An Examination of the Impact of Administrative Decentralisation on Participatory Local Government and Service Delivery in Tanzania

A Thesis submitted to the School of Government, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Western Cape in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration

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December, 2015

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DECLARATION

I, Charles Ernest Mhina, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis entitled: An Examination of the Impact of Administrative Decentralisation on Participatory Local Government and Service Delivery in Tanzania is my own work, and that I have not previously submitted it, in part or in its entirety, at any university for a degree or any other academic purpose. All sources have been duly indicated and acknowledged by means of references.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Over the course of the past three decades bi-lateral and multi-lateral donor agencies, academics and practitioners have expressed the conviction that decentralisation of administrative and political authority to the local level is of central importance to public sector reform programmes in developing states both as a means to improve service delivery and to deepen democracy. However, many states in Africa have had disappointing experiences with decentralisation which have variously been attributed to the underfunding of local governments, a lack of administrative capacity and corruption. In the light of this, a number of scholars have argued that decentralisation in Africa has achieved little in the delivery of basic services and in the deepening democracy at the local level. This has raised concerns that decentralisation, whilst necessary, is not a sufficient condition for ensuring local socio-economic development and participatory governance.

This thesis sets out to examine the process of administrative and political decentralisation in Tanzania since it attained independence in 1961, paying particular attention to the current local government reform programme which consists of a parallel system of devolved and de-concentrated government authority implemented through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). This hybrid model of decentralisation, which is heavily reliant on donor aid, has been in place for over a decade and a half. The thesis considers the extent to which the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration represents an accommodation between the neo-liberal agenda of donors (concerned with the diminution of central state power) and the policy interests of the Tanzanian government (concerned about a lack of local capacity and domestic politics). Based on a case study of three municipalities (Tanga city, and the Lindi and Morogoro district councils) the thesis examines the extent to which the hybrid model is meeting its stated objectives of strengthening local government, improving service delivery, and promoting effective citizen participation. In so doing it examines the particular role of TASAF and the extent to which its activities are supporting the development of effective local government.

Empirical evidence, which was generated through a mixed methods approach based on both quantitative and qualitative research, suggests that, notwithstanding the concerns of some local politicians that the model has undermined the authority of local councils, the

combination of local administrative coordination and the technical and financial support of TASAF, has led to significant improvements in the delivery of social services since the reform programme was launched. The thesis also found that the majority of respondents believed that the hybrid model had served to deepen local democracy to a far greater extent than decentralisation reforms of the past. It also concluded that, in spite its evident potential, the future of the hybrid model in Tanzania is highly uncertain, given that it remains heavily reliant on donor funding and is subject to the aid conditionalities imposed upon it. Unless the government is able to increase its own funding of TASAF, the hybrid model is likely to collapse due to the changed funding priorities of bi-lateral and multilateral donor agencies.

Key Words

(i) Decentralisation (ii) De-concentration (iii) Hybrid model (iv) Local government (v) Participation (vi) Service delivery (vii) Strengthening capacity (viii) Tanzania (x) TASAF

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ACCEDE   African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy

AfDB   African Development Bank

ALAT   Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania

ASDP   Agricultural Sector Development Programme

CAQDAS   Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software

CCHP   Comprehensive Council Health Plan

CCM   Chama cha Mapinduzi [The ruling party in Tanzania]

CHADEMA   Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo [Opposition party in Tanzania]

CMC   Community Management Committee

CMT   Council Management Team

COSTECH   Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology

CUF   Civic United Front [Opposition party in Tanzania]

CWIQ   Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire

D-by-D   Decentralisation by Devolution

DED   District Executive Director

DFID   Department for International Development

ESAF   Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility

FGD   Focus Group Discussion

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

HBF   Health Basket Fund

HIPC   Heavily Indebted Poor Countries facility

IFAD   International Fund for Agricultural Development

IMF   International Monetary Fund

IMR   Infant Mortality Rate

JICA   Japan International Cooperation Agency

JMT [URT]   Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [United Republic of Tanzania]

LED   Local Economic Development

LGA	Local Government Authority
LGDG	Local Government Development Grant
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
MACEMP	Marine and Coastal Environment Management Project
MASAF	Malawi Social Action Fund
MEO	Mtaa Executive Officer
MMAM [PHSDP]	Mpango wa Maendeleo wa Afya ya Msingi [Primary Health Services Development Programme]
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
NAO	National Audit Office
NPM	New Public Management
MKUKUTA [NSGRP]	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Tanzania [National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty]
O&OD	Opportunities and Obstacles to Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFID	OPEC Fund for International Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEDP	Primary Education Development Programme
PMO-RALG	Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government
PO-PSM	President's Office Public Service Management
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSSN	Productive Social Safety Net
RA	Regional Administration
RAS	Regional Administrative Secretary
RC	Regional Commissioner
RCC	Regional Consultative Committee
RS	Regional Secretariat
RWSSP	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program
SEDP	Secondary Education Development Programme

TACAIDS	Tanzania Commission for AIDS
TANU	Tanganyika National Unity party
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TINA	There Is No Alternative
TMU	TASAF Management Unit
TOA	Tanzania Osaka Alumni
U5MR	Under-Five Mortality Rate
UWASA	Urban Water Supply Authority
UWC	University of the Western Cape
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WEF	World Economic Forum
WEO	Ward Executive Officer
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWI	First World War
ZAMSIF	Zambia Social Investment Fund

CHAPTER ONE

INRODUCTION

1.1   Introduction to the research problem

This thesis sets out to examine the process of political and administrative decentralisation which is currently underway in the United Republic of Tanzania and to assess its effectiveness against the objectives set out in legislation and policy. Over the course of the past three to four decades decentralisation has been portrayed by international development agencies, multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, and academics as being of central importance to the process of public sector reform and to the deepening of democracy in emerging economies. During this period a sizeable proportion of developing countries have embraced upon some form of decentralisation (including de-concentration, delegation and devolution) whether voluntarily or as a consequence of the conditionalities of donor aid (Fisher, 1991; Crook and Manor, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; World Bank, 2000). The increasing emphasis on decentralisation from the 1990s onwards was founded on the belief that the devolution of administrative authority led to a range of positive outcomes and not least those generated through the engagement of local communities in the development process (Turner & Hulme, 1997; United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1998; UN-HABITAT, 2002; European Commission, 2007; USAID, 2009). In that respect, it has become a central tenet of decentralisation theory that local participation leads to improvements in the quantity and quality of basic services as well to the urgency with which they are delivered.

Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of their advocates, decentralisation programmes in developing states, and particularly those in Africa, have faced a number of challenges. These have been well documented in the literature and include a lack of political will on the part of national governments, a lack of administrative capacity at the local level (whether real or imagined), a lack of local accountability, and elite capture amongst others (Olowu, 1998; Ayee, 2008). However, even where there has been a political commitment to devolve power from the centre, a number of authors have pointed out that there has been a tendency to adopt what are perceived to be the best practices of decentralisation in advanced Western states with negative effect (Smoke, 2003, p. 13;

Tapscott & Thompson, 2013). Of particular concern has been the fact that these models of decentralisation have been adopted with little or no adaptation and with little consideration paid to their contextual suitability (Prud'homme, 2001). In addition to the questions raised about the suitability of the models adopted, states in Africa have faced an additional array of problems in their efforts to decentralise administrative activities. These relate to issues of inter-governmental coordination, to policy and strategy coherence across governing strata, as well as to resource constraints (Smoke, 2003).

Tanzania's experience with decentralisation and local government dates back to the colonial era where it formed part of the policy then known as 'indirect rule' (Coulson, 1982; Gauhar & Nyerere, 1984, p. 828; Ribot, 2002). At independence in 1961, the incoming ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), had stressed the importance of decentralisation as a means of bringing ordinary citizens into the decision-making process of government (Nyerere, 1968; 1969) and, in large part, took over the pre-existing colonial system of local government. However, notwithstanding the government's stated commitment to citizen participation, over the course of the past 50 years the extent of popular engagement in decision-making has either been very narrow or non-existent. Instead, what citizens were subjected to over time was a form of forced or involuntary engagement in centrally determined community activities implemented at the local level. As Hydén (1980) has noted, in instances where the government assumed that people were not willing of their own free will to meet the demands of the state, coercion was used to compel their acceptance.

The state inherited from the British colonial regime in 1961 comprised a partially decentralised government structure which included elected local governments based on traditional ethnic authorities (Coulson, 1982; Mmari, 2005, p. 5; Ribot, 2002, p. 5). The system of local government in Tanzania during the first decade of independence was thus comprised of so-called native authorities, municipalities, and district and town councils established by the colonial regime under the Local Government Ordinance of 1953. Although their activities were largely prescribed and they exercised relatively limited deliberative power, local governments during this period did assume responsibility for some revenue collection and for basic service delivery. This changed in 1972 when the government embarked on its first programme of state reform. This initiative, which formed part of the *Ujamaa* villagisation programme (then an integral part of the ruling party's commitment to socialism) amounted to the abolition of local government and its

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replacement with a form of de-concentrated administration which derived its authority from the central government. This was consistent with trends elsewhere in Anglophone Africa at the time, where one-party states asserted their control over such primary functions as health care, education, road construction and local taxation which had hitherto been the responsibility of local governments (Ribot, 2002, p. 5), whilst others went so far as to abolish local representative structures in their entirety (Oyugi, 2000; Ribot, 2002). Although the 1972 reform was ostensibly intended to transfer direct power to the people to make decisions, set development priorities and implement development programmes, it effectively ensured central bureaucratic control over local administration (Rweyemamu, 1974; Rweyemamu & Mwansasu, 1974; Hydén, 1980; Mawhood, 1993; Mukandala & Gasarasi, 2000; Mmari, 2005).

Despite the intended objective of accelerating socio-economic reform throughout the country, the re-centralisation of power proved to be ineffective and the delivery of public services deteriorated remarkably (Picard, 1980; Mmari, 2005) to the extent that by the 1980s Tanzania was ranked the second poorest country in the world in terms of GDP per capita (Ferreira & World Bank, 1996; Ayee, 2008). As a consequence, in 1982 the decentralisation policy was once again reformulated, and democratic local government was reintroduced to address the weaknesses evident in the previous policy. However, this second reform initiative led to only limited devolution and little improvement in the system of local government in terms of citizen participation and basic service delivery and the domination of the central government remained (Mmari, 2005, p. 6).

Following growing political opposition to one-party rule and the eventual introduction of a multiparty system in Tanzania in 1991, more meaningful reform of local government became imperative. In response, the government embarked upon yet another round of local government reform and the current policy of 'Decentralisation by Devolution' (D-by-D) was officially launched in the 1998 *Policy Paper on Local Government Reform.* The policy asserts the need for political devolution and decentralisation and emphasises the need to strengthen the capacity of local government authorities in order to ensure improved delivery of public services and enhanced citizen participation in local governance and development (URT, 1998).

The local government system in Tanzania, as set out in the 1998 policy paper, is based on political devolution and the decentralisation of finances and administrative functions

within a unitary state (URT, 1998). In that context, local government authorities (LGAs) derive their legitimacy variously from the Constitution (Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977), Acts of parliament (especially the Local Government (District/Urban Authorities) Act, 1982), and government policy (URT, 1998; 2006, p.7). In terms of Article 145 (1) of the Constitution local government authorities have been established in each region, district, urban area and village in the United Republic of Tanzania (*CURT*, 1977). Explicit in the legislation is the need to promote citizen participation in local decision making. Thus, according to Article 146 (1), the purpose of local government is to transfer authority to the people and to consolidate democracy as a means to accelerate development (*CURT*, 1977). In that respect, the Constitution asserts that, 'every citizen has the right and freedom to participate fully in the process leading to the decision on matters affecting him, his well-being or the nation' (*CURT*, 1977). At the same time, the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 6 of 1999 requires local governments to 'promote and ensure democratic participation in, and control of decision-making by the people concerned' (Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1999; section 17).

Local government authorities in Tanzania now comprise elected councils and committees as well as a professional administrative service (URT, 1998) and their responsibilities include the delivery of such public services as education, health, water, roads and agriculture within their jurisdiction; facilitating the maintenance of law and order; and the promotion of local development through participatory processes (URT, 1998). In performing these functions, local government authorities are required by law to 'give effect to the meaningful decentralisation in political, financial and administrative matters relating to the functions powers, responsibilities and services at all levels of local government authorities' (Section 17 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1999).

The push towards devolution in Tanzania in the last two and a half decades has been motivated by both national politics and international influences. Within the context of national politics, the policy of decentralisation by devolution may, as intimated, be seen as a response to the commitments made by the ruling party '*Chama cha Mapinduzi*'

(CCM)[1] in its election manifesto of 1995 which promised both improved service delivery and greater citizen participation (CCM, 1995). This followed the transition to multi-party democracy which brought to an end more than three decades on one-party rule by the CCM and its predecessor TANU.

In the global context, the Tanzanian policy of decentralisation by devolution may be seen to be linked to the so-called 'second-wave' of neo-liberalism that enveloped many developing countries in Africa from the mid-1990s onwards. Following the poor economic performance of most former colonies in the immediate aftermath of independence in the 1960s and 1970s, multi-lateral and bi-lateral funding organisations reassessed both the type of aid which they were prepared to offer as well as the conditionalities which they imposed on donor recipients. Set in the context of the Cold War, this neo-liberal agenda (the so-called Washington Consensus), as will be discussed, set strict conditions for the receipt of aid. Linked to this initiative was the implicit objective of diminishing the influence of central governments (seen as a vehicle for corruption and the concentration and abuse of power) and the promotion of decentralised government (Williamson, 2004; Shivji, 2006). Tanzania, as one of the poorest countries in the world and heavily reliant on donor aid, was left with little choice but to accept the conditionalities imposed by multilateral and bilateral funding agencies including a commitment to decentralise administrative authority. In has been reported that up to 95% of the current local government reform programme has been financed by international donors (Mgonja & Tundui, 2012). This supports Hyden's contention that although the government of Tanzania may own the development process, donors determine its direction and set its limits (Hyden, 2005, 2008 Hyden, 2005, 2008; Mgonja & Tundui, 2012, p. 214). Irrespective of the accuracy of these claims, the Tanzanian government itself acknowledges the significant role played by donors in supporting the local government reform programme (Mmari, 2005).

Apart from its stated commitment to political devolution, the government of Tanzania has simultaneously introduced a form of de-concentrated administration at the local level which serves to ensure close central control of local government affairs. The principle

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[1] The 'Chama cha Mapinduzi' (Party of the Revolution) was established in 1977 following the merger of the Tanganyika African National Union and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) at the time the only two political parties in existence in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar respectively.

method by which this has been achieved is through the mechanism of special projects which are sponsored by the government and international aid agencies with the intended aim of improving 'economic development and social inclusion' (Considine, 2008, p. 19). This has been the case with the establishment of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), which is intended to support the development activities of municipalities but which frequently appears to operate as a form of parallel local government. TASAF, which obtains more than 90% of its budget from donor agencies (TASAF, 2011, p. 27), derives its legitimacy from Section 21 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 6 of 1999. The Act stipulates that local government authorities may perform any functions legally delegated to them by agreement with a central government or any other body subject to the terms and conditions laid down in an agreement with the District Council. In view of the fact that TASAF had significantly more financial resources at its disposal than do municipalities its influence on local councils is significant. It is also less encumbered by the legislation which binds the operations of local authorities.

The establishment of TASAF as an autonomous programme operating within the space of decentralised and democratic local government structures has raised concerns both about the future of the recently instituted policy of decentralisation by devolution and the development of democratic local governance institutions in Tanzania (Boex, 2003; Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 2008). It has also raised questions as to how and why this hybrid model of decentralisation might have been adopted, seemingly as a partnership between the government of Tanzania and international donors (the World Bank, USAID, and DFID amongst them).

From the perspective of the national government it is understood that the need to exercise some control at the local level is prompted by concerns about the capacity of local governments to deliver much needed development programmes. Thus the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) asserts that the degree to which governments are willing to devolve authority is frequently conditioned by their confidence in the administrative capacity of lower echelons of the governing hierarchy' (UNCDF, 2002, p. 21). However, it might also be speculated that this desire to retain some form of central control could be based on concern that strong and autonomous local governments could serve as a base for the political growth of opposition parties.

The donor support for a watered down form of decentralisation is of interest in that it reflects a shift in thinking on the potential which local authorities hold to deliver effective development programmes towards a view that devolution, whilst necessary, is an insufficient condition for grassroots poverty reduction (Kuper, 2004; Turner & Hulme, 1997; Priyadarshee & Hossain, 2010). This supports Booth's assertion that 'democratic decentralisation has certainly lost some of its allure in international circles, partly because of the lack of decisive empirical support' (Booth, 2012, p. 67). The shift of donor support to special projects such as TASAF suggests a move away from a conceptualisation of decentralisation as a vehicle for deepening democracy to one that is largely oriented to service delivery. As King and Stoker observe perhaps people will now agree that 'local government is justified as the effective provider of services rather than the means of liberty, participation or democracy' (King & Stoker, 1996; citing Hill, 1974:235).

1.2 Research aim

It is more than a decade and a half since the policy of decentralisation by devolution was first introduced in Tanzania and almost as long since TASAF was established in 2000. During this period limited research has been undertaken to assess the extent to which the government has succeeded in implementing the local government reforms outlined in its 1998 policy document (URT, 1998). Still less is known about the extent to which decentralisation has improved or inhibited service delivery and citizen participation. This study consequently assesses the extent to which the current decentralisation policy in Tanzania is meeting both these stated policy objectives. It does so by examining the operations of local governments and TASAF and the extent to which they interrelate and are mutually supportive. It also pays particular attention to an examination of the interaction between the decentralised and de-concentrated systems of administration in place and the extent to which they are mutually reinforcing or conflictual.

1.3 Introduction to the theoretical framework

The thesis is informed by three theoretical perspectives. The first aims to provide an understanding of the impact of geo-politics (and the influence of international donor agencies in particular) on the affairs of developing states such as Tanzania. The second aims to provide an institutional understanding of the process of decentralisation, whilst

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the third considers the theoretical justifications advanced in support of the devolution of government. These will be discussed briefly below.

The impact of Western powers on the affairs of states in post-colonial Africa has been extensively documented (Ayee, 2008; Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002). In that respect, it has been argued that in the immediate post-colonial era the African continent became part of the battle field of the Cold War, caught between the capitalist West and the Communist bloc, and that much of the Western policy towards African states was influenced by concerns to maintain and extend their sphere of influence (Baah, 2003). Commencing with the modernisation strategies of the 1960s (which attempted to apply the same methods adopted in reconstructing post-war Europe), Western powers have, over the course of the past five decades, sought to influence the development path followed by African states by way of aid conditionalities. In that regard, an insistence on the imposition of structural adjustment programmes as a condition of aid in the 1980s has been widely seen as an attempt to impose a neo-liberal reform agenda on states in Africa (Gibbon, 1996; Baah, 2003). The promotion of New Public Management (NPM) in African states is similarly seen to be a continuation of the neo-liberal agenda (Manning, 2001), advocating, as it does, the adoption of business techniques and market mechanisms in public sector management (Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). The NPM approach also envisaged a reduction in the size and influence of the central state through privatisation, outsourcing and the establishment of specialised agencies.

The influence of NPM thinking is to be found in the poverty agenda advanced by the Word Bank in the 1990s (World Bank, 2000; Braathen, 2005). This was particularly apparent in the creation of Social Funds as specialised agencies for targeted poverty intervention and pro-poor public action. These Social Funds were to be managed by semi-autonomous agencies located outside line ministries with direct financing from the World Bank and other funding agencies. Further features of NPM evident in the administration of Social Funds were the use of out-sourcing, minimal regulation (in that they operate outside of normal state regulations) and the imposition of user charges on the public (Tendler, 2000; Manning, 2001; Braathen, 2005). Their intended efficiency and effectiveness, notwithstanding, Social Funds have been criticised for the fact that such agencies tend to spinoff from central government and by-pass democratically elected bodies. They have also been seen to depoliticise public policymaking and, in so doing, to limit the influence which the general population is able to exercise over the delivery of

local services (Kettl, 1999, 2000; Manning, 2001; Christensen & Lægreid, 2002; Braathen, 2005). The theoretical insights afforded through the critique of neo-liberal policies (and the impacts of NPM in particular) will assist in developing an understanding of the factors which gave rise to the establishment of TASAF.

The impact of de-concentrated administration on decentralised structures, and the inter-relationship between TASAF and local government structures in Tanzania in particular, is analysed in this study through the lens of institutional theory which considers the nature, resources and influence of the different agencies involved as well as their situation in the state machinery. A key premise of this theoretical approach is that a decision made at a central level of an organization is likely to affect, and can be used to explain, processes and outcomes at a lower level of the administrative hierarchy (Zucker, 1987; Clemens, 1997; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Manin, Stein, & Mansbridge, 1987; Morrill, 1999). In other words, how something is construed at a higher level is useful in explaining processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Amenta, 2005; Amenta & Ramsey, 2010; Clemens & Cook, 1999).

Whilst the institutional environments of devolved local governments can be used as a measure of the degree of institutionalization in place, contemporary, research is less concerned with the causes of institutionalization than with studying its consequences or outcomes (Zucker, 1987). Thus, for example, where there are multiple institutions with competing systems of authority this can lead to contradictory approaches which act to the detriment of an organisation as whole. The potential for this type of institutional dissonance is evident in the latent tension that exists between the service delivery objectives of TASAF and the democratic objectives of local governments.

Although decentralisation has been championed by academics and practitioners as a strategy for achieving such objectives as improved efficiency, responsiveness to local needs and accountability, few scholars have claimed that that it is likely to improve the equity of public service delivery (Bossert et al, 2003). Indeed, some scholars argue that centralized systems are more successful in redistributing resources in favour of poorer areas and poor people. Others maintain that local governments may not have the incentive to pursue redistribution strategies unless compelled to do so by the central government through the imposition of inclusive local political processes or centrally determined targeted interventions and conditional transfers (Smoke, 2001, p. 34). Linked to this is the

argument that the redistribution of resources from wealthier to poorer areas should be the responsibility of central governments since local governments are constrained by their internal resources (Smoke, 2003, p. 9). A further concern is that local governments are frequently prone to elite capture, and in such circumstance local control and local financing of service delivery will disadvantage poor communities if targeted interventions are not specifically designed by the central government to address the needs of poor people (Bossert et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003). The decentralisation programme in Tanzania will be measured against the normative goals of efficiency, good governance and equity described in the literature.

1.4   Research questions

This study attempts to address the following primary research questions:

1. What national and international factors have served to shaped the current configuration of decentralisation in Tanzania and with what effect?
2. What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders in the decentralisation process (donors, government officials, political office bearers, and ordinary citizens) about the effectiveness of the model in terms of strengthening local government, improving service delivery, in enhancing participatory development and in deepening democracy.
3. What are the practical outcomes of the decentralisation process in terms of physical infrastructure, enhanced administrative capacity and improved service delivery?

1.5   Scope of the study

This study examines the system of local government administration in mainland Tanzania but, due to constraints of time and financial resources, the scope of the research was limited to three municipalities two of which are rural and one urban.[2] The three local government authorities selected were the Morogoro District Council (in Morogoro region), the Lindi District Council (in Lindi region) and Tanga City Council (in the Tanga region). In addition to the fact that TASAF special projects are being implemented in all three, these municipalities were selected purposively. In addition to being one of the

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[2] See also Selltiz (1962, p. 50); and Kothari (2004, p. 31) for detailed explanation of the economy of methods.

primary urban centres in the country, Tanga city council in the North East has been included due to the researcher's prior work experience in the region, Morogoro district council in the centre of the country is a densely populated rural region, whilst Lindi district council was selected due to its remoteness in southern Tanzania and its high levels of poverty.

1.6 Significance of the research

The research problem addressed in this study aims to investigate the inherent tensions between the formalistic objectives of decentralisation in developing states in Africa and the practical dimensions of developing an effective system of local government which is capable of improving socio-economic development and of promoting participatory forms of governance. This approach to analysing decentralisation has been under-researched in general and has not thus far been undertaken in Tanzania. This thesis also explores how a new form of hybrid decentralisation is emerging in Tanzania and assesses the extent to which this is strengthening service delivery and deepening democracy and, to that extent, its findings are relevant to research on decentralisation elsewhere in Africa and the developing world.

1.7 Research methodology

The investigation for this thesis was based on a mixed-methods approach which made use of both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies. The adoption of a mixed-method approach aims to overcome the weaknesses inherent in a single method-approach and in that respect it follows Jick's (1979) contention that qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as opposing methodologies. In adopting this approach the study was conducted in three phases. The first phase involved short preliminary visits to the case-study municipalities to gain familiarity with the research areas and the specific procedures governing research activities in each locality, to collect relevant available secondary data, and to test research instruments. The second phase involved a sample survey and qualitative research based on key informant interviews (with government officials at national and local levels, with political office bearers, donor agencies, community leader etc.), and focus group discussions. The third phase (confirmatory qualitative exploration) was used to clarify information obtained in

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previous phases and to reach the respondents who were not included in the in-depth qualitative interviews during the second phase.

1.8   Chapter outline of the study

The thesis is structured according to the following sequence of chapters: *Chapter One: Introduction*. This chapter introduces the research topic and contextualises the challenges of administrative decentralisation in developing states. It also provides a brief overview of the process of decentralisation in Tanzania and sets out the rationale for, and significance of, the research and advances a number of research propositions.

Chapter Two: Conceptualising decentralisation. This chapter provides an overview of the literature on decentralisation and the challenges which this has presented to developing states and to states in Africa in particular. Based on this review, the chapter develops the theoretical framework which underpins the arguments advanced in the thesis.

Chapter Three: Decentralised government in Tanzania: pre and post-independence Experiences. This chapter provides an overview of the different approaches to administrative decentralisation adopted in the country since Independence in 1961. It looks at the political, economic and administrative factors which influenced the course of decentralisation as well as its outcome in terms of socio-economic development and citizen participation.

Chapter Four: Decentralisation and de-concentration in Tanzania: LGRP – TASAF emergence. This chapter discusses the current configuration of decentralised and de-concentrated government in Tanzania. It analyses the motivations for the establishment of a hybrid model of decentralisation from the perspective of the national government (administrators and political office bearers), of the donor community, and of local government officials. It also sets the stage for the empirical work undertaken in the three case-study areas.

Chapter Five: Research context and methodology. This chapter discusses the context of the research and the methodology adopted. It provides an overview of the three local council case studies and of the way in which decentralisation is functioning in practice. This focuses on the structure of these municipalities, the programmes they are implementing as well as the extent to which their activities are integrated with those of

TASAF. The chapter also describes the mixed methods research design adopted in the study and reflection on the three phases of fieldwork.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight: Perceptions on the impacts of decentralisation. These chapters present the findings of empirical research undertaken in the three case-study areas. This includes both the qualitative and quantitative data generated in each municipality.

Chapter Nine: Analysis of empirical evidence. This chapter synthesises the empirical information generated in the case-study areas and assesses the extent to which they provide answers to the key research questions of the thesis. It also considers the extent to which the policy of decentralisation in Tanzania is fulfilling its stated objective of improved service delivery and greater citizen participation. The chapter also reflects on the extent to which the evidence generated supports the theoretical framework adopted for the thesis.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion and policy recommendations. This chapter restates the research objectives of the thesis and measures these up against the empirical findings of the research. It further reflects on the lessons learnt from Tanzania's experiment in decentralisation and their implications both for theory and decentralisation programmes elsewhere in Africa.

The chapter which follows provides an overview of the literature on decentralisation and establishes the theoretical framework which informs the analysis of the empirical research which follows.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALISING DECENTRALISATION

2.1   Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature on decentralised government and the theoretical bases on which decentralised decision-making and service delivery programmes are founded. It does so by examining the reasons why countries decentralise, what is being decentralised (the dimensions of decentralisation) and how decentralisation takes place (the forms of decentralisation) in developing countries. Building on this review, the chapter develops the theoretical framework which underpins the arguments advanced in this thesis.

2.2   Concepts of decentralisation

The concept of decentralisation has changed over time along with its context in both, developed and developing countries. Conyers (2007, p. 28) notices that 'the history of decentralisation has not been static' as it has affected, and in turn has been affected by, a number of changes in the form of government which have taken place over decades. Significant changes in the conceptualisation of decentralisation took place in the final quarter of the 20th century in the context of evolving global debates on governance, socio-economic development, and technological advancement (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Following this process, the concept of decentralisation has assumed multiple connotations yet it still defies a straightforward definition.

Perhaps somewhat simplistically, Ayee (2008, p. 101) considers decentralisation to be 'the opposite of centralisation or concentration', involving delegation of power/authority from central government to the peripheral agent. In similar vein Smith (1985, p. 1) conceives of decentralisation as 'reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and conferring powers on local government'. Wekwete (1990) also defines decentralisation as a form of governance that transfers authority and responsibility from central to intermediate and local governments. Rondinelli and Nellis (1986, p. 5) however, define decentralisation from an administrative perspective as being 'the transfer

of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, (and) subordinate units or levels of government…'. This understanding of decentralisation is also evident in a definition advanced by the World Bank which sees it as 'the transfer of administrative and financial authority and responsibility for governance and public service delivery from a higher level of government to a lower level' (World Bank 2008, p. 3).

2.3   Forms/dimensions of decentralisation

Decentralisation is assigned three main dimensions or forms in the literature, namely fiscal decentralisation, administrative decentralisation and political decentralisation (Crook & Manor 1995; Boex, 2010; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Ahmad & Brosio, 2009). The subsections which follow discuss these different dimensions.

2.3.1   Fiscal decentralisation

Fiscal decentralisation refers to the process, by which the central government or its agent in a system transfers influence over budgets and financial decisions to local government. It involves the assignment of financial resources, and control of own sources of revenue, to local government together with properly defined expenditure authority (Smoke, 2001, p. 34; Ayee, 2008, p. 103). Fiscal authority may be assigned to a de-concentrated bureaucracy that is solely accountable to central government or to democratic bodies and, particularly, devolved local councils (Manor, 1999, p. 6). Fiscal assignments in the form of intergovernmental transfers can play a vital role in bridging fiscal gaps, correcting interregional resource disparities, and, when linked to participatory mechanisms, it can enhance popular participation and give voice to people at grassroots levels (Manor, 1999; Smoke, 2001).

2.3.2   De-concentration or administrative decentralisation

De-concentration, refers to the dispersal of agents of higher levels of government to lower levels of the governing hierarchy. This has also been described as administrative decentralisation in the literature (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; O'dwyer and Ziblatt, 2006). Coupled with some fiscal decentralisation but without democratization (political devolution), de-concentration is effected by moving agents of central government to the

regional or local level where they remain accountable only or mostly to their principals at the central level. This process enables the central government to penetrate into the peripheral sphere, but its impact is to diminish the influence of local institutions and locally organized groups. Under de-concentrated administration, the central government does not yield any of its authority, but instead, it simply relocates its staff to different levels of government (Manor 1999; Parker, 1995; Nge'the 1993; Oyugi 1993; Rondinelli, 1981). Administrative decentralisation according to Faust and Harbers (2012, p. 56) 'indicates the degree to which policy responsibilities are in the hands of subnational governments' (see also Schneider 2003; Montero and Samuels 2004). Notably, the devolution of decision-making authority and responsibility for policy formulation is not a necessary condition for administrative decentralisation (Falleti, 2010, p. 35).

However, whilst de-concentration is not regarded as a democratic form of governance, some have argued that it can be linked to mechanisms which create spaces for people's voice in the decisions made within government institutions, for example by establishing effective channels for communication through service user bodies (Manor, 1999; Mehorotra, 2006). Notwithstanding this potential, de-concentration is generally viewed as the weakest form of decentralisation rarely used except in authoritarian and fragile states (Manning and Parison, 2004; World Bank, 2009; Mulvaney, 2011). Administrative decentralisation has, consequently, receive little attention in the literature despite the fact that it remains the most visible form of decentralisation in most developing countries (Falleti, 2010).

