participants identified several indicators of "success", including livestock ownership (*ukufuya*), good crop yields, sale of agricultural produce, good home, access to non-farm income (wage, remittance from children, or pension) and ownership of major assets (cars, ploughs, harrow, solar panels etc.).

[94] As far as I am aware, there is no IsiNdebele-English dictionary in Zimbabwe. Instead, a version of IsiZulu-English is used.

Although both men and women identified more or less the same indicators, it is important to note that each group placed more emphasis on some assets than others. For instance, men tended to emphasise livestock ownership and regular sale of agricultural produce, while downplaying the quality of homestead as criteria of 'success' and 'wealth'. For men, regular sale of agricultural produce was deemed the main objective *(injongo*) of redistributive land reform. As one male participant argued in relation to the placement of some households with good homestead in wealthier categories while not regularly selling livestock or crops:

> Let's take the case of LB for example. He has built a beautiful homestead and engages in crop farming. But apart from that, what else does he have to merit a highest rank? Nothing! Cattle zero! You see, this is a commercial farm. A person who has spent four years without selling a single animal, but is ranked number One (most successful). How is that possible? There are people who have not sold even one bag of maize to GMB, yet they are ranked number One [because of a good homestead]. Some people who are ranked in most successful groups are beneficiaries of 'social welfare' programmes [food assistance]. You see, a person like FM or NkN deserves to be ranked number One because they produce for 'commercial purposes'. NkN sales pigs, goats and cattle regularly. This is what is required in [natural] region IV. He is exactly right at the top of it (commercial farming). He is the person who rightly qualifies to be in group 1. He is engaging in a commercial farming system – what all of us here *eplazini* – should be doing. NkN is a very good example of why we should be here in the farm. His main focus is here on the farm, where he came to produce livestock and sale. This is why he should be in Group 1. Similarly, FM sells cattle regularly and is running several batches of broilers every year. He, too, should be in group 1.

By contrast, female participants placed more emphasis on crop farming, ownership of domestic assets (e.g., solar panels, TVs, radio, tables etc.), construction of a good homestead and, more importantly, the ability to invest in the education of children. As one female participant put it, "some people boast of having large herds of cattle, yet their children are out of school."

Other proxies of 'success' and 'wealth' in the new resettlement were identified during discussions with both men and women, such as access to off-farm income (e.g., pension) and remittance (from children), farm residence, hiring of labour, careful planning and management, as well as, owning a house in town. In both villages, absentee settlers were ranked in the lowest group despite the fact that some had built elaborate homesteads. Participants argued that these absentee land reform beneficiaries "don't deserve to be here", "are just holding on to land", "it's not clear what they are doing", "there is no sign of progression at their farms", and "are wasting land". A male participant in Luma remarked, "if a person came and built a homestead and left, never to come back again, it means "*uyaswela*" (lacking resources). S/he has nothing, and the farm is not helping him". In light of this, asset-poor households who were present and

"making an effort" to engage in farming were deemed more successful than absentee households with nothing happening at the farm.

However, not everyone agreed with the above interpretation of absentee households, as one male participant in Luma noted: "But if the absentee households live overseas, this means that they are better-off than most of us here. So, how can we rank that household in the last group?" While the participants acknowledged that absentee households might have better access to income and other assets than those largely reliant on farming, participants noted that it was difficult for them to tell if such households were indeed 'rich'. Judging by what was happening at the absent farmers' plots, participants were adamant that such households lacked financial capital to invest substantially on their farms. In Luma, these absentee households were described as "ghost villagers", signalling the fact that they are unbeknownst to the villagers. In Vimbi, one participant commented in relation to one absentee household: "K has never lit up a fire at his homestead since settlement. We don't know him!". In other words, the farmer in question never had never spent a night at his farm.

When asked why other farmers were doing well and others not, several explanations were suggested. Access to regular and stable income, hard work, careful and skilful planning and management, ingenuity, having educated and employed children, diaspora networks and so on, were all recurrent themes during the discussions. Having a "good" and "hard-working" wife also emerged as a crucial factor in determining household's success. For example, one male-participant in Vimbi explained how one farmer was falling behind because his girlfriend was "*lacking*", a colloquial expression to describe someone who is lazy. This point was further reiterated by one farmer (RS), who recently married a new wife earlier this year (2022), following the death of her long-term girlfriend in 2020, who was also an A1 farmer in the village. He notes, with a touch of pride, "My new wife is very hardworking. We have got a very good vegetable garden this year, and everyone in the village is buying tomatoes from us. Now, everyone is asking me where I got my new wife from."

Table 5.1: Description of 'success rankings' based on local criteria and English translation

Success Rank	*IsiNdebele*	*English*	*Description*
1	*Abaphumelelayo*	Most successful	This group consist of (a) those who regularly produce and sell larger amounts of agricultural produce and; (b) those who are able to produce a surplus for sale but seldomly sell their produce
2	*Abazamayo*	Those who are 'trying'	Those who lack adequate assets, but produces adequate grain for self-provisioning
3	*Abaswelayo*	Those lacking resources	Asset-poor farmers, but 'put an effort' in farming. They are residence on farm
4	*Abangela lutho*	Those with nothing	Absentee households keeping land for speculative reasons, rather than for production. In some cases, original settlers had died and off-spring too young to takeover. Plots lie idle, or workers or relatives keep the plot

Source: Own data

Following rich discussions in relation to indicators of "success", households in each village were then ranked into four broad groups (Table 5.1). The names of all households were written on the cards which were then sorted into piles by knowledgeable participants, ranking from the most successful to the least successful. Four broad "success groups" (SGs) emerged, with "SG1" representing the most successful and "SG4" the least successful. For the purposes of analysis presented here, I used this ranking to stratify households into these four 'success groups' (SGs).

A brief description of these categories is in order before we turn to the correlation of this participatory rankings with household survey data. The top category (SG1) is generally composed of households with relatively large livestock holdings, owning sufficient farm equipment, producing significant amounts of agricultural outputs, selling large proportions and making a profit. Within this top category, participants distinguish between the SG1 upper-class households (referred to as "SG1A"), who are so successful that production is oriented towards 'exchange value' (i.e., sale), and the SG1 lower-class households (dubbed "SG1B"), who also produce surplus for sale but seldomly sell their produce. SG2 category is composed of asset-poor households with limited farm equipment, small herds, mainly acquired from *amasiso* and *umlaga* arrangements. They are able – more or less – to make a living from farming. They are producing relatively substantial quantities of agricultural output largely for self-provisioning, and, in some instances, produce modest surplus for sale. They include households where the

household head remained employed in cities and nearby farms but other household members are full-time residence on the farm and engage in farming. In the SG3 category one also finds many asset-poor and stockless farmers, who are unable to sustain themselves on the farm but are still committed to farming. In other words, they are struggling for subsistence. Therefore, they have to supplement income from farming by engaging in other economic activities, including off-farm work in cities and farm work in neighbouring new medium-scale farms and remaining white-owned commercial farms. While most household heads in this category are actively employed elsewhere, their families are full-time residence on the farms, as is the case for some households in SG2. Lastly, the SG4 category is composed of households that are absent (both household heads and their families) and holding land for speculative reasons. In the words of one female participant, "it is not clear what they are doing". In this group is also to be found those households that had left or abandoned their plots for various reasons, including the death of household head.

The comparison of the distribution of households by success groups clearly indicate that most households in Luma are concentrated in the least successful groups (SG3 and SG4). As Table 3.6 shows, nearly 65% (22 of 34) households in Luma sits in SG3 and SG4 categories, whereas in Vimbi only a third (33.3% or 11 of 33 cases) sits in such rankings. Moreover, Luma had fewer (21% or 7 of 34) households occupying the most successful category (SG1), as compared to a third (33% or 11 cases) in Vimbi. Consequently, Vimbi is seen to be relatively well-off than Luma. Across the two villages, nearly 63% (42 of 67) households surveyed fall in 'SG2' and 'SG3' categories, while nearly 27% (18 of 67) households are in the "most successful" (SG1) category. Seven households (10%), often absentee and holding land for speculative reasons, sits in the "least successful" category (SG4).

Because I lived in the two villages for extended periods of time between 2016 and 2018 and came to know the households under study very well, I was able to check if these rankings 'rang true' in terms of wealth status and "success" of these households. I also had rich discussions with my hosts regarding the rankings. A test of correlation was then conducted between these success groupings and household survey data in order to further verify the reliability of the rankings as a method to differentiate households. Table A5.1 shows that these success rankings were highly correlated with key socio-economic variables such as livestock holdings, assets, area cleared for cropping, ownership of farm equipment and other assets, as well as cereal production. As elsewhere (Scoones et al. 2010, Scoones et al. 2018), these positive

relationships support the hypothesis that patterns of social differentiation among the A1 farmers are also emerging in the dryland pastoral settings.

5.3 Patterns of social differentiation: A tale of two villages

5.3.1 Who got the land?

This section describes a variety of mechanisms by which farmers gained access to land, their motivations, where they came from and what they hoped to achieve.

(i) Acquiring A1 plots

Table 5.2 shows all sorts of ways by which A1 settlers gained access to land in the study areas, showing the dominance of land invasions as a route to land acquisition by A1 settlers (45%), followed by allocation by traditional leaders (31%), village chairpersons (8%), security service quota (8%), official allocation (6%) as well as war veteran quota and informal purchase (2% each). In the case of security services, most of such settlers were employed either in the army or police, and were often war veterans as well. In most cases, they made application for land through their work places. Despite this, the process of acquiring land was not unproblematic.

Table 5.2: Mechanisms by which settlers gained access to land by village

	Vimbi		Luma		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Came during jambanja	17	52%	13	38%	30	45%
Allocated by government officials	0	0%	4	12%	4	6%
War veteran quota	0	0%	1	3%	1	2%
Security services quota	3	9%	2	6%	5	8%
Allocated by village chairperson	0	0%	5	15%	5	8%
Allocated by traditional authorities	12	36%	9	27%	21	31%
Purchase	1	3%	0	0%	1	2%
Total	33	100%	34	100%	67	100%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

AbS's case illustrate some of the challenges faced by this group of prospective land reform beneficiaries in their attempts to access land. When the FTLRP began in 2000s, he was still employed in the army and deployed in DRC. Like many people who were employed in the army and deployed outside the country at the time, AbS was told to that all those who wanted land had to apply through their army offices. However, his initial attempts to obtain land

through his workplace were unsuccessful. “We filled many forms, but nothing came out of it”, he says. While still being deployed in DRC, he took some off days and returned to his rural village, Halale, where his brothers advised him “to go to the ground if he wants land”. His brothers suggested that he should try Vimbi, Holi or Woodland. “When I got to Vimbi, I was told that the allocation quotas of soldiers and war veterans were already full. But the headman told me that I could get land under the civilian quota. I asked them, ‘how does being a soldier or war veteran benefit me? They told me, ‘Nothing!’. Then I told them that all I wanted was land”, he explains.

Comparing the two villages, there are few dramatic differences in relation to mechanisms of land acquisition. First, the proportion of households who obtained land through invasions was higher in Vimbi (52%) than in Luma (38%), which can be explained by the fact that there was low interest in human settlement by villagers from adjoining Wenlock communal areas who, rather, preferred the farm to be used for grazing purposes. Some households were allocated land by local state officials (councillors, village chairmen etc.) and ‘traditional leaders’ (headmen, chiefs etc.) some years after the *jambanja* period, ranging from 36% in Vimbi and 41% in Luma. Overall, very few (6%) were allocated land by government officials, all of them in Luma. However, these were mainly for “gap filling” purposes.

Only one settler reported gaining access to land through purchase in a “vernacular land market” (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006) in Vimbi. Mr GMN (aged 45), who has been working in Rustenburg (South Africa) for 25 years, explained the land transaction:

> Since 2008, I have been looking for a plot. Then, in 2011, I met Mr M who is also a settler here but also works in Rustenburg. At the time, it was a drought year so he recommended that I bring my cattle here for relief grazing. We drove together from South Africa and we went to meet the councillor and sobhuku, and they gave me permission to bring my cattle…. After the end of the drought, I did not move my cattle back to the communal areas. This stand was “*ifusi*” (abandoned homestead). So, I enquired from the sobhuku about the owner of the stand and why he was not using it. The sobhuku told me the owner hails from Nkayi but is based in South Africa. When I returned to South Africa, I looked for his contact details and managed to contact him. We then met in Johannesburg in 2013. He told me that he had two stands, of which one was in Lupane, but he was struggling to pay land tax. The guy was struggling in Johannesburg, so I had to buy his families some groceries. We then returned to Vimbi together to meet the sobhuku. The sobhuku advised that we should go to the lands officer, who then advised that if he does not want the stand anymore he should sign an affidavit. He did just that, and the plot was ceded to me. When this was all done, I paid him R5,000 for the plot and bought some groceries for his family in South Africa.

Such transactions, although very rare, appeared to be sanctioned by both government officials, traditional (e.g., sobhuku) and modern (e.g., ward councillors) authorities.

Table 5.3: Number of years of settlement

	Mean	*Median*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Vimbi	15	17	4	18
Luma	12	8	4	18
All villages	13	16	4	18

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 5.3 shows the length of time by which households have been settled in the villages. It shows that households in Vimbi have a longer history of settlement than households in Luma. Around 55% of surveyed households in Vimbi said that they were settled between 2000 and 2001, compared to only 38% in Luma. Most households in Luma (56%) were resettled from 2009 onwards, whereas in Vimbi only 21% did so in the same period. As outlined in the previous section, most of these late arrivals in Luma were resettled by the village chairman, ward councillor or traditional authorities (headman, chief), while a few others gained access to land through official land allocation as part of "gap filling" exercise, whereby unoccupied stands were re-allocated to new people (although not all). As was noted earlier, the new settlement along the boundary in Luma was supposed to serve as a "buffer' zone between Wenlock communal areas and the inner core of the farm, given that the scheme had very few households.

Table 5.4: Length of settlement of households

	Vimbi		Luma		Total	
Years	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
< 5 years	4	12%	2	6%	6	9%
6 - 10 years	3	9%	17	50%	20	30%
11 – 15 years	6	18%	1	3%	7	10%
16 years or more	20	61%	14	41%	34	51%
Total	33	100%	34	100%	67	100,0%

Source: Own data. 2017-18 survey

As shown in Table 5.4, over 60% of households have been settled in Vimbi for more than 16 years, as compared to 41% in Luma. Fifty percent of households in Luma were settled in the village less than 10 years ago. In addition, the length of settlement of households was found to strongly correlate with success ranking. Successful households generally have a longer history of settlement in the study areas than least successful households.

(ii) Origins and previous occupation

It has been argued that most A1 settlers were land-short from the nearby communal areas and under/unemployed urban people (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012; James 2014). This is also evident in the two villages studied here. Table A5.3 shows the distribution of previous occupations of settlers by success rankings. This shows a fairly even distribution of households in each village. Urban-based businesspeople and civil servants were rare, with only one case of the former being recorded in Luma. As in other parts of the country, the two villages were dominated by people from nearby communal areas and cities, who made up over half of the settlers, and were often involved in land occupations during the early 2000s. A total of 10 settlers (15% of 67 cases) were working in diaspora (mainly South Africa) prior to settlement. Other settlers were farm workers, with the majority being found in Luma. The final group of "other" occupation was quite diverse, including petty traders in cities and wood carvers in communal areas.

Over 80% of settlers surveyed said that their district of origin was either Matobo or neighbouring Gwanda, although the proportion varies between 74% in Luma and 91% in Vimbi.[95] Contrary to Mabhena's (2014) findings in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts, the majority of land reform beneficiaries in the two villages were born in Matabeleland provinces, especially Gwanda and Matobo districts.

(iii) Land allocation by gender

Of the 67 farms I surveyed, only two original land reform beneficiaries were women: all war veterans (including war veterans and collaborators) in Vimbi who managed to acquire land in their own right. One was a widow, and the other was a second wife in a polygynous marriage. BdN, a war veteran in her early 60s, is one of the few women who decided to join the land occupations: "I was the first women to join the invasions. At the time, the former white farmer would tease me for joining the invasions. He would say, "*mama* (mom), you are wasting your energy here, please go back home. What are you doing with all these men?" Widowed, with five children to support and send to school, she saw land reform as an opportunity to take her out of poverty. The story of CN is slightly different to that of BdN. CN, now a widow in her late 50s, was married in a polygynous marriage. Her husband had two wives, and she was the youngest of the two wives. In 2000, when the land occupations began, her husband decided to join the occupations in order to secure a plot for her. Having been allocated a self-contained

[95] 87.9% in Vimbi and 50% in Luma were originally from Matobo district.

plot in Mampondweni already, the husband decided to register the A1 plot in CN's name. Also, the plot would become her inheritance, while the first wife inherited the self-contained plot.

(iv) A socio-economic profile of war veterans

This section aims to increase our understanding of the social origins of "war veterans". Here, the term war veteran is applied broadly to refer to those who fought during the brutal liberation war of 1970s, political detainees and political refugees. The proportion of original settlers who are/were war veterans was at 43% (29 of 67 cases) across the two villages. [96] This figure is much higher than reported in other studies elsewhere that adopted a broader definition of the term war veteran (e.g., Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012). Using a narrow definition – the one that captures only those who actually fought in the liberation struggle – that proportion was 27% across the two villages, which is still higher than the official figure of 17% in the whole district. All these war veterans are/were exclusively linked to ZIPRA, one of the two liberation armies that fought during the liberation. This is not surprising, given the recruitment strategies of both ZANLA and ZIPRA armies along regional and ethnic lines: ZANLA largely recruited in Mashonaland, while ZIPRA recruited in Matabeleland and Midlands (Alexander & McGregor 1998; Alexander et al. 2000). All but two were men. Although their identity as war veterans was important in gaining access to land (with few exceptions), they are by no means necessarily "ZANU-PF elites".

[96] Amongst these 29 "war veterans", 18 fought in the liberation war, 5 were collaborators, 2 political detainees and 4 were refugees.

Table 5.5: Comparison of household head's primary occupation by gender and war veteran status at settlement

	Vimbi		Luma		Total	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Primary occupation	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count	Count
Communal areas farmer	4	2	5	0	9	2
Employed in urban job	5	0	5	0	10	0
Civil servant	0	0	0	0	0	0
State security	4	0	2	0	6	0
Businesspeople	0	0	0	0	0	0
Farm worker	0	0	1	0	1	0
Diaspora	0	0	1	0	1	0
Subtotal	13	2	14	0	27	2
%	87%	13%	100%	0%	93%	7%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

As many as two-thirds (67% or 12 of 18 cases) of all those war veterans who fought in the liberation struggle were demobilised after independence in 1980. Most returned to their communal areas homes or towns where they languished in poverty (see Chitiyo 2000). Given that many had no formal education because they had left schooling prematurely to join the liberation struggle, choices were limited. Therefore, they found themselves engaging in farming, lowly paid jobs, cross-border migration or petty trading following demobilization. Those who made their way to communal areas soon became targeted by state security forces when *gukurahundi* broke and, to escape the conflict, they fled from their villages. For example, one of my war veterans informants, RN, returned home area in Halale after demobilisation from the army in 1981. However, in 1983, when *gukurahundi* broke out, he and his family fled from their village and found themselves in Bulawayo, where he later engaged in trading vegetables and goat meat in Magwegwe township. He only returned to his rural home in 1990. Upon his return, he then constructed a homestead from scratch, dug a well and started growing vegetables for sale. In the early 2000s, he then joined the land occupations and gained access to an A1 plot in Vimbi.

Similarly, RS, who was also demobilised from the army in 1981, started growing vegetables and raising broilers for sale in Bulawayo until 1984 when his father who was working at Nimr and Chapman manufacturing company "spoke with his bosses to employ him as he couldn't continue to work himself having been severely beaten and injured by Fifth brigade while on his visit at his home area in Halale on a weekend." His father later succumbed to his injuries

and passed away. Hee worked at the company until 2003 when he voluntarily retired because his "salary was getting useless everyday".

Others started small-scale co-operatives with financial help from the government (based on socialist ideals). However, such projects were rarely successful, as exemplified by the case of TP who was demobilised in 1981. Following demobilization, he and seventeen other demobilised war veterans established a grocery store and butchery in Gwabalanda "but the co-operative flopped". In 1985, he then emigrated to South Africa where he worked as a truck driver for a cross-border company. However, in 2003, he was involved in a car accident in Mozambique and lost one of his legs in the process. As a result, Mr TP was forced to take an early retirement and returned to Zimbabwe, where he stayed in his late father's house in Bulawayo. As life increasingly became difficult in town, he decided to look for land and got it as war veteran in Luma in 2005.

Most had very little (if any) formal education when they joined the liberation struggle. After demobilisation, some returned back to secondary schooling through "correspondence" (distant learning) in order to improve their chances of getting better paid employment. For example, Mr FrZ was integrated into the army in 1981 but was soon expelled in 1983 amid allegations of being a dissident "just because I was ex-ZAPU and Ndebele". He was detained and tortured severely before being expelled from the army. After his expulsion, he returned to his home area in Badha where he engaged in farming. In 1989, he then decided to return to school through "correspondence" and successfully passed his 'O' level education in 1990 and proceeded to do 'A' level education (while doing "piece jobs" at Bulawayo City Council) and successfully completed in 1992. This put him in a good stead to secure temporary jobs as a school clerk at White waters secondary school and later as a field officer for an NGO from 1997 to 2000s. In 1999, he received the ZW$ 50,000 and used the money to set up a butcher shop at Natisa but the business soon floundered. He later joined the land invasions and acquired land in Vimbi. In 2008, he secured a job as a civil servant, a position which he still holds.

Others fled to neighbouring countries, including Botswana and South Africa when *gukurahundi* broke in the 1980s, where they sought employment. For example, Mr KNN was demobilised in 1981 and, when *gukurahundi* broke, he decided to emigrate to South Africa where he had initially worked as a "scullery boy" in a restaurant for several years before joining the liberation struggle in the 1970s. He went to South Africa where he worked for the "old boss" but returned to Zimbabwe in 1999 when he "heard that war veterans were being paid

ZW$50,000". However, he had no homestead of his own during this period, hence had to rent a place to live in town. This motivated him to participate in land invasions and occupations in the early 2000.

I also encountered ex-ZAPU war veterans who were integrated into the army but voluntarily retired soon afterwards. For example, LD was integrated into the army in 1981 but took voluntary retirement after three years of service in 1984 because he "wanted to take a rest" after the war. After retirement, he got a job as a security guard in Bulawayo where he worked until 1991, when he landed another job as a messenger for a restaurant. He then left the job in 1999 when he received his "*50kg*" (ZW$50,000) war veteran payment. He used some of this money to buy a scotch cart and build his own homestead in Njelele. It was in Njelele that he decided to join the land invasions and occupation in the early 2000s. When ZW$50,000 ran out, he sought a job as a security guard at Haddon and Sly supermarket in Bulawayo in 2002, but left his family on the new land in Vimbi.

Across my sample, only six out of 18 war veterans who fought in the liberation struggle under ZIPRA were integrated into the army at Independence and were still employed in the army in the early 2000s when land occupations started, which meant that they were able to gain access to land through the army quota or formal allocation. However, all of these war veterans occupied low positions in the army, including staff sergeant.

Overall, the war veteran category, as in other parts of the country, is a diverse group. Contra to claims that these war veterans are wealthy and well-connected individuals, the majority had languished in poverty for many years in rural or urban areas, representing what is known in the literature as "fragmented classes of labour" (Bernstein 2010) with various motivations to gain access to land.

(v) Understanding settlers' motivations to access land

What were the A1 settlers' motivations for gaining access to land, and what did they hope to achieve? The motivations for gaining access to land differed among land reform beneficiaries, depending on their socio-economic status at the time. In my sample, these beneficiaries acquired land for a range of reasons, from material gain to desire to own one's own homestead. Take, for example, ChM a 38-year-old A1 farmer in Vimbi who acquired land at the age of 19 in 2003. Initially his father was against his decision to get land in the resettlement areas because he thought that he was "too young to be in a new place alone". Thus, he said that he had to

enlist the service of his father's brother to convince his father to allow him to take up land in resettlement areas. His decision to gain access to land was motivated by a wish to live with his mother who had long divorced with his father in 1989 after his father's decision to marry a second wife. At the time, his mother was living in Bulawayo where she was struggling to eke a living. As he explained:

> My mother was living in my grandmother's house in town, but she was really struggling to make ends meet. I was actually supporting her myself. My grandmother was living in her rural home in Beitbridge, but she wanted my mother to move out of her house so that she could rent out the house and get money to support herself as well. So, when I heard that "*amapulazi*" (white commercial farms) were being redistributed, I asked my mother that "if I get a place to build "*umuzi",* would you want to live "*ekhaya*" (rural areas)?" She said, "yes".

Indeed, social reproduction in urban areas has become increasingly difficult due to the economic downturn, and finding a rural home in the new resettlement areas where one could engage in farming is seen as a viable option to survive. CaD, who acquired land more recently, echoed this interpretation.[97] 63-year-old CaD used to work for a panel beating company owned by "*mupostori*" (a member of the Apostolic church), but decided to quit his job in 2005 because "the money was worthless" and "life in town was increasingly becoming tough". After quitting his job, he came to live with his nephew who is an A1 farmer in Vimbi because "life was better in the farms than in town." While living with his nephew, CaD would engage in "piece jobs" in the farms and also cropping on a small portion of land that he was allocated by his nephew. In 2013, after seven years living with his nephew, he was then allocated his own plot by the local chief.

QM, who is now late (born in 1978), acquired an A1 plot in Luma in 2010 after returning from South Africa where he worked as a housekeep/gardener. Having endured a difficult spell in South Africa, QM returned to Zimbabwe and stayed with his sister who is also a land recipient in a nearby A1 scheme, before acquiring his own plot in Luma and became committed to farming on a fulltime basis decided. Despite achieving good results at 'O' level, Qed M was forced to take on menial jobs in South Africa that paid very little. This compelled him to return to Zimbabwe and sought land for full-time farming.

Similarly, BM (aged 52) and her husband had always lived in Bulawayo before settlement in 2008 and never had their own homestead. Her husband was employed as a driver at Haddon

[97] CaD sadly passed away in 2020.

and Sly supermarket in Bulawayo, while BM was working at Toppers clothing shop as a tailor. Back then, "life was better" in town. In 2008, her husband told her that he had acquired land in Vimbi through the assistance of a friend and colleague who was also an A1 farmer in the village, and was therefore planning to build *umuzi*. The decision to acquire land and build a homestead was not BM's preference however. For her, life in rural home was arduous, and thus she was initially not keen on having a plot in the new resettlement areas. But this soon changed as life in town "became increasingly hard" because of the economic downturn.

For others, like FuZ, the decision to join land occupations was borne from a desire to have own rural homestead. 55-year-old FuZ, grew up in Njube township in Bulawayo, and described herself as a "*born-location*" who came "straight from town". Since her father was from Zambia, her family never had *umuzi*. While FuZ's late husband – a war veteran who also worked in the army after independence – did grew up in Khumalo communal areas, the family never had their own *umuzi* because of "lack of good land" in the communal areas. "There were lots of boys", she says, in her husband's family; thus, land was inadequate. When the land occupations began, FuZ and her husband had just moved from Mutare, where her husband had been deployed since 1981, to Bulawayo, where she and her children lived, while the husband was deployed in Hwange. When she heard that "people were taking back the land" in the early 2000s, she "quickly abandoned everything" she was doing in town and "came straight away" to join the occupations since her husband was unable to do so due to work commitments. "At the time, we were busy renovating our house in Bulawayo but I said this can wait", she says. "This is my first ever *umuzi*", she declared with pride.

While in the cases mentioned so far, land was seen as a fall-back resource in the wake of economic hardship when people could not sustain themselves with the income that they were getting from their jobs, others saw new land as a key site for accumulation and opportunity to diversify their business portfolio. FM's story illustrates this point.[98] Fifty-three-year-old FM is an urban-based businessman who acquired his plot in 2010 in Luma. Prior to the acquisition of the farm, FM had been working as a regional manager for a clearing and forwarding company for 17 years. However, in 2009, he fell ill and was diagnosed with hypertension and diabetes. As a consequence, his boss suggested that he would work on a "half day" basis since he was ailing, but this did not sit well with him. He decided to retire. Using his working experience,

[98] FM sadly passed away earlier this year due to stroke.

he eventually set up his own clearance and shipping company, with branches in Beitbridge in Plumtree and Beitbridge border posts. He and his wife also operate a clothing factory in Bulawayo, which supplies Edgars stores. Alongside these businesses, he decided to diversify his sources of income by venturing into farming. Thus, in 2010, he managed to acquire a plot in Luma through the District Lands Office.

For others, such as BdN, who had been trying to eke a living through farming in communal areas, land reform represented a real opportunity to gain access to better land for farming. Those who came from Khumalo communal areas said that the soils are very poor for cropping and susceptible to waterlogging when rains are too much. They also had to contend with marauding baboons. BdN, a widow and war veteran in her early 60s, said that what contributed to her decision to join the liberation struggle was land. In the "reserves", she says, "the soils are very poor and baboons are a big challenge". As a result, she could not produce enough food for her family. "I used to send my children to ask for mealie-meal from "next-door" (neighbours) every time." Widowed, with children to send to school, she said, this was a major incentive to join land occupations. Today, she "has managed to send all her children to school thanks to land reform." Another war veteran in his late 50s, RN, also said:

> The white people were occupying large tracts of land, while our soils in communal areas are poor. It was very difficult to harvest anything, especially if you didn't have manure. Sometimes if it rains too much, there would be water logging. Here, if it rains, we know that we will harvest something. The difference between Chapu area and here is huge. In Chapu, it was difficult to harvest one 50kg bag of maize. If you manage a good harvest, it would be two 50kg bags of maize. But here, it is very easy to harvest a tonne of maize. Livestock does well too.

In the cases of BdN and RN, and in many more that could not be reported here, the key point emphasised in interviews was the return of lost lands through land reform, a major incentive why a brutal war of Independence was fought in the first place. KnN, a war veteran in his early 60s, said that he wanted his own land so that he could farm and improve his life. He emphasised the fact that he fought during the for land. "ZIPRA was saying land to the people. Everyone knows that! The fight was not about money. What we wanted was land!", he says.

In sum, it is clear that land beneficiaries from diverse origins had all sorts of motives and aspirations for gaining access to "new" land, ranging from a crisis of social reproduction amidst high rates of inflation and high cost of living in urban centres, to poor productivity in communal areas, and to expanding sites for accumulation for the relatively better-off. Their demographic characteristics is explored in the next section.

5.3.2 Demographic characteristics

Table A5.2 (Appendix II) presents data on various demographic variables by village and success group. Amongst the 67 households across the two villages, the median number of household members was 8 (mean: 8), ranging between 2 and 17 and spanning about two generations. Comparing the two villages, it can be seen from table A5.4 that the median household size was very similar across both villages, at 8 per household. Across the 67 households, the household size did not vary much across success groups, except that the SG4 households had a slightly smaller household size than other success groups. This in part because most of these households were relatively young and middle age.

In total, 546 household members were recorded across the 67 households surveyed. Of these household members, 61% (n=331) were adults (above 18 years) and 39% (n=215) were children (less than 18 years). Across the 67 households, the mean household members present all or most of the nights was 3.88 persons per household, with a range of 0 to 13. Again, the average measures of members present most or all nights were similar across the success groups, except in SG4 category with none at all. Around 39% (n=128) of the total adult population was present most or all the nights, while the remaining 61% (n=203) lived in nearby farms, cities and abroad, where they engage in wage work or petty trade. The fact that half of the household members are away speaks to the importance of non-farm income in sustaining livelihoods in the resettlement areas, as discussed in Chapter Eight. Of the total adults, nearly half (47% or 154 of 331) were aged between 20 and 31. Within this category, only 3 out of 154 were reported to be engaging in farming on their own in the resettlement areas, of whom two were allocated plots own their own right, reflecting the establishment of second-generation households. During my short revisit in late 2022, I found that incidences of subdivisions were beginning to emerge in A1 resettlement areas. For example, in Vimbi, two farmers had given their young married sons a portion of their land to establish their own homesteads. We might expect that, given the growing demand for land, this trend would increase in future.

Across the two villages, the median household head age was 52 years, ranging from 23 to 78 years. Nevertheless, household heads tend to be relatively old across all success groups, except in SG4 where they tend to be younger and middle-aged, at 44 in Vimbi and 48 in Luma in both men and women rankings. These SG4 households were also smaller in size than in other categories. Considering that those in the SG4 category were relatively young, the difference in age was a factor that explained the difference in household size between SG4 and other

categories. Most farmers were full-time residence on the farms at the time of the survey, despite some having houses in cities. Most absentee households were found in SG4 group. There appears to be little correlation between household size and success.

In gender terms, the vast majority of households (84%) were male-headed, compared to only 16% female-headed households. However, the proportion of female-headed households was high in Vimbi (24% or 7 of 33 cases) than in Luma (9% or 3 of 34 cases). Most of these female household heads acquired land through inheritance following the death of their husbands, in most cases, due to HIV/AIDS. A slight variation was also observed across SG groups in the proportion of female-headed households. In Vimbi, there was a fairly even distribution of female-headed households among success groups, although there were no female-headed households in SG4 category. In Luma, all three female-headed households were found in SG2 and SG3 categories.

Table 5.5: Education level of household head

	Vimbi		Luma		Overall	
Education groups	N	%	N	%	N	%
Gr. 1 - 7	15	46%	16	47%	31	46%
Form 1 - 2	8	24%	5	15%	13	19%
Form 3 - 4	8	24%	11	32%	19	28%
Form 5 - 6	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Diploma	2	6%	2	6%	4	6%
University degree	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 5.6 Distribution of adults by gender and education attainment

Education level	Male	Female	Total
No formal education	0	0	0
Grade 1 - 7	51	36	87
Form 1 - 2	33	22	55
Form 3 - 4	64	78	142
Form 5 - 6	10	10	20
Tertiary	12	15	27
Total	**170**	**161**	**331**

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Nearly 60% of total adult population (189 of 331) had received schooling beyond Form 2, although many seldomly got to complete Form 4 (Table 5.6). Additionally, the general level

of education attainment of household heads in the two villages was very low. Education attainment among SG4 household heads was generally higher than in other categories. This may reflect the increased access to education after Independence of the younger generation. Across the two villages, around 54% of household heads had received post-primary school education, while 46% had received no post-primary education at all. However, the offsprings of the settlers tend to be better educated than their parents, with education financed largely through agriculture, especially livestock. Indeed, most successful farmers emphasized their commitment to investing in their children's education. As ChM in Vimbi explained, "I am not educated myself but I am strongly committed to invest in my children's education. My first son got to Form 4 but didn't do very well. I paid two heifers for him to take a class driver's licence [truck driver's licence]." His case illustrates how those who are engaging in accumulation are trying to ensure economic success of the next generation by investing in their children's education.

However, farmers in both villages complained that accessing school for their children was a major challenge. There are only two "satellite" primary schools in Ward 23 and no secondary schools at all. These schools only have classes up to grade 6. This means that parents have to move their children out of the villages to nearby communal areas, where they lodge with relatives, acquaintances or friends, if they wish their children to continue with schooling beyond grade 6. Additionally, farmers complained that the schools were understaffed and under-resourced, leading to poor standards of education. For example, ChM (above) said that he was compelled to transfer his daughter who was doing grade 2 at Pagati primary school to Kezi where she is now staying with a relative while attending school after his realization that "she could get to grade 7 not being able to read." Accessing schooling out of the farm has its challenges, however. Many farmers said that this was too costly as they had to support several "households". Poor households find it difficult to maintain several households, leading to dropping out of school. Indeed, around 24% of all surveyed A1 households (16 of 67) had at least one out-of-school child (aged between 6 and 17 years). For those who can afford to take their children to nearby schools, it means that children are not always available as a source of unpaid labour in farming.

In both sites, very few farmers (6%) had agricultural training, including 'Master Farmer' certificates and other training from either Hlekwine agricultural training centre or Esigodini agricultural college.

5.3.3 Religion and Church affiliation

In their study of livelihoods following land reform in Masvingo province, Scoones et al. (2010: 71) found that religion and church affiliation were critical in the establishment of social relations and networks in new resettlement areas. They argued that such social relations and networks "play an important role in shaping the outcomes of resettlement in terms of agricultural production, access to inputs and productive assets." (ibid: 71). A recurrent theme in their recent work in different sites across Zimbabwe is the role of Christian forms of religion in agriculture and rural livelihoods.[99] They discovered the rise of Pentecostal churches with charismatic leaders and indigenous African churches of many types in their research sites, with major implications for agriculture, land use and wider patterns of social support. Drawing on their 2017-18 survey in Gutu-Masvingo, for example, Scoones and colleagues found that indigenous African churches were by far the dominant church (53%), followed by Pentecostal churches (25%), Protestants and Roman Catholics (10%). Pentecostal and indigenous African churches are critical in providing marketing and business opportunities for farmers through their annual gatherings.[100] Membership of Christian religion also provide access to labour, draught power and other resources (Scoones et al. 2010). My interrogation into the role of churches in agriculture significantly echoed these findings.

Table 5.7: Region and church affiliation of household heads

	Vimbi		Luma		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Pentecostal/ evangelical churches	3	9%	9	26%	12	18%
Zionists	6	18%	2	6%	8	12%
Seventh Day Adventist	3	9%	2	6%	5	7%
Roman Catholic	0	0%	1	3%	1	1%
Traditional African practices	11	33%	12	35%	23	34%
Methodist Church	0	0%	1	3%	1	1%
Brethren in Christ	0	0%	1	3%	1	1%
Apostolic churches	9	27%	5	15%	14	21%
Salvation Army	1	3%	1	3%	2	3%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

[99] This was part of their ongoing work in Gutu, Masvingo, Mvurwi and Matobo. See, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/tag/church/ (Accessed 21 November 2022).

[100] See, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2022/11/28/religion-agriculture-and-market-dynamics-in-zimbabwe/ (Accessed 28 November 2022.

It was somewhat surprising for me to discover that African traditional practice is relatively common in the A1 sites, with 34% of households declaring no church affiliations. The most dominant church affiliation was local African churches (33%: mainly various forms of Apostolic and Zionists), followed by Pentecostal churches (18%) and Protestants (13%), mainly Seventh Day Adventist. In my study A1 study sites, church membership seems to provide other support mechanisms and networks critically important for agricultural production and livelihood in general, such as facilitating collective work parties (*amalima*) and access to draught power (see Sections 5.3.8 and 5.3.9). In some cases, it enables the creation of savings clubs, whereby monies are collected and distributed as a lump sum to each member in turn on a rotating basis. For example, in Vimbi, seven women formed a group called *Omama obumbano* aimed at helping each other to meet labour requirements and save money to buy kitchen utensils and other resources. As one group member (Mrs MD) explained:

> The Idea to start the group began with Ms Z. She said, 'it's better for us to help each other'. We agreed to the idea and decided to form a group. Today, seven women belong to this group. We take turns to weed each other's crop fields during the growing season. We also decided to contribute USD2 per member on a rotating basis (*ukutshayilana*) and use the money to buy plates and plots because we know that some do not have enough of these. This year we are planning to also help each other to collect firewood once the growing season is over. We will then be returning to the crop fields where we prepare pits for "*gachombo*" (conservation agriculture) later during the year.

The group was set up in 2016. The members were mostly members of the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) church. Some new members then joined in 2019 to bring the membership to up to 11, although some were not necessarily members of SDA church. They then decided to venture into goat production, with each member contributing to the purchase of one female goat.[101] They also had to contribute monies for paying two hired herders and purchasing veterinary drugs. However, after six months or so, they were some disagreements and they decided to sell all the goats and shared the money.

Similarly, another group of women in Luma was also planning to pool money together aimed at buying goats for its members. This group was set up in 2017, and consisted of four women who were members of the Apostolic church.

[101] Interview with Mrs M, Vimbi, 18 November 2022.

5.3.4 Landholdings, use and conservation measures

From the data in Table A5.3, it is apparent that patterns of land ownership were not sharply different between the two villages and success groups, although average size of arable land in Luma (4.6ha) was slightly smaller than in Vimbi (5ha). A significant part of the reason for the differences in landholdings in the two villages is because of various land allocation processes. In Vimbi, the mean farm size (5 hectares) was similar across all success groups, reflecting a uniform land allocation process. In Luma, farms were slightly smaller on average, at 4.6 hectares, and unevenly distributed across success groups. There were widespread informal land allocations in Luma from the 2010 onwards, whereby new entrants received only 4 hectares of land for both arable and residential purposes, rather than the officially stipulated 5 hectares arable land and 0.49 hectares for residential purposes.

Given that these two farms were previously under ranching, all settlers had to start clearing and fencing up their arable land from scratch. This required huge investments in labour and fencing materials. Land beneficiaries did not start clearing their crop fields until in 2001, when plots were officially pegged. In the early years of settlement, beneficiaries in Vimbi undertook cropping on existing irrigation plots, while they were in the process of opening up their crop fields. Each household was allocated 120m x 20m (*"umfolo"*) where they could engage in both dryland cropping and irrigation. However, in 2005, water pump became dysfunctional and efforts to resuscitate it have been futile.

By 2017, a mean area of 2.14 hectares per household had been cleared across the two villages, but land clearing is still an ongoing process. Scoones and colleagues (2010: 78) in their study of 400 households in Masvingo province estimate that the average cost of hiring labour to clear land (including clearing bush and de-stumping) was USD50 per hectare in 2009; "this represents an average investment in land clearance of USD385 per household (including who cleared none)". If we use this average cost of hiring labour of USD50, the mean investment in land clearance in the two villages was USD107 per household. Although this average was, relatively speaking, not as high as in Masvingo province, it is still considerable in this dry area, where crop production is seen as a very risky enterprise.

There are marked differences in the overall land area cleared per household in the two villages The mean land area cleared per household in Vimbi was slightly (2.4ha) than in Luma (1.9ha).

This is presumably because most settlers are still lacking "offer letters". Indeed, many farmers mentioned that they were reluctant to open up large areas of crop fields, which requires huge investments, given that they were still yet to be formalised. For those in the "Old Line", many had only cleared land around their residential stands, with many expanding the residential land illegally to expand their crop farming operations, rather than clearing their main spatially-distant 5ha arable fields. Most interviewees mentioned that these distant arable fields are far away from homesteads, hence making it more difficult to protect against animals. Notably, the one farmer who had opened up his distant arable land had set up makeshift house in the crop field where he now lives all year-round. When I asked him why he was living at the distant crop all year-round, he said that during the rainy season he will be guarding crops and in the dry season, he will be guarding grass for his cattle (see Chapter Seven). However, his stay at the crop field has had ramifications on the development of his residential stand: his homestead is one of the least developed homesteads in the village with only one hut and generally not cleared today.

The mean land area cleared by 2017 generally descends directly with success rank, except for a small dip between SG2 and SG3 households in each village. Also, land area under cultivation also decreases with success rank, with SG1 category cultivating more land during the 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons, while SG4 households cultivated no land at all during the same period. This is not surprising, given that SG4 are absentee households. Overall, patterns of land clearance and use follow the same logic: the top categories have cleared and are cultivating more land than the less successful categories. The mean area cultivated per household during the 2015-16 (bad year) and 2016-17 (good year) seasons was 1.57 and 1.72 hectares, respectively. While there was a slight increase in area cultivated during a good year, it appears that most land is still lying fallow. On average, the area cultivated per household in the two seasons was slightly bigger in Vimbi than in Luma

Besides crop fields, others had established gardens near their homes (31%), distant gardens (30%) or irrigation plots (2%). These are generally very small in size, and are irrigated mainly by hand. In most cases, these small gardens are managed mostly by women and relies on family labour, especially women and children. Leafy vegetables, onions and tomatoes are mainly grown in these gardens for both home consumption and sale. However, water supply was cited as the main constraint during the dry season. In Vimbi, most distant gardens which were established along the banks of Malundi river were washed away during cyclone Dineo in 2017,

and owners had to re-establish them again. In most cases, these gardens were fenced using brushwood, but required significant investment in labour. In Vimbi, both distant and home gardens were concentrated in SG1 and SG2 categories, while in Luma, a high concentration of garden owners was found in SG3 category.

A further important aspect in relation to people's Investment in land is planting of trees and adoption of conservation measures (Scoones et al. 2010: 85). Of the households surveyed across both villages, 84% reported having planted trees (mostly fruits) in the past 5 years, although many said that they had to replant several times because of termites. However, very few (15%) in the whole survey invested in soil conservation measures (contours, ridges etc.): 30% in Luma and none in Vimbi. Many said that they were still waiting for Agritex officers to demarcate the contours for them. At the time of survey in 2017/18, very few farmers in the two villages practised conservation agriculture, with many citing labour issues. One interviewed farmer, a former farmworker, in Luma had placed pits in his crop field to facilitate infiltration into the soil. While the *Pfumvudza/ Intwasa* programme was rolled out after the completion of the surveys, my research assistant who also works as an extension officer and lives in the area estimated that about 20% of households across the two villages took up *Pfumvudza/ Intwasa* during the 2020-21 season, for example. He said that the uptake was generally slow because the heavy soils in the area are difficult to dig by hand, although some farmers hold *amalima* (work parties) to "fast track" the process after the rains.

Investment in conservation measures is also taking place at community level: reviving of boundary fences, paddocks and fire guards. In Luma, for example, the A1 villagers have for many years been concerned that livestock incursions from the nearby Wenlock communal areas is leading to overstocking and degradation of pastures, and lack of paddocks makes it impossible to save grass for the dry period. As a result, the village chairman complained that they "are suffering from a man-made drought".[102] The A1 villagers also blamed Wenlock

[102] A few examples drawn from archival material in private possession in the village give a picture of these perceptions. They complained that boundary and paddock fences were all vandalised by people from Wenlock. In a letter to the then Minister of Home Affairs (Ignatius Chombo), the village chairman wrote: "boundaries are not recognized nor respected by Chief K. Mathema and his subjects. In our view and to ensure sound management of our valuable resource, these need to be restored and respected with the full force of the law and order." The village chairman also pointed out that "residents of Gwanda Wenlock Communal Lands cut and remove fences, thereafter forcing their livestock onto our grazing pastures in a

residents of "indiscriminate cutting down of trees and harvesting of firewood, (b) uncontrolled brick moulding by Wenlock people in the process polluting and silting our dams". As elsewhere, most farm fences have been removed and recycled to fence homesteads and crop fields by land beneficiaries themselves, effectively creating an 'open access' rangeland over which planned grazing is impossible. To address this challenge, farmers in Luma – led by their charismatic chairman – are taking it upon themselves to revive the boundary fences and paddocks in order to arrest the alleged serious environmental degradation. As discussed in Chapter Seven, the re-fencing programme is also about control over land. In other words, the other reason of re-erecting the boundary fence is to keep the neighbouring communal areas people's livestock out of the farm and prevent outsiders from getting firewood and other resources from the farm.

The resuscitation of paddocks was seen by farmers as a means to reserve grass for the dry season, but also as a strategy to obtain cattle loans from the government. The lack of paddocks, it was argued, was making it difficult for them to access cattle loans from the government. As one farmer puts it, "as long as we don't have paddocks, our chances of getting cattle loans [from government] are slim." During the re-construction of fences, the village chairman rallied communal labour from the settlers. Income to purchase fencing material was derived from a pasture leasing arrangement between the land beneficiaries and three brothers from Gwanda who were grazing a total of over 100 head of cattle in the scheme in exchange for USD100 per month. A better-off farmer, who is a businessman in Bulawayo and runs over 100 head of cattle also volunteered to purchase fencing material, and fenced one paddock close to his homestead by himself. In June 2016, the A1 villagers erected a new boundary fence, but this was soon cut a few days after its erection, as discussed in Chapter Seven.

5.3.5 Livestock ownership and access

Cattle, small stock (goats and sheep) and indigenous chickens were the most common animals kept mainly for both household consumption and sale, while donkeys were kept mainly for draught and transport purposes. Sheep are not very common in the two villages. In addition to these animals, some households also kept guinea fowls and turkeys.

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disorderly manner, as a result we are perennially suffering from our man-made drought as grass is denied the window to mature." (A letter to the Minister of Home Affairs, 4 April 2016. Material held in private possession).

Table 5.5 shows the average numbers of cattle owned and accessed per household. Across the two villages, 43% of sampled households (29 of 67) reported owning cattle at settlement. However, the herds were small at this time, with a mean of only 3.7 per household, ranging from 0 to 55. The standard deviation of 8.4 indicates that cattle ownership at settlement was highly variable and skewed. Comparing the two villages, the mean herd size at settlement were very similar across the two villages. However, Vimbi had the largest percentage of households owning cattle at settlement (52% or 17 of 33), compared to 35% (12 of 34). Of all the households interviewed, 69% owned cattle in 2018. However, when cattle owned elsewhere are excluded, the cattle-less households are revealed to be much higher. Only 57% of households owned cattle. Comparing the two villages, a total of 21 out of 33 households (64%) in Vimbi and 17 households out of 34 households surveyed (50%) in Luma reported owning cattle at the farm, which is 24% (from 17 to 21 households) and 42% (from 12 to 17 households) increases in household cattle ownership in Vimbi and Luma, respectively. Across both villages, the percentage increase in households owning cattle at the farm in 2018 was 31%. There was also an increase of 105% (from 3.9 to 8) and 154% (from 3.5 to 8.9) in the mean herd size per household in Vimbi and Luma, respectively. I would argue that these changes in cattle ownership are especially noteworthy as an indicator of herd accumulation among the A1 farmers. A substantial number of households managed to acquire or expand their herds through natural growth, purchase, pasture leasing (*ukulagisa*) and loaning arrangements (*amasiso*). In Luma, it is claimed that some war veterans illicitly appropriated calves from the former white farmer's herd during the land occupations, which they raised by hand.

Table 5.7: Cattle ownership and access across the two villages (mean, with standard deviation in parentheses)

Variable	Vimbi	Luma	Overall
N=	33	34	67
Number of cattle owned at settlement per household	3.9 (9.9)	3.5 (6.7)	3.7 (8.4)
% household owning cattle at settlement	52%	35%	43%
Number of cattle owned per household (incl. elsewhere), 2018	8.3 (10.2)	9.2 (20.0)	8.7 (15.9)
% household owning cattle (incl. elsewhere)	73%	65%	69%
Number of cattle owned per household at the farm, 2018	8.0 (10.4)	8.9 (20.1)	8.0 (15.9)
% household owning cattle at the farm	64%	50%	57%
Number of cattle kept elsewhere owned per household	0.2 (0.9)	0.3 (0.8)	0.3 (0.9)
% household owning cattle elsewhere	9%	21%	15%
Loaned-in cattle (N) per household	1.7 (5.2)	1.3 (3.8)	1.5 (4.5)
% household with loaned-in cattle	12%	15%	13%
Loaned-out cattle (N) per household	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
% household with loaned-out	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Number of cattle owned by non-household members (sharing)	1.1 (3.9)	0.6 (2.8)	0.8 (3.4)
% households with non-household members' cattle (sharing)	9%	6%	8%
% households with cattle in CA	3%	15%	9%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Roughly 15% of households owned cattle elsewhere, but herd sizes were generally small in numbers. The percentage of households who reported owning cattle elsewhere (especially communal areas) was higher in Luma (21%) than in Vimbi (9%). Most of these households with cattle elsewhere had been recently settled and were yet to move their cattle to their new land. Other reasons offered for having cattle elsewhere included uncertainty of land tenure (especially in Luma) and absenteeism. Combining cattle owned elsewhere with cattle owned at the farm, 73% of households surveyed in Vimbi and 65% of households in Luma reported at least owning one beast. However, this did not have substantial impact on the average number of all cattle owned per village.

Overall, the majority of cattle owned by households (97% or 566 of 585 cattle) in 2018 were kept at the villages. Of the 566 cattle kept on the farm, nearly 60% were female, indicating that these are largely breeding herds aimed at building herds (Figure 5.1). Although some households kept oxen for draught power, many households used donkeys for draught purposes while others use spans made of cows. In most cases, male animals were sold at a young age (less than 3 years) as steers in order to fetch better prices based on the beef grading system. The use of cattle as draughter power was most common in Luma.

Table 5.8: Distribution of households according to cattle holdings (median in parathesis)

Household holdings (%)	Vimbi	Luma	Total
N =	33	34	67
0 cattle	27	35	31
1-9 cattle	39	38	39
10 or more cattle	33	27	30
Total*	100	100	100
Mean cattle holdings (incl. elsewhere) - owners only	11.4 (7.5)	14.2 (4.5)	12.7 (6.5)

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Cattle ownership was highly skewed across the two villages. As noted earlier, some households had no cattle at all, while a few people owned very large herds (max. 109).[103] 27% of the households in Vimbi had no cattle, compared to 35% in Luma. Vimbi had a slightly higher number of households owning 10 cattle or more.

Table A5.4 shows a marked difference in livestock holdings across success groups. It is first noticeable that the averages of cattle access, cattle owned at the farm and including elsewhere all descends from richest to poorest. On average, the top category had 3 to 5 times as many cattle as households in SG2 category and at least ten times as many as less successful households. In absolute terms, the SG1 households account for over 70% of all cattle owned (including elsewhere) in each village in 2018. Likewise, absolute numbers of cattle accessed falls directly with success ranking, with the top category displaying a high concentration of all cattle accessed across all villages.

The practice of cattle loaning (*ukusisa*) was not widespread, with only four households out of 33 households surveyed (12.1%) in Vimbi and five households out of 34 households surveyed in Luma having "*amasiso*" cattle in their possession. This finding is consistent with ARDA's (1982: 11) finding in the communal areas in nearby Gwanda district, where only 16% of cattle owners and 13% of non-owners held *amasiso* cattle.

[103] In Luma sample, one household is an outlier with 110 head of cattle, and the farmer was an urban-based businessman.



Figure 5.1: Herd composition in two villages

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Goat ownership features a direct descension, with between 62% (Vimbi) and nearly 72% of all goats concentrated in the richest success group (SG1) except in SG3 category in Luma, which show slightly higher concentration of goats than in SG2 households. This may indicate that some poorer households are investing in goats, which requires relatively low start-up capital.

Some A1 farmers have also invested significantly in donkeys as draught and transport animals. To generalise, as with other livestock, the mean number of donkeys owned descends directly from the most successful (SG1) to the least successful (SG4) households, with households in SG4 having no donkeys at all. Recently, donkey theft has been common in the study areas. The broiler contract project in nearby Khumalo communal areas is believed to be the source of donkey theft which is now rampant in the area. Others believe that people from neighbouring Gwanda district are behind the rampant donkey theft. This has had serious negative impact on access to draft animals for many households in the study areas as discussed below, with some now owning no donkeys at all having lost their donkeys to theft.

5.3.6 Agricultural, transport and domestic assets

It appears that households in Vimbi had relatively more assets than those in Luma. The median value of total assets owned per household was USD1235.66 and USD1066.02 in Vimbi and Luma, respectively. Table A5.7 shows the distribution of asset ownership by village. Only fifteen households (22%) across the two villages owned a car, while only two households (3%) had a truck. The later were all found in Luma. Of the fifteen households owning a car, ten were in Vimbi. None of the households owned a tractor in both villages, while only one household

owned a grinding mill across all surveyed households in both villages. Twenty-seven households (40%) owned a snap-sack sprayer across the two villages, rising to 49% of households in Vimbi. Very few households had fridges, water tanks and pumps. Ownership of cell-phones, bicycles and solar panels were more common in both villages, with almost all households owning a cell-phone.

Table 5.9: Ownership of selected animal-drawn agricultural tools at settlement and present

	Vimbi		Luma	
	At settlement	**At present**	**At settlement**	**At present**
Plough	30%	79%	24%	65%
Scotch cart	27%	58%	12%	41%
Harrow	9%	21%	6%	24%
Cultivator	6%	12%	9%	27%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 5.9 shows the percentage of households owning key agricultural assets at settlement and at present. It shows that most households at settlement had no agricultural assets, but ownership of these assets has increased since settlement. For instance, ownership levels of ploughs have increased significantly in both villages: from 30% to 79% in Vimbi, and from 24% to 65% in Luma. This reflects the importance of the plough as a means of production in crop farming in the two villages. In 2018, a total of 60 ploughs were owned by surveyed households across the two villages, with an estimated value of USD6,871. In addition, there has been significant investment in scotch carts, with an increase in the ownership level of scotch carts from 27% to 58% in Vimbi, and 12% to 41%. Percentage ownership levels of harrows and cultivators has also risen in both villages, although ownership of these assets was still very low. In most cases, farmers indicated that they use a plough to remove weeds within rows rather than a cultivator. While there is a substantial increase in ownership levels of ploughs and scotch carts in both villages, it is clear that the percentages are slightly higher in Vimbi than Luma. This could be explained by the fact that most farmers in Vimbi are better-endowed than farmers in Luma. Moreover, production levels (especially crops) have been much higher in Vimbi than Luma, allowing for the acquisition of agricultural assets. In the past five years (2013-2017), 27% (9 of 33), 15% (5 of 33) and 9% (3 of 33) of households in Vimbi had purchased ploughs, scotch carts and harrows, respectively, as compared to 9% (3 of 34), 15% (5 of 34) and 12% (4 of 34) in Luma, respectively. In the two sites, only seven households of the 67 sampled households (five in Vimbi and two in Luma) reported receiving a plough under the Farm Mechanization Programme of 2008. All of these recipients were war veterans.

Table A5.7 shows the distribution of assets by success groups. It is clear that asset ownership also differs with success group. In Vimbi, it is notable that asset ownership directly descends from the most successful (SG1) to the least successful (SG4) households. The pattern is largely similar in Luma, although SG3 households tend to own more solar panels and bicycles. In line with other recent A1 studies (Scoones et al. 2017), the acquisition of solar panels and bicycles in the last 5 years (especially in Luma) was concentrated in SG2 and SG3 households. As Scoones (2017: 9) remarks, "[m]any richer A1 households had acquired such items in previous years, and had now switched to other investments including buying high-cost such as cars, trucks, and mini-buses and real estates in nearby towns, having exhausted immediate investment opportunities locally." However, the rate of such accumulation patterns is relatively slow in Matobo, in part because of the variable nature of production.

5.3.7 Housing, water, sanitation and energy

As elsewhere, most farmers had to start building house infrastructure from scratch. In the early years of settlement, settlers set up makeshift pole and dug houses. Today, the vast majority of houses, formerly constructed with pole and dug, have been replaced by modern dwellings made of brick and tin/asbestos roof, and elaborately furnished with a wide range of costly consumer goods purchased with income from agriculture. Many are in the process of building new houses or renovating the old ones. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 shows the distribution of housing quality in each village. In absolute terms, it is clear that the proportion of houses constructed of brick and tin/asbestos houses was slightly higher in Vimbi (62% or 41 of 66), as compared to 57% (32 of 56). Luma had the highest proportion of pole and dug housing (27% or 15 of 56) than in Vimbi (20% or n= 13). Moreover, 79% (26 of 33) of all households surveyed in Vimbi had at least one house constructed of brick and tin/asbestos roof, compared to 56% (19 of 34) in Luma. These differences can be largely explained by the fact that many settlers in Luma lacked offer letters, especially those who were illegally settled along the "New line". They feared that they might be evicted from the farm altogether, hence the reluctance to build better houses. Overall, the building of new housing infrastructure is very costly, often requiring substantial capital.



Figure 5.2: Quality of housing in Vimbi



Figure 5.3: Quality of housing in Luma

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey.

As previously mentioned, the quality of housing was viewed as an indicator of wealth and success by participants during success ranking exercises. Indeed, there is a strong and significant association between quality of housing and success. From the data in Table 5.10, nearly 73% of all houses owned by SG1 households (most successful) were made of brick and tin/asbestos roof, compared to roughly 67% of those belonging to SG2 households, while among the SG3 households, most of whom cannot afford to build houses of this kind, the percentage drops to around 39%.

Table 5.10: Type of housing by success groups (N=67)

Success Group	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4
Pole and mud	15%	13%	41%	20%
Brick and thatch	13%	20%	21%	20%
Brick and tin/asbestos	73%	67%	39%	60%
Total houses	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	48	30	39	5

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

With regards to sanitation infrastructure, 94% of households in Vimbi had invested in construction of a traditional latrine with roof (including, Blair toilet) compared to 47% in Luma. Again, most farmers in Luma said that they were concerned about the ongoing conflict and the fact that they still lacked offer letters to invest in toilets. Thus, a high proportion of households reported not having any toilet facility (implying defecation in the bushes) was found in Luma (32%), as compared to only 3% in Vimbi. In recent years, however, A1 farmers have received cement through the UNICEF's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Programme (WASH) to build toilets. Hence, some had opened up toilet pits and were in the process of constructing Blair toilets. Only one better-off household in Luma had invested in a flush toilet with a sceptic tank.

Table 5.11: Type of toilet used by household

	Vimbi		Luma		Overall	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Flush	0	0%	1	3%	1	2%
Latrine with roof, incl. Blair toilet	31	94%	16	47%	47	70%
Open latrines	1	3%	6	18%	7	10%
No toilet at household	1	3%	11	32%	12	18%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

With regards to access to water, over half of households surveyed in Luma (56% or 19 of 34) reported drawing water for domestic use from unprotected wells and rivers compared to 46% (15 of 33) in Vimbi. While over one-half (55% or 18 of 33), reportedly rely on communally-owned borehole in Vimbi, and 41% (14 out of 34) in Luma. Given the deep underlying water table in the area, the two hand pump boreholes in the area that were drilled are located along the main rivers, which is far away from the homesteads, thereby presenting transport challenges. These boreholes were drilled by NGOs such as UNICEF. Some farmers had invested in individual shallow wells, but most of these wells are ephemerals, only holding water

during the rainy season. Only one rich household in Luma had piped water, where water was pumped from a nearby dam using a small, mobile Chinese water pump. The same household was also in the process of constructing a small earth dam near his homestead.[104] Across the two villages, only six water pumps were recorded.

Table 5.12: Main type of water source used by household

	Vimbi		Luma		Overall	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Piped	0	0%	1	3%	1	2%
Hand pump	18	55%	14	41%	32	48%
Protected well	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Unprotected well	13	39%	18	53%	31	46%
River/stream/dam	2	6%	1	3%	3	5%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 5.13: Main source for lighting

	Vimbi		Luma		Overall	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Candles	3	9%	4	12%	7	10%
Solar lights	11	33%	8	24%	19	28%
Battery/ dry cells	19	58%	22	65%	41	61%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

In terms of sources for lighting, it can be seen in table 5.13 below that virtually all households used solar and battery/dry cell lights for lighting. These were mainly cheap Chinese lights, imported from South Africa and Botswana. Very few households reported using candles, while none at all used paraffin. Across the two villages, over two-thirds (70%) of all the households surveyed reported owning a solar panel. The proportion of households with solar panels was similar in both villages, at 70%.

5.3.8 Patterns of production and employment

So far, we have established that the new farmers have made significant investments on their new land. This section will now examine patterns of production in the two villages. But before going on to examine these patterns, I should say something about the general features of the emerging farming system. Based on the formal agro-ecological classification, the study area is

[104] According to the household, the cost of the dam construction stood at USD6000, conservatively, since commencement in 2015.

recommended for semi-extensive ranching and crop production under irrigation.[105] In such a setting, it is therefore unsurprising that the former white owners specialised in cattle and wildlife ranching, and occasionally small-scale irrigation in Vimbi. Today, the A1 farms have changed from a farming system predominantly focussed on livestock ranching (particularly cattle) into a fully mixed crop-livestock farming system (cf. Woolmer et al. 2002).

Some households are more focussed on small-scale livestock production, holding relatively large herds and flocks and regularly selling these animals for cash, although they also pursue dryland cropping. Yet, others base their livelihood largely on dryland cropping, with small herds serving as agricultural input in the form of draught power and manure. However, cropping is largely precarious given the area's low agro-potential conditions. Despite this, Nel and Mabhena (2020) have debunked the myth that the area was not suitable for crop production. Maize is the most dominant crop grown across the two sites, despite government and NGO officials' insistence that farmers must cultivate small grain crops that are more drought tolerant than maize. As discussed above, some households are involved in gardening through small-scale irrigation, but water supply was identified as a major constraint. Most rivers are ephemeral, making it difficult to find water during the dry season. Agricultural production in Matobo district does not, however, simply replicate patterns found in better-watered regions of Mashonaland. With recurrent drought, both arable and livestock production are risky enterprises. Production systems are characterised by periodic 'boom and bust' cycles – good years followed by bad years. As a consequence, this has ramifications for processes of accumulation and social differentiation.

5.3.8.1 Hybrid livestock production system

In general, the emerging livestock system of these new smallholder A1 farmers is distinct from that of the erstwhile white ranchers. For example, the former white commercial ranchers specialised in commercial production with animals raised for single purpose (i.e., beef). For their part, these new smallholder farmers keep cattle for multiple purposes and are managed under an extensive system. In other words, livestock have a range of uses far wider than in commercial ranching, largely focussed on off-take (meat or milk). A number of studies in the communal areas production system, which shares similar characteristics to the A1 villagised sites, have documented the value of cattle in household economy and production system

[105] As discussed in Chapter Three, the area lies in Natural Regions IV and V (Vincent and Thomas 1960).

(Scoones 1992; Barrett 1992; ARDA 1987; Danckwerts 1974). Regardless of the different methodological approaches used to measure the value of cattle in each study, these studies show that the value of cattle as agricultural input (source of draught power and manure) outweighs other functions. GFA (1983) found a positive correlation between cattle holdings and land area under cultivation as well as maize yield. Cousins (1996: 181) observes in the South African context, that "which functions are important depends on a number of factors", arguing that "one influence is agro-ecological zone: livestock sales maybe important in dry areas with poor cropping potential than elsewhere".

A1 resettlement areas studied are no exception in this regard. As with other regions in the country, cattle have multiple functions in the household economy and production system in the studied villages. Only 16% of households (11 of 67) in my sample reported using cattle for draught power. There is a strong belief among the A1 farmers that using cows for draught power reduces their ability to conceive, while selling oxen after a long and hardworking life would lead to their meat being of very low quality, thus; reduces their market value. As one farmer put it, "I don't plough with cattle because it is money. If you use cows to plough, they won't give you calves more often. If you plough with oxen, they lose value because the meat will be muscles only." Another farmer also declared, "I use donkeys to plough because cattle is my money." Thus, in contrast to Mashonaland where oxen are only sold after a long and hard-working life, oxen/steers are sold at a very young age (usually 3 years) in order to ensure that their meat is of very good quality and better prices in line with the beef grading system in Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, the farmers in my sample overwhelmingly acknowledged the importance of cattle as a source of manure. In fact, most farmers were reluctant to use chemical fertilisers, arguing that it leads to crop burns. Additionally, cattle are also widely recognised as stable savings. This is, of-course, not a new phenomenon, but the volatility of the economy has given a new impetus to invest in cattle. "Cattle is your bank these days", is a phrase I heard repeatedly as farmers conveyed the importance of investing in cattle.

33% of the surveyed households in Vimbi and 27% in Luma had a herd size of ten and more, which is estimated by Behnke (1983, 1987) as the minimal number required for surplus off-take and self-sustaining of the herd. Across the two samples, 27% of the households surveyed reported selling cattle in the last 12 months. Comparing the two villages, Vimbi had more households (36%) who sold cattle in the previous 12 months than in Luma (24%). Of the 20

households reporting cattle sales, the mean number of cattle sold per household was 3.95, with a range of 1 to 27.

Table 5.13: Total number of cattle sold in last 12 months (2016-17)

Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Range	Min.	Max.	Sum
3.95	2.00	5.698	26	1	27	79

Note: the number of households in the sample reported selling cattle last year is 20.

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Of the total 79 cattle sold, the majority were steers and oxen (63.3%), followed by cows (16.5%), heifers (12.7%), bulls (6.3%) and calves (1.3%). Table A5.9 (Appendix II) summarises the most frequently cited buyers of cattle among the 20 households who reported selling cattle in 2016-2017. With the collapse of CSC, the most frequently cited buyer was the local farmers (42%) for breeding or speculative purposes, followed by middlemen (31%) who are working with former white ranchers who have set up abattoirs in Bulawayo after having their farms expropriated by the state for resettlement. Other cited cattle markets include auctions (12%), direct sales at abattoirs (8%), local butcher (4%) and other markets (4%). While the majority of cattle sales were to middlemen, many farmers complained that these middlemen were "robbing" them of their animals because they buy animals at low prices.

In general, farmers concur that selling their cattle directly at abattoirs or auctions would increase their chances of getting fair prices for their animals. However, many farmers stated that the transport and police clearance costs were prohibitive. Thus, only a few farmers, often better-off, with their own transport or means to hire transport reported selling their cattle at the abattoirs or auctions in Bulawayo. In 2017-18, the cost of transporting cattle to Bulawayo was USD50 per animal. Additionally, when the animals are transported to town, it also reduces their bargaining power to negotiate better prices with buyers in a market dominated by buyers' cartels. Selling at farm gate therefore increases the farmer's bargaining power as the farmer has a choice to keep his/her animals if they are not satisfied with the price offered by a buyer, whereas if farmer moves his animal to town for sale, he/she might require to hire transport to take it back to the farm, which will be costly.

Unlike the erstwhile white commercial farmers who kept pure-bred cattle (e.g., Simmental, Brahman, Beef master etc.), these are mainly cross-bred cattle. For some farmers who are focussed on livestock production for sale, the quality of animals is important. Such farmers

were investing in exotic bulls (e.g., Brahman, beef master etc.) in order to improve the quality of their herd, reflecting a process of intensification. One prominent livestock farmer (FM) interviewed in Luma bought a mature brahman bull for USD2800 and a six-month-old Brahman bull from a nearby white farmer for USD600 in 2017. "I changed the bulls because I am running away from inbreeding. I therefore replace my bulls after three to four years when it starts chasing after its own daughters. I am also going for quality and animals with big frames", he says. But he reports that, despite his efforts to eliminate in-breeding, "it is difficult because your neighbour might select a bull that is an offspring of your bull".

5.3.8.2 Opportunistic crop production

Despite the formal classification of land suitability and natural regions, dryland cropping is still an important aspect of livelihood strategies across the two villages. In both villages, maize is the most important crop although small grains such as sorghum and millet are also grown. Grain output is highly variable largely because of the vagaries of rainfall. My survey looks at crop production during a "bad year" (2015/16) and "good year" (2016/17). Although the mean annual precipitation of 403mm was recorded at the nearest meteorological station in Kezi during the 2015/16 season, the rainfall varied across space and time. For instance, the farmers reported a dry spell between October and December 2015, leading to crop burns. As a consequence, some households (39% or 26 of 67) were forced to re-plough and re-sow their crop fields in January 2016. These households tended to be better-off with access to both draught power of their own and means to hire draught power and purchase seeds. Those who replanted their crop fields in January managed to harvest enough maize for consumption until the next growing season thanks to their persistence. Ms BN for example sowed her crop fields three times during the 2015-16 season. She explained: "I first ploughed and sowed my crop field in October after the first rains, but the crops were burnt. I ploughed and sowed again, but the crops were burnt again. Some gave up, but I replanted again in January (2016) and I harvested sixteen 50kg bags of maize." While replanting appeared to be an effective strategy to remedy the effects of the dry spells, it is important to note that this was not possible for some asset-poor households who lacked seeds and draught power (often dependent on others or hiring). In sum, grain production during the 2015-16 season was very low as a result of mid-season drought. Amongst the 67 households surveyed, the mean harvest of all grain per household during the 2015/16 season was 392.4kg (the mean total of maize harvested was 325.7kg and sorghum was only 66.7kg), though this varied with each village. Similarly, levels

of crop sales were also very low, with only three households (5%) reporting sales during this season.

By contrast, following season (2016/17) there was a bumper crop thanks to the good rains. The mean grain yield in 2016/17 (good year) was around 1500kg per household across the two villages, with substantial variations between success groups, as well as villages themselves. For example, the mean grain yield in Luma was somewhat lower, at 954kg per household, than in Vimbi, at 2049kg per household. Farmers in Luma pointed out that their crop fields were waterlogged because of Cyclone Dineo. The mean maize yield in particular during a good year was 1426kg per household. Across the two villages, over half (52%) of surveyed households reported harvesting a tonne or more of grain during the 2016-17 season. 27% of households reported selling surplus maize during the same season – again with substantial variation between villages. For example, over two thirds (67%) of surveyed households in Vimbi reported harvesting a tonne or more of grain, compared to less than a third (29.4%) of households in Luma. Also, 46% (or 15 of 33) of households in Vimbi sold surplus maize in 2016/17 season, of which 11 of the 15 households managed to sell a tonne or more of maize. In contrast, only 12% (4 of 34) of households in Luma, nearly a four-fold difference with Vimbi, reported selling some maize in 2016-17 season. Of these four households, only one sold a tonne or more. Of the 25,330kg of maize in 2016-17, 57% was sold to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). However, farmers faced lengthy delays in payment for their produce. One household had not received payment for the maize it had sold in 2016-17 by the end of my fieldwork in March 2018. As a result of such delays, some farmers interviewed said that they prefer to sell their produce to communal areas farmers and traders. Overall, during good years, part of the harvest is sold and profits are invested on the farm and beyond. Such investments include purchasing motor vehicles, livestock and building/renovating houses.

While yields vary depending with the season, there was a general consensus among the farmers that maize yields in resettlement areas were much higher than in the communal areas where they came from. As one farmer put it: “Here, we no longer talk of few bags of maize, we talk of tonnes!” Given the risk and uncertainty inherent in dryland agriculture, most farmers emphasized the need to reserve a significant portion of their maize after a bumper harvest, allowing one good year’s bumper crop to get the household through multiple years of little harvest. In order to ensure that the stored harvests last for a long period of time, it is treated with storage chemicals to prevent weevil infestation.

In terms of inputs, 22% of all households surveyed in the two villages used manure in 2015-16 season. Despite good rains during the next season, manure application remained largely similar in the 2016/17 season, with only 27% of households reporting having used manure. However, the proportion of those who used inorganic fertilizer increased from 54% in 2015/16 season to 61% in 2016/17 season. While many people reported use of inorganic fertilizers, the quantities used were generally small. Only 6% of households reported purchasing inorganic fertilizer in 2016-17 season, but many received free inputs from the state's Presidential Input Scheme. However, for most farmers, these meagre supplies were inadequate to sow large portions of crop fields. Hence, most farmers had to supplement these inputs through own purchase or retaining seeds from previous harvests.



Figure 5.4: Percentage of households using various strategies to plough in 2015-16 season



Figure 5.5: Percentage of households using different types of tillage methods in 2016-17 season

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Figure 5.4 and 5.5 shows the percentages of households using various strategies for tillage in 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons. These figures show that farmers use different strategies to till their land in any given year, although the figures are not very different between the two seasons. The survey data illustrate that many A1 farmers rely on animal traction for tillage. As elsewhere, draught power can be accessed through various institutional arrangements, including hiring, borrowing, pairing and loaning arrangements (see Bratton 1984; Muchena 1992; Scoones et al. 1996; Wolmer et al. 2002). Amongst those who used animal draught power, donkeys were the most preferred draught animals, and very few cases of cattle being used for draught power were observed. As discussed earlier, it is widely believed that using oxen for draught power will reduce their market value.

Across the two sites, none of the farmers owned a tractor. However, better-off households reported hiring tractors from a nearby self-contained farmer, although the percentages of those hiring tractors for tillage was largest in Vimbi (30% in 2015-16 and 2016-17) compared to Luma (around 12% and 9% in 2015-16 and 2016-17, respectively). The cost of hiring a tractor was USD65 per acre (i.e., 100m x 20m). Farmers who reported hiring tractors for tillage stressed that this allowed them to quickly plant large areas soon after the first rains, given the fact that the period by which the soils will be moist is generally short. However, there are only two farmers in the area who are offering tractor hiring services, leading to delays in ploughing. In most cases, the remaining cropping area would be ploughed using animal traction. In 2015-16 and 2016-17, Luma had the highest proportion of farmers who reported using own draught animals at 41% in both seasons, as compared to 33% in Vimbi. However, poor households without own draught animals gained access through hiring draught teams and 'borrowing' from other villagers or nearby communal areas. However, as Wolmer et al. (2002: 164) observes, "borrowing' of draught power rarely means 'free' in an absolute sense. The implicit assumption is that the borrower will be available for assistance at a later date." In Luma, one farmer was 'lending' his donkeys for tillage to a neighbour in exchange for grazing his cattle in the crop fields during the dry season.

Some farmers who do not own a full span of draught animals enter into 'pairing' arrangements with relatives, friends or fellow church members with few animals as well. However, such arrangements are not without their challenges, as exemplified by the case of JM in Vimbi. JM owns a herd of three donkeys, hence cannot make a span of four donkeys. The first two donkeys (male and female) were purchased using the proceeds he got after selling a heifer he received

as payment for leasing out pastures during the 2011-12 drought. In 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons, he combined his two donkeys and the headman's three donkeys to make a span of five. At this time, JM did not have a plough; thus, the headman would also provide the plough. However, they were some challenges. Mrs JM explained: "One morning, my son went to collect the donkeys and plough from the headman's homestead, only to be told that we could not have them that day, despite the fact that it was our turn to plough our fields. My son returned in tears. We were the last to have our fields ploughed. Each time when it was our turn, the headman's wife would come up with excuses such as, 'today we are going to plough K's (her son) field or 'ah *khulu* said we must plant all the seeds today." Before the two-season stint with the headman, JM had a pairing arrangement with Mrs N, but she would complain that her plough was wearing out. Thus, the arrangement was short-lived. All these challenges prompted Mrs JM to buy her own plough in June 2017 using her salary from a three months' casual job at the Ministry of Roads. Despite this, JM's herd of donkeys were still few to make up his own span. Thus, in the 2017-18 season, he entered into a new 'pairing' arrangement with LM, who owns two donkeys. In the previous seasons, LM had four donkeys, which was enough to make up his own span, but sold one to cover children's school fees while the other one died, leaving him with only two.

As mentioned above, donkey theft has been rampant in the area in recent times. With the loss of many donkeys due to theft in recent years, many (especially in Vimbi) are now resorting to tractor hire for ploughing due to lack of draught power. For example, Mr StM owned over 8 herd of donkeys during the 2017-18 survey, but in late 2022 eight of the household's donkeys had been stolen and was left with two sick ones. This means that they now have to rely on tractor hiring to plough all their 4 hectares cleared, whereas in the past they would only plough an acre with a tractor and the rest with their donkeys. However, the use of hired tractor had its own challenges. During the time of fieldwork, there was only two tractor hiring service providers in the area. Thus, ploughing was often late, because of the heavy demand for tractor ploughing.

Others simply hoe the land by hand. In 2015-16 and 2016-17 seasons, 24% and 27% of households, respectively, in Luma reported hoeing, compared to none across the same seasons in Vimbi. Differences in access to social relations and networks may be associated with these differences. In Vimbi, as we have seen, there are extensive social networks among the farmers, in part, because the majority of farmers hailed from the same area. Such social networks mean

impoverished households can overcome challenges of draught power through forging borrowing and pairing arrangements with better-off relatives and friends. For instance, when Mr ChM arrived in the village in 2003, he had no donkeys or a plough. Thus, he used to borrow donkeys and a plough from his uncle (father's brother), who is also settled in the same village. In Luma, very few households came from the same areas, with long-established kin linkages. Moreover, a significant number of settlers are new entrants settled in 2010 from different areas; thus, many of these settlers have no close relatives in the village and so farm alone.

While cattle are rarely used for draught power, they are still important for the provision of manure. Indeed, having access to cattle allowed some households to engage in successful cropping. Most farmers said that they were reluctant to use chemicals fertilisers for fear of crop burns. Instead, many farmers preferred manure application as a strategy to enhance soil fertility.

As Table A5.11 shows, there is a substantial correlation between cattle holdings and area cultivated and maize yield exists. Table A5.12 revealed that both mean area under cultivation and maize yields all ascends directly from stockless to large herds, except for a small dip in land area cultivated in Luma during the 2016-17 season between 1-9 cattle group (2.4ha) and 10 or more cattle group (2ha). Absolute area under cultivation during both the 'bad year' (2015-16) and 'good year' (2016-17) similarly increase directly with cattle ownership, with middle and largest herd owners boasting far more land under cultivation. Similarly, average maize production also ascends directly from stockless to the largest herd owners. It is apparent from this table that maize yield in a good year (2016-17) of households with large herds (10 or more cattle) were 4 and 2.5 times higher than the maize yields of households without cattle in Vimbi and Luma, respectively.

In terms of patterns of differentiation in relation to crop production, it is clear that the SG1 category, on average, produce relatively larger quantities of maize output and are far more likely to sell surplus after bumper harvests, although quantities sold also varied by village. In a 'good year', the average maize output was nearly double that of the whole sample. During the 2016-17 season, for instance, the average maize sales for the top category was at least double than that of the less successful categories. In addition, they also use more inorganic fertilisers and improved maize seeds. While smallholder A1 farmers are provided with inputs for free under the Presidential Input Scheme by the state, households in this top category reported buying additional inputs to meet their needs. Moreover, some successful farmers in

the top category were reluctant to plant the SC403 certified maize seed (*inkawu*) supplied by the government because of perceived low yields and weight. They also argued that the maize grains were highly susceptible to infestation by weevils (*sitophilus zeamais*), hence could not be stored over a longer period of time. As one successful crop farmer in Vimbi explained: "We don't use *inkawu* from government because it does not give good yields plus it doesn't have a lot of weight when selling. Instead, we use ZAP61 variety that we buy ourselves. We heard it being advertised in the radio and we decided to try it. The grain has a very good weight and yield." Rainfall variability is a major challenge even in crop farming. In order to successfully undertake crop in such settings, most successful farmers follow weather forecasts (mainly via radio), and try to source early maturing varieties. In addition, others stagger sowing so their crops mature and can be harvested at different times.

In contrast, the poorest households had, on average, produced very small quantities of grain and sold small quantities of maize. Rumours abound that some financially-troubled households in SG2 and SG3 categories were selling their fertilizers offered under the Presidential Input Scheme at lower prices than the market price for immediate cash. Interestingly, however, it was not the wealthier villagers who were buying this cheap fertiliser but rather to "people from Mashonaland". As noted above, most farmers interviewed said that they were reluctant to use chemical fertilizers because of fear of crop burns. Instead, they prefer to use manure or ant-hill.

5.3.9 Labour use

In terms of labour use, most A1 farmers rely on unpaid family labour. Across the two villages, only 28% of sampled households (19 of 67) reported having permanent workers, with a mean of 0.3 per household (ranging from 0 to 7). Of these 19 households, the majority (11) were in Vimbi, while the remaining eight were found in Luma. Across the 67 households surveyed, a total of 25 permanent workers was recorded. Of these, all but two were men. The majority of the farm workers (21 out of 25 or 84%) were hired for both cropping and livestock related work, while only three were mainly hired for domestic work (e.g., cooking, cleaning etc.). Only one permanent worker was employed solely for livestock-related work. The two female permanent workers found in the sample were mainly employed for domestic work. In terms of the farmer workers' origins, many hailed from outside the district, particularly marginalised areas such as Nkayi and Binga. Of all households hiring permanent workers, the mean annual wage bill was USD1098.95 per household, ranging from USD840 to USD6480. In most cases,

the permanent workers are provided with accommodation and food (mainly eating with the family).

In addition, households also rely on temporary hired labour: 53.6% of households (15 of 33) in Vimbi and 46.4% households (13 of 34) in Luma hired temporary workers at some point during the 12 months preceding the survey. A total of 78 temporary workers were recorded across the 67 households, with a mean of 1.16 per household. 90% of all temporary workers in my sample were men. These temporary workers largely came from nearby communal areas (including the settlers' original home areas), but also within the villages. The temporary workers were recruited for a wide range of activities, including crop field clearance, digging out manure, harvesting, threshing, fencing, weeding and ploughing services. In most cases, female casual workers were hired for weeding, harvesting and threshing.

In addition to unpaid family and hired labour, some A1 farmers also rely on work parties (*"amalima")*. This system is an old practice of voluntary pooling of labour based on reciprocity to assist each other in various agricultural tasks, such as weeding and transporting manure or termite hills to the field. In Vimbi, 70% of those surveyed households (23 of 33) reported holding at least one work party ("ilima") during the 2016-17 season, compared to only 9% (3 of 34) in Luma. Several collective labour groups were identified in the two villages. The first group, *Bambanani* (which literally mean unite) in Vimbi, was started by two households that were friends and neighbours in the communal areas prior to settlement, with a long history of pooling of labour to assist each other, and had 24 household members at the time of fieldwork.. As one member (ChM) put it:

> We used to have lots of *amalima* in ward 16 in Khumalo communal areas, where I grew up. I am one of the co-founders of *ilima* group called *Bambanani*. The idea to start *ilima* was started by the late DN in 2006. DN and my father were very good friends for a very long time and were both good farmers in the communal areas. When DN resettled here, my father remained in the 'reserves'. However, in 2006, they decided to continue doing the work parties for transporting manure to the crop fields. So that year, my father held *ilima* for transporting manure to the crop field and invited us to attend. During that time, I didn't have a scotch cart myself, so we took DN's scotch cart, donkeys as well as my uncle JM's donkeys (also an A1 farmer) and made a span, and went to attend my father's *ilima* in the 'reserves'. I went along with DN and my uncle JM's son who is now late. We worked the whole day and returned here in the evening. In 2007, DN then held *ilima* for transporting manure and my father came to help us. At the time, I had bought my own scotch cart. So, there were so many scotch carts including my neighbours' here. Since then, *amalima* continued between my father and DN until DN's passing in 2012. After DN's passing, the practice discontinued, however. In 2013, DN's son and myself decided to revive the practice again because there is too much hard work here. We started attending *amalima* in the reserves again. In 2014, some A1 settlers began to join as well after realising that the practice was good. In 2015, we even

> had a meeting to encourage those who had not as yet joined to do so, especially asset-poor households without scotch carts. We felt that those of us with scotch carts were excluding them. We told them that we do not discriminate against anyone. Our aim is to help each other. We encourage those without cattle to dig up termite hills (i*sidhuli*) and we will help transport it into the fields. This is how *Bambanani* was conceived. Today, 20 out of 35 households in the village are regular members or participants.

The excerpt above demonstrates how long-term social relations and networks dating back before resettlement are vital for accessing labour. It is also clear that collective labour parties extend beyond the resettlement areas to include relatives and friends from original communal areas, reflecting the continued links with communal areas.

The second group, *Omama obumbano*, in Vimbi, consisted exclusively of women often linked to SDA church membership (though not entirely) and had seven members in 2018. The group members, some of whom or their partners, were also members of *Bambanani*. The aim of the group was to weed each other's crop fields and collection of firewood during the dry season in turns. The last group, *Ilima labalimi* (which means a work party for farmers) in Luma was established in 2017 and had only five households as members at the time. The aim was to help each with agricultural work, including fencing of crop fields and digging pits for conservation agriculture. As discussed in Section 5.3.3, the group members were mostly from similar church sect, although members from other religion organisations were welcome to join.

5.4 Land conflicts

In Luma, there has been an ongoing conflict between A1 villagers and neighbouring Communal Lands (CL) farmers from Wenlock communal areas. The dispute dates back from the early 2000s, and two key causes lie at the heart of this dispute. The first one relates to how this newly acquired land was to be used. Divergent perceptions on this matter existed between the state and the adjacent CL farmers, with the latter requiring the farm to be used for grazing purposes (i.e., extension of the commons) rather than human settlement. A recurrent theme in the interviews was a sense amongst the CL livestock farmers in Wenlock that they did not feel congested; instead, they wanted additional grazing land for their animals. As one war veteran from Wenlock put it:

> When this farm was invaded, we said we don't want to come and build here. We knew that we benefit from our cattle. Today we are congested in Wenlock because we did not want to build here. We wanted our 20% [of the farm] that we agreed with the government to be used as grazing for our

> cattle, so that they can survive. I am a man because of "i*nkomo"* (cattle). If you take "i*nkomo"* away from me, it's like you are dressing me up without a "*pantie*" [underwear].[106]

This comment echoes the work of Alexander (1991) who found that there was a limited sign-up for 'Model A' scheme of the 1980s in Matabeleland South province because livestock farmers wanted additional land for grazing rather than resettlement. The war veterans from Wenlock argued that cattle farming is their main economic activity, hence they didn't want to be resettled in the farm as part of the war veteran quota because they wanted it to be used for grazing purposes. They argued that the farm is a fundamental area on which their livelihoods were based.

Prior to 2000, the Wenlock villagers had a gentleman's agreement with the former white commercial farmer dating as far back as the 1960s, allowing them to graze their cattle in several peripheral paddocks during times of drought. This meant that these informal rights were extinguished following land reform, leading to conflict, a reflective of the power of gentlemen's agreement in current land politics. These paddocks, which provided a store of forage for drought times, are now occupied by A1 settlers. The local Chief of Wenlock and his followers wanted the farm to be used for grazing purposes only under the customary '*mlaga*-type' grazing management system. Some prospective land reform beneficiaries from Wenlock who were keen to acquire land for human settlement in the scheme were even blocked from doing so by local influential figures (e.g., war veterans), who often own large herds of cattle. On its part, the state designated the farm as an A1 villagised scheme, a scheme seen as in favour of crop production.

The second issue concerns who was supposed to benefit from the newly acquired farm. The state gave precedence in the allocation of land to residents from Matobo at the expense of CL residents from Wenlock communal areas in Gwanda, who were considered "outsiders". In particular, residents of Wards 16 and 17 in Matobo were set as land reform beneficiaries. However, Ward 17 failed to fulfil its quota because of lack of interest in resettlement and the local politics of the time. Consequently, in the end it was agreed that prospective beneficiaries from Ward 17 would be replaced by residents from Gwanda. This conflict was further inflamed by Luma A1 settlers, with support from the late Chief Malaki Masuku and local councillor of ward 23, who decided to resettle 'illegal settlers' along the farm boundary to the east in 2010

[106] Mr M. Ndlovu, war veteran. 15 June 2016, Luma.

as a strategy to deny Wenlock villagers from accessing grazing and other natural resources. A total of twenty-one households were settled along this border, and has become known as the "New line". According to the village chairman, the farm during this period had very few full-time households, making it difficult "impossible or very difficult to police the farm". Chief Mathema of Wenlock and his subjects were further enraged by this decision, who issued an ultimatum to the illegal settlers, demanding that they should leave the farm or face violence that was faced by former white-commercial farmers during invasions.[107] Despite threats of violence, the illegal settlers remained put.

In June 2016, the Luma A1 villagers re-fenced the farm boundary line on the eastern side of the farm to prevent Wenlock communal areas people and their animals from entering their farm. As a response, the villagers of Wenlock cut off the fence within a few days of its construction. As a counter-response, the A1 villagers made several reports to the police relating to the theft of fences and poles. Names of suspects were submitted to the police in Kezi. On the 10th of July 2016, the A1 villagers were called to attend a court in Kezi, but it was postponed to the 31st of January 2017. "On that day, the matter again did not take off under very unclear circumstances".[108] Frustrated by the direction by which the matter was taking, the A1 villagers engaged a lawyer from Bulawayo in January 2017. Despite these efforts, no one was prosecuted for destroying the fence, and the case was dismissed in court "for want of evidence".[109]

In 2016, the DLC resolved to regularise the "illegal" settlers[110], a decision that further inflamed the tensions. According to the DLC, "this decision was arrived at after realization that only about 5% of grazing had been affected" by the settlement, that the illegal settlers have built "permanent structures" and that they have been "paying their rentals (land tax) to government religiously."[111] However, the DLC suggested that the A1 settlers needed "to compromise and

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[107] A letter from Chief Mathema and Village heads of Wenlock communal areas to households settled on the "new line" in Luma, 15/07/2010.

[108] A letter from A1 villagers' lawyers to the Area Public Prosecuter, Kezi, 21 February 2017. Private possession.

[109] A letter from the District Public Prosecutor (B. Gundani) to Masiye-Moyo and Associates legal practioners, 16 March 2017.

[110] DA's report, "Land issues", Undated. File name: Anonymous.

[111] Ibid. Also, see https://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/chronicle-zimbabwe/20161116/281638189788149

allow nearby villagers to access water and grazing for relief grazing purposes".[112] This decision infuriated Chief Mathema and close friend and ally, Chief Nyangazonke, who serves as chief senator for Matabeleland South province. They argued these "illegal settlers" or "squatters" should be evicted based on carrying capacity arguments. Determined to get the illegal settlers evicted, Chief Mathema has approached the local media on several counts to express his grievances in recent years.[113] In sum, the scheme has failed to become a fully-fledged common property regime because exclusion of outsiders could not be achieved.

The creation of A2 farms within A1 schemes have also caused conflicts and tensions. The carving out of A2 farms within designated A1 villagised schemes to accommodate well-connected political elites have been a common phenomenon in recent times, especially during elections. For example, in Luma, three A2 plots were demarcated on the western side of the farm and assigned to three well-connected people in 2010. Of these A2 settlers, one was a local chief; another was a retired lieutenant colonel (now late); while the other was a former MP and serving ZANU-PF member of Central Committee. Both the chief and the retired lieutenant colonel were each allocated around 500 hectares, with the latter's plot including the former white farmer's homestead. The former MP was allocated around 1000 hectares, 650 hectares of which lay in nearby Sibuntule A1 farm, with the remaining 350 hectares lay in Luma. However, the A1 settlers from both Luma and Sibuntule openly resisted by threatening violence when these new A2 settlers began to take occupation of their plots in 2012. The village chairman was arrested and "charged with threats of violence". A1 villagers argued that A2 farms were not officially allowed in farms designated as A1 schemes. They also argued that the former white farmer's homestead that was allocated to the retired lieutenant colonel should be used as a satellite police base and clinic.

In addition, the village chairman grounded his argument by referring to almost the "non-equilibrium ecology". He says that "the eastern side is sweet-veld, but receives little rains. If you leave the cattle to graze freely, they tend to come to the eastern side. The western part is a sour-veld and receives better rains. The western side has been a reserve for winter grazing. This is why there was a war when A2 farms were created there". In other words, words the Western

[112] DA report, "Luma issues", not dated.

[113] See, https://www.pressreader.com/zimbabwe/chronicle-zimbabwe/20161116/281638189788149; https://www.chronicle.co.zw/conflict-brews-as-villagers-axe-stray-cattle/

area, where the A2 farms were created, can be viewed as a "key resource" during the dry season (Scoones 1995).

Following the resistance, the DLC recommended that one A2 settler "recede 347 hectares on Luma section and maintain 651 hectares on Sibuntuli", while the family of the now lieutenant colonel's family was recommended "to retain the 400ha subdivision on the Luma section."[114] The local chief voluntarily withdrew in fear of bringing his reputation into disrepute and was then allocated another plot at another farm near Bulawayo. However, the A1 settlers still deeply resent the presence of the late lieutenant colonel's family and the ZANU-PF politician who retained 600 hectares of land on the neighbouring Sibuntule farm. Thus, several letters were written by these A1 villagers to various government offices, expressing their resentment of the newly created A2 farms. For example, in a letter to the then Minister of Home Affairs, Ignatius Chombo, the A1 villagers declared: "we have two "squatters" – glorified as A2 farmers on our A1 farm whom we want removed forthwith as they are seriously disturbing our plans…we implore for law and order".

In Vimbi, an 800ha A2 plot was also created on the eastern side of the farm and allocated to chief Malaba, whose chiefdom lies further south of Maphisa town. As with Luma, the A1 villagers were disgruntled by this allocation too. They accused the chief of using them to get rid of the former white farmer for his own benefit. As one villager put it, "We were used like graders and caterpillars [bulldozer]. A caterpillar opens up road and once the road is opened up and tarred, people don't want the caterpillar to drive in the road – they say, 'it will damage the road'. We were the caterpillars!"[115]

Unlike in Luma, where the A1 villagers openly resisted the establishment and allocation of A2 farms, A1 settlers in Vimbi said that they were afraid to openly resist because the chief came with the police to introduce himself as the owner of the new A2 farm. However, because the farm is largely unfenced, the A1 villagers continue to graze their cattle in the A2 farm.

In sum, leases, permits, 'gentlemen's agreements', invasions, 'citizenship' and so on are all sorts of ways by which livestock keepers gain access to grazing depending on who they are.

[114] DLC minutes, 27 January 2016. File name: Anonymous.

[115] Focus group discussion, June 2016 (Vimbi).

How different people control land (Peluso & Lund 2011) – understood as practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claims and exclusion – requires further investigation.

5.5 Conclusion

The empirical research presented in this chapter provides a more grounded understanding of the socio-economic background of land reform beneficiaries in two contrasting A1 villages; demonstrating how the very local politics and conflicts can shape the outcomes of land reform in relation to land access and ownership in ways that are very different, even between villages in close proximity to each other; and how this is shaping patterns of production, accumulation and social differentiation. This suggests that micro-political context – influenced by long-term histories of seasonal transhumance, chieftaincy and political allegiances – is critically important in understanding what happened, where (Ranger 2011).[116] It reveals how and why the land reform beneficiaries in the two villages accessed land, who they are and what they are producing.

The findings described in this chapter echoes the findings of many scholars that A1 resettlement sites were largely occupied by land-poor/ landless peasants from nearby communal areas, as well as unemployed and under-employed urban residents. It also highlighted the emerging patterns of social differentiation amongst the smallholder A1 farmers, and gave a glimpse into the emerging patterns of accumulation. The origins of the settlers varied across the village, in part, because of different land reform processes contingent to the politics of each area. This in turn affected patterns of farm investments between and within the villages. It was found that the majority of A1 farmers in Vimbi came from the same communal areas. Therefore, the village can be described as a closely-knit network of relatives, friends and acquaintances, who have known each other for years in their original home areas. It appears that settlers in Vimbi fared far much better than in Luma, and were more affluent than their counterparts. Such outcomes result from different land reform processes in each village. Overall, this chapter serves as a precursor for a discussion of processes of accumulation and social differentiation in Chapter Nine.

[116] Also see, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2012/08/06/masvingo-exceptionalism/ (accessed 3 September 2019).

In the following chapter, the focus turns to the socio-economic origins of medium-scale A2 and “self-contained” farmers in Matobo, describing how they acquired land, who they are and what they are producing.

CHAPTER 6: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF MEDIUM-SCALE FARMERS IN MATOBO

It is often asserted that medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms allocated during the FTLRP are largely occupied by "ZANU-PF cronies", and that they are unproductive and under-utilised (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2013). Framed around the concept of "neo-patrimonialism" derived from Weberian approach, recipients of A2 farms are cast as "ZANU-PF" elites who deployed their political patronage and/or corruption in order to gain access to land and inputs (Moyo & Chambati 2013). By proclaiming these land beneficiaries as "ZANU-PF elites", such narratives obscures class differentiation. As Moyo and Chambati (2013: 14) observe, "[s]uch 'elites' are not treated as a differentiated class of people, whose dynamic growth or demise in the process of class formation is worth examining. Beneficiaries employed by the state and war veterans are all assumed to be state and/or ZANU-PF 'elites', let alone assessing their class status and/or rank in such institutions … Thus, diverse social groups are lumped into the category of elites, despite their social differentiation in terms of labour relations, assets and access to finance, let alone their varied positions in the political hierarchy and economy." Indeed, new research in A2 farms do not support these claims regarding elite capture and under-utilization of these farms (Shonhe et al. 2020).

This chapter will examine the socio-economic profile of land recipients in medium-scale farms designated as 'A2' and 'self-contained' farms, with a particular focus on emerging patterns of social differences. Similarly to the previous chapter, it is intended as a precursor to a further discussion of processes of accumulation amongst A2 and self-contained farmers in Chapter Ten. It will be argued that A2 and self-contained farmers are not a homogenous class. Before we proceed, a brief remainder about the data used in this chapter is necessary. Like the previous chapter on A1 schemes, this chapter draws on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, the method of measuring inequality used here differ from the previous chapter. The fact that most of the A2 and self-contained farmers are absentee landholders, difficult to track and geographically dispersed meant that participatory ranking exercises could not be conducted. Thus, I used a 'price-weighted asset index' as proxy of wealth. This index was derived from my own survey data.

6.1 A2 and self-contained schemes in Matobo: Overview

In Zimbabwe, the emergence of medium-scale farming sector was made possible by land reform in the early 2000s, which saw the creation of around 23,000 additional medium-scale A2 farms to satisfy demands for land from the middle class[117] (Moyo 2011; Shonhe et al. 2020); thus, adding to the already existing 8,500 small-scale commercial farming areas (SSCFAs) (formerly African Purchase Areas) that were created during the colonial period in the 1930s (see Cheater 1984; Scoones et al. 2018). Today, the medium-scale farming sector (both A2 and old SSCFs) occupy 13% or 4.4 million hectares of Zimbabwe's total agricultural land (Moyo 2011: 52; 2013: 43-44). The A2 farms alone, occupy around 3 million hectares, with an average size of 134 hectares (Moyo 2013: 43).

The origins of A2 farms can be tracked back to the provisions of the 1998 land policy, but was only implemented during the FTLRP in 2002 onwards, and its aim was to spur commercial agriculture outside the remaining large-scale commercial farms (Shonhe et al. 2020). Unlike the A1 villagised schemes (Chapter Five), the land allocation process largely involved a formal application procedure. To recapitulate, the demarcation and allocation of A2 farms in Matobo began in earnest in 2002. In principle, the allocation process was conducted by the central government through the so-called District Land Committee (DLC), a state institution which was tasked to "supervise" legal and bureaucratic processes of land acquisition and distribution at district level (Chamunogwa 2018). Chaired by the District Administrator, this institution, largely characterised as partisan (Selby 2006; Dekker and Matondi 2011) played a key role in the land allocation process. However, there were some instances where the DLC was completely bypassed by 'heavyweight' politicians who simply submitted a list of their own beneficiaries. A quote from the DLC minutes in September 2002, for example, illustrate this point: the DLC agreed "that those names given by the governor cannot be tempered with".

The self-contained farms, by contrast, were not created as part of the FTLRP in Matobo (Chapter Four). This type of self-contained farms differs from the A1 'self-contained' version in other parts of the country in several respects, not least its origins. What distinguishes these farms in Matobo is that they were initially acquired by the government during the first and second phases of land reform programmes of the early 1980s and late 1990s, and designated as 'Model D' schemes (later renamed 'Three-tier' schemes). These farms were transferred to

[117] These include professionals such as the civil servants and party-military-business elites,

'beneficiary wards' as a whole (i.e., without subdivision) based on "common property". The 'Model D' scheme was implemented in response to the opposition of the crop-based 'Model A' schemes in Matabeleland. As discussed in Chapter Four, people needed land for grazing rather than land for human settlement and cropping (see Alexander 1991, 2006). The average size of the 'Three-tier' farms was 4,331 hectares, ranging from 1,284 hectares and 17,157 hectares. These farms are administered by the rural district council, rather than the central government. The policy's main objective was to expand the grazing land for the adjoining communal areas, but beneficiaries were expected to pursue commercial ranching model based on notions of commercial "viability" (Cousins & Scoones 2010). However, the policy failed to meet its stated objectives and, by the late 1990s and particularly early 2000s, there was a general consensus among the local planners that this policy had failed. As described in chapter Four, some farms are located far from beneficiaries' homes to allow daily use, leading to what the council officials perceived as "vandalism", "environmental degradation" and "under-utilisation" of these farms. It was in this context that the rural council decided to dismantle these large-scale, collectively-owned three-tier farms into individual parcels for exclusive use, ranging from several hundred to over thousand hectares in size.

Subdivision began in 1998 when Mampondweni, Wild East and Nsambani farms were subdivided into 50 "self-contained" plots because these farms are far from original ward beneficiaries' homes to allow for daily use. Initially these newly created self-contained plots were conceived as individual plots under "99-year-leases". In 2004, subdivision continued in earnest when the vast majority of three-tier farms were subdivided into individual plots or "grazing paddocks" for exclusive use. By 2017, 19 of the 31 three-tier farms had been subdivided and allocated to individual farmers with "large herds" or "productive capacity". These large herd owners were supposed to remove all their animals from the communal areas. This was, in turn, hoped to free up some grazing land in communal areas. The new land beneficiaries are required to fence up their plots as per the ideals of commercial ranching, which is completely at odds with non-equilibrium dynamics of rangeland management. Moreover, they are expected to engage only in livestock production, while crop production is prohibited. Note that these land beneficiaries are considered as "care-takers" of the land who are expected to look after the land, and to pay land tax to the local state. Plots were allocated through a somewhat hybrid arrangement between the rural council and original beneficiary wards. Prospective beneficiaries were first selected at ward level by villagers through vote, while final allocation was done by rural council (Chapter Four).

Uptake of A2 farms in the early years of settlement was slow because of white farmers' resistance. In some cases, beneficiaries simply "shunned" their allocated plots because they were "too rocky for meaningful production", "too small for enhanced livestock production" or lacked water for livestock.[118] Thus, many farms during the mid-2000s were essentially 'unoccupied'. In recent times, there has been a slight turnover of A2 farmers due to reallocations and to some extent, informal purchase. Following a central government 'circular' around 2005 directing DLCs to repossess all plots that were not taken up, some unoccupied farms were indeed repossessed and reallocated to other new beneficiaries, though many managed to retain their farms thanks to their political clout. For those farms that were repossessed and reallocated to 'new' beneficiaries, conflicts often ensued after reallocation between the "original" and "new" settlers, as shall be seen below.

In 2017, the total number of 'A2' farms in the district was 65 across thirty formerly white-owned commercial farms. The A2 farm size ranged from 40.2 to 1947 hectares with a mean size of 486.07 hectares, indicating that the vast majority of the properties fell within the "new" regional farm size regulations (1,000 ha and below in region IV). Of all the 65 A2 farms in the district, only 5 farms exceeded this ceiling, accounting for around 8% of the total. Of these five farms, four were less than 1,500 hectares in size, and only one farm in the entire total exceeded 1,500 hectares. According to a senior government official, this farm was allocated as "compensatory farm" to a black commercial farmer after his original farm that he bought with his "own resources" was invaded and occupied during the FTLRP. Although, on paper, the farm was allocated to the new farmer as whole, there were some 16 "informal" A1 settlers who had been occupying the farm since the early 2000s, and efforts to evict them are still ongoing. By contrast, there were around 152 self-contained plots across 19 of the 31 "three-tier" farms in the district by 2017. These plots ranged in size from 70 to 2,000 hectares, with an average size of 301 hectares. To place these figures in perspective, the average size of A2 farms in the district is three-fold larger than the national average figure of 134 hectares. Of the 152 self-contained plots, 150 were allocated to individual farmers, while the remaining two were allocated to a "group of 20 women" as a cooperative and to Matobo Rural District Council for its own cattle project.

[118] Matobo District Presidential Report, 2004. File: Anonymous.

Official data suggest that the vast majority of A2 settlers are men: 81% men, compared to only 19% women. A similar pattern broadly holds in self-contained schemes, where 91% of land beneficiaries are men, compared to a mere 9% of women. Given that allocation was biased towards owners of large herds, this is not surprising as cattle are mostly owned by men, while women are mainly owners of small stock. Around 44% of A2 farmers are officially identified as "war veterans" (a category likely to include political detainees, collaborators and refugees), 45% as "ordinary" people (a category likely to include businesspeople), while the remainder are classified as "chiefs" (8%), police (2%) and judges (2%). It is worth noting that the proportion of war veterans is higher than the stipulated government quota of 20%. According to one official in the Ministry of Lands, this high proportion of war veterans can be explainded by the fact that "they had an upper hand during the initial stages of the jambanja period. They were ruling the roost so to speak". In self-contained schemes, there was no official data with regards to the socio-economic origins of land beneficiaries; thus, no comparison is possible. However, in line with central government's policy on land allocation in resettlement areas, 20% of farm allocations were supposedly reserved for war veterans.

In self-contained farms, there has been a high turnover of land reform beneficiaries over the years due to reallocation. Some original beneficiaries later acquired land in 'fast track' farms and relinquished the self-contained plots. In other farms, plots are unoccupied as some beneficiaries gave up due to conflicts with nearby communal areas. For example, in Nsambani farm bordering Wenlock communal areas, a total of 10 plots were created and allocated to beneficiaries in 1999 and year 2000. However, recognizing that many beneficiaries were abandoning their plots because the farms were not large enough for cattle ranching and the problem of livestock incursions into the farms by communal areas people from Gwanda, the rural council reorganized the plots into two large plots of 650 hectares each. As one former senior council official put it, "Because of the fact that plots were very small and invasions from Gwanda people, it was deemed not good to invest on such security demanding plots only to house less than 20 cattle. So, since plot holders were perennially leaving, it was decided that two plots of 650 ha each would improve viability."[119] When plots are deserted, the general rule is that they revert to the "beneficiary wards" for reallocation.

[119] Former council official, 8 July 2019, WhatsApp correspondence.

In sum, there are commonalities and differences between these two schemes. However, they share a common feature: both schemes largely accommodated the middle-class people with an explicit aim of promoting commercial ranching. These two types of farmers also coexist and interact in the land extensive settings.

The next section that follows describes the socio-economic and political background of these new medium-scale farmers, asset ownership and production.

6.2 Social origins of medium-scale farmers in Matobo

The mechanisms by which land beneficiaries in A2 and self-contained schemes in Matobo district gained access to land are described in this section, including their motivations for acquiring land. A central argument in this section is that the land allocation processes had significant implications on socio-economic differentiation among these new medium-scale farmers. In both schemes, the state played an important role in the selection of beneficiaries, although the selection criteria differed significantly within these schemes. As discussed in chapter Four, the self-contained farms had been initially gazetted as Model D or Three-tier resettlement during the early phases of land reform, and were held communally by villagers in communal areas, but managed by the local state. These farms were later subdivided into individual plots for exclusive use. I argued that these subdivisions were driven more by security concerns – initially prior to FTLRP in 1999 when the local state decided to subdivide the first three farms (Mampondweni, Wild East and Nsambani) into individual plots under "99-year-leases", and in the mid-2000s when more farms were further subdivided into individual plots under "20-year-leases" because they were "under-utilised" and subject to "vandalism" and environmental degradation; hence vulnerable to appropriation by the central state. In contrast, the A2 model was a deliberate effort by the central state to spur commercial agriculture outside the large-scale commercial farms and estates (Shonhe et al. 2021). While this model was part of the 1998 land policy, only with the FTLRP were these farms allocated during 2001-2. But in my sites, despite much of the allocation being done during this period, relatively very few were able to occupy their farms soon after allocation because of former white farmers' resistance to eviction. These different land reform processes have had implications for accumulation dynamics.

6.2.1 Acquiring land

This section examines the process of land allocation at the local level in order to identify the causal mechanisms that explains how and to whom land was allocated. The individual case studies highlighted here reflect broader trends in the process of land allocation in the two schemes under consideration.

As seen in Chapter Four, the allocation of A2 farms was supposed to follow a bureaucratic process. Applicants for A2 farms needed to submit a business plan, five-year cash flow projection and proof agricultural training. In the early 2000s, the initial application was made to the Agritex offices because the district had no lands officer at the time. The applicants were then interviewed by Agritex officials and the application would then be evaluated by a "scoring system". The names of those with high scores would then be submitted to the DLC chaired by the DA for the final selection, before being passed to the Provincial Lands Committee (PLC) for final recommendation. The PLC would then forward the application to the head offices of the Ministry of Lands in Harare for the generation of "offer letter". According to one senior government official in the Ministry of Lands, "in most cases, the PLC just rubber stamps the DLC recommendations." This application procedure still obtains today, although the district now has its own fulltime Lands Officer, thus, applications are made to the Ministry of Lands at the district level. In most cases, targeted farms for A2 resettlement had to be officially gazetted before they could be redistributed.

Regardless of this bureaucratic application process, the land allocation was generally marred by corruption and patronage politics. This meant that some steps were simply bypassed. Prospective beneficiaries with little or no capital and virtually no proven farming experience were able to gain access to land, especially the well-connected. Indeed, it was readily admitted by one senior ZANU-PF politician, who underscored the importance of patronage politics in order to access land in A2 farms. 57-year-old Mrs RM is a serving minister and member of ZANU-PF Central Committee who used her wider political connections to gain access to an A2 plot (800ha) in December 2014. During this period, the farm was not officially gazetted. In fact, the white owner had been initially "recommended to remain" by the DLC.[120] She

[120] In the whole district, I came across several white farmers who recommended to remain by the DLC, only to be evicted latter anyway to make way for the politically connected.

described her allocation as a "directive from President Robert Mugabe". She described how she got land as follows:

> In 2005, I went to the Ministry of Lands in Kezi, and I told them that I wanted land. They [officials] placed my name on the waiting list. Then others got land but I did not get land myself despite the fact that I was injured during the war. I was bombed at Mkushi camp in 1978 and became partially blind. In June 2008, I was injured again by MDC supporters. They sprayed some chemical in my eyes, and this worsened my eye sight. In 2014, I went to the lands offices in Kezi again. That is when the DLC agreed to give me some land. In fact, it was a directive from the President [Mugabe]. I was then allocated the land but the farm was not gazetted. I then went to see Mombeshora [then Minister of Lands] because it was a special case, that was when the farm was then gazetted and allocated 800-hectare plot. After that, I had to fight with the white farmer because he was resisting eviction. I fought for this land and we must defend it.

However, after allocation, she could not take occupation of her plot immediately due to the former white-owner's resistance until 2015, when the white farmer had passed away because of stress following the acquisition of his farm.

Some government employees who were directly involved in land invasions and allocation process used their privileged positions to gain access to land. PM, aged 42, for example, works in the Ministry of Lands at Kezi. PM grew up in Bulawayo and never had strong links with rural life (although his father was from Chipinge and his mother from Tsholotsho), referring to himself as a "*born-location*".[121] He recounted how he got access to his A2 plot (283ha) in 2014: "I just said to myself, "let me get something for myself even if I don't have any cattle. One day I will leave the Ministry of Lands without land and people would ask me, "you used to work for Lands but you do not have any land, why?" I just said to myself, "let me take the risk and take the farm". I will buy cattle later. Council officials in town do allocate themselves stands all the time." Likewise, MD, a 53-year-old extension worker who was involved in the official pegging and demarcation of farms during the early years of the FTLRP, also admitted that this role enabled him to gain access to a 415-hectare plot in August 2007. He explained: "The then DA said, "my child, we are giving you a farm because you were pegging these farms for others." I didn't even choose the farm. These guys relieved me because I was struggling to get access to grazing and my cattle were dying due to drought in communal areas".

Others also used their official positions to gain access to land are state security agents. For instance, RN (aged 63), a war veteran who was also employed as a staff sergeant in the army served as a military "attaché" in the Ministry of Lands at Kezi offices, where he was charged

[121] "*Born-location*" is a slang name for people who were born and raised in the city.

with representing the interests of army personnel in the land allocation process. He then "took that advantage" to acquire a 500-ha plot for himself in 2003. However, as in the case of RM, he could not occupy the farm due to the white-owner's resistance until 2012, when the white farmer gave up the fight. Another securo-crat, BM, a fifty-eight-year-old war veteran and senior official in the Central Intelligence Organization who was employed as the "district head" at the President's Office in Kezi during the early 2000s said that he acquired an A2 plot as a way to set an example to the locals who were afraid of being arrested for occupying farms. As he put it, "When land occupation started, people from this side were not interested in getting into farms. People were scared that they could be arrested if they invade white farms. So, I had to approach local influential guys such as BT and ET (both senior officials in the army) to help convince people by setting an example. We were the first people to get into the farms here. I wanted a farm in Mashonaland not here, but I had to acquire this farm in order to set an example to the local people and show them that they won't be arrested if they occupy farms." During this period, he said that they were under pressure from the "Head Offices" in Harare to make progress, with the senior CIO official admitting, "We were constantly phoned and asked if the programme was going on well."

In theory, most urban-based businesspeople were more likely to meet the technocratic selection criteria because they tended to have better and secure sources of capital, though many lacked formal farming experience. But, given the politics of land allocation, it appears that acquisition could easily be plagued by lack of political capital. To navigate this challenge, some prospective urban-based businesspeople paid bribes to some members of the DLC in order to gain access to land. For example, it is alleged that Mr N who runs a security business in South Africa bought the then DA a Mazda 'T35' truck and took the DA for a holiday in South Africa in return to gaining access to land.

Another young urban-based investor, MM, acquired his farm through informal purchase – what he described to me as a "back-door" strategy. He is a 40-year-old mechanic by training who runs a successful transport business, including a driving school and truck hiring services in Bulawayo.[122] He alleges that he was "given" the farm by his "uncle", a war veteran who now works as a school chaplain in Bulawayo. Then a senior official in the army, MM's "uncle", CS, acquired a 350-ha plot in 2002 through political connections. However, like many farmers

[122] He has truck hiring contracts with several NGOs, including ORAP.

in Toko North, he could not take occupation of the farm due to former white-owner's resistance: the white farmer denied the new A2 farmers physical access to land that had already been allotted to them until 2012 when the white farmer had passed away. When the white farmer's family eventually vacated the farm, CS, however, in the words of a senior government official, "did nothing with the land". As a result, he decided to sell it to his nephew in 2014. MM says that after buying the land he tried to officially transfer the 'offer letter' from his uncle to him. His uncle wrote a letter and signed an affidavit to the District Lands office, stating that he wishes to cede his land to MM because he was 'old' and 'sick', and had no male children to inherit the land. They went to speak with the district administrator (DA) and the lands officer in Kezi, who MM says sanctioned the new arrangement, albeit verbally. These senior government officials, he says, advised him to make payments of land tax that was due and to put the land into production immediately. Once given the greenlight, MM moved quickly into the farm. He started by ring-fencing the farm and building housing infrastructure. On following up with one Lands officer on this issue, he indeed, confirmed that his office was in receipt of this transfer request but confessed that he was "reluctant to submit it to the DLC as the reasons offered for transferring the farm ownership were dubious and raises eyebrows". Despite this uncertainty and insecure property rights, MM considers himself as the new farm owner and feels that his land rights are secure. By 2017, he had already made significant investments on the farm, which include ring-fencing, construction of an elaborate farmhouse with piped water and workers' quarters, and he was planning to "invest in a machine for making cheap stock feed for both own use and sale". While MM did not explicitly say that he purchased the farm from his "uncle", it can be concluded that he indeed bought the farm, a sentiment that was even shared by the government officials. It also appears that the government officials sanctioned this transaction. Thus, MM's case illustrates an emerging trend of acquisition of land through informal purchase in the post-land reform period. It appears that such monetary transactions are tacitly supported by government officials.

As illustrated in the above cases, bureaucratic process of beneficiaries selection was often bypassed during the allocation process of government officials. Some government officials managed to acquire land without adequate financial resources to invest in commercial farming. Chiefs too, were also officially allocated A2 farms as a special category. In my sample, there is only one serving local chief who was allocated land in 2012. Born in 1971 to Nguni royal parents, the chief is a school teacher by training but now lives and works as a fitter and turner in South Africa. In most cases, chiefs were allocated plots with farmhouses.

In summary, these findings illustrate that the A2 farmers surveyed gained access to land through diverse mechanisms: technocratic process, corruption, patronage and purchase. There is no doubt that some A2 settlers gained access to land through neo-patrimonial networks, composed of a combination of political connections and bribes (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011). However, to assume that "patronage politics" was the major route by which A2 farmers accessed land is also to misrepresent the whole story. Some A2 farmers simply gained access to land through formal application, while others used "back-door" strategies such as informal purchase from relatives. It has been suggested that beneficiaries of A2 farms are ZANU-PF "elites" or "cronies" (Marongwe 2011). Couched in "neo-patrimonial" lens, "beneficiaries employed by the state and war veterans are all assumed to be state and/or ZANU-PF elites", with no attempts to examine "their class status and/or rank in such institutions" (Moyo & Chambati 2013, p. 14). This assumption is misleading. Empirical evidence reveals that A2 farmers are neither ZANU-PF elites as critics suggests nor "ordinary people". The truth sits somewhat in the middle.

Most civil servants and state security officials who acquired land occupied very low positions in government. While farmers were not asked about their political affiliations due to sensitivities, most were by no means ZANU-PF supporters. Indeed, in the early years of the FTLRP, some civil servants in the district were accused of being MDC sympathisers who were non-committal to land reform programme. In 2002, twenty-three civil servants across various departments in central government and rural district council in Matobo were "suspended" by war veterans for "frustrating" the land reform programme (*Financial Gazette* 2002). In fact, this was a widespread phenomenon in Matabeleland at the time (see McGregor 2002).

Drawing from official data, I estimate that less than a third of all A2 beneficiaries in the district could have used "patronage politics" or their positions in government to acquire land. This is partly because such beneficiaries sat as members and *ex-officio* members between 2002 and 2016, and were directly involved in the land allocation process.

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The focus now shifts to self-contained farms, where the "beneficiary wards" who are the original beneficiaries of three-tier farms played a key role in the selection of prospective self-contained beneficiaries among members of the local community. Most of the beneficiaries were first selected at ward level and their names were then submitted to the rural district council for

final allocation. As shown in Chapter Four, the allocation process of self-contained farms was subjected to two main criteria. First, the land allocation process explicitly targeted beneficiaries with large herds of cattle or those who could muster capital to engage in commercial ranching; not dissimilar to A2 criteria. In this sense, the selection criteria meant that the rural council sought a particular class of farmers for the settlement on the scheme. Most farmers interviewed said that they were selected as beneficiaries by the communities because they were successful farmers in their wards.

TN, a 56-year-old from Halale village and former senior official in the rural district council, exemplifies this selection criteria. In 2000, TN was selected by people from his ward as a beneficiary because he was an assiduous herd owner in his village. As he put it:

> At the time, I had about 25 herd of cattle. I was spray dipping my cattle at home because public dipping was not enough. I was giving salt blocks in winter and also in July to November, I would feed a little bit. Generally, my management of stock was above the rest of community average. I had also built small dam and was teaching those who could listen to vaccinate against blackleg and other diseases. I had even tried to persuade guys like EM [another self-contained farmer] to paddock at Duta and take occupation. So, when this came, the community selected me. Initially, I had no interest on these plots, but my community [Dema ward] insisted that I was their number one priority.

However, in 2002, a shortly after settlement, TN said that he was "harassed" by war veterans amid allegations that he was an MDC supporter. Subsequently, he gave up the plot in Wild East and moved his cattle to Mfazimithi farm near Bulawayo, where he rented an A2 plot. In 2009, he was then allocated another self-contained plot in Duta farm near his original home, but swapped plots with another self-contained farmer in Pagati so he could be far away from his "jealousy" relatives. Another farmer, HS, who inherited a 180-ha plot from his late parents said that his parents were also selected by the community because they were both "Master Farmers", and owned 75 head of cattle, which was considered to be a "nuisance" in the communal areas.

Second, as described in Chapter Four, the prospective applicants had to be a "local", i.e., born and raised in the district. Thus, the allocation process excluded some aspirant beneficiaries deemed as "outsiders" from accessing self-contained plots based on politics of "ethno-regional identity" and citizenship, i.e., autochthonous notions of "belonging" (see, Moyo 2013). For instance, MJ said that he experienced great difficulty in obtaining a plot simply because he had not been born in the district. MJ, aged 56, hails from Nkayi district; thus, has a different National Identity Number to that of Matobo district. "It was very difficult to get a plot here", he recounted. "In fact, it was next to impossible… First priority is given to locals instead of

outsiders. In that office [Council], you must have their ID number in order to get land here. In other words, you have to be a local." In order to circumvent this council rule, he had to register his plot in the name of her wife who comes from the district.

In this context it is therefore unsurprising that all but one settler in my sample were locals. This finding matches council's policy to prioritize locals over outsiders in the land allocation process. The only registered settler who hails from outside the district that I met, OD, had served as a veterinarian in the district from the early 1990s until his retirement in June 2009. He felt that the plot was a deserved reward for his long service in the district. As he put it, "a goat eats around where it is tied." Such beneficiaries were allocated land by the rural district council, without consulting the "beneficiary wards" (i.e., 'communities'). According to a former senior official in the rural council, the logic of allocating plots to extension workers is not difficult to understand. "It is important to also allocate land to extension workers and vets like OD so that they can teach farmers by practicing what they teach on their own farms", he told me. Simply put, such settlers were expected to act as exemplars of best practice in farming. In another case, but not part of the sampled farmers, where an "outsider" gained access to a self-contained plot at Halale farm, he was recommended by the local chief because "he always bought him alcohol". This plot was initially allocated to this chief but he rejected it for an A2 plot citing poor soils. Instead, he instructed that this plot be allocated to Mr KN, a businessman from Tsholotsho district who operate a store and butchery business at Natisa and Silozwi[123]. Such a decision, of course, created a degree of controversy. Even if such cases are not widespread, the allocation of land to these "outsiders" is resented by livestock farmers in "beneficiary wards" that are located near these farms, as they are facing acute pasture shortages themselves.[124]

Returning to chiefs, both headmen and chiefs were supposed to be "allocated land in their respective wards", according to rural council policy. But many (especially chiefs) later got access to A2 farms. Similarly, as with government's land allocation policy in general, a 20%

[123] In a letter to the rural council, the chief wrote: "It is said that land (*umhlaba*) is under the authority of chiefs (indunas). Some people are choosing land for themselves in places such as Bedza, Silvana, Woollandale and Shashani farms. But for some of us, land is chosen for us and we are given farms with sand soils (*emashebeshebeni*). That is why, I don't want this farm".

[124] Interviews with communal areas farmers in Khumalo communal areas, 2016-2017.

quota was set aside for allocation to war veterans. Such plots were ceded to the district war veteran association for allocation to its members.

Overall, these indicate that most prospective self-contained settlers underwent careful selection at ward level and were later referred to the rural district council for final allocation. The specified criteria relating to "large herd owners" or means to invest in cattle ranching implied that the policy prioritized better-off farmers in an explicit attempt to foster commercial ranching. By doing so, the allocation process acted as a 'weeding process' to exclude aspirant beneficiaries who owned small herds of cattle. Moreover, the prioritising of locals also meant that prospective settlers from other districts were excluded.

6.2.2 Disputes over repossession and reallocation of land

Although some A2 farmers acquired their farms as early as 2002, it became evident by 2015 that some farmers who were allocated land were abandoning their allocations or had never started utilizing them due to water problems. For example, in his monthly report, a government official complained of 'vacant plots which were not taken up by recipients mainly because of water problems.'[125] Such farms were officially repossessed and reallocated to other beneficiaries, in line with a government 'circular that was issued in 2006, ordering the DLCs to repossess any vacant plots.' [126] However, such decisions are not without conflicts. In most cases, conflicts between the original and new beneficiary ensued. Such conflicts can be exemplified by the case of MT.

MT (aged 38), a constructor and businessman in South Africa, was allocated a 288-ha plot in September 2016 after the original beneficiary DM, a 92-year-old war veteran had not utilized the farm for 16 years since allocation. Later, when the previous beneficiary (DM) found out that his farm had been reallocated to a new beneficiary (MT), and that the new beneficiary had begun putting up infrastructure, DM engaged in a dispute with MT regarding the ownership of the A2 plot. DM immediately started building a homestead on the farm, which was financed by his two "brothers" who wanted to use the farm to graze their 33 head of cattle. At this time, DM still had an 'offer letter', while TM only had a "confirmation letter" issued by the DLC. By the end of the fieldwork in early 2018, this issue had not been resolved, with a senior official

[125] Archival material, anonymous.

[126] Interview with a senior government official, 2018.

in the Ministry of Lands admitting that "this was a difficult issue with no easy solution and a first of its kind". Some members of the DLC sided with Mr DM on the grounds that he was allocated the farm through "proper" channels whereas the newcomer's allocation was perceived to have beem through "corrupt practices", involving local senior government officials. The newcomer had the backing of senior government officials, who argued that he had access to sufficient capital to put the land into production, while the former beneficiary had failed to do so for many years. However, this dispute was resolved in 2019 through political clout, with the result that the new beneficiary retained the farm. The newcomer (Mr TM) approached Tshinga Dube – a retired colonel in the army and former minister of Welfare Services for War Vets, War Collaborators and former Political Detainees – who then convened a meeting with the two beneficiaries. In the end, the former beneficiaries (DM) agreed to relinquish the plot on the grounds that the newcomer compensate him for the costs of the two-bedroom brick and tin roof house he had constructed at the farm. DM was also allocated a new A2 plot in Damara Estate farm, where TM constructed farmhouses for him. The newcomer also offered to "extend" (renovate) the previous beneficiary's house in Bulawayo as part of the compensation.

Similarly, CM (born in 1962), a businessman from Bulawayo, was allocated a repossessed farm in 2014 by the DLC, but conflict between him and the former beneficiaries soon erupted. The former beneficiary, RM, was a senior official in the Prisons Service Department at the time of allocation in 2002. He later retired and emigrated to South Africa, and never took occupation of the farm. Thus, the farm had been lying idle. As a result, in 2012, the DLC decided to repossess the farm and reallocated it to a new beneficiary, CM. When RM found out that his farm had been reallocated to a new beneficiary (CM), he came back to reclaim the farm. In the end, CM simply gave up the farm since he had no 'offer letter' and RM retained the farm, although he was renting it out to a South African-based businessman at the time of fieldwork.

In all the cases, senior government officials interviewed blamed "inconsistences" of government policies as the root cause of these disputes. Despite the government's 2006 circular which stipulates that unoccupied farms should be reallocated, the two cases above shows that such a process is far more complex. In the wake of land audit, many farmers expressed fears of reallocation. Thus, renting out the farms to others so that they are seen to be used is a vital strategy to avoid repossession and reallocation of land.

6.3 Patterns of social differentiation

In what follows I explore patterns of social differentiation through a statistical "price-weighted asset" index as a proxy for wealth. The index measured the total value of assets based on my survey's asset register: a predefined list of key domestic, agricultural, transport and water assets owned by a household. The total value of all assets owned by households in each scheme was arbitrarily split into three equal "asset groups", with "AG1" being the poorest households and "AG3" representing the richest. The choice of three wealth categories makes sense, considering that the sample sizes were too small for both schemes, and can yield meaningful results. In order to test the usefulness of the asset index, preliminary analyses of the strength of the relationship between the total value of assets owned and other key socio-economic variables were performed using Pearson correlation. There are strong and highly significant correlations between the total value of assets owned and other key variables, suggesting that the asset index is a useful proxy for social inequality among these farmers.

Who got land?

Table 6.1 demonstrate the previous/current occupations of A2 and self-contained farmers surveyed in Matobo by asset groups. A relatively large proportion of settlers in both schemes were civil servants, including teachers/headmasters, extension officers, veterinarians, parastatal employees, as well as, those working in local government (e.g., district councils) and local chiefs.[127] In the A2 sample, these farmers were concentrated in AG1 and AG2 categories, with none in the richest category (AG3). By contrast, while civil servants were found in all asset groups in self-contained farms, they were more concentrated in the richest category (AG3). As discussed in the previous section, some recipients of A2 farms used their privileged positions to gain access to land, even though they did not meet the criteria. By contrast, in the case of self-contained farms, many were simply selected by people from their respective wards, and met the criteria because they were either owners of large herds or deemed to have "productive capacity".

[127] Based on the chiefs' salary, I decided to categorize them as civil servants.

Table 6.1: Previous occupations of original settlers

	A2 farms				Self-contained farms			
Asset groups (N)	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall
Communal areas farmer	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Civil servant	4	3	0	7	5	2	8	15
Security services	1	1	2	4	3	2	0	5
Urban job	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Self-employed businessperson	1	0	4	5	0	4	3	7
Senior politician	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Employed abroad	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	2

Source: Own data

Amongst those identified as "self-employed businesspersons" are to be found those operating their own businesses with hired employees in Zimbabwe and abroad (mainly South Africa and Botswana)[128], and were concentrated in AG2 and AG3 categories. They were operating off-farm businesses, including grocery stores, hardware stores, butcheries, and trucking/transport business ("*omalayisha*"). Indeed, land reform provided an opportunity for these urban-based investors to diversify their portfolios into farming. The category of "security services" is found across the all the three asset groups in A2 survey, and only in AG1 and AG2 in the surveyed self-contained farms.[129] On the whole, the "security services" category was by no means a dominant group. This finding therefore does not support the narrative that these farms were captured by "cronies".

Finally, they were those employed in urban jobs in Zimbabwe, diaspora, as well as senior politicians. In the A2 sample, there was only one serving minister in the early 2018, when the survey was completed. As noted above, she was able to use her political networks to gain access to a farm, whose white-owner was initially recommended to remain by the DLC (Mrs RM). One settler in the self-contained sample who used to work as a secondary school headmaster in nearby Kumalo communal areas later become an MP of Matobo North under the ruling party and now serves as the deputy minister of primary and secondary education. In the wider populations, there were some (mostly retired) who previously had high positions in government (e.g., judges), including a former MDC senior politician and speaker of parliament. The

[129] This category includes the police, CIO, prisons, and army.

category of "urban jobs" consists of only one farmer employed in an NGO. In summary, these results show that the richest asset group across the two schemes consisted of top civil servants, senior securo-crats and businesspersons.

Over the years, there has been some notable changes in terms of the original settlers' primary occupation. In my 2017-18 survey, I asked if the landholders were still engaged in the primary occupation that they used to engage in prior to settlement: 10 out of 18 A2 farmers (56%) surveyed and 14 of 32 self-contained farmers (44%) said that they were still engaged in the same occupation they had at prior to settlement. Overall, these results indicate that off-farm income remains important. Of those who were no longer undertaking the previous occupation, they were either retired, had passed on or business had collapsed.[130]

War veterans and previous occupation

In both schemes, there was a greater proportion of "war veterans": 43% (14 of 32 cases) in surveyed self-contained farms and 50% (9 of 18 cases) in A2 farms. This compares to the official figure of 45% of war veterans across all A2 farms in the district. These figures are far higher than the stipulated official quota of 20% and proportions reported in other parts of the country. Shonhe et al. (2020), for example, found that war veterans accounted for 31% and 18% of farm household heads in Mvurwi and Masvingo-Gutu, respectively. It is also evident that nearly all war veterans were men: 8 out of 9 war veterans were men in A2 scheme, and 13 out of 14 in self-contained scheme.

[130] In the A2 scheme, for instance, amongst the eight cases where a change in original settler's occupation was reported, they were either retired (n=3), passed away (n=3) or business collapsed (n=2). In self-contained scheme, a change in previous occupation of original settler was recorded in 18 households. Of these 18 households, the vast majority had retired (n=11), while the remainder had either passed away (n=5) or taken up a new job (n=2).

Table 6.2: Distribution of war veterans in relation to previous occupation at settlement

Original settler's previous occupation	A2		Self-contained	
	N	%	N	%
Communal areas farmer	0	0.0%	2	14.3%
Civil service	3	33.3%	5	35.7%
State security services	4	44.4%	5	35.7%
Own/ family non-agric business with workers	1	11.1%	1	7.1%
Politician	1	11.1%	0	0.0%
Job abroad	0	0.0%	1	7.1%
Total	9	100.0%	14	100.0%

Source: Own data

Table 6.2 shows the distribution of war veterans in relation to previous occupation at settlement. It reveals that most war veterans were either employed in civil service or state security services. Four out of nine war veterans in surveyed A2 farms and five out of fourteen in self-contained farms were employed in state security services. War veterans who were demobilised from the army at Independence, with high levels of education, either took up civil service jobs or other jobs. Very few were communal areas farmers. As in A1 schemes, most of these war veterans were linked to ZIPRA. In fact, only one war veteran in the surveyed A2 farms was linked to ZANLA. Of those employed in the security services, very few were holding high-ranking positions.

The following three life-histories highlight some of the previous and current occupations of war veterans I have been discussing so far.

> *GN, self-contained farmer. GN is 56 years old and is originally from Beula. After completing primary school in 1976, he joined the liberation struggle in Zambia. At the time, he was still "very young" to receive military training, and was therefore enrolled for secondary schooling at Jaison Ziyaphapha Moyo camp in Zambia, where he did Forms 1 and 2. In 1978, he then received military, and "was part of the last group" to do so. After training, he "did not come to the front." At Independence, he was demobilised. He then decided to continue with his secondary schooling at Wanezi high school, where he completed his 'O' level in 1983. After completion, he got his first job as a 'temporary teacher' at Tshelanyemba secondary school in 1984 until 1986. In 1987, he then enrolled for a teaching diploma at United College of Education, and*

completed in 1989. Since then, he has been working as a primary school teacher in Plumtree and Bulawayo, where he still continues to do so. At one point, he even worked as an "acting headmaster". In 2005, he also operated a transport business in Bulawayo as a "side business", but decided to sell all his cars and kombies (mini buses) in 2015 because of "police harassment".

PMM, self-contained farmer. PMM, a 63-year-old man grew up in Halale village. He did primary education at Halale primary school. He then enrolled at Hope Foundation for his secondary education. After completing his secondary schooling, he enrolled for a building course at Hlekwine college from 1975 to 1976. However, he did not complete the course because he decided to join the liberation struggle in early 1977. He was recruited by ZIPRA and received military training in the same year. After completing military training in Zambia, he was deployed for only three months after which he was withdrawn and interviewed for further military training. "We were interviewed just to check if you have done some secondary education. We were asked simple maths questions. I was interviewed by Stanley Kagisa ('Mleya'). He asked me which school I had attended for my secondary education. Then I told him that I attended school at Hope Fountain. Then he asked me "who our boarding master was at the time", then I told him. After that, no further questions were asked. In 1978, he was then sent to Libya where he received further training in artillery and communication for a year. End of 1979, he was then sent to Ukraine for further training in artillery. He returned back to Zimbabwe in May 1980, when it was independence. Upon arrival, he went to Gwaai Assembly point. In 1981, PM was integrated into the ZNA where he worked in the Artillery department in Harare. He then retired in 1997 from the army where held a position of a major. His decision to retire was largely due to "lack of promotion". "Promotions were very slow in the Artillery department", he says. After his retirement, PMM went to the UK in 2002 where he had a short stint of six months before returning back to Zimbabwe. During this period, his wife who used to work for the Ministry of Labour in Zimbabwe, was already living and working in the UK, having emigrated in 1999. From 1998 to 2001, PMM held the position of a district chairperson of the War veterans association in Matobo, which enabled him to gain a self-contained farm in 2001. In 2002, he decided to join his wife "for good" in the UK, where he then went on to spend 10 years living and working in Brighton and Hove. While in the UK, PM worked as a security guard in the British Telecommunications (BT).