2.3.3   Democratic decentralisation (political devolution)

Democratic decentralisation or political devolution aims at devolving resources, authority and accountability to local governments. The level of political decentralisation reflects the extent to which local governments are democratised and have a share in the strategic political functions of governance (Faust and Harbers 2012). Democratic decentralisation, in effect, transfers power, authority and responsibility for the delivery of public services from the central government to lower echelons of government (Olowu; 2001, p.3). This applies especially to municipalities that have elected mayors (or other designated leaders) and councillors, and have been assigned authority to raise their own revenue (partially at least) and to make investments and other development decisions (Olsen, 2007). In a devolved system the geographical boundaries over which local governments exercise

their jurisdiction and within which they perform public functions are legally prescribed and recognised (Olsen, 2007).

This study focuses on two types of decentralisation, namely de-concentration (administrative decentralisation) and democratic decentralisation (devolution) and, significantly, it considers a scenario where the two types might occur simultaneously or run parallel to one another. In a study on the political economy of democratic decentralisation conducted more than twenty five years ago, Manor recognised the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of these two types of decentralisation but his research stopped short of providing empirical evidence of such a scenario (Manor, 1999, p. 5).

Theoretically, approaches to decentralisation have assumed that local governments respond to incentive structures created by actors at the central government level and to a uniform set of preferences shared by all local governments. Supporting this theoretical perspective Falleti (2005) argues that, under normal circumstance, local governments prefer political and fiscal decentralization to administrative decentralisation. Concurring with this view Faust and Harbers (2012, p. 71) assert that 'the basic notion that local governments prefer political autonomy and resources to responsibilities (administrative assignments) is correct' in the case of Ecuador, where elected sub-national governments showed a reluctance to assume additional policy responsibilities without the prospect of receiving additional financial resources. They maintain that local preferences and incentives have often been ignored, both in theory and practice, when designing decentralisation programmes (Faust and Harbers 2012:56). However, they argue, taking local interests into account is of vital importance since they influence the institutional environment of local government and the extent to which decentralisation policies are adopted by local constituencies. Gonza ́lez maintains that the reasons why local governments prefer fiscal and political decentralisation to administrative decentralisation is that the latter assigns responsibility without commensurate authority (Gonza ́lez 2008). Administrative decentralisation, in effect, constrains the ability of local governments to engage in discretionary politics and re-directs their actions towards set targets and, at the same time, subjects them to new central government monitoring mechanisms (Faust and Harbers 2012).

2.4 The normative goals of decentralisation

The normative goals of decentralisation often described in the literature include efficiency, good governance, equity, and poverty reduction (see for example, the writings of Smoke (2001 and 2003); Dele Olowu (2001); Ribot (2002) Cheema and Rondinelli (2007); and, Zhou and World Bank, (2009) amongst others). These goals are discussed briefly in the sections which follow.

2.4.1 Efficiency

The decentralisation of government administration to local governments, which are believed to have closer ties to the people, easier access to local information and privileged knowledge of the local context, is said to improve *allocative efficiency*. This is said to be so because it is believed that local governments are in a better position to identify the right mix and quantity of services to suit local demands (Oates, 1999, p. 1123); Abers, 2000; Blair, 2000; Heller, 2001; Kohl, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Nordholt, 2004; Wunch, 1998). In theory, the efficiency goal is most clearly set out in the *Oates decentralisation theorem* (Oates 1972, p. 35; Sartori, 1987; Saltman et al., 2007). The theory contends that it will always be more efficient for a local government to provide goods or services within its own sphere of jurisdiction than for a central government to provide such goods or services across several local authorities (Oates, 1972, p. 35) and 2006, p. 3; Saltman, et al., 2007). This is because different localities will want different bundles of goods and services. Although its focus is limited to the fiscal dimensions of decentralisation and efficiency in public service delivery, the decentralisation theorem establishes a foundation for understanding why governments decentralise their governance structures and the provision of public services. It also sheds some light on why it is common to find both decentralised and centralised arrangements for the provision of public services in most developing countries. Theories of public administration and management also stress the importance of decentralisation in terms of 'technical efficiency' in delivering services to the public arising from increased accountability and responsiveness (Turner & Hulme, 1997:156; Treisman, 2007). In this understanding, decentralisation leads to improved decision-making which, in turn,

increases efficiency and effectiveness in planning, coordination, innovation and policy implementation.[3]

2.4.2 Good governance

The concept of governance is ill-defined but it is generally understood to refer to the whole set of actions carried out by the government, civil society, and the private sector, and the ways in which these actors collaborate to solve society's problems. Governance is said to represent a broader and more inclusive concept than the mere notion of government. Pollitt and Bouckaert further note there is no way governance can be viewed as an alternative to government and, it should be understood that government remains 'one of its principal constituent elements' (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 21). From a governance perspective decentralisation is seen as a means to empower citizens by giving them voice, resources and a measure of self-government.

Since local governments are said to be closer to the people, it is argued that decentralisation improves governance by increasing the level of interaction between citizens and the local state and by enhancing their capacity to meaningfully influence decision making on issues relating to the delivery of public services (Smoke, 2001: 34; 2003: 9; Treisman, 2007:157). It has also been claimed that African states seeking to address institutional incapacity, weak accountability, poor service delivery and the alienation of their citizenry would benefit from the introduction of effective participatory systems (Dia, 1996;Olowu, 2001).

In theory the governance goal of decentralisation is derived from both the ideals of liberal democracy and participatory democracy. Liberal democratic political theory, stemming from the work of John Stuart Mill and others[4] envisages the returns both central and local government could derive from devolution and popular participation in formal political structures at the grassroots level (Turner & Hulme, 1997). The theory puts forward political stability, political participation, accountability and responsiveness as the political benefits that can be attained from decentralisation. According to John Stuart Mill (quoted in Wilson, 2012) representative local government encourages individuality and leads people to take an active and intelligent part in the affairs of society. Participatory

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[3] See Turner & Hulme (1997:156-157) for a detailed account on these grounds.
[4] Wilson, F. (2012) 'John Stuart Mill', in E. N. Zalta (ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (Spring Edition). URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/mill.

democratic theorists maintain that where citizens participate in self-government their sense of political agency and empowerment increases. Frequent participation, it is stated, transforms ordinary people into politically informed citizens, whilst the expansion of democratic participation beyond traditionally electoral processes breaks the monopoly of state power and builds equity and humanity in a society (Pateman, 1970; Bryan, 2004; Hilmer. 2010:56).

Contemporary participatory theorists define participation as a process whereby citizens, and especially marginalised ones, influence governance processes, decisions, policies and development initiatives that affect them (World Bank, 1992: 177; 1998; Brett, 2003; Sharma, 2004; Tapscott & Thomson, 2013). A central problem addressed by most participatory research is the nature of that influence and, particularly, how to devise mechanisms to enable state agencies to incorporate citizens' opinions into government decision-making, policy formulation, planning and budgeting processes 'directly rather than indirectly, as is the case in orthodox bureaucratic systems' (Brett, 2003:5). Some participation scholars have classified the ways in which citizens participate as occurring in two distinct spheres in what have been termed 'invited spaces' and 'invented spaces' of state-citizen engagement (Cornwall, 2002; Mohanty, 2007: 80; Kateshumbwa, 2013: 16; Cornwall, 2002; Piper, 2010). The invited spaces are institutional spaces or platforms purposefully created by government to encourage citizens to exercise their rights by taking part in government decision-making and policy processes (Cornwall, 2002; Mohanty, 2007: 80; Kateshumbwa, 2013: 16; Cornwall, 2002; Piper, 2010). It is at this level where decentralisation is seen to link with participation as it 'provides different kinds of institutions, politically and administratively, for participation at various local levels' (Samaratunge, 1998: 6). The invented spaces refer to the social spaces created by the people themselves through collective action, usually in the form of social mobilisation to confront the state (Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004; Mohanty, 2007: 81; Piper, 2010; Kateshumbwa, 2013: 16). This second category of citizen engagement with the state typically occurs when the invited spaces for participation are failing to fulfil their objectives and frustrated people create their own platforms to express their views and wants.

2.4.3   Equity

Although decentralisation has been championed by academics and practitioners as a strategy for achieving improved efficiency, responsiveness to local needs, and accountability, very few scholars have claimed that it is likely to lead to improved equity in the delivery of public services (Bossert et al., 2003). Conversely, many scholars have argued that centralized systems are more effective in redistributing resources in favour of poorer areas and poor people. It has also been argued that local governments may not have the incentive to pursue redistribution in their jurisdictions unless compelled to do so by the central government through the imposition of inclusive local political processes or centrally determined targeted interventions and conditional transfers (Smoke, 2001:34). Linked to this is the argument that the redistribution of resources from wealthier to poorer areas should be the responsibility of central governments since local governments are constrained by their internal resources (Smoke, 2003: 9). A further concern in the literature is that local governments are frequently prone to elite capture and that, in such situations, local control and local financing of service delivery will disadvantage poor communities if targeted interventions are not specifically designed by the central government to address the needs of poor people (Bossert et al., 2003; World Bank, 2004).

2.4.4   Development and/or poverty reduction

Apart from delivering basic public services, decentralised local governments are also seen to contribute to local socio-economic development. Through the provision of supportive production and distribution services, such as the provision of extension services to local firms and entrepreneurs and the creation of markets for local contractors, it is believed that local governments can stimulate economic development in local communities. Devolved local governments can also promote local economic development by legislating and creating institutional environments supportive of economic growth (Nel & Binns, 2001; Agranoff & McGuire, 2004).

In theory, decentralisation impacts poverty by making heard the voice of the poor; by improving poor peoples' access to public services; and by reducing their vulnerability (Jütting et al., 2005). The decentralisation of power facilitates the creation of democratic institutions that encourage poor people to actively participate in decision-making and lobby for a better quality of life (Parker, 1995; Jütting et al., 2005). Due to their proximity to the people, as previously intimated, local government institutions gain insight into the

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needs of different communities and are able to match local needs and services by proper targeting (Jütting et al., 2005). In that regard, Von Braun and Grote (2000) maintain, under the right circumstances decentralisation can benefit the poor.

However, since there are multiple factors which influence local development, including macro-economic and institutional conditions over which local governments have limited control, it is evident that devolution, of itself, is a necessary but insufficient condition for local development and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000b). In many developing states this fact has been used to justify rigid central government control over local government. It is also evident in the introduction of de-concentrated administrative programmes, so often sponsored by multilateral and bilateral donors under the banner of poverty reduction and the attainment of millennium development goals.

2.5   The factors for adoption of decentralisation in Africa

The introduction of decentralisation reforms in Africa has been attributed to both external and internal factors. In many countries in Africa, calls for decentralisation arose in response to the failure of centralized administrative systems which led to prolonged political, economic and fiscal crises (Wunsch & Olowu, 1990; Olowu, 2001). The financial crises of the 1980s, in particular, put considerable pressure on states in Africa to initiate reforms in their economic, administrative and political systems in order to address growing societal problems (World Bank, 1981, 1989; Cornia & Helleiner, 1994). Linked to this, political activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and various opposition groups pushed African governments to adopt political and administrative reforms through their public criticism of state policy and protest action (Olowu, 2001). These interests groups demanded greater involvement of citizens in decision-making and policy processes, and the decentralisation of highly centralised state structures as a means to narrow the gap between the state and its citizens (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998; Olowu & United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2001; Bishop & Davis, 2002). Academics also attributed the inability of African states to effectively managed their economies and to deliver services to weak leadership on the part of African leaders and the failure of the policies and systems which they had adopted (Ekeh, 1975; Hyden, 1999; Young, 2004).

In the face of a severe economic crisis, most African leaders had little choice but to seek external financing as a way of rescuing their economies and sustaining state operations.

However, foreign aid, when it was secured, seldom if ever came as a 'no strings attached gift' from donors. A number of conditionalities, including the reduction of the size of the state bureaucracy, liberalisation of the economy and markets, the withdrawal of the state from direct production of goods and services, and decentralisation, were prescribed by donor agencies (Burnell, 1997). Decentralisation, in this context, formed part of the neo-liberal policy framework (the so called Washington Consensus) advanced by multi-national financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF in particular), bi-lateral donors and the international community at large (Williamson, 2004; Shivji, 2006). The neo-liberal framework was also viewed as a counter weight to the socialist and communist tendencies prevalent in some African countries. Democratic decentralisation thus came to be seen as a key element of the good governance agenda championed by the West from the 1990s onwards and as a central component of poverty alleviation programmes (UNDP, 1997; Giguère, 2003; Von Braun & Grote, 2000; World Bank, 2001). Given the fact that many African states remain heavily dependent on foreign aid to sustain their operations, pressure from donors continues to be an important factor in steering the course of decentralisation on the continent.

Commencing in the mid to late 1980s, structural adjustments programmes (SAPs) and economic restructuring forced African states to privatise or close public entities which had initially been established to deliver important services and infrastructure. The reforms imposed by the SAPs contributed to the decentralisation process as some of the functions of public entities which had been closed were transferred to local authorities (Olowu, 2001a). However, the SAPs proved to have more negative than positive outcomes in African countries and in many they culminated 'in severe economic dislocation and deterioration' (Rono, 2002, p. 84). They also led to decreased public spending on basic social services such as health and education, which, in turn, resulted in a decline in the quality and quantity of these services, and a decline in employment due to massive public sector retrenchments (Stromquist, 1999; Rono, 2002).

Having realised the negative consequences of the structural adjustment policies in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, international financial institutions, and the World Bank in particular, came up with the idea of creating what were called 'Social Funds', as a means to channel aid for emergency relief and poverty reduction to communities most affected by SAPs. These social funds were intended to operate semi-autonomously from line ministries, and their associated political systems, and in a decentralised manner. The

social funds model challenges the borrowing countries to adopt decentralisation and encourage popular participation as a condition for the continued receipt of donor funding.

Regional conflicts and the perceived threat that frustrated local elites could seek cessation (as indeed occurred in countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somaliland and elsewhere) was a further factor contributing towards the adoption of decentralisation in hitherto highly centralised African states. Decentralisation was seen to be an effective political mechanism through which ruling elites could reach accommodation with local elites, and contain or neutralise regional or civil conflicts (Crook & Manor, 1994; Boone, 1998). Decentralisation, as Olowu (2001) notes, played a significant role in conflict resolution in countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa.

2.6   Arguments for and against decentralisation

The experience of decentralisation in poor countries of the third world has divided academics, development practitioners, policy analysts, governments and the international community into two broad blocs: the 'proponents' of decentralisation as the means to advance governance and development and its 'sceptics'. The arguments of the proponents of decentralisation include the fact that it brings public services closer to the people and, hence, that it provides opportunities for active participation in decision-making and local policy processes; it leads to improved accountability resulting from popular participation and closer scrutiny of local government activity and spending; speedier services delivery due to the elimination of extended bureaucratic procedures; greater responsiveness of services to the needs of different communities; the deepening of democracy; and the enhancement of good governance through the efficient assignment of functions and responsibilities between the different levels of government (Valk & Wekwete, 1990; Olowu & Smoke, 1992; Mawhood, 1993; Crook, 1994; Turner & Hulme, 1997; Chikulo, 1998; Manor, 1999; Ackerman, 2004; Oates 2008). Relatedly, in its 2004 World Development Report, the World Bank asserts that decentralisation is a key institutional mechanism in improving service delivery (World Bank, 2003). The advancement of decentralisation is also seen to hold the potential to ease regional tensions and provide a shield from separatists or those seeking a degree of autonomy from the state (Samatar, 1992; Olowu, 2001; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009).Those in favour of decentralisation place emphasise on the efficiency outcomes which they believe are more likely to be achieved through a bottom-up approach than through centralized or top-down systems

(Kingsley, 1996; Manor, 1999). The broad assumption is that decentralized decision-making deepens democratization and enhances good governance (Abers, 2000; Blair, 2000; Heller, 2001; Kohl, 2003; Nordholt, 2004; Wunsch, 1998). Following from this perspective, decentralisation has come to be seen to be a vehicle for the promotion of participatory decision-making, local development, and service delivery in many countries (Wekwete, 2007).

In their arguments against decentralisation, the sceptics put forward concerns about the extent to which it increases disparities and inequality among localities; jeopardizes stability and deflates national identity by encouraging regional identities; gives rise to the capture and manipulation of local structures and autonomy by rent seeking local elites at the expense of general populace; increases corruption and erodes accountability at the local level; and undermines efficiency and effectiveness due to local level resource constraints experienced in most poor countries (Slater, 1989; Saito, 2001, 2008). The problem of elite capture and domination by traditional authority structures, in particular, is seen to be a recurring problem and is cited as one of the reasons why the poor often prefer to deal with central government officials rather than with their local government counterparts (Manor, 1999). Critics further argue that decentralising the state machinery may lead to the fragmentation of society and encourage ethnic divisions in fragile states (Kaplan, 2009; Scott, 2009). This argument favours tight central control, although it is recognised that such centralisation may only work for a short time in socially diverse nations (Prud'homme, 2001). The assertion that decentralisation may trigger inter-regional inequality builds on the view, that since regions differ in terms of their resources and economic potential, granting them greater autonomy could exacerbate, rather than alleviate, inequality across a country (Prud'homme, 2001; Prudhomme & World Bank, 1994; Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005). Other arguments against decentralisation stress the lack of capacity at the local level, and the fact that most local governments lack technical and managerial skills and their staff is generally of a low calibre (Gargan, 1981).

Decentralisation is also believed to increase fiduciary risk in countries with weak financial control. Of particular concern is the fact that it can aggravate corruption at the local level due to the close proximity of local officials and politicians to clients and contractors and the opportunities which this can create for improper conduct (World Bank, 1997; Tanzi, 2000; Fjeldstad, 2004). This is reported to be one of the principal

reasons why many donor funded special projects have de-concentrated rather than decentralised forms of administration. The section which follows discusses the trajectories of decentralisation in the African context.

2.7 Decentralisation in the African context

2.7.1 Decentralisation in colonial Africa

There have been multiple attempts at government decentralisation in Africa both before and after the onset of decolonisation in the early 1960s. In some countries, such as Nigeria and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) for example, decentralisation was introduced a decade before independence whilst others adopted decentralisation shortly after independence (Rondinelli, McCullog, & Johnson Donald, 1989; Therkildsen, 1993; Mamdani, 1996a, 1996b; Ribot, 2002, p. 4; Awortwi, 2010). Commencing in the 1930s the British colonial administration introduced a decentralized system of government in their colonies in Africa, as a form of 'indirect rule' through traditional authorities. In a similar manner, the French colonial administration adopted decentralisation in what they termed 'association. However, the type of decentralised administration deployed by the colonial powers typically served as a means to penetrate peripheral rural areas and to manage Africans under their control and had little to do with the empowerment of local populations (Ribot, 2002; Mamdani, 1996a). The justification for the systems of indirect rule and association advanced by colonial ideologues has been discussed extensively in the literature as has been the claim that they served as instruments for local empowerment and community development (Buell, 1928; Alexandre, 1970; Perham, 1968). However, as many have argued, the indirect rule and association policies segregated the majority of Africans under the doctrine of differentiation and created native institutions which were different from those established for Europeans (Mamdani, 1996, p. 7; Ribot, 2002). Furthermore, the native institutions (traditional authorities, customary laws etc.) which were supported were primarily used to rule and control colonial subjects. Nevertheless, over time, the attempts by the colonial rulers to establish the boundaries of districts and to develop urban areas did lay foundations for decentralisation in some post-independence African states (Kasfir, 1993, p. 25). In the closing phases of colonial rule, in particular, departing colonial administrations in colonies like Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana and Tanganyika, left behind some form of democratic institution at the local level in their attempt to prepare these countries for independence (Kasfir, 1993, p. 28). The following

section will expand on what happened to these local government institutions after independence.

2.7.2 Decentralisation in independent African states

Upon attaining independence, African states inherited the local government systems formerly adopted by the colonial administrations (Ribot, 2002) and, in the first few years, most simply reproduced the institutions and systems which had been left behind (Mawhood & Davey, 1980; Olowu & Smoke, 1992; Mamdani, 1996; Ribot, 2002, p. 4; Mawhood, 1993). However, the independence constitutions prepared by the colonial rulers prior to their departure assigned various rights to local government which, in the aftermath of independence, came to be seen as undermining the importance of central government and as diminishing its ability to govern effectively (Kasfir, 1993, p.28).

As a consequence, from the mid-1960s onwards African governments felt they could no longer continue with the administrative structures left by the colonial regimes and many embarked on reform programmes intended to strengthen the role of central government. According to Mamdani (1996, p. 8), after half a decade of independence 'no nationalist government was content to reproduce the colonial legacy uncritically'. In countries like Tanzania and Uganda, governments attempted to depoliticise the role of local governments by taking away the policy and decision making roles of democratically elected councils and assigning them to de-concentrated central ministry field offices (Ribot, 2002, p. 5; Oyugi, 2000, p. 16; Hydén, 1980; Mawhood, 1993). The reforms of the early decades of independence, as Oyugi (2000, p. 13) observes, placed considerable emphasis on the need for 'development' and considered 'centralization' as the best strategy to achieving this goal (see also Ribot 2002, p. 5). Local governments were consequently turned into administrative units and their primary functions, such as education, health care, road construction and local taxation, were taken over by central government (Ribot 2002; Olowu and Smoke 1992). In some African countries, governments went as far as abolishing local elections and local representative councils on their entirety. The one-party states and socialist governments which came to power in the first and second decades of independence in Africa, in particular, saw no need for democratic local government (Ribot 2002). However, as numerous authors have pointed out, the abolition of local elections and local governments severely undermined popular participation in African countries and this, as shall be discussed, was a factor contributing

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to latter reform programmes (Mamdani, 1996; Oyugi 2000; Olowu, 2003; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004; Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The major focus of Kenya's decentralisation efforts from 1960s to 1970s, for example, was towards increased efficiency of central government administration in taking over many of the responsibilities of local authorities (Ribot 2002; Conyers 1993, p. 28). In the same vein, Zambia's decentralisation efforts of the late-1960s to 1970s under one-party rule served to strengthen party political dominance over district administration (Therkildsen, 1993). Other countries like Zimbabwe, Mali and Senegal, also adopted de-concentration during the 1960s and 1970s (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Conyers, 1983, 2007).

However, following the introduction of a package of fiscal and administrative reforms in the 1980s discussed above, across Africa governments began to opt for forms of democratic decentralisation, primarily in response to the conditionalities imposed by donors but also partly in response to the demands of their own citizenry. Thus Nigeria, having introduced local government elections in 1976, proceeded in 1983 to devolve major functions to municipalities including responsibility for health care, water and housing, roads maintenance, agricultural and rural development, and law enforcement (Ribot 2002; Rondinelli et al., 1989). In 1987 Ghana similarly institutionalised elected district assemblies (Chazan, 1992; Rothchild, 1994; Ribot, 2002). However, Kenya's decentralisation reforms in 1983, labelled 'district focus', maintained de-concentration and sought to increase central government administration efficiency (Oyugi, 1990; Smoke, 1993 Conyers, Cassels, Janovsky, & Cohen, 1993, p. 28). Other one-party states, like Zimbabwe and Zambia, continued with de-concentration and strove to strengthen party political dominance over district administrations (Therkildsen 1993; Ribot 1999, 2002).

Significant democratic decentralisation reforms began to take pace in the 1990s onwards (Crook & Manor, 1995). The international development agencies, donors and academics invested substantial efforts in promoting the idea of democratic decentralisation (political devolution) calling for the institutionalisation of democratic and autonomous local governments as a strategy towards democratic governance and efficient public service delivery (World Bank 2000; Oyugi 2000; Ribot 2002). In Zimbabwe, for example, the government in 1993 officially decentralized new mandates to elected rural district councils although line ministries continued to wield significant power over them

(Conyers, 2002, p. 2). Questions nevertheless remain about the extent to which recent decentralisation reforms in Africa created meaningful local government systems capable of promoting citizen participation and improving the delivery of public services to their constituents. Linked to these recent decentralisation reforms in Africa are the new forms of administrative decentralisation, the social funds model, that will be described in the following section.

2.8   New forms of administrative decentralisation: the Social Funds model

Although hitherto discounted as a legitimate form of decentralisation in orthodox development discourse, the developmental potential of administrative de-concentration is now being reconsidered by Western donors (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007, p. 13). Donors are now attempting to harmonise their interest in effective poverty reduction strategies with their interest in democratic governance (Blunt & Turner, 2007, p. 14). As a consequence, governments in developing countries have been encouraged to transfer management responsibilities and powers from central government to local institutions under a process of administrative decentralisation, and especially through the mechanism of social funds (Crook & Manor, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; World Bank, 2000a). Through this process, social funds have thus emerged as a new form of administrative decentralisation.

Social Funds, which are also named Social Emergency Funds, Social Investment Funds and Social Action Programmes, are basically investment mechanisms for channelling resources into local development projects. Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, & VanDomelen (2004, p. 4) define social funds as 'financial mechanisms that depart from traditional approaches to development by enabling communities and local institutions, rather than central governments, to take the lead in identifying and carrying out community-level investments'. A Social fund, according to the World Bank (2007, p. 3), is 'a local investment programming and financing facility, guided by a predetermined bundle of procedures and methods, and aiming at installing a community-driven development (CDD)[5] approach into the way local investments are allocated and managed'.

Social funds emerged in the 1980s as an instrument for mitigating the adverse consequences of the IMF spearheaded structural adjustment policies. Their establishment

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[5] An approach which seeks to increase community control over the way investment resources are planned, executed, and managed to improve the well-being of poor people.

was initially in response to criticisms of the damaging shocks of neo-liberal structural adjustment policies on the poor (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987; Vajja & White, 2006; Cornia et al., 1987). Early social funds mainly focused on public works and basic infrastructure projects, on social services such as health, education, on compensation for layoffs resulting from privatisation programmes, as well as on emergency relief to assist those most severely affected by the structural adjustment programmes (Reddy, 1998; Tendler, 2000; Tendler & Serrano, 1999).

Generally, social funds are understood to be the creation of the World Bank (Tendler, 2000, Braathen, 2003). The first social fund was created in Bolivia in 1987 with both technical and financial supports from the World Bank (Braathen, 2005). A World Bank report indicates that the objective of Bolivia's social fund of 1987 was 'to provide short-term employment that would ease the hardship of economic crisis and adjustment in the late 1980s' (Chase & Sherburne-Benz, 2001). Vajja and White (2006) cite the examples of Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund (ESF) and Ghana's Program of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) as evidence of short-term interventions directly linked to the impact of SAPs (Vajja and White, 2006). Since then the World Bank has advocated for the adoption of social funds in developing countries as an optimal mode of service delivery for the poor. It has done so based on a range of perceived benefits, including the claim that social funds enhance the allocative efficiency of public investments by matching community demands and public investments through direct participation of communities in identifying, choosing, implementing, and managing funded development projects. By making community participation a pre-condition for funding, social funds are believed to be empower the poor people by giving them a voice in public decision-making and a say in influencing the allocation of public resources (Ramos, 2007).

In Latin American countries the evolution of social funds was linked to the need to protect vulnerable communities from the adverse consequences of severe national debt and structural adjustment, whereas in Africa social funds were first introduced as a compensatory measures to mitigate the impact of SAPs (Ramos, 2007). Based on this fact, social fund programmes are mostly located in the countries which have undergone SAPs in Latin America, Africa and Asia (Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2013). Since 1990s, social funds have been used as an approach for decentralising the management and financing of small scale infrastructure programmes in each of these regions in conjunction with central

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governments (Batkin, 2001a; Ramos, 2007). In the context of Latin America, Serrano and Warren (2003) found that social funds were complementing the efforts of sector ministries or agencies responsible for decentralisation policies in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras in central America.

Today social funds are no longer temporary programmes aimed at mitigating the adverse impacts of SAPs, and are now oriented to longer term strategies intended to deliver poverty-targeted public services and social infrastructure in support of decentralisation programmes and community-driven development (Ramos, 2007; Jørgensen & VanDomelen, 1999; Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2013; Faust, 2012). In some countries, the social fund model has been adopted to administer the provision of block grants to districts and municipalities (Vawja and White, 2006). The literature reveals that during the period from 1987 to 2007, about 147 social fund projects worth $5.4 billion were approved and financed by the World Bank in various developing countries (Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2013; de Silva & Sum, 2008; Ramos, 2007; Chase & Sherburne-Benz, 2001; Braathen, 2005). Social funds are now increasingly used as mechanisms for poverty alleviation in developing countries by governments, international financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF) and bi-lateral donor agencies.

In Africa, the common objective shared by almost all social funds is to improve poverty-related socio-economic conditions by financing small community-based projects.[6] Social funds established in countries like Burundi, Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are also intended to create strong and vibrant local communities by promoting self-help programmes and other forms of local empowerment. The Zambia Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), in particular, has a well-articulated objective to improve the performance of local government even though some of its projects only serve to build the capacity of local officials to operate effectively within the fund's sub-project cycle (Marc, Graham, Schacter, & Schmidt, 1995; Chase & Sherburne-Benz, 2001; Rawlings et al., 2004; Lenneiye, 2005, 2006; Vajja & White 2006; Monchuk, 2014). In post-conflict countries such as Angola, and Sierra Leone, the broad poverty alleviation objectives of social funds have been merged with general reconstruction and reconciliation programmes. Social funds in Africa have also been used to mitigate environmental disasters as it was the case of Madagascar,

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[6] http://go.worldbank.org/0I7FGB1970

where emergency funds for cyclone rehabilitation were channelled to communities through the fund (Frigenti, Harth, & Haque, 1998; Monchuk, 2014). The following section will look at the rationale of social funds in the developing countries.

2.8.1   The rationale of Social Funds

According to the World Bank (2007, p. 4), social funds, which serve as semi-autonomous facilities for multi-sectoral, demand-driven, pro-poor investments in local infrastructure and services, have increasingly become the funding mechanism of choice for donors and recipient governments themselves for the following reasons:

i.   Social funds provide a temporary means of channelling resources to the local level in instances where government structures and systems are dysfunctional.

ii. Social funds play a compensatory role in tackling exceptional problems such as natural disasters, the discrimination of minorities, or pockets of deep poverty of which regular transfer systems or sectoral programmes are not well designed to address.

iii. Social funds are essential in promoting innovation and reform in service delivery and in systems development (World Bank 2007, p. 4).

Generally, social funds pursue two overarching policy objectives. In the first place, they set out to improve local service provision for the poor through increased access to infrastructure, particularly in response to shortcomings in regular local capital investment programmes in a country's decentralisation framework and policy. Social funds also target protection of poor and vulnerable groups from shocks and promote their social inclusion, especially in instances of exceptional deprivation (World Bank, 2007, p. v). In pursuit of these overarching goals, social funds have been viewed, by governments and donors alike, as important instruments for addressing a wide variety of developmental problems. In confirmation of this, Sven Sandström, former World Bank Managing Director, maintained that the Bank had used social funds in a number of developing countries 'for a variety of urgently needed tasks [including]: water supply and sewerage rehabilitation; school and health post construction; nutrition programs for mothers and infants; the building of rural access roads; and support for microenterprises' (Bigio, 1998, p. 19).

As the social fund model is believed to assist in building local and community capacity to reduce dire poverty, it is has increasingly been seen as an effective vehicle for enhancing local participation and for strengthening decentralisation processes (Faust & Harbers, 2012; World Bank, 2007). In that regard social funds were introduced as an experimental approach to public service delivery mechanisms, distinct from traditional means of state provision (Reddy, 1998; Conning & Kevane, 2002; Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004; Bhatia & Team, 2005). Reddy (1998, p. 9), for instance, maintains that community participation, private sector-involvement and decentralisation can more innovatively and feasibly be incorporated within a social fund framework than may be the case with traditional administrative structures (Reddy 1998, p. 9). In such cases, it is maintained, social funds put pressure on traditional sector ministries and local governments to deliver services more efficiently and effectively or else to run the risk of losing even more of their responsibilities and influence to social funds (Reddy, 1998; Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, & VanDomelen, 2004; Faguet & Wietzke, 2006). By serving as an alternative vehicle for service delivery, bypassing existing public service bureaucracies and their limitations, they also challenge these institutions to reform (Reddy 1998, p. 10). It is in this context, many argue, that social funds can be used to enhance the capacities and performance of existing government structures and institutions (Reddy, 1998; Bhatia & Team, 2005). The modus operandi of social funds and their interactions with central government ministries and local governments will be discussed in the section which follows.