RM, A2 farmer. RM is a 57-year-old, senior politician and serving minister. She ended schooling at grade 7, and joined the liberation struggle in 1977 under ZIPRA. In 1978, she survived horrific bombings at Mkushi (a ZIPRA women camp) by Rhodesian forces. She claimed that this attack left her partially blind. After Independence, she was demobilised. From 1990, she held a variety of positions within ZANU-PF party, including as the secretary of finance at district and provincial level in the Ministry of Gender and Women Affairs, as well as being a Member of ZANU-PF Central Committee at district level.

Taken together, these results suggest that war veterans are not a homogenous group of ZANU-PF "elites" as some authors suggests. The data presented above suggest that war veterans are a diverse group of people, with differential access to political connections and financial resources. This has important implications for farm investment, agricultural production and accumulation,

Land allocation by gender

In both schemes, the original settlers were overwhelmingly men. In my A2 sample, all but one of the original settlers were men. Likewise, original settlers in the self-contained survey are, not surprisingly given an allocation process biased towards "large herd owners" (who are often male), mostly male. Only three out of 32 self-contained farms surveyed were allocated to women, but a number of these farms were not female-led enterprises by any means; rather, the husbands of these women were de facto owners of the farms. In other words, these women are not primarily involved in farm decision-making.

To add some qualitative substance to these data, I briefly turn to the cases of those women who acquired land in their own right as registered beneficiaries. In A2 scheme, the only woman (RM above) who acquired an A2 farm in her own right at settlement was a well-connected politician and minister. Having waited to be allocated land for a long period of time, she used her privileged political position to gain access to land, as already described above. However, not many women have access to such political connections to obtain land.

In self-contained farms, all the three women who acquired land on their "own right" were school teachers in Bulawayo. All but one of the women were married but their husbands were either absent at the time of application or had not been born in the district. Take Mrs GJ for example. Her husband (MJ above) had struggled for many years to obtain land because he had

not been born in the district. In order to circumvent this bureaucratic challenge, he decided to register the plot in the name of his wife who was born in the district.

ThN (born in 1973), whose husband works as an engineer in Durban (South Africa) said that she registered the plot in her name because "I did all the paperwork as my husband live in South Africa." Finally, the late BN who acquired the plot in 2002 was able to obtain a plot with the help of her father who was a very popular businessman in Maphisa. In fact, the plot was initially allocated to another farmer (TN above), who was then forced to relinquish the farm after having been subjected to intimidation and harassment by war veterans amid accusations of being an MDC supporter. And BN's father compensated TN for all the developments he had made at the time. It is also possible that BN's father decided to register the plot in his daughter's name as a strategy to circumvent the "one man one farm" policy, given that he had already been allocated another self-contained farm else.

Understanding the settlers' motivations to access land

This section describes the motivations of A2 and self-contained settlers to access land depending on who they are. Urban-based investors, for example, saw land reform as an opportunity to venture into commercial production and diverse their business portfolios. The following cases provides an illustration of this point. SM, a 43-year-old from Lupane and accountant by profession, lives with his wife and children in South Africa. He completed 'A' level in Bulawayo in 1992 and worked briefly as a book keeper in an NGO in Bulawayo emigrating to South Africa in 1997. Once in South Africa, he took several accounting courses, and worked as a book-keeper and clerk in a private company and retail shop, respectively. He later secured another job in one of the biggest mobile telephone network companies where he served as an accountant and administrator since 1999 up to his "forced retirement" in November 2011. Following forced retirement, he decided to concentrate on his *omalayisha* business that he had started in 2008 and printing business in South Africa. By 2011, he had three trucks (8, 30 and 34 tons) and his business was "doing very well." He later decided to diversify into farming in Zimbabwe. As he put it: "I was [working] at MTN. I had put a lot of energy in that company over many years. But, in 2011, things changed. Then I decided maybe this thing [employment] is not for me anymore. At the time, I had my own trucking company doing well. Then, I thought maybe I should ramp-up in terms of farming on the other side [Zimbabwe] as well. So, I will have my trucking business here [South Africa], my farm on the other side and then life will be great." Following his decision to venture into farming, he then

made a formal application for an A2 plot and later acquired a 475-ha plot at Damara Estate in 2012.

Likewise, thirty-eight-year-old MT grew up in Maphisa and later moved to South Africa (Johannesburg) where he runs his own construction business. Alongside the construction business, he engages in farming (diary, horticulture, indigenous poultry, rabbits) on a 5-ha plot in Rikasrus (Randfontein, South Africa), which he purchased in 2014. In 2016, he applied for an A2 plot in Matobo district and was allocated a 283-ha plot in Toko North. According to MT, his search for alternative sites to diversify his business portfolio led him to acquire an A2 plot in Zimbabwe. "This place should be a place to make money", he told me. "Many people who have made it in life say you must have many streams of income." MT alleges that his desire to invest in Matobo district is also, in part, driven by a sense of belonging: "I wish that what I have done in South Africa should have done it here."

Similarly, RbN (aged 41), a lawyer by profession who owns a law firm and transport (taxi) business in Bulawayo, started "buying cattle as a hobby" in 2012 because he "likes being in the bush". As his herd, which he kept at a rented farm in Bubi district, began to expand, he decided to look for his own land in order to venture into commercial ranching. As a consequence, he was able to acquire an A2 Plot (475ha) in 2013, where he now runs 120 head of cattle.

Like most younger people, MM said that when land reform began, he was not keen on acquiring land, as he thought it was "political". As he put it: "At first, we thought this was political. We only realized the benefits of land reform now. Land reform was an eye opener for many people, especially us the young farmers." This realization was shared by many people interviewed.[131] A war veteran who was also a leader during land occupations and A2 farmer

[131] Sixty-year-old SN owns a tyre rethreading factory (and tyre shop) and petrol stations in Bulawayo. He is one of the people who failed to take the opportunity to gain access to land and, today, leases-in an A2 plot from a relative who got land as a war veteran in Damara Estate. He recounted his regrets: "I was making a serious mistake. I have 10 houses and buildings in town, but you can't survive without cattle. You can have buildings in town but when you get stuck, you can go and sell cattle. We have discovered these things very late in life. But it's never too late in life. When these things [land reform] started, they moved so fast that I was left out. Now I need my own farm. Of course, this is my relative's farm but I do not feel secure to use someone's farm. Things might change".

himself in the area, told me: “When we started the land reform programme, many people thought that this was a political gimmick. Now these people are now buying land, making the officials corrupt!”

In seeking ways to expand their business portfolios, many of the young and middle-aged urban people in this study saw access to new land as a site of accumulation. There has been a growing demand for land by this cohort in recent times. However, as land for resettlement has become scarce, this demand has fuelled corruption and informal purchasing of land. Initially, most young and middle-aged people were reluctant to occupy farms during invasions or apply for land during the early years of FTLRP. Once it was apparent that land reform was “irreversible” and that earlier settlers are reaping significant benefits, the demand for land by the urban middle-class has increased. Thus, some aspirant settlers went as far as “purchasing” land or “bribing” officials, as unoccupied plots became increasingly difficult to find.

Inheritance, succession and the lack of interest among the younger generation

Nearly 20 years after land reform, some original settlers are ageing, while others have passed on. As a result, a pattern of inheritance and succession is beginning to emerge. In the A2 sample, three cases of inheritance were recorded, compared to five in self-contained sample. However, each case was different in terms of who inherited the farm and who has full control of the farm. Of the three cases recorded in A2 farms, two were taken over by female adult children following the deaths of their fathers, despite the Ndebele patrilineal customs of inheritance and succession whereby sons are regarded as the primary heirs of their father’s property. Both heirs said that their male siblings were not interested in farming and could not take over the farm.

MyM (aged 41), for example, inherited her late father’s A2 plot in 2012 after his death in 2007 and the plot is now officially registered in her name (she has an “offer letter”). MyM said that neither of her two older brothers was interested in taking over the land following their father’s death. She related, “After the passing of my father, in line with Ndebele tradition, my mother asked my two eldest brothers if they would want to take-over the farm. They both refused! I then asked my mother if I could take-over the farm, and she said ‘yes’.” According to MyM’s cousin, MyM’s brothers lacked memories and attachment to livestock and farm life in general because their late father did not bring them regularly to the farm so that they could form memories and attachments to livestock and farm life. He explained that their mother blocked

them from going to the farm on Saturdays since she is a devoted Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) member. When MyM's father died, the family sold over 450 cattle in less than a year. This case is an anecdotal example of intergenerational aspects of accumulation. Although MyM has taken over her father's plot, she has had to build her herd from scratch, despite her late father having left a large herd of cattle. Currently, MyM said that she has full control over the farm. In recent years, she said one of her brothers asked if he could undertake his own chicken project at the farm but she refused the request.

A similar view about the reluctance of male offsprings towards farming and taking over the farm came from Ms NM (aged 40). She said that she was "in charge" of her late father's A2 plot because her old brother was a drunkard. "Before my father passed on, he called a family meeting and told the family that "I want my daughter to ran the farm. Everyone who wishes to do any farming project at the farm must come through her."" A holder of diploma and degree in Agriculture, Ms NM said that her brother was living in South Africa and not interested in farming, though he also holds a diploma in agriculture. "All he wants is fast cash", she said, adding that "he will only come here [at the farm] if he hears that a bar has been opened nearby." At the time of fieldwork, she was doing horticulture on 2 hectares through a partnership, while the rest of the farm was leased to others for grazing and the rental payment was going to her mother.

In another case, where both parents had passed away, the farm was seen as a 'family property', belonging to the whole family. Mr MbM's (43-year-old) parents all passed away, and had an A2 plot at Maleme farm. MbM's late father worked in Kezi as senior official in the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Management, a position that enabled him to acquire an A2 plot in 2002. He latter passed away in 2004. After his death, the plot was then officially transferred to his mother's name, but she also passed away in March 2017. Since his three siblings are living in the UK and South Africa, and as the eldest son to his father, MbM said that he is now "in charge of the farm, but my family is involved too". Thus, MbM does not regard himself as the landholder, but a mere "care-taker" of a "family farm" with 53 head of cattle inherited from the parents – which are also regarded as "family property" (cf. Kingwill 2014). He said that his siblings were assisting him financially to run the farm and "would want to come back one day when things start shaping up" at the farm.

In self-contained farms, five cases of inheritance were observed. Of these cases, three were inherited by the wives of the original settlers. Mr HS, aged 62, inherited a 180-hectare plot

from his late father in 2009. Although his mother was still alive, she could not take over the farm because of illness. Prior to this, HS had acquired an A1 plot in Luma during land invasions in the 2000s. After the death of his father, he moved to the self-contained plot but still retains the A1 plot, although no one is living there. He explained his decision to retain the farm as follows: "When we acquired this self-contained plot, we were told not to destroy our homesteads where we came from. This plot was supposed to be an out-boost for livestock production, but it was not easy to maintain two homes. We told our father not to destroy our original home, but our father was hard-headed. He used to say, "I can't have two homes." If we get kicked out here, we will have to start again. That's why I am holding on to that A1 stand. If I relinquish it, I might find myself floating on thin air." When his father acquired the plot, he gave away his original home to HS's mother's sister who was married in Masvingo but "chased away" by her husband's relatives after the death of the husband.

6.4 Basic demographic characteristics

In terms of age, the median age of current settler in A2 and self-contained farms was 53 and 57, respectively. However, there was a wide range of settler's age in each case: the youngest was 38 and the oldest was 75 in surveyed A2 farms; by comparison, the youngest was 28 and the oldest was 84 in surveyed self-contained farms, indicating that land reform benefited people at different points of the life course. These include the youths, middle-aged and the relatively old, although a few inherited their plots from parents or spouses.

A similar pattern is, given that the settlers are likely to be the household heads as well, observed with regards to the age of household heads. Thus, the average measures of household head are very similar to those of "settlers". The median age of household "head" among A2 farmers remained 53 compared to 57 among self-contained farmers. Over 80% (27 of 32) of household heads in the surveyed self-contained farms were aged 50 years and above, compared to 61% (11 of 18) in A2 farms. These figures compare to the average age of household heads of 52 for A2 farms in Masvingo (Shonhe et al. 2021), although the average age of household heads in self-contained farms in Matobo were somewhat older than in A2 farms.

But how does this relate to asset groups? In self-contained farms, the age of household head was relatively similar across all the asset groups. In A2 farms, the richest category (AG3) tends to be relatively younger, with a median age of 42. Most of these young farmers were running businesses in Zimbabwe and/or abroad. Similarly, the number of years spent in education by

the household head also tend to gradually rises with asset wealth across all the schemes. The proportion of female-headed households was 6% (one out of 18 cases) and 13% (4 of 32 cases) in A2 and SC farms, respectively. Most of these female-headed households were found in AG1 and AG3 categories.

Table 6.3: Social background of A2 and self-contained farmers

	A2 farms				Self-contained farms			
Asset groups	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall
Sample size (N)	6	6	6	18	11	10	11	32
Median year started farming at this farm	2013	2012	2013	2013	2003	2005	2001	2003
Mean household size (median)	7 (6)	5 (5)	7 (7)	6 (6)	5 (5)	7 (6)	7 (7)	6 (6)
Mean age of household (median)	58 (57)	54 (55)	46 (42)	52 (53)	55 (58)	62 (62)	56 (56)	58 (57)
Mean number of household head's years in education (median)	12 (10)	13 (14)	15 (16)	13 (14)	13 (11)	11 (10)	16 (17)	13 (11)
Agricultural qualification (N)	2	1	0	3	2	1	1	4
Female-headed households (N)	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	4
Based on the farm (no. of households)	1	0	0	1	3	3	1	7
Urban house ownership (no. of households)	4	5	6	15	10	8	11	29
War veteran (N)	4	3	2	9	4	5	5	14

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Recalling that the allocation of self-contained farms in Matobo district began earlier (1999) than A2 farms, as noted earlier, on average, 25 out of 32 self-contained farmers (75%) surveyed acquired their farms before 2007, compared with 10 out of 18 A2 farmers surveyed (56%). Thus, the length of occupation of farms tends to be higher among self-contained farmers than A2 farmers. In 2018, for instance, the median number of years that self-contained settlers had been farming on the current farm (15 years) was nearly more than three-times that of A2 farmers (5.5 years), indicating that A2 farmers only took occupation of their farms recently.

The median number of years that A2 farmers acquired their farms was 11 years. However, it took some farmers several years to actually occupy the allocated land, as some former white farmers resisted farm acquisition and denied new farmers physical access to the land that had been allocated to them.[132] Of the ten A2 settlers who acquired their farms between 2002 and 2007, six (33% of total sample) could not occupy their allocated farms for 9 years or more. For example, the white-owners of Toko North and Buluma farms resisted evictions since the early 2000s until 2012 leading up to the 2013 general elections, when they gave up the fight. As one senior official in the Ministry of Lands explained: "During the 2012 campaigns, a lot of political pressure was put on those guys [because] votes were needed. Then after elections, despondency by the white farmers to put resistance. You know Mugabe on his position so unwavering about eviction of white farmers."[133]

In some cases, the A2 beneficiaries said that their farms were also targeted by "big guns". For example, all three farmers who were allocated A2 plots at Maleme farm in 2002 said that they could not occupy their plots until 2012, a decade after allocation, because there were some "big guns" who also wanted the farm. JC, a 75-year-old war veteran and leader of the 2000 land invasions was allocated an A2 plot at Maleme farm in 2002, but could not occupy it until 2012 because the government officials wanted to "divert the farm" to an unknown person. He said that this person's name did not appear at all in the old minutes in relation to A2 allocations in the district. JC thus had to hire a lawyer "who then threatened the officials with corruption allegations."

[132] The average time they had to wait before they could take occupation of their farms was 3.5 years (median= 1 year), compared to 0.2 years for self-contained farmers.

[133] WhatsApp correspondence, 5 April 2020.

In contrast, the relatively shorter period between settlement and occupation among self-contained settlers can be explained, in part, by the fact that these farms had been acquired through the willing-buyer willing-seller during the early phases of land reform. The former white-owners had already left by the time of demarcation. Thus, most self-contained settlers were able to occupy their farms soon after allocation.

Across the two schemes, the majority of the farmers were absentee farmers. In part this is a result of the fact that many are still actively employed or running their own-account businesses in Zimbabwe and/or abroad, and in part because of the nature of production in the dry areas, with many specialising in extensive livestock production, "which requires less supervision and so the possibility of managing the farm through weekend visits" (Shonhe et al. 2020, p. 610). The majority of the farmers in the two schemes own houses in nearby towns, where they and their families live most or all the times. In most cases, the farmers (mostly men) visit their farms every second weekend. Thus, most farmers can be described as typical "cell-phone" farmers. Shonhe et al. (2020) reports a similar trend in the drier parts of Masvingo.

The educational attainment of household heads was generally higher in both schemes, with most household heads at least having at least secondary schooling, many with tertiary-level education. Over 78% of household heads continued in education beyond form 2 in A2 farms and 84% in farms, indicating that they are relatively well-educated. The median years of education of household head was 14 in A2 farms, compared to 11 in self-contained farms. The proportion of household heads in A2 scheme that had tertiary education was 67%, and 59% in the self-contained farms. One household head in self-contained farms was pursuing a PhD at the time of research. However, only two across the two samples (two in self-contained farm survey and one in A2 survey) had degrees or diplomas related to agriculture. Only 5 out of 32 (16%) household heads in the self-contained survey did not complete secondary school, and of these only one ended schooling at primary level. Spouses of households heads (most of whom were teachers) were also highly educated. Overall, this pattern echoes the profile of former Native Purchase Areas (Scoones et al. 2018), A2 farmers in other parts of the country (Shonhe et al. 2020) and other medium-scale farmers in the continent (Sitko & Jayne 2014; Muyanga 2013; Muyanga et al. 2019).

Unsurprisingly, the results show that levels of educational attainment were even higher among the offsprings of farmers. Often, children's education was financed through cattle production. For example, one remarked: "We sold a lot of cattle over the years to finance our children's

education, who all went to boarding schools. One of my sons recently completed a degree." Another commented: "This farm has helped me to educate my children after losing my job in 2005. My daughter recently submitted her PhD thesis in Marketing at Wits University (South Africa). She never had a scholarship throughout her tertiary education. I paid her school fees through my cattle. She did her Honours and Masters' degrees at the University of KwaZulu Natal." These cases illustrate that some accumulating farmers are trying to ensure the economic success of the next generation by ensuring that their children are well-educated, which will enable their children to enter middle-class professions.

While most farmers spoke with great pride of how they have managed to educate their children through proceeds from cattle sales, and how good education has enabled them to access well-paid jobs in Zimbabwe and further afield, some farmers complained that their children were less enthused about farming. Across the two schemes, very few adult children were engaging in farming on their own account. In cases where they did, most of them were running small broiler or irrigation projects on the farm, although, as with their parents were non-resident on the farm.

The proportion of household heads with agricultural qualifications (including 'Master Farmers' certificate, diplomas and degrees) was very low in all both schemes. Only two original settlers (all dead) had Master Farmer certificates among self-contained farmers, whereas none reported having such certificates in A2 farms. However, three out of 18 A2 farmers (17%) surveyed had other agricultural certificates obtained from nearby Hlekwine agricultural college, compared to four out of 32 self-contained farmers surveyed (13%).

The vast majority of household heads in both schemes were married with living spouses. Over 90% of household heads were married with spouses alive in A2 scheme (17 of 18), compared to 75% (24 of 32) in self-contained farms. However, polygamy was rare in both schemes, with no cases recorded in the A2 sample and only one in the self-contained sample. This finding reflects the fact that polygynous marriages and large families are no longer seen as "idioms of accumulation" (Cheater 1984), whereby wives and children are exploited as a source of cheap labour in crop production.[134]

[134]It is worth noting that the one household head who had several wives was a very successful business operating a large construction company and several retailing businesses in Bulawayo, Maphisa and Gwanda. His three wives and children lived with him in town.

Average measures (expressed as mean or median) of household size were similar in both schemes. The median household size was 6 members in both schemes, with a range of between 3 to 12 members in A2 farms and 3 to 16 members in self-contained farms. The household sizes only span two generations (i.e., parents and their offsprings), and tended to be nucleus families. The mean number of adult household members (defined as those 18 years old or more) in self-contained farms (5.3 adult members) was slightly higher than that of A2 farms (4.6 adult members). However, the mean number of children (defined as those under the age of 18 years) in the self-contained farms was one child, compared with two children in A2 farms, indicating that many A2 households have relatively younger children. Also, 30% of total adult household members in A2 farms (25 of 83 adults) were between the ages of 20 and 31, compared with 34% (58 of 171 adults) in self-contained farms. In gender terms, the proportion of (adult) women in A2 farms was slightly higher (55% or 46 of 83 adults), compared to that for women in self-contained farms (49% or 83 of 171 adults).

Consistent with data from official records, original settlers in both schemes were predominantly men. In surveyed self-contained farms, 29 of the 32 original settlers (91%) were unsurprisingly men because of the selection criteria that prioritized "large herd owners" (as explained in the previous section). Across rural Africa, men are usually cattle owners, while women are small stock owners. Likewise, in A2 farms, 94% (17 of 18 cases) were men, indicating that very few women were able to acquire land in their own right. Around 17% (5 of 32 cases) of women in self-contained farms and 22% (4 of 18 cases) in A2 farms said that they had full control of some land, ranging from a cropping field to the whole farm. All but two of these women were widows, with full control of the whole farm. Two women (all in A2 scheme) were married with living husbands. Mrs T, who also run a pop-corn making business in town, was allocated 4.5 ha of arable land for dry land cropping by her husband who specialises in livestock production himself. Mrs M (aged 41) inherited an A2 plot from her late father after none of her brothers expressed interest of taking over the farm. She said that she was in full control of the whole farm because her husband who works as a land surveyor in South Africa had no interest in farming, "but interested in his job only".

6.5 Patterns of assets ownership and investments

Table 6.4 present data on ownership and access to means of production (capital, land and assets) by scheme type and asset groups. The survey results indicated a substantial difference between the two schemes in terms of land sizes that were officially allocated. On average, self-

contained farms are much smaller than A2 farms, suggesting that these two schemes are somewhat different operations. The average farm size is bigger in A2 schemes, with a median of 475 ha (mean: 454.9 ha) with a range of 283 ha to 800 ha, compared to 155.5 ha (mean: 192.7 ha) with a range of 103 ha to 600 ha in self-contained schemes.

The data suggests that there was no standardised allocation of land. In the A2 farms, the landholdings between asset groups are highly uneven, ranging from 453 ha for households in the poorest asset group to 398 ha in the richest group. However, it is interesting to note that the amount of land officially allocated descends with 'asset wealth', with households in AG1 and AG2 in my A2 sample appear on average to own more land than the AG3 households. The differences between asset groups are obviously to do with the social origins of settlers in each category. Within the lower group (AG1) and middle group (AG2), it appears that there is a preponderance of beneficiaries who held influential or prestigious positions in either ZANU-PF, local state or war veterans' association.[135] In the face of enormous politicisation of land

[135] Of all three "asset groups" in my A2 sample, AG1 and AG2 contains the highest proportion of settlers with influential positions. In AG1, for example, amongst the six settlers in this group, four were war veterans (three of whom also employed as civil servants and state security) and two were civil servants (all directly involved in pegging and land allocation process). All four war veterans in this asset group were allocated 500ha each, while the remaining two civil servants got slightly smaller plots at 425ha and 281ha. Of the six settlers in AG2 in the A2 sample, three were war veterans, of whom one was a local politician in the ruling party, the other was again senior politician and MP in the ruling party, while one was lieutenant colonel in army. The remaining three consisted of one local chief (*induna*) and two civil servants (one involved in land allocation process). Again, two of the war veterans in the AG2 category got 500ha each, while another one, who currently serve as an MP, was allocated 800ha. Likewise, the local chief and one civil servant who was also involved in land allocation got 500ha each. Of the six settlers in the richest tercile (AG3), four were urban-based businesspeople in Zimbabwe and/or abroad, while two were securocrats. However, only one settler in this category, a lieutenant colonel in the army, got access to a 500ha plot, while the majority of the settlers who occupy the rank of businesspeople acquired less than 500ha each. Two reasons may explain this differential in land size. First, the self-employed businesspeople had no influence on the land allocation process, and often had weaker local political connections. In some cases, they were even treated with suspicion by some members of the DLC, who often perceived them as MDC supporters. As discussed in chapter 7, rumours of businesspeople bribing officials to gain access to land abound. Second, all the four businesspeople acquired their land in 2012 onwards, when all larger plots had been acquired. Such plots were either shunned by settlers who were initially allocated due to their size or water challenges, and thus were later subject to reallocation.

allocation, these individuals wielded influence necessary to secure bigger plots. Although for the households in the AG1 and AG2 categories, land sizes are comparatively larger, many are unable to fully utilise their land because they are generally capital-poor to invest in livestock production. Thus, they are leasing out land to other successful farmers in exchange for cattle, cash and other in-kind benefits (Chapter Seven). In contrast, most AG3 households appear not to have influential positions necessary to obtain large landholdings, with only two of the six settlers in the strata being both war veterans and senior state security officers. The remaining were businesspeople in Zimbabwe and/or abroad who, lacking the influence positions wielded by some settlers in AG1 and AG3, were unable to acquire large areas of land even though they commanded the required capital to invest into commercial ranching.

In self-contained farms, the amount of land officially allocated directly ascends with asset wealth, ranging from 138.9 hectares for households in the poorest group (AG1) to 261.5 hectares for the top category (AG3). The emergence of an "vernacular land market" (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006), especially informal land rental, has enabled some asset-rich households to increase the size of their holdings through purchase and leasing (Chapter Eight). Although multiple farm ownership is officially prohibited, some better-off households colluded with local state officials to obtain additional plots in the schemes that were abandoned. Overall, 8 out of 32 self-contained farmers (25%) had more than two plots in either the self-contained, A1 villagised or A2 scheme, compared to only one household in A2 farms surveyed that had another plot in a nearby A1 scheme. The higher proportion of households owning additional land elsewhere in self-contained farms can be explained by two major factors. First, most households in self-contained farms complained that the officially allocated farms were too small for any meaningful cattle ranching. Second, the contested politics of state control (as Section 6.8 explains) created a great deal of uncertainty in relation to property rights. These factors have compelled some farmers to sought additional land using all sorts of ways – depending on who they are – in order to expand their economies of scale and/or for security purposes. Consequently, many self-contained farmers were responding to shortage of grazing and what they perceive as uncertain property rights by seeking additional land.

Most farmers in both A2 and self-contained farms were devoted to livestock production, while dryland cropping was marginal. Small tracts of land were cleared for cropping. The mean land

area cleared for cropping appears to be similar across the two schemes. There is also less variation in areas cleared and cropped across asset groups, although the middle farmer category in A2 scheme tend to have larger cleared and cropped areas. Many of these farmers in the middle category had very few cattle on average, and tend to diversify into dryland cropping. Farmers in AG3, in contrast, were reluctant to open up large areas of land for cropping as this would reduce land available for pastures. In addition, area under irrigation was miniscule across the two schemes, and it is only those in categories 1 and 2 who had irrigated land. Again, such farmers were struggling to invest in cattle farming; hence, invested in irrigation which requires relatively less start-up capital, while renting-out the rest of their land for grazing to other farmers. The availability of cheap Chinese water pumps has facilitated investment in small-scale irrigation (also see Scoones et al. 2019). Because many farmers specialise in extensive livestock production, tractor ownership is very low across the two schemes, with all those owning tractors in asset groups 2 and 3. Such farmers are hiring out tractor-ploughing services to other local farmers, as well as nearby smallholder A1 and communal areas farmers.

Table 6.4: Asset ownership and investment patterns (mean, with standard deviation in parentheses)

	A2 farms				Self-contained farms			
Asset groups	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall
Land area (ha)	453.02	514.07	398.45	455.18	139	288	299	241
	(84.88)	(164.50)	(75.43)	(118.80)	(22)	(182)	(141)	(147)
Area cleared for cropping (ha)	1.8 (4.0)	3.0 (1.9)	2.0 (2.1)	2.3 (2.7)	2 (2)	2 (1)	2 (1)	2 (1)
Area cultivated in 2015-16 (ha)	0.2	1.5	0.5	0.7	1.3	0.9	1.4	1.2
Area cultivated in 2016-17 (ha)	0.2	2.3	0.9	1.1	1.4	0.9	1.6	1.3
Irrigated land (number of households)	2	3	0	5	0	0	1	1
Number of households leasing-in more land	0	0	1	1	5	1	7	13
Number of households leasing-out land	6	3	0	9	1	3	1	5
Farm fully ring-fenced (Yes)	3	5	4	12	9	9	9	27
Trees planted in last 5 years (number of households)	2	3	4	9	7	4	8	19
Conservation measures added in last 5 years (no. of households)	4	3	4	11	7	6	8	21
Cattle ownership per household, incl. elsewhere (N)	16 (16)	53 (54)	94 (101)	54 (71)	39 (27)	52 (29)	127 (56)	73 (56)
Goats (N)	0 (0)	22 (33)	20 (25)	14 (25)	6 (10)	10 (14)	6 (7)	7 (10)
Number of households with cars	1	6	6	13	3	9	11	23
Number of households with trucks	1	3	5	9	3	2	4	9
Number of households with water pumps	2	4	3	9	1	3	4	8
Number of households with snap-sack sprayer	3	6	5	14	9	8	11	28
Number of households with tractors	0	0	1	1	0	2	3	5

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Data on cattle ownership indicate a highly skewed distribution across asset groups in each scheme. In general, cattle holdings were higher in surveyed self-contained farms than in A2 farms, but there were variations across categories. In the self-contained farms, the richest category (AG3) boasted 60% of all cattle owned (including elsewhere), compared to only 18% in the poorest group (AG2) and 22% in middle group (AG2). Similarly, in the A2 farms, farmers in the AG3 category owned 58% of the total of 977 cattle recorded in the surveyed farms, as compared to the poorest group's paltry 10% (95 of 977) and middle group's 33% (320 of 977).[136]

Across the two schemes, the AG3 category included the top civil servants, senior security personnel and businesspeople. Most of these farmers had accumulated capital from elsewhere and invested it disproportionately in cattle. A few well-connected individuals had also managed to build large herds through cronyism and patronage. Within this top category, there are a number of farmers who have also managed to accumulate from below (with previous cattle production in the area) and now runs large herds of cattle. Together, these farmers now form the core of an emergent class of 'new' cattle barons in the new resettlement sites. Their farms are generally overstocked, especially in self-contained schemes with smaller plots. This is reflected by a much more widespread occurrence of leasing-in of land in these schemes (Chapter Seven). In my A2 survey, only one farmer reported leasing-in more land from others, as compared to thirteen farmers in self-contained scheme. While leasing-in of additional grazing land was found across all three groups in self-contained farms, it was more concentrated in AG3 category. In contrast, most A2 farms were understocked and are leasing-out all or parts of their land to others in exchange for breeding heifers and other in-kind benefits, especially in AG1 and AG2 categories. Indeed, half of the farmers (all in asset groups 1 and 2) in the A2 survey were leasing-out all or parts of their land to others, as compared to only five farmers in the self-contained sample.

With constrained grazing land, some owners of large herds kept a portion of their herds elsewhere, including in their original homes and leased land. Over half of households in the self-contained farms kept some cattle elsewhere, compared to only 3 households did so in A2 farms. Although such households are found in all asset groups, the reason for keeping some cattle elsewhere for those in the AG2 and AG3 was inadequate grazing. This contrasts with

[136] Percentages may exceed 100% due to rounding off to the nearest figure.

reasons offered by those in AG1 who cited reducing labour costs and risk of stock theft. Loaning arrangements were largely absent in both schemes, but few farmers reported looking after the cattle of their close relatives, mostly old parents. Goats and sheep are not common in both schemes. However, few households kept goats for home consumption, while sheep are kept for sale. Other animals kept included broilers, indigenous chickens and donkeys for draught power.

In terms of transport assets, most farmers owned cars and trucks: over two-thirds of households in each scheme owned a car. There are also a few households in the AG2 and AG3 who have invested in trucks, which are important for transporting animals to the market and inputs to the farm. Some farmers, especially in AG2 and AG3, have also invested in water pumps, for watering livestock and horticulture. Most farmers, across all groups, have also made significant investments in fences, paddocks and conservation measures such as fire guards.

6.6 Housing, sanitation and energy

As with A1 schemes, most farmers across the two schemes had to start putting housing and sanitation from scratch. Seven out of 18 A2 farmers (39%) surveyed and only one out of 32 self-contained farmers inherited either a farmhouse, workers' quarters or both. In A2 schemes, often those who wielded influential positions, such as a local chiefs or politicians, were able to obtain plots with housing infrastructure. All of the settlers who inherited some housing infrastructure in the A2 scheme either sits in AG1 or AG2 categories. In terms of absolute concentration of housing quality for household use, 65% and 58% of main houses in the A2 and self-contained schemes, respectively, were brick and asbestos/tin houses. The proportion of main houses constructed using pole and mud was negligible in both schemes: 13% in the self-contained farms and 0% in A2 farms. In self-contained farms, rural district officials prohibited land beneficiaries from constructing permanent structures as there are seen as holding land as "care-takers" (as explained in Chapter Four). This, however, did not stop some settlers from building elaborate homes. As one senior official said: "We do not encourage the beneficiaries to construct permanent structures, but some are building beautiful homes with tiles".[137] The building of these permanent structures may be regarded as a means to control land.

[137] Mr S, Interview, June 2016, Maphisa.

Table 6.5: Quality of main houses by scheme type and asset groups

	Self-contained (n=32)			A2 (n=18)		
	Type of main house used by farm owner					
Success Group	AG1	AG2	AG3	AG1	AG2	AG3
Pole and mud	14%	21%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%
Brick and thatch	14%	14%	60%	50%	38%	35%
Brick and tin/asbestos	71%	64%	40%	50%	63%	65%
Total houses	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	7	14	10	4	8	17
	Type of main house used by workers					
Pole and mud	0%	0%	8%	0%	25%	0%
Brick and thatch	0%	10%	0%	20%	0%	0%
Brick and tin/asbestos	100%	90%	92%	80%	75%	100%
Total houses	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	8	10	13	5	12	6

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding-off.

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 6.5 shows the distribution of housing quality by scheme type and asset groups for both farm owners and workers. As the table shows, around 65% of all houses owned by asset-rich (AG3) households in A2 farms are made of brick and tin/asbestos roofing, compared to 50% of those belonging to AG1 households. In self-contained farms, 40% of all houses belonging to AG3 households are made of brick and tin/asbestos roofing, compared to 71% of all houses belonging to AG1 households. Interestingly, 60% of households belonging to AG3 households in self-contained farms are made of brick and thatch grass. It would however be wrong to assume that these asset-rich households were not investing in good houses. Instead, most of these brick and thatch houses are quite elaborate and modern houses, as shown in Figure 6.1 below. Some have installed DSTVs and WIFI networks at their farm homesteads. For example, Mr MX, a businessman and successful A2 farmer told me: "I have internet and DSTV at the farm. I have brought town into the rural areas so that my family does not complain when we are at the farm." This is important, as having a wife's support in the farming business is seen as vital (as explained in Chapter Ten).

Figure 6.1: An example of modern-day brick and thatch house in Mampondweni

Source: Photo taken by the author

In addition, there has been significant investments in dwellings for workers. With regards to access to water, fifteen out of 18 A2 farms surveyed (84%) and twenty-one out of 32 self-contained farms surveyed (66%) reported drawing water from rivers, dams and open wells (Table 6.6). However, some have invested in water pumps and access water through piped water. Others have tried to drill boreholes with very limited success. In Wild East, a group of six farmers have pooled their resources to refurbish a pre-existing water pump for domestic and livestock use.

Table 6.6: Sources of water

	A2 scheme		Self-contained scheme	
	N	%	N	%
Piped into dwelling	1	5.6	1	3.1
Piped outside dwelling	2	11.1	7	21.9
Unprotected well	1	5.6	0	0.0
River/dam	14	77.8	21	65.6
Private hand pump	0	0.0	3	9.4
Total	18	100.0	32	100

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Taken together, these results suggest that there have been significant investments made in the new medium-scale farms since settlement. This contrasts the often-repeated narrative of lack of investment in the new medium-scale operations.

6.7 Patterns of production and farm employment

6.7.1 Emerging farming systems

Prior to land reform, these farms were under extensive livestock production, notably cattle. So, what forms of farming systems are emerging in these former large-scale commercial farms? In self-contained farms, it seems that land-use patterns are closely linked to land tenure as land use is prescribed by the terms of the lease. As discussed in Chapter Four, the subdivision of these former Three-tier farms was motivated, in part, by the desire of the local state to promote commercial ranching. Land reform beneficiaries in these farms are expected by the local state to engage in commercial livestock production, based on the planning laws of the Three-tier resettlement model. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of self-contained farms are used for extensive livestock production, primarily cattle, but also some sheep and goats. The land reform recipients in these farms are not allowed to engage in crop production. As a result, beneficiary households only engaged in dryland cropping on very small plots, largely for family and workers' consumption.

While land use in A2 farms is not prescribed by the terms of leases, extensive livestock production was by far the dominant farming system. Horticultural activities (mainly vegetables and green mealies) were restricted to a few A2 farms (5 of 18), with access to large rivers. Most of the households who were engaging in horticultural activities sits in AG1 and AG2 categories, with limited capital to invest in livestock production. In most instances, they were leasing-out pastures to others. As in the case of self-contained farms, dryland cropping was negligible in A2 farms. The major crop currently grown by farmers is maize, and in most cases, it is largely grown for workers' consumption.

Table 6.7: Patterns of production (mean, with standard deviation in parentheses)

	A2 farms				Self-contained farms			
Asset groups	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall	AG1	AG2	AG3	Overall
Mean annual maize output 2015-16 (kg)	25 (61)	92 (201)	0 (0)	39 (121)	105 (235)	325 (800)	109 (302)	175 (495)
Mean annual maize output 2016-17 (kg)	33 (82)	1567 (2727)	958 (1269)	853 (1756)	927.27 (1078.74)	1140.00 (1383.80)	688.18 (703.63)	911.56 (1060.97)
Mean number of cattle sold last year (N)	2 (4)	7 (7)	7 (9)	5 (7)	4 (4)	5 (5)	25 (25)	11 (18)
Mean income from cattle sales (USD)	817 (1812)	3108 (2964)	6100 (8597)	3342 (5499)	1875 (1820)	2156 (1937)	1343 (13414)	5953 (9533)
Number of households sold cattle last year	2 (33%)	5 (83%)	3 (50%)	10 (56%)	7 (64%)	6 (60%)	10 (91%)	23 (72%)
Purchased feed inputs last year (number of households)	2	3	4	9	8	4	9	21
Purchased vet inputs last year (number of households)	3	6	6	15	9	8	11	28
Cattle milk sales (number of households)	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Broilers/ egg layers (number of households)	1	1	1	3	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Horticulture (number of households)	2	3	0	5	0	0	0	0
Permanent employees (N)	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.0	1.2	2.7	1.7
Farm managers (no. of households)	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Temporary employees last 12 months (N)	0.7	4.7	2.8	2.7	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.7
Mean annual wage bill (USD)	1770 (1712)	2375 (1339)	2540 (1798)	2228 (1567)	802 (587)	1164 (896)	3131 (2634)	1716 (1920)
Work party (number of households)	1	5	1	7	5	2	6	13

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 6.7 presents data on production and employment patterns by asset groups. At the time of settlement, households in self-contained farms owned more cattle, with a median herd size of 16 compared to 7.5 head in A2 farms. This can be explained by the rural council's land allocation policy that targeted beneficiaries with "large herds" or "productive capacity" to engage in commercial ranching (as explained in Chapter Four). Indeed, the data showed that only 7% of settlers in self-contained farms had no cattle at the time of settlement, compared to 28% in A2 farms. A comparison of cattle data from the time of settlement and fieldwork period (2017-18) reveals some notable changes. Median herd size (including kept elsewhere) per household has increased substantially, from 16 to 54 head in self-contained farms and from 7.5 to 31 head in A2 farms. By 2018, 83% owned cattle in surveyed A2 farms, and 97% in self-contained farms.

Nevertheless, households in self-contained farms owned more cattle than those in A2 farms. Of the total 2,343 head of cattle owned by households ('sum') in the surveyed self-contained farms, 22% (n=514) were kept and grazed else, as compared to 18% of 977 head ('sum') in A2 farms. The data reveals that 53% of households in self-contained farms had cattle kept elsewhere, compared to 22% in A2 scheme. This could be because plots in self-contained schemes are relatively small, compared to A2 schemes. Indeed, most farmers interviewed in self-contained schemes indicated that the plots were too small to sustain large herds of cattle, thus were compelled to split their herds. As one self-contained farmer graphically puts it, "My herd [at the farm] is now about 60. So, I am already overstocking because the units are small; that's why I had to fish out some of the cattle." Of the 514 cattle kept elsewhere by households in self-contained schemes, the vast majority were in original communal areas (53%), while the remaining were in resettlement farms where land was accessed through informal leasing from other farmers or own land acquired through formal channels, invasion or informal purchase.

In A2 farms, most households rarely mentioned inadequate pastures as a major concern because most of these farms were still under-stocked or stockless; data reveals that 50% (9 of 50 cases) households were leasing out pastures to others, compared to only one household that was leasing in additional pastures from others. Of the 18% (n=175) cattle kept elsewhere by households in A2 scheme, 69% (n=120) were owned by one household and grazed on a rented farm, while the remaining were kept in communal areas (23%) and A1 villagised scheme (9%).

In general, cattle were mainly kept for sale, but also as a store of wealth outside an unreliable banking system. Unlike in Mashonaland and other parts of the country, use of cattle for draught purposes is serious frowned upon in both A2 and self-contained farms. Instead, male neutered animals are primarily raised for beef production. In most cases, they are sold before they reach the age of 3. Broadly described as "steers" in the terminology used to describe age and sex of cattle, most farmers said that they prefer to sell their animals at this age in order to maximise profit. Based on the carcass grading system in Zimbabwe, steers were likely to be classified as high-grade meat (i.e., "super").

Besides cattle, farmers across the two schemes also kept small stock, donkeys as well as poultry (both indigenous and broilers). Donkeys were kept mainly for draught purposes, while poultry and small stock for both sale and household consumption. By 2017, 39% of households owned small stock on farm in A2 scheme, and 53% in self-contained scheme.

The mean area cleared for dryland cropping was slightly above 2 hectares in each scheme. This was not surprising, given the region's low agro-ecological potential. Nevertheless, maize was the major crop grown, primarily for household and hired labour consumption, with the exception of a handful of households that reported selling maize during good seasons.

Given that the area's agro-ecological conditions are well suited to livestock, many farmers are specialising in livestock, especially cattle. As Table 8.4 shows, a significant number of farmers, especially in AG3, have managed to build up fairly large herds of cattle and successful cattle ranching enterprises. Such farmers have managed to establish large herds through investing part of their wage earnings and/or non-farm business income or profit in livestock ("accumulation from outside"). There are a few who have also managed to accumulate "from below" (through local production) and "from above" (via patronage), as I discuss in Chapter Ten. In short, these farmers have access to better capital and resources to invest in livestock. They also regularly sale cattle, and reinvest proceeds on the farm or, other non-farm economic activities, such as transport. These farmers hire more permanent labour than farmers in other categories, explicitly for herding. A few farmers in the top category in the self-contained sample also employed a farm manager.

With herds continuing to expand, these farmers are now highly constrained by the size of land allocated. In other words, there are significant limits to land concentration. Section 21 of 2000 Land Commission Act (Chapter 20: 29) prohibit allocation of more than 1500ha and 2000ha

in agro-ecological regions IV and V, respectively. Nonetheless, most farms allocated in both A2 and self-contained farms were several times smaller than these stipulated farm sizes.

Most farmers in the AG3 category and a few others in the AG2 category said that their activities were largely constrained by the size of land allocated. Despite the state-imposed restrictions mentioned above, some farmers in the top categories accumulated more land through informal purchase, while others circumvented restrictions through family registration of multiple plots, including in A1 schemes. Others are leasing-in additional land from less successful farmers in the area and beyond. Besides all these mechanisms for gaining access to more land, other farmers in the top category are beginning to shift towards more intensive production, especially stall-feeding using purchased feed.[138]

This contrasts with most farmers in asset groups 1 and 2 who are struggling to invest in livestock due to lack of capital. Lacking enough capital to purchase cattle, and coupled with lack of state support, these farmers have turned to leasing-out all or parts of their grazing land to the most successful farmers (especially in AG3 category) and communal areas herd owners in exchange for breeding heifers. Although many receive a regular monthly salary or pension, it is meagre to such an extent that it does not provide much of a basis for investment in cattle. However, many said that they have been living frugally in an attempt to invest in production. Given the lack of sufficient capital to invest in cattle, some farmers in asset groups 1 and 2 (all in A2 farms) have turned to horticultural production using cheaply available Chinese pumps. Broiler and egg production is rare, but was found across the three categories in A2 farms. However, a significant number of farmers across all groups are engaging in broiler production in cities as an option to raise working capital for the farm operations.

In terms of labour, the majority of both A2 and self-contained farmers interviewed rely exclusively on wage labour. Not only is the wages meagre but living conditions for the herders are also very poor in most cases. Most farmers do not provide adequate housing for their herders. Although some farmers provide food, this is not always enough to last the workers the entire month.[139] These challenges often result in high turnover of farm workers.

[138] The case of MJ is instructive. Mr MJ's wife was allocated 108ha in Mampondweni in 2013.

[139] The following basics are provided: relish (mainly chunks), mealie-meal, 2kg of sugar and bar of soap.

6.8 Land conflicts and control

Conflicts over access to grazing land between the new settlers and the adjoining communal areas have been observed in both schemes. For example, half of A2 farmers surveyed (9 of 18 cases) reported experiencing conflict concerning access to grazing and water resources since settlement. These were evident, particularly in Damara, Toko North, Maleme and Natisa. In Damara farm, a total of fifteen A2 plots were created, but most beneficiaries had not taken up their plots during the time of fieldwork, in part, because of ongoing conflicts with nearby communal areas in Gwanda. Most farmers complained that livestock farmers from nearby communal areas were cutting their fences and pushing their animals into the farms, particularly during the dry season and times of drought.

A similar situation is happening in Maleme farm, which borders with Khumalo communal areas to the north. The presence of three A2 farmers is deeply resented by villagers from the neighbouring Khumalo communal areas. Here, a constant theme was the relationship between property rights and "citizenship". The villagers accused the local administrative officials of corruption, and for allocating land to "outsiders" from other chiefdoms (*izigaba*) at the expense of the grazing needs of the locals. As one villager from Shumbeshabe village put it, "Our *induna* must be respected just like any other *induna* in Matobo. How can people from other *izigaba* get land in another chief's *isigaba*?"[140] "They call us *amadoda eMaphaneni* (literally meaning, 'men from Maphaneni')", one A2 farmer told me, "As if we are not from the same district".

Determined to have the new A2 farmers removed, a group of villagers wrote a letter to the DLC in 2016, applying for this 1500 hectares of land that was allocated to these three A2 farmers. This group, called "Nzula Development Initiative" (named after the local chief's father), consisted of over 20 villagers, and it was supported by the Chief Masuku, Nyangazonke, Mathema, as well as Ebenezer trustees, ward councillor, the grazing committee, among others. They argued that this land has been "greatly underutilized since 2007 to date. We are asking the Ministry of Land and Rural Resettlement to allocate the underutilised section 1, 2 and 3 to the community." They argued that they wanted to "embark on large scale developmental projects" on this piece of "underutilised" land. Such projects would include, the construction

[140] Interview 24 May 2016.

of a secondary school, irrigation on 250 hectares in partnership with Ebenezer, dairy project on 300 hectares, as well as poultry and ostrich projects. Additionally, 500 hectares was to be used for communal grazing, given that "Khumalo communal lands are in dire need of grazing land". They argued that the "only area the Khumalo communal lands can graze is at Maleme Ranch, considering that the other area is a National Park (Matopo) and it is mountainous." However, the DLC "regarded [this] application as nullity" and "agreed that the Ebenezer trustees had to be reprimanded for misleading the ward 16 community." Although the DLC dismissed allegations of "under-utilization" of the three A2 plots in question, two of the three farmers are leasing-out their farms to other farmers for grazing purposes. This has caused further resentment among the villagers of Khumalo who are in short of grazing. Not surprisingly, the nearby villagers use "weapons of the poor", such as fence cutting and illegal grazing in these farms (cf. Scott 1985).

Similar disputes were also reported in self-contained farms such as Halalie and Wild East, with the former sharing the boundary with Makwe communal areas (Gwanda) and the latter with Khumalo communal areas. For instance, in Nsambani farm, one of first three Three-tier farms to be subdivided into plots for exclusive use, conflict emerged soon after the allocation of plots. Here ten plots were created in 1999, but for some years, settlers could not take occupation of their plots soon after allocation because of conflicts with nearby communal areas herdowners. In the early 2000s, the then CEO of MRDC complained that the new settlers were prevented from taking up their plots by villagers from the nearby Makwe communal areas in Gwanda who "claim [that] Nsimbane farm belongs to them and have vowed to stay put".[141] This conflict led to a low uptake of plots. It is against this backdrop that the council later decided to re-demarcate the farm into two large plots of 650 hectares each. As one former senior official in the rural council explained:

> Because the plots were very small and invasions from Gwanda people, it was deemed not good to invest on such a security demanding plot only to house less than 20 cattle. So, since plot holders were perennially leaving, it was decided two by 650 hectares would improve viability.[142]

Violent confrontations between the new settlers and villagers from nearby Makwe communal areas during the early years of settlement in Wild East were reported too. It is alleged that one

[141] Ibid.

[142] WhatsApp correspondence, 8 July 2019.

beneficiary in Wild East was beaten up by villagers from Makwe communal areas when he took up his plot in the early 2000s.

In Halalie and other neighbouring three-tier farms, disputes over access to grazing resources between new land reform beneficiaries and villagers from Khumalo communal areas are still ongoing. As already mentioned, villagers from Khumalo communal areas complained that most land beneficiaries are "outsiders" from other chiefdoms ("*izigaba"*), especially south of the district. In the lead up to the 2013 elections, the community sent some representatives of the grazing committee to the Land Inspectorate Offices in Harare to report their grievances. It is claimed that, following this visit, some officials from the Lands Inspectorate later visited the area, and promised that "if ZANU-PF wins, they will rectify this issue".[143] However, this never materialised, despite ZANU-PF winning the election in both Matobo North and South constituencies. The villagers even approached the then new MP for Matobo North, Never Khanye, who promised that he would resolve the matter. However, as one member of the grazing committee put it, "he disappeared". They have met and written to the current CEO of Matobo RDC on several accounts, but to no avail. Today, the CL livestock owners resort to fence-cutting and poach-grazing in neighbouring A2 and self-contained farms.

However, there are few cases where conflicts over grazing and water resources between land recipients and nearby CL farmers have since subsided and relations have become cordial, as the two groups begin to benefit from one another. For instance, Mr MpN who was allocated acquired 650 hectares of land plot in Nsambani in 2012, said that he had to "understand and accommodate" the villagers from nearby Makwe communal areas by leaving a "third" of his allocated farm unfenced so that the villagers could use it for grazing. Another A2 farmer and lawyer, Mr RN, said that in the early years of settlement the villagers "had a perception that the land is ours and were hostile towards me…. so, I made sure that criminals cutting fences and poach-grazing were arrested and charged". Relations between him and the communal areas farmers were combative, but have since improved because he now allows the villagers to cut fuelwood in his farm during funerals. He says that he also hires both casual and permanent work from the communal areas, as well as buying livestock from them.

[143] A focus group discussion in Ward 17.

Conflicted state control

The subdivision of three-tier farms has also led to ongoing conflicted politics of state control between local state requiring subdivision to assert presence and central government. The central government accused Matobo Rural District Council of subdividing the three-tier farms without following the correct procedure. In early 2015, the Provincial Land Committee recommended that the management and use of these farms "should revert to its original design" (Three-tier model), and specifically be used for "relief grazing" by communal areas livestock owners.[144] Although these farms were administered by the rural council, it was categorically stated that the farms "remain state-land under the ambit of the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement and any compelling desire to change the model needs the concurrence of the Minister of Land and Rural Resettlement who is the Acquiring Authority" (ibid). The Ministry of Lands argued that reorganisation and leasing of these farms was prohibited as they were meant to be used as communal grazing by herdowners from nearby communal areas rather than exclusive use as private property by a few individuals.

6.9 Conclusion

As with previous chapter, the empirical research presented in this chapter provides a rich understanding of the socio-economic and political origins of land reform beneficiaries in A2 and self-contained farms in Matobo district; demonstrating how and why they acquired land, patterns of farm investments and what they are producing. These farms were established with the aim of spurring commercial ranching. In principle, the criteria with which beneficiaries were selected, ostensibly, were financial resources and farming skills of applicants. The findings described in this chapter suggest that the majority of land recipients in these schemes are urban middle-class with relatively stable jobs and/or self-employed businesses. A2 and self-contained farmers are generally perceived as ZANU-PF cronies. However, it has been shown that land recipients in these schemes came from diverse backgrounds. Some of these recipients were successful businesspeople who regarded livestock production as one livelihood activity

[144] A letter from P.K. Mhlanga, Lands Officer (for Matobo District Land Committee Chairman) to E. Sibanda, the Chief Executive Officer of Matobo Rural District Council, RE: PROVINCIAL LAND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION ON UTILISATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THREE TIER FARMS, 25th September 2015.

within a portfolio and had no history of farming in the area before settlement. Some politicians and civil servants also acquired land through political connections and networks, but many have struggled to invest in production due to a lack of funds. All or part of their land is being leased in by successful livestock producers, particularly the urban-based business people with large herds of cattle.

The A2 farms are also generally acknowledged as being under-utilised. The level of state support has been marginal since settlement in Matabeleland. The Command Agriculture scheme has largely focussed on high-potential regions, where crop production dominates. Its equivalent – the Command Livestock scheme – had not taken off by the end of the fieldwork in 2018. Thus, A2 and self-contained farmers were largely self-reliant for investments and inputs. Many farmers bemoaned of lack of external financing schemes, and that it is only a very few well-connected people who benefited from cattle loan schemes from CSC in the early years of settlement. Thus, the scope for patronage-based corruption has been limited. In this context, access to income from other non-farm sources is of crucial importance to farm investment and production. Shonhe and colleagues (2021) who concluded from their study of A2 medium-scale farms in Mvurwi and Gutu-Masvingo, that patterns of social differentiation are underway in A2 farms, and the assumption that land is under-utilised and unproductive does not hold. Chapter Ten will discuss trajectories of accumulation in both A2 and self-contained schemes.

It is interesting to compare these conclusions with profile presented for other medium-scale farms in Africa, although they are not necessarily land reform beneficiaries of state-led land reform programmes. Across much of Africa, medium-scale farms are said to be on the rise, largely driven by the rise in world food prices; agricultural policy reforms; rise of land markets; and increased farm lobbies (Sitko & Jayne 2014; Jayne et al. 2016; Muyanga et al. 2019; Anseeuw et al. 2016; Jayne et al. 2019). For instance, it is estimated that medium-scale farmers now control 19%, 31.8%, 39% and 52.9% of agricultural land in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia, respectively (Jayne et al. 2016). My results suggest that the A2 and self-contained farmers in Matobo district are not dissimilar to those emerging elsewhere in Africa, demographically and occupationally. These studies found that the majority of medium-scale farmers are relatively well-educated and urban-based professionals who purchased land using non-farm income.

The next chapter will consider access to income sources other than agriculture. It will be argued that access to non-farm income is crucial across the three schemes.

CHAPTER 7: OFF-FARM ACTIVITIES AND MIGRATION: MAKING A LIVING IN A HIGHLY VARIABLE LANDSCAPE

This relatively short chapter attempts to briefly draw out livelihood diversification trends among land reform beneficiaries in a highly variable environment and further elaborates on the importance of diversifications in coping with climatic shocks and for farm investment and accumulation. Agriculture is not the only source of income for rural households in the researched areas. Households often combine agriculture and off-farm activities in order to make a living. That farmers combine farming and off-farm activities is not surprising, given the setting. It is commonly acknowledged that variability and so uncertainty is a typical part of life in Matobo. The region is subject to severe drought, and farming (both livestock and cropping) is therefore a risky enterprise. Drought may completely wipe out crops and leave the farmers with insufficient food supplies and no income from crop sales at all. If these farmers lack access to income from off-farm sources, this means that they will struggle to purchase inputs for the following season, leading to low yields. Equally, a serious drought may also lead to high cattle mortalities due to lack of fodder. Unless herd owners are able to mobilise cash from other sources, they will be unable to purchase supplementary feeding and veterinary drugs or livestock for recovery following drought, for example. This highlights the need by most households to engage in alternative off-farm economic activities to make a living. In the study areas, diversification is not a new phenomenon. In the past, the white farmers who made use of this land pursued various off-farm income-generating activities, including engineering services. This chapter therefore argues that access to off-farm income is vital. It helps to compensate for the variable and unreliable returns from both dryland cropping and livestock production.

The linkages between off-farm income activities and agriculture are well documented. Off-farm income help to support agriculture by enabling farmers to purchase inputs and support investment in agriculture and/or supplement agricultural income during periods of drought or even floods. Correspondingly, agricultural income is also used to diversify into off-farm income generating activities such as real estate, trade and transport business. This chapter focuses on making livelihoods outside farming. It discusses livelihood strategies pursued by land reform beneficiaries across different land uses and reflects on the implications for farm investment, accumulation and social differentiation. The following questions guided my

analysis: what livelihood portfolios are characteristic for the land recipients in the researched areas? And how are these portfolios linked to patterns of investment, accumulation and social differentiation? It is argued here that straddling and livelihood diversification, involving a wide range of off-farm activities, are vital in offsetting consequences of variability or climatic shocks, such as drought. Secondly, straddling may be undertaken to earn capital needed to finance farm investments in the context of capital flight. The chapter concludes by suggesting that access to off-farm income is a key factor in explaining patterns of accumulation and social differentiation, which will be discussed in Chapters Nine and Ten.

7.1 Debates on straddling, livelihood diversification and de-agrarianization

Straddling and livelihood diversification have been widely documented in rural Africa. The term "straddling" has a long history and has been used in different ways. Cohen and Kinyanjui (1977), for example, used the term to describe state employees who invest in agriculture and other private sector activities using income from the state in the form of wages. Along similar lines, Cowen (1981) found that accumulating farmers heavily relied on straddling, which he understood as the use of money from their wage labour as a source of initial capital. In examining the emergence of a class of African capitalist farmers in Kenya, Kitching (1982) recognised that a class of capitalist farmers was emerging thanks to the process of stratification, which involved "accumulation from below", whereby some were able to access additional funds in the context of increased monetization of relations and generalised commodity production. He identifies straddling, defined as "the use of off-farm income to expand landholdings and commercialization", as key strategy to accumulation (Kitching 1982: 3). For Kitching, the primary source of such income was the public sector employment, what he calls the "state wage bill". This use of earnings from wage labour raises important analytical questions: the salaried land owner is simultaneously an employer himself, hence an exploiter of wage labour (i.e., petite bourgeoisie). This renders the classic Marxist classification into bourgeois and proletariat in the global South obsolete.

Other scholars have expanded from this Kitching's (1982) stricter definition of straddling. John Illife (1983), for example, uses straddling to refer to all simultaneously "modern sector" and agricultural activities, which he claims can be generalized to much of Eastern and Southern Africa. Later on, Bernstein and Woodhouse (2001) differentiated two aspects of straddling: "sequential" and "simultaneous" straddling. "Sequential" straddling is defined as "the mobilization of savings from careers in wage employment and/or business that is then invested

on ‘retirement’ in full-time agricultural commodity production” (ibid: 316). On the other hand, “simultaneous” straddling refers to “the diversification of activities, income sources and investment, in ‘portfolio’ accumulation” (ibid: 316). Ellis (1998: 4) defines livelihood diversification as “the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their standards of living.”

Diversification of income sources in rural areas is the norm (Barrett 2001). It has long been recognised as a way for rural households to spread risks and as a response to uncertainties of making a livelihood (Berry 1993; Scoones et al. 1996). This is especially true in dryland pastoral settings, where uncertainty is the norm (Scoones 1994, 2019, 2023). It “is subject to class differentiation generated by commoditization. Diversification by those whose ‘portfolios’ combine agrarian commodity production with investment in and incomes from shops, transport, crop and livestock trading, equipment hire and other service provision, has a very different dynamic to the imperative of diversification as a ‘survival’ strategy in the face of poverty and insecurity” (Bernstein & Woodhouse 2001: 316-317). In other words, livelihood diversification or “simultaneous” straddling “differs in relation to its place in household reproduction” (Schaefer 2017: 68). For better-off households, straddling may be part of a strategy of expanded social reproduction or capital accumulation, while for poor households it is a survival or coping mechanism.

Research from Africa points to the continued importance of straddling in rural accumulation. As Bernstein and Woodhouse (2001: 316) put it, “Accumulation in rural areas in Africa is typically the results of sequential or simultaneous ‘straddling’ of commodity relations in and outside farming.” Based on his study of rural accumulators in the groundnut basin in Senegal, for example, Oya argues that “the combination of different sites of accumulation and their variability over times lends support to the idea that “entrepreneurship” among rural West African capitalists is mostly evident in the way they mix activities and experiment with new forms of accumulation”. Neven et al. (2009) found that medium-scale farmers rely on combining farming with off-farm activities, including migration, as a source of income to invest in production, particularly in a context where its cost of production is rising. Other recent studies about changing farm size distribution in Africa provide evidence of the rapid rise of ‘medium-scale’ farms (ranging between 5 and 100 hectares) over the past decade or so, driven in part, by the growing interest in rural land by urban-based professionals and businesspeople

(Chapoto et al. 2013; Hilhorst & Nelen 2013; Jayne et al. 2014, 2016; Anseeuw et al. 2016). A study in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia estimates that these 'medium-scale' farmers now control 19%, 31.8%, 39% and 52.9% of farmland respectively (Jayne *et al*. 2016). In their study of agricultural commercialisation in Kenya, Hall et al. (2017: 528) note a trend involving "commercialisation driven by investments from outside of agriculture, such as retirement funds, remittances or on-going urban employment – what might be termed 'stepping in'". In Marxist terms, this accumulation path has been variously described as a "Merchant path" (de Janvry 1981), "accumulation from outside" (Whitfield 2016) or simply "capital beyond agriculture" (Bernstein 2010).

Some have argued that diversification of rural livelihoods represents a process of "deagrarianisation". Deagrarianisation is defined as "a long-term process of occupational adjustment, income earning reorientation, social identification and spatial relocation based on modes of livelihood" (Bryceson 1996: 276). Deagrarianisation includes an important aspect of depeasantization, that is "a specific form of de-agrarianisation in which peasantries lose their economic capacity and social coherence, and shrink in demographic size relative to non-peasant populations" (Bryceson 2002: 727). It is argued that diversification of rural livelihoods has intensified dramatically, in part, because of structural adjustment programmes (Bryceson 2000). While recognizing the importance of food self-provisioning in rural areas, these studies suggest a 'surge' in non-agricultural activities, particularly trade and mining, which have tended to replace export crop production (Bryceson 2002, 2009).

Bernstein (2004) sees livelihood diversification as a "crisis of employment", and notes that the majority of "small farmers" in the global South are part of what he calls the "classes of labour": "neither dispossessed of all means of reproducing itself nor in possession of sufficient means to reproduce itself" (Bernstein 2010b: 91, original emphasis). While the former is "not exceptional nor novel", the latter "marks the limits of their viability as petty commodity producers" (ibid: 91). "Classes of labour", argues Bernstein (2006: 455):

> comprise 'the growing numbers … who now depend – directly *and indirectly* – on the sale of their labour power for their own daily reproduction' (Panitch and Leys 2001, ix) … through insecure and oppressive – and in many places increasingly scarce – wage employment, often combined with a range of likewise precarious small-scale farming and insecure informal sector ('survival') activity, subject to its own forms of differentiation and oppression along intersecting lines of class, gender, generation, caste, and ethnicity. In short, most have to pursue their means of livelihood/reproduction across different sites of the social division of labour: urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural wage employment and self-employment. (Bernstein 2006:455)

He further notes that "this defies inherited assumptions of fixed, let alone uniform, notions (and 'identities') of 'worker', 'peasant', 'trader', 'urban', 'rural', 'employed' and 'self-employed'", and also contributes to what he terms the "fragmentation of classes of labour" (ibid: 2010b: 91).

Still others argues that a process of "repeasantization" is taking place. This process is constituted by a two-fold process: making agriculture more peasant-like and a *quantitative* increase in the number of peasants (van der Ploeg 2009). Leonardo van der Berg et al. note that repeasantization involves "interrelated process of people 'returning' to rural and land-based activities, through inheriting land from kin, purchasing privately owned land or accessing land through planned and unplanned (e.g., squatting) land reform programmes" (2018: 656). In the context of Zimbabwe, Moyo and Yeros (2005: 195) have argued that the FTLRP exemplifies a phenomenon of repeasantization, with "the new petty-commodity-producing establishments account[ing] for 93.7 per cent of total new farming establishments, thus far on 40.7 per cent of the land acquired." In the context of global COVID-19 pandemic, it can be predicted that repeasantization and the importance of land-based livelihoods will increase.

Jacobs' (2018) influential work with long-term urban residents who are involved in land occupations for raising livestock in Zabalaza, revealed that urbanisation/proletarianization has not dissolved the 'peasant outlook' or that there is a "strong latent demand for land for agricultural livelihood in the city". He coined the term "urban proletariat with peasant characteristics" to explain the curios case of Zabalaza land occupations whereby the occupiers combine urban wage labour and livestock farming. As he put it, "While the diverse ties to land reflect the *peasant character* of the urban proletariat, their diverse ties to wage labor are indicative of their proletarian character." (ibid: 891). Though the Zabalaza land occupations are taking place in an urban setting, he believes that his conceptualization is in sync with the "repeazantization thesis".

7.2 Diversified livelihood

This section examines livelihood diversification in the study sites and its role in processes of accumulation and differentiation. A vast body of previous research have documented the importance of livelihood diversification in Zimbabwe's rural areas (Scoones 1990; Scoones et al. 1996; Campbell et al. 2002; Bird & Shepherd 2003), including the old resettlement and spontaneous areas (Kinsey 1999; Chimhowu 2002; Chimhowu & Hulme 2004), new

resettlement areas (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Mkodzongi 2013b; James 2014; Scoones et al. 2018) and small-scale commercial farming areas (Scoones et al. 2018). The erstwhile white-commercial farmers also depended on income from other sources, including real estate, hotels, tourism and wildlife, transport, import-export trading, as well as agricultural processing and marketing (Selby 2006). For instance, the owner of Luma operated a hotel and tourism business near Gweru, which was linked to game ranching at the farm. Others such as O. Connolly were running engineering firms in Bulawayo as well, while others such as Peter Cunningham of Maleme ranch had animal feed manufacturing company in Bulawayo. Thus, they had multiple sources of income, apart from farming. The new settlers of Matobo district are no exception to other farmers in pursuing a wide variety of livelihood strategies. In variable environments, such as those found in southwestern Matabeleland, there is an added incentive to spread risks and leave options open (Berry 1993; Scoones et al. 1996). Livelihood diversification is vital in offsetting the consequences and impacts of variability or climatic shocks. My findings from Matobo shows that diversified livelihoods may involve combining farming with wage labour, harvesting and selling of natural resources, gold panning, or border jumping.

Table 7.1-7.3 presents descriptive statistics of the income sources observed across the different schemes at the household level. The household surveys reveal that all households across all the schemes were involved in a wide range of activities, including wage employment, non-farm business, harvesting of natural resources, house rental, crop and livestock sales, and local piece jobs. The number of income sources ranges from a median of four to six, although they vary in quality. Virtually all households across the three resettlement schemes had a source of income other than farming. In the A1 schemes, a total number of 446 household income sources were recorded across 67 households surveyed. Of these, 85 (19%) were jobs abroad, 65 (15%) were livestock income, and 60 (13%) involved harvesting of natural resources. Land-related income sources, which include livestock, crop and natural resources, amounts to 45% of all total income sources in the A1 schemes. In self-contained farms, a total number of 193 household income sources were recorded in 32 households. The most common income source was jobs abroad (49 of 193 or 25%), followed by off-farm permanent jobs in Zimbabwe (41 of 193 or 21%) and livestock (30 of 193 or 16%). Here, only 22% of total income sources were land-based incomes, including farming elsewhere. The same pattern seems to be evident in A2 schemes. The most common income source was employment outside Zimbabwe (23 of 85 or

28%), followed by formal permanent jobs in Zimbabwe, livestock (11 of 85 or 13%) and pension (10 of 85 or 12%). Land-based income amounted to only 14% of all income sources.

It is clear from the data that international migration (i.e., working abroad) consistently feature as a livelihood source with the highest percentage contribution to the total income sources across all the three schemes. Due to the 1980s violence, marginalization, lack of opportunities and the economic crisis, many people have resorted to international migration, commonly to South Africa, Botswana and the UK to work as domestic workers, care-givers and general labourers (Maphosa 2007; Thebe 2011; Nyamunda 2014). Most of those involved in cross-border migration to South Africa, especially in A1 schemes, are border jumpers. Those with better education are employed in well-paid jobs, while others are operating self-employed businesses.

Other sources of income included self-employed business, local farm labouring, permanent farm work, house rental and hiring farm equipment and so on. Agricultural jobs were non-existent in surveyed A2 and self-contained households than in A1 schemes. This is because household members in these schemes tended to be more educated and thus were more likely to participate in urban jobs and/or self-employed businesses. Some household members in A1 schemes reported local semi-skilled jobs such as building, thatching and carpentry.

Table 7.1: Total and average household income sources and adults with income sources in A1 schemes

	Sum		Measures of central tendency				Range	
	N	% Total	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. Dev	Min.	Max.
Total Income Sources	446	100%	6.66	6.00	6[a]	3.445	1	18
Job abroad	85	19%	1.27	1.00	0	1.309	0	5
Permanent, non-agricultural job	36	8%	.54	.00	0	1.020	0	6
Temporary, non-agricultural job	7	2%	.10	.00	0	.308	0	1
Local farm labouring ('piece job')	23	5%	.34	.00	0	.641	0	3
Local, semi-skilled job	37	8%	.55	.00	0	.744	0	3
Permanent, farm job	21	5%	.31	.00	0	.679	0	4
Off-farm business, no employees in Zimbabwe	28	6%	.42	.00	0	.607	0	2
Off-farm business, employees in Zimbabwe	5	1%	.07	.00	0	.401	0	3
Off-farm business, no employees abroad	1	0%	.01	.00	0	.122	0	1
Off-farm business, with employees abroad	0	0%	.00	.00	0	.00	0	0
Livestock income	65	15%	.97	1.00	0	1.044	0	4
Crop income	30	7%	.45	.00	0	.585	0	2
Natural resources	60	13%	.90	.00	0	1.281	0	4
Pension	29	7%	.43	.00	0	.679	0	2
House rental	11	2%	.16	.00	0	.373	0	1
Hiring out tools/ draught power	4	1%	.06	.00	0	.295	0	2
Financial support	4	1%	.06	.00	0	.295	0	2
Adults earning income	278	84%	4.15	4	2	2.120	1	11
Adults not earning income	53	16%	.79	1	0	.946	0	5
Adults not earning + children	266	49%	3.97	4	4	2.296	0	10
Dependency Ratio	0.96		1.1562	1.0000			.00	4.50

[a]Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.2: Income sources in self-contained farms

	Sum		Measures of central tendency				Range	
Income Source	N	% Total	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Total Income Sources	193	100%	6.03	5	5	2.834	2	13
Job abroad	49	25%	1.53	1	0	1.883	0	9
Permanent, non-agricultural job in Zimbabwe	41	21%	1.28	1	1	1.085	0	3
Temporary, non-agricultural job in Zimbabwe	1	1%	.03	0	0	.177	0	1
Local skilled, non-agricultural job	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Permanent, farm job	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local farm labouring (piece job)	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pensions	18	9%	.56	0	0	.801	0	2
On-farm business, no employees	1	1%	.03	0	0	.177	0	1
On-farm business, employees	4	2%	.13	0	0	.492	0	2
Off-farm business, no employees in Zimbabwe	10	5%	.31	0	0	.471	0	1
Off-farm business, employees in Zimbabwe	18	9%	.56	0	0	.801	0	3
Off-farm business, no employees abroad	1	1%	.03	0	0	.177	0	1
Off-farm business, employees abroad	5	3%	.16	0	0	.628	0	3
Livestock	30	16%	.94	1	1	.564	0	2
Cropping	5	3%	.16	0	0	.448	0	2
Natural resource	1	1%	.03	0	0	.177	0	1
Farming elsewhere	3	2%	.09	0	0	.390	0	2
House rentals	6	3%	.19	0	0	.397	0	1
Financial assistance	0	0%	.00	0	0	.000	0	0
Adults earning income	126	74%	3.94	4.00	4	2.327	1	11
Adults not earning income	45	26%	1.41	1.00	1	1.214	0	5
Adults not earning + children	80	39%	2.50	2.00	1	2.874	0	15
Dependency Ratio	46.3		1.45	0.44	0			

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.3: Income sources in A2 farms

	Sum		Measures of central tendency				Range	
	N	% Total	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Total Income Sources	83	100%	4,61	4	3	3,20	1	14
Jobs abroad	23	28%	1,28	1	1	1,60	0	6
Permanent, non-agricultural job	15	18%	0,83	1	1	0,86	0	3
Temporary, non-agricultural job	1	1%	0,06	0	0	0,24	0	1
Local semi-skilled, non-agricultural job	0	0%	0,00	0	0	0,00	0	0
Permanent farm job	0	0%	0,00	0	0	0,00	0	0
Farm labouring ('piece job')	0	0%	0,00	0	0	0,00	0	0
Pension	10	12%	0,56	0	0	0,71	0	2
Off-farm business, no employees in Zimbabwe	3	4%	.17	.00	0	.383	0	1
Off-farm business, employees in Zimbabwe	8	10%	.44	.00	0	1.042	0	4
Off-farm business, no employees abroad	2	2%	.11	.00	0	.323	0	1
Off-farm business, employees abroad	5	6%	.28	.00	0	.575	0	2
Livestock	11	13%	0,61	1	1	0,61	0	2
Cropping	1	1%	0,06	0	0	0,24	0	1
Natural resource	0	0%	0,00	0	0	0,00	0	0
House rentals	3	4%	0,17	0	0	0,38	0	1
Financial assistance	1	1%	0,06	0	0	0,24	0	1
Adults earning income	61	74%	3.39	2.50	2	2.330	1	11
Adults not earning income	22	27%	1.22	1.00	0[a]	1.215	0	4
Adults not earning + children	54	47%	3.00	3.00	4	1.815	0	6
Dependency Ratio	0,89		1.3773	1.1667	.00a	1.16661	.00	4.00

[a]Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.

*In this study, I defined "remittance" as money from other relatives who were not necessarily considered as part of the household.

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.4: Main occupation of household heads across A2, A1 and Self-contained schemes

	A2		S-C		A1	
Main occupation	N	%	N	%	N	%
Full-time farming	3	17	10	31	38	57
Civil service	3	17	4	13	1	2
State security services	2	11	0	0	2	3
Other off-farm job	1	6	3	9	6	9
Self-employed business	6	33	10	31	2	3
Work abroad	2	11	2	6	7	10
Unemployed	1	6	1	3	0	0
Farm worker	0	0	0	0	5	8
Farm labouring ('piece jobs')	0	0	0	0	2	3
Local semi-skilled jobs	0	0	0	0	3	5
Artisanal gold mining	0	0	2	6	1	2
Total*	18	100	32	100	67	100

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding-off to the nearest figure.

It is further notable, as shown in Table 7.1, that household heads surveyed were still engaged in off-farm activities as their main livelihood. The proportion of household heads engaging in off-farm activities as their main occupation varied across schemes. In A1 schemes, the proportion of household heads engaging in an off-farm activity as the main occupation was 43% (38 of 67 cases), while in A2 and self-contained schemes, the percentages were 84% (15 of 18 cases) and 69% (22 of 32 cases), respectively.

Occupation profiles also differed across the schemes. Absentee urban-based investors were most common in A2 schemes (33% or 6 of 18 cases) and self-contained schemes (31% or 10 of 32 cases); while full-time farmers were most common in A1 schemes (57% or 38 of 67 cases). In both A2 and self-contained schemes, the second most common occupation was farming, at around 17% (3 of 18 cases) and 31% (10 of 32 cases). A significant percentage (42% or 28 of 67 cases) of household heads in A1 farms were retired, and were now full-time farmers. In A2 and self-contained farms, 11% (2 of 18 cases) and 38% (12 of 32 cases) of household heads said that they were retired from their previous main occupation, but were still involved in other off-farm activities such as self-employed business and artisanal mining which kept them in the urban areas. Livestock production does not require long-term intensive labour, and the livestock owner's presence at the farm during weekends is more than enough to manage the farm. Livestock production is thus suitable for pluriactivity.

Since most of these households were either state security employees or civil servants, many of them were receiving a monthly pension. The percentage of household heads employed as civil servants ranged from 2% (1 of 67 cases) in A1 farms to 17% (3 of 18 cases) in A2 farms. It is clear that the proportion of active civil servants shrank between the early years of settlement and the time of my fieldwork: from 50% of the total household heads surveyed to 13% in self-contained farms; and from 39% of total household heads surveyed to 17% in A2 farms. Similarly, the percentage of household heads who were working as state security has also decreased since settlement: from 22% to 11% in surveyed A2 farms; and from 16% to none in self-contained farms by 2018. Though most household heads have since retired from their previous occupations, virtually all are still involved in off-farm income generating activities in order to supplement farming income. These included casual employment, consulting, self-employed businesses, artisanal gold mining, back-yard urban agriculture and so on. Given the highly variable nature of agricultural production in Matobo, described in Chapter Five and Six, it is not surprising that many farmers are continuing with off-farm income-generating activities.

Meanwhile, the proportion of household heads who reported farming as their major occupation had increased by 2018. At settlement, a mere 6% of the total household heads in self-contained farms surveyed reported farming as their primary occupation, compared to 0% in A2 farms. In 2018, 31% of household heads in sampled self-contained farms reported farming as their major occupation, compared to 17%. These trends presumably reflect that some beneficiaries who were formally employed at settlement have now moved into farming on a full-time basis after retirement.

Table 7.5: Off-farm income activities and success groups in A1 schemes

Success Group		Number of pensions	Number of house rental income	Number of household members earning income from:							
				Job abroad	Permanent non-agric job in Zimbabwe	Casual non-agric job in Zimbabwe	Local piece work	Local semi-skilled work	Permanent farm work	Natural resource-based income	Non-agric self-employed business w/out employees
SG1	Median	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Sum	16	4	19	11	0	2	5	3	6	11
	Column Sum %	55.2%	36.4%	24.1%	29.7%	0.0%	8.7%	15.6%	13.6%	15.4%	32.4%
SG2	Median	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	Sum	6	3	19	14	1	3	7	2	12	8
	Column Sum %	20.7%	27.3%	24.1%	37.8%	14.3%	13.0%	21.9%	9.1%	30.8%	23.5%
SG3	Median	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
	Sum	7	3	36	9	5	17	18	16	20	13
	Column Sum %	24.1%	27.3%	45.6%	24.3%	71.4%	73.9%	56.2%	72.7%	51.3%	38.2%
SG4	Median	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Sum	0	1	5	3	1	1	2	1	1	2
	Column Sum %	0.0%	9.1%	6.3%	8.1%	14.3%	4.3%	6.3%	4.5%	2.6%	5.9%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.6: Off-farm activities and asset groups in Self-contained schemes

Asset Groups		Number of pensions	Number of house rentals	Number of household members earning income from:		
				Job abroad	Permanent non-agric job in Zimbabwe	Non-agric business w/out employees
1	Median	0	0	1	1	0
	Sum	8	2	14	13	5
	Column Sum %	44.4%	33.3%	28.6%	31.7%	16.7%
2	Median	0	0	3	0	1
	Sum	6	2	26	6	9
	Column Sum %	33.3%	33.3%	53.1%	14.6%	30.0%
3	Median	0	0	0	2	1
	Sum	4	2	9	22	16
	Column Sum %	22.2%	33.3%	18.4%	53.7%	53.3%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.7: Non-farm activities and asset groups in A2 schemes

Asset groups		Number of pensions	Number of house rental income	Number of household members earning income from:		
				Job abroad	Permanent non-agric job in Zimbabwe	Non-agric business w/out employees
1	Median	1	0	1	1	0
	Sum	5	1	11	6	4
	Column Sum %	50.0%	33.3%	47.8%	40.0%	21.1%
2	Median	1	0	1	1	1
	Sum	4	2	10	4	6
	Column Sum %	40.0%	66.7%	43.5%	26.7%	31.6%
3	Median	0	0	0	0	2
	Sum	1	0	2	5	9
	Column Sum %	10.0%	0.0%	8.7%	33.3%	47.4%

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

In sum, these findings reveal that off-farm income is still important across the different schemes, although households in A1 schemes depend more on agriculture and natural resource harvesting as a main source of livelihood. This is unsurprising, given the settings dominated by high variability in terms of environmental dynamics. In periods of drought, households barely produce enough grain to cover consumption needs until the next harvest. Similarly, drought can also wipe off forage resources for livestock. This makes venturing into other off-

farm activities vital as it provide cash to survive or purchase inputs such as seeds and supplementary feeding for animals. In some cases, where farmers have very small herds which can only yield limited and inadequate livelihoods, off-farm income enable households not to depend too much on their herds, which could lead to herd depletion.

In the section that follows, I offer selected detailed life-histories collected across the three schemes in order to offer a glimpse of the importance of off-farm income in farm investment and production.

Case studies

Case 1: EM, Mampondweni, Self-contained (AG3)

EM, a war-veteran in his mid-fifties, ran several businesses in different locations, including a brick-moulding company in Bulawayo, tractor-ploughing hiring and grinding milling services at the farm, cross-border transport business, as well as grocery and bottle's store. He was also a headmaster at a secondary school in Khumalo communal areas until his retirement in July 2017. He has also been a national treasurer of Zimbabwe Teachers Trade Union (ZIMTA) from 2009 until his retirement in 2017. He was also, for a time, an executive member of ZIMSEC. In 2018, EM was elected as a ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for Matobo North in the previous elections (2018), and later appointed as the deputy minister in the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education. In 2018, he owned a head of 200 cattle. He regularly sells cattle to finance major investments. For instance, in 2015, he sold around 70 cattle and purchased a tractor, and in the following year, he sold 100 cattle and used the proceeds to set up a cross-border transport business in partnership with one of his sons who works as a researcher at UNISA in South Africa. His two other sons were studying engineering and medicine at NUST and UZ, while her two daughters completed degrees in tourism and ran their own catering business in South Africa. When his is away his farm manager runs the farm and manages six permanent workers.

Case 2: NdN, Pagati, Self-contained farm (AG3)

NdN is a war veteran in his late fifties who run a cross-border transport business from Botswana, having left Zimbabwe during *gukurahundi* when ex-ZAPU war veterans were being persecuted by the state forces after demobilisation. The trucks operated between Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe and DRC. He also runs an engineering company in Botswana, while

his wife operates a packaging company in Botswana as well. NdN also owns, in partnership with his brother, another haulage transport business in Zimbabwe. NdN has a formal qualification in motor mechanics, which he acquired in Ukraine during the liberation struggle. Before setting up his own business, he had worked previously as a "simple" workshop foreman in a transport company called Zalawi in Botswana. His transport businesses were a major source of capital for his cattle business. In 2001, he had over 330 head of cattle, which he kept at his communal lands homestead in Kafusi and graze in Sear Block, while others were lease-grazed in Malundi area. Having these cattle in two different places proved "costly in terms of transport, medicine and work force". This prompted him to apply for land in 2001.He managed to acquire a plot in 2004. By 2018, he had around 220 cattle. He hires in herders to look after his cattle, under the farm manager's supervision, while he is busy with his off-farm businesses. In early 2018, he was in the process of starting an out-grower broiler project at the farm, linked to Peter Cunningham of nearby Maleme farm. However, he lamented the ongoing threats of eviction of the white-farmer and the associated uncertainty.

Case 3: OD, Wild East, Self-contained farm (AG1)

Born in Msipani area of Zvishavane in 1954, OD is a retired veterinary officer, who spends most of his time at the farm. After 27 years of working as a veterinary officer in Matabeleland south, he resigned from his work in July 2009. In 2001, he sold his "permanent paid-up shares" (PUPS) worth ZW$50,000 from CABS bank and used the proceeds to purchase two cows and two heifers. During this period, he had no land of his own, so he kept the cattle on a leased farm in Nevada. In 2003, he then acquired his own plot in Wild East. Today, he owns around 30 head of cattle and 15 goats, and largely depends on cattle for a living. To make extra income, he does some 'consulting' and supervision work as a farm manager for a nearby black large-scale commercial rancher. His relationship with the black large-scale commercial rancher also enables him to access grazing in the farm during the dry season and drought times. Since retirement, OD used to take care of his livestock using his own labour, except in recent times, when he hired a herder whom he pays USD50 per month. OD has four children (three boys and one girl), all of whom have completed at least secondary schooling or bachelor's degrees. One of his sons, who works as a quantity surveyor in Namibia, pays the hired herder's salary every month, while his only daughter works as a salesperson for a large mobile phone network in Zimbabwe. His daughter helps him to cover other expenses in town such as water and electricity bills.

Case 4: JnD, Maleme, A2, (AG1)

JnD, a war veteran in his late seventies, was one of the "leaders" of land occupations in the district in the early 2000s. During this period, he was the district chairman of Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA). Harnessing his position in ZNWVA and role in the land occupations, JnD successfully secured an A2 plot in 2002, although he did not meet the required criteria. By his own admission, JnD said that he had inadequate financial capital needed to invest in commercial farming. Due to lack of finance, he has struggled to put the farm into production since settlement, and therefore resorted to leasing-out grazing to others. JnD was demobilised from the army soon after Independence in 1980. In the 1980s, he was elected as a ZANU-PF councillor for his rural ward until 2004 when he lost the elections. In the 1990s, he worked as a bar manager for Matobo Rural District Council's bar in Kezi but was later imprisoned and incarcerated for embezzlement of funds. In the late 1990s, after returning home from a term spent in prison, he set up a butcher store in Maphisa using the ZW$50,000 he got as war veterans' gratuities as capital. However, the business quickly collapsed. Today, JnD lives at his original rural homestead in Kezi and depends entirely on war veteran pension and house rental from Maphisa to make a living. As of 2018, he owned around 10 head of cattle, which he kept at his communal areas homestead in Kezi, while renting out the farm to another herdowner from Tshelanyemba. One of his sons (teacher by profession) who runs a butcher store and restaurant in Maphisa, decided to establish a horticulture project at the farm in 2016 using income from his businesses as capital. "My son, N, is now trying to push things at the farm. So, I am now reaping my benefits [of educating him]. He's making a lot of investments at the farm", he explained. His other son, M, who works as a taxi driver in South Africa was planning to build a homestead at the farm. "I always tell them that this is your farm, if you let it go it will be your own problem", he says.

Case 5: RbN, Damara Estate, A2 (AG3)

RbN is a man in his early forties and lawyer by profession who run a law firm in Bulawayo. Together with his wife, he also operates a taxi transport business. His business income enabled him to start buying cattle in 2012. At the time, he had no land of his own; so, he kept the cattle at an A1 scheme in Bubi district, where he was renting grazing land. In the year that followed, he acquired an A2 plot and moved his cattle there. By 2018, RbN's cattle herd had increased to 150. Like other urban-based investors, RbN hires three permanent herders who he pays USD150 each per month, while he still focusses with his off-farm businesses. He wishes to

retire from his Law firm business so that he can focus on his cattle business, "but as you know, most of us started with no funding…if I leave this place the other businesses (including the farm) will suffer".

Case 6: RN, Buluma, A2 (AG1)

RN, born in 1955, is a war veteran and ex-soldier, who was integrated into the Zimbabwe National Army in the early 1980s and later retired from his job as a staff sergeant in 2006. He used some of his earnings to buy cattle, which he kept at his communal areas homestead in Lubhangwe. He acquired an A2 plot in 2002 through connections, but had a small herd (12 cattle) which he had built from earnings from wage labour. In 2018, RN owned around 37 head of cattle. He depends entirely on cattle sales and pensions. In addition, he also leases out part of his grazing land to other nearby herdowners in exchange for cash and/or cattle. RN is also taking care of the cattle of his two brothers who live and work in South Africa. In return, the two brothers are paying the hired herders' wages. RbN spend most of his time at the farm alone, while his wife works as a school teacher in Bulawayo. He sells cattle regularly to school his children. In 2018, RN was planning to start a broiler project at the farm of his neighbour, who inherited a white-farmer's farmhouse. However, he lamented that the existing water pipes were broken and was therefore struggling to fix them.

Case 7: NmF, Buluma, A2 (AG2)

NmF is a local chief in his late forties, who works in South Africa as a fitter and turner on a casual basis. Born to a royal Nguni family, NmF was installed as a chief in 2007 following the death of his father. A secondary teacher by training, NmF decided to emigrate to South Africa in 2000. He relies entirely on 'part-time' jobs as a fitter and turner from his friend who runs a private company that maintains machines in Johannesburg. In addition, he also receives a monthly allowance as a chief in Zimbabwe. His wife, a primary teacher by training, managed to set up and runs a pre-school in South Africa. When not at work, NmF says that he sometimes helps his wife at the pre-school. Thanks to his position as a chief, he successfully secured an A2 plot (500ha) in 2012. Like other chiefs in the area, he inherited former white-farmer's farmhouse. When he acquired the farm, he had no cattle. He only started buying cattle in 2013 using his wage earnings from South Africa. By 2018, his herd had grown up to 37. He also owned 29 goats at the farm. Since his herd is still relatively small, he has been renting out grazing land to his two cousins who owns a total of 22 cattle between them, in return for one

heifer per year. However, he was planning to "kick them out" in the near future, given that his own herd was expanding rapidly.

Case 8: KM, Buluma, (AG2)

KM, born 1955, is a war veteran and retired civil servant, who acquired 500 hectares of land in an A2 scheme in 2003. After acquiring his A2 farm, he decided to retire from his job in the same year, after 15 years working for CSC, so that he could concentrate on his farm. Having worked for CSC for many years, he had high hopes of getting a cattle a loan from CSC as was the case for white farmers in the past, but this never materialized. As he put it, "You die with your wishes!" With no access to credit, KM said he could not expand his herd due to lack of financial resources. At that time, his herd was around 30. He also tried to set up a horticulture project, but failed due to lack of water. In 2005, when the economic situation worsened, he realized that he could no longer rely exclusively on cattle sales as this would deplete his herd. He therefore decided to sought employment again. Thus, he took up a job at GMB as a production officer on a short-term basis. After his contract had expired in 2007, he then worked for an NGO as a field officer for an NGO on a short-term contract. In September 2009, he took up a job as a farm manager for a church-based NGO, Lutheran Development Services (LDS) at Mnene mission in Mberengwa. He worked there for 4 years before his contract expired. He then returned to farming on a full-time basis. However, in 2016, he took a job as an assistant project officer and/or enumerator at another church-based NGO called Brethren in Christ Compassionate and Development Services (CDS) in Gwanda. Since then, he has been employed on short-term contracts of usually 4 to 5 months, but subject to renewal if the NGO still needs his services. His contract was set to expire in February 2018. Given that he and his family are members of the Brethren-in-Christ Church, he receives first preference when work opportunities do arise in the NGO. His ambition was to raise some money to invest on his farm and concentrate on farming as a full-time occupation. As he put it: "All I want is to go back to my farm. I am trying to raise money so that I can fix a few things [on the farm], then I go back to my farm." Although his contracts with the NGO are usually short, casual work helped him to avoid having to regularly sell his cattle for subsistence. KM's other income came from his war veteran and NSSA pensions, as well as remittances from his three children who are working in South Africa and Germany. One of his sons (aged 30) works as a computer engineer in South Africa, one daughter (aged 32) is chartered accountant in South Africa, while another son (aged 28) is a nurse in Germany. Although he was happy that his children were sending

remittances, KM said that it was hard for his children to support their own households, let alone the parents: "It's also difficult for them because they also want to shape their own future, but here we are – parasites! I don't want to be a parasite own my children again. But because I am suffering, I end up being a parasite. I am disturbing their future. Instead, they should be coming to me [for help]". His wife is also involved in a mushroom project in Bulawayo, linked to their church, Brethren-in-Christ.

Case 9: ChM, Vimbi (SG1)

ChM is a 38-year-old man, born into a polygynous family in Emagobeni area in Khumalo communal lands. He attended school until Grade 7. After dropping out of school, he stayed home, helping his father to farm and look after cattle. In 1998, he got a job at Maleme farm, where, following in his father's footsteps, worked as a farm worker. In December 1999, his work ethic and out-going manner soon caught the attention of the white farmer, who shifted him to his animal feed manufacturing company in Bulawayo. His earnings enabled him to buy two heifers: one from his father for ZW$5,000 in 2001 and another one from his employer for ZW$6,000 in 2003. In the early 2000s, he joined the land occupations and got a plot in Vimbi, where he left his wife and mother, while he continued working in town. In the early 2007, he left his job because of cash problems. As he explained: "We were no longer receiving our salaries in time, yet rents needed to be paid in time." In October 2007 he went to Botswana as a "*border jumper*" to work as a herder.[145] Here, he earned 350 Botswanan Pula (BP) per month. In November 2008, he left the job and returned home with a total cash of BP2,500, which he saved from his salary. Since it was a drought year, he used most of the money to buy food and clothes for his young family, and gave the remaining BP900 to his wife for safe-keeping. That same year, he went to South Africa, again as a *border jumper*, where he worked as a "*dhaka-boy*" (builder's assistant) in a construction company. Since he didn't have a passport, he had to pay an ox to "*omalayisha*" (cross-border transporter) who assisted him to illegally cross the border. While in South Africa, his wife exchanged the remaining BP900 cash into Zimbabwean Dollars and bought a heifer for ZW$26,000 from a nearby white farmer. In December 2009, he returned home. After a year, during which he earned enough to purchase building materials such as iron roofing sheets to build "proper houses" at the farm, he returned to the farm to focus on farming. He replaced all the pole and dug buildings he had initially constructed during the

[145] A 'border-jumper' is a term used to describe those who travel to other neighbouring countries illegally.

early years of settlement. Given the precarious nature of immigrant life in South Africa, he decided not to return to South Africa. Since then, he decided to focus on farming and only taking local casual jobs when the conditions are right. In 2011, he worked for 5 months at a gold mine near Bulawayo but decided to quit the job because of late salary payments. His last casual job was in 2015 when he was employed as a grader operator on a short-term contract (four months). Since then, he has been a full-time farmer, at the age of 37. In 2018 ChM was one of the largest herd owners in Vimbi, owning around 35 head of cattle, and had increased to around 40 by end of 2022. He explained that life was better as a full-time farmer than taking on menial jobs that pay very little, and that being present all/most of the nights allows him to carefully manage his herd. He sells cattle regularly to finance major investments. For example, in 2013, ChM exchanged eight heifers (valued at US$500 each) with a used 'pick-up' truck (valued at US$4500) with a nearby self-contained farmer. Today, he uses the bakkie for hiring transport services to other farmers. In 2015, he exchanged two oxen (valued at US$1200) with a nearby former white farmer for a grinding mill. In good years, ChM could harvest up to five tonnes of maize. His wife also sells milk from their milking cows during the rainy season. She also engages in broiler rearing, trade, as well as selling beer and hot stuff, locally.

Case 10: JM, Vimbi (SG3)

Educated until form 3, forty-seven-year-old JM works as a security guard at Arkjet mine in Gwanda district. He acquired an A1 plot in 2003 but only occupied it two years later in 2005. At the time he was employed as a carpenter or mechanist at Spearhead Timbers in Bulawayo, where had been working since 1995. He started as a security guard and was later "promoted" to the position of a carpenter. Through this employment, JM gained carpentry skills and, in 2006, when the economy was in dire straits, he decided to resign from his job because his "wages could no longer buy anything". He then managed to set up a carpentry business in Nketa 9 and Mganwini townships in Bulawayo. He hired six male workers, all of them his siblings, to help him. By 2009, amidst hyperinflation, the business floundered because "of cash shortages", although he had "many customers". Thereafter, he enrolled for a security training course with a company called Guardians Security. Upon completion of this course, he was able to secure a job as a security guard at BP petrol station, before landing another security job in December 2011 at another security company, which later deploys him at Arkjet mine. While his contract says that his monthly salary is USD220, he said that he had been receiving only USD100 per month since 2014 because, he said, "the company says it has no money", and

doubts if the company would pay the money owed to him in deferred wages. To supplement his income, he also engages in gold panning at the mine where he works. The mine allows the workers to engage on gold panning at the mine as a strategy to supplement their meagre incomes. Alongside his job and gold panning he also engages in prophetic healing in exchange for "donations", part-time carpentry and milk trading in communal areas in Gwanda. His wife, RoN, also engages in casual employment such as housekeeping in Kezi and casual labouring in government. For instance, in March 2017, she was employed as a domestic worker in Kezi, earning USD90 per month. Most of the income from her wages was used to buy food. Between April and June of the same year, she secured casual job as a general hand at the Ministry of Roads for three months, during which she earned enough money to purchase a plough for USD120. She also used part of her earnings from casual work to purchase chicken feed, as she plans to begin a broiler project at the farm. Since JM and his wife are always away, they hire a domestic worker to look after the homestead and their two young children, while they are busy with off-farm activities.

Case 11: AgN, Luma, A1 (SG4)

AgN, a widower in his late forties, works as a "*garden-boy*" in South Africa. Before emigrating to South Africa in 2009, he was employed as a construction worker at a private company in Bulawayo. In 2010, he acquired an A1 plot because he wanted his own rural homestead, having been raised at his own brother's homestead in Ratanyane, and wanted his children to inherit "something" one day when he dies. He has four children (two boys and two girls) with "different women", he says. His first daughter is married in Harare, while the other one (aged 28) is working as a domestic worker in South Africa. His eldest son (aged 20) and his sixteen-year-old pregnant wife, was looking after the plot in 2017 but "they ran away", leaving no one staying at the farm. AgN lamented his inability to find a "good wife who is willing to stay at the farm", while he is busy with employment in South Africa. In December 2017, AgN returned to the plot with a wife (aged 38), whom he later left behind after the holiday. Although the wife said that he and his new husband wanted a rural home, "life in the farms was not that easy". Since they had no cattle or donkeys, they depend entirely on hiring draught power from nearby others, using some of AgN's earnings.

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What is clear from these cases is the continued importance of capital from off-farm sources in supporting farm investment and the critical role it still plays in shaping production and accumulation in a highly variable landscape.

7.3 Migration and remittances

Labour migration has a long history in Zimbabwe, dating from the colonial period. In the early years of colonialism, most African people resisted low wage labour, and rather preferred to meet their new cash needs through selling their produce on the new markets (Phimister 1988; Moyana 1984; Ranger 1985). However, a series of state interventions such as taxes, regulations and discriminatory policies gradually destabilised agricultural production in African societies, and spawned a labour migrant system whereby African men were compelled to become labour migrants in order to meet their cash needs (Arrighi 1970). African communities were forcedly removed from good quality land to make way for white settlers, and placed in "native reserves" with poor quality land. Through a combination of natural increase in population and continued appropriation of good quality land by white settlers, conditions of extensive production in the reserves massively deteriorated. The result was that many of the African households became reliant on wage remittances. The costs of social reproduction of the male migrant proletariat were subsidised by his family in the reserves to the benefit of mines, settler agriculture and manufacturing industries (Potts 2000). A minority of wage earners were able to invest surplus funds in farm equipment, inputs and livestock (Arrighi 1970; Palmer 1977; Phimister 1978; Ranger 1985), and a few of this seized the opportunities for engaging in accumulation presented by the establishment of "African Purchase Areas" with more secure land tenure (Cheater 1984; Shutt 1997). The migrant men maintained a strong link to their rural home, where they would retain to upon retirement.

In contemporary Zimbabwe, access to off-farm income remains vital in shaping processes of accumulation and social differentiation in rural contexts, including in land reform contexts (Cousins et al. 1992; Scoones 1990; Scoones et al. 1996; Scoones et al. 2010). As the case studies above show, migration outside the resettlement areas is an important livelihood strategy in my study sites. "There has been significant changes in migration patterns in recent decades, and the classic pattern of demographically defined circular migration…while still existing, is the only one among an increasing number of pathways people follow" (Scoones et al. 2010: 177). Today, there has been other forms of migration, which include long-term overseas migration within the SADC region or further afield (Scoones et al. 2010). The recent wave of

international migration began in the late 1990s when Zimbabwe's economic conditions began to decline. While Zimbabweans are now scattered across the globe, the top destinations for Zimbabweans have been South Africa and the United Kingdom ("Harare North") (Mbiba 2005). It has been asserted that around 3 million of the estimated 4 million Zimbabwean international migrants live in the United Kingdom and South Africa (Dendere 2015: 86). Many highly skilled Zimbabweans have left for the United Kingdom, where they engage in care work. JoAnn McGregor (2007) have described these care workers as the "British Bottom Cleaners". Notably, migration of women, unlike in the past, has become increasingly common in contemporary Zimbabwe.

The cross-border economy between Matobo and South Africa and Botswana, noted in many studies (Hobane 1999; Maphosa 2007a, b; Matsa & Matsa 2011; Thebe 2011), was a key theme emanating from this study, illustrating the significant role cross-border migration play in injecting cash into the Zimbabwean economy, alongside remittances from further afield. In Matabeleland, cross-border migration to South Africa has a very long history. Prior to the advent of colonialism in Zimbabwe in 1893, cross-border migration to South Africa was already established in Matabeleland region, where the Ndebele men would travel to the Rand for work in the gold mines (Clarke 1976). This continued into the colonial period, such that the white settlers faced stiff competition for labour recruitment from South Africa (ibid). As one A1 farmer said: "My father used to migrate to *Egoli* (Johannesburg) when I was young. During those days, they were going on foot and they would spend days walking. Some were even eaten by lions!".

White settlers in Zimbabwe paid very low wages than gold mines in the Transvaal. As a result of this, people preferred to migrate to South Africa than to work in local mines. In Bulilimamangwe district, for example, Africans refused to work in local mines because they were used to higher wages in the Transvaal (Phimister 1988: 25). The famous Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), known colloquially as commonly as "Wenela", had a recruitment office in Gwanda district by 1901. Cross-border migration to South Africa would continue throughout the colonial period as many sought employment in gold and diamond mines, as well as other sectors.

Over the recent years, the volume of cross-border migration to South Africa has increased dramatically due to the combined effects of state violence of the 1983-1987 disturbances (*gukurahundi*), the marginalization of the region after *gukurahundi* and onwards, the

deterioration of the country's macro-economic conditions from the late 1990s onwards, lack of employment opportunities and recurrent drought (Maphosa 2007a, b; Matsa & Matsa 2011; Thebe 2011; Nyamunda 2014). Today, migration to South Africa is a goal that many, especially the youths, aspire to and work towards; and the desire to migrate is now a "rite of passage" in Matabeleland (Maphosa 2007a, b).[146] Indeed, most surveyed households have at least one household member living and working in South Africa.

Most of the Zimbabwean migrants work illegally in South Africa, and many others have obtained their "permits" or naturalised citizenship through fraudulent means. In Matobo, undocumented migration to neighbouring South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Botswana is not a new phenomenon.[147] In 1991, for example, the DA of Matobo district noted: A "man was brought to court and fined $40 for leaving the country without a passport, although he had now obtained one. Such incidents are likely to continue cropping as a sizeable number of young men in the district illegally crossed the border and are working in South Africa".[148] Illegal migrants are highly vulnerable to the threats of apprehension and subsequent deportation, as well as xenophobic attacks, and have to adapt to very xenophobic environments (see, for example, Muzondidya 2008; Hungwe 2013.[149] Estimates put the number of Zimbabweans living in South Africa at over 1 million (StatsSA 2023), although this estimate might be an underestimate.

Cross-border migration to South Africa has changed in recent times (Crush et al. 2016). In the past, Zimbabwean migrants did not settle permanently in South Africa, but instead return to Zimbabwe following periods of employment. Recent studies suggest that some Zimbabwean migrants have settled permanently and naturalised as South African citizens (Crush et al. 2016).

[146] This is not only true for Matabeleland region, but also of Zimbabwe as a whole.

[147] In general, Botswana is a less preferred destination, in part because of its hostility to Zimbabwean immigrants. See, for example, https://allafrica.com/stories/200404300292.html.

[148] A monthly report, June 1991. File name: Anonymous.

[149] For instance, earlier this year (2022) a Zimbabwean illegal migrant, Elvis Nyathi, from Bulawayo was brutally killed by a group of local residents after he failed to produce a passport with a valid visa. See; https://www.newframe.com/zimbabweans-show-anger-at-service-for-elvis-nyathi/

Table 7.8: International distribution of migrants by gender and destination across A1 villages

Country	Male	Female	Total
South Africa	47	32	79
Botswana	3	2	5
UK	1	2	3
Other non-African countries	1	1	2
Total	**52**	**37**	**89**

Source: Own survey, 2017-18 survey

Table 7.9: International distribution of migrants by gender and destination in S-C farms

Country	Male	Female	Total
South Africa	10	26	36
Botswana	3	3	6
Other African countries	2	2	4
UK	6	3	9
Other non-African countries	1	2	3
Total	**22**	**36**	**58**

Source: Own survey

Table 7.10: International distribution of migrants by gender and destination in A2 farms

Country	Male	Female	Total
South Africa	13	19	32
UK	1	1	2
Other non-African countries	0	1	1
Total	**14**	**21**	**35**

Source: Own survey, 2017-18 survey

Within the A1 schemes, 63% (42 of 67) of all surveyed households reported having at least one adult household member living abroad in various countries. Data from the household surveys showed that the predominant international destination was South Africa. In my A1 sites, a total number of 89 transnational migrants were recorded in 67 households surveyed. Of these, nearly 90% (79 of 89) of these transnational migrants were residing in South Africa. In gender terms, male migrants were strongly represented in South Africa, making up 59% (47 out of 79). The majority of these migrants typically occupy poorly paid and precarious jobs such as gardening, domestic work and waitressing. Most migrants are largely undocumented, making them vulnerable to exploitation, deportation and xenophobic attacks. Very few migrants in South Africa were operating their own self-employed businesses within my A1 sample. Only one adult male migrant was operating a cross-border transport business as a sub-contractor for a funeral home in South Africa. Only two households (3%) of the 67 A1 households surveyed

were found to have migrants working in the UK and Canada. Both households were relatively better-off, and had invested in their children's education.

Similar trends are evident in A2 and self-contained farms. 69% of all households in the self-contained survey and 72% households in A2 survey had at least one adult member residing abroad. Of the 171 adult household members in self-contained schemes, 34% (n=58) were living abroad. In the A2 sample, 35 of the total 83 adults recorded were living abroad, representing 42% of the adult population. Again, the overwhelming majority of migrants were residing in South Africa. For instance, over 90% (32 of 35) of migrants in A2 farms were living in South Africa, while only three migrants were residing in Europe and other non-African countries such as Canada. In gender terms, it is evident that international migration in both schemes was both a men and women affair, although gender distribution vary depending with scheme. In the surveyed A2 farms, women made up the largest group of adult household members living abroad (20 of 35 or 57%), while the opposite was equally true in self-contained farms: 36 of 58 adults living abroad were men (62%). The average age of migrants ranged between 19 (youngest) and 59 (oldest), indicating that migration is an important livelihood strategy across different life courses. Most of these migrants work in professional jobs, while others, especially in South Africa and Botswana, were running their own businesses with or without employees. The most common self-employed business performed by male migrants in South Africa was cross-border transport (*omalayisha*). The importance and emergence of *ukulayisha* system has been broadly studied elsewhere (see, for example, Thebe 2011; Nyamunda 2014). These cross-border transport operators offer a dual service: transporting goods from South Africa and returning back to South Africa with border jumpers. They are highly differentiated, ranging from "small-scale" unregistered to "large-scale" registered companies (Nyamunda 2014).

The grouping procedure revealed significant variation between and within schemes, as displayed in Tables 7.5 to 77. In A1 schemes, the median number of "jobs abroad" remain constant at one, until dropping to zero in the least successful group (SG4). In self-contained farms, the same median number of jobs abroad featured a somewhat direct ascension from the poorest asset group (1) to the middle (3), though the richest asset group recorded zero. In A2 farms, the median number of jobs abroad remain stable at one throughout, until dropping to zero in the richest asset group.

Though most households have family members working abroad, few can rely on regular remittances from these international migrants. SeD, and A1 farmer who had a son and several grandchildren working in South Africa, said that his son and grandchildren working in South Africa "are just being eaten up (*ukudliwa*) by girlfriends", and are not sending anything back home. Another A1 farmer, IM, said that his daughter who has a degree in law and is working in South Africa "is an irresponsible child. How can a girl child forget her own mother?" KM, an A2 farmer whose three adult children working in Germany, Canada and South Africa regularly send remittances, said that his over-reliance on them could have negative impacts on their own lives.

> It's also difficult for them because they also want to shape their own future, but here we are – parasites! I don't want to be a parasite own my children again. But because I am suffering, I end up being a parasite. I am disturbing their future. Instead, they should be coming to me [for help]'.

Besides international migration, formal and informal wage employment within Zimbabwe is also an important source of income across all schemes. This includes temporary "piece jobs", local-skilled jobs (e.g., thatching, building etc.) and formal employment. The incidence of these different types of wage employment varies between schemes, with some, such as formal jobs, being higher among the A2 and self-contained farms; others such as local "piece jobs", are highest in A1 farms. The proportion of formal jobs are highest in A2 schemes, with 21% of all income sources being permanent jobs, followed by self-contained farmers (18% of all total income). Incidences of such jobs are comparatively low in A1 schemes at only 8% of the total income sources. In broad terms, household members in A2 and self-contained schemes generally hold relatively remunerative and secure jobs, whereas household members in A1 farms tend to have low-paid jobs, in part, due to a lack of formal education.

Tables 7.5 to 7.7 also indicate that access to permanent job also varies with asset or success groups. In self-contained farms, the richest asset group claimed about 54% of all permanent formal jobs in the sample, with a median of two formal jobs per household). By contrast, the poorest households in A2 farms claims 40% of the total permanent formal jobs in the sample, with a median of two formal jobs per household. In A1 farms, access to formal off-farm jobs is too low to make any impact on the median, but SG2 households claim nearly 38% of all permanent off-farm jobs in the sample. Off-farm work within the resettlement areas like semi-skilled work (e.g., thatching, building etc.), farm labouring ("piece jobs") and permanent farm also provide opportunities for some households in A1 schemes. While instances of all these kinds of employment were too low to make any impact on the median, there is a clear

correspondence between success ranking and absolute concentrations of these job. As can be seen in Table 7.5, poorest households (notably SG3 households) in A1 farms claim 74% of all local piece jobs, 56% of semi-skilled jobs and 72% of all permanent farm jobs. In most cases, these households perform these kinds of employment for the more better-off households within the A1 schemes, as well as A2 farms, self-contained farms and remaining white-owned and black-owned commercial farms.

7.4 Natural resources harvesting

The research shows that incomes based on harvesting natural resources were largely prominent in A1 schemes than in A2 and SC farms. It includes harvesting of mopane worms *(Imbrasia belina*), fishing, gold mining, wood carving, brick moulding, making mats and baskets, as well as selling of thatch grass. These activities are highly gendered, with women especially involved in harvesting of mopane worms, harvesting and selling of thatch grass and making baskets. Women also mentioned being involved in brick moulding and fishing. The money derived from these activities is not only used for daily household expenses and consumables but also for investment in assets. The clearest example is the case of MoD.

MoD and her husband who worked as a general labourer at Matopos Research Station until 2017 joined land occupations in the early 2000s and later acquired a plot in Vimbi. They arrived with no cattle or donkeys of their own. But some years later, MoD managed to buy two donkeys using income from *mopane* worms. By 2018, the household had 8 donkeys thanks to natural growth. She insisted that the donkeys were hers, and she bought them using income from selling mopane worms, while her husband was "eating his money alone" when he was employed as a farm labourer for Matopo Research Station. She hires out her span of donkeys to other farmers during the growing season. In 2017, MoD got USD190 from selling mopane worms, which she harvested in neighbouring farms. Although providing a good return, she admitted that *mopane* worms harvesting is a very arduous and laborious job. As a result, she "does not abuse the money" that she obtains from selling mopane worms, and therefore always makes sure that she spends it in a "good way". Thus, in 2017, she used the money to purchase building materials for constructing another modern house at her homestead. In the same year, she also sold 60 bundles of thatch grass at USD2 per bundle, receiving a total of USD120. At the time, she had cut the thatch grass in a nearby black-owned large-scale commercial farm and Pagati farm, a council-run farm. She used the money to purchase 25kg of barbed wire to fence her crop fields.

In early 2020, there was a lot of *mopane* worms in the study areas, and there was an influx of people into the farms, including government officials from nearby farms, who were harvesting mopane worms. Such movements involved breaking the COVID-19 regulations. In Vimbi, farmers said that traders came with groceries and utensils, which they barter-traded with buckets of mopane worms. For example, Ms CeN managed to harvest seven buckets of mopane worms, which she barter-traded most of them with kitchen utensils.

Women are also involved in selling of dried traditional vegetables. These vegetables are picked in the crop fields during the rainy season, and are cooked and then sun-dried. In most cases, they are then sold during the lean period when relish (i*sitshebo*) is hard to find. However, this activity does not provide substantial income. During the dry season, some women also make mats and baskets, but efforts are frustrated by the lack of a market. Informal conversations also indicated that some young men engage in wildlife poaching. In such cases, the fresh meat is then supplied to some women traders who then sells it in Kezi and Maphisa. However, wildlife poaching is a clandestine activity. Fishing is carried out in nearby dams and rivers, but siltation is becoming a threat.

Although there are no gold sites in my study sites, artisanal gold mining is also an important male-dominated income-generating activity based on natural resources. This is mainly done in Maphisa and in nearby Gwanda district. One A1 farmer (JM above) who works as a security guard at Arkjet mine in Gwanda said that the mine allows its workers to engage in gold panning at the money in order to supplement their meagre salaries, but the workers are forced to sell the gold to the company at a lower rate. Income derived from gold mining can be an important source of investment in farming. AgN, for example, is a 28-year-old man who works as a general hand at Maphisa hospital. He was allocated a self-contained farm in Wild East, which he registered in his brother's name. In the 2010s, AgN was involved in artisanal mining in Maphisa, and used some of his earnings from gold mining to invest in cattle. Today, AgN is one of the largest herd owners in the area, who is also buying and selling cattle as a middleman.

7.5 Self-employed business

Household members also engage in a wide variety of own-account non-farm businesses. These include setting up of small businesses (e.g., tuckshops) in the farms, petty trading, hiring out of tractors for ploughing, cross-border transport business (*omalayisha*), construction and so on. As mentioned already, some are operating formal large-scale businesses in South Africa and

Botswana. The proportion and quality of these self-employed businesses vary between schemes. Self-employed businesses with or without employees account for 22% of all income sources in A2 farms and 20% in self-contained farms, compared to only 8% in A1 farms. In broad terms, many of the self-employed businesses in A2 and self-contained farms are far more remunerative than those found in A1 schemes. Most of these urban-based businesspeople are investing in livestock production substantially.

7.6 Other income sources

Other sources of off-farm income that are important to new farmers in the resettlement areas include rental property in town, pensions and renting out grazing. Pension contribute 7% to the total number of income sources of A1 households, 9% of total income sources of self-contained households, and 12% of total income sources of A2 households. The most common source of pension are war veteran pension and other state pensions. Others, especially those with limited capital to invest in livestock production in A2 and self-contained farms, derive income from renting out all or part of their grazing land to others. Such households receive rental payment in the form of in-kind benefits or cash, and therefore forms part of their total income. This issue is taken further in the next chapter.

7.7 The importance of off-farm income

Access to capital from off-farm sources is a critical factor in sustaining farm investments and agricultural production (both crops and livestock). Previous studies have highlighted that off-farm income remains important in rural areas, including resettlement areas (Scoones et al. 2010, 2018; Mkodzongi 2013a). Matobo district is no exception. Since the 2000s, private bank and state finance have been very limited (Scoones & Murimbarimba 2022). In Matabeleland regions, the "Command Livestock" programme was still at its infancy by 2018, as discussed in previous chapters. Thus, the farmers are predominantly self-reliant for financing their farm investments and production. This point was a recurring theme during field work. Most farmers' agricultural activities, especially in A2 and elf-contained farms, typically rely on their access to capital from wage employment and/or businesses.

RbN, for example, said that he wishes to resign from his legal firm and transport businesses, but his livestock enterprise relies on his access to non-farm income, stating "Sometimes I wish to retire from my business, but as you know, most of us started with no funding…if I leave the businesses the farm will suffer." Unsurprisingly, most household heads, especially in A2 and

self-contained farms, are still pursuing off-farm jobs and/or businesses. Even those who have retired and are now full-time farmers, remittances coming from relatives in the diaspora is vital. AIN, for example, an 84-year-old retired primary school teacher who acquired a self-contained plot, explained how remittances from his daughter who works in the UK helped him to build a modern iron roof house at farm, dig a deep well (18m) for irrigation, purchased water tanks and pipes, and that her daughter was considering to drill a borehole because the well has an unreliable yield.

Given the high levels of rainfall variability found in Matobo, dryland cropping and livestock production are highly unstable and variable. Alternative sources of income are therefore necessary. These help to buy livestock inputs or pay for relief-grazing during drought years. HS, for example, a retired headmaster and full-time self-contained farmer, said that he lost 10 cattle during the 2019-20 because his well-educated sister with a good job at a research institute in Kenya could not send her some money to purchase supplementary feed as she often does because was sick and her partner also passed away at the same time. As discussed in Chapter Five, dryland cropping is a risky enterprise for ensuring food security in Matobo. In good years, the grain harvests usually satisfy household needs, grain is stored for future years and any surplus grain is marketed. In most years, however, agricultural output is very low and lasts only part of the year, forcing households to purchase maize for consumption. Thus off-farm income is vital to offset against drought shortages.

Overall, diversification is imperative in variable environments such as those found in Matobo. This echoes Rangers' (1999) earlier historical work in the area, who found that former white farmers were also challenged by making a living in a highly variable and uncertain environment. Navigating their way in this variable landscape, white farmers had to engage in pluri-activity. Rangers (1999) provides several examples of white settlers going 'bust' due to drought and forced to seek other livelihood activities elsewhere, and only returning to the farm when herds built up again. Likewise, the new farmers in Matobo have to pursue diverse livelihood strategies in order to deal with high variability in rainfall.

7.8 Conclusion

In exploring the livelihood strategies of the land reform beneficiaries in Matobo district, I have shown how access to capital from off-farm sources sustain farm investments and production in a highly variable landscape. Like in other rural areas, land recipients have had to respond to

variability and uncertainty by diversifying their household portfolios in order to spread risks and keep options open (cf. Berry 1993; Scoones et al. 1996).

The study reveals that access to off-farm income shapes patterns of accumulation and differentiation among farming households. Those with access to high wage and/or non-farm business income were found to be investing substantially in livestock production and farming in general, while those without off-farm income have struggled to gain a foothold in farming. This is especially true in self-contained and A2 farms, which requires relatively significant capital to start. These issues are discussed in great detail in Chapters Nine and Ten.

CHAPTER 8: TERRITORY, LAND TENURE AND SPATIAL DYNAMICS IN THE NEW RESETTLEMENT AREAS IN MATOBO

Farming in unpredictable, variable environments, such as those found in Matobo, comes with an array of challenges. Unpredictable weather and recurrent drought are some of the challenges that the new farmers have to deal with. This, combined with the ongoing economic crisis, means that farmers must carefully manage their herds in order to achieve reliable outputs in a highly variable environment. The ability to accumulate in these settings depends very much on the farmers' ability to effectively manage variability.

Drawing from the concept of "high reliability management" (Roe et al. 1998; Roe 2020), this chapter describes some of the intensive and extensive strategies pursued by the new farmers in resettlement areas in the context of a highly variable resource base: the ways in which livestock producers adapt, cope with or adapt to variability of grazing and water resources over space and time. This is important for facilitating our understanding of dynamics of accumulation in drylands. Pastoralism is understood as a "critical infrastructure" (Roe 2020). To survive in their variable environment, pastoralists adopt a wide range of coping and production strategies including various forms of mobility, diversification of species of animals, provision of supplementary feed, adoption of technologies, disease control and so on (Krätli & Schareika 2010; Scoones 1995, 2021; FAO 2021). Through such practices, they are able to produce a stable flow of livestock goods and services that are essential for livelihoods in a variable landscape (Roe et al. 1998).

This chapter looks at how the new livestock producers in Matobo district are generating reliability in the context of a highly variable resource base and rangeland fragmentation in post-land reform settings. Land reform in Zimbabwe has created a new social landscape with new boundaries, property rights and property relations in the rangelands, with a more differentiated array of livestock owners and different types of herd management or livestock production. This intersects with non-equilibrium rangeland conditions that prevail in the area. As noted in Chapter Three, Matobo is characterised by highly variable climatic conditions and climatic unpredictability. Drought is a regular occurrence. This can have a detrimental effect on livestock production. Variability dominates herd management practices, and herd owners must respond to spatial and temporal shortage of grazing and water resources.

Although land reform was aimed to transfer land to smallholder and medium-scale producers, the issue of how rangelands were going to be managed was not part of the debate. Thus, the chapter addresses this gap in our understanding of land reform outcomes by examining how livestock management practices – including both intensive and extensive strategies – are deployed by livestock producers (depending on who they are) in response to spatial and temporal shortages of grazing and water resources in post-land reform settings. These include provision of supplementary feeding and various forms of livestock movements such as pasture-leasing, poach-grazing and so on. Despite rangeland fragmentation (Hobbs et al. 2008) following land reform, I show that livestock mobility remains a key aspect of livestock production in resettlement sites in Matobo.

In the sections that follow, I describe the land tenure systems found in the new resettlement area in order to contextualise the preceding sections. Typically, most of the resettlement areas in Matobo are held as either exclusive commons (in the case of A1 villagised schemes) or private property (medium-scale A2 and self-contained schemes) with fixed boundaries that are often at odds with dryland pastoral practices. Access therefore requires a special type of negotiation and collaboration. Thereafter, I discuss the emergence of a vibrant informal land market – particularly pasture-leasing – and why this has emerged in the post-land reform settings. Lastly, I discuss how livestock farmers across different land use types responded to drought during two period

8.1 Context: Land tenure and use in the new resettlement areas

Despite resettlement areas notionally being state land, these areas are held as exclusively private or "communal" tenure. A2 and self-contained farms are held as private property regime under lease agreement with the state. Nonetheless, leasing arrangements differ significantly between the two schemes. In terms of legal documentation, A2 beneficiaries are initially issued "resettlement confirmation letters", while waiting for the processing of "offer letters" by the Ministry of Lands in Harare. Once they receive "offer letters" they will be "assessed" for "99-year leases" issuance. In 2018, 87.5% of all A2 farmers in the district had "offer letters", while 12.5% were still waiting for their "offer letters" to be processed, though they currently hold "resettlement confirmation letters". However, as of 2018, no farmer had as yet received '99-year-leases' in the whole district, though a few well-connected farmers (21%) had their farms "assessed" for 99-year-leases.

By contrast, property rights in self-contained farms in the district are ambiguous, conflicted and uncertain. The state has played an ambivalent role in regulating property rights in these farms. Although it was initially suggested that the self-contained farmers should obtain 99-year-leases, this has not yet materialised. The duration of these "leases" or "permits" are ambiguous, unclear and confusing due to the conflicted state control between the central government and rural council (Chapter Six). According to council officials, the subdivided farms remain officially designated as state property under the Three-tier resettlement model. Beneficiaries of the newly-created self-contained farms are officially viewed as "care-takers" who are "only looking after the farms" on behalf of the beneficiary communities, and are prohibited from building permanent structures as their property rights can be extinguished anytime by the local state. However, some have begun to develop elaborate structures as a strategy in an attempt to strength their rights to land. Moreover, the lease conditions prescribe land use, with land recipients being required to only engage in "proper" commercial ranching and prohibited from engaging in crop production on the new land (Chapter Four). According to council's regulations, holding land for speculative purposes, subletting and sale of land is officially prohibited. The "permits" are renewable contingent to good husbandry practices and payment of annual land tax of USD0.75 per hectare per year to the rural council. If these conditions are not met, if the land beneficiary no longer want to use the land or is not 'productive', the land reverts to the originating community and can be allocated to another household. The rule also stipulates that these land reform beneficiaries withdraw their animals from communal areas, but many continue to utilise communal grazing. Despite being conceived as private property regimes, most farm boundaries in these A2 and self-contained schemes are porous, not least because of ecological grounds and the need to move livestock in space and time.

In the A1 resettlement areas, a mix of *de facto* private and common property exists, which is formalised (although these are often hybrid, involving Committees of Seven, war veterans, local state officials, traditional leaders and so on).[150] Within this system, crop fields are privately held, while grazing land is held under the commons. "Offer" letters or permits to occupy are issued.

[150] "Committees of Seven" are governance structures set up by land reform beneficiaries in A1 schemes following the FTLRP.

But, what does all this mean for livestock management in variable environments? In variable environments, land control and governance must be flexible and adaptive to allow for livestock mobility (Scoones 2021). Boundaries needs to be flexible and negotiable, rather than clear and unambiguous (cf. Cousins 2000). This allows pastoralists to use marginal resources more efficiently, and to maintain large herds (Behnke & Scoones 1993). Unfortunately, most land reform policies in Zimbabwe tended to favour sedentary production systems, and often attempt to impose ideologies of privatization. Land reform thus can lead to fragmentation of rangelands, defined as dissection of previously large tracts of extensive grazing land into spatially isolated parcels, that can have negative consequences on mobility (Galvin et al. 2008; Hobbs et al. 2008). Land redistribution in Zimbabwe by its very nature has resulted in the breaking up of former large-scale farms and creating small-scale A1 and medium-scale A2 farms. In semi-arid environments, managing animals in fenced farms is a difficult task due to the uneven spatial distribution of rainfall and grazing resources and the likely unavailability of 'key resources' on a small-scale farm to fall back on during times of drought. Despite all this, livestock mobility is still vital in my study sites, with livestock producers entering into complex arrangements with neighbours and others for accessing grazing land beyond the boundaries of their individual farm units. This is unpacked in the next section.

8.2 Livestock movement

Mobility is part and parcel of "living with (coping) and from (productive use of) variability in dryland pastoral settings (Scoones 1994, 2021, 2023a, b; Turner 1999; Turner & Scheldt 2019). Livestock-owning households undertake several types of movements, ranging from daily herd movement to seasonal transhumance (Scoones 2023b). In Matabeleland, seasonal transhumance has long been a key aspect of cattle management strategy to overcome climatic uncertainty and variability associated with farming in harsh and marginal environments with unpredictable climate. The local Ndebele word for seasonal transhumance is *mlaga,* which traditionally denotes the movement of livestock (mainly cattle) from one area to another in search of grazing and water resources. The word has, however, expanded in its meaning to include leasing of pastures in the new resettlement areas.

Chapter Four discussed the origins of this practice (Section 4.2.1). In post-land reform settings, it is evident that the term *mlaga* has acquired a new local meaning, linked to the widespread practice of pasture-leasing or (cattle) sharecropping arrangements. It has therefore become ambiguous and less precise. In order to avoid confusion, I will use the term *ukulagisa* to

specifically refer to the practice of share-cropping or informal pasture-leasing in the resettlement areas, reserving the term *mlaga* to describe the old-age system of the past where relevant. The resurrection of this old-age Ndebele term in the new resettlement areas carries a meaning that is distinct from its original connotations. One A1 farmer explained: "In resettlement areas, the herdowner of *inkomo zomlaga* must pay rent. This is different to communal areas such as Tshelanyemba and in Beitbridge, where the herdowner is allowed to use cattle posts (*emlageni)* for free". In other words, those herdowners who do not have enough pastures have to rent more grazing land from neighbours. Thus, the new version of *mlaga (ukulagisa)* in land reform areas is somewhat different from the old-age system in old communal areas, not least because the arrangement involves some form of payment, either in kind or cash. However, its purpose is consistent: to maintain herds and cope with spatial and temporal shortage of fodder and water.

8.2.1 Local strategies of livestock movement

Herd movement takes many forms in the new resettlement areas of Matobo district, ranging from lease grazing from other landholders to poach grazing. This section describes a range of livestock strategies that were observed in the study and examine who gets involved in such strategies.

8.2.1.1 Informal land rental markets

Although land leasing is not allowed in resettlement sites, there has been an emergence of a vibrant informal land market. This can be called a "vernacular land market" (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). The A2 and self-contained farmers who took part in the survey are maintaining their herds by informal pasture-leasing or (cattle) sharecropping from others. *Ukulagisa* is a colloquial term used to describe an informal leasing agreement whereby a landholder leases-out or sharecrop-out part or all of his/her land to another herd owner for grazing purposes for a specific period of time in exchange for in-kind benefits (mostly cattle and/or fixing or developing farm infrastructure) or cash. Qualitative interviews suggest that *ukulagisa* agreements are usually oral agreements, although occasionally written agreements such as affidavits can be done in front of neighbours as witnesses. The duration of these arrangement ranges from short periods of three to six months in the dry season to longer-term such as the entire year or more.

Rental charges vary, depending with the number of cattle seeking access to grazing, the duration that the cattle owner wishes to graze his/her animals on the farm and the relationship

between the livestock owner and farm owner. As noted earlier, payment is largely in-kind, but rarely in cash. In-kind payments largely include livestock (e.g., heifers, goats), payment of 'land unit tax', fixing or developing key farm infrastructure (e.g., construction of fences and farmhouses) and other off-farm benefits. The rate varies from one heifer per 10 head of cattle to one heifer per 15 head of cattle for a specific period, depending on pasture demand. In 'bad' rainfall years, the demand for leasing-in pastures is usually higher than the supply, hence leading to high lease rates. For example, the 2011-12 and 2015-16 season were bad years due to drought: hence the leasing rates were high – at one heifer per 10 head of cattle for a period of three months (September/October – December/January). However, in 'good' rainfall years, the demand for leasing-in pastures is lower; hence leasing costs are relatively cheaper. The leasor in this arrangement is usually highly capital constrained, and relatively land abundant. In this case, *ukulagisa* enables this capital-constrained landholder to build his/her own herd or fix or develop farm infrastructure.

Two broad types of *ukulagisa* arrangements can be identified on the basis of rationale and time period they occur: long-term and short-term arrangements. These two forms of *ukulagisa* arrangements have specific functions. Long-term *ukulagisa* arrangements are more associated with expanding operations whereas short-term *ukulagisa* arrangements are aimed to overcome spatial and temporal shortage of grazing and water resources.

(a) Long-term ukulagisa as a strategy to expand operations

Due to the inability by the local and central state to allocate additional landholdings, some A2 and self-contained farmers who have managed to build large herds have been forced to start looking for ways to expand their operations. Most of the A2 and self-contained farmers surveyed with large herds complained that land parcels are small to maintain large herds throughout the year. Long-term, informal leasing of the rangeland is thus one way that large herd owners are able to overcome land constraints. This type of arrangement is most common among the self-contained farmers. 28% of those surveyed (9 of 32 cases) are leasing-in or sharecropping-in land on a longer-term basis as a strategy to expand their operations; by contrast, only 6% (1 of 18 cases) of A2 farmers surveyed are leasing-in/ sharecropping-in land. This can be accounted for by the size of land allocated in self-contained schemes and the selection criteria biased towards owners of large herds. As seen in Chapter Six, self-contained farms tended to be smaller in size than A2 farms. However, the sad irony is that the allocation process was biased towards those who were better-endowed with capital and were therefore

able to quickly invest in livestock production and further expand their herds soon after settlement, leading to overstocking on their allocated land parcels. To put this into perspective, it might help to point out that under the official carrying capacity of the area (8LU per hectare), self-contained farmers with 241 hectares on average, their holdings can only keep around 30 head of cattle.

Table 8.1: Number of households engaging in ukulagisa arrangement as tenants

Self-contained				A2			
AG1	AG2	AG3	Total	AG1	AG2	AG3	Total
3	1	5	9	0	0	1	1

Source: own data, 2017-18 survey.

As herds began to grow, some self-contained farmers tried to apply for additional land for grazing from the Rural District Council (RDC). However, many such applications were turned down on the basis of land ceiling and multiple farms regulations, although a few did manage to circumvent these local state regulations through social and political networks. With options limited, many turned to *ukulagisa* arrangements on a longer-term period to expand their operations.

EM, for example, a successful livestock farmer whose household sits in AG3 category, illustrate this dynamic. Mr EM's household was officially allocated 162 hectares of land in a self-contained scheme in 1999. In 2009, he applied for additional land to the rural council after his herd had grown to 42. He wrote: "With the passage of time, my herd has grown resulting in overgrazing. The plot is 162ha and my cattle herd is now 42. This means that I have exceeded the grazing ratio threefold and in the event of a drought, I will be adversely affected. To that end, I request council to lease me an additional plot, should this become available".[151] However, he said that he never had any response from rural council. During my interview with him, he lyrically argued that he needs around 142 breeding cows in order to reach break-even:

> The self-contained scheme was a bad idea. I did some rough calculations and I realised that I need 142 breeding cows to reach break-even point. With this herd size, I will then be able to get around 70 calves per year, and I will also be able to sell about 60 weaners per year. I employ three herd boys, whom I pay USD100 each per month in wages. This means that I pay a total annual wage bill of USD3,600 per year, which if we convert to cattle, this will be about 7 cattle (at USD500 per animal at the time of fieldwork). I would have to remove this USD3,600 from the proceeds of selling the 60 cattle. I told the officials that these farms are small and if we follow the conservative stocking

> rates, say 1LSU per 10 hectares, I will only be able to keep 20 cattle. With this number, I won't be able to make a living solely on the farm. I asked them that "what is the objective of creating these farms? Do you want people to make a living on the plot or do you want people to be cell-phone farmers?" When I sounded this, they told me "If you don't want it, don't take the plot".

This compelled him to seek alternative strategies of expanding his operations. Entering a u*kulagisa* arrangement with land-abundant neighbours is thus one of the strategies pursued by EM to expand operations. With no other alternative, he entered into *ukulagisa* arrangement with other neighbouring A2 and self-contained farmer on a longer-term basis. Today, he owns 200 head of cattle that are grazed in neighbours' plots under *ukulagisa* arrangement and other plots that he had purchased from struggling farmers. Table 8.2 summarises all the longer-term *ukulagisa* arrangements that Mr EM is involved in.

Table 8.2: Mr EM's ukulagisa arrangements

Land owner	Land-use type	Land size (ha)	Period of arrangement	Payment
Plot 1	A2	281	2015 - current	Payment of land-unit tax
Plot 2	A2	250	2013 - current	4 heifers per year
Plot 3	A2	250	2013 - current	4 heifers per year
Plot 4	Self-contained	100	2010 - current	2 heifers/ USD1000 per year

Source: Own data

Similarly, PN, another large herd owner whose household sits in AG3 and was allocated 139 hectares of land in Mampondweni farm in 2000, applied for additional land from Matobo RDC in 2009 following the expansion of his herd. He wrote:

> I do hereby apply for an additional plot close to my plot number 47. My herd if 54 cattle and 13 goats can no longer be grazed on the 139-hectare piece of land. Currently, part of herd is being grazed on plot number 44. However, the nearest to mine is plot number 45. Currently, the plot is vacant. I would like to be considered when unoccupied plots are being re-allocated.[152]

However, PN said that he never got a response from the RDC, but the Chief Executive Officer of RDC simply scribbled the following words on the application letter: "He already has a plot!"[153] With the herd continuing to expand, PN was compelled to "fish out" some of his cattle back to his communal areas, while also leasing-in additional grazing land from a black large-

[152] A letter from PN to the Chief Executive Officer of Matobo Rural District Council, "re: application for an extra plot", 30 August 2009. File Name: 'Three Tier Ward meetings 2004', held at Matobo Rural District Council, Maphisa.

[153] Ibid.

scale commercial farmer in Fort Rixon in Insiza district where he now keeps 23 head of cattle in exchange for one heifer per year.

Similarly, NG, one of the largest herd owners and urban investor in the self-contained sample, who was allocated 360 hectares of land in a self-contained scheme decried the size of land allocated because it cannot accommodate his head of 225 cattle. As a result, he was compelled to seek alternative ways of accessing additional pastures for his cattle. Thus, in 2006, he entered into a leasing arrangement with nearby A1 villagers at Holi farm, which allows him to access grazing in the scheme throughout the year in exchange for cash and diesel for tractor ploughing. This arrangement still stands today. Mr NG pays the A1 villagers a total of USD350 per year, which the villagers would then share among themselves. In addition, he also gives each household 20 litres of diesel per year for ploughing purposes using a rented tractor.

In sum, *ukulagisa* has become important for successful capitalist farmers who have developed large herds thanks to their greater access to capital to invest substantially in cattle ranching, but do not have access to sufficient grazing land. Their access to land via legal means is rather constrained because of the inability or unwillingness of the rural council to allocate more land. Thus, *ukulagisa* arrangements make it possible for them to expand their scale of operations.

(b) Temporary ukulagisa as a strategy to deal with climatic variability

As mentioned earlier, there is a great deal of variability of grazing resources over both time and space in Matobo. Drought is a recurrent feature. Temporary, informal pasture-leasing or (cattle) sharecropping is one way that herd owners are able to overcome temporal and spatial shortages of rangeland resources. There has been a resurrection of this old-age system of seasonal transhumance, but this is facilitated by an informal market-based transaction of land. When drought strikes, cattle can be transferred from a drought-affected property or farm to someone else's property for the duration of the drought and then moved back again after the drought breaks. In exchange, the landlord is paid either in cash, heifers and so on. In essence, this type of arrangement allows owners of large herds to overcome drought. Rental charges vary, and are often charged on the basis of the number of cattle that seek access to grazing and the length of time they wish to graze their animals.