2.8.2 Modus operandi of Social Funds

Irrespective of regional variations and contextual setting, social funds operates as second-tier financial agencies that appraise, finance and supervise investments carried out by other agencies. Serving as quasi-financial intermediaries, their operations are based on channelling grants from the central government directly to local communities based on predetermined eligibility criteria (Marc et al., 1995; Fumo, de Haan, Holland, & Kanji, 2000; Faust, 2012). In order to do this, social funds use a variety of participatory mechanisms, such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA), to empower marginalized groups by facilitating community representation and by giving them a voice in local government decision making processes (World Bank, 2007). They offer communities a choice of multi-sectoral investments ranging from health, education, infrastructure, microcredit to disaster relief and management. Their projects are demand-driven, originating from local actors, and are implemented and managed by community groups,

NGOs, local governments, and line ministries (Bigio 1998, p. 19; World Bank, 2007). Community groups choose their projects from a given menu of options and implement and manage project resources according to specific predetermined criteria for the development of their area.

In many developing countries where they have been established, social funds enjoy operational autonomy from traditional sector ministries and bureaucratic procedures, and deploy modern management techniques such as private-public partnerships, and private sector norms of efficiency which are commonly associated with the principles of new public management thinking (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Rawlings et al., 2004, pp. 10–11; Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2013, p. 3). In their design social funds are intended to be semi-autonomous facilities, operating outside of normal government bureaucratic systems, in order to be able to respond quickly and provide rapid relief to communities in need. Such autonomy includes by-passing central government line ministries by working directly with local governments, NGOs and their respective local communities (Carvalho et al., 2002; Vajja and White, 2006).

As envisaged in the World Bank models, social funds are structurally established parallel to existing line ministry and local government structures with the major aim of bypassing the perceived incompetence, ineffectiveness and/or corruption of existing systems (Batkin, 2001; Ramos, 2007). This would suggest that such funds may serve to undermine existing national decentralisation policies and programmes. However, this is not an inevitable outcome and there is evidence in the literature that capacity building and the devolution of control over resources to local communities through social fund projects has contributed to the laying of the foundations for effective and prompt political devolution in countries like Cambodia, Malawi and Zambia (Serrano, 2005). However, social funds do not generally support the idea of devolving direct administrative control to local authorities due to concerns that the poor will not be effectively targeted if social funds are absorbed into normal municipal budgets and operating systems. In that regard Rawlings, et al. (2004, p. 68) caution that, merging the financial resources of social funds into a country's general system of fiscal transfers could worsen the targeting outcomes for those resources to the detriment of the poor. Despite the convictions of its advocates, the social funds model is not without its critics and some of the concerns raised will be discussed in the next section.

2.8.3 Criticisms of the Social Fund model

Concerns about the latent tensions between the service delivery objectives of social funds and the goal of establishing effective democratic local government have begun been around for some time. Commenting on this, Parker and Serrano (2000, p. 1) observe that, 'if social funds establish parallel channels for local expenditures and community participation without building channels for accountability or sustainability, they can weaken nascent local governments and impede decentralisation efforts'. Other writers suggest that while the establishment of parallel structures may be beneficial in the short term, in the longer run the focus should be on improving local governance by strengthening local government institutions, by influencing pro-poor politics, and building the capacity of local administrators (Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2013).

Critics also argue that despite their discretionary powers and relative autonomy, social funds remain vulnerable to local and state-related power interests which can still direct the distribution of their resources to non-poor areas and hence prevent genuine decentralisation (Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2013; Van Domelen & Jorgensen, 1999; Conning & Kevane, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Mude, 2006; Ensminger, 2007). Critics of the social funds model of decentralisation also question the assertion that the funds are demand-driven (bottom-up) and that their ultimate goal is decentralised participatory development. Their argument is that social funds represent a form of de-concentrated administration, with some elements of democratisation but with very limited devolution of management power to local communities. This is in contrast to democratic decentralisation where actual power rests with the local population and the poor or their democratically elected leaders (Tendler, 2000; Chakrabarti & Dhar, 2013).

Non-government organisations (NGOs) perceive social funds as being 'very much a part of the central government structure, managed by institutions that are close to the president, the executive branch, or the prime minister's office' and hence they run the risk of being subjugated to party politics (Bigio, 1998, p. 31). The operations of social funds have also been criticised for inhibiting the development of a vibrant political system which will build relationships local communities and their elected leads and thereby create an enabling environment for good governance at the local level (ibid). Despite these criticisms, the literature suggest that the extent to which social funds serve to weaken or strengthen local governments is generally contextual and depends on

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prevailing socio-political and institutional factors in any particular country (Parker & Berthet, 2000; Rawlings et al., 2004, p. 12). This perspective will be examined further in the theoretical framework discussed in the following section.

2.9 The theoretical framework

Preceding sections have looked at the concept of decentralisation and its different trajectories in the African context and, based on these discussions, this section advances the theoretical framework which will inform this study. In that regard, the study is informed by three theoretical perspectives: the first, geopolitical theory, aims to provide an understanding of the impact of geo-politics (and the influence of international donor agencies in particular) on the affairs of developing states such as Tanzania. The second, institutional theory, aims to provide an institutional understanding of the process of decentralisation, whilst the third, decentralisation, considers the theoretical positions advanced in support of the devolution of government. As the third theoretical perspective has been discussed in some detail in preceding sections and it will not be repeated here.

2.9.1 Geo-political theory

Geopolitics is a highly contested term, and there is little merit in attempting a comprehensive definition of the concept. However this study follows a basic definition that, 'geopolitics is a way of seeing the world' (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998; Newman, 1998; Slater & Bell, 2002; Agnew, 2003, 2010; Hyndman, 2004; Murphy, Bassin, Newman, Reuber, & Agnew, 2004; Flint, 2006, p. 13, 2012; Kearns, 2008). In that respect, geopolitical theory is not a stand-alone theory but an assemblage of schools of thought, which includes the multiple geopolitical practices and multiple representations of a wide variety of territorial contexts (Gilmartin & Kofman, 2004). As a method of analysing international affairs, geopolitics has developed a recognized set of theories including classical or traditional geopolitics and critical geopolitics, which includes what have been called resistance geopolitics or anti-geopolitics (Sempa, 2002, p. 3).

Theories generated towards the end of the nineteenth century coalesced into what is now known as 'classic geopolitics' (Flint 2006). Many of these classical theories have a distinctly Eurocentric orientation and focus on the geopolitical traditions of different European countries such as Britain, Germany, France and Russia (Atkinson & Dodds, 2002); (Dodds & Sidaway, 2004); Flint, 2012). In this rubric classical geopolitical theory

assumes that, 'the existing unfairness of the world as it presents itself is acceptable; and that there is no way to imagine it shaped more equitably' (Kearns, 2008, p. 1600). This theoretical assumption is evident in the assertion by the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, that 'there is no alternative' (TINA) to capitalism (Kearns, 2008, p. 1599 citing Bateman 2002). In classical geopolitical thought, the power of the world leader rests in its agenda setting capacity and its ability to enforce this through its material power or naval capabilities (Sempa, 2002; Flint, 2006). This conception of power brings us to another assumption that, 'following Gramsci (1971), the most powerful countries will exercise an ideological power over other countries; and that, the most powerful country will attempt to set a political agenda that the rest of the world would more or less, follow or adhere to' (cited in Flint, 2006, p. 35). What these theoretical strands suggest is that, the influence of Western powers and their institutions on the affairs of developing states such as Tanzania is inevitable. And that adopting the economic and political agenda of Western states is the only possible path to development and survival for aid dependent states in post-colonial Africa. Because of its Eurocentric orientation, and its interest in interstate conflict, classical geopolitics focuses on the operations of powerful Western states while underplaying, or taking-for-granted, the impact of Western imperialism over weaker states (Blouet, 1975; Parker, 1982; Flint, 2006; Kearns, 2009).

The emergence of alternative geopolitical frameworks such as those espoused by critical geopolitics theorists, marked a departure from classic geopolitics in the contemporary world (Dalby, 1996; Tuathail & Dalby, 1998; Smith, 2000; Flint, 2006). Whilst contemporary geopolitics is concerned with providing 'a framework for seeing how geopolitical actions are 'situated' within the dynamics of the world' and how they impact on different geographical contexts and polities (Flint, 2006, p. 24), critical geopolitics is much more concerned with 'questioning assumptions in a taken-for-granted world and examining the institutional modes of producing such a world vis-a-vis writing about the world, its geography and politics' (Hyndman, 2001, p. 213; Kearns, 2008; Müller, 2008). It subjects to critical scrutiny the common phrases that governments and other geopolitical actors use to justify existing state practices; it does so to establish how the representation of such phrases serves to limit our view of the world and thereby limits the policy choices which can be followed (Flint, 2006, p. 16).

Contemporary geopolitical theory also attempts to 'unravel the manoeuvres of relatively marginal actors [i.e. weaker states] vis-à-vis the dominant narratives of the centre' (Dalby, 1996; Kuus, 2008, p. 2073). This approach follows Kuus' (2008, p. 2073) assertion that 'geopolitics is not simply written in the concert of great powers and then handed down to the smaller, relatively marginal, states'. In summary therefore, contemporary geopolitical theory which analyses the power relationships within geopolitical pronouncements, seeks to understand the assumptions which underlie such phrases as 'the spread of free markets' or the 'diffusion of democracy', to mention a few. It also seeks to analyse the policies and practices which emanate from these concepts and to determine who gains and who loses as a consequence (Flint 2006, p. 16).

The influence which Western powers have exerted over the affairs of states in post-colonial Africa has been extensively documented in the literature (Mutahaba & Kiragu, 2002; Ayee, 2008). During the 1960s, when most African colonies achieved their independence, the Cold War was at its height, many new independent states were caught in the struggle between the capitalist West and the Communist bloc, and that much of the Western policy towards African states was influenced by concerns to maintain and extend their sphere of influence (Baah, 2003). Over the course of the past five decades Western powers have sought to direct the development paths of African states through the conditionalities imposed through their aid programmes. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes as a condition of aid from the 1980s onwards has been widely been interpreted as an attempt to impose a neo-liberal reform agenda on states in Africa (Gibbon, 1996; Kiely, 1998; Baah, 2003). The United States of America (USA) which emerged as the leader of the Western world following World War II (Sempa, 2002; Flint, 2006), together with its allies, played a dominant role in enforcing SAPs as part of a package of economic reforms prescribed for developing states as part of the so-called 'Washington Consensus'. The Washington Consensus outlined policies for trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization, fiscal and tax policy, and control over public spending (Kiely, 1998). Flint (2006, p. 73) maintains that, other issues such as corporate governance, corruption, labour policy, and social safety nets have been added to the neo-liberal agenda over time.

Attempts to introduce the principles of New Public Management into African states have been seen as a further attempt to promote the neo-liberal agenda (Manning, 2001). In addition to the promotion of business techniques and market mechanisms in public sector

management (Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011), the NPM approach also proposed a further reduction in the size and influence of the central state (already impacted by SAPs) through privatisation, outsourcing and the establishment of specialised agencies. The influence of NPM approaches are clearly evident in the poverty agenda advanced by the Word Bank in the 1990s (World Bank, 2000;World Bank, 2001; Braathen, 2004; Braathen, 2005) and, as discussed above, never more so than in the creation of Social Funds as specialised agencies for targeted poverty intervention and pro-poor public action. The theoretical insights afforded through the critique of neo-liberal policies (and the impacts of NPM in particular) will assist in developing an understanding of the factors which gave rise to the establishment of TASAF.

Flint (2006, p.23) maintains that 'critical geopolitics offers a critical analysis of policy, rather than being a support for government policy'. In so doing, it encourages anti-geopolitics or resistance practices, by individuals, groups of citizens, indigenous peoples, and weaker states against the domination of powerful states and multilateral institutions; it does so by promoting interpretations of world events that run counter to hegemonic narrative of the world order (Flint, 2012). From a feminist perspective, geopolitical knowledge is thus perceived as part of the struggle by marginalized peoples, in different situations, against the   domination of the views of the most powerful (Flint, 2006). However, such resistance need not necessarily be violent, but rather should be based on negotiation and other peaceful means of engagement (Dittmer & Sharp, 2014, p. 17).

Countries make geopolitical choices by taking into consideration the broader geopolitical environment (Flint, 2006, p. 33; 2012) and contemporary theorists draw attention both to how geopolitical agents make strategic choices, and how these are complicated by competing goals and changing circumstances. Flint (2012), for example, describes how, in expanding its influence in East and South East Asia, the Chinese government has hitherto been meticulous in its efforts not to provoke or antagonise the dominant world power, the United States. This suggests that 'geopolitical decisions are made with an eye toward the global geopolitical context, and especially the ability of a dominant power [states] to set the agenda' (Flint, 2012, p. 196). The main theoretical proposition advanced here is that, irrespective of their dislike of the conditionalities imposed through foreign aid, the governments of least developed countries (LDCs) will always be cautious not to antagonise their key donors (and hence access to future funding) in their foreign

and domestic policies and will, instead, attempt to accommodate the agenda set before them.

2.9.2   Institutional theory

As previously indicated, institutional theory will be used to analyse the way in which de-concentrated administration impacts on decentralised systems. In so doing, it will consider the type, resources and influence of different agencies involved in both systems as well as their situation in the state machinery. In this context, institutions are conceived of as structures of rules, procedures and organisations (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004; Meagher & Kimenyi, 2004; Walker, 2015). Institutional theory is not a stand-alone theory but a cluster of schools of thought drawing from sociological, political and economic perspectives. The basic and cross-cutting theoretical assumption derived from these diverse schools is that a decision made at a central level of an organization is likely to affect, and can be used to explain, processes and outcomes at the field or local level (Zucker, 1987; Clemens, 1997; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Mann, 1986; Morrill, 1999). In other words something conceived at a higher level is useful in explaining processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis (Amenta, 2005; Amenta & Ramsey, 2010; Clemens and Cook, 1999).

In analysing the institutional environments of devolved local governments, the level of control exercised by the state through laws, regulations, directives or resource flows, can be used as a measure of the degree of institutionalization (Zucker, 1987). However, contemporary, research is less concerned with the causes of institutionalization than with studying its consequences or outcomes (Zucker 1987). For example, where there are multiple institutions with competing systems of authority this can lead to contradictory approaches which act to the detriment of an organisation as whole. It may also lead to role strain (Eckstein, 1966, 2015) in field organisations and, in most instances, actions becomes less predictable where multiple institutions compete or where no institution is firmly established (Clemens and Cook 1999; Mann, 1986; Morrill, 1999). The institutional theory framework is deployed in assessing the inter-relationship between TASAF and local government structures in Tanzania.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on decentralised government and the theoretical bases on which decentralised decision-making and service delivery programmes are founded. In doing so, it has examined the reasons why countries decentralise, what is being decentralised (the dimensions of decentralisation) and how decentralisation takes place (the forms of decentralisation) in developing countries. In so doing it has also identified the social funds model as a new form of decentralisation, albeit a de-concentrated one. The chapter has also provide greater detail on the theoretical framework outlined in the introductory preceding chapter and has discussed how it underpins the arguments advanced in this study.

The chapter which follows will discuss the different approaches to decentralisation adopted in Tanzania since independence in 1961 as a background to subsequent discussion on the contemporary systems of local government.

CHAPTER THREE

DECENTRALISED GOVERNMENT IN TANZANIA: PRE AND POST-INDEPENCENCE EXPERIENCES

3.1   Introduction

In analysing current local government reform in Tanzania it is important to heed the advice of Eckert who suggest that 'processes of democratisation and decentralisation should be examined in the context of the historical experiences of local actors' (Eckert, 1999, p. 213). However, although some prototypes of delegation, including the transfer of responsibility and authority to perform assigned tasks, were used by traditional chiefs during the pre-colonial era in Tanzania, they bear little resemblance to the modern system of local government and processes of decentralisation. Following Mawhood (1993, p. 74) and Eckert (1999, p. 214) this thesis traces the origins of decentralised government in Tanzania to the colonial period, and especially to the later era of British rule. Since the advent of independence in 1961 the government of Tanzania has also implemented various forms of administrative decentralisation and this chapter sets out to provide an overview of the different approaches adopted since then. In order to provide context for subsequent discussion on the current form of local government in the country, the section which follows provides an overview of the systems of decentralisation adopted during the colonial era.

3.2   Decentralisation during the colonial era 1884 –1961

Tanzania's experience with colonial administration falls into two separate phases, each with a different colonial master. The period of German rule (1884–1917) marks the first phase of colonial rule in Tanganyika, while the period of British rule (1917–1961) marks the second and the last phase before independence (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 2004). Some forms of traditional local administration existed in the pre-colonial era, prior to the European invasion (Abrahams, 2007; Masanyiwa, 2014; URT, 2004) and these took the form of traditional chiefs and elders' councils, called 'mabanza' in Kisukuma and other names in other localities (Binagwa, 2005; Abrahams, 2007; URT, 2004). The elders' councils comprised spokesmen from each clan and, with the discretionary powers delegated by chiefs, they deliberated on matters affecting the tribe's security and welfare,

including outbreaks of disease, famine and threats from neighbouring tribes (Binagwa, 2005; Abrahams, 2007; URT, 2004). The idea of local decision making was an accepted practice but, as will be discussed below, this form of devolved decision making was ignored by the Germans.

3.2.1 Decentralisation under German colonial rule

German rule was characterized by 'direct rule' which meant that in most parts of the country. 'the civil administration of the country was brought under the direct control of the central government' (Binagwa, 2005, p. 26). Although there were some attempts to decentralize the colonial government and introduce local administration in urban areas, rural areas were governed directly from the centre (URT, 2004) and pre-existing forms of local leadership were replaced direct colonial administration (Iliffe, 1969). The arrival of the Germans in the country, following the Berlin conference of 1884 and the subsequent scramble for Africa, effectively brought an end to self-rule in African societies (Iliffe, 1969; Max, 1991 ; Binagwa, 2005). Based on the Imperial Decree of 29 March 1901, the German colonial administration established Communal Unions (Kommunal Verbandes) for some parts of the German East Africa (Tanzania), and especially in the areas where White settlers lived. Such areas include the districts of Tanga, Lushoto,[7] Pangani, Bagamoyo, Kilwa, Lindi, Kilosa, Mbeya[8] and Dar es Salaam (Jerman, 1997; Kironde, 2001; Ngware, Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam, & Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania, 2003; URT, 2004).

These Communal Unions comprised an appointed district officer and a council composed of three to five nominated non-official members, who were mostly Whites. Although there was provision for the appointment of one native, the requirement that all members should speak the German language effectively served to exclude Africans (Nimtz, 1980). The German colonial government decentralised to Communal Unions administrative responsibility for establishing schools, street lighting, refuse collection, drainage of swampy and unhealthy areas, construction of roads, streets and bridges, distribution of seed, and oversight of the co-operative village farms (URT, 2004). Since the Communal Unions failed to perform these decentralised functions effectively the colonial government decided to abolish them in 1909, and retained only Dar es Salaam and Tanga,

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[7] Then known as '*Wilhelmstall'*
[8] Then known as '*Langenburg'*

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but with a curtailed jurisdiction and a reduced scope of operation (i.e. limited to residential areas) (URT, 2004).

However, over time, the centralised administration became increasingly problematic and ineffective. This was due to a number of factors, including the large size of the colony and the relatively small numbers of White officials available to oversee local affairs. This prompted the colonial government to consider the establishment of town councils and the Order of the Imperial Chancellor of 1910 subsequently made provision for the creation of Municipal Councils in German East Africa (URT, 2004). However, by the end of the German rule in 1918, only Dar es Salaam and Tanga had achieved municipal status under the 1910 Order (Becher, 1997; Gillman, 1945). These two municipalities were managed by Town Councils (*Stadtgemaindes*) headed by the District Commissioner, with six elected members and two other members appointed by the Governor, most of whom were Whites (URT, 2004). The colonial government once again decentralised to the Town Councils functions such as the upkeep of roads and public spaces, street lighting and cleaning, school maintenance, water supply and refuse disposal (URT, 2004). As the scope of their operations was limited to the key urban areas of Dar es Salaam and Tanga, it is generally believed that these institutions were aimed at meeting the interests of expatriate administrators and civilians to the exclusion of the native population (URT, 2004; Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (JMT), 2011).

German colonial administration developed a system that permitted missionaries to provide social services to some areas whilst the government established public education and health care facilities in a few other localities. Few pre-primary, primary or secondary public schools were built, and those that were constructed served the population on a racial basis (JMT, 2011). The famous Tanga School founded in 1892 was one of the few schools built for natives and it had Kiswahili as its medium of instruction (JMT, 2011). By 1914 the number of primary and intermediary schools established on the mainland had reached 1,800 and these were served by 110 000, mostly local teachers (JMT, 2011). In general, however, under German rule educational opportunities for Africans were very limited both in terms of quality and quantity.

A few clinics and small hospitals were established to meet the health needs of Whites and the few Africans who served in the colonial offices and plantations (JMT, 2011). German colonialists also established the Lutindi mental hospital in Korogwe in the Tanga region.

The provision of health services for rural people and for African women and children living in urban areas was not a prioritised in the colonial government budget. As a consequence, it is maintained, 'the majority of the people in the country continued to use traditional methods of fighting diseases because they were denied access to modern health services' [my translation from Swahili] (JMT, 2011, p.11). German colonial administration in mainland Tanzania ended with Germany's military defeat in the First World War and it was followed by more than 40 years of British colonial administration.

3.2.2   Decentralisation during British colonial rule

British rule in Tanzania began in 1916 with the establishment of civil administration in Lushoto in the conquered northern part of German East Africa. In 1919 the British moved their administrative centre from Lushoto to Dar es Salaam (URT, 2004). Under German rule mainland Tanzania had been called Deutsche Ost-Africa (German East Africa). The British sought to do away with the German legacy and in 1920 several names were proposed for the country including 'Smutsland', 'Ebumea', 'New Maryland', 'Windsorland' and 'Victoria' (JMT, 2011, p.13). However, none of these names were acceptable to the British government in London, and they instructed the colonial administration to base their proposals on indigenous names. With this directive in mind, names like 'Kilimanjaro' and 'Tabora' were also proposed but subsequently dropped. Finally, the name 'Tanganyika Protectorate' was recommended by the Assistant Minister of Colonies (JMT, 2011, p.13). The name 'Tanganyika' was not new to the people of the region. Even before the arrival of colonial agencies, indigenous people in the Western regions of mainland Tanzania had called the big lake situated in that area '*Ziwa Tanganyika*' in Kiswahili, meaning 'Lake Tanganyika' (JMT, 2011, p.13). In January 1920, therefore, the name Tanganyika Territory was officially assigned to the area previously known as German East Africa (JMT, 2011, p.14).[9] The Tanganyika Order of 22nd July 1920 formally established the British administration which ruled the country for four decades up until independence in 1961 (URT, 2004).

In the first few years of British rule the administrative structures left by the Germans were maintained. The British did not alter the regional and local boundaries established by the Germans and in most cases the same local officials who had served under the Germans continued to serve the British colonial administration. The arrival of Sir Donald

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[9] At independence in 1961 the country was still called Tanganyika. The name 'Tanzania' only came later, in 1964.

Cameroon as the Governor of the Tanganyika territory in 1925, however, marked the beginning of significant changes in the British colonial administration. Cameroon adapted the systems of 'indirect rule' introduced by Lord Lugard in Nigeria and instituted it in Tanganyika (Eckert, 1999; URT, 2004). Indirect rule entailed the recognition and deployment of traditional rulers or local chiefs in the governance of the territory at the local level. For every ethnic community, traditional rulers or local chiefs were identified and in areas where there were no traditional chiefs, or where they resisted colonial rule, the British appointed their own chiefs who enjoyed the same powers as traditional rulers (Coulson, 1982; Semboja, 2015).

In order to promote the system of indirect rule, Governor Cameroon caused the enactment of the Native Authority Ordinance (Cap. 72) of 1926, which recognised traditional chiefs as the rulers of their tribes or ethnic groups. Traditional chiefs were thus empowered to exercise some administrative, executive and judicial powers in their areas of jurisdiction and they were groomed to support the colonial government (Coulson, 1982; URT, 2004, p. 6).

The British ruled all urban areas centrally up to the time when the Local Government Ordinance of 1953 was enacted. Prior to this, townships had been established under the Township Ordinance (Cap. 101) of 1920 and their management was assigned to Township Authorities appointed by the Governor. The Governor appointed the Presidents of the Township Authorities under the 'Township Rules' of 1923. These were senior members of the colonial administration working in the district or sub-district in which the township was located (URT, 2004). Members of the Township Authority were technocrats from the Land, Public Works, and Medical departments who were nominated by their departmental heads. Township Authorities existed solely for administrative purposes although some matters of local importance were also included in their jurisdiction. As such, they could not be considered fully-fledged local governments since all their members were appointed officials, rather than elected representatives, and they had little autonomy as any of their decisions could be vetoed by the Governor. In practice, Township Authorities, tended to be captured by technocrats and traders at the expense of the native populace, who were excluded from them (JMT, 2011).

The decentralisation of urban authorities began after the passing of the Municipalities Ordinance (Cap. 105) of 1946. In 1949 this piece of British colonial legislation made Dar

es Salaam the first municipality in Tanganyika. This was a breakthrough in the history of administrative decentralisation and the development of urban authorities in Tanzania. The newly created municipal council was composed of appointed members based on racial representation and some Africans were appointed to represent the municipality's African population. In terms of the Ordinance municipalities were given some discretionary power to make by-laws and impose property rates and business fees (URT, 2004). They were also entitled to receive government subventions for financing the services and administrative functions decentralised to them, including primary education for Africans, health, roads, abattoirs, and firefighting (JMT, 2011; URT, 2004). It is worth noting that both the township authorities and the municipalities (by then it was only Dar es Salaam) largely served the interests of colonial government officials, foreign traders and expatriates. Africans were generally unwelcome in urban areas, although the government was obliged to address some of their interests, but even then, not before those of the European and Asian communities had been taken care of (Coulson 1982; JMT, 2011).

In assessing the delivery of public services during the colonial era, the Tanzanian government's 'Fifty years independence report 1961–2011' acknowledges that, to some extent, the British did expand the provision of social services in the country, but these were provided on a racially discriminatory basis. (JMT, 2011). The colonial government and missionaries built new primary schools and secondary schools in addition to those left by Germans. In urban areas there were designated schools for Europeans, Asians and Africans but the quality of infrastructure and education provided in the schools varied significantly, with White children studying in the best schools while African children were assigned to the worst (JMT, 2011, p.15). Generally, the majority of indigenous people were denied access to education during the colonial rule. At the primary level, for instance, it is estimated that only 25% of children of school age had the opportunity to attend school under British colonial rule (JMT, 2011, p.15). Limited access to education resulted in high levels of illiteracy in Tanganyika and it is estimated that only 10% of the country's people could read and write during this time (JMT, 2011, p.15).

Compared to the period of German rule, the provision of other services such as health, water and housing, expanded under the British colonial administration. By 1960 the central government had 73 health facilities, which accommodated about 7,028 beds, while local authorities had 737 health centres with 1,795 beds (JMT, 2011, p.15). It is evident, however, that health services continued to be provided on a racially

discriminatory basis (ibid). For example, social services in the rural areas, where the majority of the people lived, were extremely poor in comparison to the larger urban areas, where the Europeans, Asians and a few economically well-off Africans lived (JMT, 2011, p.15). Since 1930 the colonial administration had invested in the provision of water services, targeting big urban centres, schools, missionary centres and big plantations such as sisal, coffee and tobacco estates (JMT, 2011, pp.186–192). It is estimated that while 25% of the urban population had access to clean and safe water for domestic use in 1961, only 6% of the rural population had similar access (JMT, 2011, p.186). It has been argued that the British did not invest much in social services in Tanganyika due to the fact that the country was a League of Nations trust territory rather than a conventional British colony (Bates, 1955; Turshen, 1977; Havinden & Meredith, 1993; Davidson, 2014)[10]. The system of indirect rule used by the British also increased inequalities in infrastructure, economic development and service provision due to the neglect of chiefdoms that showed resistance to colonial rule, and of those native authorities and municipalities where resources desired by the colonists were limited (Semboja, 2015, p. 88).

Due to increasing political pressure for self-rule and to financial constraints stemming from the Second World War, the British colonial administration decided to introduce local government in Tanganyika in the 1950s. This began in 1950 with amendment of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 to establish Chiefs-in-Council advisory committees, to which ordinary citizens were appointed by the district commissioners (Binagwa 2005; URT, 2004). The power enjoyed by chiefs, who were generally allies of the colonial administration, was thus reduced as part of their mandate was decentralised to the councils. The decentralisation of these mandates made it compulsory for the chiefs to consult and seek the approval of Chief-in-Council's advisory committees prior to making important decisions. However, the native authorities lacked true representation and their jurisdiction did not extend to include non-natives (JMT, 2011).

The Local Government Ordinance enacted in 1953 broadened the scope of administrative decentralisation and created municipal, town and district councils in the Tanganyika

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[10] Following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Tanganyika was assigned to Britain as trust territory to be managed on behalf of the League of Nations.

territory (Bienen, 2015).[11] It was through this Ordinance that local councils gained popular representation and the jurisdiction to exercise their functions in respect of all persons in their geographical area (JMT, 2011). The representation of people in the councils, however, remained racially based and council elections voters were obliged to vote for three candidates in each constituency, one African, one Asian and one European (URT, 2004).

By the time of their departure from Tanganyika in 1961, the British colonial government had institutionalised three distinct categories of local authority. These were: the native authorities established by the Native Authorities Ordinance of 1926; the municipality of Dar es Salaam established by the Municipalities Ordinance of 1946; and town and district councils established by the Local Government Ordinance of 1953 (URT, 2004; Binagwa, 2005; Bienen, 2015).

3.3   Decentralisation in the first decade of independence: 1961–1971

In order to understand the origins of contemporary decentralised government in Tanzania, it is necessary to first unpack its colonial legacy (Mawhood, 1993, p. 74; Eckert, 1999, p. 214). At the time when Tanganyika gained political independence from her British colonial masters in 1961, the nation, as indicated, had inherited a partly decentralised government structure and institutional arrangements which included 67 local government authorities (James, Mdoe, & Mishili, 2002; Tidemand & Msami, 2010; Mmari, 2005; Binagwa, 2005). The British local government model was, in effect, adopted (Mmari, 2005) and in the immediate post-independence era the native authorities, and district and town councils continued to function with the powers granted to them by colonial legislation (Binagwa, 2005; JMT, 2011; Bienen, 2015).

In 1962 the government embarked on a programme to establish democratic local government authorities (Max, 1991; Masanyiwa, 2014). This was done through an amendment to the Local Government Ordinance of 1953 which abolished the existing 54 native authorities and replaced them with a new countrywide system of local councils. The Local Government Ordinance of 1953 was further amended by the African Chiefs

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[11] The Local Government Ordinance of 1953 provided for the gradual replacement of native authorities by district councils, which were rural municipalities.

Ordinance (repeal) Act, No.13 of 1963 (JMT, 2011, p. 32; Bienen, 2015).[12] In abolishing the native authorities, the chiefs were effectively removed from the local government system (Max, 1991; James et al., 2002; URT, 2004) although they were permitted to continue performing their cultural and traditional roles (JMT, 2011). The Tanzanian government's justification of the decision to abolish native authorities is that it was necessary to eliminate leadership and administrative systems based on tribalism in order to build a unified national system of administration (JMT, 2011, pp.32–33).[13]

Democratic local government elections were held for district councils which replaced the native authorities (Coulson, 1982, 2013; Max 1991; Binagwa, 2005). The membership of these councils comprised elected members (councillors), who formed the majority; members appointed by the Minister responsible for local government; and members co-opted by the councils, if any (Max 1991; Shivji & Peter, 2003; Binagwa, 2005). These elected officials and appointed administrators constituted local government authorities, with the former assuming responsibility for policy and decision-making. The local government authorities had the mandate to collect taxes and deliver public services to the communities, and enjoyed some degree of autonomy.