The following three cases of successful households illustrates well the *ukulagisa* arrangement during times of drought. LN, a 51-year-old senior council official, was allocated 258 hactares

of land in a self-contained scheme in 2004. At the onset of 2011-12 drought, he owned 70 head of cattle, which he kept at his plot. When the drought situation worsened, he transferred his cattle to Doublevale A1 scheme in the neighbouring Bulilimamangwe district in August 2011, even though this meant breaking veterinary rules. As he explained:

> The veterinary officials advised me not to move my cattle to Bulilimamangwe because of its a "red zone" but I went against the advice. They said that if I move my animals to Bulilimamangwe I won't be able to move them back to Matobo. But I said to myself, no I can't let my cattle die here, I will have to cross that river when I get there.

He further explained that he was willing to take this risk because "there was plenty of water and grass" in Bulilimamangwe. The lease charges were also relatively cheaper at one heifer per every 20 head of cattle, compared to Matobo where it was going for one heifer per 10 head of cattle. While the landholder (i.e., A1 farmer) wanted him to pay 4 herd of cattle for a head of 80 cattle at the end of the leasing arrangement in 2012, he refused, arguing that some of his animals were calves. In 2013, after the drought, he then moved his cattle back to his own plot in Matobo. In the lead up to moving cattle back to Matobo, LN had successfully negotiated with another A1 farmer in Mncwazini village, located less than 20km away and adjacent to Doublevale scheme but situated in Matobo district, so that he could move his cattle there. The logic of this move was simple, as he explained:

> Cattle from both sides crosses to either side every time. So, for me, it was only a matter of crossing over to the other side of the road in Matobo [to Mncwazini Resettlement]. So, I moved my cattle to Mncwazini where my cattle stayed there for four months (from December 2012 to March 2013). Come April, it was now easy for me to move my cattle back to Mampondweni. It was now easy for me to get a permit from the vet guys. The vet guys said we are not going to give you a permit because you moved your cattle to Bulilima district. I said no, no those were the other herd and it's still there. This herd that I want to move [from Mncwazini] has been here for quite some time. So, it was very difficult for the vet guys to make a lot of noise about it. I told them that even cattle from Matobo normally cross the road to Bulilima side. So, I told them that you can't query that!

During the 2015-16 drought, he leased-in a "paddock" from a nearby A2 farm where he grazed a head of 30 cattle for two months (October to December of 2016) in exchange for two goats. He also poach-grazed the rest of his herd at another A2 farm in the area, with very few animals.

Returning to the case of EM above, during the 2011-12 drought, he leased-in a 'paddock' from Holi A1 scheme. He then transferred his 130 head of cattle from his drought-affected plot to the A1 farm in December 2011, and moved them back to his plot in December 2012, after a year. In terms of payment, he was paying a rental fee of USD1,300 per every three months. Although he never lost any animals due to drought during this period thanks to this *ukulagisa*

arrangement and supplementary feeding, he complained that the rental fee was too expensive. As a result, he had to conjure a clever plan to "recover" some of the rental cash. As he put it: "To recover some of some of my money back, I would take a full truck of groceries when going to pay the A1 farmers, then sell to them and I would return back my money the same day

ON, a retired senior veterinary officer, owns 108 hectares of land in a self-contained scheme. In 2012, he transferred his herd of cattle to an A2 plot in Natisa farm "because there was no grass and water" in his plot. However, he did not stay long at the A2 plot because he and the landowner could not agree on the rental charges. "The rental charges were too expensive", he says. He then moved his cattle to his uncle, another A2 farmer, at Umfula farm. However, his uncle told him that he could not "accommodate" his cattle at the farm as he had already entered into *ukulagisa* arrangements with other farmers. Again, ON had to transfer his cattle to Vimbi A1 scheme, where he stayed at TN for free in exchange for veterinary expertise. Initially, they agreed that he would pay a heifer as rental to a neighbouring household whose name had used to register the cattle in the village, but later decided to pay in cash. However, ON says that they were already lots of leased-in cattle by the time he arrived that there was no grass: "When we moved our cattle to Vimbi, we thought that we were moving our cattle to a better grazing area. But we only realised that we had moved our cattle into an empty matches box". His cattle only stayed for 6 months, but ended up feeding using commercial feed but "the only good part was that water was available." When the 2015-16 drought struck, he transferred his cattle to Walma ranch, a black-owned large-scale commercial farm in exchange for livestock veterinarian "expertise", and kept the weaker cows at his plot where he fed them with hay, which he cut along contour ridges in Betseba irrigation scheme and transported it to his farm using his bicycle.

In A1 schemes, only in rare cases do farmers sharecrop or lease-in additional pastures from others during drought. The only exception I encountered is one relatively large herdowner who sharecropped-in or leased-in 5 hectares of arable land (mostly fallow) from a neighbour with two cattle for grazing purposes during the 2015-16 drought in exchange of three goats. MtM is a former farmworker in his late seventies, who acquired an A1 plot in Luma's "New line" in 2010. He and his son, who works in Bulawayo, owns a total of 25 head of cattle. In September 2016, he approached a neighbouring A1 farmer and entered into a short-term leasing arrangement with the farmer to graze his 25 cattle in return for three goats. Under this

arrangement, MtM would graze his herd of cattle in the crop field during the night and let them out in the morning for three months.

8.2.2 Recreating or reasserting the commons

Another strategy of accessing grazing resources that is slowly emerging in the A2 and self-contained farms is what has been termed elsewhere as "recreating" (Archambault 2016) or "reasserting" the commons (Galaty 2016). This strategy often occurs between landholders with contiguous parcels. In most instances, such arrangements are based on cooperation, social networks and kinship ties. Less wealthy herders are likely to use this strategy. To illustrate this process of recreating the commons by way of an example, an informal water association in Wild East is discussed below.

A group of six contiguous landholders in Wild East collaborated to refurbish an existing old water pump. Today, they pump water to their homestead for both drinking and livestock purposes during the dry season. During the rainy season, each landholder contributes 5 litres of diesel every month to pump water. In the dry season, when the dams and rivers dry up, each landholder contributes up to 20 litres of diesel for pumping water for both home consumption and livestock watering. Based on this very close working relationship, most of the landholders in this group allows each other's animals to graze on each other's plots during the dry season. ON, who is a member of this group, explained: "During the dry season, we do not close our gates. Closing the gates will kill our animals. We allow the animals to graze in all the plots freely during the dry season. But when rains come, I immediately close my gates." Thus, the private property regime falls away during the dry periods.

This example reveals how social networks can override formal property divisions as a response to variable environments. In other words, working together addresses the challenges of subdivision and fragmentation of rangelands by bringing down fences during certain times of the year in relation to environmental variability.

It is important to note that tthe case documented above is by no means the only incidence of the process of reasserting the commons. The surveys showed that 18.8% (6 of 32 cases) of self-contained farmers and 22.2% (4 of 18 cases) of A2 farmers said that they were sharing their plots with their neighbours. These arrangements allow them to access forage and water resources that are unevenly distributed in space and time.

8.2.3 Land purchase

Cases of land purchase are rare in the new resettlement sites studied. I only found two cases of households in self-contained farms who reported purchasing additional land from others. EM, who acquired 162 hectares of land in a self-contained scheme, negotiated and bought the two nearby farms in 2011 and 2013 for USD3,000 and USD5,000 after his failed attempts to access additional grazing land from the rural district council. Having seen his herd expanding rapidly beyond the carrying capacity of his allocated farm, he then informally purchased two contiguous self-contained plots near his farm from struggling farmers who were fearing that their farms were at risk of losing the farms through repossession because they had struggled to put the land into production. Similarly, LN, another large herd owner, decided to purchase an A1 plot from a young widow in the north of the district, where he now keeps around 25 head of cattle.

8.2.4 Crop fields as a 'key resource'

Within A1 villagised schemes, the land tenure system is "communal" in character, but somewhat "mixed" tenure regime at the same time. Crop fields are privately held, while grazing land is held under the commons. In most old communal areas, farmers do not claim private access to their crop fields after harvest, allowing livestock to graze crop residue in a anybody's field. However, this was not the case in the two villages I studied. Here, in a context in which pastures tend to be scarce during dry season, farmers still claim private access to their crop fields even after harvest. Both crop residues and fallow crop fields have become vital individual 'key resources' during the dry period (cf. Bayer & Waters-Bayer 1989; Cousins 2000). The settlers, especially in Luma village, said that they were unable to reserve pastures for grazing in winter. The key reasons emphasised in interviews were lack of paddocks to practice rotational grazing and what they perceive as incursions by cattle from nearby communal areas and surrounding A2 and self-contained farms. The problem of shortage of pastures in the village was particularly acute during the dry season. Thus, crop fields provide important relief grazing during this period. Recently large herd owners in Luma have started to fence up large areas as crop fields ostensibly for private grazing during the dry season. This trend is exemplified by EnN.

EnN was allocated 5 hectares of arable land by government officials, but decided to expand the crop field illegally to more than 7 hectares, which he ring-fenced using barbed wire. His major incentive to fence up this tract of land was to reserve grass for his cattle during the dry period.

After harvesting, he ensures that the crop field remain inaccessible to other villagers' animals. He has set up a temporary structure on the crop field, where he sleeps during both the wet and dry season, guarding crops and grass respectively. He explained:

> In the crop fields, I guard my grass as much as I guard my crops. I guard the grass for those hard times [dry period]. I reserve grass my cattle. From October until the start of the rainy season, my cattle will be grazing in the crop field. During the day, they go to drink water and graze in the crop field during the night. I have extended my field with another 2 hectares to serve grass for my cattle. This is how I survive. No one else's cattle get into my crop field.

NcD, another A1 farmer in Luma, said that he scans the horizon for potential dry spells/ drought years, stating that "when season appears to be a bad rainy season I only plough a small area and reserve big portion for grass", where he will graze his lactating cows during the dry season. "I am planning to expand the crop field for grazing and clear all the bushes to encourage grass growth", he says. Even the crop fields of those without livestock remains private property after harvest, with access requiring payment of rent in cash or kind (see Section 8.2.1.1).

In Vimbi, the problem of pasture shortages during the dry period is less evident. However, crop fields were also important for grazing weaned calves, but also lactating cows, ailing animals and donkeys (given the high rates of donkey theft in the area) during the dry season. Most farmers said that they wean calves in June or July when they are around six months old, given that most calves are born in December/January period. In this context, most farmers interviewed said that they use crop fields and crop residue to graze these calves, where they will be separated from their mothers until they "forget" to suckle. During this period, they will be supplied with water at the crop fields. After two weeks, the calves will then be allowed to re-join their mothers. Thus, crop fields are also vital for weaning process. In some cases, the crop fields were used to graze donkeys in the dry season, given the high incidences of donkey theft in the area.

8.2.5 Privatization of the commons

In Luma, where there has been a long-standing dispute over access to grazing, *de facto* private enclosure of grazing land is also emerging. Three households with relatively large herds have fenced up large areas of land next to their kraals as "calf-paddocks". FM, who owned 110 cattle in 2018, fenced an entire paddock (around 240 hectares) – which surrounds his homestead – under the pretext of community development. He explained: "I fenced one paddock alone. I bought the barbed fence and my *boys* [workers] did all the fencing work. I am looking at this

farm as a long-term investment. That is why I am investing in things like community paddocks. I have this sense of community and belonging."

This phenomenon of fencing large tracts of land for private grazing is unfolding well beyond Luma. For example, this was widely reported in Senungu, another A1 scheme situated along the Matobo-Gwanda border, and adjoining with Wenlock communal areas. This was also reported in Khumalo communal areas. For instance, EnN (above) also said that he has "fenced a large piece of land" belonging to his family at his original home in Khumalo for grazing purposes. During the dry season, he said that he moves his cattle to the communal areas, where he grazes them in this crop fields. There were reports that other households in communal areas were even fencing up their crop fields and leasing out to large herd owners.

8.2.6 Poach-grazing

Illegal access to rangeland resources through poach-grazing is also a widespread phenomenon in all resettlement sites. Herds are often grazed in properties of other landholders, especially those that are under-utilised, without permission. Some A2 and self-contained farms remain under-utilised for want of financial capital to develop relatively large farms. Such farms, as one successful self-contained farmer put it, have become "second farms" for successful cattle owners. "I will never allow my cattle to starve to death when there is plenty of grass next-door" is a fairly common sentiment among successful herd owners. In Wild East, most successful herd owners illegally graze their herds in a nearby black-owned ranch called Walmer ranch, especially during drought, taking the risk of stock theft. In some instances, large herds owners mostly in self-contained schemes illegally graze their animals in nearby A1 resettlement areas, with relatively fewer animals. In some cases, this has led to conflicts over trespassing between landholders.

8.2.7 Intensification

Due to the challenges of movement (such as costs and cattle theft), there has been some shift to more intensified production strategies such as supplementary feeding with purchased feed (including salts and licks) and hay collection. This strategy is largely pursued by relatively wealthier households with remunerative jobs and/or off-farm business. There is growing evidence of intensification of fodder use. Around 47% of surveyed livestock owners in self-contained farms, 33% in A2 farms and 28% in A1 schemes reporting purchasing commercial stock feed in the last 12 months. The use of licks and salts is commonplace in A2 and self-contained farms than in A1 schemes, with 63% of herd owners in self-contained farms

reporting the purchase of licks and salts as compared to 47% in A2 farms. Stock feeds are generally purchased from major towns (Maphisa, Bulawayo) at USD15 per 50kg (as of 2018), and so access to transport is crucial. Since 2017 was generally a "good" year, very few herd owners reported purchasing hay. It is important to note, however, that the use of commercial stock feed intensifies during times of drought.

Table 8.3: Households who reported purchasing commercial feed, salt/licks and hay in the 2017 (excluding those without cattle)

	Self-contained (N=30)		A2 (N=15)		A1 schemes (N=53)	
Response	N	%	N	%	N	%
Purchased feed	14	47	5	33	15	28
Purchased salt/licks	19	63	7	47	6	11
Purchased hay	5	17	2	13	2	3

Source: own data, 2017-18 survey

Others have begun hay collection at a relatively large scale. This is most common in self-contained farms. In most cases, the hay is cut in Bulawayo town. This strategy requires cash resources to invest in mowing equipment, labour and own transport or the means to hire it. The case of MJ is instructive. MJ, a secondary school teacher in South Africa, owns 122 hectares. Since 2015, when he got the farm, his herd has been growing rapidly through natural increase and purchase. By 2018, his herd had grown to 83. As his herd grew, he realised that he was now "overgrazing" his farm. To overcome this challenge, he began to lease-in additional grazing from other landowners in exchange of heifers or cash. But his long-term plan is to move towards "non-grazing", whereby he "just paddock them in a reasonable area to free them a bit so that they can freshen up and bring them back in." Thus, in 2015, he bought a slasher for R28000 in South Africa, where he is working as a secondary school teacher. During the February/March period, he cuts grass in Bulawayo and transport it to his farm using his Toyota pick-up and trailer. He explained: "During the rainy season, everybody is trying to get their places neat in town. So, I go around cutting and racking grass around with my boys [workers]." He hires his friend's tractor to pull the slasher, and "pays him 20% of what he cuts". Recently, he applied for permission to cut grass at Matobo Research Station and the application was successful.

Similarly, PN, following his failed attempts to secure access to additional grazing land from council, decided to adopt supplementary feeding using hay complemented by keeping cattle in different places. He explained that *in situ* feeding was cheaper than leasing additional pastures

from others. As he explained: "I realised that I do not need more land. It's totally unnecessary! You can feed. [That way], you will save a lot of money. If you have money, just get water. That's what is important. Once you have water, the rest will fall in place". PN purchases bales, commercial feed, molasses and a bag of course salt, which he then uses to feed his cattle. The quantity of feed purchased depends on the season. He describes the actions he takes to feed his cattle:

> What I do is, I use that grass, then molasses which I dissolve. So, I dip the grass inside the molasses [solution] and then put in feeding troughs. Then I sprinkle the pen feed on top to improve the nutritional value of the grass… because it might not be sustainable to give them 100% [pen fattening] feed only. It will be too expensive.

Today, he also collects hay from cricket fields in Bulawayo. "The workers at the cricket fields call me to come and collect the hay when they cut the grass", he said. He then transports it on busses to his communal areas and feeds it to his 25 cattle. In sum, the cricket fields in Bulawayo have become a 'key resource' for him.

TN, a retired senior council official who now farm livestock on a full-time basis, owned a herd of 121 in 2018. These animals were kept at his 330-ha self-contained plot. He regularly invests in veterinary drugs, supplementary feed and licks, as well as dipping chemicals. Every year, he purchases 20 blocks of winter licks, as well as a tonne or more of supplementary feed to the weak ones depending with the year. During the winter period, he supplies his cattle with this winter licks, which prevents the cattle from developing "water" ('*ndolo*') in the joints. "This *ndolo*", he explained, "makes the cattle very week. But, if you give the animals the winter lick, you will find that even if they are thin, they are still strong. They can still run…." He also feeds the cattle with pen fattening feed, to weaker ones, pregnant cows and cows with calves. In 2018, TN was planning downsize his cattle herd to about 70 Grey Brahman. When I visited him again in November 2022, he had already started his "grey" and "brown" Brahman project and had sig, and his cattle herd had been reduced to 71, "but with better quality and value". By doing this, he was moving towards intensification. TN's biggest challenge is water, and over the years, he has invested substantially in building of small earth dams and drilling boreholes, with limited success. During the dry season, when water runs out in his farm, he waters his cattle at Vimbi A1 farm where he also owns an A1 plot.

8.3 Drought coping strategies

In this section, I consider how the responses discussed above were deployed during two periods of drought: 2011-12 and 2015-16. The 2011-12 drought was remembered by many settlers as the worst of recent times. It affected both crop production and livestock (especially cattle). The number of cattle mortalities could not be quantified because of the difficulty in gathering the data. On the other hand, the intensity of the 2015-16 drought was relatively lower than the 2011-12 drought. However, not all the resettlement sites were affected the same way. While there was a generally a lack of sufficient grass production during the two periods across the study sites, the self-contained farms were the most affected areas during the two periods. As discussed already, this was partly because these plots are relatively smaller in size; hence, most of them were generally overstocked prior to the droughts. By contrast, the A2 and to some extent, A1 farmers, have access to relatively larger grazing land, yet they own relatively fewer stock. As a result, most A2 famers had excessive forage than they required for their animals.

Table 8.4: Most frequently cited cattle-related drought coping strategies in self-contained farms[a]

	2011-12 (N=26)			2015-16 (N=25)		
	Responses		Percent of	Responses		Percent of
Strategies	N	Percent	Cases	N	Percent	Cases
Illegal grazing	6	10%	23%	11	21%	44%
Land leasing	6	10%	23%	14	26%	56%
Movement out	10	16%	39%	0	0%	0%
Commercial feed	25	40%	96%	15	28%	60%
Hay	6	10%	23%	7	13%	28%
Sale	7	11%	27%	0	0%	0%
Supply pods	1	2%	4%	1	2%	4%
Crop residue	1	2%	4%	2	4%	8%
Cut-and-carry grass	0	0%	0%	2	4%	8%
Broiler litter	0	0%	0%	1	2%	4%
Other	1	2%	4%	0	0%	0%
Total	63	100%		53	100%	

[a] Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 8.5: Most frequently cited cattle-related drought coping strategies in A2 farms[a]

	2011-12 (N=10)			2015-16 (N=5)		
	Responses		Percent of	Responses		Percent of
Strategies	N	Percent	Cases	N	Percent	Cases
Land leasing	2	10%	20%	1	17%	20%
Commercial feed	10	50%	100%	5	83%	100%
Hay	4	20%	40%	0	0%	0%
Sale	3	15%	30%	0	0%	0%
Broiler litter	1	5%	10%	0	0%	0%
Total	20	100%		6	100%	

[a] Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Table 8.6: Most frequently cited cattle-related coping strategies in A1 farms[a]

	2011-12 (N=30)			2015-16 (N=22)		
	Responses		Percent of	Responses		Percent of
Strategies	N	Percent	Cases	N	Percent	Cases
Illegal grazing	6	13%	20%	13	46%	59%
Land leasing	1	2%	3%	1	4%	5%
Movement out	2	4%	7%	1	4%	5%
Commercial feed	23	48%	77%	13	46%	59%
Hay	3	6%	10%	0	0%	0%
Sale	6	13%	20%	0	0%	0%
Crop residue	4	8%	13%	0	0%	0%
Cut-and-carry grass	2	4%	7%	0	0%	0%
Broiler litter	1	2%	3%	0	0%	0%
Total	48	100%		28	100.0%	

[a] Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

8.3.1 Supplementary feeding

From the survey data (Table 8.1 – 8.3), across the three land uses, it is clear that supplementary feeding *in situ* has been the single most important drought coping strategy during the two periods. Purchasing commercial feed supplements (including salt and licks) was by far the most commonly adopted supplementary feeding strategy during the two periods. Others include feeding animals using locally available feed stuffs such as tree pods (especially, *Acacia* spp.), cut-and-carry grass and broiler litter. Many commented that bringing in imported food stuffs

and feeding animals *in situ* was a better strategy than moving animals due to the logistic, labour and rental costs involved. In 2011-12, extension officers and NGOs were instrumental in encouraging the uptake of supplementary feed for survival. This "survival feed" was sold at subsidized price of USD7.50 per 50kg bag – only half of the actual price was.

Survival feed was critically important for sustaining animals during the 2011-12 drought. For example, TN, bought tonnes of survival feed survival feed and hay for his animals during this period. He would sell two or three cattle at a time in order to purchase a full truck load of 'survival' feed. Although the 'survival' feed was crucial in ensuring that his cattle survive the scourging drought of 2011/12, he complained that:

> Survival is not advantageous because it just keeps her [cow] at that [same] level. It won't be fed adequately. But during that time [drought period] you don't feed adequately, you feed for survival. So, you don't give the animal 15kg per day, but maybe 7 – 8 kg per animal so that it can survive. So, it does not get fat. It still drops [body weight]. But you just want to say 'let's reach the rainy season, let's reach the rainy season.

In order to maintain his animals in a better condition, he also feed them with supplementary pen feed. At the time, he also invited ON, a former senior veterinary officer and livestock farmer himself, to bring his animals at his homestead so that he could benefit from his knowledge and experience. Together, they adopted what can be described as a "semi-intensive" management approach, involving a combination of intensive and extensive methods simultaneously. Animals were fed with supplementary pen feed for two weeks to maintain them in relatively good condition; (b) in the third week he would provide them with survival feed, and (c) then leave them to freely forage on the available without bringing them to the kraal at time, depending on their condition. Monitoring the physiological state of the animals was vital for TN, as he explained: "when I saw them 'dropping' their weight, I would bring them again for pen feeding." Through this careful management, TN managed to avoid any cattle mortalities due to drought, such that by the end of drought his herd had expanded to 171 due to natural increase.

This case reveals how collaboration with other farmers and knowledge sharing are essential for generating reliability in variable environments.

Others mixed hay with commercial feed and molasses to make it more appetizing to the animals. For example, PN, purchased two truckloads of hay and a few bags of pen feed. He explained how he used them as follows: "We would deep the hay in a container full of molasses,

and then sprinkle some pen fed on the grass. I can tell you the animals loved it." Using this strategy, PN "did not lose a single animal" due to drought. Howe

Others used poultry litter (a mixture of poultry excreta, bedding material and wasted feed), sourced from Khumalo communal areas where local farmers are engaging in broiler contract farming linked to a nearby remaining white commercial farmer. Notably, very few livestock-owning households surveyed reported using crop residue to feed their animals, even in A1 schemes where dryland cropping is prevalent. This was for me a somewhat surprising finding of the study. There was a general belief that maize stalks if fed to animals would lead to poor body conditions. Thus, most farmers interviewed in A1 schemes where dryland cropping is most common said that they prefer to burn the maize stalks soon after harvest as a strategy to get rid of pests such as army worms. Similarly, the collection of acacia pods (*umtshatshatsha*) to feed animals during the 2011-12 drought was reported by only one farmer in the self-contained farms.

8.3.2 Livestock movement

Livestock movement out of farm boundaries was also an important coping strategy during the two periods, especially in A2 and self-contained farms. These movements took various forms in resettlement areas. It often included leasing additional pastures (*ukulagisa*), poach-grazing in nearby under-utilised resettlement farms and large-scale commercial farms, as well as "movement out", involving non-market mechanisms.

Table 8.7: Leasing-in additional land during two drought periods

	Self-contained				A2 schemes			
Asset Groups (N=)	1	2	3	Tot	1	2	3	Tot
Did hh leased-in additional pastures during the 2011-12 drought?	2	0	4	6	0	1	0	1
Did hh leased-in additional pastures during the 2015-16 drought?	5	2	7	14	0	0	1	1

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Lease-grazing was an important strategy during the 2015-16 than during 2011-12 drought in self-contained farms. In many instances, movements were mainly local and involved short distances to surrounding farms (especially A2 farms). 19% (6 of 32 cases) of those who were interviewed in self-contained farms reported that they leased-in additional pastures in response to the 2011-12 drought. Of these six, three rented in nearby A1 schemes, one in nearby black-owned large-scale farm and two less successful farmers within self-contained schemes. By

contrast, only one out of 18 A2 farmers interviewed reported leasing-in additional pastures during the 2011-12 drought, while no one did so in A1 schemes. Rental charges were set at one heifer per 10 head of cattle. In most cases, cattle were moved over short distances, although a few long-distance movements were observed. While the 2015-16 drought was relatively of low intensity, 44% (14 of 32) households in self-contained farms reported leasing-in additional pastures from others (mostly from struggling A2 farmers), while only 6% (1 of 18) and 2% (1 of 67) farmers in self-contained and A1 schemes, respectively, did so in the A2 sample. Comparing the three land-uses, we can see that the self-contained schemes have the highest proportion of households who leased-in additional grazing land during the two periods because they are generally smaller in size. Overall, livestock movement through informal land market was only available to the wealthy livestock-owning households, with access to financial resources to pay rental, labour and transport costs.

"Movement out", without having to pay rental fees, was another common strategy among self-contained farmers. This strategy involved moving animals back to original home in communal areas or to other plots registered in relatives' names. This was especially common amongst those whose original homes are located near Matobo National Park. Such movements allowed herd owners to illegally graze their animals in the National Park. However, others simply moved their animals back to their home areas for closer management and the fear that hired herders would sell feed to meet their own cash needs. MD, for example, moved his herd back to Mancina village near Kezi because "sometimes hired herders can sell feed in order to buy cigarette". In some cases, herd owners were compelled to move their cattle back to their original homes because of lack of water at the farms.

Others with multiple properties in the resettlement, often registered in the names of their children and relatives, simply moved their cattle to properties that had abundant grazing and water resources at the time. For example, TN moved all his cattle from his self-contained plot to his A1 plot in Vimbi, which is registered in his son's name. This strategy was therefore available to the well-connected people, who managed to acquire more than one plot thanks to their local connections. It also appears to be most common in self-contained farms.

Others resorted to cut fencing poach-grazing in neighbouring under-utilized plots and large-scale commercial farms, risking conflicts with their neighbours. GN, for example, a primary school teacher, said that he resorted to poach-grazing at the nearby then white-owned ranch during the 2011-12 drought, despite the harshness of the white farmer. "We would drive the

animals into the farm through a donga, and they would graze in the farm until early in the morning when we fetch them. This is how I survived during the 2011-12 drought." However, the white farmer was eventually evicted in the period leading up to the 2013 elections, and three A2 plots were created, meaning that poach-grazing in the farm was no longer possible.

Overall, livestock movement was less common in A2 farms during the two periods. This is largely because most settlers owned very few cattle during the two periods, and they had sufficient feed for their animals – if anything, most of the farms were under-utilised or understocked due to lack of capital to invest in cattle. In fact, the struggling households seized the opportunity to expand their own herds through leasing-out pastures. For instance, Mr MD who has 475ha plot, leased-out part of his farm to a black large-scale farmer in exchange for heifers and farm development (fencing) during the 2011-12 drought. At the time, he only owned 7 head of cattle. Very few A2 farmers who owned large herds reported leasing-in additional grazing from their neighbours or large-scale commercial farmers during the two periods.

In A1 farms, herd movement was less prevalent during the two periods. In Vimbi, there was an influx of cattle from the drought-stricken southern part of the district and neighbouring self-contained farms during 2011-12 when the villagers made a decision to lease-out pastures to other herdowners. As discussed above, in early 2012, villagers agreed that each household would bring in ten head of cattle under leasing-in arrangement. This was seen as a strategy to build their own herds, given that most had no or a just few at the time. However, "because of greed", what was supposed to be a stream of incoming cattle turned into a flood. As a consequence, the farm was overstocked, leading to insufficient feed. Hence, the A1 villagers were compelled to purchase supplementary feeding, while others resorted to illegal grazing in nearby under-utilised A2 and large-scale farms. One farmer, ChM, reported "movement out" as an adaptation strategy during the 2011-12 drought. When he realised that there was no more grazing in Vimbi, he moved his animals to Mapani Poort whose white-owner at the time was a good friend of his. As he explained: "Because of the influx of *mlaga* cattle, there was no more grass left here. So, I asked my friend Habe if I could take my cattle to his farm and he said "yes". I moved all my cattle there, and they returned after the drought looking very fresh. I never lose a single animal during the 2011-12 drought."

A similar situation prevailed in Luma, although the farm was largely overrun by livestock from neighbouring Wenlock. During the 2015-16, A1 villages were not badly affected by drought.

Many herdowners, however, resorted to illegal grazing in surrounding under-utilised A2 farms. One herd owner (EN) said that he moved his cattle back to his original home near the park, where he had fenced a large tract of arable that belonged to his late father as a strategy to reserve grass for his cattle. In addition, moving the animals back to his original home also allowed him to illegally graze them in the national park.

Comparing the coping strategies pursued by livestock-owning households between the two periods in each scheme, there are some important differences in relation to the coping strategies that were pursued by livestock-owning households between the 2011-12 and 2015-16 drought periods. For example, during the 2011-12 drought, 39% of livestock-owning households in surveyed self-contained farms adopted 'movement out' as a coping mechanism compared to none during the 2015-16 drought. Similarly, 96% of livestock-owning households in self-contained farms used commercial feed in 2011-12 drought compared to 60% during the 2015-16 drought. In the A1 farms, 20% of herd owners interviewed adopted poach-grazing in neighbouring farms during the 2011-12 drought compared to nearly 60% of households during the 2015-16 drought. But what explain these differences?

Not only does these differences in strategies adopted by herd owners between the two periods can be explained by the severity of the drought, but by externalities such as possibility to move cattle somewhere else, access to remittance, or off-farm income. HS, for example, could not purchase supplementary feed during the recent 2019-20 drought because his sister with a good job at a research institute in Kenya could not send her remittance to purchase supplementary feed as she often does during drought periods because of ill health and the unexpected passing of her husband at the same time (Chapter Seven). As a result, he lost 10 head of cattle due to drought. In some cases, the few remaining white-owned farms that provided the much-needed drought fodder in the past – either through poach-grazing or negotiation – have been resettled. This means that access depend on negotiation with the new farmers. For example, ChM moved his cattle to nearby Mapani Poort farm, whose white-owner was a good friend of his, when drought intensified in 2012. However, he could not repeat the strategy during the 2015-16 drought as the white-farmer was later evicted and the farm was subject to elite grabbing.

8.3.3 Sales

Sales as a coping measure were less common during the two periods. However, this strategy was largely adopted by households with limited access to off-farm income. In most cases, few

animals were sold and the proceeds were then used to purchase commercial feed supplements to feed pregnant and lactating cows.

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In sum, livestock producers pursued a wide range of both intensive and extensive management strategies, involving various forms of livestock mobility and provision of external feed. These strategies had different implications for labour, land and capital.

8.4 *Ukulagisa*: Seizing opportunities during periods of rainfall variability

Leasing-out or sharecropping-out on a longer-term basis is more pronounced in A2 schemes than in self-contained schemes: only 19% (6 of 32) of households surveyed reported leasing-out or sharecropping-out part or all of their land to other cattle owners on a long-term basis, as compared to nearly half of the households (44% or 8 of 18) in A2 sample.

Table 8.8: Leasing-out arrangements by asset groups

Self-Contained				A2 farms			
AG1	AG2	AG3	Total	AG1	AG2	AG3	Total
2	3	1	6	6	2	0	8

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

As the Table 8.3 illustrates, the cases of leasing-out or sharecropping-out land are concentrated in AG1 and AG2 categories. What is notable is the near-absence of cases of leasing-out land in AG3 category. The ongoing economic distress, lack of capital and the absence of official credit, has meant that many poor households in AG1 and AG2 categories are compelled to lease-out all or part of their lands to better-off farmers in exchange for heifers and other farm infrastructural development (e.g., fencing and housing).

Table 8.9: A summary of longer-term ukulagisa arrangements in A2 farms

Landowner	Gender	Occupation	Asset Group	Farm size (ha)	Cattle owned on-farm	Time period of arrangement	Type(s) of tenant	Type(s) of payment/ benefits
MD	Male	Works as an extension officer	AG1	415	25	From 2014 up to date	1 CA farmer & his son	Farm owner concealed details of arrangement. Specific details could not be solicited
JnD	Male	Unemployed, formerly ZANU-PF councilor	AG1	460	0	From 2013 - up to date	1 CA farmer	Two heifers per year
EM	Female	Unemployed, full-time farmer in CA	AG1	500	0	From 2013 - up to date	1 CA farmer	Two heifers per year
PM	Male	Works at the Lands Office	AG1	283	0	From 2015 - up to date	1 SC farmer	Tenant only assumed responsibility for land tax, which was USD1420
MN	Male	Works as a civil servant	AG1	500	18	From 2013 - up to date	1 SC farmer	Four heifers per year
NF	Male	Local chief, but works in South Africa	AG1	500	37	From 2013 - up to date	1 CA farmers	1 heifer per year for grazing 23 head of cattle between the 2 lessees
RN	Male	Retired, formerly worked in the army	AG1	500	43	From 2013 - up to date	1 SC farmer; his 2 brothers	4 heifers per year; his two brothers help to pay herders' wage bill

MM	Female	Works at ZESA	AG1	284	25	From 2015 to update	1 A2 farmer	Tenant ring-fenced whole farm in exchange to access to grazing

Notes: CA= communal areas; SC= self-contained farms; LSCF= Large-scale Commercial Farms

Table 8.10: A summary of longer-term ukulagisa arrangements in self-contained farms

Landowner	Gender	Employment	Asset Group	Farm size (ha)	Household cattle owned on-farm	Time period of arrangements	Types of tenant(s)	Type of payment/ benefits
MeM	Female	Unemployed, full-time farmer	AG1	148	2	From January 2018 – to date	1 communal areas farmer	1 heifer per year, plus access to milk, manure, as well as boyfriend employment as herder
OM	Female	Unemployed, full-time farmer at the farm & original CA home	AG1	170	30	From 2013	2 self-contained farmers	*Tenant 1*: two heifers per year; Tenant *2*: pays herder's monthly wage bill of US$900, plus herder's food
ZN	Male	Works at an NGO	AG3	273	39	From October 2016 - to date	1 communal areas farmer	One heifer per year
SN	Male	Self-employed, businessperson	AG3	172	0	From 2007 to date	1 communal areas farmer	Arrangement unknown. Farmer could not divulge details
BzN	Female	Passed away, formerly worked as a school teacher	AG3	145	0	From 2015 up to date	1 communal areas farmer	Lessee assume responsibility for land tax
PD	Male	Retired soldier	AG2	105	44	From 2012 up to date	2 Communal areas farmers	Contributed towards construction of housing infrastructure

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

The case of RN, a capital-constrained farmer, exemplifies these dynamics. He acquired 500 hectares of land in 2002 using his role as a military attaché at the District Lands Office at the time. RN worked as a staff seagent in the army, a low position he held until his retirement in 2005. Because of lack of adequate capital, he says that he has struggled to invest substantially in cattle. During the interview, he spoke of his vain attempts over many years to obtain a loan from the bank. Lacking adequate capital and in the absence of formal credit, he said that he is compelled to rent out a portion of his farm to better-off livestock-owning households. Thus, *ukulagisa* has become a key strategy to build his herd and raise money to pay annual land unit tax, which he says is very high, totalling USD2,500 per year. When he took occupation of the farm in 2013, he had only 11 head of cattle, which he bought using income from his salary a long time ago. Currently, RN is renting-out 250 hectares of his farm to a wealthy herd owner at a nearby self-contained scheme, an arrangement that has been going on for the last 3 years. In return, he receives 4 herd of cattle every year as payment.[154] Additionally, he also leases out other portions of the farm to other cattle farmers for grazing on a short-term basis (e.g., 3 months), especially during dry spells and droughts, as will be discussed below. According to RN, land leasing has helped him significantly to build his herd. When paid, some of the heifers joins his herd, while others are sold to cover his children's school fees. By 2018, RN had gradually expanded his herd to 37 thanks to both *ukulagisa* arrangement and births. RN is also taking care of cattle owned by his two younger brothers, who are working in South Africa. In exchange, the two brothers 'help' him to cover the wages of the herders.

Rental payment is not only restricted to cattle, but other benefits such as financing the development of farm infrastructure (e.g., housing and fencing) or payment of labour. For example, OM, a widow and capital-short farmer, who inherited her husband's self-contained plot is in a long-term ukulagisa arrangement with two most successful self-contained farmers (one of them is EM above). One of the tenants, MN was grazing his herd of cattle on OM's land in exchange of paying her herder's wages (USD900 per annum) and providing veterinary drugs and dipping chemicals. Another case is that of a civil servant, MM, who inherited her father's A2 plot and entered in a long-term *ukulagisa* arrangement with neighbouring A2

[154] While he mentioned that he is renting out part of the farm, he was unwilling to discuss the details of the leasing arrangements. Thus, this information was obtained from herders and the farmers themselves who are leasing-in or have previously leased-in land from him.

farmer (who is also a relative). In return, the tenant ring-fenced the whole farm in exchange for pastures.

As household herds slowly and steadily expand, some households who initially adopted sharecropping-out or leasing-out all or part of their land as a strategy to build or expand their herds seem to abandon the practice to ensure that their animals have access to adequate forage throughout the year. For example, KM, a capital-constrained farmer in the A2 schemes, reported that when he acquired his 500 hectares of land in 2003, he hoped that he would secure a loan from CSC as was the case for white farmers, but his hopes never materialized. With limited access to capital, he decided to rent out a portion of his farm to other cattle farmers in exchange for heifers. In the years between 2009 and 2013, KM rented-out part of his grazing to two brothers from Manama (of whom one was a teacher) who owned a total of 100 cattle between them. In return, the brothers were paying him one heifer per 10 cattle grazed on the farm every year. KM was therefore able to expand his herd to 75 head of cattle in 2014, in part, through *ukulagisa* arrangement on a longer-term basis. However, in recent years, KM said that he no longer rent-out pastures to other cattle farmers to ensure his herd has enough forage to last the whole year.

Farmers who hold land for speculative reasons also lease-out land for two main reasons. First, leasing-out is seen as a way of 'keeping the land' in the family while not using it until such time when the financial situation of the farmer improves. Leaving the farm unused, whether abandoned or idle, has reallocation consequences. Secondly, leasing-out land enables the landowner to raise land tax. Again, non-payment of land tax, has reallocation consequences. F

PM, born and raised in the city, whose household sits in AG1 group, admitted that he managed to acquire an A2 farm (248ha) through his position as a senior official at the Ministry of Lands in Kezi. With surprising frankness, he admitted that he took a calculated "risk" to access the farm without cattle or capital to invest in livestock production. Currently, PM does not own any cattle because of lack of access to capital. As he explained: "I have nothing at the farm at the moment. The economy has been bad." He wishes to start buying cattle when the economic situation "improves" as "it's not wise for the farm to stay without cattle for a long time." Given that he has got "nothing" at the farm, PM decided to lease-out the entire farm to a wealthy herd owner (EM above) in exchange for assuming responsibility for paying land tax of USD1,420 per year.

In some cases, farmers leased-out land after experiencing shocks, such as the death of the household head or farm owner. CN, for example, inherited a self-contained plot following the death of her daughter (BzN) in 2006, but decided to lease-out the entire farm to a relative who works as a school headmaster in Maphisa in exchange that the lessee assume responsibility for payment of land tax of US$ 108.75 per year. Ms CN said that leasing-out the farm was a strategy to "keep the farm for her daughter's *umntwana* (child)", whom was still very young to take over the farm at the time of the field work.

Similarly, MeM, a capital-constrained widow whose household sits in AG1 category, said that she entered into a longer-term *ukulagisa* arrangement as a strategy to rebuild her herd which had been decimated by the 2011-12 drought and other social factors. Her late husband (McS) took an early retirement from his job as a tour guide and became a full-time farmer in 2010. At the start of 2011-12 drought, McS fell ill and family was forced to sell four cattle to cover the medical bills. At this point, the household had 26 head of cattle. They sold another animal to buy feed. But this did not help much as the household lost many animals due to lack of water. In December 2012, McS died, and another animal was slaughtered during his funeral. McS had two wives, of which the first wife remained at his old homestead in communal areas. Rumours had it that all the remaining cattle that survived the 2011-12 drought were taken by McS's first wife following his death, leaving MeM with no single animal. In an attempt to rebuild her herd and finance farm investments, she was forced to enter into numerous *ukulagisa* arrangements with herd owners from within the self-contained scheme and nearby communal areas. For example, between 2013 and 2014, she leased-out the entire farm to a communal areas herdowner for one year in exchange of cash. The herd owner paid her a total of USD500, which she used to pay off land tax arrears, which was left by her husband, as well as children's school fees. During the 2015-16 drought, she leased-out the entire farm to another herd owner from nearby communal areas in Gwanda in exchange of fencing off the whole farm. In 2017, Ms MeM leased-out pastures to another local self-contained farmer for 4 months (August to December) in exchange of one heifer. Initially having struck a written agreement (a deal that was signed in the presence of some neighbouring farmers) with the local farmer to lease-graze the farm for 8 years in exchange of only two heifers, she realized that she had been "cheated on" and had to backtrack on the agreement. In 2018, she entered into a longer-term *ukulagisa* arrangement with a communal areas farmer, who also works as a school headmaster, in exchange of one heifer per year for a herd of around 25. Moreover, she was also allowed to use manure for cropping and milk the cattle for consumption use, while her boyfriend was

employed by the herd owner as a herder at USD130 per month. The herd owner would also cover the land tax of USD110 per year. In sum, this *ukulagisa* arrangement, which appears to combine both elements of lease-grazing and cattle loaning, has helped MeM to maintain the fertility of her crop field, rebuild her herd and thus her livelihood following a series of shocks. By 2022, her cattle herd had increased to four thanks to the *ukulagisa* arrangement.

While climatic variability (especially drought) is a challenge for better-off households with large herds, it is an opportunity for poor households with no or fewer cattle to acquire or expand their herds in a context of economic distress. In this sense, Scoones (2021) proposes understanding uncertainty as an opportunity as much as it is a threat. Whereas the better-off households focus on how to cope with drought, the situation with poor households is about how to capitalise on the drought years. In A2 schemes and to some extent self-contained schemes, the AG1 and AG2 categories of farmers tend to own few cattle, while the AG3 category own nearly double the number of cattle (Chapter Six). Acknowledging this, the former categories, especially in A2 schemes where landholdings size are relatively larger, tend to have excess forage resources than they require during drought years. Hence, they sharecrop-out or lease-out all or part of their land to other farmers in desperate need of pastures. As mentioned earlier, such arrangements are on a shorter-term basis, lasting until the end of drought.

(i) Land-leasing out during drought in A2 and self-contained schemes

In my sample of self-contained farmers, sharecropping or leasing out pastures to others during the two drought periods studied was less pronounced. No cases of farmers were found of households who entered into sharecropping or leasing out pastures with other herdowners during the 2011-12 drought. However, during the 2015-16 drought, two self-contained farmers interviewed reported that they had leased-out pastures to others during the period in exchange for cash or cattle. MeM, for example, has had numerous short-term *ukulagisa* arrangements with other herd owners during drought periods since the death of her husband in 2012. These arrangements have helped her to ringfence her farm and rebuild her herd following a series of unfortunate events.

In A2 schemes, four out of the 18 households (mostly, those who had been settled at the time) said that they sharecropped or leased-out all or part of their grazing land to others in return for heifers and/or other farm developments during the 2011-12 drought. Most of these farmers had no or few cattle at the time, but with excess pasture than they require. Thus, they seized on the

drought to expand their herds through *ukulagisa* arrangement. For example, MD, who works as an extension officer, leased out the whole of his A2 farm (415ha) to another local herdowner in exchange of five heifers. In addition, the herd owner ring-fenced and constructed paddocks as part of the payment. He admitted that he got the farm through his job, but lacked adequate capital to invest substantially in cattle production. Thus, this arrangement helped him to build his herd and invest in fencing. In particular, ukulagisa helped him to acquire some of his first animals. Today, MD owns around 25 head of cattle.

While the 2015-16 drought was of low intensity as already mentioned above, three households in A2 farms reported leasing-out all or part of their land to wealthy herd owners from self-contained farms in exchange for heifers and other off-farm benefits. All these farmers are war veterans, who have been struggling to make use of their land, as they had limited resources, and used their political capital to gain access to land. RN, for example, who acquired land through his position in the army, leased out part of his grazing land to two better-off herd owners from self-contained farms during the 2015-16 drought in exchange of heifers and goats. In one arrangement, he received three goats after allowing a herd owner to graze 30 head of cattle at his plot for two months (November and December) in 2016. Another herd owner, moved his head of 40 cattle to RN's farm for two months again in 2016 in return for two heifers.

However, it is important to note that some households who are engaging in *ukulagisa* are not necessarily struggling households. Instead, they are holding land for speculation purposes or farming is not really of great interest to them for now. We may see this in RM's case. 63-year-old RM is a war veteran, senior politician and serving minister who gained access to 800-ha A2 plot through political connections. She admitted that her land allocation was "a directive from President Robert Mugabe". When she acquired land in 2015, she had no cattle at all. Since 2015, she has been leasing out the whole farm to other herd owners in exchange for cash, heifers and other off-farm benefits. Table 8.11 summarises all the sharecropping or leasing out arrangements she entered into during the 2015-16 drought. In total, she received eight heifers from three of the four tenants as rental payment, while another herd owner (a local businessman and constructor) built her a three-roomed cottage and put concrete-slab on the main house in Maphisa town as payment for grazing his 180 head of cattle for a year. Of the 8 heifers received as rental payment, RM sold six of them and used the proceeds to cover medicals bills for her step-father.

Table 8.11: RM's leasing-out arrangements

Tenant (herd owner)	*Type of tenant*	*No. of cattle grazed*	*Period*	*Payment*
GN	SC	45	September 2016 - January 2017	2 heifers
CM	SC	34	September 2016 - January 2017	2 heifers
MN	SC	180	June 2016 - June 2017 (One year)	Constructed three-roomed cottage & concrete-slab main house in Maphisa
ET	A2	80	September 2016 - January 2017	4 heifers

Abbreviations: SC = self-contained farmer

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

This case reveals that some land recipients see land as one resource within a portfolio and take little active interest in farming it.

In sum, *ukulagisa* during times of drought has allowed those without adequate financial resources to build or expand their herds in the absence of private and state financing. Conversely, *ukulagisa* has also allowed wealthy livestock-owning households to cope with climatic variability in the context of rangeland fragmentation in A2 and SC farms.

The next section examines how *ukulagisa* arrangements play out in A1 villagised schemes, where grazing is communally-owned.

(ii) Land-leasing out in smallholder A1 schemes during drought

During the 2011-12 drought, A1 villagers in both Luma and Vimbi sharecropped or leased-out pastures to other livestock farmers from outside the villages in exchange of heifers and cash. However, the arrangements differed between the two villages. In Vimbi, the villagers agreed to lease-out pastures on an individual basis as a strategy to build their herds. The village chairman and dipping chairman (and para-veterinarian) calculated the total number of cattle owned by village households and found that the village had a total of about 200 cattle at the time. Thus, they then calculated that each household would accommodate a head of 10 cattle under a *ukulagisa* arrangement in exchange for one heifer (*itokazi*). Hereafter, I refer to these leased cattle as "*izinkomo zomlaga*", as they are colloquially known by locals.

According to villagers, the purpose of leasing-out pastures to others was to allow them to "sprout" in terms of livestock ownership. Moreover, the idea was to enable cattle-less households to acquire their first animals. As one farmer put it, "We realised that if we call for collective labour to revive farm fences and paddocks, cattle-less households would not attend as they say they don't have cattle. So we wanted every household to own some cattle in order to solve the problem." The ten-cattle rule or quota was intended to "control" cattle numbers, while also trying to ensure equal benefits among all villagers. Through this quota system, the village leaders envisaged that a total of around 200 *izinkomo zomlaga* would be accommodated across all the A1 households who had taken occupation at the time, making a total of about 400 head of cattle (including their own herds), grazing at the farm during this time. This figure was conceived to be in line with the farm's carrying capacity. Nevertheless, this 'ten-cattle' rule per household or quota system was simply ignored by many with the number of accommodated *izinkomo zomlaga* way beyond the stipulated number, as demand for pastures increased as the drought conditions intensified in the southern parts of the district, while the A1 villagers themselves seized the opportunity to gain more heifers.



Figure 8.1: Cattle movements during the 2011-12 drought

Izinkomo zomlaga began to arrive in early 2011, but the numbers kept on increasing as the drought conditions increased in 2012. In fact, there was a huge influx of cattle from the southern parts of the district, where the impacts of drought were severe, into the resettlement areas. According to state veterinary records on livestock movements collected from five Animal Health Centres, over 1000 *izinkomo zomlaga* sought "relief grazing" in Vimbi alone. Initially, to ensure that the A1 villagers comply with the ten-cattle rule, the village chairman would record the details of the herd owner seeking accessing to pastures, arrival date, number of cattle that would be lease-grazed and the name of the village household where the cattle would be kraaled. However, the villagers began to circumvent this record keeping procedure, as more cattle were accommodated without the knowledge of the village leaders. As one villager leader put it, "there was no control!". This led to overgrazing and death of many cattle due to shortage of forage and water. As one A1 farmer explained: "It was no longer enjoyable to take a walk in the bushes because of stench of rotting carcasses."

Table 8.12: Distribution of households who took on umlaga cattle in 2011-12 drought by success

	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Overall
Vimbi	11	8	6	1	26
Luma	0	1	0	0	1
Total	11	9	6	1	27

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

The survey results reveal that 25 out of the 33 surveyed in Vimbi had *izinkomo zomlaga* during the 2011-12 drought. Besides household heads and their spouses, other adult household members (such as farmer's adult children and relatives), who had no homesteads of their own at the time, also entered *ukulagisa* arrangements on their own account. Although one head of cattle (mainly heifers) per ten cattle was usually set as payment of *ukulagisa*, payment depended on one's negotiating skills too. Payment of the lease rent (i.e., heifers) had to be negotiated and made at the beginning of the lease period. Once payment had been made, the herd owner seeking access to grazing would then leave the cattle in the care of his/her own hired herder. The herd owner of *izinkomo zomlaga* had to provide food supplies to the hired herder/s, while the village household had to provide accommodation for the hired herder/s. On average, *izinkomo zomlaga* stayed at the farm for one year, and the majority left in December of 2012 after the first rains.

Some villagers benefitted more than others, while others lost out. For some, *ukulagisa* arrangement provided a basis for expanding herds. For example, ChM a young and wealthy herd owner, owned 12 cattle at the start of 2011-12 drought. When drought struck in 2011-12, he took the opportunity to expand his herd by entering into several *ukulagisa* arrangements with herd owners from the drought-stricken regions in the southern-part of the district. As with many households, ChM simply ignored the stipulated ten-cattle rule per household as he sought to maximise the opportunity to expand herd. Thus, he took in 52 head of cattle, owned by three different herd owners from Silawa and Zwehamba, in exchange for three heifers. These heifers became part of his breeding herd. By 2018, these heifers had since given birth at least three times each. By 2022, his cattle herd had expanded to 40.

Others had no cattle at all at the time, and therefore ukulagisa presented an opportunity for them to acquire their first cattle. For example, CaD, who had not yet acquired land at the time, had no cattle at the start of the 2011-12 drought. During the 2011-12 drought, 63-year-old CaD was living at his cousin's homestead, having retired from his job as a panel beater in Bulawayo

in 2005 “when the money was worthless”. Despite not having own homestead, he entered into two *ukulagisa* arrangements with two herdowners from communal areas in exchange for heifers. In total, he received two heifers from the arrangement. In 2013, he then managed to obtain his own plot through the local chief. He then sold one heifer for USD500 and bought a plough using part of the proceeds, and retained another for breeding purposes. Today, his herd has increased to three.

Others feared that cattle may die due to lack of feed or diseases. As a result, they either received donkeys as rental payment or later exchanged the cattle with donkeys for which donkeys are important for drought purposes. For example, JM, a security guard at a nearby mine who arrived in Vimbi with no livestock in 2005, entered into an *ukulagisa* arrangement with one herd owner from Zwehamba and received one heifer as payment. However, given that the household had no draught power at the time, coupled with the fear that the heifer could die due to drought or animal disease, he decided to exchange the heifer with two donkeys (male and female) and a “top-up” of US$50 with a local self-contained farmer. By 2018, the household’s herd of donkeys had increased to four through births. Before acquiring the donkeys, JM said that he had been struggling to plough his fields because of a lack of draft power.

Others sold the animals as soon as they received them because of beliefs and fears that some herd owners use *umthuso*, a traditional medicine to enhance fertility of the herd. Retaining those cattle in their own herd, it was thought, could cause abortion in their own herds. However, such farmers later acknowledged that there was no truth in such beliefs, as those who had retained the animals had not experienced such problems, and most sales were motivated by the need to meet immediate social reproduction needs.

Not all benefitted from this *ukulagisa* arrangement, however. Absentee households at the time lost out on this opportunity. Some female-headed households also lost out, as their ability to negotiate for rental payment was limited or the herd owners simply disappeared with the cattle after drought. FuZ, a 55-year-old widow, is one of those who didn’t benefit from the u*kulagisa* arrangement at the time. FuZ was living alone at the time, with no hired herder, while her children attend school in town. Like many, she entered into an *ukulagisa* arrangement with a herd owner from Gohole area near Maphisa to graze a herd of 16 cattle in April 2012. Once a verbal agreement was made, she was then shown the heifer, which was supposedly her payment. However, since she had no hired herder herself at the time, coupled with the fact that all her children were attending school in town, she decided not to take the heifer immediately

after she was shown the animal. As time goes on, the hired herder for the herd owner left FuZ's homestead and went to stay "near the dam", making it difficult for FuZ to keep an eye on her heifer. Later on, the hired herder told her that the heifer had disappeared. At the end of the drought, the herd owner took back his cattle without paying her anything.

Others, like LeN, said that they were given weak and sick animals, which soon died, either from starvation or disease. Some large herd owners in the village experienced cattle deaths due to lack of fodder as the farm became overstocked by outside cattle or animal diseases. For example, SeD, a 66-year-old widow, owned over 40 head of cattle at the start of the 2011-12 drought. However, she lost more than 12 head of cattle due to lack of fodder, while others got stuck in the mud in the nearby dam as they tried to access water. She surmised that most of her cattle succumbed to starvation because they were big Brahman cross-bred animals.

In sum, it is clear that the benefits of *ukulagisa* arrangement in Vimbi were not evenly distributed. Others benefitted, whilst others lost out. Thus, *ukulagisa* had an impact on accumulation and social differentiation processes, as we shall see in the next chapter. In some cases, the heifers that were obtained as payment for *ukulagisa* were retained, making a basis for cattle accumulation. In other cases, the poor households sold the heifers as soon as they received them, ostensibly, because of fears of *umthuso*, but in actual fact to meet the immediate needs of their families. Some large herd owners experienced cattle losses due to overstocking and outbreak of diseases. Other villagers said that they lost some cattle through stock theft, when the *umlaga* cattle were returning to their original home areas during the end of 2012. Because of such problems, the villagers vowed not to lease-out pastures to others again. During my fieldwork, no household was leasing out pastures to others in the village.

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I now turn to Luma village. Although A1 villagers in Luma, as with Vimbi, agreed to lease-out pastures to others during the 2011-12 drought, they did so as a collective (i.e., at community level) and the proceeds of the arrangement benefitted the whole village. During the 2011-12 drought, the villagers leased-out pastures to a nearby medium-scale farmer in return for cash. This cash was kept in the village chairman's own bank account since the villagers did not have a collective bank account. However, some villagers alleged that the village chairman embezzled most of the money, before deciding to purchase a mobile water pump for use by the whole village. Today, the water pump is now used to fill up the village's plunge dip. Given the

sensitivities around this issue, I could not establish how much cash was derived from this leasing-out arrangement.

Only one household interviewed in Luma reported leasing out grazing during the 2011-12 drought on an individual basis, although this was disguised as *amasiso*. When I asked why they did not lease-out pastures during the drought period at household level, many said that they were worried of stock theft, which is rampant on farms along the Gwanda-Matobo border.

During fieldwork, I also found out that the villagers were leasing out pastures to three brothers from Gwanda who owned over 100 head of cattle between them for a fee of USD100 per month, using this income mainly to purchase fencing for re-fencing and re-paddocking the farm. As the village chairman explained: "The reason why its little is that we should have given them a paddock for exclusive use. At the moment, their cattle grazing together with ours." At household level, as of 2018, two households were reportedly holding *izinkomo zomlaga*, although I was unable to ascertain the details of such arrangements.[155] Another villager leased out his crop field for grazing purposes to a large herd owner in the village for one month in October 2016 in return for three goats.

8.5 *Ukusisa:* Loaning arrangements

Another common phenomenon encountered during fieldwork is called *amasiso* or *ukusisa*, a cattle-loaning institution, briefly discussed in the last section. In contrast to *ukulagisa*, *ukusisa* is a cattle-loaning institution whereby an individual household looks after someone else's cattle, usually a relative, friend or acquaintance, in exchange of agricultural inputs (manure and draught power mainly) and milk. Besides these benefits, the herd owner will also give *umacgina* (keeper) a heifer every 1 to 2 years as a "token of gratitude" referred to as *inkomo yokubonga,* which literally means a 'cattle for thanking'. In contrast to *ukulagisa*, this 'token of gratitude' is voluntary rather than mandatory, and does not depend on the number of cattle being looked after. In principle, the herd owner supplies the veterinary drugs, dipping chemicals, as well as supplementary feeding, if required; while the *umacgina* is responsible for

[155] Of the two, one could not be accessed for interview as the family was an absentee household, with a hired worker. The worker could not divulge information. But villagers said the cattle that were at the farm did not belong to owner of the plot, but to someone else who was leasing in from the owner. With regards to other case, the household held another herd that did not belong to it, but I could not ascertain the details of the arrangement due to sensitivities. However, the villagers confirmed that this herd was "*izinkomo zomlaga*".

herding labour. In contrast to *ukulagisa*, the time period of the *amasiso* arrangement is usually longer. However, the herd owner may recall his/her cattle anytime, if there are concerns of untrustworthiness and abuse of the animals.

Amasiso arrangements are more pronounced in A1 schemes, while there are rare in medium-scale A2 and self-contained schemes. This is largely because the great majority of farmers specialise in livestock production rather than crop production. Only one case of a hybrid of *amasiso* and *ukulagisa* was found in self-contained farms. After she and her now late husband lost all their cattle during the 2011-12 drought, MeM decided to concentrate on dryland cropping to provide for her two sons, while leasing out all her pastures to other farmers. In January 2018, she entered into a hybrid arrangement of *amasiso* and *ukulagisa* systems with a herdowner from Khumalo communal areas, as discussed in previous section. This arrangement involved looking after 30 head of cattle in exchange for a suite of benefits, including one heifer per year, manure for crop production, and employment (herding) for her boyfriend.

Table 8.13: Distribution of households with loaned cattle in 2018

	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
Vimbi	0	3	1	0	4
Luma	0	3	2	0	5
Total	0	6	3	0	9

Source: Own data, 2017-18 survey

Within A1 schemes, 13% (9 of 67 cases) of households surveyed held loaned-in cattle across two villages. In Luma, only 5 out of 34 households (15%) reported having loaned-in cattle, compared to only 4 out of 33 households (12%) in Vimbi. Of the 9 households with loaned-in cattle across the two villages, the median herd size was 9 (mean=11), ranging from 2 to 25. These findings resonate with ARDA's (1982) findings in the communal areas in neighbouring Gwanda district, with only 16% of cattle owners and 13% of non-owners holding *amasiso* cattle. The majority of those households said that they received a heifer every few years as a 'token of appreciation'. Not only is *ukusisa* an important strategy to access draught power and manure for poor households, but also as a strategy to slowly build their own herds. The case of Mr NdM is instructive.

In 2010, NdM in Vimbi, was given a head of 13 cattle to look after under *ukusisa* arrangement by his wife's uncle (who they refer to as "*khulu"* (grandpa)), who is now old and lives in Mpumalanga where he also has a rural homestead, although he is originally from

Tshelanyemba (south of Matobo district). By 2018, the herd had increased to 28. NdM uses the cattle for draught purposes and manure. Moreover, since 2010, *khulu* has been giving NdM one head of cattle virtually every year as a token of appreciation. By 2018, NdM had 5 head of cattle thanks to the loaning arrangement. In February 2018, *khulu* came to sell some cattle and asked NdM to choose one animal he would want him to give him. He explained his decision:

> I chose the ox that I had trained to plough. He asked me if I was sure that I want an ox. I said "yes!". He wanted to give me a heifer, but I said "no", please give me this ox because it has production in my crop field. This will be my "*fosholo"* (shovel). That ox is GMB [Grain Marketing Board]! The ox will train others how to plough too. We are not going to sell or exchange the ox anytime soon.

Each time *khulu* sells cattle, he also gives NdM's wife US$100, which she uses to pay school fees for their children. However, not all loaning arrangements were beneficial to the cattle holders. I found a few cases where the holders complained that the herd owners were not supplying them with the required medicine and drugs.

Because he has never been employed in a "proper job" throughout his entire life, he had no capital to finance any cattle acquisition. His short stints as a herder in Botswana (early 2000s) and then security guard in South Africa (2008 – 2010) did not allow investment into cattle. By 2018, he still had his wife's uncle's herd, which had increased to 28. These cattle serve as important inputs to cropping: that is, a source of draught power and manure. More importantly, he receives payment of one animal virtually every year as token of appreciation. By 2018, he had received a total of 5 head of cattle under *amasiso*

Similarly, when MnD arrived in Luma in 2004, he had no cattle. In 2012, he struck an *amasiso* arrangement with an uncle from Kezi, who gave him a herd of 11 cattle to look after in exchange for one heifer every year, inputs to cropping (i.e., manure and draught power) and milk. Since then, he has received heifers on three occasions from his uncle as token of appreciation. By 2018, he owned 5 head of cattle thanks to *amasiso*. Thus, *amasiso* has allowed him to establish his own herd. Having been unemployed and reliant on wood carving as an occupation prior to settlement, MnD was unable to acquire cattle through purchase. With access to a relatively large herd (12 head of cattle, including loaned cattle) that serves as agricultural input (manure and draught power), he has earned a reputation as a good crop farmer in recent years. As a result, his household was ranked in SG1 by both women and men participants.

Although most farmers with loaned cattle have managed to establish their own herds, not all of them have benefitted from *amasiso*. ShM's experience is instructive. With meagre income

from his job as a security guard in Chiredzi, ShM arrived in Luma with no livestock. He struck an *amasiso* arrangement in 2010 after a herd owner from Kezi, whom he was not related to, had approached asking for access to pastures. He agreed to look after 8 head of cattle in exchange for agricultural inputs (draught power and manure) and a heifer every few years. In addition, they agreed that the herd owner would employ ShM's eldest son (aged 16 at the time) as a herder for a monthly wage of USD50. However, in 2013, seven of the cattle were stolen living behind only one animal. Of those stolen, ShM was able to recover only one ox, which was then sold by the owner. In the same year, prior to the cattle's disappearance, he was also paid with a heifer, but this was also stolen together with the herd owner's cattle. During the time of this research, he still held the one *amasiso* cattle that had escaped theft. However, he complained that the herd owner was no longer supplying him with drugs or money to pay cattle tax; thus, had to bear such costs himself.

Similarly, JkM's case is also demonstrative of the challenges faced by ShM. He holds 8 amasiso cattle owned by a communal areas herd owner from Tshelanyemba. The herd owner initially moved his cattle to Vimbi in 2012 under *ukulagisa* arrangement. After the drought, he moved the bulk of the cattle back to his communal areas, but left a few animals that were lost. These animals were later recovered by Vimbi villagers, who then informed him that they had found his cattle. While waiting for him to come and fetch the animals, the villagers agreed that the cattle should be kept at the village chairman's homestead. However, when the village chairman (LD) was lent another herd of cattle by his cousin in 2013, he asked that the cattle be kept at JkM's homestead, since he is the headman. In 2014, the herd owner (EN) then came and asked if the villagers could keep the animals a little longer under amasiso in exchange of one heifer, which belongs to the whole village. Since then, he never returned to check on his animals, which has since multiplied to 9. This is seen by JkM as an unusual behaviour, and he lamented the villagers' decision to agree to keep the animals in the first place. Since 2014, JkM said that EN (herd owner of *amasiso* cattle) never supplied him with drugs nor paid cattle tax. Rumours abound that these animals are actually owned by the EN's mother who lives in South Africa; hence, EN's lack of care.

Lastly, QM's case illustrates a recall of *amasiso* cattle after reports of abuse. He was lent 23 head of cattle under *amasiso* arrangement by an unrelated herd owner from Maphaneni (southern part of the district) who approached him for access to pastures in 2012. With no cattle himself, QM used these cattle as agricultural input to cropping. However, this was short-lived

as the herd owner recalled all of these animals back after QM's "jealousy" neighbour told the herd owner that his cattle were being "abused". Upon the recalling of the animals, QM was paid a heifer by the herd owner, and through natural growth, the herd had increased to 3 by 2017.

8.6 Water resources

Access to water is also a critical aspect of livestock production across the sites. However, there are no permanent rivers in the study area. Most rivers dry up within a few months after the rainy season, making investment in water vital. Thus, significant investments in water infrastructure have been observed in all the schemes, especially among the relatively wealthier households. These investments include drilling and installation of boreholes, building small earth dams, purchasing water pumps and tanks and so on. In the 2017-18 survey I asked the farmers about the investments in water (both ground and surface) they had made since settlement on their holdings. Since settlement, only one household in A1 farms, one in A2 farms and three households in self-contained farms had constructed small dams on their holdings. Unsurprisingly, these were all wealthier households in AG3 category. Similarly, one household in A2 farms and four in self-contained farms had invested in boreholes, although most of these boreholes are low yielding and cannot water large herds especially at the peak of the dry season. In fact, most farmers who had drilled boreholes said that they had to try on several sites before they could find some water. However, because of lack of security tenure, many farmers in A2 and self-contained farms are afraid to invest in boreholes.[156] Others, especially in AG2 and AG3 categories, had also invested in water pumps. Poor households tend to rely more on shallow wells *(umthombo*) for their workers and their animals during the dry season.

In A2 and self-contained farms, some – especially the well politically connected – were allocated plots with existing dams and boreholes. In principle, those farmers who inherited dams from white farmers are encouraged to share water for livestock with their neighbours on an adhoc basis. A rule of thumb is that animals seeking water should be accompanied by a herder to drink in another farmer's plot and immediately taken out as soon as they have been watered to avoid them from grazing in the plot. For example, HS, a self-contained farmer in

[156] Ref: the A2 petition.

Halalie farm, said that during the dry season and drought periods, he asks for permission to water his cattle at a dam in Holi A1 village.

However, some plot holders who inherited dams from white farmers, having fenced their plots, do not allow livestock farmers to water their animals in their farms, consequently leading to conflicts. For example, a conflict over access to water ensued between A1 villagers and A2 farmers over access to a dam, which led to one A2 farmer taking the A1 villagers to court. Overall, access to water determines which adaptation strategy a household can adopt in response to climate variability. For example, water availability is a key aspect of intensification strategies.

8.7 Conclusion

The chapter has explored the complex ways by in which livestock farmers sustain their livestock in the context of a harsh and highly variable resource base in post-land reform settings. The 2000 land reform saw the breakdown of former white-owned large-scale ranches into smaller and medium-scale ranches, leading to fragmentation of rangelands. This have had profound consequences for how land reform beneficiaries manage space in a bid to sustain their animals in a highly variable and unpredictable environment. It has been shown that different social groups manage their livestock differently. In self-contained and A2 farms, successful households have the means to rent additional pastures and/or purchase commercial feed and have political connections. The strategies of the poor households are different, however. During periods of drought, some gain access to land through social networks, while others engage in poach-grazing in others' farms.

CHAPTER 9: A TALE OF TWO VILLAGES: ACCUMULATION AND CLASS DIFFERENTIATION IN THE SMALLHOLDER A1 SCHEMES IN MATOBO

In Chapters Five and Six, I discussed the socio-economic and political origins of land reform beneficiaries in A1 (*villagised*), A2 and self-contained schemes. The chapters presented emerging patterns of social differentiation among land reform beneficiaries. What was not made clear was exactly *how* and *why* such patterns of differentiation are emerging. In this chapter and the next I seek to explain more substantive causal relations of these patterns of social differentiation amongst farmers studied. In Chapter Five I presented patterns of socio-economic inequality among smallholder A1 farmers in two contrasting villages. This represents an important first step as a precursor to further analysis of patterns of accumulation and differentiation. As Chapter Five makes clear, patterns of social differentiation are underway in the two studied villages. While analysis of survey data and specifically its correlation with "success ranking" is useful in helping us to understand emerging patterns of differentiation among these A1 farmers, they are not sufficient to account for *why* these patterns are emerging. In short, "extensive research" does not necessarily provide the causal relationships amongst these "taxonomic" groups of farmers (Sayer 2000). Accordingly, qualitative and ethnographic research methods (i.e., "intensive research") becomes vital. To push the analysis further, this chapter uses empirical evidence garnered through intensive research in order to explain *why* and *how* processes of accumulation and social differentiation are occurring in the studied area.

By doing so, the intention is to contribute to a growing scholarship examining trajectories of agrarian change patterns in the smallholder A1 farms following Zimbabwe's 2000 land reform (Scoones et al. 2010, 2012, 2018; Chiweshe 2011; Mkodzongi 2013; Chigumira 2018; Mazwi et al. 2020; Shonhe 2018; Shonhe and Mtapuri 2020; among others). Much of the work conducted on smallholder A1 farms has taken place in relatively high-potential regions in Mashonaland, where crop production has come to dominate. This body of research, although important for enhancing our understanding of class dynamics and different patterns of accumulation among the A1 farmers following land reform, is lacking on detailed studies that shed light on trajectories of agrarian change in dryland settings, which are dominated by highly variable rainfall and episodic, chance events such as drought, livestock diseases, theft and so

on. Complementing other works on Matabeleland region (Nel & Mabhena 2020; Nel 2020; Ncube 2018), this chapter asks: how do A1 farmers accumulate in a variable environment?

This chapter is based on "intensive research" (Sayer 2010) conducted during the period 2015-18 with 67 households, and brief revisit in November 2022 in two contrasting villages. As noted in Chapter Five, these two villages are located less than 20km apart within ward 23. Yet the land reform process unfolded in somewhat different ways, with profound impacts on the social origins of settlers. While I do not claim that these two villages represent Matobo or Matabeleland region, it certainly throws up processes and patterns of social differentiation that have wider relevance. Based on rich set of oral histories of A1 farmers in two villages, I argue, that a significant number of households are beginning to engage in "accumulation from below" through a combination of small-scale livestock dynamic and dryland crop production. However, because the area inhabits a non-equilibrium ecosystem, agrarian capital accumulation is essentially shaped by chance. Agricultural production is characterised by periodic 'boom-and-bust' cycles – "good years" followed by "bad years". Regarding cropping, for instance, farmers harvest bumper crop, and substantial quantities are sold and proceeds are reinvested on the farm and beyond. In bad years, farmers barely harvest adequate maize to feed a family until the next harvest. With regards to livestock, drought can lead to die offs of cattle, with recovery often taking many years. Such production cycles have major implications for patterns of accumulation. Patterns of accumulation are therefore non-linear, and often characterised by ups-and-downs. The ability to manage these boom-and-bust cycles is therefore vital for accumulation.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section begins with a discussion of how different researchers have observed the process of differentiation and so trajectories of accumulation in the smallholder farm sector (communal areas, A1 schemes, old resettlement areas, spontaneous settlement) in Zimbabwe. As we shall see, most of these previous studies have taken place in high-potential regions (where cropping predominates), but few have examined patterns of accumulation and differentiation in dryland livestock settings. The second section analyses the dynamics of accumulation that are emerging in the A1 sector in Matobo district. The third section explore factors that help to explain the emerging patterns of differentiation among these A1 farmers. A brief conclusion summarises the main arguments made in the chapter.

9.1 Accumulation trajectories in smallholder A1 schemes in Matobo

With a few exceptions (e.g., Nel & Mabhena 2020), very few studies have examined class differentiation among A1 farmers in the dryland pastoral settings of Matabeleland. This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by expanding the analytical scope and providing an original analysis of the emerging patterns of social differentiation among the A1 farmers in a pastoral region. Could the processes of accumulation and differentiation also be occurring in these dryland settings? If so, what are the underlying dynamics generating these patterns? In what follows I present accumulation trajectories among the A1 settlers in Vimbi and Luma in Matobo district.

9.1.1 A heuristic typology of smallholder A1 farmers

Based on agrarian political economy scholarship (e.g., Byres 1996, 2003; Bernstein 1996, 2006, 2016; Cousins 2010, 2013; Neocosmos 1993) and inspired by theoretical contributions within livelihood studies on "livelihood change" (e.g., Dorward 2009; Dorward et al. 2009; Mushongah 2009; Hall et al. 2016), I explore processes of accumulation and so differentiation among A1 settlers in two contrasting villages in Matobo district. Building on previous schemas developed by Dorward et al. (2009), Dorward (2009), Mushongah (2009) and Hall et al. (2017), and adapted by Scoones et al. (2010) and many others, I categorise all the 67 households surveyed into three broad "agricultural trajectories", which are in turn, linked to "class position/ character" and "accumulation strategy", in order to illustrate emerging processes of accumulation among these farmers.

In their schema, which describe livelihood change and wider aspirations of households, Dorward (2009) and Dorward et al. (2009) identifies three categories. The first one, "hanging in", describe a scenario whereby "activities are engaged in order to maintain livelihood levels, often in the face of adverse socio-economic conditions". The second, "stepping up", involves "activities engaged in, with investments in assets to expand these activities, in order to increase production and income to improve livelihoods". The third and last, "stepping out", involves undertaking "activities in order to accumulate assets, which in time can provide a base or 'launch pad' for moving into different activities" (Dorward et al. 2009: 242–243). Mushongah (2009) applies this framework to explore long-term livelihood changes in Mazvihwa communal areas, south central of Zimbabwe, and added a fourth category "dropping out" to capture those who are destitute, reliant on external support, and often in the process of exiting.

In the last ten years, this overall framework has been adapted by various scholars in order to explore processes of agrarian change in various rural contexts (e.g., Scoones et al. 2010, 2012; Hall et al. 2017; Vicol 2019; Olofsson 2019). For instance, Scoones et al. (2010, 2012) studied A1 farmers in Masvingo province, Zimbabwe. They apply Dorward et al.'s (2009) and Mushongah's (2009) framework to explore emerging trajectories of accumulation among the newly resettled farmers in Masvingo province. Four broad groups of farmers were identified: (a) "hanging in" who are surviving, but poor; (b) "stepping out" encompassing those diversifying away from agriculture, both locally and through migration; (c) "stepping up" entailing accumulation locally, through agriculture; and (d) "dropping out" households reliant on different forms of social protection, and often in the process of migrating away. Hall et al. (2017) also applied this framework into the study of agricultural commercialization in Africa, and adds the category "stepping in" to denote those engaging in commercialisation driven by investments from outside, such as retirement funds, remittances and off-farm wage income.

Scoones et al. (2010: 226) usefully suggest that these categories can be analytically linked to class-based analysis. As they argued, "those 'hanging in' or 'dropping out' may constitute the semi-peasantry and failing petty commodity producers in Cousins and colleagues' 1992 classification, while those 'stepping up' could be worker peasants. Finally, those 'stepping up' – through whichever accumulation strategy – include the emergent rural petit bourgeoise, as well as the more successful petty commodity producers and worker-peasants." Moreover, they insist that these three broad categories overlaps – though not entirely – with the wealth rankings.

Inspired by Scoones et al.'s (2010) analysis of class dynamics in the new resettlement areas in Masvingo province, my approach is also linked to key concepts of political economy of agrarian change such as "social reproduction", "capital accumulation", "petty commodity production", and "accumulation paths" (Bernstein 1996, 2006, 2010, 2016; Byres 1996, 2003, 2006; Cousins 2013; Neocosmos 1993). Drawing from extensive literature on social differentiation in rural areas, I distinguish several class positions: *small-scale capitalists* who produce a surplus and sell regularly, reinvest in farming and hire labour; *successful petty commodity producers* that are sustaining themselves on the farm, engage with the market but do not hire in labour; *urban-based capitalists*, who are heavily involved in 'straddling' as an

accumulation strategy[157] (cf. Cohen 1982; Kitching 1983; Oya 2007); and two classes of struggling households, namely, *worker-peasants or pastoralists*, who are engaging in petty commodity production but fundamentally rely on wage labour, as well as *semi-peasants*, who are struggling to meet social and simple reproduction through farming (Cousins et al. 1992).

My analysis draws from primary qualitative data from 'life-histories' (Francis 1993; Oya 2007), participant observations, ethnography, focus group discussions, success rankings, in depth interviews, informal conversations and WhatsApp updates between 2015 and 2022. Using this data, I identify three broad "agricultural trajectories", some with at least two sub-categories:

- **'Stepping Up and In'** – Within this category, I identify two types: (a) those that are accumulating/expanding largely within agriculture, locally ('stepping up'); and (b) the urban-based investors who are investing in agriculture in a substantial way linked to better-paid jobs and/or off-farm business ('stepping in'). In Marxist parlance, the former category can be understood as engaging in 'accumulation from below', while the latter can be understood as 'accumulation from outside';
- **'Hanging In'** – Within this category, two sub-categories are identified: (a) those farmers who have managed to build up and maintain modest herd size at more or less size although still very precarious but without expanding or depleting their herds thanks to other off-farm income; and (b) Those farmers who largely constrained by limited access to financial capital, but are slowly starting to build their herds
- **'Dropping down' and 'Dropping out'** – This category includes those households that are experiencing reduction in production because of economic reasons, but also demographic (e.g., death of household head, illness, old age etc.), and are undergoing a process of "decumulation"[158] which will lead eventually to exiting.

Analytically, this typology is, in turn, linked to wider class dynamics and processes of accumulation, and distinguishes farmers in terms of patterns of accumulation (or not). Thus, theoretical insights from the literature on agrarian change is used to explain these dynamics.

[157] 'Straddling' here refers to being involved in both farming and other off-farm businesses or work at once.

[158] By decumulation, I refer to de-accumulation of assets.

Overall, I think that this typology allows us to identify general patterns of accumulation, and to "highlight significant variations and potentials of new resettlement farmers." (Scoones et al. 2010: 230). As Table 9.1 shows, some are *stepping in* into commercial agriculture in a substantial way linked to off-farm income; others are *stepping up* by expanding/accumulating within agriculture (locally); some are *hanging in* farming but impoverished; while a select few are *dropping down* in production or exiting (*dropping out).* Of course, like any other typology, the one proposed here is not definitive and fixed. As Scoones et al. (2010: 30) have argued, "There are always variations and blurring of categories, and people move between categories over time, sometimes quite suddenly."

Table 9.1: Agricultural trajectories and strategies in two A1 villages (n=67)

Agricultural trajectory	Class identity	Accumulation strategy	Vimbi (n=33)	Luma (n=34)	Description
Dropping down/out (n=4 or 6%)	Semi-peasants	De-accumulation/ decline	3	1	Those who are experiencing downsizing in production due to economic shocks, drought or demographic reasons (e.g., death of household head or ill health etc.)
Hanging in (n=38 or 56.7%)	Worker-peasants/pastoralists	Constrained simple & expanded reproduction	11	20	Those who are constrained by lack of finance to invest on their farms. Agriculture is combined with other income sources
	Worker-peasants/pastoralists	Speculative accumulation	4	3	Those who are keeping the plot for future investments (speculative use)
Stepping in/up (n=25 or 37.3%)	Small-scale capitalists & successful petty commodity producers	Local expanded reproduction	15	9	Those who are largely accumulating within agriculture (both crop and livestock), as well as through harvesting natural resources (e.g. mopane worms etc.)
	Urban-based capitalists	Straddling (accumulation from outside)	0	1	Those who are absentee urban-based businesspeople and professionals who are investing in agriculture in a substantial way.

Source: Own data

9.1.1.1 Dropping Down and Out: Decumulation or decline

In this first category, "dropping down/out", two pathways can be identified. The first sub-category, which can be described as "dropping down", involves households who are headed by the elderly and infirm. Such households are facing challenges of production, and downsizing their operations because of a variety of reasons, including economic misfortunes, lack of labour or climatic shocks (e.g., drought). Lack of labour was largely a result of demographic reasons such as illness, death of household head or outmigration of household members. In my sample, households in this category are few in number (n=3), and were widely understood to be experiencing downscaling during success ranking exercises. In most cases, these were previously very successful households who were engaging in expanded reproduction through local petty commodity production at a certain stage, but things had since changed, with their trajectory now simply focussed on social reproduction.

For example, SeD who is now 66, arrived in Vimbi in 2000. Her husband, who passed away in 2012 as a result of HIV/AIDS related illnesses, was a war veteran and ex-soldier who also led the land invasions in the early 2000s. SeD's household came from Khumalo communal areas, and was one of the prominent farming households in the village. At settlement, the household had relatively more pre-existing assets than any other household in the village. It had around 50 head of cattle, 32 goats, 9 donkeys, as well as all agricultural assets, including a plough, scotch cart, harrow, cultivator and planter. All these assets were purchased with the husband's wage salary and surplus from farming in communal areas. After formalisation in 2001, the household wasted no time in clearing 4ha of arable land. In years of good rainfall, the household would produce a surplus, sell and reinvest in the farm. Not surprisingly, from the period of settlement until around 2011, participants of success ranking exercises ranked the household – relatively speaking – as one of the 'richest' and most successful households in the village.

However, things changed in 2011, following the death of her husband, which coincided with a severe drought of 2011/12. The household lost 11 head of cattle as a result of drought. SeD said that most of her animals severely succumbed to drought because they were Brahman crosses. In some cases, they got stuck in the mud at a nearby dam as they try to access the little water that was left in the nearby dam. In response to 2011-12 drought, she sold several animals to purchase feed for in-calf cows and those with calves. However, this did not help much as she started providing supplementary feed "too late". A few years after the death of her husband, four of her adult daughters and one son also passed away in quick succession, some again, due

to HIV/AIDS related illnesses. During the illnesses of her children, she was forced to sell some cattle to meet medical bills. Of those who passed away, two daughters left her with a total of five young children to support. As a consequence, she was again forced to sell many cattle to pay for the children's school fees over the years. In sum, due to a series of unfortunate events, SeD's cattle herd had severely declined to just six by 2018. Similarly, her herd of donkeys, which were an important source of draught power, has severely declined. In 2016, she owned six donkeys. However, by 2017, she had no donkeys at all: 3 were stolen and 3 others died, leaving her with no draught power. This prompted her to enter into a draught 'pairing' arrangement with NdM, her husband's nephew. She now combines her two cows with NdM's to make a span of four.

Given all this, it is therefore not surprising that the household has moved down the village 'success' and 'wealth' rankings. Participants of participatory success ranking exercises placed SeD's household in the SG3 category. However, participants agreed that, in the past when her husband was still alive, she could be counted as one of the 'most successful' (SG1) (*abaphumelelayo*) in the village. One woman participant in a women's group said: "In the past, she used to have everything, but things are no longer the same" (women's group, 2018). Similarly, a Another also noted: "The family used to produce a lot of maize more than any household here. Before her husband's death, I was the village secretary and I remember at one point they had 43 head of cattle, but now they are left with 7 or so" (men's group, 2018). Participants were also quick to point that SeD's major constraint was lack of labour. They said that her thirty-year-old son was lazy and alcoholic. As one male participant remarked, "If the son had followed his father's footsteps, she would be far by now."

While SeD has access to her husband's pension and her own war veteran pension, participants emphasised that a lot of people depended on her. One participant commented: "She receives pension but has a lot of people to support." She looks after all the orphans left by her deceased adult children, while her also supporting his 30-year-old unemployed and alcoholic son and unemployed daughter and their children. Another participant, pointed out that the decline in household's crop production has been further exacerbated by "poor planning": "These days, she is just doing farming for the sake of doing it. She doesn't plan well. She also no longer guards against wild animals to prevent crop damage." Another participant said that his husband had livestock guarding dogs to prevent jackal depredation of his small stock, and "these dogs were kept and fed at the kraal." Dryland farming requires good, careful planning and

opportunistic responses such as ensuring that seeds are planted early, plants are weeded well, investing in fast maturing seed varieties, crops are guarded against wild animals and so on (Chapter Five). All these factors are now lacking today at SeD's household. With a hint of nostalgia, she reminisces about the way things used to be done, when her husband was still alive:

> My husband was like a *bhunu* (white man). During the growing season, you would not find anyone at home. Everyone would be in the crop fields. When he was alive, we used to do winter ploughing and we never struggled with weeding, as is now the case. Each year, we would harvest lots of maize more than any other household in this village.

As of 2018, SeD's household had transitioned to a lower rank (SG3), and had struggled to recover from the shocks.

The second sub-category, consist of those households who had left the schemes or are in the process of exiting due to various reasons, including the death of the household head, lack of tenure insecurity, or administrative reasons.[159] Basic census data reveals that only 10 households across the two villages fall into this category, representing 12% of all households. In most cases, there are no structures at all at their residential stand, but participants of success ranking exercises indicated that these settlers or their offsprings these farmers "will return" someday, hence their plots should not be re-allocated. QM, for example, passed away in August 2017 as a result of HIV/AIDS related illnesses. Although still unmarried at the time of his death, he had a daughter with a young widow who has her on A1 plot in the village. Her daughter was expected to take over the plot when she becomes an adult. In sum, this case is demonstrative of the "dropping out" trajectory.

Taking the population of the two villages as a whole, I recorded at least a dozen cases of settlers who had left the villages altogether. Although I was unable to track most of these households, I collected information through interviews with neighbours and local leaders. There are several cases where settlers abandoned their plots following the death of the household head. Others abandoned their plots because of insecurity of tenure. For example, Mr N was allocated a plot in Vimbi through the Ministry of Lands at Kezi and came with a truck "full of cement bricks"

[159]Similar findings are presented by Scoones et al. in their study of livelihoods after land reform in Masvingo province. They identified several reasons behind the dissolution of households, including death, tenure insecurity, domestic problems, as well as expulsion, movement to another plot on another scheme and community disputes (Scoones et al. 2010, p. 74).

in 2015. According to one villager, N said that his plot was between Mr FZ's and Ms FZ's plots, but Mr FZ told him that the portion he claimed to have been allocated was part of his crop field. There was also widespread dissatisfaction among the villagers with how he had acquired the plot. In the end, N sold the bricks to another settler in the village, and never came back since then. Another settler, Ms SN, who used to work as a storekeeper at another farmer's tuckshop in Vimbi, abandoned her plot after the Lands officer threatened her with eviction, having been settled by Chief Masuku. At the time, she had built two pole and dug huts, but these structures have since collapsed. While the village head was adamant that she will return, many villagers said that they were sceptical of her return. A few years after she left, another villager's brother tried to take over the plot, but many villagers expressed their dissatisfaction. As a result, he also left. Another land recipient in Luma, Mr JD, who is the late headman's son "ran away" to South Africa following allegations of stock theft, and left the plot unoccupied and undeveloped. While JD's name still appears on the official list of beneficiaries, the village chairman said that his plot had been reallocated to a new farmer. However, I could not verify this claim, especially given that the said new farmer's name was also on the official list.

9.1.1.2 Hanging in: Constrained accumulation

The second category, "hanging in" comprises of those households whose ability to reproduce or sustain themselves is highly constrained. Such households have relatively fewer assets, including livestock and farm equipment. A large number – over half (56.7% or 38 of 67) – of households fell into this category. Of these 38 households, 60.5% were found in Luma. Often, they have few social networks, having settled relatively recently and came from distant places. Others lacked labour because they either had young families or out-migration. They often combine farming with either local farm work or off-farm wage employment. These households were described as either "*abazamayo"* (those who are trying) or "*abaswelayo*" (asset-constrained) by participants of participatory success ranking exercise. Cattle holdings are often small: ranging between 0 and 5, perhaps received as payment of pasture-leasing (*ukulagisa*) or loaning (*ukusisa*) arrangements.

Within this trajectory, there are essentially two categories. The first sub-category comprised of those households, often ranked in SG2 and SG3 categories, whose production and so accumulation is constrained by lack of assets. In class terms, this sub-category includes the "worker-peasants" who combine on-farm production and off-farm wage employment elsewhere, and the struggling "semi-peasantry" who also engages in on-farm production but

frequently work as farm workers and casual laborers for the other A1 farmers and nearby new medium-scale farmers. Others work as farmworkers on the remaining white-owned commercial farms. Overall, most of those in this group had poorly paid menial work which provided very little capital to invest in farming.

For example, JM who acquired a plot in Vimbi in 2005, works as a security guard at a nearby Arkjet mine in Gwanda. While his contract says that his monthly salary is USD220, he said that he has been receiving only USD100 per month since 2014 because "the company says that it does not have money". He explained that the company owes him "a lot of money", but admitted that he is unsure if he would ever receive the outstanding salary. He supplements his income by engaging in gold panning at the mine he works, carpentry and prophetic healing. The mine allows the workers to engage on gold panning at the mine as a strategy to supplement their meagre incomes. However, his earnings from all these activities were still very low that at best bought his household food. Thus, he has struggled to make any substantial investments on the farm. To supplement his meagre income, his wife also undertakes short-term work as a domestic worker in Kezi or general labourer at government departments when they arise. This has been a vital source of income for supporting farm investment and production for the household. For example, earnings from her recent three-months contract (2017) at the Ministry of Roads enabled the household to purchase a plough for USD120. She said that if the contract was a bit longer (e.g., six months), she would have bought a scotch cart as well. She also used part of her wages from casual work to purchase chicken feed, as she planned to start a broiler project. In 2018, the household owned a herd of 4 donkeys thanks to *ukulagisa* arrangement during the 2011-12 drought. As discussed in previous chapter (Section 8.4), JM entered into a ukulagisa arrangement with a herd owner from communal areas, and received a heifer as payment, which he later exchanged with two donkeys. These donkeys are a critical source of draught power for the household. Although the JM's household engage in crop production each season, they hardly produce enough maize for own consumption to take them throughout the season. As a result, they supplement their produce through purchase using income derived from off-farm sources.

Similarly, FeN (aged 60), works as a security guard for a nearby remaining white commercial farmer at Maleme Ranch, where he has been employed since 2004. Having worked in the area for many years, FeN managed to gain access to an A1 plot in Luma in 2010 after having approached the local chief. As of 2018, he had no plough, cattle or donkeys save for a few

chickens. He admitted that he was struggling to eke a living and had "nothing". His housing structures were still built of pole and dug by 2018, when many others have replaced them with brick and iron houses. He uses hoeing to cultivate about 1.5ha of cleared arable land. In 2017-18 season, after a relatively bumper harvest in the previous season, he hired a farmer and his oxen from nearby Wenlock communal areas to plough his field for 8 buckets (20kg) of maize. However, he was forced to replant after the initial plants were burnt out following a dry spell, and this time around, he had to do hoeing. Many of the newcomers in Luma such as FeN do not have relatives in the area and so are unable to get any assistance with ploughing. As discussed in Chapter Five, there is a relatively greater prevalence of households who are simply hoeing in Luma than in Vimbi. As Scoones et al. (1996: 83) observes elsewhere, "networks and relationships form the basis on which social sharing and exchange arrangements are negotiated".

Finally, within this group, there are those who speculatively acquired land for future use and took little active interest in farming. Unlike the preceding sub-category, they are typically absentee landholders with either relatives, workers or no one at all living on the farm, despite some having invested in elaborate houses at their homesteads. Many own no livestock at all at the farm. In Luma, these households are described as "ghost" villagers, a term indicating that they are unknown to the villagers.

LD, for example, who was born in 1977, works in South Africa, where he emigrated in 1994. His late father was a war veteran and an influential figure during land invasions and occupations in the early 2000s. He used his position to gain three plots in Vimbi: one for his second wife and two for his sons (LD and KD). Both sons work in South Africa, and their land lies idle. LD managed to construct an elaborate house on the plot, but no one lives there. He said that he still had other business interests in South Africa which kept him away from the farm.

In almost all cases discussed in this trajectory, farmers tend to combine farming with wage work elsewhere. Many were involved in low-paid menial jobs away from the farm as a form of 'survival diversification'. According to Cousins et al. (1992)'s class typology, farmers in this group can be understood as "worker-peasants".

9.1.1.3 Stepping In and Stepping Up: Accumulation from above and outside

This group represent nearly 40% of the overall sample (26 of 67 households). Most of these farmers sits in SG1 category, but also include those in SG2 category. They combine small-scale livestock production and dryland cropping. In "good" rainfall years, they produce substantial quantities of agricultural output, selling relatively large proportions of surplus and reinvesting on the farm. They also own relatively large herds of cattle, sell regularly and reinvest on the farm. A significant proportion employ both permanent wage labour (15 of 26 households), as well as temporary workers. This group largely consists of retirees, who were formerly employed in a wide range of occupations (including state security, civil service and other urban jobs). After retirement, such farmers became committed to farming and invested heavily in livestock and farm equipment through savings or pension from wage employment. A few farmers are still actively employed in non-farm salaried work. It is a relatively privileged group on the basis of its education and (previous/current) occupation and access to regular income which the majority of A1 farmers did not have.

Most households in this group possess two main advantages: (b) access to a regular monthly non-farm income, such as wage, pension or non-farm business income, and (b) full-time residence on the plot (although some have houses in town). Typically, a portion of non-farm income is used to pay for hired wage labour, inputs and farm equipment. Most households in this group invested their modest savings from off-farm jobs in both agricultural and livestock production. Full-time residence enables proper management of labour itself. Only four households (all in Vimbi) were female-headed households. In class terms, this category is composed of new agrarian petty bourgeoisie/capitalists, urban-based capitalists, successful worker-peasants and successful petty commodity producers.

The success ranking exercise saw attributes such as the ownership of cattle, good homestead, successful crop production, commercial farming, ownership of adequate farm implements, access to regular monthly income (e.g., pension), hiring wage labour, tractor hiring for ploughing, agricultural commercialization and car ownership as important characteristics attributed to this group. The ability to educate children was emphasized too. In gender terms, there are few cases of female-headed households in this category (five out of 25: all in Vimbi). All these women are widowed, but had access to a regular monthly income, including late husband's pension.

Two trajectories of accumulation can be identified in this group. First, is the classic "accumulation from below" through on-farm production and harvesting of natural resources, combined with petty trading and/or wage employment. Profits are reinvested on the farm, through purchasing farm equipment, as well as elsewhere, such as building or renovating houses in town. Most of these households arrived relatively poor, but have managed to improve their livelihoods through land reform. In other words, these households are "stepping up" (Dorward et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010), through petty commodity production.

ChM, for example, whose household sits in the SG1 category, is regarded by villagers as a role-model of being a successful "youth" farmer. One woman participant during wealth ranking exercises in Vimbi commented: "ChM is very clever, and has everything – cattle, a car and a good homestead. He has achieved all these things through farming." Another also commented, "When I am advising my children, I refer to him as a good role model." Yet another remarked; "At one point, he went to South Africa but came back with nothing! This is when he realised that wealth is in farming not in South Africa." ChM, who is now 38 years old, arrived in Vimbi 2003 with "nothing", as he put it. At the time, he was working as a "truck-loader" at a feed manufacturing company in Bulawayo, having started as a farmworker at the white-owner's farm (Maleme ranch). His earnings enabled him to purchase his first heifer from his father in 2000. He then purchased another one from his employer (i.e., white farmer) through instalments. Around 2002, the first heifer gave birth and his herd increased to three.

In 2007, amidst hyperinflation, left his job to emigrate to Botswana as a "border jumper", where he worked as a herder at a cattle post near Francis town. After a year, during which he earned enough to fund the purchase another heifer, he returned home. During the 2011-2012 drought, he entered into a *ukulagisa* arrangement with several herd owners from Tshatshani communal areas and received three heifers. He is one of the many farmers who disregarded the ten-cattle quota system that was set by village leaders (Chapter Eight). Unlike many who decided to sell their animals received from *ukulagisa* for fear of *umthuso* that is believed to cause cattle abortions, he retained the heifers for breeding. By 2018, these three animals had since given birth to three offsprings. When I asked why other people decided to sell animals from *ukulagisa* arrangement of 2011-12 drought, he unequivocally dismissed this belief, stating that "those who sold their animals simply wanted cash". Today ChM's household is one of the wealthy livestock-owning households in Vimbi, owning over 40 cattle and 27 goats by 2022. He is widely regarded by other villagers as an assiduous livestock farmer. His calves are weaned in

June of each year, around the age of 5/6 months, after crop harvest. Typical of other farmers in the area, he uses his crop field as a "private paddock" to separate the calves from their mothers and to graze the weaned calves and donkeys (given the high levels of donkey theft in the area). ChM regularly sells cattle and uses the proceeds for subsistence and reinvestment on the farm. In 2013, for example, he exchanged 8 heifers (valued at USD500 each) with a used 'pick-up' truck (valued at USD4500) with a nearby self-contained farmer. He uses this bakkie for hiring transport services to other farmers. In 2015, he exchanged two oxen (valued at USD1200) with a nearby former white farmer for a grinding mill. In the following year (2016), ChM exchanged a heifer with a 270Watts solar panel. In 2017, he sold a bull (USD750) and an ox (USD450) for a total amount of USD1200, and used part of the proceedings to build a new house and pay children's school fees. Apart from cattle sales, ChM's wife also regularly sells *amasi* (sour milk) locally and at Natisa business centre during the rainfall season, as well as trading beer at the farm.

Besides livestock, ChM's household also engages in crop farming for sale and subsistence. As with other villagers, ChM always harvests a bumper harvest in good rainfall years and sell surplus. For instance, in 2013/14 season (a good rainfall year), the family harvested around 4 tonnes of maize; and sold two tonnes to various people for a combined total of USD740. Of this amount, USD480 was used to purchase 'sofas', while the remaining USD260 was used to purchase two male donkeys for draft purposes. In 2016-17 season, another good rainfall year, the household managed to harvest over 4 tonnes of maize, and sold nearly 2 tonnes to people from nearby communal areas for a total amount of around USD700. Of this amount, he saved USD400 for the construction of another house at the homestead, while the remaining money was used to pay children's school fees, cattle tax and car licence.

In sum, ChM's household relies on farming, alongside petty trading, as well as hiring out transport and draught services to other farmers. In class terms, ChM can be regarded as a successful petty commodity producer. His ability to accumulate in livestock production depends very much on his ability to manage variability. ChM explained how he continuously scan the horizon for threats and understand the realities on the ground in order to make future decisions. As he put it: "I constantly look at the weather and veld conditions, and if I see that it is promising to be a bad year, I sell some animals and buy feed." His knowledge and skill in relation to livestock husbandry was unmatched by any other farmer in the village thanks to his contact with white ranching in his early working life as a farm worker.

Another example is the household of NkN, which sits in SG1 category in Luma. 60-year-old NkN arrived in Luma in 2001. A war veteran and retired soldier, he acquired the A1 plot as part of the ZNA quota. At settlement, he had 21 goats, one donkey and other farm equipment which he had bought using income from his salary as a soldier. In 2005, he retired from his army job, after 25 years of service. In the same year, he bought 5 heifers from a communal areas farmer in Gwanda using a portion of his pension. In 2006, three of the five heifers calved, while one had a uterine prolapse and eventually sold it. He used the money from the sale to buy donkeys. By 2017, NkN owned 35 cattle, 54 goats, 11 sheep, 9 donkeys and 3 pigs. Like ChM, he tends his livestock with assiduous attention. Currently, he works as a "para-vet" in the village. In order to protect his goats and sheep from jackal depredation, he uses livestock guarding dogs. This system has enabled the him to reduce losses of small stock due to jackals. He also invests in veterinary drugs such as anti-parasite medications and other vaccinations. NkN regularly sells livestock and reinvest on the farm. In 2016, for instance, he sold 6 oxen at an auction (CC Cattle Sales) for a total of USD4500 and 5 goats (at USD50 – USD60). He used the proceeds to repair a house at the farm, to purchase a gas freezer for use at the farm, and to buy other household needs. In 2019, he sold 8 steers and used the proceeds to purchase a pick-up truck. Overall, NkN is widely regarded by other villagers as a typical "commercial farmer". As one male participant commented during success ranking exercises in 2018: "if we talk about people who are fulfilling the objective of resettlement in this area, NkN has to be number one. He regularly sells cattle, goats and pigs. Thus, he is engaging in commercial farming." While NkN's household engages in crop farming, the main production focus has been "livestock ranching because this is region V". Cropping is mainly done for subsistence purposes.

I also found cases of successful women farmers who were, in some instances, more productive and wealthier than their male counterparts. One such example is BdN, whose household sits in SG1. She was born in 1961, bred in Plumtree and was made to join the liberation struggle by ZAPU recruiters at a young age because of her "big body". At Independence, she was then demobilised at Independence after she fell pregnant and later got married. But her husband died in 1997. Widowed, with five children, these privations made her strongly motivated to join the land invasions and occupations in the year 2000, despite the fact that this sphere was dominated by men. Indeed, she is was among the first people to occupy Vimbi in 2000. She explained that prior to settlement, her house was one of the poorest in Natisa area. She struggled to produce enough food to eat and to raise school fees for her children through farming. She arrived with one cow, but the cow died soon after settlement. She then bought one heifer using proceeds

from maize sale and her war veteran pension. During the 2011-12 drought, she received a total of three heifers and four donkeys as payment for *ukulagisa*. Unlike many others, she retained all these animals for breeding purposes. She also bought some goats using income from crop sale. Today, she owns 7 cattle, 7 donkeys and 6 goats. She regularly sells donkeys to other local farmers. In 2016, for instance, she sold two males donkeys for a total of USD310, and used the money to pay for her son's school and examination fees. BdN is a very good crop farmer who regularly produce good harvest, sell the surplus and reinvest of livestock, farm equipment and housing infrastructure at the farm. While the household has adequate draught power to plough, BdN prefers to hire a tractor using her war veteran pension as this is quicker and allows the household to plant while the soil is still moist. In terms of labour, BdN relies on family labour, although she sometimes hires temporary workers (mainly relatives) from nearby communal areas during harvests in exchange for maize.

The three cases reveal how some A1 farmers are beginning to engage in "accumulation from below" through petty commodity production in mainly livestock, but also dryland cropping. These farmers are therefore "stepping up". It is important to acknowledge that their ability to accumulate depend very much on their capacities to manage variability. Through horizon scanning and day-to-day adaptive practices, they are managing to achieve reliability in a variable environment.

The second "stepping in" category (Hall et al. 2017) consists of absentee urban-based professionals (including senior civil servants, businesspeople, politicians etc.) who are investing in agriculture in a substantial way (as a business). They regard agriculture as part of their diversified portfolios. Following Whitfield (2016), we can understand this trajectory as "accumulation from outside", whereby "capital flow from outside" (Bernstein 2010). This trajectory differs from the "stepping up" category in that non-farm income activities are inextricably linked to possibilities of expanded reproduction production in agriculture. This trajectory is less common in the smallholder A1 farms.

I found only one A1 farmer (FM) in this category. In fact, the household is a notable outlier compared to the whole A1 sample. Given his financial position, he said that he would have successfully acquired a medium-scale A2 farm if he had applied for it. When I asked him why he chose to be settled in an A1 scheme, he explained that he was born and bred in former African Purchase Areas in Plumtree, and was aware of the challenges of managing livestock in

a small, confined area in a dry area. FM, aged 51, acquired an A1 plot in Luma in 2010.[160] He and his wife operate several businesses in Bulawayo, including a professional forwarding and clearance agency and clothing company (which supplies Edgars stores). FM decided to also venture into farming as a strategy to diversify his portfolios. He explained that "being his own boss" opened up more free time in his life to engage in commercial farming. The household's privileged access to financial capital enabled them to invest in production (both livestock and cropping) in a substantial way within a short period of time that was not possible for other A1 villagers. He started buying cattle in 2010 using part of income from forwarding and clearance business, and by 2018, the herd had increased to 109 thanks to both natural increase and purchase. In 2018, his herd constituted 36% of the total cattle in the village. He also owned 90 goats and 12 sheep. He also embarks on a commercial broiler project through contract farming, raising a flock of 2500 chicken per batch in a relatively state-of-the-art foul run that costed him around USD10,500 to construct. As he explained:

> The broiler project was started in April 2016, and we only did two lots that year with a gross income of USD1,500 for 1800 birds per batch. We then stopped as I was unwell and hospitalised for a while. The basis of the contract is that Higrow supply me with day old chicks and all the requisite feed to maturity. I provide labour and medicaments. I am allowed to sell off as many birds as I am able to open market in pursuit of maximum benefits. Higrow remains my back up market for what remains after my attempts, which I then sell to them and come to collect at wholesale going prices. I then clear my accounts on the basis of the returns from the yield per batch. I basically use, on average of USD400 on medicaments for water purification and vaccinations, as well as, detergents. I use USD250 on labour per batch in six weeks. I have done six lots this far and I am currently on my seventh with 1,700 birds maturing (six weeks) in a week's time.

FM's household also regularly sell cattle and reinvest on the farm. Before selling the steers, he pen-feed them to realise maximum profit. The household hires seven permanent wage workers, as well as, a significant number of temporary workers every year. Besides livestock production, the household also engages in dryland production on a 4.9-hectare arable plot and usually have bumper harvests in years of good rainfalls. He uses the maize harvested to make maize meal for his canteen at the clothing factory in town.

Although access to high non-farm income is still an important factor in accumulation, it appears that FM was on the path from 'accumulation from outside' to 'accumulation from below' through local production.

[160] Mr FM sadly passed away in March 2020 due to hyper-tension.

Overall, there is no doubt but that processes of accumulation are underway in the smallholder A1 farms in Matobo. Some farmers are doing well and flourishing, while others are struggling to make ends meet. A significant group of farmers (37.3%) are beginning to engage in "accumulation from below", linked to petty commodity production. These farmers are producing large quantities of agricultural output, regularly selling these and reinvesting on the farm as well as beyond the farm. Others are "hanging in" by combining farming and wage labour, while others are "dropping down and out". But who is getting ahead and why, who is dropping behind and why? In the next section, I explore this question.

9.2 Understanding divergent accumulation paths and social differentiation

In this section, I explore some of the factors that explain the emerging patterns of accumulation in the two villages, and the directions of change between and within categories and sites.

9.2.1 Access to off-farm income, migration and urban-rural linkages

Access to capital from off-farm income sources is important for supporting farm investments and production (Chapter Seven). Since the early 2000s, state and donor/NGO investment and support has been sporadic and marginal in the fieldwork area. Of the 67 households surveyed, only 10% (7 out of 67) – mostly war veterans – received ploughs from government under the Farm Mechanisation Programme of 2009-10. Without irrigation, Command Agriculture has been non-existent in the two villages. A variation of this program called "Command Livestock" aimed to provide livestock loans to farmers in dry areas was yet to be implemented by 2018. When I returned in 2022, one senior government official told me that the government had no money to implement the programme, although a few politically-connected did manage to get few heifers. Since the 2000 only one A1 farmer in Vimbi, whose late husband was a war veteran and influential figure, reported receiving a state-sponsored cattle loan of two heifer in 2003 across the two villages. Her husband was "someone who was very clever and would apply for many government loans in Maphisa and get them."[161] Hence, it is not much of a stretch to assume that CeD leveraged on his husband's political connections to get this loan. Such cases, however, are few and far between. The party-state's donations of farming inputs under the Presidential Input Scheme were reportedly inadequate (Chapter Five). Thus, farmers are self-reliant for farm investment and inputs.

[161] Informal conversation with Mr ChM, February 2018, Vimbi.

Access to off-farm income is thus crucially important for sustaining farm investment and production. The importance of off-farm income for supporting small-scale agriculture has been noted in rural Zimbabwe (Jackson et al. 1987; Adams 1987; Cousins et al.1992; Scoones 1990), including in resettlement sites (Scoones et al. 2010; Shonhe & Mtapuri 2020). Most of herd owners in this study invested a proportion of their wage and business incomes in building up herds and other farm infrastructure. According to one farmer, "it is 'tradition' that a young man should buy an animal with his first salary of working life." Another large herd owner (AD) in Luma explained how he bought his first animal: "My father forced us to buy cattle at an early age. He told us that we should buy cattle with our first salaries, and if we don't do it, he won't pay lobola for us. So, all my brothers and I bought cattle that way. It was a really clever way of making us buy cattle." In fact, for many this is instilled from a young age.

ChM, for example, wage income as a farm worker was responsible for financing of the first purchase of his two heifers. Cross-border migration to South Africa and Botswana is also an important source of income to invest in farming. For example, ChM used the income derived from cross-border migration to South Africa and Botswana to purchase more livestock and home building. Overall, those with better and stable off-farm incomes are likely to fare better than those with low paid jobs. For example, FM used capital from his off-farm businesses to engage in commercial agriculture. It appears that FM's household engages in what others term "horizontal straddling" (Woodhouse & Bernstein 2001), which entails combining different economic activities continuously and more or less simultaneously.

However, some had better and regular income from wage employment or business than others. This, in turn, translate into considerable differences in patterns of investment, production and accumulation. For some farmers, access to a regular and steady off-farm income provided a solid basis in their trajectories of accumulation. In other words, their access to off-farm wage or business income allowed them to invest quickly in livestock (notably cattle) and farm equipment.

There are gender dynamics too. Some natural resource-based activities were dominated by women. The revenue raised from harvesting of natural resources such as mopane worms (*amancimbi*) and thatch grass (*utshani*) is channelled towards acquisition of livestock too. For example, MD has managed to build a herd of 8 donkeys from income derived from harvesting and selling mopane worms. In 2017, she bought two goats for USD50 each using income derived from thatch grass sales. Some women also mentioned livestock acquisitions through

traditional healing services. SfN, a 48-year-old widow who practices as a traditional healer (*inyanga*) was able to buy 3 donkeys in 2017 thanks for the income derived from traditional healing services. Another widow, SkM was also able to acquire goats through offering healing services, and now owns a flock of 16 goats.

In summary, access to has a significant bearing in accumulation patterns in A1 villages. Access to non-farm income additionally enables households to purchase agricultural and livestock inputs, especially during stress periods. Off-farm income is also important for hiring tractor for ploughing. Tractor enables large tracts of land to be cultivated within a short period of time.

Access to financial capital is not a panacea for success, however. The ability to accumulate or survive in variable environments depends on the ability to manage variability.

9.2.2 Managing variability

In order to survive or accumulate in an unpredictable and variable semi-arid environment, livestock producers in this study pursue various intensive and extensive strategies aimed at generating reliability, as discussed in the previous chapter. The importance of horizon scanning for threats was a recurrent feature among wealthy herd owners in this study. In years of drought, livestock producers deploy a wide range of strategies to ensure that their animals survive. These strategies include provision of supplementary feed during drought, livestock movement, reserving crop fields for grazing and privatization of the commons. These strategies are, however, not available to everyone. With ongoing livestock incursions from nearby communal areas, the enclosure of common rangelands by wealthy herd owners is slowly gathering momentum in Luma. These are often referred to as "calf paddocks". This strategy requires access to off-farm income to buy fences. Crop fields have become important 'key resources' that are grazed individually during dry spells and times of drought in both villages. Again, this requires significant investments in fencing. The increasing use of commercial feed has also been observed during drought periods. Networks and social relations play an important role in responding variability. Overall, the capacity to respond to environmental variability depends very much on externalities such as the ability to move somewhere else, access to off-farm income to purchase inputs, social networks and relations, ability to rent additional grazing and so on.

The ability to ride out periods of drought is vital to success. When drought strikes, some strategies are available to others; but not so much to others, as shown in the following two

cases of livestock owners. The two cases I present here show how different people, with different access to social networks, knowledge and skill responded to the 2011-12 drought. ChM is a relatively young farmer with excellent knowledge and skills in animal husbandry thanks to his childhood experience and previous job as a farm worker at a nearby white-owned commercial farm. He is known as an assiduous livestock farmer in the Vimbi village. During the 2011-12 drought, he had 12 head of cattle, and did not lose a single animal as a result of drought. At the time, he regularly checked on the availability of grass and water resources. When he realised that there was no grass anymore in the village, he approached his friend, a white-farmer who owned a neighbouring farm, and asked if he could move his cattle there. He cattle stayed there for over six months, and only returned to the village after the rains. He explained: "My cattle returned with calves, and they were looking very fresh." By contrast, many households whose animals remained in the village experienced huge cattle losses due to drought. For ChM, horizon scanning is key to informing his management decisions. He explained that he keeps a close eye on the weather and veld conditions in order to inform stocking and destocking decisions. He says that when he sees that the season promises to be a bad one, he sells some animals while they are still in a good condition and use part of the proceeds to purchase supplementary feeding. All this allows him to remain relatively successful when many others fail in the face of a highly variable and unpredictable climate.

SeD, now a widow at the time, had over 40 cattle at the start of 2011-12 drought. At the time, SeD's household had over 40 cattle. Due to drought, they were left with 25 cattle. During the same period, her husband fell sick and died. Before her husband's death, the household was considered one of the wealthiest households in Vimbi. However, this all changed following the 2011-12 drought and death of her husband. During the 2011-12 drought, SeD described the strategies she adopted to keep her animals alive. She explained: "I sold five animals and bought 'survival' feed, but it was too late. The animals were emaciated when I started providing them with feed. Most animals that died were lactating or pregnant cows." Since then, SeD's household has not been able to recover to previous livestock numbers by 2022. This situation was compounded by misfortunes, which saw the death of three of her children in quick succession following the 2011-12 drought. She was compelled to sell some cattle in order to cover medical costs of her children. Today, she owns 4 head of cattle.

These two vignettes reveal the importance of social networks and social relations in responding to variability. Movement requires access to social networks, which not everyone has. In

befriending a white farmer from a nearby commercial farm, ChM was able to track variability through social networks, while so many others lacked such social networks. They also highlight the importance of horizon scanning which is combined with the day-to-day practices that enable rapid adaptive responses. Misfortunes may often be enough to push previously successful households to a lower rank, as exemplified by the case of SeD.

Apart from variability, A1 farmers also contend with livestock depredation, diseases and stock theft in the study sites. Thus, they have to respond to respond to these challenges as well. NkN, for example, has tried to reduce livestock losses (mainly small stock) through depredation by adopting an old practice of using livestock guarding dogs. NkN grew up in Kafusi area in Gwanda, where this practice has long been practised. According to Pathisa Nyathi, this system is an old-age livestock management strategy of the Babirwa people who inhabit the area (*The Chronicle* 2016; pers.com 2022). The dogs undergo a careful training, whereby, at a young age, are kept and fed at the goat pen all the time, where they grow up with goat/sheep kids. This allows the dogs and goats/sheep to build a strong bond, and to treat each other as conspecifics. Because of this system, NkN has been able to effectively address livestock depredation of his small stock by jackals, and build large flocks of sheep and goats. However, when we visited him in November 2022, his flocks of goats had significantly declined from around 75 goats to 47 goats. One of the main reasons of this decline was depredation by jackals because most of his dogs had died and was left with only two dogs. He explained: "My security guards died and I am left with two dogs only, which is not enough."

Figure 9.1: An A1 farmer in Luma feeding a mixture of sweet potatoes and salt to one of his oxen

Source: Author, 2017

Different strategies are also pursued to deal with environmental variability opportunistic dryland cropping. Careful planning is vital to success: "being ready for any contingency".[162] Having inputs ready, ensuring draught animals are in good shape, booking a tractor for ploughing in advance, and so on were seen as vital to successful crop production. Delays in planting can have serious implications for crop harvest, as the season might be shorter. Farmers rely on informal and formal sources of knowledge to make decisions.

9.2.3 Seizing Opportunities: Drought, land-leasing, cattle-loaning and livestock acquisition

As I have argued in the previous chapter, institutions such as *ukulagisa* (informal land leasing) and *ukusisa* (cattle loaning) are central to building herds and generating reliability in my study sites. This has significant implications for processes of accumulation and differentiation.

While drought can be devasting for many, it can be an opportunity for livestock acquisition for others, particularly those with access to pastures more than their requirements. Since settlement, Matobo district has been hit by severe droughts on several occasions, notably in 2011-12. Given that there was surplus grazing in the A1 farms during this period, with many farm households still building up their herds, the settlers were able to seize the opportunity presented by 2011-12 drought to acquire livestock through *umlaga* and *amasiso* arrangements, though this did not benefit everyone in the same way. When the 2011-12 drought struck, there was a huge influx of cattle from the drought-stricken areas in the southern part of the district into the new resettlement areas. Now, let us explore the role of these arrangements for processes of accumulation and differentiation.

9.2.3.1 The role of informal land rental market in livestock accumulation

At household level, my household surveys across the two villages show that 40% households (27 of 67) took in leased-in cattle ("*inkomo zomlaga*") during the 2011-12 drought (Chapter Eight). This arrangement was most common in Vimbi (26 of 27 cases). The most common form of payment was heifers. Of the 27 households that took in *mlaga* cattle, the median number of cattle received as payment was 2 animals per household, ranging from 1 to 3. While villagers in both villages agreed to take on "*inkomo zomlaga*" (leased cattle) during the 2011-12 drought, there are variations in the way in which this arrangement was implemented. In

[162] See for example, https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/2022/05/23/farming-with-variability-mobilising-responses-to-drought-uncertainties-in-zimbabwe/ (Accessed 22 May 2022).

Vimbi, as explained in Chapter Seven, the villagers decided to lease-out pastures to herd owners from outside in exchange for livestock (notably heifers) during the 2011-12 drought. This arrangement, they argued, was aimed to allow them to "sprout" (*ukuhluma*) in terms of livestock ownership. A "ten-cattle rule" or quota per household was set, which was sought to control and limit the numbers of cattle allowed to "lease-graze" (the term used in Matobo for renting pastures during drought), while also trying to ensure equal benefits among settlers. Nonetheless, this ten-cattle rule was simply ignored by most households, as drought conditions intensifies and the demand for pastures further escalates.

The institution of *ukulagisa* of 2011-12 provided much of a basis for accumulation, but also even exacerbated existing structure of inequalities in the village. Not all the villagers benefitted from it in the same way. It therefore accelerated existing processes of social differentiation in the village. Payment varied, depending on one's ability to "negotiate" and household head's gender. Across the households, different types of livestock – mostly cattle, but also donkeys and sheep – were received as payment. It is interesting to note that the number of households who took in umlaga cattle during the drought descends directly with success groups, with over a third concentrated in the most successful group.

For households who had some cattle at the time, *ukulagisa* was an opportunity to consolidate and further expand their herds, and transmit to higher success ranking. For example, ChM took the opportunity to expand his herd by striking several arrangements with herd owners from drought affected areas. He took on three herds from Silawa and Zwehamba (near Maphisa) and received a payment of 3 heifers, which he retained for breeding. At this time, he had a herd of 21 cattle that he had established through wage income as a farmworker in Zimbabwe and cross-border migration to Botswana. By 2018, each of these animals had given birth at least three times. He now owns 43 head of cattle. Today, ChM pursues both small-scale cattle production – selling regularly and reinvesting on the farm – and cropping – with cattle serving as an important input in terms of manure. He regularly sells cattle and use the proceeds to finance investments at the farm.

JM's case illustrates how asset-poor farmers, who lacked draught power for cropping, were able to also capitalise on *umlaga*. In 2011-12, he had no draught power and was therefore struggling to plough his fields. He had to rely on hiring draught animals from others. During the 2011-12 drought, he took on a herd of *umlaga* cattle – together with three other villagers – in exchange of three heifers, which they then shared equally. He then exchanged the heifer with

two donkeys. He now owns four donkeys, and combines his three adult donkeys with another villager's one donkey to make a span. Likewise, BdN was also able to capitalise on *ukulagisa* to acquire donkeys for draught purposes. As one of the households without draught power in Vimbi, she initially took on a herd from Mbuya area near Maphisa in early 2011 in exchange of four donkeys (two females and two males). "I wanted donkeys because I had no draught power", she said. Her herd of donkeys has since increased to 7. She also took on another herd in 2012 in exchange of two heifers, of which she sold one and retained another. While she often hires a tractor to plough a large portion of her arable land, the donkeys remain an important source of draught power for her household. More importantly, the donkeys have become an important source of income in their own right. She regularly sells donkeys to other farmers for cash. She has sold several donkeys over the years to finance her children's education.

Ukulagisa was also an opportunity for some impoverished households without sufficient non-farm income to invest in cattle to establish herds, although this is still precarious. For example. MiD, a war veteran who works in Bulawayo, arrived in Vimbi with no cattle in 2000. In 2012, he and his neighbour took on two large herds from Zwehamba, and received a payment of two animals each. In particular, MiD got a heifer and a steer, which he later exchanged with a heifer with a nearby self-contained farmer. However, the heifer kept on returning to the self-contained farmer's plot. This prompted him to sell it back to the self-contained farmer for USD400 out of fear that the heifer would end up "disappearing" or being "stolen". He then used the money to build a two roomed tin roof house at the farm. The other heifer received from *ukulagisa* has since given birth twice. He now owns 3 cattle. Another farmer, JkM took on two herds from Sontala area in exchange of two heifers and six sheep. However, all the sheep died due to diseases and predation.

Yet others who were desperately in need of cash simply sold the animals to nearby A2 and self-contained farmers. Some, therefore, still owns no cattle to this day. RN's case is demonstrative of this scenario. A war veteran, RN arrived in Vimbi with two cattle in 2002 but all died soon after his arrival. During the 2011-12 drought, he took on three herds and received a payment of 3 heifers, but sold all of them. When I probed why he sold all these animals, he said that he felt that he would eventually lose them due to drought. While RN claims that he used most of the money to buy zinc for roofing, some villagers told me that he squandered most of the money on beer. Today, he has no cattle but has some donkeys that he inherited from his mother and a few goats. Others who had cattle during this period also sold animals received from *ukulagisa,*

citing fear of "*umthuso*". Retaining such animals in their herds would cause abortion in their own herds, they argued. However, as mentioned by ChM above, some farmers simply wanted cash for immediate use.

SeD's household is one of the very few households in the village that owned large herds of cattle and flocks of goats prior to the 2011-12 drought. The household had approximately 40 head of cattle. Despite this, the household took on five herds of cattle: two under SeD's name in exchange of two heifers and three under her son (IN) and daughter (TN) (who all did not have their own homesteads) in return of three heifers. In total, the household received five heifers as payment. Because of fear of *umthuso*, the household sold all the animals received from *ukulagisa* for cash. According to some villagers, SeD's son spent most of the proceeds on drinking at Natisa. Given that the household had large herd holdings at the time, SeD's household had less motivation to retain animals at the time. However, as noted above, SeD's own herd was decimated by drought in during the 2011-12 drought which was further exacerbated by the illness and subsequent death of her husband and some of her children, which compelled her to sell to cover medical and funeral expenses. After these events, SeD now owns only four cattle.

The case of FuZ, a widow, also illustrates the gendered aspects of benefitting from the 2011-12 *ukulagisa* arrangement. With the help of her late husband's brother, she struck an arrangement in April 2012 with a herd owner from Gohole area, who was seeking to graze a herd of 16 cattle. However, the herd owner disappeared without giving her the heifer as was agreed upon. Others like CaD took the opportunity to acquire heifers, even though he had no plot of his own at the time (Chapter Eight: Section 8.4). Together with his nephew, they took on a herd of approximately 60 cattle in exchange of 3 heifers. They then shared the 3 heifers among themselves, of which he got two. Soon after, he later acquired his own plot, and sold one heifer to finance the first purchase of plough and building of homestead. Similarly, InM (aged 31) who lives with his mother, also took on two herds of cattle on his own right in return for two heifers, but sold all the animals and spent the money on alcohol.

Although a few farmers said that the large influx of cattle into the village exhausted grazing resources and consequently cattle deaths due to poverty, the benefit of *ukulagisa* arrangement was certainly higher. Most households were able to exploit this drought period in which pastures were still plentiful in the village in order to establish or further expand their herds.

Overall, all these factors had significant ramifications for processes of accumulation and social differentiation in Vimbi.

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In Luma, the *ukulagisa* arrangement was somewhat different from that in Vimbi. In Luma, I found only one household that took in *umlaga* cattle at household level in 2011-2012 drought. This arrangement was disguised as '*amasiso*' (loaned) arrangement. This relatively small proportion of households that took in leased cattle is the result of not just the villagers' decision to enter into a leasing arrangement as a collective (i.e., at community level) where proceeds were to 'benefit the whole village' but the ongoing land dispute and high incidence of cattle theft (see Chapter Six). The villagers leased-out pastures to a nearby indigenous large-scale farmer in exchange for cash. This cash was kept in the village chairman's bank account since the villagers had no collective bank account. However, some villagers alleged that the charismatic village chairman embezzled most of the money, before purchasing a mobile water pump for use by the whole village. Today, this pump is used to fill up water in the village's plunge dip. Given the sensitivities around this issue, I could not establish how much cash was received from this arrangement.

Overall, the possibility of livestock accumulation through *ukulagisa* during the 2011-12 drought was largely absent.

9.2.3.2 The role of cattle loaning in livestock accumulation

As I have argued in the previous chapter, the institution of *amasiso*, although not as widespread as in the past, is also an important mechanism not only for dealing with variability, but accumulation for poorer households (Chapter Eight: Section 8.5Not only does *amasiso* arrangements allows the stockless to establish their own herds, but also to increase crop production, with cattle serving as important inputs in terms of draught power and manure (Scoones & Wilson 1987; Scoones 1990; Scoones et al. 1996; Cousins 1996; Wolmer et al. 2002). In my study sites, the cattle keeper receives one heifer once in a while as a "token of appreciation", while also allowed to benefit from cattle as inputs to cropping (notably manure and draught power) as well as milk. Thus, some poorer households have managed to accumulate livestock through *amasiso* arrangements. For example, NdM has managed to slowly build his herd through amasiso arrangement (Chapter Eight: Section 8.5). However, the emerging class of petty-bourgeoisie owning large herds expressed resentment towards

households that hold *amasiso* cattle. For example, ChM, one of the largest herd owners in Vimbi, said: "We must limit the number of cattle one can hold under *amasiso.* Otherwise, we will overgraze the farm and our own animals will starve."

9.2.4 The role of the state

In the literature on agrarian question, the state is a central actor in shaping the dynamics of agrarian change and accumulation (Byres 1996). This section draw attention to the role of the state in nurturing or not patterns of accumulation and differentiation in the two villages studied. In Luma, the state's involvement in the land reform process had an impact on the emerging accumulation patterns. Here the government officials went to great lengths in imposing that the beneficiaries of the scheme should be residents of particular wards in Matobo district at the expense of the villagers from nearby Wenlock communal areas who were seen as "outsiders" from another village. This has in turn led to ongoing tensions over access to and control of land (Chapter Five). These ongoing tensions and contestations, coupled with insecure land rights *appear* to inhibit agricultural production in the village for one major reason. Most farmers said that they were reluctant to clear their distant arable fields because of this ongoing conflict. Only three settlers had obtained "offer letters" by the end of 2018 (Chapter Five). In addition, they also complained of livestock incursions from Wenlock communal areas, leading to what they described as "man-made drought" for their livestock. Additionally, the state is seen by the A1 settlers as "absent" or "insufficient" in resolving this ongoing conflict. The village chairman related, "We have tried everything, but seems like the state won't be able to assist us." Indeed, the village has written to various government departments, appealing for assistance, to no avail.

By contrast, land insecurity and contestations were not so much of a big issue in Vimbi, in part, because of the land reform process. The process of land reform in the village was largely a "bottom-up" process, with the state not involved in who should benefit from the scheme. As shown in Chapter Five, most settlers came from nearby Khumalo communal areas. Hence, the farming households frequently described to me close-knit social relations dating back many years before settlement. Given this, it is unsurprising that households been able to form close-knit work-party groups, as well as rotating savings and credit associations in the village, with somewhat ease, compared to Luma.

Beyond making land available to the new farmers, the state has done little to directly support agricultural production in these areas. As noted earlier, there has been lack of state and donor investment and support in the A1 schemes. Accessing school for children remains a challenge

in both villages. In Ward 23 as a whole, there was only two primary schools, with no secondary schools at all. The existing primary schools only reaches up to grade 6. Thus, farmers are forced to take their children out of the farm in order to attend grade 7 and beyond. Often, these children are living with relatives, friends or acquaintances in towns or communal areas. Thus, accessing school for children in towns or communal areas puts labour strain on households during the growing season and adds a significant financial burden. Similarly, accessing medical resources requires travel to centres, which is also very costly.

9.3 Conclusion

This chapter brings together the adapted livelihood typology and Marxist political economy to analyse processes of accumulation and social differentiation in two contrasting smallholder A1 villages in Matobo district. I have shown how access to off-farm income, the role of institutions such as *amasiso* and *ukulagisa*, the role of the state and the ability to manage variability must be taken into consideration to understand the dynamics of accumulation in Matobo district. To navigate environmental variability, livestock producers pursue different strategies, often in combination, to generate reliability. These strategies require flexibility and of course resources such as labour, capital, knowledge, social networks, skills and so on, which are not available to everyone.

The next chapter will analyse similar dynamics in medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms, before I turn to direct comparisons and contrasts between the smallholder farm and medium-scale farm sectors, and reflect what this all means for political-economic settlement in dryland livestock settings, in Chapter Eleven.

CHAPTER 10: ACCUMULATION, CLASS DIFFERENTIATION AND AGRICULTURAL TRAJECTORIES IN THE MEDIUM-SCALE FARMING SECTOR

In Chapter Six, it was shown that recipients of medium-scale A2 and self-contained farms in Matobo district are not a homogenous group of "ZANU-PF cronies", as often depicted in neo patrimonial narratives. Instead, these farmers are a diverse population. I presented evidence that points to the emergence of social differentiation amongst these farmers. In this chapter, the focus shifts to an examination of trajectories of accumulation among medium-scale A2 and self-contained farmers. The chapter shows that a significant stratum of mainly urban-based capitalist farmers, whom has become the new cattle barons and rural bourgeoisie, has emerged in the newly created medium-scale farms in Matobo, alongside a large group of "impoverished landed property" who are capital constrained and earn rent from leasing-out all or parts of their farms because of their inability to use it.

10.1 Trajectories of accumulation in medium-scale farms in Matobo

To gain an increased understanding of accumulation trajectories, I adopt a tentative typology presented in the previous chapter. To recapitulate, the three broad categories used for this study can be described as follows:

- **'Stepping Up' and 'Stepping In'** – Within this category, I identify two types: (a) those that are accumulating/expanding largely within agriculture, locally ('stepping up'); and (b) the urban-based investors who are investing in agriculture in a substantial way linked to better-paid jobs and/or off-farm business ('stepping in');
- **'Hanging In'** – Those who are dependent on combining poorly paid wage labour (locally or in towns/abroad) and small-scale agriculture, as well as those who are just keeping plot for future use;
- **'Dropping Down' and 'Dropping out'** – This category includes those households that are experiencing reduction in production because of lack of labour (due to migration). It also includes quite poor households, who have recently experienced livelihood shocks (e.g., death of a household head) and are candidates for exit

A typology should not be treated as complete, but rather as a route towards analysing immensely rich and complex data. A note on data and method used to segment the farmers is

warranted before continuing. Various methods have been used to categorise the medium-scale farm farmers in Zimbabwe and further afield. These range from subjective analysis based on "accumulation histories" (e.g., Cheater 1984; see also Oya 2007), to quantitative techniques based on surveys (e.g., Oya 2001) and those based on "mixed" methods combining both qualitative and quantitative data (e.g., Shonhe 2021; Shonhe et al. 2021; Shonhe and Mtapuri 2020). The typology presented here is a subjective one, based as it does, on ethnographic and qualitative data gathered through various methods, including life histories, participant observations, in depth interviews, informal conversations and workshop-style ranking exercises. My analysis for distinguishing categories is based on the overarching criterion of patterns of accumulation (or not). Great care was taken to understand the sources of capital being invested in agricultural production and the role of farm profits in particular, alongside other non-farm income sources. The theoretical basis for using this variable is based on an understanding of how capitalism works in the abstract sense, though in reality, this is messy and rather complex.

The analysis presented here focusses – for the most part – on those farms actually sampled rather than the entire medium-scale farms in the district. The small sample size made it relatively easier to classify these farms from rich qualitative data, given that I knew all the cases very well. However, there were some challenges too. First, a few farms could easily fit into more than one category. Thus, placing them into categories was not always clear and easy because there are some overlaps in some cases. Equally, it should be stressed that these are not watertight categories. In other words, these trajectories are not static phenomenon: there is likely to be mobility between these categories over time, and from year to year. Some households may fall into another category, while others are able to upgrade into another category.

Table 10.1: Agricultural trajectories of households surveyed in A2 and self-contained schemes

Agricultural trajectory	Class character	Accumulation pathway	A2 (n=18)	Self-contained farms (n=32)	Description
Dropping down/out (n=4)	Impoverished landed property	De-accumulation/ decline	1	3	Those who are experiencing downsizing in production due to economic failure, drought or demographic factors (e.g., old age, illness or death of the household head)
Hanging in (n=24)	Impoverished landed property	Constrained accumulation	9	11	Those who are constrained by lack of finance to invest on their farms. Agriculture is combined with other income sources
	Impoverished landed property	Accumulation in future (speculative)	2	2	Those who are keeping the plot for future investments (speculative use)
Stepping in/up (n=22)	Rural capitalists	Local accumulation	0	5	Those who are largely accumulating within livestock and local off-farm businesses (e.g., tractor hiring services, grinding mill, tuck shop etc.)
	Urban-based capitalists	Straddling (accumulation from outside)	4	11	Those who are absentee urban-based businesspeople and professionals who are investing in agriculture in a substantial way.
	Urban-based capitalists	Politically assisted accumulation	2	0	Those who benefitted from state subsidies through patronage networks

Source: Own data

As Table 10.1 reveals, only a few farmers appear to be engaging in local accumulation and agriculture accumulation in particular. In other words, only a handful farmers in the self-contained scheme are engaging in "accumulation from below" through local petty commodity production and non-farm activities (e.g., tractor hiring), while none of the A2 farmers are doing so, which reflect the constrained nature of farmers' access to capital. Most of the new capitalists managed to finance their farms through "straddling", while accumulate through patronage, who often benefit from state subsidies.

10.1.1 Dropping Out and Dropping Down: Decumulation

This category accounted for only one out of 18 surveyed A2 farms and three of 32 surveyed self-contained farms. While some of these farmers sit in the richest asset group (AG3), it consists mainly of farmers who are experiencing what can be described as "de-accumulation", whereby they are facing a decline in production due to economic decline or failure, but also other demographic reasons such as death of household head. In most cases, these farmers had initially made significant investments in livestock assets and farm infrastructure during the early years of settlement using income derived from off-farm businesses and/or wage employment, but further farm development and investment has since stalled due to a mix of misfortune, old age, ill health or death of household head. They own very few cattle both on and outside the farm, if not none at all at the farm. Thus, most of these farms are understocked and, in some instances, leased-out to others or simply lie idle, with no-one occupying the farm. Some farmers are even facing the threat of farm repossession (which can be understood as the final stage of dropping out) and subsequent reallocation to someone else by state authorities.

For example, SM (aged 42), an accountant by profession who emigrated to South Africa in 1997, acquired 475 hectares of land in 2012 after he was "forced" to retire from his administration job at one of the biggest mobile network companies in South Africa. At the time, SM had already set up a cross-border transport business (*malayisha*) using personal savings from his job and had three haulage trucks (8, 30 and 34 tons). When he retired, his transport business was "doing very well", and thus he decided to concentrate on his business adventure, while still based in South Africa. "Then I thought, maybe I could ramp-up in terms of farming on the other side [Zimbabwe] as well. So, I will have my trucking [business] here, [and] my farm on the other side and then life will be great", he explained. Thus, his desire to venture into farming was a strategy to diversify business interests and sites of accumulation. By 2012, the household had already acquired an A1 plot in Luma (acquired in 2009 and

registered in her wife's name), where it kept a substantial herd of cattle and flock of goats. SM started buying livestock using from his transport. These animals were kept at his father-in-law's A1 plot in Laconcorde farm. As the herd expands, this prompted the household to look for his own land. He later managed to acquire an A1 plot in Luma, which he registered in his wife's name in order to circumvent the multiple farm ownership regulations since he wanted to eventually acquire an A2 farm. As his livestock increases through further purchase and natural growth, he then applied for an A2 plot and obtained it in 2012. Upon acquiring the A2 plot, he immediately took occupation of his A2 plot and constructed makeshift pole and dug houses for workers. At the time, he had 35 cattle and around 30 goats. During the 2011-12 drought, SM took the advantage to further expand his herd and flock by exchanging grain with livestock. As he explained:

> In 2012 and 2013, it was a big drought. So, I moved maize to my home area, Lupane. I was selling it there. So, I was taking goats, cows, money, everything! That was when I didn't have [formal] work that's why I was doing that thing. And, I still had my trucks running. So, I was picking up the maize myself and take it to Lupane. I was exchanging it with whatever you got – money, goats, cows.

However, in 2015, SM's transport business began to flounder because of lack of "good loads", marking the beginning of financial challenges. As a result, he could not visit the farm regularly as he used to do when his business was doing well. He explained how the collapse of his business affected his livestock enterprise and farm development:

> In 2015, I was here [South Africa]. I wasn't much involved that side [farm]. Things were tough. I stayed here nine full months without going home, managing [the farm] with a remote control, that Bob [Mugabe] didn't' want. Guess what the boys [hired herders] did? Took all my cattle and sold them, then they left. They sold 10 oxen and all the 30 goats and some of the stuff that was at the village [A1 plot]. I am talking to the boys thinking that they are in the yard [farm]. Little did I know that they were gone. The boys ran away to South Africa.