During the first decade of independence, basic social services such as education, health care, and water were provided by local governments and access expanded rapidly (JMT, 2011). However, due to growing financial constraints the system of local government was increasingly unable to fulfil its mandate and provide adequate services (Mmari, 2005). This was due both to the limited financial base available to local governments and to difficulties in tax collection (URT, 2004). This state of affairs was aggravated by the fact that the political environment at the time was not supportive of greater revenue generation by local authorities, while the grants provided to them by the central government were insufficient to provide the public services most needed by the poor majority (Mmari, 2005; URT, 2004). As a consequence, socio-economic conditions in the country in the first half decade of independence (1961–1966) remained largely the same as in the colonial era (Crouch, 1987, p. 15).

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[12] However, the Local Government Ordinance 1953 (with its amendments) remained the principal legislation that provided for the administration of local government for the entire first decade of independence (see Shivji and Peter, 2003 for detailed discussion of local legislations in the 1960s).
[13] See also Binagwa, 2005.

Partly in response to the lack of development progress and partly due to the geopolitics of the time, in the mid-1960s Tanzania embarked on a socialist programme called *Ujamaa*, or African socialism (Crouch, 1987, p. 15). The goals of *Ujamaa* which were launched in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, were to eliminate exploitation, to ensure public ownership of key economic sectors, and to establish a socialist society (Crouch, 1987, p. 54). The Declaration was an ideological policy document articulating new economic and social priorities for the nation (Bjerk, 2010).

An important initiative of the *Ujamma* programme was the collectivisation of rural communities. In 1962 an attempt had been made to implement a 'village settlement scheme' in mainland Tanzania. The aim of the scheme had been to move people from urban to rural areas and to engage them in productive economic activities, and farming in particular, (Hydén, 1980; Mawhood, 1983) but it had made little progress. Following the Arusha Declaration, however, the village settlement scheme was taken far more seriously and the government campaigned forcefully for the establishment of Ujamaa villages, which were intended to be fundamental institutions for building African socialism (Mawhood, 1983; JMT, 2011). The villagisation programme was also intended to provide a framework through which the government could deliver such services as rural health care, education and water supplies (Crouch, 1987; Mawhood, 1993). In the early years of the programme significant breakthroughs were indeed recorded in the provision of education, rural health care, and water supplies services albeit from a very low base (Crouch, 1987; JMT, 2011).

Along with compelling people to settle in collectives to facilitate service delivery, *Ujamaa* villages were intended to realise the principles of producing and sharing along socialist lines (Mawhood, 1993, p. 97). This reflects the nature of government's approach to citizen participation in the first decade of independence. At this time government administration at the village level took various forms. The section which follows reflects on the deconcentration approach adopted in the 1970s when enactment of the Villages and *Ujamaa* Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act of 1975 both abolished local governments and attempted to regularise village governance (Mawhood, 1993).

3.4   Decentralisation during the deconcentration era 1972–1981

The 1972 decentralisation model set out to implement socialism and self-reliance, which were the focus of the first regime in Tanzania, and resulted in the abolition of local government authorities. District Authorities were effectively abolished on 30 June 1972, while a year later, on 30 June 1973, urban authorities were abolished as well.[14] Democratic local authorities were replaced by direct central government rule under the policy rhetorically labelled 'decentralisation'. The Decentralisation of Government Administration (Interim Provisions) Act of 1972, shaped the configuration of government institutions at the regional and local level, based on deconcentration. The urban councils comprised town councils and the two municipal councils, namely Dar es Salaam (which gained city status in 1961) and Tanga (James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002; Tidemand & Msami, 2010; Mmari, 2005; URT, 2004). A system of deconcentrated government thus 'replaced the comprehensive local government system which had existed for a decade' (URT, 2004, p.11).

Local government institutional weaknesses and inefficiencies in the provision of public services have been cited by policy makers and academics as the main factors behind the adoption of centralisation and the abolition of the local government system in the 1970s. The local authorities of the 1960s were seen to be mismanaging both the funds generated through their own revenue sources as well those received from central government grants (Binagwa, 2005; URT, 2004). In response to the lack of financial accountability in local governments, the Public Accounts Committee of 1967 recommended 'a much closer control of central government on affairs of local councils' (Mawhood, 1983, p.89). The president at the time, Julius Nyerere, also raised concerns about the ineffectiveness of local authorities in his speech on Republic Day in 1968 (Mawhood, 1983, pp.89–90). A consultancy firm employed by the government (Mckinsey and Co., Inc.) also recommended central co-ordination of rural development and down played the significance of local autonomy (Warioba, 1999; Mawhood, 1983).

It has been further suggested that the government decided to adopt a policy of deconcentration   in order to address the inequalities that existed between the few

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[14] Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (2004) History of Local Government System in Tanzania; Excerpts from the website http://pv01.pmoralg.go.tz/about_us/history.php. At the time of their abolition, there were 66 rural/district councils and 15 urban councils in Tanzania (URT, 2004).

resource-rich urban municipalities and the majority of resource-poor rural districts (Semboja, 2015). The centralisation of decision-making and service delivery was seen as a way of ensuring equitable redistribution of scarce resources. In this context, the introduction of deconcentrated administration was seen as a response to the inefficiency of local government and its failure to deliver basic services. However, whilst their shortcomings were indisputable, it is evident that the institutional configuration of local government in Tanzania during the first decade of independence contributed to their under-performance and led to their ultimate abolition. This is because post-independence local authorities worked within an institutional environment that, in many respects, set them up for failure. For example, given that the country had just obtained its independence, both the state and its citizenry had high expectations for service provision but the financial resources available to local governments were completely inadequate to meet these expectations (URT, 2004; Mmari 2005). Furthermore, due to inadequate capacity building before and after independence, local government personnel lacked the capacity to deliver services autonomously (Massanyiwa, 2014). The Tanzanian government itself has since acknowledged that local government officials and local political office bearers lacked the necessary experience and know-how to run local governments (URT, 2004). This state of affairs was aggravated by the fact that the system of local government oversight that had been in place since colonial times had been eroded in the reconfiguration of the state.

The government's adoption of the Ujamaa ideology in the late-1960s, as indicated, was a fundamental factor driving centralisation in the 1970s. The Ujamaa revolutionary socio-economic development system involved reorganising rural settlements into communal villages, and entrenched party supremacy in the political, social and economic organisation of Tanzanian society (James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002; JMT, 2011; URT, 2004). In this context, the local government system inherited from the colonial administration was seen as an obstacle to the evolving political set up (URT, 2004). The reconfigured local authorities were thus left with little option but to implement central government's plans which were based on a nationalist passion for state-controlled development (Havnevik, 1993; James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002; Massanyiwa, 2014). The role of grassroots local government institutions was also curtailed due to a conceptualisation of a village as 'a geographical space or locus of development not a

social space of government' (James, Mdoe & Mishili 2002, p. 21 citing Shivji & Peters, 2000).

It is worth noting, that notwithstanding its socialist orientation, the *Ujamaa* policy of village self-reliance attracted huge quantities of Western aid in this period. Annual aid flows increased from $20 million in 1967 to $500 million in 1981 (Crouch, 1987, p. 83). Assistance from the World Bank and International Development Association (IDA), in particular, increased significantly between 1970 and 1979. This has been ascribed to the fact that, its socialist bent aside, Tanzania's development strategy of attacking poverty through rural development, education, and a more equitable distribution of income was in line with the World Bank's own recommendations at the time (Crouch, 1987, p. 87). Somewhat paradoxically, the increase in donor aid enabled the government to implement its socialist programmes at a quicker pace than had it been reliant solely on domestic revenue.

The government structure during the deconcentration (or *madaraka mikoani*) era was based on Regional Development Committees (RDCs), chaired by Regional Commissioners and with Regional Development Directors as their chief executives; and District Development Committees (DDCs), chaired by District Commissioners and with District Development Directors as their chief executives (JMT, 2011). Since state and political party structures were merged during the *Ujamaa* era, the Regional and District Commissioners were also TANU secretaries at the regional and district levels respectively. Regional Commissioners were vested with substantial decision-making and supervisory power over local socio-economic development in a region. Likewise, Regional Development Directors had a broad mandate in the execution of government functions and in the expenditure of public finance (JMT, 2011, p.53). As part of the process of strengthening the policy of deconcentration (power to regions), the government also enacted a law to establish District Development Corporations in 1973. These corporations were responsible for coordinating economic plans and production activities. This formed part of the *Ujamaa* policy of self-reliance that sought to place the commanding heights of the economy, and all economic activities pertaining to the wellbeing of citizens, under the control of the central government and its parastatals (JMT, 2011). In essence, the government's local-level structures under the decentralisation policy of 1972 were based on strengthened deconcentrated

administrations at regional and district levels and this, as discussed above, made elected local governments redundant (Tidemand, 2005).

In 1973, President Nyerere called for all citizens living in rural areas to settle in the villages established for them by the government so they could more easily gain access to public services. This initiative, as intimated, was a continuation of the 1960s village settlement scheme under *Ujamaa* socialism. In order to put the government's call into action, a campaign named *Operesheni Vijiji* was launched in 1973, and the Villages and *Ujamaa* Villages (Registration, Designation and Administration) Act was enacted in 1975 to ensure its enforcement. By 1977 the campaign had successfully moved some 13 067 220 people (not all willingly) from their scattered rural homes to 7 684 established villages (JMT, 2011). The new law abolished existing cooperatives and gave village governments the mandate to lead local affairs, including establishing villages as centres for development and serving as the arm of government at the community level. In 1976 *Operesheni Maduka* was launched in an effort to stimulate income-generating projects in Ujamaa villages (JMT, 2011), but in practice, this represented part of an attempt to curtail and ultimately destroy private sector production in the economy.

A decade after its inception, it became evident to the government that, in the absence of local government, the *madaraka mikoani* deconcentration policy in itself was incapable of enhancing citizen participation (JMT, 2011). Far from expanding the scope of citizen participation, the deconcentration policy effectively curtailed it by replacing popular representatives with official representatives in all local institutions. Nevertheless, some aspects of the *Ujamaa* programme implemented during the deconcentration era did contribute to improved access to public services, such as education, health and water. The villagisation experiment left a legacy of enduring rural institutions, such as the 'village governments', and expanded rural infrastructure, road and water networks in particular, and in so doing it contributed to the development of the rural areas (Shivji, 2004; Bjerk, 2010; URT, 2004). There also is evidence that the villagisation programme, notwithstanding its limitations, did succeed in bringing social services closer to rural communities (Coulson, 1992; Shivji, 2004; Bjerk, 2010). Significantly, however, Western aid played a significant role in delivering many of these public services to the rural areas. Crouch (1987, p. 95), for example, asserts that, 'Western donors, particularly the Scandinavian countries, helped bring piped water to between 20% and 30% of Tanzania's villages'. It was the Western donor money, he maintains, that enabled Tanzania to

continue pursuing development projects and the provision of services in the 1970s despite its declining economic growth (ibid).

However, there is also considerable evidence that the centralized bureaucracy failed to deliver quality services to the poor and it also served to stifle local enterprise (Mmari, 2005; URT, 2004). Furthermore, because its focus was on rural development, the urban areas were largely neglected and services within them deteriorated as a result (Tidemand, 2005). As a consequence of the deterioration of such services as sewerage, water supply and sanitation, the urban areas experienced frequent outbreaks of infectious diseases such as cholera and other waterborne diseases. In that regard it is worth noting that cholera epidemic in 1975 prompted calls to re-establish urban local governments and that this led to the passage of the Urban Councils (Interim Provisions) Act of 1978 (URT, 2004; Tidemand, 2005).

3.5 Decentralisation during the liberalisation era 1982–1997

The failures of *Ujamaa* policies to transform Tanzania into the promised land of milk and honey, coincided with the economic crisis of the 1980s and this ultimately left the country with little option but to approach international financial institutions and Western donors for additional relief. However, by this time virtually all Western donors had lost interest in supporting policies in support of socialism. In a bid to bail the country out of its economic crisis, the IMF and the World Bank, in particular, insisted upon the fulfilment of numerous aid conditionalities, aimed at cutting back public spending and opening the country's markets to foreign competition (Nugent, 2004). This was based on the IMF's belief that Tanzania's economic hardships were the results of 'a misguided attempt to build socialism by abandoning free markets in favour of centralised administrative controls' (Crouch 1987, p. 101). The IMF ultimately proposed, and insisted on, the liberalisation of the economy as a precondition for the aid stabilisation programme that Tanzania so desperately needed to rescue its economy (ibid).

From 1982 onwards, democratization and, implicitly, the restoration of the local government system, became a part of Western donor countries' agenda for Tanzania, along with the economic liberalisation policies recommended by the multilateral donor agencies. Thus, between 1982 and 1997 Tanzania progressively departed from its socialist path and undertook a multitude of economic and political reforms, including the

gradual re-institution of local government authorities (James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002, p.10). The reintroduction of local government was first raised in the CCM's 1980 election manifesto and after the passage of legislation in 1982, local government institutions were established in cities, towns, districts and villages (Tidemand, 2005, Mmari, 2005).

The 1982 legislation included six local government Acts promulgated by the National Assembly; these were: the Local government (District Authorities) Act No. 7; the Local government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8; the Local Government Finances Act No. 9; the Local Government Service Act No. 10; the Local government negotiating Machinery Act No. 11; and the Decentralisation of Government Administration Act No. 12 (Binagwa, 2005, p. 24). The legislation re-established village councils, township authorities and district councils as key rural local government institutions; and town, municipal and city councils as urban local government institutions (URT, 2004, p.13). This was followed by local government elections in 1983 and the effective reinstatement of democratic local government authorities in 1984 (URT, 2004, 13). In order to maintain their place in the government machinery, the Constitution was amended by Act No. 15 of 1984 to incorporate local government authorities as permanent institutions. The local government system was thus practically re-launched in 1984 (Binagwa, 2005; JMT, 2011).

The decentralisation reform that took place during this period of liberalisation (that is from 1982–1997) represented a return to the British colonial model of local government. This is evident from the fact that 'the reinstated urban Authorities were bestowed with the responsibilities previously held by them under the Municipalities Ordinance of 1946 and the Local Government Ordinance of 1953' (URT, 2004, p.13). However, Tidemand (2005, p.4) points out that the re-introduced urban local authorities had less autonomy than previously because the Regional Administration exercised significant influence over local government affairs, including local revenue. Nevertheless, the newly elected councils were accorded some power to enact by-laws, collect revenues, and to plan and budget for local service delivery and development. Service delivery in such sectors as primary education, primary health, local water supply, local roads, agriculture extension, street lighting and solid waste removal thus became a responsibility of local councils (Boex, 2003; Tidemand, 2005). Local governments derived their income mostly from central government subventions and, to a lesser extent, from locally generated revenue.

Mmari (2005) maintains that, while local government authorities were formally reintroduced in 1984, in practice they remained highly constrained and regulated by central government bureaucracy due to the persistence of a top-down administrative approach. Through their regional administrative offices, central government ministries continued to direct most local government affairs (Mmari 2005). Regional administrations maintained their direct control over the implementation of development activities, whether or not they did so in collaboration with LGAs, and they also controlled most of the local funding (Tidemand 2005). In this system, responsibility for local service delivery remained substantively in the hands of regional administrations (Tidemand & Msami 2010, p.18). Democratic local governments, in contrast, were underfunded, had a limited development mandate, and operated largely as deconcentrated structures under the regional administrations (Tidemand, 2005).

A number of further institutional constraints inhibited the re-established local authorities including a complex, ambiguous and fragmented institutional framework guiding central-local government relations, overlapping and conflicting legislation, and excessive central government control over local governments in terms of plans, budget scrutiny and by-laws censorship (URT, 2004; Mmari 2005; Tidemand, Olsen & Sola 2008). Other constraints included the limited capacity of local councils, the lack of LGA representation in central government policy making, and financial and human resources limitations (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1996; URT, 2004; Tidemand et al., 2008). Of particular concern was the fact that local governments operated under severe financial constraints and were underfunded by central government. Their ability to generate local revenue was also limited due to the fact people were reluctant to pay local taxes to what they perceived to be inefficient, un-transparent, un-accountability, and corrupt municipalities (URT, 1996; URT, 2004; Tidemand et al., 2008).

Combined, these factors impeded the performance of local authorities and limited their capacity to deliver services to their communities. Levels of poverty also increased because of the lack of local economic development interventions (URT, 2004). As a consequence of underfunding, there was little prospect of developing new service infrastructure or of rehabilitating existing facilities and services such as roads, drains, sewers, schools, health centres, public toilets and market places (URT, 2004). Underfunding also led to poor waste management in towns and communities were

compelled to live in unhealthy environments, surrounded by heaps of stinking, uncollected waste.

Taken as whole, the decentralisation reforms of the 1980s failed to bring about the anticipated improvements in local service delivery and local democracy (Mmari, 2005). Local councils were unable to deliver services as they were expected to, due to the central government's tendency to centralize and concentrate power and resources within line ministries and central government agencies (World Bank, 1999; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji & Peter, 2003; URT, 2009; Kessy & McCourt, 2010; Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010; Masanyiwa, 2014). Service failures were also a consequence of the 1980s economic crisis which led to the deterioration of public services throughout the 1990s. A World Bank review published in 1999, for example, revealed that the health sector, in particular, had been highly affected as it had experienced critical shortages of medicines and other hospital supplies, as well as understaffing and inadequate supervision of district and community health facilities. The general reduction in development expenditure in the 1980s also led to deterioration in the health infrastructure due to the poor maintenance of equipment and buildings (Tidemand et al., 2008). In the water sector, likewise, as the implementation of infrastructural plans faltered, communities were left with incomplete wells and pumping systems which further limited their access to water services (Massanyiwa, 2014). Viewed through the lens of geopolitical theory, it may be argued that the changing policies of Western donors played a role in the deterioration of these services. Having initially supported Tanzania's socialist programme, the progressive withdrawal of Western donor funding in the 1980s and 1990s reversed gains in the provision of domestic water, universal primary education, and rural health care that had been achieved in the 1970s.

Citizen participation in local government was also constrained during this period of liberalisation. As the government, operating within a single party system, continued to insist on the fusion of state and political party throughout the administrative hierarchy, the deepening of local democracy was virtually impossible regardless of the efforts to restore local government (James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002, p.10). However, the single party system which had prevailed in the two decades following independence, was itself subjected to widespread opposition during the liberalisation era, and was subsequently abandoned in favour of multiparty democracy in 1992. The institutionalisation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania was effected through amendments to Articles 20 and

21 of the constitution by Act No. 5 of 1992, which sets out the fundamental principles, processes and institutions for a multiparty system (JMT, 2011, p.64). The introduction of multi-party democracy did lead to some changes in local democracy as the machinery of local government machinery had to be reconfigured to accommodate more than one political party. Councillors and village chairpersons were thus elected by the people from contesting political parties. A provision for re-calling elected officials before their term had been served (due to unsoundness of mind, fraud etc.) was also incorporated in local government legislations (James, Mdoe & Mishili (2002).

Towards the end of the 1980s, Tanzania was compelled to embark on a structural adjustment program (SAP) which was intended to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy. The SAP comprised a set of prescriptions devised by the IMF and World Bank and subsequently adopted by Western aid donors as a condition for continued aid support (Nugent, 2004). In fact, the IMF, with the authority delegated to it by capitalist states, pushed the SAPs to the extent that the adoption of an economic policy in line with the IMF/World Bank guidelines was considered by the Western donors as a pre-condition for aid (Nugent, 2004). Without the IMF's stamp of approval it became difficult for a country to secure aid from any other donors. Concerns about this reality are evident in a new year's message to diplomats by Nyerere wherein he states that 'when we reject IMF conditions we hear the threatening whispers: *without accepting our conditions you will not get our money, and you will get no other money*' (Crouch, 1987, p. 102 citing Development Dialogue, Number 2, 1980, p. 8).

Further reforms were, however, initiated in the 1990s with the intention of bringing about significant political and economic liberalization (Tidemand & Msami 2010). As a continuation of the SAPs, a Civil Service Reform Programme was launched in the 1990s and this had as one of its major components the reform of local government reform. The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) of 1998 called, inter alia, for a broad decentralisation of government functions, responsibilities and resources to local councils, the strengthening of local administrative capacity, and the promotion of local democracy (Mmari, 2005). Once again, donors played a significant role in encouraging decentralisation though during the local government reform programme, and more will be said about this in the chapter which follows.

3.6   Decentralisation in the local government reform era, 1998 to the present

The local government reforms embarked upon in 1998 represented a continuation of the democratisation process that had begun with the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992 (James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002; Lange, 2008). The LGRP was conceived of as a vehicle through which government would promote the decentralisation process (Massanyiwa, 2014) and its goal was to 'strengthen local government authorities with the overall objective of improving the quality and access to public services provided through or facilitated by the local government authorities' (URT, 1998; Ngwilizi, 2002; Lange 2008). It was believed that the reforms could 'help LGAs to significantly improve their performance, to stimulate local economic development, and to deliver better quality services, especially in the pro-poor areas like health and education' (Mmari, 2005, p. 16; James, Mdoe & Mishili, 2002).

Under the LGRP the government announced its policy of decentralisation-by-devolution (D-by-D). In the reform programme, decentralisation is conceived of as a four-dimensional process comprising political devolution, fiscal decentralisation, administrative decentralisation and the transformation of inter-governmental relations (URT, 1998, 2005). Full devolution is stated to be the ultimate objective of the LGRP but some writers are sceptical whether this is possible. According to Tidemand, Olsen and Sola (2008, p. 96), full devolution will 'require full backing of the political leadership, which seems not coming at present and substantive reforms in that direction should not be expected'. Under the existing system of inter-governmental relations, configured through amendments to local government legislation in 1999 and 2006, the current model of decentralisation appears to embody a combination of decentralised and deconcentrated forms of administration which in this thesis is referred to as 'a hybrid model of decentralisation'. In the hybrid model, forms of deconcentrated administration run parallel to the decentralised system of local government administration. These are evident in various donor funded projects special designed to strengthen infrastructure in poor coommunities and to provide safety nets for the poor.

Some of these hybrid arrangements are sector specific, as is the case with the Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP), the Secondary Education Development Programme (SEDP), and the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP), where school committees and water facility boards have been established. Others are special

projects located outside the sectoral ministries, as is the case with the Tanzania Social Action Fund, which forms a focal point of this study. TASAF uses community committee structures in delivering services to local communities (Lange, 2008). Such committees, which operate parallel to grassroots local government institutions, are made responsible for the organisation of service provision and resources expenditure, while maintaining accountability to the village government and programme officials (Lange, 2008). Ribot (1999) maintains that such parallel structures are encouraged by donors as a way of enhancing community participation on the assumption that local authorities may not be true representatives of the people.

These sector specific and special arrangements for service delivery are seen by many commentators to be have been encouraged by 'the donor community' and by so-called 'international good practices' (Tidemand et al., 2008; Lange, 2008; Ribot, 1999). According to Tidemand 'the general trend towards introduction of user groups [i.e. user boards and community committees] has been significantly influenced by donors...' (Tidemand et al., 2008, p. 96). However, other scholars maintain that the establishment of TASAF and other sector-specific arrangements for service delivery (such as PEDP) is more endogenous and reflects the national government's intent to promote community-based development (Tidemand, 2005). It is the position of this thesis, nevertheless, that the Tanzanian approach to decentralisation has been strongly influenced by donor agencies. TASAF, like many other social funds in sub-Saharan Africa, is intended to improve local service provision through the development of infrastructure, the provision of safety nets to poor and vulnerable groups, and the promotion of good governance through enhanced participation and improved social inclusion (World Bank, 2007). This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter which follows.

3.7   Conclusion

This chapter examined the different approaches to decentralisation adopted in Tanzania since independence in 1961 and traced the origins of the local government system back to the colonial era. It discussed the different approaches to decentralisation adopted in the post-colonial era and the shortcomings of both the original devolved form of local government and the subsequent deconcentrated systems of administration introduced during the Ujamaa period. The discussion also focused on the objectives of Local Government Reform Programme launched in 1998 and its continuation in the current

policy of decentralisation-by-devolution. In that regard, the local government reforms underway in Tanzania were seen to constitute a hybrid model of decentralisation that not only claims to promote political devolution but also aims to advance local service delivery and infrastructural development through a form of administrative deconcentration executed through sector-specific programmes and special projects like TASAF. The chapter which follows describes this hybrid model of decentralisation in greater detail and examines the national and international factors that have served to shape its current form.

CHAPTER FOUR

DECENTRALISATION AND DE-CONCENTRATION IN TANZANIA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LGRP AND TASAF

4.1   Introduction

This chapter discusses the hybrid model of decentralisation currently in operation in Tanzania and analyses in greater detail the factors underlying the emergence of the Local Government Reform Programme and TASAF, together with the institutional arrangements which underpin them. The chapter also addresses the primary research question as to whether, and to what extent, national and international factors have shaped the current configuration of decentralisation. The analysis is based on secondary data as well as a series of interviews with key officials from central and local government, local political office bearers, community leaders, the World Bank and other non-state actors.

In the past decade and a half, Tanzania has undergone a major process of decentralisation as part of the LGRP. This has aimed to improve the quality of, and access to, public services through or by LGAs (URT, 2005). The country has also made significant strides towards institutionalising poverty reduction strategies through, for example, the adoption of the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (MKUKUTA) and, as will be discussed, the establishment of TASAF in 2000 (TASAF, 2005, p. 1; 2013, p. 1).

In the past decade a variety of studies have been carried out on different aspects of local government reform in Tanzania. Some have focused on the fiscal aspects of decentralisation (Boex, 2003; Fjeldstad, 2001, 2003; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2000; Fjeldstad, Henjewele, Mwambe, Ngalewa, & Nygaard, 2004; Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008; Boex, 2003; Braathen, Chaligha, & Fjeldstad, 2004; Lund, 2007), whilst others have focused on political devolution or democratic decentralisation and local government autonomy and accountability (Lange, 2008; Kessy & McCourt, 2010; Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010). Still others looks at the impact of the local government reform programme (Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 2008; Tidemand & Msami, 2010; Pallangyo & Rees, 2010; Mgonja & Tundui, 2012). However, despite its topicality there has been relatively little focus on the national and international factors that underpin the adoption of the current model of decentralisation and their effects on institutional

arrangements. Relatively little attention[15] has also been paid to the interplay between the decentralised and deconcentrated local-level institutional arrangements and how they impact on broader local governance structures.

In an attempt to bridge this gap and to further contribute to body of literature on decentralisation in Tanzania, this chapter applies geopolitical theory, discussed in preceding chapters, to analyse the national and international factors that have shaped the current programme of local government reform in the country. The goal is to provide an understanding of the impact of geo-politics, particularly the influence of international donor agencies, on Tanzania's local affairs. Institutional theory is also applied in understanding the process of decentralisation and its structures. In this chapter, institutions are conceived of as structures of rules, procedures and organisations (Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004; Meagher & Kimenyi, 2004).

4.2   A synopsis of the Tanzanian hybrid model of decentralisation

The local government system currently in place and the policy of decentralisation by devolution, as indicated, was officially launched in the 1998 Policy Paper on Local Government Reform although the actual implementation of the LGRP programme only began in 2000 due to delays arising from donor funding arrangements and the institutionalisation of a reform coordinating body – the Local Government Reform Team (URT, 2005, p. 1). Under the LGRP decentralisation is conceived of as a four-dimensional[16] process (URT, 1998, p. 8). In the first place, it entails the political devolution of power by creating local democratic institutions and enhancing public participation in decision-making and service delivery (URT, 1998, 2005, 2009). In the second, it involves fiscal decentralisation to boost local government finances; this entails introducing equitable and transparent discretionary and targeted sector-specific grants from the central government, and mandating LGAs to plan and budget for service delivery and development based on local priorities (URT, 1998, 2005; Mmari, 2005). Administrative decentralisation is a third dimension, which seeks to de-link LGA staff from central government line ministries and to integrate them into LGA administration for closer supervision and local accountability. Administrative decentralisation also

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[15] The exceptions being research on the types of institutions created by sector-specific decentralisation in the water sector (Cleaver & Toner, 2006; Jiménez & Pérez-Foguet, 2010; De Palencia & Pérez-Foguet, 2011; Masanyiwa, 2014); and health sector (Mubyazi, Kamugisha, Mushi, & Blas, 2004; Boon, 2007; COWI & EPOS, 2007; Maluka et al., 2010) and others.

[16] Used synonymously with 'policy areas'.

includes redefining planning and service delivery relationships between sector ministries, agencies and local government authorities (URT, 1998; Mmari, 2005). The fourth and final dimension of the decentralisation process is about reorienting central-local relations to create an institutional environment that is supportive of the decentralisation process (ibid).

Of these four dimensions, the government maintains that the highest priority of the LGRP is in the area of fiscal decentralisation (URT, 2005, P. 6). As a consequence, the local government reform programme has attempted to address such problems as poor financial management, low levels of competence in staff management and physical service delivery, and limited citizen engagement (URT, 2005). The local government system is based on committees and supporting departments. Whereas committees are chaired by elected councillors, the department is headed by a professional administrator appointed by the council (URT, 1998, p. 33). Local governments under D-by-D have responsibility for social development and public service provision within their jurisdiction, as well as for facilitating the maintenance of law and order, and issues of national importance such as education, health, water, roads and agriculture (URT, 1998).

Despite official rhetoric (URT, 1996, 1998, 2005, 2009), as indicated above, the system of decentralisation underway in Tanzania cannot be described as one of devolution, but rather a hybrid model with both decentralised and deconcentrated forms of local administration. The latter is evident in the operations of TASAF which was initiated by the government in 2000 as a poverty reduction project, aimed at addressing issues that are taken for granted by the macro policies of economic restructuring. The project is one of the implementation mechanisms of Tanzania's poverty reduction strategy (TASAF, 2005). TASAF, as a national programme, is established within the President's Office, and is co-funded by the government, the World Bank and other donors (TASAF, 2005, 2013; Lange, 2008). The fund derives its legitimacy from Section 21 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 6 of 1999, which stipulates that local government authorities may perform any functions legally delegated to them by agreement with central government or any other body, subject to the terms and conditions laid down. To implement its functions at the local level, TASAF has co-opted decentralised local government structures at both the local council and community levels.

Prior to its formal launch, TASAF was piloted in eight districts in 1999 (James et al., 2002). In its first phase (i.e. TASAF I) which commenced in 2000, the programme covered a limited number of districts (40 local government authorities in mostly poor areas), but it was subsequently expanded to cover all districts. This was especially so in its second phase (TASAF II), but it has continued in its third phase (TASAF III), which is currently being rolled out (James et al., 2002; TASAF, 2005, 2013; Lange, 2008; Mmari, Sinda, & Kinyashi, 2014).

The government maintains that the fund was established as just one of its programmes to empower poor communities to improve their living conditions and quality of life by funding social services and income-generating activities managed by the communities themselves (JMT, 2011, p. 121). Like many other social funds in Sub-Saharan Africa, TASAF's main goal is to improving local service provision for the poor through increased access to service infrastructure and through the provision of safety nets to poor and vulnerable groups. In keeping with the broad donor agenda it also aims to promote good governance through enhanced participation and improved social inclusion (World Bank, 2007). TASAF II, in particular, set out to empower communities to request, implement and monitor projects that contribute to improved livelihoods linked to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (TASAF, 2005; URT, 2005b). In so doing it concentrated on the following objectives:

a) ensuring that communities access resources that can stimulate economic activity and thereby allow poor households to increase their incomes;

b) reducing vulnerability by empowering them with more means to minimise the risks they face; and

c) improving access to and use of social services.

The objective of the current phase (TASAF III), is to enable poor households, and especially the 33.6% of the population living below the basic poverty line, to increase incomes and opportunities while improving household consumption (TASAF, 2013, p. 2). To achieve this objective, TASAF III aims to:

a) establish a national safety net to provide transfers to the poor and vulnerable;

b) support community driven interventions that enhance livelihoods and increase incomes (through community savings and investments as well as specific livelihood enhancing grants); and

c) invest in targeted infrastructure development (especially in the education, health, and water sectors) and build the capacity of communities, local government authorities, and other levels of government to implement programme activities effectively (TASAF, 2013, p. 2).

The Government's vision in the policy paper on local government reform was that, through the principle of subsidiarity, service delivery would be brought closer to the intended users and political powers would be devolved to the grassroots levels of government (URT, 1998). In this context, local governments are seen as fundamental democratic institutions for local level service delivery due to their proximity to local communities (Tidemand et al., 2008). Following this, under the provisions of local government and sector-specific legislation and policy, LGAs have been given a broad mandate to provide such basic services as health, education, water, roads, and agriculture, to mention a few (URT, 1998, 2005; Tidemand et al., 2008).

In the case of health, district level services have been devolved to local authorities (Tidemand et al., 2008) and local councils are responsible for the management of district hospitals, health centres and dispensaries. These health facilities are run by local government authorities with subventions from central government and locally generated revenues (URT, 2003; Maluka et al., 2010; Masanyiwa, 2014). A district hospital provides services to 200,000–250,000 people, a health centre serves 50,000 people, and a dispensary serves 6,000–10,000 people (Tidemand et al., 2008). The national Primary Health Services Development Programme (PHSDP) 2007–2017[17] targets the construction of a dispensary in each village and a health centre in each ward in order to bring service delivery closer to the people in local communities. It also aims to provide adequate medicines and proper staffing of these facilities (URT, 2007). The funding of these projects is through the central government transfers/subventions, TASAF and other donor-funded projects.

The provision of water supplies and sanitation is decentralised to local governments in rural populations but is deconcentrated to agencies of the Ministry of Water (Urban Water Supplies Authorities) in urban populations (JMT, 2011, p.192).[18] District councils are thus responsible for managing rural water supplies for domestic use, livestock and

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[17] Mpango wa Maendeleo wa Afya ya Msingi (MMAM) in Kiswahili.
[18] The Urban Water Supplies Authorities were established under the Water Act No. 8 of 1997 in cities and towns (JMT, 2011, p.192).

irrigation (de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011; Massanyiwa, 2014). Although LGAs have some degree of autonomy with regards to decision making, planning and the implementation of water supply interventions, the central government ministry influences their decisions through non-discretionary grants (conditional transfers), guidelines and directives (Massanyiwa, 2014). Funding for the construction of water supply facilities and services in rural populations is provided through central government transfers to local governments, TASAF grants and other donor-funded projects. In urban areas, the Ministry of Water finances these services directly through the Urban Water Supplies Authorities.

Primary and secondary education services have also been decentralised to local councils. Under the decentralised arrangements, local government is responsible for providing education services to local communities with funding from central government and pooled donor funds under the PEDP and SEDP programmes (Tidemand et al., 2008; TASAF 2005, 2013). These programmes aim to expand education infrastructure, increase enrolment, improve the quality of education, and strengthen institutional arrangements (Tidemand et al., 2008). The TASAF conditional transfers also contribute to funding education infrastructure, including the building of classrooms, offices and teachers' houses.

In essence, local government funding is derived from three primary sources: central government grants, own revenues that are locally sourced, and local government borrowing (Fjeldstad, 2003; Fjeldstad et al., 2004; Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), 2008; Fjeldstad, Katera, Msami, & Ngalewa, 2010). Of the three, the major revenue source remains central government grants which accounts for about 90% of operational costs and development investment in local councils. Local governments' own revenue accounts for about 6%, while local borrowing contributes less than 1% to local government financial resources (Fjeldstad et al., 2004; Hoffman & Gibson, 2005; Boex & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006; Fjeldstad et al., 2010; Tidemand & Msami, 2010; Venugopal & Yilmaz, 2010). The following section unpacks the factors that shaped the current configuration of decentralisation.

4.3 Factors that shaped the emergence of local government reform and the Tanzanian Social Action Fund

Building on the discussion on the geopolitical dimensions of donor aid raised in the previous chapter, this section suggests that the factors that have served to shape the hybrid model of decentralisation were primarily externally driven but that they were also influenced by domestic realities. The neo-liberal agenda advanced by the IMF and World Bank (principally through the prescriptions of the structural adjustment programme) was shown to have been a driving factor behind the emergence of the LGRP. In the 1990s the adverse effects of the SAPs elsewhere in Africa had prompted calls for structural adjustment 'with a human face', as part of the so called Post-Washington Consensus, (Fine, Lapavitsas, & Pincus, 2003) and Tanzania, which had embarked on structural adjustment programme later than most other countries in the continent, was encouraged both to target the poor in its development strategies and to strengthen local government and democracy. As will be discussed below, the pressures exerted through this process were given additional impetus by the domestic financial crisis faced by the Tanzanian government.

4.3.1 Economic crisis and higher levels of poverty

Domestically, the push for greater decentralisation was triggered by the economic crisis of the 1980s. Several factors had contributed to the crisis, including increased national expenditure that was unmatched by revenue generation, a weak economic base, and massive expansion of social service infrastructure during *Ujamaa*. The break-up of the East Africa Community, a war with Uganda, falling commodity prices in the world market, and the oil price crisis were exogenous factors which contributed to the crisis (Singh, 1986; Fischer, 2006). The economic crisis weakened the government's capacity to deliver services to its citizens through domestic revenue and Tanzania's socialist government was left with little option but to approach Western donor countries and international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank in particular), for external assistance to mitigate the crisis and promote growth (JMT, 2011, p. 112). However, the aid relief sought, as indicated, came with conditions, such as a commitment to privatisation, market deregulation and democratisation (Harrison, 2001; Mmari, 2005; Harrison, Mulley, & Holtom, 2009; JMT, 2011; Browne, 2012). Following this, in the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, the government embarked on a process of

economic liberalisation which included the cutting of public expenditure, the privatisation of state owned enterprises, the opening of its markets and, importantly, a move towards decentralisation (Singh, 1986; Nugent, 2004).

Economic liberation brought some positive changes, including economic growth, but it also contributed to increased household poverty. Many people lost their jobs due to retrenchments and the fact that, as a consequence of financial mismanagement and asset stripping, not all the state owned enterprises which had been privatised in the 1990s survived. The fertiliser factories in Tanga City Council, for example, collapsed because the new owners failed to maintain them. Farmers were also hard hit by the removal of agricultural subsidies and by falling prices brought about by unregulated imports. All of these factors contributed to rising levels of poverty among both rural and urban communities, despite the promise that a democratic local government system would improve service delivery and promote local economic development (LED) (Rogerson, 2002). In a classic case of growth without redistribution, a TASAF official interviewed in Dar es Salaam stated that although macro indicators in the 1990s showed that the country's economy was growing, in reality a substantial proportion of the population, about 35%, were living in absolute poverty and were surviving on less than US$ 1 per day.

The growing levels of poverty, especially among rural populations, were reflected both in terms of declining household income and in terms of decaying service infrastructure such as schools, dispensaries, rural roads and water supply facilities. Faced with growing poverty and an under-performing system of local government, the government felt compelled to re-introduce a form of deconcentrated administration to run parallel to decentralised system and it was in this context that a social action fund (TASAF) was established. However, unlike the deconcentration of the 1970s, the deconcentrated administration introduced through TASAF was intended solely for equalisation purposes in order to address geographical and social inequalities in resource distribution.

TASAF officials interviewed maintained that in the year 2000, in a bid to reduce poverty levels, the government adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) proposed by donors with a focus on five sectors: education, health, water, roads and agriculture (TMU officials 14.05.2014). TASAF, which was established in the same year, was intended to address the priorities set in the national poverty reduction strategy by

supporting service improvements in education, health, water, roads and agriculture in poor areas, and providing income-generating interventions for vulnerable groups (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). Commenting on this, a TASAF official stated that:

> President Mkapa thought TASAF would be a good model for implementing the national poverty reduction strategy because it had the potential to reach the very poor and vulnerable groups within a society – through deconcentration – while maintaining high levels of accountability (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014).

4.3.2 Deteriorated local government service delivery

Since their restoration in the mid-1980s local governments had been severely under-resourced due to the central and sector ministries' withholding of finance and other resources necessary for the provision of public services (URT, 2005, p.5). A ministry official confirmed that in the mid-1980s and 1990s, the proportion of the national budget allocated to local governments was extremely small (Ministry official$_{02}$: 11.06.2014). The sectoral ministries also continued to hold onto control of sector personnel who served in the local councils. The withholding of financial and human resources were reflective of government's limited commitment to decentralising and the fact that the deconcentrated administrative systems introduced in the 1970s were still in place and delivering services. Ministries continued to use regional administrations in delivering their sector-specific services and local governments received central government grants through these agencies and these were seldom sufficient to cover their normal operational costs or to fulfil their mandates. As a consequence, most ministries continued to retain central control over important services (such as health and urban water and sewage), and to by-pass local authorities in priority setting for such services (URT, 1998, p. xiii).

This mismatch between the functions of LGAs and the resources assigned to them was also raised during interviews with key informants as one of the factors which had led to local government reform. A ministry official in Dodoma, for example, maintained that while 70% of all government functions were carried out in local governments, only 12% of total government financial resources had been allocated to them before the reforms (Ministry official$_{02}$: 11.06.2014). In other words, only 12% of resources were used to carryout 70% of government functions. A study by Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2003, p.1) also confirmed that 'although LGAs in Tanzania play a significant role in the delivery of key government services, the resources which the central government provides the local level are tightly controlled by the central government'. In a bid to

address the acute shortage of resources in LGAs the government sought to enforce a 'resources follow functions' principle, meaning that 'if, for example, a third of [a] ministry's functions is implemented at the LGA level, then the ministry must be prepared to devolve a third of its budget as well to the local government' (Ministry official[02] 11.06.2014; RA official, Morogoro 09.07.2014). Following this principle, it was believed that devolution was the only way in which there could be a more effective distribution of resources.

However, since local government capacity had been severely impaired during the 1970s, it was recognised that, on their own, municipalities were incapable of delivering the mandate assigned to them. In that regard, a World Bank official interviewed in Dar es Salaam maintained that, along with supporting the decentralisation reform agenda, consideration had to be given to filling the capacity gap in local government by devising alternative arrangements to deliver targeted services until such time as municipal administration had been strengthened (World Bank official 23.03.2015). This being the case, TASAF was designed by the government, and approved by the Bank, as a short-term mechanism to bridge the capacity gap and to fast track the delivery of safety nets and service infrastructure to poor communities. Local government officials and local political office bearers interviewed in the three case-study municipalities acknowledged that TASAF had been introduced because 'local government authorities did not have the capacity to implement all the development initiatives and deliver all types of services prior to the take-off of the local government reform' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014), at a time when the demand for service infrastructure in rural and peripheral urban communities was high (Councillor, Lindi 19.06.2014). Under these circumstance a Word Bank official maintained, the establishment of a body like the TASAF Management Unit (TMU) was unavoidable (World Bank official, 23.03.2015). In the context of limited LGA capacity, TASAF was designed to play a complementary supportive role in the local government reform process, building local administrative capacity, installing much needed service infrastructure and delivering critical pro-poor services. In confirmation of this objective, a ward administrator interviewed in Lindi district council also maintained that 'I think the government introduced TASAF to complement LGAs in delivering services and development to the people, because the Fund truly relieves local councils by contributing to the installation of service infrastructure' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

4.3.3 Domestic political considerations

Domestic political pressures for change have long driven decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. The pragmatic approach to decentralisation adopted from the 1970s onwards was driven by the political calculations of the ruling party, TANU and CCM, although donors did wield significant influence through their aid conditionalities. With regards to the 1998 local government reform and the decentralisation policy under way, CCM in its election manifesto of 1995 promised to strengthen the local government system with the overall objective of improving the quality of, and access to, public services provided by LGAs (URT, 1998; Tidemand, 2015). Their domestic appeal aside, the declarations of the manifesto also broadly conformed to the objectives of key donor organisations on whose financial support the reform programme heavily rested (URT, 2005; Mgonja & Tundui, 2012). Ministry officials interviewed confirmed that 'decentralisation came up from the CCM party manifesto of 1995 and the government managed to convince donors for funding' (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014). It was in this context, following its victory in the polls 1995, that the CCM government invited both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to take part in design of a local government reform programme and it was through this process that the Local Government Reform Agenda 1996–2000 was developed (URT, 1996, 1998, 2005a, 2009). As might have been expected under the circumstances, the local government reform agenda was fully endorsed by key donor agencies and following their pledges of support, a special programme management team was immediately established to develop the LGRP in 1997 (URT, 2005a) and this was followed by the publication of a government policy paper on local government reform in 1998. In that regard, the government of Tanzania has itself acknowledged that the LGRP 'has been a vehicle through which the government and donors initiated and promoted the decentralisation process' (Mmari, 2005, p.10; see also URT, 1998; 2005a).

Domestic political considerations unquestionably influenced the pace at which local government reform objectives were implemented, and the hybrid nature of decentralisation which emerged. TASAF officials affirmed that the Fund was conceived by top leaders in the party and government. Having been piloted in a few local councils, political office bearers, and especially the Members of Parliament, pressured the government to extend TASAF operations across the country based on the promising outcomes of its first phase (TASAF, 2005). Given the nature of TASAF operations, this

suggests a shift in political commitment to devolution towards a deconcentrated form of administration.

An analysis of the policy orientation of Tanzanian governments under different presidential leadership is of interest in that it reflects a progressive shift towards, and a compliance with, the neoliberal agenda advanced by Western donors. Thus, for example, the first president, Julius Nyerere, was highly sceptical of the structural reforms proposed by donors and is quoted as saying: 'When did the IMF become an international ministry of finance? When did nations agree to surrender to it their power of decision-making?' (Nugent, 2004, p. 326; Loxley, 1986). In the late 1970s Nyerere's disagreement with the structural adjustments proposed led to a suspension of the IMF support and a severe reduction of foreign aid to Tanzania (Muganda, 2004; JMT, 2011). His stepping down from the presidency in 1985 sent a message to the donor community that the country was ready for neo-liberal reforms. The second president, President Mwinyi (1986–1995), set the stage for structural and institutional reforms and played a vital role in opening up the country to market forces. Mwinyi spearheaded the liberalization efforts immediately after assuming office in 1986 (Kjaer, 2004; Shivji, 2006). The reforms during his presidency emphasized getting the prices right, particularly the dismantling of the set of policies resulting from the 1967 Arusha Declaration which had been designed to support a centrally-planned economy that (Muganda 2004), And by the end of 1991 the government 'had implemented a substantial element of the liberalization process' (Muganda 2004, p.3; Kjaer, 2004).

The third president, President Mkapa (1996–2005), took to heart the implementation of the IMF/World Bank's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) programme and its successor, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Mkapa fully embraced the World Bank-supported programmes and those supported by other multilateral and bilateral donors (Havnevik & Isinika, 2010; Kjaer, 2004). His commitment to reforming the public sector included the privatisation of two-thirds of public enterprises, introduction of the local government reform programme, and initiation of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty along with the establishment of TASAF (Muganda, 2004; Havnevik & Isinika, 2010). Confirming this commitment, a World Bank's report states that:

> When the President of Tanzania visited Malawi in 1998, the Malawian President took him to see communities supported by the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). This resulted in the Government of Tanzania (GOT) requesting the World Bank to send the same team to help it create a similar social fund to help communities contribute to their own development (Lenneiye, 2006, p. 1).

A TASAF official interviewed asserts that, following the President's visit to Malawi, 'TASAF benchmarked from the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) which had a similar objective of fighting poverty' (TMU official01 14.05.2014). The fourth president, President Kikwete (2006–2015) continued with the implementation of the reforms initiated by previous governments although the reforms seem to lose momentum in his second term in office (2011–2015).

4.3.4   Disappointments with the former decentralisation reforms

The government's earlier attempts at administrative decentralisation in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in the previous chapter, had largely negative outcomes including service delivery failure, citizen alienation from governance systems, and the weakening of local institutions. Shifting the responsibilities for service delivery and citizen engagement from democratic local government institutions to the Regional and District Administrations (serving as agencies of central government sector ministries), it is argued, led to the weakening of LGA capacity, which the current local government reforms are intended to address (Tordoff, 1965, 1994; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji & Peter, 2003; URT, 2005; Kessy & McCourt, 2010). Ministry officials interviewed stated that the current model of decentralisation came about, as previously indicated, after several failed attempts to decentralise, including the 1972 deconcentration programme, popularly known in Kiswahili as *Madaraka Mikoani*, and the 1982 restoration of local government authorities (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014). A ministry official interviewed maintained that 'with all the failed attempts, devolution was thus considered to be the best model for transferring authority, functions and resources to local governments' (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014).

Nevertheless, in implementing its policy of D-by-D the government opted to retain both devolved and deconcentrated institutional arrangements in its local government system (Semboja, 2015; Tidemand, 2015). This was perceived to a pragmatic response to the demonstrated administrative weaknesses of local governments in transition to devolution. The need for a hybrid form of decentralisation in such situations has been recognised in

the literature. Thus, for example, Semboja (2015, p. 95) maintains that 'if there is weak capacity in local authorities, then it is necessary to keep them closer to the centre in order to allow for prompt intervention to address the failures'. Similarly, in South Africa Tapscott (2004) proposed an asymmetrical devolution of local power as a way of ensuring service delivery while progressively strengthening the capacity of local institutions. World Bank officials in Dar es Salaam stated that the weak capacity of local governments in both financial and human resources made it difficult for the government and donors to completely rely on existing decentralised local government structures to deliver all types of public services, including the targeted pro-poor services (World Bank official 23.03.2015). The establishment of the (TMU) and its structures at the local levels was thus seen as critical in supporting government to deliver targeted pro-poor services (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

4.3.5 Donor influence through conditionalities and the neo-liberal agenda for structural adjustment programmes

From the 1980s onwards Western donor countries and multilateral aid agencies (especially the World Bank and IMF), as previously discussed, have increasingly attached conditionalities to the aid offered to developing states such as Tanzania. This has include the imparting of what are believed to be governance 'best practices' through various technical assistance programmes. In this way donors have played an important role in shaping the course of local government reform in Tanzania, which according to Tidemand (2015, p. 69) has been 'significantly driven by donors with limited domestic policy support'. The literature further suggests that 'the source of aid and the intent of the donor have significant impacts on a recipient country in terms of democratisation' (Tripp, 2012, p. 3 citing Bermeo, 2010; also see Muganda, 2004; Hyden, 2005; Mgonja & Tundui, 2012). The LGRP, as indicated, emerged in the 1990s partly in response to donors concerns about the need for reform of the public sector. The idea of a Tanzania Social Action Fund, similarly, emerged from donors' interest in devising a mechanism to mitigate the negative impacts of SAPs, implement World Bank initiated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and manage foreign aid provided through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

It is thus, no exaggeration to state that local government reforms and the establishment of TASAF have, from the outset, been heavily donor driven and dependent on donor funding (Ng'andwe, 2003; Lange, 2008; Warioba & Warioba, 2012; World Bank, 2012).

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This is evident from the fact that donors were involved in the reform process step by step, in designing both the local government reform agenda and funding mechanism (that is, the basket funding system), and in the actual financing of the LGRP (URT, 1998; 2005). In February 1999, for example, donor agencies and the government collectively carried out an appraisal of the action plan budget (APB) for the LGRP which was endorsed in April 1999. This was followed, in July 1999, by an agreed reform package and funding mechanism which ultimately enabled implementation of the first phase of the LGRP in 2000. Donors, and especially bilateral western donor countries, have financed a large part of the LGRP (URT, 2005; Tidemand & Msami, 2010). These countries include Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, while multilateral donor agencies include the EU and UNDP/UNCDF (URT, 2005).

Both central and local government officials interviewed confirmed that donors, and especially the World Bank, had a large stake in establishing and funding the TASAF. A TASAF official maintained that the World Bank has been one of TASAF main financers since its establishment, although the government has also contributed a significant portion of its revenue (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014). Another official confirmed that, from the first phase (TASAF I) until towards the end of the second phase (TASAF II), the World Bank provided financial assistance to TASAF in the form of credit support and grants (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). This finding is consistent with the World Bank's (2012, p. 2) own statement that 'the Bank has supported the Government with two phases of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) since 2000'. TASAF officials indicated that apart from the credit and grants issued directly to TASAF, other projects funded by the World Bank, for example, the Marine and Coastal Environment Management Project (MACEMP), the Tanzania Commission for Aids (TACAIDS), and the Zanzibar AIDS Commission (ZAC), were also advised by the Bank to use TASAF to reach grassroots communities thereby increasing the Fund's resource base (TMU officials 14.05.2014). TASAF also received sporadic funding from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for small-scale and pilot projects. A TASAF official in Lindi maintained that OPEC had issued an area-based credit for Lindi and Mtwara regions (TASAF Lindi, 02.05.2014)[19]. Further evidence of OPEC support for TASAF is to be found in an OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) press

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[19] Lindi and Mtwara regions are the main deposits of natural gas in Tanzania. Extraction of natural gas from these regions began in recent years.

release, number PR50/2005, which stated that OPEC had extended a US$10 million loan to the Government of Tanzania for poverty alleviation through TASAF II (OFID, 2005). In the current TASAF III, OPEC has pledged to expand funding in two other regions, namely Arusha and Njombe (*Arusha Times*, 2015; *Pesa Times*, 2015). The perception of local government officials and local political office bearers in all three case-study LGAs was that TASAF had been established as a mechanism for managing donor funds. A local political office bearer in Lindi, for instance, maintained that, 'TASAF simplifies the management of donor funds, including the OPEC funds in our district and the neighbouring Mtwara region' (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014).

Bilateral and multilateral donors differed in their thinking about decentralisation in Tanzania. Multilateral donors, especially the World Bank and IMF, paid more attention to economic restructuring, to fiscal decentralisation (for example, in designing a formula-based grants system), to sectoral decentralisation with specific reference to education, health and water, and to administrative decentralisation, and especially to the establishment of a social fund mechanism (i.e. TASAF) for implementing poverty reduction strategies (World Bank, 2004; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013). The IMF and World Bank interest in sectoral decentralisation is evident in their SAPs for Tanzania, which proposed and supported administrative decentralisation for the education and health services sectors rather than the holistic approached envisaged in the LGRP (IMF, 2001; 2012). In addition, as Table 4.1 illustrates, the Bank neither financed the LGRP nor did it channel its funding for the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) through the Common Basket Fund arrangement, but through its own Local Government Support Project (LGSP) that focuses principally, although no exclusively, on fiscal decentralisation (PMO-RALG, 2009).

Unlike the multilateral donors, Western bilateral donor agencies financed the implementation of broader democratic local government reform (devolution) in part because they were interested in promoting their own democratic institutions and systems as 'best practice' for the least developed countries (LDCs) (Tripp, 2012, p. 5). Evidence of their support for devolution is to be found in Table 4.1 below, which lists a number of bilateral donors that financed local government reform in Tanzania. Japan, although not formally part of the West, also sought to promote its best practices in decentralised local government in Tanzania. This is evident in comments made by a Deputy State Minister

(PMO-RALG) in an address to the Tanzania-Osaka Alumni meeting held in Tanga in 2014:

> When we went to Japan for a study tour to see how Japan is practicing participatory processes which they proposed as best practices in our O&OD project, we told them that these things are not new in Tanzania. The people have been practicing this over decades. What is lacking off course is just fine-tuning and simplifying our participatory processes to suit the local context (Deputy Minister 02.07.2014).

Some literature also links bilateral donor country efforts to replicate their domestic political systems and liberal democratic institutions in the LDCs with their interest in making these countries a better place to live in for their own nationals and businesses (Crouch, 1987; Burnell, 1997; Burnell & Collier, 1998). Crouch (1987, p. 84), for example, maintained that 'donors are unlikely to tax their own populations to aid Tanzania unless tangible political and economic benefits accrue to them'. In the same vein, Boex & Martinez-Vazquez (2003, p. 25) maintained that 'donor agencies pursue their own policy priorities and adhere to their own national regulations'.

Even Arab donors, who appear to be less interested in imposing conditionalities or in influencing the sovereign affairs of recipient countries than some Western states, still use aid as a mechanism to advance their interests in Sub-Saharan African countries by 'securing investment opportunities, opening access to markets, capturing resource flows, and soaping diplomatic solidarities with political elites' (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 141 citing Naim, 2007). In that regard, in TASAF II Tanzania received development assistance from OPEC to strengthen local government service delivery in the southern regions of Lindi and Mtwara, both of which are rich in natural gas (OFID, 2005). The decision to provide aid for the development of these two regions serves to confirm the assertion that donors have both political and economic motivations when giving aid to LDCs (Hunter, 1984; Harmer & Cotterrell, 2005; Kiala, 2010; Ghosh & Kharas, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012).

It is evident that the geopolitical global and regional security concerns of Western donors have also contributed to the boosting of aid flows in support of democratisation and decentralisation. Given that Tanzania is perceived to be an ally of Western states in the war against terror, there has been increasing donor interest in strengthening its political and economic institutions. This has especially been the case since it adopted the anti-terrorism framework engineered by the United States (US) following the bombing of the American Embassy in Dar es Salaam and the 9/11 tragedy in the US (Helleiner, Killick,

Lipumba, Ndulu, & Svendsen, 1995; Radelet, 2003; Tarnoff, 2005; Picard & Buss, 2009). The increased interest of Western donors in strengthening the processes of democratisation is also evident in countries like Iraqi and Afghanistan where Western donor countries, and especially the US, have been assisting governments to create decentralized and participatory systems of democracy (Ottaway, 2003; Moss, Standley, & Roodman, 2005; Woods, 2005; Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009; Howell & Lind, 2009).

Table 4.1: Donors' interest in financing local government in Tanzania

Donor	Area (basket) of financial assistance[20]					
	LGRP Basket[a]	LGDG Basket[b]	Health Basket[c]	RWSSP Basket[d]	ASDP Basket[e]	TASAF[g]
AfDB/DADEA				X		
Belgium		X				
Denmark			X	X		
European Union		X		X	X	
FAO/IFAD					X	
Finland	X	X				
France				X		
Germany	X	X	X	X		
Ireland	X	X	X		X	
Japan		X		X	X	
Netherlands	X	X	X	X		
Norway	X	X				
Sweden	X	X	X			
OPEC			X			X
UNFPA/UNICEF			X			
World Bank[f]	x	X	X	X	X	X

Source: PMO-RALG (2009) Local Government Reform Programme II (Decentralisation by Devolution) Vision, Goals and Strategy July 2009 – June 2014; and TASAF documentation.

It was stated in the preceding chapter that the influence of Western donors and international financial institutions had put pressure on the Tanzania government to implement a SAP that included the reduction of public expenditure, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, and privatization (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993; Adejumobi, 1996; Shivji, 2006; Peet & Hartwick, 2015). In conformance with the neoliberal agenda of the

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[20] [a]Local Government Reform Programme; [b]Local Government Development Grant; [c]Health Sector Support Programme and District Health Infrastructure; [d]Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme; [e]Agriculture Sector Development Programme; [f]The World Bank provides funding for the LGCDG through the LGSP Project, coordinated with the LGDG Basket Fund, but does not channel its funds through the LGDG CBF arrangement; [g] TASAF is funded outside LGRP and operates as an agency within the President's Office.

Western states, which advocated more business-like practices (market institutions) in the public sector, these structural adjustment measures prompted the country to shift from the centralized economic policies of *Ujamaa* to more decentralized policy making (Burnell, 1997; Bonal, 2002, p. 4; World Bank, 2001; Harvey, 2005; Shivji, 2006). The SAP objective of reducing the scale of the public sector, and particularly its role as a producer and provider of goods and services, through downsizing, privatisation and decentralisation, drove public a series of sector reforms, among them a drive to reform local government (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993; Harrison, 2001; World Bank, 2001; Ayee, 2008). A ministry official confirmed that privatisation and decentralisation were seen as strategies to right-size the government (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014).

These reforms also followed general accusations that the public sector was performing poorly despite consuming the bulk of public funding and that it was placing a growing budgetary burden on the government (Williamson, 2004; Shivji, 2006). In essence, the public sector was accused of ineffectiveness and inefficiency, and of being oversized. A ministry official in Dodoma confirmed that local government reform in Tanzania is attributable to the World Bank/IFM allegation that 'the government was unreasonably big' (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014). With this in mind, donors argued that in order to reform the public sector, effective implementation of the SAPs proposed by the IMF/World Bank was unavoidable (Singh, 1986; Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993; Kilindo, 1995; Kaul, 1996; Muganda, 2004).

Although Tanzania had embarked upon a SAP from the mid-1980s onwards, its achievements in terms of public sector reform, privatisation and improved efficiency in the utilization of public resources a decade later were limited (Makusi, 1992; World Bank, 2001; Mmari 2005, p. 6). In order to speed up the process of economic reform and growth, the World Bank and IMF issued a Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) of about SDR 93.2 million (US$128.9 million) with an IDA reflow allocation of SDR 2.8 million for the period October 1997 to June 2000 (World Bank, 2001). The credit provided supported reforms focusing, inter alia, on consolidating macroeconomic stability, improving public expenditure management and basic service delivery, decentralising and strengthening the management and financing of social services (education and health) at the local level in order to increase access, restructuring and privatising targeted parastatals, and trade liberalisation (World Bank, 2001). The support to decentralisation provided to these sectors by the IMF/World Bank's 1997–2000 SAC paved the way for

other donors, especially the European Commission and bilateral donor countries, to finance the LGRP in subsequent years (URT, 1998; 2005; World Bank, 2001). A ministry official stated:

> Following the IMF advice to downsize, we then agreed that central government should remain with the traditional core functions of central government. The responsibilities pertaining to the implementation of the policies should go to the local government. That is where we came up with the Local Government Reform Programme (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014).

In that respect, the emergence of TASAF formed part of the form of structural adjustment process advocated by the IMF-World Bank as part of the 'post-Washington Consensus', which, as previously stated, recognised the negative impacts of the first wave of SAPs (Killick, 1995; Jayasuriya, 2002; Fine et al., 2003; Hayami, 2003). Reflective of this, in Tanzania, according to a government report, the removal of subsidies as part of the SAP led to rising food insecurity and a general decline in access to basic social services such as education, health and water (JMT, 2011, p. 113). This decline in access to, and the quality of, basic services was most evident in the shortage of safe drinking water, low school enrolment rates, shortages of health facilities and high infant mortality rates, to mention a few (Rusimbi, 1994; Lugalla, 1997; Naiman & Watkins, 1999; Grosen & Coşkun, 2010; Fonjong, 2014;). These negative outcomes were coupled with low purchasing power due to increased levels of unemployment caused by massive retrenchments which, in turn, led to increased poverty levels, as had occurred in many other LDCs (Kilindo, 1995; Fonjong, 2014).

The UNICEF, International Labour Organisation and some donor countries warned that although stabilisation and adjustment policies were desirable and irreversible, their effects on socially vulnerable groups required direct mitigation (Svendsen 1987; Minecke, 1989; Gibbon 1993). The 'post-Washington Consensus' package of ideas and policies (Fine et al., 2003) was a response to these concerns (Craig & Porter, 2003; Cooksey, 2004;).[21] The World Bank came up with an adjustment mitigation facility in Sub-Saharan Africa in the form of a social fund, the earliest being the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment in Ghana (Gayi, 1991; Gibbon, 1992, 1993) and later the TASAF in Tanzania (TASAF, 2005).

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[21] See also the WHO website, 'Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health: Post-Washington Consensus; URL: www.who.int/trade/glossary/story074/en/ accesses on September, 04, 2015.