In 2017, SM's financial situation got worse when an errant driver stole ZAR60,000 worth of tyres that he had just replaced and abandoned the truck in Kadoma in Zimbabwe. By 2018 he had disposed two of the trucks and was left with one, which he was trying to sell so that he could "revamp" his farm using the proceeds. Besides his transport business, his printing business that he had also set up in South Africa also floundered, largely because "people don't print any hard copies these days". Following the collapse of all his businesses, SM has recently resorted to trading forex online in South Africa because "jobs are now scarce".

Overall, SM's farming enterprise was inextricably linked to his off-farm transport business. However, the collapse of his bussinesses had a domino effect of stalling farm investment, as he explained:

> I went into that with other businesses. When the other businesses fell apart, it meant therefore, I could not sustain myself at the farm because I was only starting out and I still had to do some investments. So, now, since the other businesses have not been doing well, I could not put more into the farm. That was my major challenge. So, I had to put the farm on hold.

In 2018, SM's herd had depleted to a mere 15, and were now kept at his A1 plot in Luma. Since he could not afford to pay a hired herder, he had asked his neighbour Mr N (who does not own cattle himself) to look after the cattle in exchange for draught power, milk and manure under *amasiso* arrangement. No one was living at both his A1 and A2 plots. While he had constructed proper houses at his A1 plot, he had not done so at the A2 plot. The A2 plot was still unfenced by 2018 and the makeshift houses he had built at occupation had since collapsed. At the same time, he had also been served with a "notice to repossess" the farm by the Lands office because his "development is not visible". Overall, SM's household has transitioned from the "stepping in" category in the early years of settlement (which saw a rapid investment in livestock using income from off-farm transport business) to "dropping out" due to economic decline in recent years.

Similarly, IN, a 54-year-old self-employed businessman who acquired two plots (one is registered in her wife's name) in Wild East in 2007, was able to invest substantially on his farms during the early years of settlement thanks to income from off-farm transport business. IN emigrated to South Africa in 1988, where he initially worked for a company that manufactures tools for drilling purposes, before he setup own *malayisha* and mini-taxi businesses. However, due to taxi violence, he decided to sale his taxi vehicles and moved to the UK in 2001 for two years to work. When he returned to Zimbabwe, he setup another transport (kombis) using earnings from the UK. In 2007, he then stepped into livestock production by acquiring two self-contained plots in Wilde East. At the time, he had already established his herd (38), which he kept at a rented farm in Esigodini. Upon acquiring the farms, he made significant farm investments such as fencing and building farm houses. According to one of his neighbours, IN's "farm was vibrant. He used to come all the time in a *komb*i, playing radio at a high volume." Although the farming adventure seemed to have considerable promise in the early years of settlement, things have not been going well for the household at the farm recently. Today, he owns less than 10 head of cattle that are grazed between the two plots.

Farm investments and production has since declined due to a lack of financial capital. NI's transport has since collapsed due, in part, to traffic police's corrupt practices. One of his neighbours ascribed the failure of IN's business to the killing of his *chikwambo* (goblin used to get rich) by prophets. Another neighbour said that "he got broke because some of his mini-busses were taken by credit providers after he had failed to repay debts. By 2018, he had no kombis and had recently resorted to (cross-border) flea market trading. He also said that his herd has declined due to rampant cattle theft in the area. Since settlement, he estimated that he has lost over 20 cattle due to theft. Additionally, farm fences have been constantly stolen by villagers from neighbouring communal areas in Gwanda. These problems, he said, compelled him to move most of his cattle to his parents-in-laws' farm in Gwatemba, where the family now owns 18 head of cattle.

MthN (aged 57), who works as an ambulance driver at government hospital in Lupane, acquired a self-contained plot in the early 2000s. Since then, he has tried piggery project using initial capital from a relative who works in the UK. However, the project did not succeed due to lack of markets. Today, MthN owns 11 herd of cattle, all kept at the farm. However, during fieldwork, rumours abound that the MthN had "sold" the plot to Mr S, who operates a transport business in Bulawayo.

Overall, the first two cases that agrarian accumulation is non-linear and production is inextricably linked to external finance, such that any misfortunes in the world of business or wage employment is likely to have a domino-effect on farm investment and production.

10.1.2 Hanging In: Constrained-accumulation "from below" and stalled-accumulation "from above"

In both schemes, the 'hanging in' trajectory constituted the largest group, and were nearly half the total in self-contained farms (13 of 32 cases) or more in A2 sample (11of 18 cases). Of the total 26 households across the two samples, the great majority of farmers (n=15) were employed in civil service at settlement, followed by army (n=5), communal areas farmers (n=2), local politicians (n=2) and other urban jobs (n=2). Overall, most are employed in low-paid jobs or are poor retirees who had served either in army or civil service but whose meagre salaries did not enable them to accumulate capital needed for cattle production. Thus, their key problem is lack of access to financial capital to make initial investments in cattle and farm infrastructure, as well as working capital to maintain production, as shall be discussed further below. Thus, many have struggled to gain a foothold in livestock production since settlement.

This has prompted these farmers to resort to two main strategies. First, they are leasing-out pastures to other better-off herd owners in exchange for heifers and farm infrastructure, such as the erecting fences and building houses. Second, they try to invest on their farms by using a portion of their meagre wages, which involves significant cutting down on consumption. While many have managed to build modest herds of cattle, many said that they were still struggling financially and their livestock enterprises were precarious.

"War veterans" predominate in this group than in the other two groups both in A2 and self-contained samples (6 of 11 cases and 8 of 15 cases, respectively), all of whom are linked to ZAPU. Most of those who received military training and fought during the 1970s liberation war were demobilised soon after Independence, while only four across the two surveys were integrated into the ZNA and later retired in the 2000s. The previous occupations at settlement of those war veterans who were demobilised are diverse. Some were employed as civil servants; others were local politicians; while others were communal areas farmers. Those that were integrated in the army after 1980, often occupied very low military ranks. Although these war veterans simply used their status to obtain land, many are struggling to invest in production or maintain a foothold in production, as they lack capital. For example, JnD, a war veteran who acquired over 450 hectares of land in an A2 farm said:

> I am struggling [to invest in production] because I got this farm as a war veteran and I had totally nothing. Some of us were demobilized after independence in 1980, and we did not get a chance to join the National Army. After demobilization, we were given ZW$185 per month for only two years, and it was then closed. That was that! From 1983 to 1997, we got nothing. We were then given ZW$50,000, and that ZW$50,000 was wiped out by inflation. So, I did not have any other sources of income. I never worked again. Think of a man with 11 children, trying to push then through to school. My eldest son, Nkosi, did a diploma at [Joshua Nqcabuko Nkomo] Teacher's college, and he is a teacher by profession. All my other children reached Form 4… When I got the farm, I did not have any other source of income except the [war veteran] pension of USD160 per month. So, I have not made a lot of investments on the farm…. I have been concentrating of my last-born daughter's education so that one day when I left this earth, she will have something [to fall back on].

He complained that there was limited state support for war veterans despite the fact that "they work hard" for the party-state to ensure that ZANU-PF remains in power.

Within this "hanging in" trajectory two sub-categories can be identified. The first sub-category consists of those who are significantly capital constrained to build up or expand their herds, but are trying too to gradually or incrementally do so against all odds. These farmers have limited access to credit, savings, remittances, savings or capital resources to invest in livestock,

and thus overcome lack of capital through *ukulagisa* (informal land-leasing). They generally begin with a few livestock and accumulate livestock at slower rates, until they have built a relatively large herd. In many cases, these households had to make sacrifices including reducing consumption in order to finance their first acquisition of livestock. Within this category there are also some households that had experienced a decline in production due to shocks (e.g., drought, death of household etc.), but are gradually rebuilding their herds to begin livestock farming again. This kind of trajectory has been described by Dubb (2015) as "creeping back" in the context of small-scale sugar producers in KwaZulu Natal. In class terms, these households can be described as "impoverished landed property" (Ngubane 2020).

MD, for example, now in his late 50s, who works as an extension officer, gained access to an A2 plot (475ha) because of his position in 2007, but lacked financial capital to invest in livestock. He admitted that he was only able to acquire this farm as a "token of appreciation" for his role in officially "pegging farms for others" during the FTLRP rather than on merit (Chapter Six). At the time, he had only seven cattle, which he kept at his home area. He explained that, with no financial credit, he had to cut down on food consumption in order to buy some cattle. He explained: "I have been trying to push things without resources, particularly finance. I have been slowly building the herd using money from my salary. My family at home was not eating. I was saving money to buy cattle. Fortunately, my wife understands the situation." Additionally, he also leases-out part of the farm to others in exchange for heifers and other benefits. For example, during the 2011/12 drought, the he leased-out the entire farm to another farmer in exchange of five heifers, which became part of his breeding stock. Also, the lessee ring-fenced and paddocked the farm, though "people from Gwanda had cut all the fence". In 2018, he was leasing-out pastures to his brother and brother's son who owns a total of 46 head of cattle between them in exchange of heifers.

In May 2017, Mr MD received a loan of thirteen heifers from CSC/Trek (worth USD4120, with each heifer valued at USD320 on average), intended to be a pilot "Command Livestock" programme.[163] This loan was payable over a period of 5 years. To avoid the death of the heifers

[163] Roughly six years ago, MD also applied for a cattle loan at Cold Storage Company (CSC) but production at the parastatal plummeted since then. Recently, however, after the revival of the parastatal through a public-private partnership between CSC and Trek Petroleum that saw a resumption of operations, these old applications were retrieved and MD "was of the five people who were lucky to be selected" in the district to benefit from a pilot CSC/Trek cattle loan scheme, as part of "Command Livestock".

through poverty, he was forced to take a two months' loan of USD500 at 7% interest rate in July from Mrs M, who operates a micro-finance business in Maphisa, in order to purchase a tonne of supplementary feed. He explained that he "had no option" because he "didn't want those animals", and therefore "it was better for me to go to bed on an empty stomach. Since his herd is still small, MD said that he had not yet sold any cattle, thus, relies on his salary to meet input and labour costs, although he is aware that "a farm must maintain itself". He said that all he needed to succeed in livestock production was "financial back" because he has expertise in agriculture.

While some farmers in this sub-category have managed to gain a foothold into livestock production thanks to informal renting of grazing land, this was still precarious. Thus, most of the farmers still engage in off-farm economic activities (although some have retired from their initial jobs) in order to avoid having to sell their few animals in order to meet social reproduction needs.

For example, KM (born in 1955), is a war veteran who was acquired an A2 plot (500ha) in 2003. At the time, he was working as a ranch manager at CSC, but decided to resign in order to venture into commercial livestock production. KM stepped into livestock production in 2000 by acquiring a self-contained plot under the war veterans quota in Wild East. However, he decided to relinquish the self-contained plot in 2003 when he acquired a 500ha plot in an A2 scheme. With high hopes of getting cattle loan from CSC once available to erstwhile white commercial farmers, he then took a decision to retire from his job as a ranch manager at CSC in order to focus on his own ranching enterprise. He explained that his decision to quit his job was driven by a strong desire to venture into commercial ranching and "contribute to the creation of jobs for others and restocking" in the district. In taking commercial farming as a fulltime job, he had high hopes of obtaining a cattle loan from CSC, as was the case with white farmers in the past. However, his hopes were thwarted by a lack of funds. When he took occupation of his new A2 farm, his cattle herd was at 30, which meant that his farm was relatively understocked. Unable to obtain a cattle loan from CSC, he turned to leasing-out part of his land to two herd owners from Manama in exchange for one heifer per 10 head of cattle, as a strategy to expand herd. In 2005, when the economic situation worsened, he realized that proceeds from cattle sales were not enough to support his family or to cover workers' wages without depleting his small herd. Thus, in order to meet wage bills and other farm costs, he was compelled to sought casual off-farm work. Since then to this day, he has worked at GMB and

several NGOs on short-term contracts.[164] He explained that earnings from these short-term jobs have enabled him not to over rely on his cattle, as this will deplete his herd. In 2014, his herd had increased to 75 thanks to natural growth and *ukulagisa* arrangements. However, without casual work at the time, he became heavily reliant again on cattle sales in order to meet workers' wages, fuel costs (when travelling to the farm and pumping water) and buying food for workers. This resulted in herd decline to around 40. Reflecting perhaps the importance of off-farm income to his livestock enterprise, he still works at an NGO in Gwanda. however, he said that his desire remained to become a full-time commercial rancher. His aim was therefore "raise some funds so that I can fix a few things at the farm." By 2018, he had 48 cattle, and his wife was selling sour milk from the farm. Given that his herd had substantially grown, he no longer leases out part of his grazing land to others in order to ensure that his herd has sufficient grazing throughout the year. While KM also receives monthly war veteran and NSSA pension, he lamented that this was meagre to enable him to meet his family's needs and fund working capital for the farm. He also relies on remittance from his children in diaspora. Overall, this case demonstrates how precarious most of these livestock enterprises are, and the importance of non-farm income for both farm investments and funding working capital.

While the area is officially classified as suitable for livestock production, lack of capital to invest in livestock (especially cattle) has forced some farmers in this category to step into dryland crop production and small "projects" such as broilers and horticulture, which requires comparatively low start-up capital. For example, MeM, a widow in her early forties, switched to dryland production after she lost all the cattle due to the 2011-12 drought and death of her husband. By 2018, she had cleared 4 hectares of land for dryland cropping. In good years, she

[164] He joined the Grain Marketing Board as a 'production officer' until 2007 when he left the job. In 2008, he joined Practical Action (an NGO) as a field officer on a short-term contract. In September 2009, he then joined Lutheran Development Services (LDS) where he served as a farm manager at Mnene station for 4 years. He left after his contract expired. In 2016, he sought a job at Brethren in Christ Compassionate and Development Services (CDS), a church-based NGO, as an assistant project officer or sometimes as an enumerator conducting surveys aimed at assessing the impacts of a program called Sustained Conservation Agriculture and Livestock Enterprise (SCALE) in Gwanda. He says he employed on short-term contracts of usually 4 to 5 months, but subject to renewal if the NGO still needs his services. He says that his current contract expires in February 2018. Given that he and his family are members of the Brethren in Christ Church, this means that he receives first priority when work opportunities do arise in the NGO.

is able to harvest a lot of maize and groundnuts, and usually sells surplus in order to pay her son's school fees and meet household costs. Because of the fact that she is unemployed, with no access to a stable income, she has struggled to rebuild her herd. Since the death of her husband, she has been leasing-out pastures to others in return for fencing and heifers since 2013 (see Chapter Eight). Today, she owns four cattle thanks to *ukulagisa* arrangements.

Within this category a few farmers (5 of 18 A2 farmers) were also involved in "projects", such as broiler production and horticulture. As mentioned above, the start-up costs for such projects were relatively low, and often financed by adult children through non-farm income. For example, NmM (born in 1978), holds a diploma and degree in agriculture, and works as a secondary school teacher. Her father (who died in 2012), was a war veteran and civil servant, who acquired an A2 plot (500ha) in 2002, and passed away in 2012, leaving NmM "in charge" of the farm. Like MD, she explained how she has struggled to raise capital to start small "projects" at the farm and the sacrifices she had to make along the way to continue operations. NmM occupied the farm in 2012, and soon began a piggery project, which "failed because of lack of funding". She then thought of a "partnership", but finding the partner proved difficult at first. She "proposed the idea to various rich people" but her proposal was turned down. In 2017, she stepped into horticulture in a partnership with an accountant based in Bulawayo.

The second sub-category consist of those who acquired land for speculative purposes. There is little, if anything, happening on these farms. The proportion of these households were the same in both samples: two in A2 sample and two in self-contained farms. Like farmers in the previous sub-category, all but one were leasing-out pastures to other farmers in exchange of a range of in-kind benefits, including heifers and payment of land tax. However, the difference here, is that for these farmers in this sub-category, rent is usually paid in cash and used to pay land tax. In cases where cattle are received as rent, such animals are usually sold rather than used for breeding purposes, and the proceeds are used for subsistence or to fund other off-farm activities. Other farmers use leasing-out land as a strategic to keep the land in the family. Such farmers are concerned that unless they maintain a certain degree of activity on the farm, their farms will be repossessed and reallocated by the state officials. In A2 and self-contained farms studied, two households in each scheme falls in this sub-category. For example, PM, now in his early forties, who took advantage of his position as a Lands Officer to acquire land, was leasing out the whole farm to a wealthy herd owner in return for payment of land unit tax, which was at USD1420 per annum in 2018. At the time, PM had no cattle at all due to a lack

of funds, and leasing out the whole farm was a strategy to keep hold of the land by ensuring that the land tax is paid.

Another farmer, VN (aged 58) acquired a 108ha self-contained plot in 2003 when he was employed as a risk control manager at Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA). Unfortunately, in 2004, a year after he acquired the farm, he "was forced to retire because of ill health" when a doctor told him that he was suffering from a "life-threatening disease". After retirement, he used some of the "lump sum" he received as pension to build farmhouses and to buy few goats and sheep. In 2005, he was compelled to go to South Africa in order to seek medical assistance, where he stayed for four years. While away, the few goats and sheep that he had bought and brought to the farm "disappeared" when his farm worker left the job. With no one living at the farm, the farmhouses were also vandalised. Since 2005, VN never worked again, but says that he was in the process of establishing his own company in 2018. Due to "lack of finance", he said, "I have failed to invest on the farm, despite having a lot of desire". While there had been no threats of repossession from rural council, he admitted that "some few years back, I had a problem with one council official who wanted to reposes the farm so that he could re-allocate it to his friends." He described the council officer as a "corrupt" employee, who wanted to "take away the plot from me under very dubious circumstances". This droves him to fend off the official by threatening to expose his "corrupt activities". Since then, council had "never threatened" to repossess the farm, and has been paying land tax religiously.

10.1.3 Stepping In and Up: accumulation from below, above and outside

These farmers, often in AG3 category, are running relatively large herds of cattle, selling regularly and reinvesting on the farm (e.g., improving the quality of their herds), as well as investing in properties in town and off-farm businesses (e.g., transport). These farmers represent a third of A2 farmers surveyed (6 of 18 cases) and nearly half of self-contained farmers (14 of 32 cases). The occupation of farmers in this category reflects a preponderance of urban-based professionals and businesspeople in Zimbabwe and abroad. In the self-contained scheme, for example, amongst the fourteen farmers, eight were self-employed businesspeople of whom one was based in Botswana. The remaining six were either combining wage employment with off-farm business (3), or employed in urban job (2). Only one farmer, a retired senior official at the rural council, was a full-time cattle rancher. In the A2 sample, the six farmers in this category also consisted of four self-employed businesspeople (of whom two were based in South Africa) and two were senior securo-crats (of whom one was a

lieutenant colonel in the army and the other was senior CIO official). Across the two sample, there were no female-headed households. The majority of these farmers sit in the "richest" asset group.

This group of farmers have access to better and regular off-farm income from wage employment and/or business, which the majority of farmers did not have. They were able to or are in the process of making substantial investment (in terms of livestock acquisition and farm infrastructure) into livestock production. A proportion of the off-farm income pays for hired workers and inputs (such as drugs, dipping and supplementary feeding). They employ a significant number of both temporary and permanent workforce, and even professional farm managers in some instances. They all specialised in livestock production (particularly cattle), and run relatively large herds of cattle. For these farmers, the size of land allocated was reported as a major constraint to accumulation. In self-contained, some of them had tried unsuccessfully to acquire additional land from the rural district council. Acquisition of more land to increase the scale of operation, but also to deal with variability is common strategy amongst livestock producers in this group. They deploy a variety of mechanisms, including *ukulagisa* for long- and short-term periods, to access additional land to meet their requirements.

Within this category, three sub-categories can be identified. The first sub-category consists of those who are engaging in local accumulation within agriculture and livestock in particular. In other words, such farmers are capitalists, who are "stepping up" (Scoones et al. 2010) and engaging in "accumulation from below", rooted in petty commodity production. Some of these farmers had previous farming connections to the area and "prior accumulation" through savings from well-paid wage employment and/or business. For some, accumulation in livestock was a long and protracted process, which often started in communal areas before land reform. This was especially the case for self-contained farmers, most of whom were selected as beneficiaries because they were owners of large herds. Two of these farmers had set up off-farm businesses at their farms, including grinding mill services, shops and tractor hiring.

For example, EM (aged 56), a businessman, former headmaster and now ZANU-PF MP for Matobo North and deputy minister of primary and secondary education (as of September 2018), is regarded as one of the prominent livestock farmers in the area. He started buying cattle in the early 2000s when he acquired a self-contained farm using earnings from his job as a headmaster and off-farm businesses. In 2008, he obtained a loan of ZW$30 billion from the RBZ under the Farm Mechanization Scheme against assets already owned as collateral. He

used this money to purchase thirty in-calf heifers. While he repaid the loan a year later in 2009, "it was by then worthless" due to hyper-inflation. Thanks to a combination of external finances, he was able to build up a large herd of cattle, and owned 200 head of cattle in 2018. He regularly sells a significant number of cattle every year, and reinvest on the farm or other off-farm businesses. In 2015, for example, he sold around 70 cattle and used the proceeds to purchase two tractors from a former white commercial farmer, which he now hires out for ploughing services around the district. In 2016, he sold nearly 80 head of cattle and used the money as "top-up" to purchase four trucks to set up a cross-border transport business, in partnership with his son who is based in South Africa.

Another farmer, TN, who is now in his late fifties, used his first salary as a "temporary" school teacher to purchase his first two heifers for ZW$140 and ZW$160 in 1984. This was all part of the Ndebele ritual which stipulates that "when young begin to work, he must buy isifuyo (livestock) with his first salary." Despite this, he explained that he was not particularly interested in cattle farming but "I just bought them because it was tradition." Since then, his herd began to grow through natural growth and was kept at his father's home in Halale. In 1986, after completing an accounting course at Domboshaba Training Centre, TN then left his teaching job and became an accountant at Umzingwane Rural Council. However, in July 1991, he left the accounting job and moved to Matobo where he took up another job as a clerk at Matobo Rural District Council and gradually rose to a senior position. This is where he started to take livestock farming seriously. As he explained: "As far as cattle farming is concerned, the best decision I ever made was moving from Esigodini where they don't see cattle as anything to Matobo." At this time, his herd had increased to 20 due to natural growth, and was keeping them at his father's homestead in Halale. However, his herd was decimated and reduced to a mere two head of cattle thanks to the 1991-92 drought, although he blames himself for "lack of care" with his animals. At that time, he said that he "always had some money in his wallet" from trading in maize; thus, he could afford to buy supplementary feed for his animals but he "allowed then to die" from starvation "because of a lack of care".

In 1997, he decided to restock again, a decision he explained was motivated by the hardships he endured as a child while growing up in the care of a very "harsh step-mother". He thought that cattle would offer a degree of financial stability for his family. He therefore started rebuilding his herd through purchase using income from his council job and maize trade. At this time, he often had to help his uncle who had a large herd of cattle and was leasing a Three-

tier farm in the vicinity of Kezi, to manage the cattle during weekends. This solidified his love for cattle. Additionally, he managed to garner cattle farming experience through helping out his uncle. By 1999, his herd had increased again to 25. At this time, he had established his own *umuzi* in his home area, and had moved his cattle to his own homestead. This is when he established a reputation as an assiduous cattle owner in the area. Because of this reputation, he was then selected by his community to benefit from the self-contained scheme. At the time, he described his cattle management as "above the rest of the community": he provided his cattle with supplementary feed and licks during winter, as well as dipping his cattle regularly using spray dipping. As a result of all this, his community saw him as a perfect candidate to gain access to a self-contained plot in 1999. In other words, he met the criteria with which the community chose recipients: he had a relatively large herd, access to a stable off-farm income (wage and trade income), the experience of cattle farming and a good reputation as a good cattle farmer. He was initially reluctant as he was not interested in land reform. Eventually, he carved in after the community had persisted.

He was first allocated a plot in Wild East in 2000, but subsequently left in 2002 amid accusations of supporting MDC by local war veterans.[165] He then moved his cattle to Mfazimithi farm, near Bulawayo, where he had to rent an A2 farm from another farmer. In 2009, he was later allocated another self-contained plot at Pagati farm, where he runs 121 herd of cattle, while another herd of 41 cattle are kept at a rented A2 farm at Mfazimithi where he rent 200 hectares in exchange of USD1,000 per year. He says that he has given this herd to his two sons to manage as a strategy to ignite their interest in cattle farming. In recent years, Mr TN has been regularly selling cattle and reinvesting proceeds in building infrastructure (e.g., dams, borehole and fencing) at the farm, Brahman bulls and heifers, as well building a restaurant shop for his wife to operate once she has retired from her teaching job. On average, he sells 30 steers per year, as well as exchanging young bulls with heifers for replacement with other local farmers. His current objective is to establish a grey/white Brahman stud, and has been buying white/grey Brahman heifers and bulls. He had since retired from his job as a senior official in the rural council. Unlike, many other farmers in the area, he is now engaging in

[165] He said that the war veterans accused him of being an MDC supporter because he is a "long-time friend" of Lovemore Moyo, a former MDC T politician, member of parliament and speaker of parliament. The two have been friends since the late 1970s, when they met in Zambia as liberation war refugees. They also come from the same village.

fulltime livestock farming and spends most of his time at the farm. Besides cattle farming, he also owned 43 goats and 108 sheep in 2018.

Another livestock farmer and local businessman, PFM (aged 81), has a long history of cattle farming in the area. PFM started his carrier as a health inspector in the 1960s, and then set up his retail business in Maphisa in the 1980s. In the 1990s, he then started cattle farming using income from his businesses. In 1995, he was one of the first few local businesspeople with large herds who took matters into their hands by moving his 120 herd of cattle into Mampondweni farm (a three-tier farm) without official sanction, although he was later allowed to officially lease the farm (Chapter Four). Before land reform of the 2000s, he sold his steers to white commercial farmers and CSC, and the beef was destined for European Union (EU) beef market. Using proceeds from cattle sales, he was able to buy a brand-new truck and tractor at the time and setup a hiring services business. After land reform in 2000, he said that "I lost a lot because my cattle were sold overseas. My cattle were sold abroad and I was paid in US dollars". Not only did land reform led to the ban of EU beef export, but also the subdivision of Three-tier farms meant that he could no longer sustain a large herd of cattle on small plots. Whereas prior to subdivisions, he was leasing the whole of Mampondweni farm alone; now he has access to only three plots totalling less than 350 hectares. Currently, he slaughters the cattle and sell the meat at his own butchery store in Maphisa. While FpM still boast a large herd of cattle (126), he is now unable to manage the enterprise properly due to ill health: "All things come to an end. I had money time, now it's gone", he said. His only "legitimate" son was reluctant to be involved in managing the farm and "loves drinking alcohol too much".

A second sub-category comprises largely of absentee investors, without previous farming connections to the area, who are investing in livestock in a substantial way through savings from well-paid off-farm jobs and/or businesses. While these farmers generally see livestock farming as a business and site of accumulation, they also see investment in livestock (notably cattle) as a "safe haven asset" in a country bedevilled by hyper-inflation and unreliable banking system. In the latter scenario, many of these urban investors are keen to convert their hard-earned money into cattle as a strategy to hedge against inflation and lack of public trust in the government in relation to use of local currency. In this context, livestock is seen as a store of value. As I will discuss below, access to regular off-farm income is not only essential for start-up capital, but also for funding working capital. Unlike the previous sub-category, which entails "stepping up" through petty commodity production, these farmers are "stepping in"

whereby commercial agriculture is driven by investments from outside (Hall et al. 2017). These farmers are therefore engaging in what Whitefield (2016) has termed "accumulation from outside". As herds expands, some of these urban-based capitalists are may be on a pathway from accumulation from outside ('stepping in') to accumulation from below through local production ('stepping up'), though still dependent on off-farm income for part of their working capital.

As will be shown later in the chapter, "straddling" is a key accumulation strategy among this group of farmers. Indeed, revenue generated from livestock ranching cross-finance off-farm businesses, and vice versa. To borrow from Oya's (2007: 474) words, there is "a symbiotic relationship between farming and trade, where surplus generated in one activity is reinvested in the other or *vice versa*". Like farmers in the previous sub-category (those accumulating within agriculture), these farmers also boast very large herds of cattle, with the exception of one farmer who had recently acquired the farm in 2016. Given access to a stable and better non-farm income, the most of the farmers in this sub-category had managed to rapidly build large herds of cattle in a short period of time.

For example, MM (aged 40), is a mechanic by profession who operates a transport business (truck hiring and driving school) in Bulawayo. He purchased an A2 plot in 2014 from his "uncle", a war veteran and retired lieutenant colonel who was initially allocated the farm in 2002 but could not put it into production and who he claims is now "sick and old" (Chapter Six). In 2014, when he took over the farm, he had 10 cattle, but his herd has expanded very quickly through further purchases and natural increase. By 2018 his herd was at 247. Given the physical lack of cash, he allows his clients to pay for driving lessons in cattle. Of the 247 cattle, 147 cattle were grazing on the farm and a cousin's neighbouring farm whom he helped to ring-fence, while the remaining 120 cattle were kept at a leased A2 farm in Excess farm in exchange for two head of cattle per annum and other in-kind benefits. In 2017, he sold 20 steers after pen-fattening them and used the proceeds to purchase a Toyota land cruiser, a off-roader vehicle which he uses to visit the farm, given poor road network leading to his farm. In addition to cattle production, he also runs an egg layer chicken project at the farm. At the time of research, he had a batch of 457 egg layer chickens, producing around 31 crates of eggs per week, which were then sold in Bulawayo. He employs a total of four permanent workers at his farm at US$90 per month. Of the 4 workers, two males are employed as herders, while another two (male and female) are employed in the egg layer project.

Another farmer, JoM explained how he had managed to build up his herd through *ukulayisha* business. JoM started his working life as a "scullery boy" in a restaurant in South Africa in the late 1990s, and eventually setup his own cross-border transport business (*omalayisha*) in the mid-1990s.[166] This was a very lucrative business, but the changing migration policies in South Africa, and the adoption of multiple currency policy and the subsequent improvement of economic situation in Zimbabwe in 2009 made it less profitable. This prompted him to abandon the business, returned to Zimbabwe permanently, where he set up a grocery shop using earnings from *omalayis*ha business. By this time, he had managed to build up a herd of 70 cattle using savings from *omalayish*a business. As he explained: "When I was still engaging in omalayisha business, I would buy at least one animal every trip." These cattle were kept at his late aunt's A1 plot in Zadobe. In 2012, following the death of his best friend who was allocated a self-contained farm in Wild East, but whose widowed wife could not continue to run the farm, he took the opportunity to take over the farm and finally own his own plot in Wild East

The trajectory of MM and JM is demonstrative of "straddling" as a main avenue of accumulation. For these urban-investors, land reform presented an opportunity to diversify their portfolios into cattle ranching using a portion of (high) wages and/or business income. As one urban investor and capitalist farmer based in South Africa argues, "This place [farm] is a place to make money. People who have made it in life say you must have many streams of income". Thus, farming has become a new site of accumulation for this group of farmers, where profits from non-farm business are ploughed back into the farm and vice-versa.

Finally, the third sub-category consists of those who are engaging in "politically-assisted accumulation", that is, accumulating "from above" through political patronage. These are very few, and only found in A2 survey (two out of 18 households). This is not surprising, given that state subsidies in livestock farming and Matabeleland in general has been few and far between since the early 2000s. All the two farmers were war veterans, and currently employed in state security services. Rumours abound that the pair "benefitted from many government loans which they never paid back" in the early 2000s. BT (aged 59), a senior official in the army, had 156 cattle, 85 goats and 20 sheep by 2018. While I could not establish the extent to which BT had benefitted from the state with regards to his cattle enterprise, government officials and

[166] It involves the transportation of goods from South Africa to Zimbabwe, and smuggling of human biengs (see Thebe 2011).

other farmers I interviewed told me how he uses his networks to gain access inputs from the party-state. Likewise, BM (aged 58), a senior officer at the President's Office, was reputed for using his position to gain access to heifer loans that were set to benefit several farmers in the early years of land reform. One neighbouring farmer told me:

> BM and NK looted cattle scheme in 2002. I and many others were in the beneficiary list but on arrival of the cattle, they came and made noise about the heifers being small and not going to be distributed. So, when we left, they took the cattle for themselves. It was supposed to be two heifers each per person but those two got six each. All this was done under the banner of "The Party" and once you questioned, you were then labelled MDC and victimised[167]

BM owned no cattle at all when he acquired the farm in 2002. By 2018, he had 41 head of cattle thanks to government "loans", purchase, lease grazing and natural growth.

10.2 Agrarian dynamics and processes of accumulation

Why are some farmers prosperous, and others not? In this section I highlight several factors that can help us to answer this question. Although some of these factors have been highlighted throughout the preceding section, it is necessary to discuss their implications on processes of differentiation in a more direct way.

10.2.1 Access to financial capital

From the materials presented above, it is clear that a key differentiating factor among these farmers is access to financial capital. The fact that these new medium-scale "commercial" farmers are struggling can only be understood in the context of the country's continual economic crisis. Zimbabwe's ongoing economic crisis since 2000, especially the period between 2006 and 2009 and again 2018 onwards (Shonhe et al. 2021: 615), has left many farmers in dire straits. There has been little (if any) financial support from the government since settlement, especially compared to the "situation before Independence, when large-scale farming was heavily subsidised and received generous soft loans through seasonal and medium-term loans." (ibid: p.616). State backing was, thus, essential for both the establishment of the farms in the early twentieth century and for its sustenance thereafter (Dunlop 1971; Palmer 1977; Herbst 1994). This has been lacking for the new medium-scale farmers, many of whom felt badly let down by a lack of access to financial support from the government. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the state cattle loans of the early 2000s mainly benefitted

[167] WhatsApp communication, 19 March 2019.

those who were well-connected. Only one self-contained farmer across the two samples had obtained a loan from the RBZ's Farm Mechanization scheme of 2007/08. This is not surprising, given that the two Matabeleland provinces received a mere USD 14 million worth of loan value from this scheme, representing about 7% of the loan's total value compared to Mashonaland provinces (Magaisa 2020). As discussed in the previous chapter, the so-called "Command Livestock" programme – designed to provide livestock loans in the semi-arid regions – was still at its infancy. My survey across the two schemes revealed that only two farmers of the 50 farmers surveyed reported having received cattle loans from ARDA/Trek as part of a pilot scheme of Command Livestock programme.

With lack of state and private loans, the A2 and self-contained farmers have had to rely on themselves for establishing their livestock enterprises. Indeed, most of them used earnings from wage employment or self-employed businesses to support agricultural production. It is therefore not surprising that most of these new farmers have struggled to set up their new farms. Such struggles to set up farms echoes the experience of Afrikaner settlers who had used the land in the 1920s and 1930s (Nel & Mabhena 2020). The majority of these farmers were notoriously under-resourced and under-capitalised, and were thus criticised by authorities for failing to establish their farms, paying their workers meagre wages and living under precarious conditions (citing Ranger 1999). As with the Afrikaner farmers of the late 1930s, lack of access to capital is a major obstacle to commercial agriculture in the new medium-scale farm sector in Matobo. Thus, the new farmers have been "similarly-accused, but just as in 1939 getting farms going in a very dry area with limited resources is exceptionally difficult" (Scoones 2020).

As shown in the preceding section, farmers have drawn on several sources to finance the acquisition of livestock and other farm investments. These include savings from wage employment and/or business income, state sponsored loans, diaspora, joint ventures and so on. However, these sources are not available to everyone.

Most wealthy herd owners who are "stepping in" or "stepping up" rely on horizontal straddling (Woodhouse & Bernstein 2001), which involves combining different economic activities continuously and more or less simultaneously. This type of straddling – as Oya (2007) shows for the rural capitalists in Senegal – involves a symbiotic relationship between livestock farming and off-farm income activities, whereby surplus generated from one economic activity is invested in another. For example, surplus generated in cross-border transport business can

be used to invest in livestock (see SM and JoM cases for example), or vice-versa (the case of EM).

The period from birth and to market weight ranges from six months to three years for cattle in the area, depending with the cattle breed. This means that farmers must therefore have access to other sources of income during this period. Other streams of income enable them to purchase inputs and cover labour costs. Thus, most farmers, including successful herd owners, are still engaged in off-farm jobs and businesses. Many farmers interviewed expressed their desire to rely on livestock as their main activity, but lack of credit has thwarted such desire. For example, RN (aged 41), a large herd owner in the area, explained that his livestock enterprise is now "self-sustaining" and "feels comfortable" that he wishes he could retire from his legal firm business. However, he reiterated that if he leaves his business in town, his farm "will suffer". RN sells cattle only once or twice every year, meaning that he has to draw on income wages to pay workers and other costs. After the sale, he says he is able to recoup all his costs that he had used the entire year. Thus, access to a better and regular income is not only important for setting up a farm enterprise, but also to fund working capital.

Some urban-based capitalist farmers were able to invest in livestock production through earnings from international migration (diaspora) overseas. For example, Mr PMM, an ex-ZAPU war veteran and retired soldier, related how he managed to build up capital to invest on his self-contained plot through international migration to the UK. He retired from the army in 1997 "because of lack of promotion". In 2001, while serving as a district chairman for war veterans, he was able to acquire a self-contained plot under the war-veteran quota. He then emigrated to the UK, where he joined his wife who had left in 1999. While in the UK, he managed to secure a job as a security guard at British Telecommunications (BT) thanks to his experience in the army. While working in the UK, he was able to build up capital to invest in cattle, farm assets (e.g., water pump), pick-up truck, and three houses in Bulawayo. In 2012, he returned to Zimbabwe to focus on farming. The houses in town allows him to derive a regular income from rent, which is in turn used to pay wages and farm inputs.

Others were able to build up capital and herds through "*ukulayisha",* an informal cross-border transport business, which involves transporting and smuggling of different types of goods and cash from South Africa, as well as, smuggling Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa (Thebe 2011). Other absentee urban-based investors are also engaging in backyard broiler production in town with whatever revenue generated being used to support the farm. For example, MJ

explained how proceeds from backyard broiler project in Bulawayo is a major source of working capital at the rural farm. In particular, he uses profits from the backyard poultry business to purchase supplementary feed and to pay herders' wages.

In sum, some urban-based investors had adequate capital at the outset of settlement which enabled them to heavily invest in livestock. For these farmers, land reform provided an opportunity to diverse their portfolios into farming, hence farming was seen as a new site of accumulation. The findings reported above suggest that these urban-based farmers were able to finance farm investments through savings from well-paid wage jobs and/or self-employed business. In self-contained farms, the land allocation process biased towards beneficiaries with "large herds" or "productive capacity" meant that such beneficiaries had already accumulated substantial amounts of capital before settlement. Twenty years on, such farmers are now reinvesting surplus into the farm, perhaps combined with non-farm business profit.

At the other extreme, the impoverished landed property – who makes up the bulk of the sample – had insufficient capital to invest in production, hence are struggling to gain a foothold in commercial farming. The low-paid jobs militated against substantial farm investments, and the meagre income so received did not provide much of a solid basis for accumulation.[168] In other words, they have struggled to mobilise start-up capital necessary for commercial cattle ranching. By being extremely frugal, some were able to slowly build up herds from relatively low wages, but such enterprises are still precarious (as in the case of MD). For these farmers, farm investment is mainly from a portion of wages or from a portion of non-farm business income (but not necessarily profit) at the expense of: (a) consumption (social reproduction), and hence a result off a 'squeeze' at least to some degree; or (b) non-farm profit that could be reinvested back into that business, hence a different kind of 'squeeze'. The sharecropping/ leasing arrangements has become especially vital for this group of farmers as a means for livestock acquisition in the absence of state support and access to credit.

Misfortune in the world of off-farm wage employment or business can also lead to accumulation failure at the farm. The case of SM illustrates this. Long-term absenteeism away

[168] As the previous sections establishes, in most instances, these farmers are or had been previously employed in low-paid jobs such as civil service and lowest ranks in military. Wages in civil service are amongst the lowest in the country.

from the farm proved costly for SM as his herd declined through theft. His comments "cell-phone farming doesn't work" was a recurrent theme amongst farmers.

10.2.2 Managing reliability

The ability to succeed in an unpredictable and variable environment depends very much on managing variability. In order to survive or accumulate in an unpredictable and variable semi-arid environment, livestock producers in A2 and self-contained farms pursue various intensive and extensive strategies aimed at generating reliability (Chapter Eight). In years of drought, livestock producers in these farms pursue a wide array of strategies to sustain their animals. These strategies include provision of supplementary feed during drought, livestock movement, investing in veterinary drugs, and so on. As I argued in the preceding chapter, these strategies are, however, not available to everyone.

Livestock mobility remains a key aspect of livestock production in the new medium-scale farms, despite the fact that land reform has resulted in rangeland fragmentation. Given that A2 and self-contained farms are notionally held as private property, livestock producers enter into very complex arrangements with neighbours and others in order to access pastures beyond the boundaries of their individual units. In the early years of settlement, most of these farms were largely understocked (especially A2 farms) and unfenced, allowing wealthy livestock-owning households to "poach" graze in neighbours' plots with fewer animals. Things look rather different now. Most farms have been occupied, ring-fenced and boast large herds. This meant that new arrangements had to emerge.

One such arrangement is the institution of *ukulagisa* (informal land leasing) described in Chapter Eight, which facilitates livestock mobility in the new resettlement areas. This institution enables the tracking of grazing and water resources over time and space. It is therefore central for generating reliability. However, this strategy is however costly, and therefore is available to wealthy livestock-owning households who can afford to pay rent.

On the other hand, the poorer herd owners largely rely on social networks such as close kinship ties, neighbourly relations and good connections with government officials to secure access to additional grazing outside the formally allocated land. Those who had good connections with local state officials were able to augment their landholdings through additional allocation of those who had quit or multiple allocation (registered in other household members' names). Collaboration with other neighbours and kin is also vital. For example, a group of six

households in Wild East collaborated to refurbish an existing old water pump, which they now use to pump water to their homestead for both drinking and livestock purposes during the dry season. Based on this very close working relationship, some members of this water association graze their animals together during the dry season. A member of this group explained: 'During the dry season, we do not close our gates. Closing the gates will kill our animals. We allow the animals to graze in all the plots freely. But when rains come, I immediately close my gates'. Thus, social networks override formal property divisions as a response to variable environments. Illegal grazing or poach-grazing was also found to be a common practice. This often take place in neighbouring farms with fewer animals, including A1 schemes and large-scale farms. Others have managed to acquire A1 plots in nearby farms, and registered such plots in the names of their spouses or children in order to evade the ban of multiple holdings.

Other relatively wealthy herd owners have adopted semi-intensive strategies in order to generate reliability. This strategy requires significant capital and skill. It also involves the use of commercial supplementary feed, and bringing grass from elsewhere. Access to water is crucial for *in situ* feeding. This strategy is costly and therefore only an option for the relatively wealthier households with access to stable and remunerative jobs and/or off-farm businesses.

Livestock farming in a highly variable landscape such as that of Matobo district requires careful and fine-tuned management, hard work, prior farming experience and good luck. Careful management of cattle is vital for success. This requires skill, hands-on management and working capital to purchase supplementary feeding and veterinary drugs. Most successful herd owners invested in veterinary drugs and dipping chemicals.

Overall, all these strategies are important for sustaining animals in dryland pastoral settings. However, they are not available to everyone, as others requires skill, capital, labour and so on.

10.2.3 Informal land leasing

In the context of limited access to finance, the *ukulagisa* has become a critical strategy for building up herds for relatively poor-households. As many case studies have shown in the preceding chapters, some farmers who had no or few livestock at settlement have managed to build up herds through *ukulagisa* arrangements.

10.2.4 The role of the state

The state has played especially a contradictory role in nurturing or constraining processes of differentiation and so accumulation. First, the state played a crucial role in the land allocation processes. In the case of self-contained farms, the land allocation process was carefully regulated by the local state and the "beneficiary wards" which are the original beneficiaries of the communally-held Three-tier farms. Local councillors, chiefs and headmen also played a key role in the allocation of land. As shown in Chapter Four, land allocation was biased towards owners of large herds or those with access to adequate capital to invest in commercial cattle ranching. While prospective land recipients were elected by villagers on the basis of livestock holdings, the local state undertook the final allocation. Thus, both the local state and the communities sought a particular class of livestock farmers for settlement on the scheme. To borrow Sachikonye's (1989: 31) words, the selection process itself was "a differentiating exercise" in its exclusion of aspirant livestock farmers with smaller herds and access to capital. To this end, most of these farms were acquired by relatively prominent people, including owners of large herds in the communal areas, urban-based investors, civil servants and local traditional leaders. The local state expected this class of farmers to "put up infrastructure as per ideals of proper ranching".[169] Indeed, many of these beneficiaries had resources required to fence off their plots, and engage in commercial ranching.

As early as the mid-2000s, however, it became clear that the smaller farm sizes allocated to farmers was placing a fundamental constraint on accumulation, especially in the uncertainties in non-equilibrium ecosystems. Most of the farms allocated could only accommodate 20-25 LU, according to the official recommendations. I have already shown how capitalist farmers attempted to use "carrying capacity" arguments in order to gain access to more land. I have also shown that the local state prevented further land accumulation by these capitalists by dismissing the applications on equity grounds. Thus, the local state played an ambiguous role in both facilitating and constraining accumulation and differentiation. And it is also necessary to say something about the continual great deal of ambiguity in relation to property rights and the related conflicted politics of state control between the local and central state. There is no space to deal with this issue in great detail here, but essentially this involves the local state control, requiring subdivision to assert presence, versus central control, suggesting that the

[169] A letter from the CEO Matobo to CEO Gwanda, RE: Use of Antony, Sweet Grass farms and Shashi Block of farms (Champion, Nasby, Dube and Sidube), 24 February 2010.

farms must revert to original land use. This has created continual anxiety among self-contained farmers about security of tenure.

Unlike in self-contained farms, the central state played a crucial role in the land allocation process. As noted in Chapter Four, applicants for A2 farms had to submit a business plan, prove that they had the necessary capital and agricultural experience (also see Shonhe et al. 2021). In practice though, the process was sometimes marred with corruption. As seen in chapter 5, some well-connected people used their political connections to gain access to land, although they did not meet the criteria. This explains the predominance of "war veterans" in A2 farms. Such beneficiaries have therefore experienced a major hurdle in acquiring livestock and investing on the farm.

Beyond making land available for settlement through redistribution, both the local and central state has done little (in any) to support the new livestock farmers since settlement. While a few well-connected have benefitted from different forms of state support, many have struggled to get going due to lack of capital, as observed above. This situation is not new. As noted above, archival evidence suggests that early white settlers in the late 1930s experienced a similar challenge, but were fortunately supported by the state during the colonial period. As observed elsewhere, these farmers had to start from scratch. Farms had to be fenced off, buildings had to be constructed for accommodation purposes and livestock acquired. In addition, the farmers had to invest in other farm infrastructure such as animal handling facilities, boreholes and small dams. Most farms were bushes, with no roads and farmers had to construct their own access roads. In most cases, these dirt roads become inaccessible during the rainy season, and even left eroded after heavy rains. In such instances, farmers have to take their own initiatives to fix the roads.[170] As noted earlier, farmers had to make all these farm investments using their own funds. The "Command Livestock" has been woefully underfunded and marred with corruption allegations, as previously noted. Many A2 and self-contained farmers surveyed also complained of lack of extension services. As a result, some capitalist farmers hire current or retired veterinarians as "consultants" to help with livestock management, while others hire professional managers.

[170] I observed one case where farmers in Malundi dirt road to access their farms had to contribute some money in order to hire a grader to fix the road after Cyclone Dineo, while the rural council supplied them with diesel. The farmers also supplied labour to clear up bushes along the road.

10.3 Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, the claims that medium-scale farms allocated during Zimbabwe's land reform in the early 2000s are largely occupied by "cronies" and the "unproductive" and "underutilization" tropes that are common in writings about these farms are grossly overstated. I have argued that a process of accumulation and differentiation is occurring in the medium-scale farms in dry areas, as is the case in A1 schemes (Scoones et al. 2010; Scoones et al. 2016; Mkodzongi 2013), other A2 areas elsewhere (Shonhe et al. 2021), communal areas (Cousins et al. 1992) and former African Purchase areas of the colonial era (Cheater 1994). I classified the medium-scale farmers into three broad categories: "dropping out/down", "hanging in", and "stepping in/up". These categories were in turn linked to a broader class character of farmers - "urban-based capitalists", "rural-based capitalists", and the "impoverished landed property" – as well as accumulation paths ("from above", "below" and "outside").

Several key factors that explain why some farmers are doing well while others are not have been discussed. These include access to high wage or non-farm capital, careful management, ingenuity, fortune and so on. Some of these constitute "high-reliability" management. One key factor which explained these social differences is access to capital. In class terms, a substantial group of capitalist farmers linked to off-farm business and/or wage employment – engaging in "accumulation from below" and "accumulation from outside" – is emerging, alongside a large group of "impoverished landed property" that lack capital to farm relatively large holdings. For the rural- and urban-based capitalists in the "stepping in/up", their greater access to higher wages and/or non-farm business income provided a basis for accumulation. However, the major constraint on their expanded reproduction is access to more land: this is a crucial factor for expanding the scale of operation and coping with forage variability. On the other hand, the "impoverished landed property" has been constrained by lack of capital. This has, in part, led to the emergence of the "vernacular land market".

I argued that the development of this vernacular land market can be explained by two factors: first concerns the land constraint experienced by successful capitalist farmers due to land ceiling regulations imposed by the state. The second issue concerns the need to temporarily move cattle to alternative grazing in response to variability. This explains the reinvention of old age livestock management systems such as *mlaga* or *ukulagisa*, and its importance in dryland livestock production systems. This arrangement has allowed capitalist farmers and successful simple reproducers to gain access to more land, and the struggling farmers to build

or expand their herds in a context of no state support and economic collapse. However, some of these less successful farmers are beginning to experience land shortages as they also begin to develop relatively large herds themselves (as in the case of KM).

Finally, the effects of state action on accumulation patterns were also highlighted. I have shown how the local state played a contradictory role on accumulation among the self-contained farmers. On one hand, the local state set a specific agenda to promote "proper commercial ranching", ensuring those with large herds or productive capacity to engage in commercial ranching from communal areas are selected as beneficiaries. However, by emphasizing equity, the farm sizes are not viable. This has compelled the new capitalist farmers to pursue a variety of mechanisms, including illegal ways such as renting, in order to meeting their land requirements.

Apart from making land available, the state has also done little to directly support the new medium-scale farmers. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of farmers (especially in the A2 farms) are struggling to gain a foothold in livestock production in the wake of an ongoing financial crisis in Zimbabwe. For many, farm investments and livestock acquisition has been largely piecemeal. It is clear therefore that access to financial capital explains these emergent patterns of differentiation, and the direction of change between and within the categories. Those without capital have found it difficult to invest in production in a context of limited state support. To build or expand their herds, these capital-constrained farmers resort to leasing-out pastures to others as a livestock accumulation strategy, although leasing is officially prohibited. This has allowed those endowed with capital to expand production by leasing-in additional pastures. With no subsidies from the state, some war veterans used their status to gain access to land have struggled to invest and engage in production, a phenomenon which I have termed "stalled accumulation from above". Perhaps these struggling farmers, most of whom are retired or active salaried workers, might be described as "fragmented classes of labour", combining limited agricultural production, if any, with off-farm economic activities. It is therefore misleading to assume that these new medium-scale farmers are a homogenous group of ZANU-PF "cronies". As I have argued in chapter 6, there was some degree of social differentiation among these farmers at the onset (at settlement), with differential access to capital, social networks and land (Moyo 2013).

This chapter's findings also resonate with the experience of other medium-scale farms in Africa, including Zambia, Tanzania and Nigeria, where there has been a major rise in the

number of African-owned medium-scale farms (Jayne et al. 2016). A key finding is that a few of the medium-scale farmers started out as small-scale farmers who later acquired more land and expand their operations into medium-scale farming ("stepping up").[171] A key finding is that a few of the medium-scale farmers started out as small-scale farmers who later acquired more land and expand their operations into medium-scale farming ("stepping up"). Instead, the vast majority of these medium-scale farmers were relatively privileged rural folks (e.g. civil servants, religious people, extension officers, rural-based entrepreneurs, chiefs or headmen) or urban-based professionals and businesspeople, who are "stepping in" medium-scale farming using non-farm income to buy land and start farming, a pattern that echo similar trends in Zimbabwe (although these are beneficiaries of land reform). Within agrarian political economy approach, Whitfield (2016) characterizes this as a form of "capitalism from outside" (Whitfield 2016), a phenomenon which de Janvry (1981) has termed the "Merchant Road". Examples of "accumulation from outside" or "Merchant Road" have been found elsewhere in Africa (Whitfield 2016), as well as in other parts of Latin America (de Janvry 1981).

[171] An exception is Ghana (Chapoto et al. 2013).

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSIONS

11.1 Research questions and methods: a recap

This thesis has investigated how processes of accumulation and social differentiation play out post-land reform in dryland livestock settings in southwestern Zimbabwe, where high levels of environmental variability exist. It is motivated by the fact that dryland pastoralist settings are distinct from the sedentary, temperate and crop-focused contexts upon which debates about the peasantry and agrarian change have been largely focussed (Scoones 2021: 1). Four specific research questions were raised to address gaps in knowledge relating to class dynamics and agrarian change in Matobo district:

RQ1: Who are the new land reform beneficiaries and what are their socio-economic and political origins?

RQ2: How do processes of social differentiation, class formation and agrarian accumulation play out in highly variable environments?

RQ3: What strategies do the new land reform beneficiaries deploy to survive and accumulate in the context of a highly variable resource base and how are these strategies related to class and gender?

RQ4: How have politics and power relations between the people and the state affected the outcomes of the FTLRP in relation to the allocation of farms in particular?

This chapter considers the degree to which the overall aim has been addressed and the research questions answered though the research process. It begins by summarising its research design and reiterating key findings. Drawing from a combination of "intensive" and "extensive" research across several phases of data collection from 2015 to 2022 in Matobo district, Zimbabwe, this study argues that – while processes of accumulation and social differentiation amongst different types of (livestock) farmers are underway in Matobo – paths of accumulation in these settings are not as linear as often portrayed in the literature and the classic agrarian debates. This thesis therefore bears out Jacobs' (2018) point that there is no simple "agrarian transition" to a more capitalist agricultural production accompanied by a process of rural proletarianization, nor any guaranteed emergence of a class of successful agrarian producers (Oya 2007) in dryland settings.

A key feature of dryland settings is their variability in temporal and spatial distribution of rainfall that result in variability in grazing and water resources (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). This has important implications for understanding the nature of agricultural production and the possibilities for accumulation in these settings. Here, agricultural production (both crops and/or livestock) is characterised by boom-and-bust cycles, not only but in larger part due to agroecological conditions. The argument presented here is that agrarian accumulation in dryland settings is often disrupted, and therefore requires inputs from outside and access to diverse rangelands during such cycles.

Chapter Seven shows the importance of off-farm income for sustaining farm investment and production. There were very few households within the study sites who relied solely on agricultural income for their livelihood. Instead, they straddled a variety of off-farm and non-farm activities. In most cases, accumulation in livestock was contingent upon non-farm earnings, such as a self-employed business or wage income.

Chapter Eight shows that livestock producers actively manage variability and uncertainty in order to survive or accumulate in a variable landscape. These strategies include livestock movement, supplementary feeding, destocking, disease control, and so on. Such strategies are aimed to ensure a stable flow of livestock products and services (Roe et al. 1998; Roe 2020). For example, animals are moved in response to spatial and temporal variability of the resource base (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994). To do so requires strong social institutions, linking across kin group and clans, and allowing collaboration work, including scouting out areas, striking grazing contracts, and managing herding labour (Turner & Scheldt 2019). Livelihood diversification – which may combine farming, harvesting of natural resources, and other off-farm activities (e.g., wage work and trade) – is also vital. Off-farm income may enable pastoralists to purchase outside inputs for recovery after a shock (e.g., drought), or offer an alternative livelihood if farming fails due to shocks.

This thesis has examined these themes in some detail, with a particular focus on resettlement areas in Matobo district, in the southwest of Zimbabwe. It has therefore brought together several different strands of literature to demonstrate a theoretical argument for the inclusion of perspectives from pastoral studies when examining processes of accumulation and class differentiation in non-equilibrium environments, dominated by an unpredictable and harsh climate. It draws on insights from Marxist agrarian political economy (Byres 1996; Neocosmos 1993; Bernstein 1996, 2006, 2010; Cousins 2013, 2010), non-equilibrium ecology (Ellis &

Swift 1988; Westoby et al. 1989; Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones 1994; Vetter 2005), high-reliability theory (Roe et al. 1998a, b; Roe 2020) and property rights (Cousins 2000; Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006). The argument for the inclusion of some insights from pastoral studies draws from Scoones' (2021) seminal article. A significant contribution of this work has therefore been to bring these different strands of literature together.

In the previous seven chapters we have noted a number of comparisons between sites, schemes and findings from other parts of the country, which have relatively higher agro-ecological potential. In summary, the empirical evidence presented in this thesis has demonstrated the highly varied character of both processes and outcomes in Zimbabwe's land reform, as argued by Cliffe et al. (2011). Matobo district is no way 'typical', and its distinctive agroecology brings to prominence particular forms of capital accumulation and social differentiation.

Scoones et al.'s (2010) work in Masvingo province and the growing body of literature from Mashonaland and other parts of the country provide a useful point of departure for my analysis of accumulation dynamics in dryland non-equilibrium settings. I call this the "Masvingo/Mashonaland crop farming story" because these case studies are largely based in the medium to high potential regions of Masvingo and Mashonaland provinces that offer more opportunities for dryland crop farming, but Matobo district is geographically distinct: the region is characterised by low rainfall and persistent drought shocks as well as non-equilibrium dynamics.

Chapter Three discussed the methodology deployed in my enquiry and the profile of study sites. Following Sayer (2010), my empirical research consisted of three overlapping phases. (a) The first 'exploratory' or 'preliminary' phase was concerned with becoming acquainted with the district, its history, people and relevant government officials and traditional authorities. Second, potential research sites were identified and visited. After several days of talking with and interviewing farmers and government officials, a decision was made to focus on Ward 23, because it had a high concentration of different land use types. It was felt that this area would provide a focussed and manageable site for examining different livestock systems and their interactions in extensive settings, particularly during periods of drought. (b) The second, 'intensive-qualitative-historical research' phase of research was concerned with gathering qualitative and historical data via in-depth interviews and archival research in government offices in Maphisa and Kezi. This information was invaluable for sharpening my research questions and designing the questionnaire instrument. (c) The third 'hybrid intensive-

extensive' phase was concerned with collecting quantitative data by way of household survey directed to land recipients across three different land uses. Concurrently, over the course of this phase I conducted 'life-history' interviews with all the farmers in the survey, focusing on dynamics of accumulation. (d) The final 'revisiting the field' phase aimed to update some of the data. It involved collection of detailed qualitative data on the changes that had taken place during my absence from the field.

Table 11.1: A comparative summary of general features

A1 schemes	A2 schemes	Self-contained schemes
Established through land invasions and occupations led by war veterans and others in the early 2000	Established through a formal application and allocation procedure from 2002 onwards	These farms were once collectively-held Three-tier/Model D scheme that were then subdivided into individual units for exclusive use from 1999 onwards
Sample size: 67 households (82% in the two villages)	Sample size: 18 farms (53% in the ward)	Sample size: 32
Median land area allocated (median): 5 ha (Range: 2–5 ha)	Land holdings (median): 475 ha (Range: 283.1–800 ha)	Land holdings (median): 155.5 ha (Range: 103–600 ha)

Source: Own data

The processes of land reform described in Chapter Four influenced the socio-economic and political profile of land reform beneficiaries in each scheme, with significant contrasts between different categories of land reform 'schemes' (see Table 11.1). The A1 villagised schemes have their origins in the land invasions and occupations (*jambanja*) in the early 2000s, which was led by war veterans and others. As in other parts of the country, these land invasions and occupations were regularised after a year or two (see Scoones et al. 2010). For this study, I surveyed two contrasting A1 villages: Luma and Vimbi. With regards to the process of land reform, these village, located within Ward 23 and less than 20 km apart, display both commonalities and differences. They are similar in that they lie in the same agro-ecological region and in their origins as a result of land invasions and occupations in the early 2000s and later regularisation but show significant contrasts in the degree to which the state was involved during the land reform process from invasions to regularisation, especially with regards to land allocation (Chapter Five). In other words, the villages experienced diverging land reform processes and thus outcomes. In Vimbi, the land reform process was a "bottom-up", while in Luma it was a "top-down" approach, although this categorisation somewhat oversimplifies much more complex processes. These processes had major implications for who benefited from

the land reform sites, and also patterns of production (Chapter Five) and accumulation (Chapter Nine). What these differences across the two villages demonstrate is that the outcomes of land reform are contingent on 'histories of place' (Ranger 2011).

11.2 Patterns, variations and contrasts within and across land reform research sites

Chapters Five and Six show how the new farmers are highly differentiated with different assets, livestock ownership, capacities to invest in production and links to off-farm income. These chapters also illustrate how different land reform processes can shape processes and outcomes of land reform. In particular, Chapter Five shows how very different local politics and conflicts shape both processes and outcomes of land reform.

The thesis found that land reform beneficiaries came from very diverse socio-economic and political origins. In the A1 schemes, the overwhelming majority of settlers were landless or land-poor from neighbouring communal areas and the unemployed and under-employed people from nearby urban areas, accounting for over 62% of all surveyed A1 farmers (Chapter Five). Similarly, land recipients in A2 and self-contained farms were from diverse social backgrounds, in part, because of various processes of land allocation. However, civil servants and those defined as self-employed business-people in and/or outside Zimbabwe were dominant (Chapter Six). Contrary to some studies that casts recipients of A2 and self-contained farms in other parts of the country as "cronies" (Marongwe 2011; Zamchiya 2011), the study clearly shows that this narrative is not supported. Overall, these findings are consistent with other studies in other parts of the country (Moyo et al. 2009; Scoones et al. 2010; Matondi 2012; Hanlon et al. 2012; Mkodzongi 2013; Chigumira 2014).

There are of course some who were able to use their political connections (at district and national level) to gain access to land, especially those employed in the security services, politicians and, to some extent, civil servants (Chapter Six). Most of such beneficiaries tended to be members of the District Land Committee (DLC), and were able to manipulate the system to their benefit. This is, however, not the whole story. Some simply successfully applied for land. A small proportion of original settlers were employed in the security services: 13% in A1 farms, 22% in A2 farms and 16% in self-contained farms. These findings are in line with Shonhe et al.'s (2020) findings in A2 farms in Mvurwi and Masvingo-Gutu (where those in the security services accounted for only 18% in Mvurwi and 10% in Masvingo-Gutu) and Scoones et al.'s (2010) findings in Masvingo. Looking at these data, we are drawn to the conclusion that

the claim that A2 and self-contained farms were taken by well-connected political elites does not hold water.

When compared with other regions, the proportion of war veterans benefiting from land reform were found to be quite high. Using a broad definition, Scoones et al. (2010) found that "war veterans" in Masvingo province made up only 8.8% of the surveyed population.[172] Within A2 sites, Shonhe et al. (2020: 611) found that 31% and 18% identified themselves as war veterans in Mvurwi and Masvingo-Gutu, respectively. The proportion of war veterans in this study was found to be much higher in all three schemes than in other parts of the country. In Matobo district as a whole, the proportion of war-veterans based on official records were 45% in A2 farms and 17% in A1 schemes, with the former higher than the 20% quota officially stipulated by the government and the latter lower than the 20% quota.[173] No official social profile data was available for self-contained farmers, but given the salience of war veterans elsewhere in the region, it can be assumed that the proportion of beneficiaries who were war veterans is somewhat similar to that of A2 schemes. The survey data shows much higher proportions than these figures, with half of the settlers (50% or 9 of 18 cases) in A2 farms studied, 43% in A1 farms and 43% in self-contained farms identifying themselves as war veterans.

Most of these war veterans were men, and often linked to ZIPRA (affiliated to the late Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union, or ZAPU) one of the two liberation armies that fought the brutal liberation of the 1970s. That the majority of war veterans were ex-ZAPU is not surprising, given the recruitment strategies of the liberation armies along regional and ethnic lines (Alexander & McGregor 1998; Alexander et al. 2000). ZIPRA tended to largely recruit in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces, while ZANLA (affiliated to the Zimbabwe African National Union, or ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe) recruited in Mashonaland. Although the war veteran status "was a key factor during occupations and land allocation processes", as Scoones et al. (2010: 54) suggest, my findings cast considerable doubt on studies which have characterised war veterans as rich, well-politically connected ZANU-PF "elites". The life-histories of war-veterans discussed in Chapter Five and Six show, for instance, that most of the war veterans in the study area were demobilised following Independence in 1980. These war veterans either took up permanent jobs in Zimbabwe and further afield as truck

[172] Defined as those who fought in the liberation struggle, war collaborators and political detainees.

[173] Based on data drawn from Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement records.

drivers, security guards, civil service, teachers, mechanics or stayed in the communal areas. Their chances of getting a remunerative job depended on level of education. In A1 farms, most of the war veterans were not well educated.

The findings of the survey also suggest that the majority of land beneficiaries were from the Matabeleland region. Contrary to the findings of Mabhena (2014) in Gwanda and Umzingwane districts, the overwhelming majority across the three schemes were found to hail from this region. For instance, in the A1 scheme, 97% of the settlers were born in Matabeleland, with around 70% being born in Matobo district (Chapter Five). These findings resonate with Ncube's (2018) findings in Bubi district, which reports that only three out of 18 A1 (villagised) farmers surveyed were from outside Matabeleland. Similarly, in A2 farms surveyed for this study, all but one (17 out of 18 cases) settlers were born in Matabeleland, with 83.3% of settlers (15 out of 18 cases) hailing from Matobo district. A similar pattern was also observed in Council's self-contained farms: 97% of settlers (31 of 32 cases) hailed from Matobo district (Chapter Six). The narrative that most land in Matabeleland went to "outsiders" from other provinces (Mabhena 2010) is not supported (see Table 11.2).

Table 11.2: Vimbi and Luma: a comparative summary of general features

Vimbi	Luma
Original farm size: 2576 ha. Of these, 800 ha of land is designated as A2 farms (A1 scheme: 2101 ha)	Farm size: 2849 ha. Of these, 1073 ha of land is designated as A2 farms (A1 scheme: 1776 ha)
Year settled: 2000	Year settled: 2000
Located in the inner part of the ward	Located on Matobo-Gwanda border
Land reform process: "bottom-up"	Land reform process: "top-down"
88% of households came from Matobo district. 3% from Gwanda	50% of households came from Matobo district. Around 24% from neighbouring Gwanda
Relations with neighbouring areas (all resettlement areas) are generally harmonious	Land conflicts with nearby communal areas and A2 farms are rife
Total A1 households: 35, but only 29 households were formally allocated	Total A1 households: 47, but only 27 households were formally allocated
83% had "offer letters"	9% had "offer letters"

Source: Own data

Chapter Five investigated the socio-economic profile of those land reform beneficiaries who gained access to land in A1 smallholder schemes, and in particular patterns of social differentiation among these farmers, drawing from socio-economic data collected in my own surveys and rich qualitative material from two contrasting A1 villages (see Tables 11.3 and

11.4). To describe patterns of inequality among the A1 smallholder farmers, a ‘success’ ranking exercise was utilised, with households clustered into four ‘success groups’ (SG) based on the notion of success. ‘SG1’ households were found to own the bulk of the means of production (e.g., cattle and farm implements), have access to more income sources of better quality, have better quality houses and usually produce relatively larger amounts of grain for both consumption and sale in ‘good’ years. ‘SG4’ households were found to be largely absentee farmers who were simply keeping land for speculative reasons. It was also found that the land recipients in these schemes came from diverse backgrounds. The majority were previously poor small-scale farmers in communal areas or were under- or unemployed in nearby towns or cities.