In November 2001 Tanzania acquired debt relief of about US$3 billion[22] over 20 years under the enhanced HIPC facility[23] (the equivalent of a 54% reduction in the net present value (NPV) of Tanzania's total external debt). Its level of debt servicing was reduced from about 19% of government revenue to an average of 7.7% for 2001–2010, and 4.4% for 2011–2020 (IMF, 2001, 2013; Cooksey & Likwelile, 2002; Mramba, 2003; Kamala, 2004). The World Bank and IMF set as a condition the clause that 'resources made available by debt relief provided under the HIPC initiative will be allocated to key anti-poverty programmes, which are outlined in Tanzania's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)' (IMF, 2001). To comply with this and maintain its reputation with the donor community, Tanzania strengthened TASAF, which had been established a year earlier, with World Bank technical assistance.

4.4   Reasons for de-concentrating the Tanzanian Social Action Fund

The adoption of a deconcentrated model for TASAF, according to TASAF, World Bank, and local government officials, was primarily for reasons of efficiency. TASAF officials stated that it was thought to be more cost efficient to use local government officials in implementing the fund's activities at the district level than to deploy experts from the centre (TMU officials 14.05.2014). Since operational decisions for service delivery are made at the local level, it was thought TASAF could best meet its objectives by co-opting decentralised local government structures. This, a TMU official maintained, was only possible because TASAF's status as a special agency allowed for a degree of experimentation and the piloting of new operating procedures (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014). Local government officials and local political office bearers also ascribed the deconcentrated approach to concerns about cost efficiency in delivery of pro-poor services and to the limited capacity of LGAs. Local government officials understood that, for reasons of efficiency, the government could not afford to further centralise the activities of TASAF nor, due to limited capacity at the local level, to further devolve its operations. Under these circumstances, it had little option but to deconcentrate the Fund's projects and to implement them in conjunction with LGAs.

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[22] Equivalent to US$2.026 billion in net present value (NPV) terms.
[23] The HIPC Initiative, which was introduced by the IMF/World Bank in 1996 and adopted by the international community in an effort to eradicate unsustainable debt in the poorest and most heavily indebted countries, aims at reducing the net present value (NPV) of debt at the time when a country is assessed to have satisfactorily met IMF/World Bank conditionalities (IMF 2001; 2013).

Local political office bearers interviewed stated that following the increased transfer of funding to municipalities as part of the LGRP, a range of financial irregularities came to the fore due to weak financial management capacity at the local level. It was as a consequence of this, it was stated, that the government believed that TASAF could bridge the 'capacity weaknesses of LGAs and bring [about a] quick change at the grassroots' (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014). A TASAF district official confirmed that 'CMCs were introduced to ensure increased financial accountability since the villages in which TASAF projects were implemented received allocations of up to US$50,000 from the Fund (TASAF Lindi, 02.05.2014).

TASAF officials also maintained that the Fund had succeeded mainly due to the deconcentration approach adopted which had placed it beyond from politics and local elite capture (TMU officials 14.05.2014 and 30.03.2015). The aim of establishing structures parallel to the democratic institutions, TASAF officials maintained, was to do away with politics and allow for a technocratic approach in the delivery of services and local development (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). The deconcentrated administration of TASAF imposed new structures to run in parallel with local government institutions, including the Community Management Committees (CMCs) introduced at the grassroots level. It also meant reinventing the decision-making process and shortening decision-making routes at the district council level. Local government officials and local political office bearers concurred with this view, stating that by de-concentrating TASAF, the government aimed to depoliticise poverty reduction and by-pass bureaucratic procedures in order for a more speedy and efficient provision of services. A ward administrator interviewed in Tanga confirmed that 'the deconcentration system of TASAF avoids politics to attain efficiency in the use of financial and time resources, and speedy delivery of services directly to the local communities' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014).

World Bank and TASAF officials maintained that structures like the CMCs were established because people did not trust village councils and their standing committees. Village chairpersons, for instance, were accused of being unaccountable to their communities. According to ALAT officials interviewed, this 'made projects like TASAF worried [about] failure to meet their programme objectives if they implemented their initiatives within a decentralisation framework' (ALAT official 01.07.2014). In essence, the design of the TASAF model and its parallel structures set out to restore trust and speed up the delivery of services whilst at the same time strengthen the capacity of local

actors. The following section discusses the institutional configuration of hybrid decentralisation.

4.5   Institutional configurations for the hybrid model of decentralisation

The effectiveness of any model of decentralisation in delivering public services and in promoting grassroots participation depends on the way in which its institutions are configured. In that regard, the functionality of institutional arrangements at all levels of the administrative hierarchy is of paramount importance to the effectiveness of decentralised government (Azfar, Kähkönen, & Meagher, 2001; Mollel, 2010). This is because the institutional arrangements or structures determine the environment within which decentralised administrations operates. Institutional environments, as discussed in the theoretical framework of this thesis, can either support or impede the delivery of decentralised public services and the participation of the local community in public affairs. Tanzania adopted a two-tiered system of government, based on central and local government structures, but, as discussed, this system also includes aspects of both deconcentrated and decentralised authority. The institutional configuration and interconnectedness of the two layers of government, central and local government, are highlighted in Figure 4.1 below and their impacts are discussed in the empirical chapters which follow.

Figure 4.1: Tanzania's decentralised institutional arrangements

Central Government   *Local Government*   *Special Project*

President's Office

Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF)

Sector Ministries

Prime Minister's Office, Reg Admin & Local Govt (PMO-RALG)

Regional Admin (Regional Secretariat)

District Commissioner's Office

Local Government Authority (LGA)

TASAF District Management Team (DMT)

Divisional Office

Ward (Office of the WEO & WDC)

Rural   *Urban*

Village Council

Mtaa (Neighbourhood) Committee

TASAF Community Management Committee

Kitongoji (Hamlet)

Local communities >

Participatory Processes   Service Delivery

Village Assembly/ *Mtaa* Assembly

Key:

→ Administrative and control relationship

— Technical assistance relationship

- - - - Advisory and consultative relationship

⇒ Functions/roles

Source: Author's sketch

4.5.1 Central government institutions for decentralisation by devolution

The D-by-D decentralisation policy document provides that the overall role of central government institutions is confined to the following functions:

- facilitating and enabling LGAs to deliver services;
- developing and managing the policy and regulatory framework;
- monitoring LGAs' accountability;
- auditing (financial and performance related); and
- providing grants to LGAs for service delivery (URT, 1998).

However, central government retains overriding powers over local government, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the Constitution (URT, 1998). The central government institutions responsible for overseeing local governments, as shown in the figure above, include the Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) sector ministries, and the regional administrations (regional secretariats).

The Prime Minister, in addition to his general role of overseeing and controlling the activities of sectoral ministries and leading the business of government in the National Assembly, is also assigned responsibility for overseeing local government in mainland Tanzania in terms of Government Notice No.1 of January 2006. In fulfilling his oversight responsibilities the Prime Minister is assisted by a State Minister in the PMO-RALG.[24] The PMO-RALG has the overall responsibility for formulating broad national policies, co-ordinating policy issues with regard to local government, and monitoring LGAs to ensure the integration of national policies into locally developed programmes.[25] It works in collaboration with sector ministries, which also formulate sectoral policies relating to service delivery in local government areas, for example, in education, health, roads, water, land and agriculture.[26] Sectoral ministries play an important role in the decentralisation processes because they have a direct link to the sector-specific services provided by local governments (URT, 1998, p.9). Sector ministries are therefore responsible for:

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[24] Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government is the official name for the Ministry responsible for local government in mainland Tanzania.
[25] Tanzania Local Government Profile 2011-2012
[26] Ibid.

- directing sectoral reforms (in health, education and water)[27] and providing LGAs with technical assistance in those sectors;

- setting minimum standards for service delivery and monitoring compliance;

- advising on resource allocation in specific sectors; and

- advising on sectoral improvements at different levels (Wizara ya Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa (TAMISEMI), 1999, p. 18; URT, 2007).

To assist central government ministries in executing their roles within the decentralised local government system, the Regional Administration Act of 1997 establishes a Regional Secretariat (RS) within the Regional Administration (RA) as a deconcentrated arm of the central government. It functions as a technical and advisory body above the local government system and below the sector ministries, and it is staffed with technical experts from all sectors. Generally, the RA, led by the Regional Commissioner (RC), is responsible for overseeing local governments in the region. The RS, headed by the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS), assists the RC in carrying out his or her roles. Section 29 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2006 identifies the functions of the RS as including:

- monitoring of quality and standards of service delivery in LGAs;

- enhancing the institutional capacity of LGAs;

- providing technical and administrative assistance;

- identifying development opportunities in the region; and

- recommending new strategies for productivity (Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2006).

Since the Regional Administration Act No. 19 of 1997 was enacted a year before the 1998 Policy Paper on Local Government Reform was officially launched, concerns that the Act is out-dated and thereby limits the autonomy of LGAs (by deconcentrating rather than decentralizing administrative responsibility) have begun to emerge in central government institutions (President's Office Public Service Management (PO-PSM), 2011, p. 1). This is evident in the fact that the influence of the RA extends to the district level, where the District Commissioner (DC) provides assistance to the RC. At the Division level (the lowest organ under the RS) the Divisional Officer (DO) assists the DC in maintaining law and order as well as in ensuring implementation of central government

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[27] For example, 'Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax reform' (van Dijk, 2008, p. 150)

directives in the division. The DO is also assigned the controversial role of supervising Ward Executive Officers (who are LGA staff) as well as responsibility for development activities in the division, with dual accountability to both the DC and the District Executive Director (DED) (Local Government Laws [Miscellaneous Amendments] Act, 2006). This arrangement suggests that the powers devolved to the local level are actually quite limited.

4.5.2   Local government institutions

Local governments in Tanzania are constitutionally recognised as semi-autonomous bodies with legal status (corporate entities) and they are able to exercise a degree of discretionary power over local affairs, within the framework of a unitary state (Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (CURT), 1977; URT, 1998; REPOA, 2008, p. 4). The local government system comprises two categories of local authorities, namely rural authorities (district authorities) and urban authorities (URT, 1998). The district authorities in rural areas are established under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. Urban authorities, likewise, are established by the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982.

The district authority comprises a district council, village councils, township authorities, Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and *Vitongoji* (*Kitongoji* in singular). With the exception of the WDCs and *Vitongoji*, the remaining structures are mandated to make by-laws according to the applicable regulations within their area of jurisdiction. These include land use management, environmental management, revenue collection, approval of annual budgets, formulation of development plans and passing taxes (JMT, 2011a, pp. 4–6). The urban authorities (often referred to as urban councils) are categorised as city, municipal and town councils. Urban councils consist of a city, municipal or town council, ward and *Mitaa*. They have similar mandates and functions to those of district councils.

At the local government level, the district or urban council stands as the main decision-making organ in the local government system, comprising all ward councillors, special seat (women) councillors and Members of Parliament (MPs) of the constituencies within the council area. Councillors are democratically elected every five years. The local councils are headed by the council chairperson or mayor, elected the councillors themselves from within their own ranks (Local Government Act No. 7 and 8 of 1982). The decision-making structure of the LGAs consists of the full council assembly and

various standing committees. The membership of the full council includes all councillors, MPs in the council area and the district/city executive director. The executive director, as the head of the council administration, is assisted by department heads to form the Council Management Team (CMT). The administration of LGA business in a ward is carried out through the WDC comprising all chairpersons of village councils, Village Executive Officers (VEOs), the ward councillor who chairs the WDC and the Ward Executive Officer (WEO), who is the Secretary to the WDC.

At the grassroots level, village governments are established by local government legislation in every registered village on the mainland (Local Government (District Authority) Act 1982; JMT, 1995).[28] A village government is headed by the village chairperson, duly elected by village residents in local elections, and assisted by the VEO (JMT, 1995). The decision-making structure of the village government includes the Village Assembly, composed of all adult men and women of voting age (eighteen years old and above), who are ordinarily resident in a particular village; the village council; and various standing committees (Local Government (District Authority) Act 1982; JMT, 1995). The overall responsibility of village government includes:

- identifying development priorities through participatory planning;
- supervising the implementation of projects;
- enacting village by-laws;
- ensuring peace, safety and security in the village; and
- any other developmental and service delivery functions (JMT, 1995).

4.5.3 Deconcentrated institutional arrangements for the Tanzanian Social Action Fund

In various government documents the TASAF structural arrangements are referred to as 'decentralisation' but, as used in practice, the term appears to be synonymous with 'deconcentration' (TASAF 2005, 2013). This section provides an overview of the organisational structure of TASAF, from the national level, through LGAs to the grassroots.

At the national level TASAF is established under the President's Office. Oversight power is vested in the National Steering Committee (NSC), whose members are appointed by

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[28] A grassroots local government institution similar to village council in urban authorities is the *Mtaa* Committee.

the President from the public and private sectors and from NGOs (TASAF, 2005). Among other functions the NSC reviews TASAF's annual plans and budget, and endorses community projects recommended by the Sector Experts Team (SET). The SET consists of senior sector experts appointed by permanent secretaries in the relevant sector ministries to support the NSC in reviewing sub-projects submitted and in determining their conformity with sector norms and standards (TASAF, 2005).

The TMU established within the President's Office is headed by an Executive Director. The TMU is responsible for the routine operations of TASAF and it reports to the NSC (TASAF, 2005). Its specific functions include:

- implementing the project in accordance with the Operational Manual;
- the timely disbursement of, and accounting for, project funds in compliance with the financial management principles stipulated in the Development Financing Agreement (DFA);
- the procurement of goods/services outside the communities jurisdiction;
- the preparation of annual work plans for the NSC's approval;
- service audits;
- the preparation of financial monitoring reports (FMRs); and
- staff performance management and reporting (TASAF, 2005).

TASAF does not have a line structure at the regional level. Instead, the Regional Consultative Committee (RCC) is vested with some oversight authority over the LGAs with regard to TASAF operations. A designated officer, with the title 'TASAF focal person', is appointed by the RAS from among the regional secretariat staff to coordinate TASAF activities in the region and to consolidate LGA reports for submission to the RCC and NSC (TASAF, 2013).

At the local government level, the management of TASAF operations is entrusted to the DED and the Council Finance Committee.[29] TASAF enters into a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the DEDs which specifies the responsibilities of both parties in relation to activities financed by the Fund. However, the legal standing of these MoU has yet to be formalised since the accountability of local councils to TASAF is not necessarily based on a legal instrument but on hierarchical power. This is because the

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[29] This is called the Finance, Administration and Planning Committee in the district councils and the Finance and Administration Committee in the urban councils.

signing of a MoU between TASAF and a local council would amount to entering into an agreement with the President for which there is no legal precedent. The Council Finance Committee oversees community projects within the municipality's geographical jurisdiction and approves project proposals before forwarding them to the TMU for endorsement and the allocation of funds (TASAF 2005, 2013).

An LGA appoints a TASAF Coordinator (Village Fund Coordinator) and a TASAF Accountant (Village Fund Justification Assistant) from among its staff, and these are charged with responsibility for the day-to-day operations of TASAF in the municipality. The CMT, as a technical working committee of the council, is chaired by the DED and its membership includes all department heads. It is also responsible for project appraisal, technical support and the monitoring of sub-project implementation. The CMT performs the exercise of targeting communities and facilitates the extended participatory rural appraisal (E-PRA) processes (TASAF 2005, 2013). The role of the WDC and the ward administration is not explicit in TASAF projects.

At the community level, TASAF projects are managed by the Village Assembly, the Village Council and the CMC. It is worth noting, though, that TASAF guidelines stipulate that the primary implementer of TASAF projects at the community level is the CMC; and that the role of formal grassroots local government institutions is that of overseeing the CMC in an 'eyes on, hands off' style (TASAF 2005). The functions of the Village Assembly, with regards to TASAF projects, include:

- endorsing the expression of interest made by the beneficiary groups during the E-PRA;
- electing CMC members or endorsing the CMC members proposed by the beneficiary groups;
- receiving and discussing sub-projects progress reports from the village council; and
- endorsing the beneficiaries for cash transfers (safety net grants) (TASAF 2005, 2013).

The TASAF operational manual emphasises that the Village Council – a formal grassroots local government institution comprising democratically elected members and appointed officials – must cede the implementation of TASAF activities to the CMC

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immediately after its endorsement by the Village Assembly (TASAF 2005; Mmari, Sinda, & Kinyashi, 2014, p. 5). The guidelines describe this arrangement as an act of authorising and delegating to the CMC responsibility for the day-to-day management of the sub-projects (TASAF 2005). Following this, the Village Council is only expected to oversee the implementation of community projects by CMC from the initial stage to completion (TASAF 2005; Mmari et al., 2014). This includes soliciting and receiving project progress reports from the CMC and presenting quarterly reports to the Village Assembly before submitting them to the local government authority. The following section discusses the nature and the role of the CMC in the TASAF service delivery.

4.6 The nature and roles of Community Management Committees in Tanzanian Social Action Fund service delivery

The responsibility of the CMC includes the actual implementation of TASAF-funded community projects in accordance with the prescribed guidelines[30] (TASAF, 2005). Specific activities include, amongst others, the following:

- the preparation of sub-project write-ups in collaboration with the E-PRA Team;
- completion and submission of sub-project application forms;
- taking part in field appraisals;
- financial management of the 90% of project funds disbursed by TASAF to the sub-project bank account in the name of the CMC for approved sub-projects;
- accounting for the funds spent;
- procurement of goods and works/services in accordance with the project manuals and the World Bank guidelines of March 1998; and
- on-site implementation of sub project activities (TASAF 2005).

In understanding the functioning of CMCs, it is necessary to develop to provide some background to the way in which they are established, the educational levels of their members, and their capacity to make informed decisions. This section looks at these issues by drawing on TASAF policy provisions and guidelines, previous research and the empirical findings of interviews with TASAF officials, LGAs, local political office bearers, and MC members. From this a snapshot emerges of the nature of the CMCs which are entrusted with the delivery of TASAF services.

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[30] These guidelines are listed in the Community Sub-project Management Handbook.

The TASAF guidelines stipulate that CMCs must be formed through democratic elections carried out during a Village Assembly attended by at least 70% of the intended beneficiaries (residents) of voting age (TASAF, 2005, p.5). A TASAF official interviewed confirmed that 'the quorum for the Village Assembly to elect the CMC members is set at 70% of all residents in the village or *Mtaa*' (TMU official[01], 14.05.2012). A ward administrator interviewed in Lindi observed that 'participants of the Village Assembly proposed the names for CMC members and cast an open vote by a show of hands to elect the members from the proposed list' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). However, a local political office-bearer in Morogoro confirmed that whilst 'it is true that the selection of CMC members and leaders follows democratic processes' … 'the quorum is too high for the Village Assembly' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). As a consequence, although the responses from grassroots local government administrators, local political office bearers and the TASAF district officials confirmed that CMC members are elected through democratic processes, they also revealed that due to low participation in the Village Assemblies, members have, in many cases, been elected without the 70% quorum. This was confirmed in the findings of this investigation, presented in chapters which follow, which indicate that a 70% quorum is seldom achieved in CMC elections. This confirm the findings of Mmari et al. (2014, p.8), who found that the majority of households in their survey, along with a good number of village council members, did not attend the meetings where CMC members were elected. In light of this, they argue, 'the likelihood that CMC members were selected by less than 70% of the eligible voters […] is high' (Mmari et al, 2004, p.9).

A review of TASAF guidelines reveals that there are no specific educational requirements for CMC members, apart from the general expectation that they should know how to read and write. A TASAF official maintained that the omission of educational criteria was unavoidable because projects target poor communities and vulnerable groups, whose members are unlikely to have attained higher levels of education (TMU official[01] 14.05.2014). Local government officials, local political office bearers and the CMC members themselves in all three case-study municipalities confirmed that the majority of CMC members are people with low levels of education. A councillor in Tanga, for example, stated that 'most of the TASAF CMC members are un-educated and illiterate' (Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014). This supports the findings of previous studies which reported low levels of education among CMC members. Research by Mmari et al. (2014),

for example, found that the education level of the majority of CMC members does not exceed primary school and, by implication, that some members are unable to read or comprehend project transactions.

The low education levels of members may influence the capacity of CMCs to deliver services to their communities. This is because the skills members bring to a committee when elected have a bearing on the capacity and performance of that CMC. Reflective of this, CMC members indicated that the low levels of education of most of their members had created a dependence on a few knowledgeable and skilled individuals when making decisions pertaining to project implementation. A CMC member in Tanga stated:

> …our project committee mostly depended on the expertise and experience of a retired public servant who served as a Chairman in the project committee and the continuous support from TASAF District Coordinator. Our Chairman was highly skilled in engineering and public projects management but the rest of us were laymen (CMC member, Tanga 14.08.2014).

This dependence on a few educated and skilled members and the TASAF District Coordinator raises the possibility of elite capture of project resources for personal gains. The suggestions of more educated members and/or the District Coordinator tend to be accepted uncritically by less educated members, thereby running the risk that they might be motivated by self-interest. A concern of this nature was raised in the study by Mmari et al. (2014, p.10) which found that as there was uneven capacity in CMCs the process of consensual decision-making was undermined. This was because less educated CMC members were unable to critically evaluate proposals made by TASAF officials in implementing the committee's mandates, and this served to support their hegemony over the form and operations of a project.

The type of capacity-building carried out for CMCs by TASAF also determines the extent to which committees are able to support community-based projects and to engage productively with local government institutions. According to TASAF officials who participated in the focus group discussions in the case-study areas, and corroborated by TASAF documents and manuals, CMC members received training from the Fund in the following areas: project budgeting; the management of sub project financial transactions including initiating, approval of payment and withdrawing money from bank; simple book keeping and procurement management; and report writing skills (TMU official[02]

14.05.2012). As shall be seen in subsequent chapters, these training interventions did yield results and the skills gained contributed to the success of CMCs in many projects.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how both national and international factors contributed to the current programme of local government reform, with its policy of D-by-D supported by the deconcentrated administrative involvement of TASAF. The hybrid nature of the decentralisation model in Tanzania is evident in the interconnectedness of decentralised and deconcentrated forms of administration in local governments. Viewed through the lens of geo-political and institutional theories, the chapter concludes that the current configuration of decentralisation in Tanzania has been shaped both by the concerns of Western donors in advancing a neo-liberal agenda and internal realities in the Tanzanian political economy such as the economic crisis, high levels of poverty, poor service delivery, and domestic political considerations. The next chapter further expands on the impact of TASAF capacity-building interventions in enabling LGAs to deliver services and engage the people.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides information on the demography, economic, political, and administrative features of Tanzania and the three case-study municipalities (Tanga City, Morogoro District and Lindi District) which form the focus of this study. It also provides an overview of the methodology adopted in conducting fieldwork for this investigation and the method of data analysis employed.

5.2 Background to the country and study areas

5.2.1 Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania comprises the formerly independent countries of Tanganyika (currently mainland Tanzania) and Zanzibar (made up of Unguja and Pemba islands). Tanganyika gained independence from British colonial rule in 1961 and Zanzibar gained independence from the Oman Sultanate following a revolution in 1963. The two countries were united in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanzania covers a land area of 945,203 km² (inclusive of inland waters) and borders Kenya and Uganda to the north; Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (across Lake Tanganyika) to the west; Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south; and the Indian Ocean in the east. Administratively the country is divided into 30 regions, 25 of which are on the mainland and five in Zanzibar (URT, 2013a). Dodoma is the capital city while Dar es Salaam remains the commercial centre and home to most government ministries and international institutions such as diplomatic missions (URT, 2015). Tanzania is a multi-ethnic country which, on the mainland, is comprised of some 120 ethnic groups, none of which make up more than 10% of the total population (ibid). Kiswahili is the national language and is widely used as an official language, followed by English as a second official language.

According to the 2012 national census, Tanzania had a population of 44.9 million (URT, 2013a) of whom 43,625,434 lived on the mainland (URT, 2013a, 2013c). Reflective of rapid population growth (2.7% per annum), this figure is three times the size recorded in

the first post-independence population census in 1967 (Agwanda & Amani, 2014, p. v). The average population density which is 51 persons per km^2, varies across regions (URT, 2013c) with the majority (77%) living in the rural areas where farming is the main economic activity (Dungumaro & Hyden, 2010). The economy relies heavily on agriculture, which accounts for about 50% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and employs about 80% of the working population. Other sectors, which include mining and tourism, have recently begun to record significant growth (URT, 2011a).

Mainland Tanzania is a unitary state' (URT, 1998) with a two-tiered system of government comprised of central and local government administrations. The central government system is made up of ministries, independent departments, executive agencies and regional administrations (commonly known as regional secretariats). Local governments in Tanzania include cities, municipalities, towns, districts, township authorities and village councils (URT, 1998, p. 22). LGAs are classified as either rural authorities (district councils and township authorities) or urban authorities (city, municipal and town councils) under the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982 and the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982 respectively, as amended from time to time. Local government is not a union matter, hence different local government systems and institutions exist in Zanzibar and these fall outside the scope of this study. As of November 2014, Tanzania had 168 LGAs. Of these, 36 are urban councils (five city councils, 18 municipal councils and 13 town councils); and 132 are rural councils (or district councils, as they are commonly known).

Due to constraints of time and financial resources, this study was carried out in mainland Tanzania and the scope of the research was limited to three municipalities, two rural (Morogoro District Council in the Morogoro Region, and Lindi District Council in Lindi Region) and one urban (Tanga City Council in the Tanga Region).[31] The location of the case-study areas is shown in the map in Figure 5.1 below. In addition to the fact that TASAF special projects are being implemented in all three of these local councils, they were purposively selected on the basis of variations in their resource base, rural/urban variations, and poverty levels. In addition being one of the primary urban centres in the country, Tanga City in the North East was included due to the researcher's prior work experience in the region. Morogoro, in the centre of the country, is a densely populated

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[31] See also Selltiz, 1962, p. 50; Kothari, 2004, p. 3 for detailed explanation of the economy of methods.

rural region, whilst Lindi was selected due to its remoteness in southern Tanzania and its high levels of poverty. Key statistics relating to each of case-study areas are presented in Table 5.1 below, followed by a brief description of each municipality in the sections that follow.

Figure 5.1: Map of Tanzania showing regions and case-study areas

Source: Tanzania in Figures 2014

Table 5.1: Key statistics for case-study municipalities 2013

Variable	Tanga	Morogoro	Lindi
Year of establishment	1891		1953
Land area (km^2)	600	11,925	6,623
Population			
Population size	273,332	286,248	194,143
Annual population growth rate (%)	1.2	2.6	0.6
Population density (persons/km^2)	475	23	28.1
Average household size	4.4	4.2	3.7
Administrative units			
Number of constituencies	1	2	2
Number of divisions	4	6	9
Number of wards	24	31	31
Number of villages	23	151	140
Number of *Mitaa*	68	-	-
Number of vitongoji (hamlets)	130	746	748
Health service facilities			
Hospitals	1	0	1
Health centres	4	6	6
Dispensaries	29	44	41
Primary health indicators			
Under five mortality rate (U5MR)	15/1000	11/1000	17/1000
Infant mortality rate (IMR)	-	21	11
Maternal mortality rate (MMR)	398/100,000	-	152/100,000
Education service facilities			
Primary schools	79	148	113
Classrooms (primary school)	677	824	633
Secondary schools	26	28	23
Classrooms (secondary school)	425	241	172
Education indicators			
Primary school enrolment = n(%)	8,989 (99.98)	6157(100)	37,615
Secondary school enrolment = n(%)	4505 (100)	8355(100)	4,215 (100)
Pupils passed primary school leaving exams = n(%)	4,266 (68)	2,217(33.4)	1,112 (31)
Students passed Form IV (secondary) exams = n(%)	1,680 (50)	2,556(41)	224 (21)
Water services			
Proportion of population accessing potable water within less than 1Km (%)[32]	-	65.0	50.6

Source: Compiled by the author from LGA reports and national statistics

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[32] 'Within less than 1km' was used in many previous national surveys, although the national water policy sets 'within 400 metres' from the household as an access indicator (Ministry of Water and Livestock Development, WaterAid - Tanzania with Eastern Africa Statistical Training Centre, & National Bureau of Statistics, 2002).

5.2.2   Tanga City Council

Located on the Indian Ocean in the north-east of mainland Tanzania, the port City of Tanga is an old colonial township, the Germans having established a district office in the locality in 1891, and it was subsequently designated a 'township' in the Deustch Ost Afrika colony. It remained a municipal council until June 2006, when it gained city status and it is now administered by a city council. Tanga City, which has a land mass of 600 km^2 and is one of 11 LGAs in the Tanga region, borders Muheza District in the west and south, Mkinga District in the north west and the Indian Ocean in the east. It is 354km north of Dar es Salaam and about 250km south of Mombasa in neighbouring Kenya. Tanga City is accessible by road, flight and rail from Dar es Salaam, and neighbouring regions and municipalities. The city serves as the administrative and commercial centre for Tanga region and is the second largest port in Tanzania. It is also the headquarters of the Tanga region.

According to the population and housing census of 2012, Tanga has a population of 273,332, of whom 47.9% are male 52.1% are female (URT, 2013a). The city has both urban and peripheral rural communities. The majority of the population (80.9%) live in the urban areas with remainder (19.1%) living in the rural peripheries. The population growth rate of 1.2% and the household size of 4.4 remained unchanged in the inter-censal period between 2002 and 2012. The city has a population density of 475 people per km^2 and a dependency ratio of 39% (61% of the population are economically active people between the ages 15 and 64 years).

Administratively, Tanga City Council is located within one national constituency, but in terms of its own area of jurisdiction it is divided into 24 wards, 68 *mitaa* (neighbourhoods), 23 villages, and 130 *vitongoji* (hamlets). It is headed by an elected Mayor and an appointed city director as CEO and accounting officer. Tanga City Council comprises 35 councillors, including one elected councillor from each ward, women appointed as special seat councillors, and 1 MP representing the national constituency. The council currently includes representatives from both the ruling *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) party and the opposition Civic United Front (CUF).

It was estimated that the annual per capita income of a person living in Tanga in 2011 was about Tsh.886,343 (US $587). Such a low level of income is attributable to the decline of industrial activities (sisal and manufacturing industries) in the region and

reduced harbour activities, all of which led to a rise in unemployment. In addition, due to limited resources and expertise the local community has been unable to exploit existing opportunities, especially natural resources (fishing and fertile lands), bank services and tourism attractions, has also contributed to low income levels. Low purchasing power has also hindered their access to basic social and economic services. It is noted, for example, that a significant number fail to access health services due to the cost-sharing requirement, which is estimated at one dollar a person per annum.

In terms of education services, in 2013 Tanga City Council had 97 primary schools of which 79 were public and 18 were private. The public primary schools had 47652 students, of which 23435 were boys and 24,217 were girls (Tanga City Council Primary Education Department, 2013). These schools were served by 1,227 teachers, of whom 270 men and 957 were women. In 2013 6261 pupils sat for the national primary school leaving examinations, of whom 4269 students (64.6%) passed. The recorded ratio of text books to pupils in primary schools was 1:3 by 2013, which suggests some improvements over the ratio of 1:6 in 2010.

Tanga City Council has 42 secondary schools, of which 26 are government schools and 16 are private. There are 17843 students in the government secondary schools (9277 boys and 8666 girls). Twenty-one of the government secondary schools are day schools and five are boarding schools. The City Council achieved an enrolment rate of 100% among secondary school students in 2013, of whom 5547 students were enrolled in form one classes.[33]

In terms of health services, Tanga City has 34 public health facilities including a hospital, four health centres and 29 dispensaries. There are also 19 private health facilities including five privately owned health centres and 14 dispensaries. The ratio of doctors to patients is 1:2,314 compared to the national threshold of 1:23000. The city's hospital to patient ratio is 1:133,048 which suggests an improvement over the national threshold of 1:200000. The ratio of dispensaries to population is 1:6948, which is within the national threshold range of 1:5000–10000. The city's ratio of people to health centre is 1:33968, which is much lower than the national threshold of 1:50000 and suggests a significant improvement. The under-five mortality rate (U5MR) for Tanga is 15/1000 while the maternal mortality rate (MMR) rate stands at 398/100000.

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[33] Data from the Tanga City Council Secondary Education Department, 2013.

In peri-urban and rural areas the provision of water services is the responsibility of the city council, and in urban areas, it is the responsibility of the Tanga Urban Water Authority (Tanga UWASA). Tanga has abundant water sources from the Zigi River. The maximum water processing capacity is 42000m^3 per day, while daily demand is 26,000m^3. Currently, Tanga UWASA supplies water to 99% of the urban population and to some village areas where a water network is available. Tanga City Council provides water services to 79% of the rural and peri-urban population living far from the Tanga UWASA water supply network. The rural communities of Tanga City get water from wells and natural springs.

5.2.3   Morogoro District Council

Morogoro District Council is among seven LGAs in the Morogoro region. The district is located in the north east of Morogoro and borders Bagamoyo and Kisarawe districts to the east; Kilombero district to the south, and Mvomero district to north and west. Morogoro District Council has a land area of 11925.75km^2. According to the latest 2012 census, the population of Morogoro is 286,248 of whom 140,824 (49%) are males and 145424 (51%) are females (URT, 2013a).

Administratively, Morogoro District Council is divided into six divisions, 31 wards, 151 villages and 746 *vitongoji* (hamlets). It is headed by a Council Chairwoman and a DED as a chief executive officer and accounting officer. The District Council has two parliamentary constituencies, namely Morogoro North and Morogoro South. It has 39 councillors of whom 35 are from the ruling party (CCM) and four from the opposition party (CHADEMA). Among the 39 councillors, 29 are elected ward representatives and 10 are appointed special seats councillors. As required by law, the MPs for the two national constituencies in Morogoro District are also members of the council. Morogoro was among the districts included in the first phase of local government reform and TASAF.

The economy of Morogoro district is predominantly based on agriculture, with 82% of the adult population deriving their livelihoods from subsistence farming, 6% from business operations, 6% from elementary occupations, 4% from office work and 1.3% from livestock keeping. The major food crops grown include maize, paddy, cassava and sorghum, whereas the main cash crops are cotton and sisal plus vegetables, spices and tropical fruits (PMO-RALG, 2012). The district has extensive arable lands with fertile

soils and about 75321ha is suitable for a variety of crops.The per capita income of the residents of Morogoro district is estimated at Tshs.454376 (US$ 302) per annum.

In terms of primary education services, the Morogoro District Council has 149 primary schools. Of these 148 are public and one is a private school owned by a missionary organization. The District Council has witnessed fluctuations in pupil numbers with 60085 enrolled in 2010, 61423 in 2011, 61131 in 2012, 54415 in 2013 and 53712 in 2014. Although by no means the worst resourced education sector in the country (the current book-student ratio, for example, is 1:1, meaning that each student has access to a book in each subject), pass rates in the primary school leaving examinations (PSLE) have poor in recent years due to a variety of factors. These include a shortage of teachers, lack of adequate and good quality infrastructure and low levels of interest among parents to oversee the development of their children. In 2013 only 33.4% of the 6631 pupils who sat for the PSLE passed.

In terms of secondary education, Morogoro District Council has 29 secondary schools, of which 28 are public and one is owned by the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF). The TPDF school is the only one in the district that offers advanced-level secondary education (i.e. Form V and VI). Levels of secondary school enrolment in the Morogoro District Council have also fluctuated due to such factors as an inability to pay school fees and other financial contributions, student pregnancies, and early marriages. Student achievements in the secondary school Form IV examinations have been below average for some time and in 2013 on 41% of the 6300 students who sat for the Form IV secondary examination passed; however, this is an increase over the 28% who passed in 2011.

With regard to health services, Morogoro District Council has 60 dispensaries of which 44 are public facilities, four are owned by parastatal organisations, and 12 are privately owned. It also has six public health centres and two privately owned health centres. The Morogoro District Council does not have a district hospital. The Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) was recorded at seven deaths among 14628 women in 2013, which is an improvement from the previous 13 deaths among 10307 women in 2010. The Under 5 Mortality Rate (U5MR) in 2013 was 11/1000, which is an improvement over the previous rate of 23/1000 in 2010. However, the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) of 21/1000 in 2013 represented is an increase over the previous rate of 3/1000 in 2010. The main challenges

facing the health sector in Morogoro District Council include a shortage of qualified medical staff, shortages and delayed supplies of medicines from the government's medical stores department, and an acute shortage of staff houses.

About 52% of the population have access to clean water for domestic use, accessed from various sources, including gravity schemes, deep and shallow wells and dams. The council has 79 gravity schemes, 178 operating shallow wells, and nine working deep wells that use electrical pumps.

5.2.4 Lindi District Council

The Lindi District Council is among the oldest local authorities in mainland Tanzania and was first established in 1953 as the Lindi Native Authority. In 1984 the Lindi District Council was officially established under the Local Government (District Authority) Act No. 7 of 1982. Lindi District is located in the south-east of Tanzania and borders the Indian Ocean to the east, Kilwa to the north, Newala, Tandahimba and Mtwara districts to the south and Masasi and Ruangwa districts to the west. It is one of six councils in Lindi region and covers an area of 6623km^2. Administratively, Lindi District Council is divided into two national constituencies, 30 wards and 140 villages. The Lindi District Council is headed by a council chairman and the DED as chief executive officer and accounting officer. It comprises 41 councillors, among whom 30 are elected members representing the existing number of wards, 11 women appointed as special seats councillors, and the MPs for the Mtama and Mchinga constituencies.

The population of Lindi is comprised of three main ethnic groups, namely the Mwera, Makonde and Makua, although smaller ethnic groups like the Ngindo and Matumbi also live in the area. The population according to the 2012 census is 194143 people. The district has 52471 households with an average household size of 3.7. The population growth rate is 0.6% and population density is 28.1 people per km^2.

Lindi is considered to have amongst the worst levels of poverty in the region and it is estimated that about half of the rural population live below the poverty line. The current per capita income is estimated at Tsh. 574282 (equivalent to US$380). The main productive sectors are agriculture, livestock, manufacturing, mining and natural resources. Others include fishing, forestry, tourism and beekeeping although the majority of people depend on agriculture as their main economic activity. The contribution of the

agricultural sector is estimated at 75% of the total GDP of the district, employing about 84% of the total population. The major cash crops are cashew nuts, sesame, coconut and groundnuts and the main food crops are maize, paddy, cassava, sorghum and legumes. Despite being the main economic activity for most households in Lindi, agricultural productivity remains low due to a reliance on small-scale farming and hand tools (District Agricultural Development Department, 2013).

In 2013 the available health facilities in the municipality fell below World Health Organisation (WHO) standards (Lindi District Council 2014). The district has a hospital, six health centres and 41 dispensaries, but not all are in good condition owing to inadequate maintenance. Since the national standards require one health centre in each ward and one dispensary in every village, the district has a shortage of 25 health centres and 99 dispensaries. Lindi has an MMR of 152/100000, a U5MR of 17/1000 and an IMR of 11/1000 (Lindi District Council 2014).

In terms of education, Lindi has a total of 113 public primary schools and no private primary schools. The district has 633 classrooms, which represents 60% of the required number for the district (Lindi District Council 2014). The total enrolment in primary schools as of 2014 was 39798, reflecting an increase of 13.9% over the figures for 2010. The ratio of teachers to primary school pupils is 1:39, which is higher than the standard national ratio of 1:40. Although there appears to be no shortage of primary school teachers in the district, just 31% of the 3533 pupils who sat for the PSLE in 2014 passed the exam and this figure is lower than the 36% who passed in 2010.

At the secondary level, Lindi has 23 public secondary schools and 4 private schools. The current secondary education enrolment rate (Form I–IV) is 1233 students, which is a 39.3% drop from the 2033 students who enrolled in 2010. Secondary education enrolment has declined each year since 2010 due to the decreasing throughput of pupils continuing to secondary school from primary school. Since 2010, the number of girls enrolled in secondary schools remained at, or less than, 40% of the total enrolment. The district has 172 secondary classrooms, which represents 75% of the required number, and 209 secondary education teachers, which represents a shortfall of 35% of the required number. Reflective of the shortage of teachers, just 21% of the pupils of the 1070 students who sat for the Form IV examination in 2014, 21% passed. This represents part

of a downward annual trend from 2010 when 42% of 1493 pupils who sat for exams passed.

The main sources of domestic water in Lindi are boreholes, shallow wells and surface water (rivers and springs); the water from rivers and shallow wells is generally polluted (Lindi District Council (LDC), 2014). About 49.3% of the population in Lindi receive their water from the available 287 water schemes, including shallow wells, boreholes, gravity schemes, rainwater harvesting, and hand-dug wells. Shallow wells and boreholes appear to be the main source of water in this district as they supply water to about 72500 people, which is almost 36.6% of the population. About 33 of the 138 villages in the area have no access to clean and safe water at all (LDC, 2014, p. 28). While the national water policy of 2002 stipulates that the number of people served with clean water in the rural areas should reach 65% of the population by 2015, Lindi at 45% still falls far below that target (ibid).

Having provided a background to the demography and socio-economic and administrative characteristics of the case-study areas, the sections which follow will provide details on the methodology employed in conducting fieldwork for this thesis.

5.3   Research methodology

5.3.1   Research design

The fieldwork conducted for this study was based on a mixed-methods approach, which made use of both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies in a bid to overcome the weaknesses inherent in a single-method approach. In that respect it follows Jick's (1979) contention that qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as opposing methodologies. Following Scrimshaw (1990) the choice of a mixed-methods approach also aimed to ensure the validity and reliability of the results. While qualitative methods appear to be more accurate in terms of ensuring validity, and quantitative methods are better in terms of ensuring reliability or replicability, combining the two can optimise both the validity and reliability of the findings (Morse & Niehaus, 2009). The terms validity and reliability basically refer to the meaningfulness, accuracy and credibility of the research findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). Validity thus suggests taking the necessary measures to ensure that the conclusions or inferences drawn from the data are warranted, while reliability suggests

the possibility of yielding similar responses if the same investigation was to be repeated. The production of valid and reliable knowledge in an ethical manner is central to the usefulness of any empirical investigation (Merriam & Merriam, 2009).

The mixed-methods data collection process employed assisted in answering the primary research questions posed in the study; it did so by generating the detailed evidence necessary to illustrate the outcomes of administrative decentralisation in Tanzania. It has was also of relevance in operationalising and validating the three theories employed in the investigation.

As part of the mixed-methods approach, the study was conducted in three overlapping phases: a preliminary phase, an exploratory qualitative/quantitative phase; and finally, a confirmatory phase. Together these ran over nine months, from October 2013 to April 2015. The following section describes these phases in detail.

5.4 Phases of study

5.4.1 Preliminary phase (October–November 2013)

The first phase involved short preliminary visits to the relevant authorities in the capital Dar es Salaam and in the study areas, to familiarize the researcher with the research areas and specific procedures governing research activities, to collect relevant available secondary data, and to test the qualitative research instrument by conducting informal interviews with a few selected local council officials. Important primary and secondary documents were also collected and reviewed during this phase. These included council strategic plans, mid-term expenditure framework plans and budgets, local council profiles, structures and composition, and TASAF operational manuals and other related documents.

The procedure and criteria for the selection of wards and villages to be studied were also developed in this phase. The researcher also established the obligatory compliance procedures for the requisition of research permits from relevant authorities, including the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH), regional administration and LGAs. Overall, this phase provided invaluable information on the institutional configuration of decentralised service delivery, as well on the ethical procedures governing the conducting of research in Tanzania.

5.4.2   Exploratory qualitative/quantitative phase (January–August 2014)

The second (exploratory qualitative/quantitative) phase involved quantitative surveys and in-depth qualitative investigations. Citizen surveys were conducted in the three case-study local councils, covering the wards and villages identified in the first phase. In-depth key informant interviews and focus group discussions also took place with central government officials from the ministry responsible for local government, regional administrators, the TASAF Management Unit (TMU), local government officials and local political office bearers, and other non-state actors, especially officials from ALAT.

However, it is worth noting that the timing of the data collection, particularly in Lindi region, may have influenced peoples' perceptions of and interest in public affairs. The citizen survey in Lindi was conducted at a time when there were tensions between residents of the southern regions of Lindi and Mtwara and the government over the issue of gas extraction in these regions and the decision to construct a gas pipeline to Dar es Salaam. Their concern was that whilst the whole country, and especially Dar es Salaam, would enjoy the benefits of the gas extracted, the regions of Lindi and Mtwara, which already suffered from a shortage of basic services and had poverty levels higher than the national norm, would receive no compensation from the proposed development (Karugendo, 2013). In particular, they believed that they would receive little benefit if the gas was transported to Dar es Salaam rather than being processed in the areas where it was extracted (Msuya, 2013)

Another factor that might potentially have influenced respondents' perceptions was that the period between March and June is a season of heavy rain in southern Tanzania. The damage caused to basic service infrastructure by floods led to road closures and considerable inconvenience to local communties.[34] Transport hardships and the limited access to other service centres experienced by Lindi residents during data collection period may have influenced their perceptions about the performance of local governments in delivering services to the people.

5.4.3   Confirmatory qualitative study (February–April 2015)

The third phase of the field research was a confirmatory qualitative exploration which was intended to clarify and validate information obtained in the qualitative and

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[34] In Somanga, where the roads were badly damaged by floods, the researcher was among travellers trapped for two days following road closures.

quantitative research. It was also used to reach those respondents who were not contacted in the second phase in-depth qualitative interviews, including officials from the World Bank Tanzania country office in Dar es Salaam. Of particular value in this exercise was the manner in which council administrators, regional officials, donor agency officials and local communities reacted to the citizen survey findings which were presented to them. In Lindi District Council, for example, participants in focus group discussions confirmed that the findings on citizen perceptions of the performance of the local council were realistic and that they did not differ much from the actual performance reported in government documents. The qualitative data obtained during this phase complemented the survey and qualitative data collected in the previous phase.

5.5   Data collection methods

5.5.1   Qualitative data collection

The qualitative research in this investigation aimed 'to produce a detailed and systematic recording' (Burnard, 1991) of issues around the three themes intended to assess the impact of administrative decentralisation on local government, namely: strengthening the capacity of local government, improving service delivery, and enhancing citizen participation.

Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were the methods used in the generation of qualitative data. Key informant interviews were guided by a schedule of open-ended (unstructured) questions which allowed for more detailed responses and probing. Subject to the consent of respondents, interviews were recorded in audio form. Where consent was not forthcoming, or where the researcher presumed this might be so, responses were recorded manually. The key informants interviewed included local government officials, local political office bearers, members of CMCs and ordinary residents in local communities. Also included were central government ministry officials from the PMO-RALG, regional administration officials in Tanga, Morogoro and Lindi, and non-state actors including officials from ALAT and a donor agency.

Focus group discussions were conducted with local government officials, community leaders and beneficiaries of TASAF projects. The homogeneity of focus groups was maintained by separating programme beneficiaries from community leaders or programme officials and, whenever possible, people from close or nearby communities

formed a group to maintain group cohesion. Focus group discussions allowed for exploration of additional information and the validation of the responses obtained through interviews and surveys. Three focus group discussions of six to ten persons each were conducted in each case district. For each group the researcher lead the discussion as a moderator, assisted by one or two assistant moderators. In the group discussion sessions, a facilitation guide with key topics directed the focus to specific issues.

5.5.2 Quantitative data collection

Quantitative surveys were conducted in each of the case-study areas as a means to assess citizen perceptions of the quality of service delivery and their ability to participate and influence decision-making and policy processes. The survey instrument used in the study was based on the well-tested Afro-barometer questionnaire (reported in their publication *The quality of democracy and governance in Tanzania*) (REPOA & Michigun State University (MSU), 2012; Aiko et al., 2015), and the service delivery survey questionnaire utilised by the University of the Western Cape's African Centre for Citizenship and Democracy (ACCEDE).

In each locality the researcher recruited and trained field assistants (4 in total) to implement the survey instrument (a questionnaire); this included familiarising them with the objectives of the study, providing them key interviewing skills, and alerting them to the ethical requirements of the study. These assistants were secondary school teachers and recent university graduates who had knowledge of surveys and who had served as enumerators in the national population census in the study areas. Two fieldworkers were recruited in Tanga, one in Morogoro and one in Lindi. The questionnaire was piloted during the field training of enumerators in the *Mtaa* (neighbourhood) of Kisosora and in the village of Kasera in the Mkwakwani area of Tanga. Following this, some adjustments, including changes in terminology, were made to the survey instrument.

The questionnaire was designed by the researcher in English, and thereafter translated into Kiswahili, which is the language most spoken in Tanzania. This was done to maintain a common understanding between the researcher, survey enumerators and the ordinary citizens surveyed. The researcher did most of the translation, which was reviewed by three other persons (including an expert in linguistics and an experienced interpreter) to ensure retention of the meaning of the original English version and the adoption of appropriate formal Swahili vocabulary in the field of governance.

The questionnaire was printed in both English and Swahili so that it could be administered to respondents speaking either language; thus, a question in Swahili was presented first, followed by an English interpretation in italics. This enabled enumerators to directly question speakers of either language. This helped to minimize problems relating to onsite translation (translating during interviews), the distortion of meaning, taboo vocabulary, and the wasting of respondents' time while looking for another script in a different language. The literature confirms that the quality and comparability of data is likely to be compromisd when the flow and pace of an interview is disrupted by onsite translation (Grootaert, 2004).

5.5.3   Sampling and sample size

Basing on the mixed-methods adopted, a multi-stage sampling procedure was used in this study. In the first place, three LGAs, namely, Tanga City Council, Morogoro District Council, and Lindi District Council were selected purposively. Five wards were also identified from each study area. The survey sample was based on the random selection of elements from the general population in each of the three research areas. A sample size of 400 respondents was selected for the survey, calculated from the total population of 753,723[35] people in the three case districts, at a confidence level of 95% and with a confidence interval (margin of error) of 5% and a response distribution of 50%. The sample was selected proportionally according to the population size of each of the three municipalities as follows: Lindi 100, Morogoro 150, and Tanga 150. A 'systematic' (N[th] name) sampling technique was applied to select respondents.

Based on a municipality's proportion of the total sample size, three villages were randomly selected in each of the five wards in Tanga and Morogoro, and two villages in each ward in Lindi. As the villages and *Mitaa* in each of the wards were of equal size, the sample size was divided equally among villages and *Mitaa.* Thus, approximately 10 households were randomly selected for the study in each village and one participant from each household was interviewed. The recommendation to field assistants was that they should administer the questionnaire to the head of household or to any other household member aged eighteen and above. The questionnaire was administered to individual residents on a face-to-face basis until all the residents had completed the questionnaire. Table 2.5 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of citizens surveyed, including

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[35] Tanzania 2012 Census data (URT, 2013a).

sex, age, and education level. Overall, about 55.2% of respondents were men and 44.8% were women. The plan was to have equal numbers of men and women respondents in the sample and, coincidentally, only an insignificant variation was observed across the study areas surveyed.

In terms of age, more than a third of respondents were between the ages of 18 and 30 (43.2%) and further third (38.0%) were between 31 and 45 years old. The mean age of respondents was 36.2 years. The plan was to interview people who had attained the voting age of 18 and consequently a high percentage of respondents fell within the economically active age group. In terms of education, significant variations were recorded in the educational levels of respondents in different municipalities. In Tanga (50.7%) and Morogoro (54.0%) a small majority had secondary education, while Lindi only (42%) had progressed beyond primary education. Moreover, a higher proportion of respondents in Lindi (23%) had no formal education than was the case in Tanga (8%), or Morogoro all had had some formal education.

Table 5.2: Demographics of survey respondents (N=400)

Variable	Categories	Tanga (n=150)	Morogoro (n=150)	Lindi (n=100)	Total (N=400)
Sex	Male	83	87 (58.0%)	51	221 (55.2%)
	Female	67	63 (42.0%)	49	179 (44.8%)
Age	18–30 years	72	90 (60.0%)	11	173 (43.2%)
	31–45 years	41	50 (33.3%)	61	152 (38.0%)
	46–60 years	25	4 (2.7%)	21	50 (12.5%)
	61+ years	12	6 (4.0%)	7 (7.0%)	25 (6.2%)
	Mean age (years)	35.6	30.9	41.2	36.2
Education level	No formal education	12	-	23	35 (8.75%)
	Primary education	39	57 (38.0%)	57	153
	Secondary education	76	81 (54.0%)	19	176 (44.0%)
	University graduates	23	12 (8.0%)	1 (1.0%)	36 (9.0%)

Note: Figures in brackets are percentages

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

5.6 Data analysis

Quantitative data generated in the study was analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Statistics) computer software. Field data from the questionnaires was coded and captured to create a database for statistical analysis, and summary frequencies were run to check the completeness and accuracy of data. The analysis of survey data was based on descriptive statistics.

Qualitative data collected from interviews and focus group discussions were analysed by using a thematic content analysis (framework analysis) method with the assistance of the ATLAS.ti computer aided qualitative data analysis software programme. In analysing the data the researcher first listened and assigned titles to the recorded audio files immediately after the interview or focus group discussion was completed. The title or names of the files indicated the type of data (whether interview or focus group discussion responses), the place of collection, and the date of data collection. The researcher applied the same method to the field book where interview/focus group discussion data was manually recorded. This was done in order to guide the transcription of the audio data, and the referencing of qualitative data in the thesis. It also assisted in ensuring proper identification of data to the source and avoided the mixing up responses. The audio data was then transcribed and saved in Microsoft Word files.

The next step was to create an ATLAS.ti project in the computer and load the transcripts containing qualitative data into it as primary documents. The researcher then read and re-read the transcripts in the ATLAS.ti project and assigned codes (short names) describing the kind of information contained in a particular sentence or paragraph of interest in relation to the main themes of the study. The process of coding was repeated for all transcripts. At the end of the coding process, a total of 26 codes were generated across all transcripts. After this, the researcher created code families based on the three conceptual themes: strengthening capacity, service delivery and citizen participation. Output reports of code families and quotations were then generated from the ATLAS.ti project and saved into the Microsoft Word files for analysis and report writing.

However, as a matter of design, and for ease of referencing data sources, the titles assigned to the transcripts, reflecting the acronym of the category of respondents, place and date of interview (for example, CMT member, Lindi 11.03.2015), were maintained when citing quotations in the text of this thesis. This was instead of the style commonly used in ATLAS.ti project (for example, P 1: [meaning primary document one]). The style of referencing qualitative data applied in this thesis sought to connect the quotations to their respective categories of respondents in order to aid both the researcher and his audience in making sense of them.

5.7   Research Ethics

This study complied fully with the ethical standards prescribed by the code of ethics of the University of the Western Cape. In that regard, the researcher was fully informed of his ethical responsibility towards maintaining intellectual honesty and professional integrity and of the need to take into consideration the expectations of the different respondents approached in the course of information gathering. Every effort was made to treat research participants with respect, to guard privileged information and to protect their identity from any possible harm or disadvantage that might arise from their disclosures to the researcher. Where interviews and discussions were concerned, all protocols were observed with regard to voluntary participation, to guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality, and to fully explaining the objectives of the research.

In the country of study, several permits had to be attained prior to conducting fieldwork. In the first place, the researcher applied for a research permit from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology and a research permit (number 2014-03-NA2014-03) was issued for the period from January 2014 to January 2015 (see Annexure 4). An extension to the permit was sought and obtained in January 2015 in order to proceed to the second phase of fieldwork from February 2015 to April 2015. The researcher also sought approval from the various government offices visited, including the ministry, regional administrations, LGAs in the areas of study, and the TMU (see Annexure 5).

Having provided an overview of the institutional arrangements in each case-study municipality, together with a summary of the key demographic characteristics of their populations, this chapter also discussed the research methodology employed in generating empirical evidence to test key research questions proposed for the study. The chapter which follows presents some of the findings of this fieldwork and, in particular, relating to respondents' perceptions of the extent to which administrative decentralisation had served to on strengthen the capacity of local government.

CHAPTER SIX

PERCEPTIONS ON THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION ON STRENGTHENING THE CAPACITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

6.1   Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of fieldwork conducted in each of case study areas and analyses the perceptions of key informants and ordinary citizens in regard to the effectiveness of Tanzania's hybrid model of decentralisation. The focus of the chapter is on the second primary research question of this investigation, namely the extent to which the interventions of TASAF are perceived to have strengthened the capacity of local government in the case study areas.

6.2   Perceived changes in local government resulting from the hybrid decentralisation reforms

Citizens surveyed in the study areas were asked what they perceived to be the major changes that had occurred in local governments since the introduction of the hybridised decentralisation reform process. Respondents were asked to rank the impact of the reforms on the three major themes developed for this study, namely, 'strengthening the capacity of LGAs', 'service delivery' and 'citizen participation'. Overall, as Table 6.1 below illustrates, increased citizen participation appears to be the major change perceived to have occurred (50% of respondents), followed by strengthening the capacity of local governments (29% of respondents) and service delivery (21% of respondents). However, the focus of the chapter, as indicated, is on the manner and extent to which the TASAF model of decentralisation has served to build the administrative capacity of local councils.

Table 6.1: Perceived change in local government authorities due to the hybrid decentralisation reforms (N=400)

Major themes	Percent	Sub-themes[36]	Percent
Citizen participation	50	More citizen engagement	32.9
		More decision making at the local level	9.3
		Deepened democracy	8.1
Strengthened LGAs capacity	29	LGAs capacity building	10.8
		More authority and responsibilities to local governments	9.8
		More resources to local governments	7.9
Service delivery	21	Improved services delivered to communities and the poor	14.5
		More development	6.7

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

In general, the findings in Table 6.1 suggest that respondents believed that TASAF has been fairly successful in strengthening citizen participation, but less influential in building the capacity of local councils, and in improving the provision of services by local councils. In order to understand why citizens ranked TASAF's ability to improve participation higher than its ability to strengthen the capacity of local government, it is necessary to determine their general perceptions of the capacity of municipalities.

6.3 Perceptions of the capacity of local government authorities

From interviews with the different categories of stakeholders in the decentralisation processes (central government ministry[37], TASAF, regional administrations, LGAs, the World Bank and ALAT), it is evident that they believe that local governments still face a number of capacity problems. These include limited financial and human resources, weak institutional structures, a lack of accountability and lack of commitment and seriousness in government business. World Bank officials interviewed in Dar es Salaam, for example, stated that 'government structures are weak and in most regular local government structures there is a lack of commitment, lack of accountability, and capacity issues' (World Bank official 23.03.2015). This line of argument was supported by TASAF officials, who stated that 'When we started the second phase of our programme, LGAs claimed to have the capacity to do everything but it was subsequently proved otherwise' (TMU official $_{01}$ 14.05.2014). Ministry officials from the PMO-RALG conceded that

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[36] Respondents were asked to choose any three sub-themes from the list.
[37] Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG)

'LGAs have an acute shortage of resources' and that there is a mismatch between the devolved functions and the available resources needed to carry them out (Ministry officials 11.06.2014; 12.06.2014). They also noted that the resources that are currently allocated to LGAs account for no more than a quarter of the national budget.

The lack of local capacity was confirmed by the local government officials and political office bearers, themselves, in all three case-study municipalities. A councillor in the Tanga City Council, for instance, declared that 'we are facing many financial problems in our City Council' (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014); this was a view shared by a ward official who stated that municipalities suffered from 'inadequate sources of revenue' (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014). In general, the interviews revealed that local government officials largely agreed with World Bank views on the weakness of local government (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014) as evident in a statement by a CMT member in Lindi who conceded that 'it is well known that most of our village governments have very low capacity' (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014). Interviews with local government officials also revealed that village governments frequently do not have funds to implement their day-to-day administrative functions because LGAs' resources have not been sufficiently devolved to grassroots institutions (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). This reality was confirmed by an *Mtaa* Chairman in Tanga, who observed that 'there is no money given to us by the City Council for office running' (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). A ward administrator in Lindi also observed that 'village chairmen are not paid salaries or any fringe benefits' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). However, the *Mtaa* chairman in Tanga stated that although village chairmen had not hitherto been paid salaries, the government had since begun paying them a monthly allowance of Tsh. 15–20,000 (about US$10). He nevertheless felt that this was insufficient compensation for all the work they do in their communities (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). Although unstated, a failure to pay or a tendency to underpay, local office bearers could affect their levels of commitment in serving their communities and this is reflected in a comment by a TASAF official that there was a lack of accountability to their communities on part of the village leaders (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014).

Local officials interviewed maintained that LGAs experienced shortages of both specialist and basic administrative staff. This is particularly challenging in the delivery of services to local communities, where interviews revealed that LGAs face an acute

shortage of VEOs and MEOs, leading to a single official being assigned more than five villages or *mitaa* (CMT Member Tanga 14.08.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 05.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). As a consequence of this, grassroots political office bearers maintained, VEOs and MEOs were unable to perform their duties effectively due to the large number of work stations assigned to them (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). It was stated that 'one MEO/VEO cannot adequately handle office responsibilities for all these *mitaa*/villages including holding village/*mtaa* assemblies in every quarter of a year' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014).

Local officials and politicians stated that efforts by the government to build the capacity of grassroots officials had been inadequate and a councillor in Morogoro maintained that 'it is true that at the village level we have capacity weaknesses with our leaders and executives…' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). Ward administrators stated that, apart from the councillors and WEOs who at least received some training from the LGA on various aspects of leadership, most village council leaders and their administrators have had little or no training at all in the running of government business (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). The *mtaa* administrator in Tanga, for example, claimed that 'I have never seen the village chairmen or VEOs attending training or seminars; and even when appointed or elected, they only assume responsibilities without orientation' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). Most grassroots political office bearers interviewed felt that there is an urgent need to build the capacity of local government in terms of human capital, finance and service infrastructure (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; Village Chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014).

6.4 Strengthening the capacity of local government authorities through decentralisation by devolution

Members of the CMT in all three case study municipalities expressed the view that decentralisation had simplified the administration of LGAs. Commenting on this, a CMT member in Lindi stated that 'in the past we used to accumulate a lot of functions here at the council but with the current model of decentralisation we are now somewhat relieved from much of the responsibilities for projects implementation and left with the supervision role' (CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014). This view reflects the outcome of the deconcentrated model of administration adopted by TASAF where citizens in their local

communities assume responsibility for the management of sub-projects in their localities (TASAF, 2005, 2013) and the various sector-specific bodies are responsible for managing sector-specific facilities; this is evident, in the water sector, where water services user bodies manage rural water facilities and reinforce cost sharing for water services (JMT, 2011, p. 189).

Officials interviewed in the case-study LGAs understood that by decentralising the ownership of service facilities to communities, the government was strengthening the capacity of local government to deliver the most needed public services (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; Lindi RA official 12.03.2015; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). A participant of a focus group discussion in Mikese ward in Morogoro noted that 'service facilities like primary and secondary schools, dispensaries and health centres are now owned by the local communities' (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). Ministry officials maintained that more financial and human resources are being assigned to local councils to strengthen their capacity to deliver services (Ministry official$_{02}$ 12.06.2014). However, whilst a grassroots administrator in Tanga supported the view that 'LGAs revenues have begun to increase because of decentralisation' (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014), other grassroots administrators maintained that the transfer of service delivery responsibilities to LGAs had resulted in significant increases in local governments' financial resources (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Local government leaders and officials interviewed in all three case-study municipalities stated that as part of the decentralisation programme the government had been allocating funds to their local council for capacity-building activities (Councillor Morogoro, 11.07.2014; CMT member Lindi, 05.05.2014; CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). Local councils have use these funds for the training of councillors and staff, professional career development, retooling and other capacity-building related activities (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). A WEO interviewed in Tanga acknowledged that 'the capacity of local government leaders – the councillors and ward executive officers – has been built' (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014), whilst a ward administrator in Lindi district stated that 'We were trained three times on participatory planning' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). The respondents added that as a result of the skills development programmes offered by the local councils in collaboration with PMO-RALG, 'the local people have begun to build trust in their leaders' (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014). However, as noted in the section above, it appears that most capacity-

building programmes were only provided up to the ward level only, and left out the village and *mtaa* leadership.