Table 11.3: A comparative summary of key features in the domain of farming system and investment

A1 schemes	A2 schemes	Self-contained schemes
Farming system: small-scale extensive livestock production and dryland cropping	Farming system: extensive livestock production (mostly cattle). Cropping is negligible. Very few (4 out of 18) engage in small-scale irrigation	Farming system: extensive production (mostly cattle). Dryland cropping is negligible. None engage in irrigation
Median land area cleared by 2017 (ha): 2 ha (range 0 – 5 ha)	Median area cleared by 2017 (ha): 1.25 ha (range 0 – 10 ha)	Median area cleared by 2017 (ha):
68.7% of households own cattle. Median herd size per household: 2 (mean = 8.7, range 0 – 109)	83.3% of households (15 out of 18 cases) own cattle. Median herd size: 31 (mean = 54.3, range 0 – 267)	96.9% of all households (31 of 32 cases) own cattle. Median herd size per household: 54 (mean = 73.2, range 0 – 199)
65.7% of all households (44 of 67 cases) own goats. Median flock size per household: 3 (mean = 8.0, range 0 – 125)	33.3% of households (6 out of 18 cases) own goats. Median flock size per household: 0 (mean = 13.9, range 0 – 85)	43.7% of all households (14 out of 32 cases) own goats. Median flock size per household: 0 (mean = 7.4, range 0 – 35)
53.7% of all households (36 of 67 cases) own donkeys. Median herd size per household: 1 (mean = 3.1, range 0 – 15)	11.1% of all households (2 out of 18 cases) own donkeys. Median herd size per household: 0 (mean = 0.6, range 0 – 5)	40.6% of all households (13 out of 32 cases) own donkeys. Median herd size per household: 0 (mean = 2.3, range 0 – 15)
22.4% of households (15 out of 67 cases) own cars/trucks	72.2% of households (13 out of 18 cases) own cars/trucks	84.4% of all households (27 out of 32 cases) own cars/trucks
0% of the households (none) own a tractor	Only 1 household (5.6%) own a tractor	15.6% of all households (5 of 32 cases) own a tractor
65.7% of households (44 of 67 cases) own bicycles	22.2% of households (4 out of 18 cases) own bicycles	25% of households (8 out of 32 cases) own bicycles
71.6% of households (48 out of 67 cases) own ox-plough	50% of all households (9 out of 18 cases) own ox-plough	59.4% of households (19 out of 32 cases) own ox-plough
49.3% of households (33 of 67 cases) own scotch-cart	27.8% of households (5 out of 18 cases) own scotch-cart	40.6% of households (13 of 32 cases) own scotch-cart
40.3% of households (27 of 67 cases) own snap-sack sprayer	77.8% of households (14 of 18 cases) own snap-sack sprayer	87.5% of households (28 of 32 cases) own snap-sack sprayer
65.7% of households (44 of 67 cases) have brick house with asbestos or zinc roof	44.4% of households (8 of 18 cases) have brick houses with asbestos or zinc roof	46.9% of all households (15 of 32 cases) have brick houses with asbestos or zinc roof

Source: Own data

Table 11.4: The general socio-economic and demographic characteristics

A1 schemes	A2 schemes	Self-contained schemes
Median household head's age: 52 years (range: 23 – 78 years)	Median household head's age: 53 years (range: 38 –75 years)	Median household head's age: 57 years (range: 28 – 84 years)
43% of original settlers were/are 'war veterans'	50% of original settlers were/are 'war veterans'	43% of original settlers were/are 'war veterans'
Current/previous occupation: Communal areas farmers (22%), diaspora (15%), security services (13%), farmworkers (9%) and 'other' (7%)	Current/previous occupation: communal area farmer (0%), civil service (39%), self-employed businesspersons (27%), security services (22%), diaspora job (6%), senior politician (6%), and employed abroad (6%)	Current/previous occupation: Primary occupation at settlement: communal area farmers (6.3%), civil servants (46.9%), security services (15.6%), urban job (3.1%), self-employed businesspersons (21.9%), and employed abroad (6.3%)
Nearly 70% were born in Matobo and 13.4% from nearby Gwanda. Only 3% of settlers were born outside Matabeleland province	83% were born in Matobo. Only 6% were born outside Matabeleland provinces	97% of original settlers were born in Matobo. Only 3% of settlers were born outside Matabeleland provinces
Only 2% of original settlers had 'Master Farmers' certificates. 5% had other agricultural qualifications	None of original settlers had 'Master Farmers' certificates. 22% have other agricultural qualifications	Only 6% had 'Master Farmers' certificate. 13% had other agricultural qualifications
54% of household heads went to school beyond Form II. Only 6% had college diplomas/certificates and none had university degrees	83%of household heads went to school beyond Form II. 44% had college diploma/certificates and 22% had university degrees	84% went to school beyond Form II. 25% had college diplomas/certificates and 34% had university degrees
Only 3% (n=2) original settlers were women	Only 6% original settlers were women	Only 9% original settlers were women
Median year started farming: 2004	Median year started farming: 2013	Median year started farming: 2003

Source: Own data

Chapter Six considered the socio-economic aspects of medium-scale farmers who were allocated land in A2 and self-contained schemes, with a particular focus on material inequality. A 'price-weighted asset index' was utilised to describe patterns of inequality among these medium-scale farmers. Households were ranked rather arbitrarily into three equal 'asset groups' ('AG1' to 'AG3', with 'AG3' representing the most successful) in each scheme. 'AG3' households were found to occupy high ranks in security services or civil service or are businesspeople, in turn have access to high quality off-farm income, and account for the bulk of the cattle. The chapter criticises the view that these farms are occupied by "ZANU-PF elites" and that they are unproductive and under-utilised. In terms of production, it was found that some large herds are developing in both A2 and self-contained farms, often linked to off-farm

businesses and/or jobs for others. And the phenomenon of the well-connected using patronage networks was rare.

Chapter Seven then proceeded to interrogate income sources beyond the farm across all three schemes. While farming is obviously an important livelihood option, off-farm livelihood activities remain crucial in the study areas. It was found that diverse livelihood strategies are pursued, which may combine farming, natural resources harvesting and off-farm activities, such as 'piece jobs', own-account businesses and migration. Off-farm incomes do not only support investments in agriculture but offer an alternative livelihood option if farming fails due to sudden events, such as floods and drought.

Using data gathered through 'life-history' interviews with all surveyed farmers, Chapters Nine and Ten sought to interrogate the underlying causal dynamics generating patterns of inequality amongst farmers discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Farmers were thus grouped into three groups in terms of paths of accumulation (or not), deploying a slightly modified version of a typology first propounded by Dorward et al. (2009) and subsequently adapted by Mushongah (2010), Scoones et al. (2010) and Hall et al. (2017). This typology was in turn linked to a relational understanding of patterns of accumulation and social differentiation. It was found that a significant proportion of farmers were doing well, while there was a proportion that was not. A question was posed in each chapter: why are some beneficiaries prosperous and why are falling behind? A wide range of factors was discussed to explain the differences. These included: access to capital from off-farm income sources; 'prior accumulation' (i.e., the starting point of farmers); how the beneficiaries of land reform were selected by the state (central or local); the farmers' ability to ride out the periods of drought and economic downturn through diversified sources of income; and so on. Overall, it was argued that patterns of accumulation are non-linear because of non-equilibrium dynamics, compounded by other economic and social factors.

Another key component of the dissertation was an analysis of trajectories of accumulation. In order to fully assess emergent processes of accumulation, I collected detailed qualitative data from 67, 18 and 32 beneficiaries from, A1, A2 and self-contained farms, respectively. I adapted different framings of accumulation trajectories that have been used in other rural and land reform contexts in order to examine trajectories of accumulation (Scoones et al. 2010; Hall et al. 2017; Mtero et al. 2023). In this study, I identified four accumulation trajectories which captured the emerging forms of accumulation among land reform beneficiaries in different

types of farms in Matobo district: "stepping up", "stepping in", "hanging in" and "dropping in/out" (see Chapters Nine and Ten). To recap, *stepping up* referred to those households that were accumulating or expanding locally within agriculture, and in Marxist parlance, they were described as "accumulation from below". Second, *stepping in* represented those urban-based investors who were investing in agriculture in a substantial way linked to better-paid jobs and/or off-farm business, and were understood as "accumulating from outside" (Whitfield 2016; Bernstein 2010: 109) or following a "merchant path" (de Janvry 1981: 76). Third, the "hanging in" category referred to those who were maintaining a modest herd at more or less the same size – although still very precarious – but without herd expansion or depletion, as well as those largely constrained by limited access to financial capital. Finally, the "dropping down" or "dropping out" and de-accumulation category referred to those households that experienced reductions in production outputs due to economic and demographic factors (e.g., death of household head, illness, old age etc.), while others pursue alternative livelihoods elsewhere. This categorization was not an attempt to 'pigeon-hole' households into categories that are dynamic and everchanging in a non-linear or predictable direction but to help distinguish patterns and make sense of the complex set of data that had been collected.

There are, nonetheless, some important differences between the types of resettlement schemes and specific villages. For A1 schemes, the findings reveal that over a third of sampled households (35.8% or 24 of 67 cases) were 'stepping up' or accumulating through reinvestment of proceeds from farming. In class terms, these farmers were largely petty capitalists and successful commodity producers who were engaging in accumulation from below, through a mix of small-scale livestock production, opportunistic dryland crop farming and harvesting of natural resources. Only one farmer was found to be in the 'stepping in' category. Around 57% (38 of 67 cases) households were 'hanging in', with most of such household struggling to maintain their social reproduction through farming, and another 6% (4 of 67 cases) in the 'dropping down' category – experiencing 'de-accumulation' as a result of economic failure, as well as shocks and stresses (e.g., drought, death of a household head). In class terms, such households were designated as 'worker-peasants' and 'semi-peasants', often combining petty commodity production with other forms of non-agricultural activities. The findings reveal that very localised forms of politics and the conflicts they generate can and do shape outcomes in relation to access to land and ownership, which in turn, shape processes of agrarian accumulation (Chapters Five and Nine).

In A2 farms, in contrast, the findings reveal that over 60% (11 of 18 cases) of the surveyed households were in the 'hanging in' category (Chapter Ten). In class terms, a large proportion of these farmers were essentially 'impoverished landed property' who were capital-constrained and earning rent from leasing out all or part of their land because of their inability to farm. As Chapters Six and Ten reveals, most of these farmers were war-veterans and/or civil servants who were able to use their political connections (at both national, provincial and local level) to access land, despite having limited financial means to put their land into production. This represents a failed attempt to promote a new dynamic of 'accumulation from above'. Thus, leasing out of pastures to wealthier herd owners has become an important mechanism through which this class of impoverished landed property can build up its herd or fund farm infrastructural development (Chapter Eight). In A2 farms, the process of expanded reproduction in agriculture, a key indicator of capitalist development, has not been fully established. In self-contained farms, the findings reveal that 34.4% (11 of 32 cases) of the households were in the 'stepping in' category. These producers were largely urban-based capitalists who had managed to build up large herds of cattle, often linked to off-farm jobs and/or self-employed businesses. Thus, it appears that accumulation in livestock was contingent upon non-farm earnings, not agricultural surplus. In other words, off-farm income remained inextricably linked to production. This accumulation strategy has also been observed in a study of land reform beneficiaries in South Africa (Mtero et al. 2023).

The findings of this study are in keeping with previous studies, which report that some land reform beneficiaries are engaging in accumulation (Scoones et al. 2010, 2012, 2018; Mkodzongi 2013; Shonhe et al. 2020). In Masvingo province, for example, Scoones et al (2010) present evidence that around one third of resettled households are engaging in 'accumulation from below' – particularly in smallholder A1 schemes – with another third struggling to continue farming (i.e., facing a crisis of social reproduction), and another 10% exiting their plots as a result of poor health or being too poor to farm. A further one third of households were successfully diversifying their livelihoods to sustain their reproduction, including through local off-farm activities and remittances from migrant family members located in both Zimbabwe and in the diaspora. More recently, the same authors also found similar class dynamics in Mashonaland West province, where contract farming of tobacco has come to dominate (Scoones et al 2018). They found that the proportion of households accumulating from below was even higher in this area – at around 60% of the surveyed households.

This thesis shows that paths of agrarian accumulation are often interrupted, highly variable and non-linear, and often require outside inputs and access to diverse forms of rangelands during these cycles. Chapter Eight shows how livestock producers in the new resettlement areas manage their animals in a context of environmental variability and rangeland fragmentation. Livestock producers adopt a wide range of intensive and extensive management strategies, including various forms of livestock mobility, supplementary feeding, hay collection, investing in water infrastructure and so on. These strategies are aimed to generate a reliable output in a variable environment. Despite rangeland fragmentation, mobility remains key in tracking resources over time and space. Livestock producers enter into complex arrangements with neighbours and others in order to access additional grazing land beyond individual farm units. An adapted, age-old *mlaga* (seasonal transhumance) system has since emerged in the new resettlement areas. The research findings suggest that a vibrant vernacular land market is emerging, fuelled in particular by the need to track variability over time and space; hence, the wealthy herd owners rely on these informal markets to access additional grazing. Social networks and connections are also vital as they allow sharing and collaboration in order to generate reliability.

In keeping with the research findings, a number of policy implications emerge. Firstly, the commercial ranching model with its focus on privatization requires a rethinking, particularly considering the importance of livestock movements. Secondly, in the future, extensification via leasing in the market will continue, but if formalised (more property rights enforcement), it may become trickier for people to move their livestock.

11.3 Explaining the dynamics of accumulation and social differentiation

So why are some land reform beneficiaries successful more than others? In both schemes, access to capital from income sources was a differentiating factor as households with access to high wage or business income sources had managed to build up large herds of cattle. Other researchers have similarly reported that access to finance has a significant bearing on social differentiation among the new farmers (Shonhe 2017; Shonhe & Mtapuri 2020; Shonhe et al. 2020). As Shonhe et al. (2020: 618) note, with regards to A2 farmers, access to finance "substantially underpins the variations in outcomes in terms of production, agricultural investment and household accumulation in agriculture". This is not a new phenomenon as access to off-farm income has long been inextricably intertwined with processes of accumulation and social differentiation in rural Zimbabwe (Scoones 1990; Cousins 1992).

Second, given high levels of environmental variability that characterise the region, success in accumulation is contingent upon the ability to manage variability. In order to survive or thrive, livestock producers in the study sites adopted a wide range of extensive and intensive strategies in order to generate reliability. These strategies include livestock mobility, supplementary feeding, hay collection and so on. These strategies are not available to everyone, however. Those with access to financial capital are likely to rent additional grazing from others or purchase supplementary feed, while those with limited access to capital tended to rely on social networks to manage variability. In addition, the ability to manage economic downturn through diversification of income sources is equally important.

Third, 'prior accumulation', i.e., what the land reform beneficiaries brought to the table at the outset, is also critical for explaining trajectories of accumulation observed in the study sites. In self-contained farms, the selection criteria were biased towards wealthy herd owners or those with financial resources to engage in commercial ranching. It is therefore not surprising that the self-contained farmers were doing relatively well. Thus, the state has played a major role in shaping processes of accumulation.

Lastly, political connections are important too. While few in number, some have managed to capture the meagre resources made available by the party-state.

11.4 Contributions to the literature

This study makes a contribution to the literature on the dynamics of agrarian change in a number of ways. Firstly, this study has explored patterns of accumulation in dryland pastoralist settings following a major land reform. In doing so, it has responded to the provocation by Scoones (2021), who has stressed the importance of combining insights from pastoralist studies and critical agrarian studies in order to understand processes of agrarian change in the context of uncertainty.

Secondly, this present study adds to the growing body of research that indicates that processes of accumulation and social differentiation are underway in new resettlement areas (Cousins et al. 1992; Moyo et al. 2009; Chiweshe 2011; Scoones et al. 2010, 2012, 2018, 2019; Mkodzongi 2013; James 2015; Chigumira 2018; Shonhe 2018; Shonhe & Mtapuri 2020; Shonhe et al. 2020; Mudimu et al. 2021; Shonhe et al. 2022). What this study adds to this literature – and what is only beginning to be explored by others (e.g., Nel & Mabhena 2020) – is a detailed analysis of class dynamics in the under-researched semi-arid regions of Matabeleland (as noted

by Cliffe et al. 2011) – where livestock production predominates. This region is characterised by high levels of variability in rainfall and forage resources over time and space, which has important implications for production and accumulation. This research therefore adds a clear exposé of the effects of variability and non-equilibrium dynamics on accumulation and social differentiation.

Thirdly, this research adds further empirical evidence to support what has been observed elsewhere: that processes of agrarian accumulation in dryland pastoralist settings are non-linear in character. This is because of both the non-equilibrium dynamics evident in semi-arid rangelands and the nature of livestock as 'liquid wealth' (Pappagallo 2023); livestock production is thus characterised by 'boom-and-bust' cycles, whereby herds or flocks grow and decline, in relation to both environmental conditions and flows of capital from outside agriculture

Unlike the classic agrarian transitions discussed by Byres (1996), it is clear in Matobo district that successful smallholder producers – especially in medium-scale and self-contained farms – are largely not of 'agrarian origins', but rather rely on capital largely accumulated outside of agriculture (see Chapters Nine and Ten). This finding supports the essence of Bernstein's (2010) argument that the 'agrarian question of capital' is now less relevant for the development of capitalist economies, given that other sources of external funds are drawn upon to finance industrial development more broadly.

Fourthly, the research findings also give credence to the recent argument that there is no simple 'agrarian transition' to a more intensive, capitalist production accompanied by rural proletarianization as has been often assumed; nor necessarily any guaranteed emergence of a class of successful smallholder agrarian producers (Oya 2007; Jacobs 2018). What this study shows is that patterns of accumulation in dryland pastoral settings tend to be non-linear in character (Scoones 2023b; Pappagallo 2023).

11.5 Avenues for further research

This thesis has carefully examined how processes of accumulation and social differentiation are playing out in post-land reform settings in Matobo district, in Matabeleland South province, Zimbabwe. The findings reveal that processes of accumulation and social differentiation among land reform beneficiaries are underway, but are highly variable, often interrupted and

so require outside inputs for recovery and access to diverse forms of rangeland during these cycles.

A limitation of this research is the fact that it pays little explicit attention to gender issues, despite several individual case studies touching on the role and prospects of women in relation to accumulation relative to men. Another limitation is that this study did not address the impacts of land reform on 'environmental degradation'.

Evidently, more detailed research is needed, which focusses on gender and generational dynamics. For instance, a further study could carefully track the investments made in trying to ensure the economic success of the next generation by those who have accumulated resources. A question for further research is whether successful accumulators ensure that their children are well-educated, and enter middle class professions. There is more some hint of that this is the case in the various individual case studies (see Chapters Five and Six)

11.6 Conclusion

My research shows that patterns of agrarian accumulation and social differentiation are underway in dryland pastoral settings in Zimbabwe in the post-land reform era, but paths of accumulation are non-linear, not only because of agro-ecological conditions but also the flow of capital from outside. Those with access to stable, reliable and high off-farm income from businesses and/or jobs are able to invest substantially in production and engage in both "accumulation from below" and "accumulation from outside". They are also able to sustain their herds in the context of high levels of environmental variability by moving their animals renting additional grazing land from neighbours and others, investing in inputs and technology and so on. By contrast, those with limited access to capital have struggled to invest in livestock production, and resort to leasing out all or parts of their grazing land in exchange for heifers, farm development or cash.

Through a combination of intensive (qualitative) and extensive (quantitative) research, this research has made an empirical contribution to the growing literature on class dynamics and agrarian change in post-land reform settings in Matobo district where there are high levels of rainfall variability. This research is significant in its own right, but the geographical location of the study, an under-researched semi-arid region of Zimbabwe, adds to its importance within the wider literature.

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APPENDIX I: FARMER HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

LIVESTOCK, GRAZING AND LAND REFORM IN SOUTHERN MATABELELAND, ZIMBABWE

Questionnaire #: _____

Hello, my name is Tapiwa Chatikobo. I am a student from the University of the Western Cape, in South Africa. I am conducting a study of livestock and grazing management systems in Matobo district. Your homestead has been selected for participation in this survey. I ask permission to interview the main farmer from this homestead. The selected farmer's participation is voluntary i.e. he or she has the right to refuse. The information obtained from all participating farmers will be compiled in a report and the findings will be presented in the surveyed areas. No names will be referred to in the report. Your responses will be kept strictly confidential.

Name of respondent	
Name of household head	
Ward	
Village	
Type of property regime	
Name & surname by which the homestead is known	
Cell phone number of respondent	

Particulars of visit to the homestead

Particulars of visits	**Date**	**Time started**	**Time ended**
First visit			
Second visit			
Third visit			

Are you available and interested in taking part in this survey? Yes ___ No ___

Any concerns/ comments:

_____

A: GENERAL HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

A1	**A2**	**A3**	**A4**	**A5**
Would you rate yourself as (success): _ [1] Doing well _ [2] Doing OK _ [3] Doing badly	Why do you hold this opinion? Explain….	Gender of **MAIN household head** (can be non-resident): _ [1] Male _ [2] Female	Gender of **RESIDENT household head** (Maybe the same as MAIN) _ [1] Male _ [2] Female	What church does **RESIDENT household head** attend? (add code for site, include **none)**

A6	**A7**	**A8**	**A9**	**A10**
Is there anyone in the household who is a leader any organization? **Yes / No**. If any, please name (e.g. councillor, VIDCO, committee of 7, political party, farming organisation, church leader, NGO project leader etc.)	Is/ was the **MAIN household** head a **War Veteran/ collaborator** when s/he acquired this plot? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No _ [3] I don't know	What job did the **MAIN household head** have before settlement here? Write it down	What job if any does the **MAIN household head** have now? Write down including NONE Expand on changes in occupation, if any……..	How many members of this household have gone to new resettlement areas (nos.)? Indicate who e.g. son, daughter etc.

A11	A12	A13	A14	A15
Which resettlements? Names, e.g. 1: xx, 2: yy etc. ADD names indicating A1, A2	Does this household have a house in town? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If YES, where?	Does the **MAIN household head** have a Master Farmer certificate from AGRITEX? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	Does the **RESIDENT household head** have a Master Farmer certificate from AGRITEX? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	When did the household acquire this land? **Date:** When did the household started farming at this place? (Year)

A16	A17	CHECK	A18
Where did you reside before resettlement at this place? Write down the name of the place	Where is the **MAIN household head** originally from?	Does the MAIN household head have any official post? _ [1] Chief/ Headman _ [2] Kraal head _ [3] Councillor _ [4] Party official _ [5] Member of committee _ [6] Extension Officer _ [7] Other	What kind of legal papers does the household have? _ [1] Permit _ [2] Lease _ [3] Resettlement confirmation letter _ [4] Nothing

A19	A20	A21
Is the MAIN household head a member of any Livestock Association? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No Name of association:	Is there any member of the household who belong to any farming co-operative/ organisation? **Y / N** **Name of organization:**	Do you have a homestead else? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If NO, what happened to the homestead? Explain:

B. RELATIONSHIPS WITH RESETTLEMENT AREAS

B1	B2	B3	B4
What relationships do you have with nearby communal areas? _ [1] Have a homestead there _ [2] Hire labour _ [3] Graze animals _ [4] Sell food _ [5] Help out relatives with food/ money _ [6] School-going children living with relatives there _ [7] Other, specify…….	Where do your children go to primary school? _ [1] Here in A1 area _ [2] in nearby communal area _ [3] In nearby town _ [4] Boarding elsewhere	Are there any conflicts you have experienced with nearby communal areas? _ [0] None _ [1] Over grazing resources _ [2] Over water resources _ [3] Over cultivation areas _ [4] Over hunting and collecting _ [5] Over boundary fencing _ [6] Other, specify_____	Who do you go to solve such conflicts? _ [1] chief _ [2] Sabhuku _ [3] Councillor _ [4] Committee of 7 _ [5] VIDCO _ [6] District Administrator _ [7] War veterans _ [8] Party officials _ [9] Other, (e.g. church leaders/ sangomas

CODES TABLE 1: HOMESTEAD MEMBERS							
	How is this person related to you? **[Col 4]** [**DO NOT READ OUT]**		What is the marital status of this person? **[Col 5] [DO NOT READ OUT]**		How often is this person present at this homestead? **[Col 6**] **[DO NOT READ OUT]**		Highest education level achieved? **[Col 7] [DO NOT READ OUT]**
1	Self	1	Never been married	1	Present most or all nights	0	No schooling
2	Husband or wife or partner	2	Customary marriage	2	Present during working days but away most weekends	1	Up to grade 7
3	My child	3	Civil marriage	3	Present during weekends but away during working days	2	Up to form 2
4	Adopted/ foster child	4	Divorced	4	Present about once a month	3	Up to form 4
5	Child-in-law	5	Separated/deserted/ abandoned	5	Present for one or two periods of the year	4	Up to form 6
6	Grandchild	6	Widowed (husband/wife deceased)	6	Present during school holidays	5	College diploma
7	Parent		Other (describe)	7	Other (describe)	6	Bachelor's degree
8	Parent-in-law					7	Honor's degree
9	Grandparent					8	Master's degree
10	Sibling					9	Doctorate degree
11	Co-wife					10	Other (specify)
12	Co-wife's child					11	I don't know
13	Partner's sibling						
14	Own niece/ nephew						
15	Other relative						
16	Other relative of respondent's partner						
17	Domestic worker						
18	Other (describe)						

C. HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

Please tell me about all the people who are members of the homestead, even if they are not here at the moment. Do not include people who have established other homesteads and have not come home in the last few years. Start with the oldest person and then go through to the youngest baby. **[USE CODES TABLE: Homestead members]**

	Col 1	Col 2		Col 3	Col 4	Col 5	Col 6	Col 7
	C1. Full name	C2. Gender		C3. Year of birth and age of this person	C4. How is this person related to you? **[USE CODES]**	C5. What is the marital status of this person? **[USE CODES]**	C6. How often is this person present at this homestead? **[USE CODES]**	C7. What level of education did this person reach? **[USE CODES]**
		M	**F**					
1	**MainHHH**	1	2	/ /				
2	**ResidentHH**	1	2	/ /				
3		1	2	/ /				
4		1	2	/ /				
5		1	2	/ /				
6		1	2	/ /				
7		1	2	/ /				
8		1	2	/ /				
9		1	2	/ /				
10		1	2	/ /				
11		1	2	/ /				
12		1	2	/ /				
13		1	2	/ /				
14		1	2	/ /				
15		1	2	/ /				
16		1	2	/ /				
17		1	2	/ /				
18		1	2	/ /				
19		1	2	/ /				
20		1	2	/ /				

CHECK	C8	C9	C10
How many children aged now between 20 and 31? (numbers) Male: Female:	What these individuals doing now? Primary occupation linked to gender, so e.g. F: domestic worker, M: maricho, F: at home. Write out detail for coding later.	In this 20 – 30 age group are any farming? If so, indicate gender and where (include, own 1 – own CA plot, 2- own A1 plot, 3 – own A2 plot, 4 – subdivision of parents' plots, 5 – husband's plot, 6 – other, specify)	How many of **ALL children** are out of the country now? Indicate gender. Male: Female:

C11	C12	C13	Add comments:
Where are these children currently staying? **Name** **Male/Female?** **Country** 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	How many school-going children in the household no longer attend school (age 6 – 17 years)? Indicate gender.	Why are the children no longer going to school? Indicate reasons for each child, e.g. X: 1, 2 etc. _ [1] Costs (including school fees) _ [2] Distance to school _ [3] Pregnancy _ [4] Lack of interest _ [5] Marriage _ [6] Other, specify	

D. HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS ON THE FARM

At the homestead, how many of these **completed** and used **structures**….

D1	D2	D3	D4
Pole and mud/ amagaba (tin bricks) houses:	Brick and thatch houses:	Brick and asbestos/ tin houses. Indicate number of rooms for each	Pole and dug kitchens:
D5	**D6**	**D7**	**D8**
Pole and mud kitchens:	Brick and thatch kitchens:	Brick and asbestos/ tin kitchen (nos.):	Granaries:

E. WATER AND HYGIENE

E1	E2	E3	E4
What is the main source of water for your household? _ [1] piped into dwelling _ [2] piped outside dwelling personal _ [3] communal stand pipe _ [4] communal hand pump _ [5] personal hand pump _ [6] protected spring _ [7] protected well _ [8] unprotected well	How far away is this source? _ [1] within homestead _ [2] under 100km _ [3] 100m – 1km _ [4] over 1km	Number of individual wells or boreholes dug in the last 5 years (number)	What type of toilet does the household use? _ [1] Flush _ [2] Traditional latrines with roof (including Blair toilets) _ [3] Traditional latrine without roof _ [4] no toilet

_ [9] River/ lake _ [10] other, specify_____			

E5	E6	E7	E8
Number of pumps owned **(number**):	Number of water pumps bought in the last 5 years **(number):**	Number of water tanks purchased or built on this plot (include 'jojos' and brick tanks, year purchased/ constructed) Jojos: _____ Built tanks: _____	Dams (number), Add costs: Costs $:

F. ENERGY

F1	F2	ANY other comments:
What is the main source of energy for lighting home? _ [1] electricity _ [2] paraffin _ [3] candles _ [4] gas _ [5] solar lights _ [6] battery/ dry cells _ [7] other, specify _____	What is the main source of energy for cooking? _ [1] electricity _ [2] paraffin _ [3] charcoal _ [4] firewood/ gas _ [5] gas _ [6] other, specify _____	

G. DURABLE GOODS & FARM ASSETS

G1	G2	G3	G4
Total bicycles (number): Years acquired:	Number bicycles purchased in the last 5 years:	Total tractors: Add details on year acquired & cost etc.	Numbers of tractors purchased in the last 5 years:

G5	G6	G7	G8
Total number of cars in running order: Year acquired:	Number of cars purchased in the last 5 years:	Number of trucks in running order: **Grinding mills (no.)**:	Number of trucks purchased in the last 5 years:

Agricultural…….

G9	G10	G11	G12
Number of ploughs (number):	Number of ploughs purchased in the last 5 years: **Number of ploughs donated** by government in the last 5 years:	Number of scotch carts: Year acquired/cost	Number purchased in the last 5 years: Number donated by the government in the last 5 years:

G13	G14	G15	G16
Number of harrows: Year acquired:	Number of harrows purchased in the last 5 years: Number donated by the government in the last 5 years:	Number of knapsack sprayers: Number purchased in the last 5 years:	Other agricultural assets, LIST ALL: **Asset Number Year acquired/Cost** Planters…….. Wheelbarrow…… Water cart…….. Scale/ belt…….. Hoes…….. Spade……..

Domestic……

G17	G18	G19	G20
Number of TVs: TVs purchased in last 5 years:	Number of solar panels: Number of solar panels purchased in the last 5 years:	Does the household have a DSTV? Year ins: [1] Yes [2] No Year installed:……	Number of radio/ CD player:
G21	**G22**	**G23**	**G24**
Number of cell phones owned by household:	Number of generators:	Number of generators purchased in the last 5 years:	**Other domestic assets, list all**: Fridge: Gas stove: Other:

H. LAND USED BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD

H1	H2	H3	H4
Hectares allocated, not including land rented in, but shared/ shared or rented out…. Arable land:	How was this land acquired? **Add story!** _ [1] inherited _ [2] allocated by District Land Committee _ [3] allocated by traditional authorities _ [4] allocated by village chairman _ [5] allocated by councillor _ [6] Bought from someone _ [7] other, specify_____	Is the plot shared with/ rented out to others? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If YES, how many hectares?_____ ha	If YES, who is it shared/ hired out to? _ [1] Son _ [2] Daughter _ [3] other relative _ [4] Hired out for rental, $_____ _ [5] Other, specify

H5	H6	H7	H8
Does this household rent in land for grazing (**including in the arable plot!)** from someone else? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If YES, indicate where, rental fees, property regime and number of hectares? Where?: Rental cost$: Regime type (e.g. A1, A2 etc.): Hectares:	Have this household ever rented out grazing to someone else in the last 5 years (2013 – 2017)? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If YES, …… Years (e.g. 2012, 13) To whom?: Duration: Payment method:

H9	H10	H11	H12
Number of cleared by 2016:	**Ha arable land ploughed**/ used by THIS HOUSEHOLD in 2016/17 season (Not including land shared or where separate	Ha arable land ploughed by THIS HOUSEHOLD (not including sons etc.) in the 2015/16 season	Garden at home: [1] Yes [2] No **Size of garden (Ha):**

	household established. **This should be a new household. Add on list!**): _____Ha		

H13	**H14**	**H15**	**H16**
Has the garden been used by THIS HOUSEHOLD in the last 12 months? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If yes, crops grown……	Garden elsewhere: [1] Yes [2] No **Size (Ha):** **If YES, distance from homestead** (km)	Irrigated plot: [1] Yes [2] No Hectares: _____ha	Does the household (including the wife, but not adult children) have any other farm land? _ [1] None _ [2] Communal areas _ [3] A1 resettlement areas _ [4] A2 Resettlement _ [5] 3 tier sub-divided farms _ [6] self-contained farm
IF YES, indicate size of the farmland, its location and distance etc. here!			

I.CONSERVATION

I01	**I02**	**I03**	**I04**	**I05**
Has the household planted trees on this farm in the last 5 years? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No List trees planted….!	Has the household added any conservation measures (e.g. contours, pits etc.) _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	Has the household practised conservation farming in the last season (2016/17)? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	Does the household participate in re-fencing of paddocks in this A1 scheme? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	In your opinion, what are the perceived benefits of reviving paddocks in this A1 scheme? (Name based on importance e.g. 9, 1) _ [0] No benefits _ [1] Exclude outsiders' livestock _ [2] Reserve forage for dry periods _ [3] Protection of crop fields _ [4] improved cattle performance

				_ [5] improved veld conditions _ [6] high returns on cattle _ [7] improved conservation _ [8] allows proper breeding _ [9] Other, specify

J. LABOUR EMPLOYED

J1	J2	J3	J4
How many permanent workers do you have at this farm? Add duration of service! **Males:** **Females:**	Where do permanent workers come from? (Name the places where the permanent workers are from e.g. 1: Gwanda, 2: Binga).	How many temporary workers did you hire in the last 12 months? Add activities, linked to gender e.g. 3M: fencing etc.) **Males:** **Females:**	Where do temporary workers mostly come from? Name the places….

J5	J6	J7	J8
Of these, are any specifically employed to herd livestock? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If YES, specify…. **Temporary last 12 months** (number): **Permanent** (number):	Wages ($) of permanent worker ($ per month) (**if kind, indicate cash value!**): 1. $ 2. $ 3. $	Wages of temporary workers per activity:

J9	J10	J11	J12
What is the total wage bill per year on this FARM?	Do you provide the permanent workers with food and accommodation? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No **Cash value of any groceries** provided: $	Did you host work parties on your own field in the 2016/17 season? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	Did you host work parties on your own field in the 2016/17 season? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No

K. CROPS GROWN

Crops grown & Sold											
	1. Crop	2. Season	3. Amount harvested (number of bags)	4. Amount sold (number of bags)	5. Cash received (US$)	6. Purchaser/ Market	7. Used fertilizer		8. Credit		COMMENTS, IF ANY (e.g. how much credit taken?)
							Yes	No	Yes	No	
1	Maize	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
2	Pearl millet	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
3	Finger millet	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
4	Sorghum (*amabele*)	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
5	Sunflower	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
6	Sugar beans	2015/16					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
7	Groundnuts	2015/17					1	2	1	2	
		2016/17					1	2	1	2	
	Other, specify						1	2	1	2	
8							1	2	1	2	
9							1	2	1	2	
10							1	2	1	2	
11							1	2	1	2	
12							1	2	1	2	

K10	K11	K12	Any other comments!
What are the types of maize seed varieties used in the last season (2016/17)? Please list the varieties based on rank order, from largest quantity to small quantity….. indicate traditional seeds used!	What were the top 3 items of expenditure from crop sales from THIS FARM in the last 12 months? Indicate in order of importance _ [0] No sales [7] buying car _ [1] school fees [8] buying livestock _ [2] medical expenses [9] buy property _ [3] farm equipment _ [4] farm inputs _ [5] paying labour _ [6] building home	In the 2015/16 season, how many times did you plough and plant? _ [1] Once _ [2] Twice _ [3] Other, specify	

L. LAND PREPERATION

L1	L2	L3	L4
Types of land preparation methods used by the household in 2015/16 season _ [1] Own draught animals _ [2] Rented draught animals _ [3] Paired/ teamed draught animals with neighbour/ relative _ [4] loaned draught animals _ [5] Work party (amalima) _ [6] Rented tractor _ [7] Loaned tractor _ [8] Hoeing	**If draught animals (own/ hired/ loaned) in 2015/16, specify animals used and animals in the span…..** _ [1] Cattle (specify type) only _ [2] Donkeys only _ [3] Combined donkeys & cattle If hired (tractor/ draught), indicate $ cost:	Types of land preparation methods used by the household in 2016/17 season _ [1] Own draught animals _ [2] Rented draught animals _ [3] Paired/ teamed draught animals with neighbour/ relative _ [4] loaned oxen _ [5] Work party (amalima) _ [6] Rented tractor _ [7] Loaned tractor _ [8] Hoeing	**If draught animals (own/ hired/ loaned) in 2016/17, specify animals used and animals in the span…..** _ [1] Cattle (specify type) only _ [2] Donkeys only _ [3] Combined donkeys & cattle If hired (tractor/ draught), indicate $ cost

_ [9] Other, specify		_ [9] Other, specify	

M. LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP AND SALES

M1	M2	M3	M4
Total number of cattle owned now (including cattle kept elsewhere and looked after by others):	How many cattle are held at this A1 farm? How many cattle did the household have **AT RESETTLEMENT** ? (number)?_____	Of this number, how many are loaned in from others (inkomo zamasiso)?	How many cattle owned by the household are on other farms (*indicate number and tenure type, e.g. CA: 20; A1:10, A2: 30, state land: 5*)

M5	M6	M8	M10
Indicate the type of arrangement in each case (e.g. CA: loaning, A1: borrowing, A2: renting):	Goats (number): Goats **AT RESETTLEMENT** (nos.):	Donkeys (numbers): Donkeys **AT RESETTLEMENT**:	Chickens:
	M7	**M9**	**M11**
	Sheep (number): **@RESETTL**:	Pigs:	Other (specify):

		Acquisitions of grazing animals in the last 12 months for this farm						
		M12	**M13**	**M14**	**M15**	**M16**	**M17**	**M18**
	Type of livestock	**Births**	**Number bought in last 12 months**	**Lobola/ Gift**	**Payment as rental**	**Inheritance**	**Payment for loaned in cattle**	**Other, specify**
1	Cattle							
2	Goats							
3	Sheep							
4	Donkeys							

Please tell me about the number of animals you disposed over the last 12 months

		Losses/ disposals in the last 12 months								
		M19	**M20**	**M21**	**M22**	**M23**	**M24**	**M25**	**M26**	**If slaughter, for what purpose? (e.g. funeral, sale, thanksgiving, umubuyiso)**
	Type of livestock	**Deaths**	**Sales**	**Slaughter (purpose)**	**Stolen/ disappeared**	**Gift/ Lobola**	**Payment as rental**	**Predators**	**Other, specify**	
1	Cattle									
2	Goats									
3	Sheep									
4	Donkeys									

M27	**M28**	**M29**	**M30**
Do you have any cattle (inkomo zamasiso) belonging to other people (not from your HH)? If yes, to whom do they belong to? _ [1] Relative _ [2] Friend _ [3] Other, *specify* _____	For how long have these cattle been loaned out to you? (period)	Do you receive any form of payment from the herd owners? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	IF YES, what is the payment method? Add details in qualitative notebook

Please tell me about how often you sell your animals, to whom and amount received. If available, will you please show me the receipts that you sold the animals, and the prices offered?

		M31	M32	M33	M34	M35	M36
	Type of livestock	**Total number of animals sold in the last 12 months**	**How many times have you sold in the last 12 months?**	**Where did you sell the animals? (e.g. CSC, local farmers)**	**Measure in kg (live / cold weight)**	**Amount received per animal (average)**	**Total amount received**
1	Cattle						
2	Goats						
3	Sheep						
4	Other, specify						
5							
6							
7							

Please tell me about how you used the money from the sales in the last 12 months

		What were the top 3 items of expenditure?																
		M37		**M38**		**M39**		**M40**		**M41**		**M42**		**M43**		**M44**	**M45**	**M46**
	Type of livestock	**Household needs**		**Medical expenses**		**School fees**		**Purchase of breeding stock**		**Farm equipment**		**Buying cars**		**Pay rentals**		**Farm inputs**	**Building home**	**Other, specify (e.g. paying labour force)**
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Y / N	Y / N	
1	Cattle	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	Y / N	Y / N	
2	Goats	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	Y / N	Y / N	
3	Sheep	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	Y / N	Y / N	
4		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	Y/N	Y/N	
5		1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	Y/N	Y/N	

M47	M48	M49	M50
Own private broiler projects (not contract): _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If YES, how many broiler chickens do you have currently? (number)	Contract broiler project: _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If YES, how many birds do you have currently?

N. MODES OF TRANSPORT

N1	N2	N3	N4
When transporting your cattle to the market, what mode of transport do you use? _ [1] Hire truck _ [2] Own truck/ pick-up _ [3] Hoof with drovers _ [4] Other, specify	Cost per trip/ animal:	Number of cattle transported to the market in the last 12 months: Distance from the farm to market: Total transport cost paid $:	When transporting feed stuff to the farm, what mode of transport do you use? _ [1] hire _ [2] own truck/ pick-up _ [3] Other, specify Cost $:

O. DROUGHT RESPONSE & COPING STRATEGIES

O1	O2	O3	O4
Where cattle grazed most in last dry season? Name the places	Did you move your livestock from THIS A1 SCHEME during the course of last year? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	When in the year did you move the livestock? (months)	If YES, where do you move them to? (place)

O5	O6	O7	O8
For how long was the cattle moved for? (months)	**Before the 2011/12 drought,** how many cattle did you own (including calves)?	How many died during the 2011/12 drought (number)?	Number of cattle owned after the 2011/12 drought:

O9	O10	O11	O14
What were the drought mitigation strategies used by the household? LIST ALL… ***(Add details in the qualitative notebook)*** _ [1] illegal grazing/poaching _ [2] lease grazing in resettlement areas _ [3] Purchase commercial feed _ [4] Supply hay _ [5] Crop residues _ [6] Chicken manure _ [7] Slaughter/ sale _ [8] loaning _ [9] Other, specify_____	In terms of mitigation strategies, what were the top 5 strategies (Rank order) based on the effectiveness of reducing cattle mortality (Add details in the qualitative notebook)	**During the 2011/12 drought**, did the household move cattle to another area elsewhere? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No **O12** Number of cattle moved: **O13** Number of cattle died after moved: Number of cattle moved back to this farm:	If YES, name the places, type of property regime, district and distance from this farm (e.g. Double-vale farm: A1: Bulilima: 200km)

O15	O16	O17	O18
During the 2011/12 drought did the household rented out to/ shared grazing with someone else? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If yes, whom (Add details in qualitative notebook about the relationship with the household and herd owner) From where (name place):	Number of cattle received: Number of cattle died at the farm: Number of cattle returned back after the drought:	When in the year, and for how long was the cattle moved? (e.g. late dry season etc.) From (e.g. Oct 2011): _____ To (e.g. Dec 2012): _____ Duration of stay: _____

O19	O20	O21	O22
What king of grazing arrangements were involved? _ [1] Rental/ share-cropping arrangements _ [2] loaning arrangements _ [3] Borrowing arrangements _ [4] Other, specify_____	If rental/share-cropping arrangements, how much cash ($) or cattle did this household receive? Cattle _____ Cash (US$): _____	Have you ever rented out grazing to someone else in the last 5 years? 2013: **[Y / N]** 2014: **[Y / N]** 2015: **[Y / N]** 2016: **[Y / N]** 2017: **[Y / N**	IF YES, add details on amount paid as rental, period of the year, and duration

P. BASIC INPUT USE & PROCUREMENT (in the last 12 months)

	P1	P2		P3	
	Inputs	**Have you purchased the following inputs in the last 12 months?**		**Estimated cost (US$)**	**Add details here!**
		Yes	No		
FEED STUFF					
1	Salts/ licks	1	2		
2	Supplementary feed	1	2		
3	Hay	1	2		
CHEMICALS					
1	Dipping chemicals (e.g. spray, tick grease)	1	2		
2	Vaccines	1	2		
3	Antibiotics	1	2		
4	Deworming (e.g. Albex)	1	2		
5	Wounds (e.g. exit, wound oil etc.	1	2		
	OTHER INPUTS (e.g. fences)	1	2		
		1			

Q. FACTORS AFFECTING LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

Please tell me about the factors that affect livestock production enterprise in order of most to least damaging

Q1	Q2	Add details about why the respondent ranked the problems this way:
List all the challenges affecting your livestock enterprise: _ [1] insufficient grazing land **[Y / N]** _ [2] Poor veterinary services **[Y / N]** _ [3] transport problems to the market [Y/N] _ [4] Poor prices/markets [**Y / N]** _ [5] droughts **[Y / N]** _ [6] insufficient drinking water for animals _ [7] diseases **[Y / N]** _ [8] cattle rustling **[Y / N]** _ [9] predation **[Y / N]** _ [11] Uncertain of property rights **[Y / N]** _ [12] other, specify_____	**RANK TOP 5**, according to the order of most to least damaging (e.g. 8, 4, 9, 12 etc.).	

R. ANIMAL HEALTH & DISEASES

Please tell me about the major sickness and ailments of cattle, and remedies used

R.1	R.2	3	4	5
What are the **major sickness** & **ailments** of **cattle**? _ [1] Black leg _ [2] Tick-borne diseases _ [3] Foot & Mouth _ [4] Lumpy skin _ [5] Anthrax _ [6] Worms _ [7] Eye infections _ [8] Boils _ [9] Botulism _ [10] Quarter-evil _ [11] Wounds _ [12] Other, specify	Rank the **top 3** according to **disease importance**	Do you use traditional or herbal remedies for any of these ailments? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	For which of the ailments do you use what traditional remedy? Add details in the qualitative note book (E.g. Blackleg: Umvagazi, boiling water; Wounds: "joyi" etc.)	How frequent do you dip your animals during (a) Rainy season (b) Dry season

S. WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

S1	S2	S3	S4
For the lead female in female household (e.g. wife or hh head), do you have the full control of some land in your own right? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If yes, how many hectares?	For lead female in HH, do you have a business of your own with independent control of income? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If YES, what is the business?	For lead female in hh, how long did you spend preparing food for the family yesterday (from morning till night)? Minutes	For lead female in household, do you have an official post/ leadership post in any group or organisation? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If YES, specify what group/ organization?

T. PROJECTS

T1	T2	T3	T4
Has the household received any advice from an extension officer in the past season? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If yes, specify which agents (e.g. AGRITEX, Vet, Private company etc.)	Was the household involved in Command Agriculture programme in the last season? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If so indicate, what inputs were received?	Is the household involved in any other projects dealing with agriculture? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No If Yes, name the projects (please get further details on what projects are happening in the area)	Of these projects, which ones are dealing with livestock? **FOR LEAD FEMALE**, which other farming areas to you require improvement in knowledge? **List all**:

U. REMMITTANCE

U1	U2	U3	U4
Did you receive any remittances in cash or kind in the last 12 months? _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	Source of remittance: _ [1] inside Zimbabwe _ [2] South Africa _ [3] Botswana _ [4] UK _ [5] Other, specify	How many times have you received remittances in the last 12 months? (Add details in qualitative notebook!)	Who sends the remittances? Add details about how many people sending remittances to the household in qualitative notebook. _ [1] Sons _ [2] Daughters _ [3] Husband _ [4] Wife _ [5] Grandchildren _ [6] Other, specify

CODES TABLE 2: INCOME SOURCES OF HOMESTEAD MEMBERS

	Nature of work (C02)
1	Employee in permanent job inside Zimbabwe
2	Employee in temporary, contract job inside Zimbabwe
3	Remittance in cash from outside Zimbabwe
4	Remittance in kind (e.g. clothes, food etc.) from outside Zimbabwe
5	Remittance in cash from inside Zimbabwe
6	Remittance in kind (e.g. clothes, food etc.) from inside Zimbabwe
7	Artisanal (gold) mining
8	Cattle sales
9	Goat or sheep sale
10	Poultry sale
11	Vegetable sale
12	Crop sale
13	Building and carpentry
14	Brick making
15	Fishing
16	Wood carving
17	Tailoring
18	Transport business
19	Grinding mill
20	Thatch grass sale
21	Pottery and basket
22	Trading (including cross-border)
23	Farm work (piece work / labouring)
24	Other off-farm work

25	Business with employees
26	Business without employees
27	Pension from the state
28	Pension from other companies
29	Government aid and food-for-work
30	Broiler production
31	Land rental in resettlement areas
32	House rentals from town
33	Other, specify (e.g. making and selling mufushwa)

V. SOURCES OF INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

Please tell me about any kind of income, monetary or not, which benefits the household. Please specify who earns it, how it is earned, where and how much

Name of household member		LIST ALL the income sources from ANY member in the household in the last 12 months? Starting with the most important to the least important.				
		1. Code		**Description**		
				2. Nature of work	**3. Where/ when (frequency?)**	**4. Rank order, according to importance**
1	**MAIN HH**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
		3				
		4				
2	**RESIDENT HH**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
	(Male / Female?)	**3**				
		4				
3	**ADULT MALE 1**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
	(Male/ Female)	**3**				
		4				
4	**ADULT MALE 3**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
	(Male / Female)	**3**				

		4				

Sources of income continued

Name of household member		LIST ALL the income sources from ANY member in the household in the last 12 months? Starting with the most important to the least important.				
		1. Code		**Description**		
				2. Nature of work	**3. Where/ when (frequency?)**	**4. Rank order, according to importance**
5	**ADULT MALE 3**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
		3				
		4				
6	**ADULT FEMALE1**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
	(Male / Female?)	**3**				
		4				
7	**ADULT FEMALE 2**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				
	(Male/ Female)	**3**				
		4				
8	**ADULT FEMALE 3**	**1**				
	Name:	**2**				

	(Male / Female)	**3**				
		4				

W. MILK USE & SALE

W1	**W2**	**W3**	**W4**
When your cows calve do you milk them or allows your herders to milk? (Add details on season etc.) _ [1] Yes _ [2] No	If NO, why do you not milk when they calve?	For your last cows that calved, what was the most milk you were able to get a day (litres)? Per cow_____ Total: _____litres	Were you selling part of the milk? [**Y / N**] Fresh milk: _____ litres/ day/ wk Sour milk: _____ litres/ day/ wk

W5	**W6**	**Add other details here!**
Amount received $ from milk selling	To whom did you sell most of the milk? _ [1] local farmers/ neighbours _ [2] Market at business centre _ [3] Other, specify	

X. HERD STRUCTURE AT THE FARM

How many each of the following animals do you have in your cattle herd?

1. Bulls	**2. Cows**	**3. Bullying heifers**	**4. Feeder steers**	**5. Oxen**	**6. Weaners**		**7. Calves**		**8. Total**
					Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	

GENERAL

1. With regards to the conflicts you have been experiencing in Luma with the neighbouring communal areas, who do you think must solve these conflicts? (e.g. DA, Chief, headman, President, Vice president, Police etc.)
2. Why do you select this group or person, instead of others?

_____
_____

SIYABONGA KAKHULU. Thank you for taking your time and share your experiences with us. We hope this has been an interesting activity for you too. Do you have any questions or comments for us?

APPENDIX 2: ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

Table A5.1 Correlations of success rankings with key socio-economic indicators

		Value of assets					Grain output		Cattle ownership		Land area				
		All assets	Domestic	Agric	Water	Transport	2015/16	2016/17	Tot. owned, incl. elsewhere	Owned on farm	Cleared for cropping, 2017	Planted 2015/16	Planted 2016/17	Number of brick and asbestos/tin houses	Age of household head
Overall Rank	Pearson Correlation	.186	.419**	.518**	.062	.075	.459**	.588**	.530**	.548**	.424**	.556**	.510**	.574**	.219
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.132	.000	.000	.617	.548	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.075
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Source: Own data

Table A5.2 Demographic data by success rank

Success groups	Vimbi					Luma					All households				
	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
Sample size (N)	11	11	9	2	33	7	5	17	5	34	18	16	26	7	67
Median year started farming at this farm	2003	2003	2005	2004	2003	2002	2004	2011	2011	2010	2003	2003	2011	2011	2004
Median household size	9	7	7	6	8	7	11	8	5	8	8	8	8	5	8
Median number of members present most or all nights	4	2	3	0	3	2	6	4	0	3	3	4,5	4	0	3
Median number of adults present most or all nights	2	2	1	0	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	0	2
Mean number of adult females present most or all nights	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Mean number of children (<18 yrs.) present all or most nights	2	1	3	0	2	0	4	2	0	1	1	1,5	2,5	0	1
Median age of household	57	48	48	44	53	64	68	57	48	58	59	55	56	47	55
Median number of household head's years in education	7	8	9	11	8	8	7	8	11	8	7	7	8,5	11	8
Agricultural qualification (no. of households)	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	3	2	0	2	0	4
Female-headed households (no. of households)	3	2	3	0	8	0	1	2	0	3	3	3	5	0	11
Non-residence on the farm (no. of households)	0	0	0	2	2	2	1	0	3	6	2	1	0	5	8
Urban house ownership (no. of households)	6	3	2	0	11	5	2	2	1	10	11	5	4	1	21
War veteran (N)	5	6	4	0	15	4	2	8	0	14	9	8	12	0	29

Source: Own data

Table A5.3 Landholdings and use by success groups

Success groups		Vimbi						Luma						All households				
		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Tot.		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Tot.
Land area (ha)	Mean	5	5	5	5	5		5	5	5	4	5		5	5	5	5	5
	STDev	0	0	0	0	0		1	0	1	1	1		0	0	1	1	0
	Sum	55	55	45	10	165		33	24	78	22	157		88	79	123	32	322
	% Total in sample	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
Area cleared for cropping (ha)	Mean	3	2	2	1	2		3	2	2	1	2		3	2	2	1	2
	STDev	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	2	1		1	1	1	1	1
	Sum	35	21	21	2	79		22	8	28	7	65		58	28	49	9	144
	% Total in sample	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
Area cultivated in 2015-16 (ha)	Mean	3	1	2	0	2		3	1	1	0	1		3	1	1	0	2
	STDev	1	1	2	0	1		1	1	1	0	1		1	1	1	0	1
	Sum	30	14	13	0	57		19	7	22	0	49		49	21	35	0	106
	% Total in sample	1	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
Area cultivated in 2016-17 (ha)	Mean	3	2	2	0	2		3	1	1	0	2		3	2	2	0	2
	STDev	1	1	1	0	1		1	1	1	0	1		1	1	1	0	1
	Sum	30	18	17	0	65		18	7	24	0	50		49	25	42	0	115
	% Total in sample	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
Garden near home (no. of households)		4	2	1	0	7		4	1	8	1	14		8	3	9	1	21
Garden away from home (no. of households)		7	6	1	0	14		1	0	5	0	6		8	6	6	0	20
Trees planted in last 5 years (number of households)		11	11	7	0	29		6	5	13	3	27		17	16	20	3	56
Conservation measures added in last 5 years (no. of households)		0	0	0	0	0		5	2	3	0	10		5	2	3	0	10

Source: Own data

Table A5.4 Livestock ownership by success group

Success groups		Vimbi						Luma						All households				
		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
N=		11	11	9	2	33		7	5	17	5	34		18	16	26	7	67
Cattle access	Mean	21	10	2	0	11		33	17	1	5	11		26	12	2	4	11
	Median	26	10	0	0	7		21	20	0	0	1		24	14	0	0	3
	STDev	13	11	4	0	12		35	10	2	12	20		24	11	3	10	17
	Sum	226	109	22	0	357		234	84	18	27	363		460	193	40	27	720
	Row Sum %	63.3%	30.5 %	6.2%	0.0 %	100.0 %		64.5%	23.1 %	5.0%	7.4 %	100.0 %		63.9%	26.8 %	5.6%	3.8 %	100.0 %
Cattle owned, incl. elsewhere	Mean	18	5	2	2	8		33	10	1	3	9		24	7	1	3	9
	Median	15	3	0	2	4		21	5	1	0	1		18	4	1	1	2
	STDev	12	5	3	1	10		35	11	1	7	20		24	8	2	5	16
	Sum	198	54	18	3	273		231	50	14	17	312		429	104	32	20	585
	Row Sum %	72.5%	19.8 %	6.6%	1.1 %	100.0 %		74.0%	16.0 %	4.5%	5.4 %	100.0 %		73.3%	17.8 %	5.5%	3.4 %	100.0 %
Cattle owned on farm	Mean	18	5	1	0	8		33	10	1	2	9		24	7	1	2	8
	Median	15	3	0	0	4		21	5	0	0	1		18	4	0	0	2
	STDev	12	5	2	0	10		35	11	1	5	20		24	8	2	4	16
	Sum	198	54	13	0	265		231	50	9	11	301		429	104	22	11	566
	Row Sum %	74.7%	20.4 %	4.9%	0.0 %	100.0 %		76.7%	16.6 %	3.0%	3.7 %	100.0 %		75.8%	18.4 %	3.9%	1.9 %	100.0 %
Goats	Mean	12	4	4	0	7		32	6	3	2	9		20	5	3	2	8
	Median	7	1	3	0	4		12	5	2	0	2		8	4	2	0	3
	STDev	10	6	4	0	8		45	5	4	4	23		30	6	4	4	17
	Sum	136	49	33	0	218		226	29	49	11	315		362	78	82	11	533

	Row Sum %	62.4%	22.5 %	15.1 %	0.0 %	100.0 %		71.7%	9.2%	15.6 %	3.5 %	100.0 %		67.9%	14.6 %	15.4 %	2.1 %	100.0 %
Sheep	Mean	1	0	0	0	0		4	0	0	0	1		2	0	0	0	1
	Median	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
	STDev	3	0	0	0	2		8	0	0	0	4		5	0	0	0	3
	Sum	13	0	0	0	13		31	0	0	0	31		44	0	0	0	44
	Row Sum %	100.0 %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0 %	100.0 %		100.0 %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0 %	100.0 %		100.0 %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0 %	100.0 %
Donkeys	Mean	8	3	2	0	4		5	2	1	0	2		7	3	1	0	3
	Median	8	2	0	0	3		7	2	0	0	0		7	2	0	0	1
	STDev	3	4	3	0	4		4	2	2	0	3		3	3	2	0	4
	Sum	86	37	17	0	140		38	12	16	0	66		124	49	33	0	206
	Row Sum %	61.4%	26.4 %	12.1 %	0.0 %	100.0 %		57.6%	18.2 %	24.2 %	0.0 %	100.0 %		60.2%	23.8 %	16.0 %	0.0 %	100.0 %

Source: Own data

Table A5.5: Number of households owning transport, domestic and water assets (N=67)

	Vimbi		Luma		All households	
Success groups	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bicycles	24	72.7	20	58.8	44	65.7
Cars	10	30.3	5	14.7	15	22.4
Trucks	0	0	2	5.9	2	3
Tractors	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grinding mill	1	3	0	0	1	1.5
Snap-sack sprayer	16	48.5	11	32.4	27	40.3
Solar panel	23	69.7	24	70.6	47	70.1
Cell-phone	33	100	32	94.1	65	97
Fridge	2	6.1	4	11.8	6	9
Generator	10	30.3	7	20.6	17	25.4
Water pump	1	3	5	14.7	6	9
Water tanks	0	0	3	8.8	3	4.5

Source: own data

Table A5.6: Number of households who purchased the following assets in the last 5 years

	Vimbi		Luma		All households	
Asset type	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bicycles	11	33.3	10	29.4	19	28.2
Cars	10	30.3	4	11.8	14	20.9
Trucks	0	0	1	2.9	1	1.5
Grinding mill	1	3	0	0	1	1.5
Plough	9	27.3	3	8.8	12	17.9
Harrow	3	9.1	4	11.8	7	10.4
Solar panel	17	51.5	18	52.9	35	52.2
Fridge	2	6.1	3	8.8	5	7.5
Generator	5	15.2	5	14.7	10	14.9
Water pump	0	0	1	2.9	1	1.5
Water tanks	0	0	2	5.9	2	3

Source: Own data

Table A5.7: Asset ownership by success groups (number of households N=67)

	Vimbi					Luma					All households				
Success groups	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
Bicycle	11	6	7	0	24	5	3	10	2	20	16	9	17	2	44
Car	8	2	0	2	12	2	0	1	2	5	10	2	1	4	17
Truck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	2
Plough	11	9	6	0	26	7	5	7	3	22	18	14	13	3	48
Scotch-cart	10	7	2	0	19	7	2	8	2	19	17	9	10	2	38
Cultivator	2	1	1	0	4	3	1	4	0	8	5	2	5	0	12
harrow	2	3	2	0	7	6	1	0	1	8	8	4	2	1	15
Generators	6	2	2	0	10	6	1	2	2	11	12	3	4	2	21
Solar panel	11	9	3	0	23	6	5	12	1	24	17	14	15	1	47

Source: Own data

A5.8: Assets purchased in the past 5 years (2013-2017) by success groups (number of households N=)

	Vimbi					Luma					All households				
	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
Bicycle	4	4	3	0	11	1	1	6	2	10	5	5	9	2	21
Car	6	1	1	2	10	2	0	1	1	4	8	1	2	3	14
plough	4	2	3	0	9	0	0	1	2	3	4	2	4	2	12
Scotch cart	1	4	0	0	5	2	2	1	0	5	3	6	1	0	10
Harrow	2	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	1	4	4	1	0	1	6
Fridge	1	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	5
Generation	3	1	1	0	5	3	1	0	1	5	6	2	1	1	10
Solar	6	9	2	0	17	5	3	9	1	18	11	12	11	1	35
Water pump	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
Tank	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2

Source: Own data

Table A5.9 Total responses of cattle sales

Buyer [a]	Number of cattle sold	Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Abattoirs	30	2	7.7%	10.0%
Middlemen	18	8	30.8%	40.0%
Nearby butchery	1	1	3.8%	5.0%
Local people: Resettlement Areas	21	11	42.3%	55.0%
Auction	8	3	11.5%	15.0%
Other	1	1	3.8%	5.0%
Total	79	26	100.0%	130.0%

[a] Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Source: Own survey

Table A5.10 Crop production by success groups

		Vimbi					Luma					All households				
Success groups		SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total	SG1	SG2	SG3	SG4	Total
Maize output 2015/16 (kg)	Count	11	11	9	2	33	7	5	17	5	34	18	16	26	7	67
	Mean	555	93	167	0	261	993	240	288	30	388	725	139	246	21	326
	STDev	317	127	141	0	296	1069	185	389	67	626	715	158	327	57	492
	Sum	6100	1020	1500	0	8620	6950	1200	4900	150	13200	13050	2220	6400	150	21820
	Row Sum %	70.8%	11.8%	17.4%	0.0%	100.0%	52.7%	9.1%	37.1%	1.1%	100.0%	59.8%	10.2%	29.3%	0.7%	100.0%
Maize sales, 2015/16 (kg)	Mean	27	0	0	0	9	71	0	3	0	16	44	0	2	0	13
	STDev	90	0	0	0	52	189	0	12	0	86	134	0	10	0	71
	Sum	300	0	0	0	300	500	0	50	0	550	800	0	50	0	850
	Row Sum %	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	90.9%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	100.0%	94.1%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	100.0%
Cash from maize sales, 2015/16 (US$)	Mean	11	0	0	0	4	36	0	2	0	8	21	0	1	0	6
	STDev	38	0	0	0	22	94	0	7	0	43	64	0	5	0	34
	Sum	126	0	0	0	126	250	0	28	0	278	376	0	28	0	404
	Row Sum %	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	89.9%	0.0%	10.1%	0.0%	100.0%	93.1%	0.0%	6.9%	0.0%	100.0%
Maize output,	Mean	3284	1595	1244	0	1966	1793	1230	671	110	901	2704	1481	869	79	1426
	STDev	1567	1052	1299	0	1602	1903	738	699	195	1128	1811	956	965	168	1473
	Sum	36120	17550	11200	0	64870	12550	6150	11400	550	30650	48670	23700	22600	550	95520

2016/17 (kg)	Row Sum %	55.7%	27.1%	17.3%	0.0%	100.0%	40.9%	20.1%	37.2%	1.8%	100.0%	51.0%	24.8%	23.7%	0.6%	100.0%
Maize sales, 2016/17 (kg)	Mean	1405	215	278	0	616	457	320	12	0	147	1037	248	104	0	378
	STDev	1466	425	423	0	1048	1209	661	49	0	598	1416	489	275	0	876
	Sum	15460	2370	2500	0	20330	3200	1600	200	0	5000	18660	3970	2700	0	25330
	Row Sum %	76.0%	11.7%	12.3%	0.0%	100.0%	64.0%	32.0%	4.0%	0.0%	100.0%	73.7%	15.7%	10.7%	0.0%	100.0%
Cash from maize sales, 2016/17 (US$)	Mean	541	73	90	0	229	119	125	4	0	45	377	89	34	0	136
	STDev	585	148	144	0	412	316	266	15	0	174	530	184	92	0	325
	Sum	5952	800	814	0	7566	835	625	60	0	1520	6787	1425	874	0	9086
	Row Sum %	78.7%	10.6%	10.8%	0.0%	100.0%	54.9%	41.1%	3.9%	0.0%	100.0%	74.7%	15.7%	9.6%	0.0%	100.0%

Source: Own data

Table A5.11 Correlations of cattle holdings with area cleared, cultivated and maize yield

			2015-16		2016-17	
		Area cleared by 2016	Area cultivated	Maize output	Area cultivated	Maize output
Cattle owned on fam	Pearson Correlation	.293*	.387**	.685**	.341**	.526**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.016	.001	.000	.005	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67
Cattle access	Pearson Correlation	.356**	.426**	.642**	.423**	.537**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Own data

Table A5.12 Land area under cultivation, maize yields and sales by cattle groups

		Vimbi				Luma				Total			
Cattle groups		0 Cattle	1 - 9 cattle	10 or more cattle	Total	0 Cattle	1 - 9 cattle	10 or more cattle	Total	0 Cattle	1 - 9 cattle	10 or more cattle	Total
N		12	10	11	33	17	8	9	34	29	18	20	67
Land area cleared by 2016 (ha)	Median	1.5	2.8	3.0	2.0	.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.1	2.0	2.8	2.0
	Sum	21.4	27.6	30.0	79.0	21.0	19.5	24.0	64.5	42.4	47.1	54.0	143.5
	%Total	27.1 %	34.9%	38.0%	100%	32.5 %	30.2%	37.2%	100%	29.5 %	32.8%	37.6%	100%
Area cultivated, 2015-16 (ha)	Median	.5	2.0	2.5	2.0	.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	.5	2.0	2.0	1.5
	Sum	11.1	20.8	24.9	56.8	12.7	17.0	19.0	48.7	23.8	37.8	43.9	105.5
	%Total	19.5 %	36.6%	43.8%	100%	26.1 %	34.9%	39.0%	100%	22.5 %	35.8%	41.6%	100%
Maize output, 2015-16 (kg)	Median	0	300	450	250	150	250	500	175	100	275	450	200
	Sum	970	2950	4700	8620	2500	3600	7100	13200	3470	6550	11800	21820
	%Total	11.3 %	34.2%	54.5%	100%	18.9 %	27.3%	53.8%	100%	15.9 %	30.0%	54.1%	100%
Area cultivated, 2016-17	Median	0.7	2.3	2.5	2.0	.5	2.0	2.0	1.1	.5	2.0	2.0	1.6
	Sum	14.8	24.3	26.1	65.2	13.0	19.0	18.0	50.0	27.8	43.3	44.1	115.2
	%Total	22.7 %	37.3%	40.0%	100%	26.0 %	38.0%	36.0%	100%	24.1 %	37.6%	38.3%	100%
Maize output, 2016-17 (kg)	Median	550	2225	2250	1550	400	875	1000	600	450	1725	1500	1000
	Sum	8700	25620	30550	64870	8450	8950	13250	30650	17150	34570	43800	95520
	%Total	13.4 %	39.5%	47.1%	100%	27.6 %	29.2%	43.2%	100%	18.0 %	36.2%	45.9%	100%
Maize sales, 2016-17 (kg)	Median	0	125	1120	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sum	500	4750	15080	20330	1700	100	3200	5000	2200	4850	18280	25330
%Total	2.5%	23.4%	74.2%	100%	34.0%	2.0%	64.0%	100%	8.7%	19.1%	72.2%	100%

APPENDIX III: AGROECOLOGIZAL ZONES

Region	Area (km^2)	Characteristics	No. growing days	Farming systems
I	7 000	• <1 050 mm rainfall per year, some rain year round. • Covers 2% of the total land area. • 18% of the total land is communal land. • Prone to soil erosion when vegetation is cleared. • Mainly covers the eastern parts of the country (Eastern Highlands).	170-200 days	Suitable for diversified or specialised farming. Main crops include tea, coffee, and macadamia nuts.
II (Sub-regions A & B)	5 860	• 700 to 1 050 mm rainfall p.a, confined to summer. • Sub-region IIA receives an average of at least 18 rainy pentads[174], region IIB higher rainfall variability. • Covers 15% of the total land area. • 21% is occupied by communal farmers.	120-170 days	Suitable for intensive crop and livestock production.
III	72 900	• Between 500 and 700 mm rainfall per year. • Covers 19% of the total land area of the country. • Subject to infrequent heavy storms, although characterised by mid-season dry spells. • 39% of the land is communal lands.	60-120 days	Semi-intensive farming. Suitable for livestock production, together with fodder and cash crop production under good farm management.
IV	147 800	• 450 to 600 mm rainfall per year. • It accounts for 38% of the total land area. • Subject to frequent seasonal droughts. • 62% of the total area is communal lands. • Other parts of HCL fall in this region.	60-120 days	Semi-extensive farming. Suitable for livestock production and drought-resistant crops and fodder. Forestry and wildlife/tourism.

[174] A rainy pentad refers to "the centre period of three five-day periods (pentads) which together receive more than 40 mm rainfall and two of which receive at least 8 mm rainfall" (Cousins 1992:5).

V	104 400	• >500 mm rainfall per year, very erratic and unreliable. Northern Lowveld may have more rain, but topography and soils are poorer. • It covers 27% of the total land of Zimbabwe. • 45% of total land is communal lands.	70-135 days	Extensive farming. Suitable for extensive cattle ranching, forestry, wildlife and tourism.
Total	39 700			

Source: Compiled by author