According to a variety of respondents, decentralisation has strengthened the capacity of LGAs to respond to poverty and in the words of one official:

> The discretionary grants and subsidies for income generating activities provided by the central government to LGAs under decentralisation have made it possible for the LGAs to respond to the needs of the various community self-help groups established for fighting income poverty (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014).

Local government officials and councillors pointed to the Women's Development Fund (WDF), that provides credit to women in all the local councils of mainland Tanzania, as one of these initiatives (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). The WDF is supported by the government through the National Gender Machinery complimented by the local councils (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 2005a). According to ward officials, LGAs contribute about 5% of their revenue to the WDF and manage the fund in their areas of jurisdiction (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). A statement by the Deputy Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children, quoted in the *Daily News*, that 'I urge all MPs who are also councillors in their respective councils to continue pushing the five per cent allocation to WDF' confirms this practice (*Tanzania Daily News*, 2012).

Councillors interviewed in the local councils maintained that D-by-D has had some positive impact but this is limited because the central government has not fully implemented the local government reform programme (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 02.05.2015; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). A councillor in Tanga City Council, for example, stated that 'the local government reform programme sponsored by the donors has not yielded big results, although I can't deny that the programme has had some positive impact' (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). Councillors in all three municipalities argued that many of the things that were planned for implementation in the LGRP have not yet been implemented, leaving much still to be achieved (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). *Mtaa* and village chairpersons interviewed felt that the government had not done enough to empower village councils and *mtaa* committees to undertake their responsibilities effectively (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). According to them, 'the D-by-D policy is more spoken than practiced' (*Mtaa* Chairman

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Tanga 15.08.2014). Grassroots administrators also felt that the government is doing very little to build the capacity of grassroots local government institutions (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014).

Councillors also stated that insufficient resources had been decentralised and that despite the fiscal constraints by LGAs the bulk of national revenue remains with the central government (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). According to these political office bearers, the Achilles' heel of decentralisation remains the inequitable formula used in resource allocation between the central government ministries and LGAs. The formula for the distribution of revenue from natural resources and from the industrial and commercial sectors, for example, gives little to local councils despite the fact that they are responsible for maintaining an environment conducive to industrial and commercial activities (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). A councillor in Morogoro observed:

> Just imagine the LGA located in a mineral rich area, expected to deliver all services effectively, i.e. health, education, roads, water to the people and investors, but given a peanut out of the proceeds from such natural resources. Is it really building the capacity or weakening the LGAs? (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

6.5 Impacts of administrative decentralisation on strengthening the capacity of local government authorities

This section seeks to establish how the TASAF model has helped in strengthening the capacity of local governments from the perspective of multiple stakeholders. Critics of social funds, as discussed earlier, maintain the view that the strengthening of local government capacity has not been a key objective of such programmes (Tendler, 2000). Some respondents, including Ministry and regional administration officials, held a similar view that strengthening the capacity of LGAs has never been the central objective of TASAF given that the fund was designed and piloted prior to the launch of the LGRP (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014; RA Morogoro 09.07.2014).

6.5.1 Financial support to the local government authorities' budgets

Officials and political office bearers generally believed that the administrative decentralisation of TASAF had helped to strengthen the financial capacity of local governments. A CMT member in Tanga stated that 'TASAF has strengthened local

government financial capacity by putting in place an alternative funding arrangement, taking into consideration that we [LGAs] continue to get little and delayed budgets from central government' (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). The participant of a CMT focus group in Lindi supported this view stating that 'TASAF has helped in areas where the Council failed to reach financially, like in building classrooms for secondary schools' (FGD CMT Lindi, 02.05.2014). Councillors in all three case-study municipalities confirmed this, maintaining that the administrative decentralisation system of TASAF has assisted the LGAs to secure financial support from the Fund in areas where they had an acute shortage of financial resources (Councillors Lindi 02.05.2014 & 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillors Tanga 21.03.2014 & 14.04.2014). A TASAF district official interviewed in Tanga stated that their interventions helped to boost the delivery of services through projects, especially in areas that were underfunded by LGAs' own revenue and discretionary grants from the central government such as the capacity-building grant (CBG) (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014). Maintaining the same view, TASAF district officials in Lindi and Morogoro stated that TASAF has provided working tools such as vehicles, computers and office equipment to LGAs in order to strengthen their capacity to deliver services (TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014).

Grassroots administrators in all the LGAs studied also believed that deconcentrated and targeted grants provided by TASAF have strengthened LGAs' financial capacity. Based on their own working experience, ward and village administrators interviewed asserted that TASAF had broadened the financial base of local governments and made it possible for them to access alternative funding for the installation of service infrastructure (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; WEO Tanga 21.03.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). The *Mtaa* executive officer in Tanga, for example, elaborated that 'when the council invested in constructing classrooms, TASAF funds could alternatively be used in building or rehabilitating health centres' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). This view was supported by the ward administrators, who were of the opinion that TASAF has empowered local councils by adding to their development investment efforts at the grassroots level (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). Respondents added that the economic interventions and productive income-generating safety net grants transferred by TASAF to LGAs strengthened their capacity to respond to poverty. The

grants had assisted in improving household income and had a big impact on the living standard of the beneficiary groups (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014).

Of significance was the fact that TASAF's support for strengthening LGAs' financial capacity was not limited to the higher-levels of local government but penetrated to the grassroots village and *mtaa* levels, boosting their financial position and empowering them to support local socio-economic development effectively. This was observed by almost all categories of respondents in the study. A ministry official stated that 'the TASAF funds are highly decentralised up to the village or community level' (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014) and this view was repeated during a focus group discussion at the PMO-RALG ministry, when participants maintained that 'the TASAF funds are highly controlled but more decentralised' (FGD PMORALG 12.06.2014). TASAF officials and World Bank staff maintained the same position when stating that in all its phases, TASAF has earmarked a certain percent of money that must be provided to village councils for supervision and monitoring of sub-projects, over and above funds for allocated for implementation of a specific project (TMU official 14.05.2014; World Bank official 23.03.2015). A CMT member in Lindi maintained that 'Since there is a certain percentage of money given to the village council for supervision of sub-projects, in one way or another, TASAF is also building the capacity of village councils'(CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014).

Ward and village administrators interviewed in all case-study municipalities confirmed that TASAF funds do reach the grassroots institutions (village councils and *mtaa* committees) (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). In that regard, a ward administrator in Tanga confirmed that a percentage of money earmarked for village councils '[have] been deposited into the village bank account and since there [were] no other funds for recurrent expenditure provided by the council, the TASAF grant thus remained the only fund available for the village council administration' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). The village and *mtaa* leadership all confirmed that they had received funding for the supervision of projects whenever their communities received funding from TASAF (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Village Chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). An *mtaa* chairman in Tanga, for example, stated that 'This system of TASAF is good because our *Mtaa* committee was given some money for supervision of the CMC in the construction of classrooms at MACECHU secondary school' (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). It was noted, that

money ring-fenced for monitoring and supervision activities became a discretional grant as soon as it was transferred to village councils and gave them far more decision-space than was normally the case with council projects. This was because the village and *mtaa* had full control of the monies transferred to them for the supervision of CMCs.

However, some councillors felt that, in the long term, the system of deconcentrated project funding provided by donors may serve to build effective local government because it does not give LGAs the autonomy to decide what to invest in to ensure efficient service delivery (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014). According to these councillors, LGAs' exercise far greater autonomy over their own sources of revenue than do so with TASAF grants (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 03.05.2014). This suggests that improving the collection of locally sourced revenues through a more effective tax system and various forms of public/private partnership would strengthen the capacity of LGAs to deliver local services and this would be more sustainable than a reliance on central government grants and donor funds. A further concern raised by a ministry official was that current TASAF funding system raised the risk that it could reduce the government's commitment to fiscal devolution (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014), and it would encourage the fungible use of donor funds (i.e. by not budgeting for priorities).

6.5.2 Supporting decentralisation by giving authority to formal local government institutions

It is worth noting that whilst respondents from the central government, local government, the World Bank and ALAT believed that TASAF has promoted decentralisation to the local communities, the communities surveyed indicated that although local government has been decentralised to some degree, it continues to be subject to interference by the central government. In contrast, TASAF officials claimed that even though their project has been deconcentrated to LGAs, it has successfully championed decentralisation agenda at the grassroots level (TMU official 14.05.2014), and it was stated that 'Although LGAs claim more devolution, they do not take it down to the grassroots as we do' (TMU official 14.05.2014). Ministry officials also conceded that 'TASAF committees might have a significant contribution in reinforcing decentralisation, although in a deconcentrated style' (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014). World Bank officials too, stated that TASAF has supported decentralisation by opting to not directly implement projects at the community level, but rather to engage the LGAs and communities to do it on their

behalf (World Bank official 23.03.2015). Councillors interviewed agreed that 'TASAF has helped to further decentralisation and to truly transfer authority and resources to the community members for implementation of projects' (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014).

To establish whether the hybrid model has effectively deepened decentralisation, ordinary citizens surveyed in the local communities were asked how they perceived the degree of decentralisation and local autonomy. The survey results in Table 6.1 below indicate that in both urban and rural settings, an insignificant proportion of respondents (<10%) perceived local government to be fully decentralised and autonomous. The majority of citizens in the urban authority of Tanga (66%) and the rural authorities of Lindi (82%) and Morogoro (76%), however, said that local governments are decentralised but that they are faced with either minor or severe interference from central government.

Figure 6.1: Opinions on the degree of decentralisation and local autonomy (N=400)

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

TASAF officials, however, believed that assigning responsibility and authority for sub-project management to local government bodies and community structures was a way of reducing this interference. They stated that TASAF assigned decision-making authority to CMTs and councils' finance committees for the management of TASAF functions at the council level. The CMTs are empowered to make technical decisions on TASAF

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investments in the LGAs' area of jurisdiction. The CMTs facilitate participatory planning processes at the community level, do feasibility assessments and manage TASAF transactions at the LGA with technical support from TASAF officials attached to the local councils (TMU official 14.05.2014). Finance committees, which are also councils' political decision-making bodies, have been empowered to scrutinise the proposals of the CMTs and to inform TASAF which ones their councils would support for TASAF funding (World Bank official 23.03.2015). They also oversee the implementation of sub-projects within the councils (TMU official 14.05.2014).

While the majority of the councillors interviewed stated that the TASAF guidelines formally recognised finance committees as the main decision-making body for Fund activities at the local level, some felt that the role of finance committees has been reduced to merely receiving information about the projects' progress. It was stated that they have little power to question or change anything since they are not fully involved in the management of sub-projects, which is the responsibility of TASAF district officials, CMTs and CMCs (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). According to these councillors, when TASAF funds are received, the finance committees receive a receipt statement but have no say over how funds are expended. They cannot alter TASAF decisions or even the proposals made by communities or council administrators (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). In this context, it was stated, finance committees only served as a rubber stamp (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). The view of TASAF district officials that councillors and finance committees have no power to change anything in TASAF sub-projects seems to confirm the concerns of councillors discussed above (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014 & 02.04.2015; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014). This suggests that although TASAF acknowledges the finance committees as decision-making bodies, little space has been provided for them to have any say in the Fund's socio-economic investments at the community level.

Although not all councillors are members of finance committees, under normal circumstances, they would be expected to exercise some oversight over development projects (such as those implemented by TASAF) in their wards and their absence has been noted by their constituents. Councillors in fact complained that some council administrators and TASAF officials have been deceiving the members of the beneficiary groups and CMCs by telling them that councillors are not interested in their projects

(Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga, 14.04.2014). Because of this misrepresentation, it was claimed, 'When you, as an individual councillor, visit those projects to assess implementation, those people will just look at you as if you are a visiting stranger and they will not cooperate' (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). As a consequence of this state of affairs, it was stated, councillors become voiceless, powerless and demotivated to follow up on the progress of projects (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). This suggests that the power to oversee TASAF activities at the local council level is vested in the finance committees as collective rather than in individual councillors. As a consequence of this, a councillor in Tanga asserted that the deconcentration model of TASAF is an impediment to effective devolution (Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014)

The ward officials also claimed that the TASAF model does not strengthen local government because it bypasses ward administrators when assigning responsibility for the implementation of sub-projects (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Evidence from TASAF officials indicates that the ward administration is indeed skipped, but this is intended to reduce the levels of decision-making in the implementation process. However, research by Tenga (2013, p. 33) indicated that 'Ownership of created assets at ward level such as constructed secondary schools infrastructures is not clear, as the ward government was not directly involved in the institutional structure for the implementation of TASAF II supported sub-projects'. This suggests a need to take on board local technocrats at all levels, based on their scope of influence in the success and sustainability of TASAF interventions.

Village administrators stated that even though TASAF claims to have conferred power and authority over sub-project management to the village councils, in many cases such power proved to be non-existent (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). As a consequence, the village leadership is often unhappy with the privileges given to the CMC to control a sub-project's finances as well as its role in contracting, managing, and paying contractors (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). According to a World Bank official, the establishment of CMCs with so much authority was unusual in a social action fund:

> In some countries like Ethiopia, you won't see this kind of temporary committee. There are temporary committees from the community and from the [village] council who will be managing the projects; but the committee that actually make payments! It is not there (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

As a consequence of the responsibilities assigned to the CMCs, a ward administrator maintained, 'The village government has been reduced to a rubber stamp, if even the signatories of the village project account are the CMC committee leaders' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). TASAF district officials, to the contrary, believed that village councils have substantive power over the CMC and TASAF sub-projects in the village (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). To illustrate this, a TASAF district official in Morogoro stated that 'The Village Council can terminate any CMC member for misconduct and inform the village assembly of its decision' (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). This was confirmed by a grassroots administrator in Tanga, who stated that 'the CMCs are only sub-committees of the village council, and in case they misbehave the village chairmen should be held accountable too because they are supposed to supervise them' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). This appears to counter the view that 'TASAF committees are undermining the authority of village councils' (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014).

It is interesting to note that ordinary people interviewed differed from grassroots administrators and politicians in their understanding of the powers exercised by CMCs and village councils. Thus, people who had voted in both the village council and the CMC understood that the former is accountable for the conduct of the CMC and for overall delivery of the TASAF sub-projects in their communities (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). In some places, this was evident in the forced resignation or blocked re-election of the village leadership due to the poor performance of TASAF sub-projects in their communities. In Lindi district, for instance, respondents said that the leadership of Mandawa village:

> was held accountable by the people and forced to resign over the market building project which went astray within the hands of the committee, simply because the only authority the people know with regard to their local development was the village government (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

A similar account was given by the *mtaa* administrator in Tanga, who observed:

> A village chairman at my previous work station was held accountable by the people for the embezzlement of TASAFs fund even though he was not at all involved in the project. The people refused to re-elect him simply because of the embezzled TASAF funds and substandard construction of the intended project (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014).

6.5.3 Support to weak local government structures by the parallel structures

A World Bank official stated that 'The TASAF structure has adequate capacity and resources that make it easier for them to build capacity at the local level' (World Bank Official 23.03.2015). In response to the question of how the parallel structures of TASAF strengthen the capacity of democratic LGAs, World Bank officials declared: 'Whatever the additional structures they [TASAF] put on the ground is also to strengthen the capacity of local government, not to replace the local government structures' (World Bank 23.03.2015). This suggests that the structures introduced in parallel to, or within, local government institutions were intended to build their capacity to provide targeted pro-poor services. The question nevertheless remains, how effective, in practical terms, have these parallel structures been in terms of strengthening LGAs service delivery capacity?

TASAF officials and World Bank staff indicated that the decision to recognise the CMTs and finance committees as the main decision-making authorities, rather than the full council, was solely for the purpose of speeding up the service delivery to poor people. According to TASAF and World Bank officials, the finance committees were included to support the broad decentralisation agenda (as discussed in the previous section), but also to ensure that communities, and vulnerable groups in particular, received the support they needed in a timely manner (TMU officials 14.05.2014; World Bank Official 23.03.2015). TASAF officials maintained that the finance committees are in a better position to ensure quick decision making because they meet more frequently than the full council (TMU official_02 14.05.2014). Considerations of time were also cited by a World Bank official who stated that 'Relying on the existing decision structures will hamper speedy implementation of sub-projects and the people will not get the services they need to get on time' (World Bank official 23.03.2015). The focus on timely decision-making and speedy implementation of sub-projects was confirmed by a member of the CMT in Tanga:

> TASAF has been using the finance committee to approve its projects and transactions because this committee meets every month, and its members are the chairmen of all other committees. The full council meets after every three months so using it for approval of project transactions would cause delays in implementation' (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014).

The fact that the councils' finance committees are active in scrutinising and approving TASAF project transactions at the council level was confirmed by councillors interviewed. One councillor, who was also a member of the Morogoro District Council Finance Committee, confirmed that 'the TASAF coordinator presents his report every month when we sit for the council's finance committee…' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). The inference of this is that the shortening of decision-making processes and the strategic assignment of decision-making authority within the local councils has strengthened the capacity of LGAs to deliver services to targeted groups more speedily. As for the CMT, officials at the TASAF coordination offices in the three LGAs confirmed that the heads of department in each section within the council management functioned as technical advisors for the Fund's projects (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014).

As a general rule, the management and implementation of TASAF sub-projects at the community level, as noted in chapter four, is entrusted to the CMC while the village council, or *Mtaa* committee in case of urban councils, is assigned oversight over the CMC (TASAF, 2005, 2013). In that regard a World Bank official asserted that CMCs are not independent bodies but are seen as the technical arm of the village council and are fully accountable to the village government (World Bank 23.03.2015). Overall, responses from all categories of respondents acknowledged that CMCs have assisted LGAs in the delivery of services funded by TASAF, and they have effectively managed sub-projects at the community level. Ministry officials also agreed that TASAF committees had made a positive contribution to the delivery of LGA services in poor communities (Ministry official.$_{02}$ 11.06.2014).

Staff from the TASAF district coordination offices in all three LGAs noted that a village council is obliged to open a separate bank account in the name of the CMC for each sub-project in order to give the CMC full control of the sub-project finances (TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014). However, grassroots local government officials stated that while CMCs managed all project transactions, they did not do so without the approval of village councils. This is evident from the fact that a CMC may only draw down project funds if the minutes of the village council-CMC meeting specifying the objectives of monies to be spent are attached to the application (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). Furthermore, a village administrator in Lindi

confirmed that notwithstanding the fact that 'CMC members were signatories and managers of the TASAF project bank account in the village … the consent of the village council was sought prior to withdrawing funds or making any payments' (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). This practice was confirmed by a TASAF district official in Morogoro, who observed that 'all the money spent in procuring goods and services by the CMC had to be approved by the village council even though the CMCs were the signatories to the sub-project bank account' (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014).

TASAF officials expressed the view that, as a consequence of the capacity building provided by TASAF, CMCs were able to recruit and supervise contractors using the operational manual and approved bill of quantity for building facilities such as classrooms and dispensaries (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014). They added that CMC-appointed contractors were sourced locally or obtained from the district council, and this was confirmed by grassroots local government administrators in all three LGAs (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). However, this does not appear to be the case in all TASAF projects and a village administrator in Lindi argued that 'In most cases, as we have witnessed, although contractors were normally recruited by the CMC itself, many were brought from the district by the TASAF District Coordinator' (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

Grassroots politicians in all three LGAs confirmed that CMCs built service infrastructure by supervising the contractors by themselves (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; *Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). As a village chairman in Lindi district observed that 'The village leadership had little or no voice in managing the contractors but the CMC [did], although we tried hard to follow up [on] the progress of such projects' (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). This view suggests that CMCs did enjoy, or at least assumed, greater power than the village councils over the management of community sub-projects and the contracting of service providers. It is worth noting, moreover, that in terms of TASAF guidelines, contracts entered into by the CMCs may not be legally binding as they are considered ad hoc committees and this could be problematic if there are any problems with completed work (TASAF 2005; 2013). However, a World Bank official argued that one should '…see these CMCs not necessarily as temporary arrangements because they are from the community, formed by the community and they are part of community' (World Bank official 23.03.2015). Nevertheless, in the event of a dispute a village government may not have the legal

capacity to sue a contractor as they were not party to the contract. A CMT member in Tanga concede that 'it becomes very difficult to make follow up of irregularities and non-compliance to standards after the project is completed since the village councils were excluded from the direct implementation of TASAF projects' (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). She maintained that this had been the reason for the sub-standard construction of some buildings.

Respondent's suggested that, given the existing skills shortage in the villages and *mitaa* as identified in the previous sections, the introduction of CMCs had served to fill a gap and had strengthened the capacity of village governments. According to a World Bank official, CMCs have provided the village councils a voluntary workforce to deliver TASAF-funded services (World Bank official 23.03.2015). Village and *mtaa* administrators also confirmed that the establishment of CMC made available a substantial voluntary workforce available to assist the village council which would not otherwise have been at their disposal (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; World Bank Official 23.03.2015). According to ward administrators in all three municipalities, the involvement of CMCs served to relieve the heavy workload of village councils (WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014; WEO 28.01.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Illustrating this fact, a grassroots administrator in Tanga stated that 'The village council with only 25 members, if given all the responsibilities and the finances for TASAF, would not be able to deliver. It is much better the way TASAF makes every project a committee' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). This view was supported by a ward administrator in Lindi who asserted that 'the division of labour between the village council and CMC committees have relieved us from being overburdened, and I pray that it continues to exist' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

Although grassroots administrators understood that CMCs acted only as temporary sub-committees in the village administration and that they were not intended to supplant existing local government structures, some officials believed that as existing village council standing committees were not fully utilised, there was no need for any additional structures (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). As a consequence, some officials and local politicians felt that a more sustainable institutional structure might have been established had the standing committees of the village governments been used instead of the CMCs in that they could more easily have been held accountable (VEO Morogoro

11.07.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 19.06.2014).

When these concerns were put to World Bank, TASAF, and regional administration officials, most respondents raised the issue of low capacity, the lack of incentives and commitment to deliver the targeted services on a voluntary basis, and low accountability on the part of the village council members, as the reasons why TASAF should continue operating through CMC structures rather than through the village councils' standing committees (TMU officials 14.05.2014 and 30.03.2015; RA officials, Morogoro 09.07.2014; Lindi 12.03.2015 and Tanga 01.04.2015; World Bank Officials, 23.03.2015 and 19.04.2015). According to a World Bank official, 'Given the low capacity of village councils, coming up with an additional body – the CMC – and building its capacity to deliver the intended services was critical in order to achieve the programme's objectives' (World Bank officials, 23.03.2015).

Some officials and local political office bearers maintained the view that TASAF was not intended to strengthen the village governments, but rather to weaken them. This was because of the limited decision making pace provided to village councils, vis-à-vis the CMCs and the TASAF district coordinators, with regard to local socio-economic development (RA official Morogoro, 09.07.2014; WEOs Tanga 03.02.2014 & 14.02.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). The only role assigned to village chairmen, it was claimed, was to officiate at in TASAF meetings (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). According to a ward administrator in Lindi:

> …as it is for now, the only work of the village council is to open the meetings, coordinate the election of CMC members and closing the meeting. After that, everything concerning the project is between the CMC and TASAF District Coordinator. The village government becomes a rubber stamp because the signatories of the project account are the CMC committee leaders since it has its own Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

Local politicians and administrators also accused CMCs of only responding to instructions received from the top level of TASAF (the District Coordinator) rather than to the village councils (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). TASAF district officials also acknowledged this skewed loyalty but restated the position that 'CMCs, as the implementers of community sub-projects, work directly with the

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TASAF District Coordinator but the village council oversees their functions on the ground' (TASAF Tanga 02.04.2015). However, it is clear that reporting lines are a source of concern to village leaders and it was stated that 'When the TASAF district officials came to inspect projects, they often bypass the village government and go straight to the CMC' (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). Concerns of this nature were also expressed by a councillor in Morogoro who stated that reporting lines had '…created a reporting problem at the grassroots level because some CMCs [also] became arrogant to the extent of bypassing the village council leadership when sending their reports to the TASAF District Coordinator' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

6.5.4 Capacity building through training and human capital development

Local government officials understood that building the capacity of LGAs required nurturing expertise at the local level. Officials from the TMU stated that in every phase, TASAF had a capacity-building component for both LGAs and local communities (TMU official 14.05.2014). The ward administrator in Tanga, for example, asserted that 'TASAF has indeed gone further into building the capacity of grassroots officials and communities' (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014). According to TASAF officials, local government officials were trained in monitoring and evaluation, participatory planning processes, budgeting and quantity surveying, and procurement (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014). TASAF also built the capacity of LGAs officials to undertake feasibility studies necessary for assessing and approving sub-projects (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014; FGD TMU 29.05.2014). This was confirmed by TASAF district officials in the case-study LGAs, who stated that they took part in the capacity building of staff in their local councils by training them in various skills (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014). TASAF (TMU) officials also stated that the capacity of the finance committees had been strengthened such that they were able to advise communities and TASAF to give priority to the sectors not funded by LGAs (TMU official$_{01}$ 04.05.2014).

At the lower level of local government, respondents said that the village councils were provided with skills in leadership and decision-making, participatory planning processes and sub-projects oversight (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). TASAF officials and World Bank staff observed that, unlike the village councils, which have both political and administrative functions, CMCs functioned at the operational level, and accordingly were

trained in the technical skills necessary for practical delivery of targeted services (TMU officials 14.05.2014 and 30.03.2015; World Bank Official 23.03.2015). Such skills include project planning, handling financial transactions, sub-project management, project implementation, project procurement, reporting, community participation, conflict management, service delivery, building the capacity of beneficiary groups, and specific skills related to the projects assigned to them (TMU official 04.05.2014; World Bank official 23.03.2015). TASAF district coordination staff confirmed that they took part in building the capacity of sub-project committees by training them in how best to manage and implement community projects (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014). The respondents added: 'The training was jointly conducted for both the village council and the CMC' (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). In this way, TASAF and World Bank officials believe, the Fund has contributed to human capital building for the communities and local councils respectively (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014; World Bank official 23.03.2015).

Local government administrators and political office bearers in the case-study LGAs also confirmed that training had been provided by TASAF to LGAs and CMCs and that 'CMCs were trained in how they can implement the community sub-projects' (CMT member Lindi, 05.05.2014). CMC members too, acknowledged the value of the training they had received from TASAF. During focus group discussions in Mabokweni (Tanga), Majengo (Lindi) and Mikese (Morogoro), CMC members admitted that at the outset most of them did not have the basic skills required but that they had acquired these through the training provided by the TASAF and council officials (FGD Mabokweni Tanga 02.04.2015; FGD Mikese Morogoro 10.07.2014; FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2014).

Respondents stated that TASAF-funded community income-generating projects, like fish farming, poultry and dairy farming, in particular, had imparted skills to the various beneficiary groups in the communities and had empowered them to improve their household living conditions (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). A village chairman in Morogoro, for example, stated that 'The people were provided with expertise on poultry production along with the funded income-generating projects' (Village chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014). According to TASAF officials and World Bank staff, the human capital recruited from the communities and trained had contributed to the skills-based task force in the villages (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TMU official 14.05.2014).

However, some ward administrators and political office bearers raised a concern that 'The capacity building efforts made by TASAF to CMCs might have been better given to the village councils' standing committees for long-term application and bigger impact' (WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014). Responding to this concern, both TASAF and World Bank officials stated that TASAF has built the capacity of both the village councils and the CMCs through training, depending on their different needs (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014; World Bank Official 23.03.2015). World Bank officials added that 'What TASAF is doing is to balance' both the village councils and the CMCs in their capacity-building interventions (World Bank Officials 23.03.2015). However, as TASAF officials at the field level (district coordination offices) conceded, such a balance was only partially achieved because 'Although all CMCs received training, not all the village councils were trained because of financial constraints' (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014).

6.5.4.1 *How harmonious are the parallel structures operating with formal local government authority institutions?*

Having looked at the degree to which TASAF's parallel structures support local government institutions, it is necessary to assess the extent to which their operations are harmonised. Overall, interviews indicated that there have been some disputes within LGAs, especially at the community level, following the introduction of the deconcentrated structures of TASAF. TASAF officials admitted that in the past, it had been claimed that TASAF was operating against the local councils (LGAs) (TMU officials 14.05.2014). The accusations raised against TASAF, it was stated, was that its operations were illegal and in contravention of the Local Government Act. These charges forced TASAF to seek a legal opinion from the state attorney (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). As previously mentioned, an amendment to the Local Government Act, 1982 by section 21 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 6 of 1999, appears to have been made in response to this legal challenge from the LGAs.

Local governments administrators and councillors stated that there was little conflict over TASAF operations at the higher levels of local government (the council level) because those normally involved in the management and implementation of TASAF activities at such levels were the CMTs and the councils' finance committees (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). At the

lower levels of local government, however, councillors stated that minor conflicts did occur between the deconcentrated structures of TASAF and the formal decentralised LGA institutions. Tensions arose, it was stated, due to the fact that the CMCs were perceived to have been granted too much autonomy, and they were not consulting formal grassroots authorities in operational decision making processes (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014).

Officials and politicians indicated that the higher degree of autonomy enjoyed by CMCs in the control of community sub-project finances has been a source of conflict between the village councils and CMCs. The CMC, respondents stated, had more power over financial resources than did the village council (Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). The CMCs, it was claimed, had been emboldened by the fact that power was perceived to be more about access to finance than to the formal institutional standing of actors. The village councils felt that these committees were assuming their own roles and powers with regard to local development and service delivery (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; WEO Tanga 03.02.2014; RA official Morogoro 09.07.2014). Given that the CMCs were responsible for projects involving large sums of money, it was stated, they considered themselves superior to the village council, forgetting that the projects implemented were not their own, but fell under the village's formally elected governing body (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Ministry officials noted that 'Conflicts between CMC and grassroots LGAs institutions existed in almost 20% of all LGAs in the country' (Ministry official$_{-01}$ 11.06.2014), and TASAF district officials conceded that there had been some disputes between the CMCs and the village councils in their LGAs (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014). However, council administrators believed that a degree of conflict was inevitable because, as the CMT member in Tanga observed, 'You can't avoid frictions where two unrelated teams temporarily come together to work together (CMT member Tanga14.08.2014).

Conflict between CMCs and village councils has long been recognised by the government but it is not deemed to have reached a level where intervention is required. Commenting on this, a ward administrator stated that 'in some places the CMC and village council could not work together harmoniously because of the minor conflicts between the two, although the government tended to take [the conflicts] for granted' (WEO Lindi

03.05.2014). In Tanga City Council, likewise, a ward administrator admitted that 'We have had some conflicts between *Mtaa* councils and TASAF committees in the past' (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014). It seems that the main causes of conflict included a lack of role clarity in the TASAF guidelines, TASAF District Coordinators' inadequate knowledge of local government structures and their interconnectedness with TASAF structures; inadequate knowledge of procedures and the assigned roles to CMCs and village councils; power struggles over the control of TASAF sub-projects finances; and the withholding of information by the CMCs.

Most of the conflicts or misunderstandings between the village governments and the CMCs have occurred because it had been an expectation of grassroots administrators and political office bearers that the village councils would assume responsibility for the management and implementation of TASAF sub-projects. This was stressed by ward administrator in Tanga who stated that 'We expected the village councils to be the implementers of TASAF projects, not otherwise' (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014). Ward administrators also stated that members of *mtaa* committees and village councils felt side-lined and resented the fact that the CMCs had been entrusted with sub-project funding (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014; FGD Kiwalala Lindi, 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014).

A lack of clarity on the assignment of roles and the mandate of the CMCs and the *Mtaa* or village councils were further sources of conflict. Councillors and CMT members stated that in the past CMCs appeared to have been given much more power than the village government (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014), and it became very difficult for village leaders to question their activities (Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014). Relatedly, a leader of the *Mtaa* Committee in Tanga city complained:

> When we took the initiative to question the CMC about the progress of what they were doing; they told us that their project is not linked with the government, and that they are the sole implementers, so we had to leave them until they completed the project and handed over the building to us (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014).

Similar disputes were mentioned in interviews in Morogoro and Lindi (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; FGD Kiwalala Lindi 03.05.2014), where a CMT member stated:

> When that dispute came to our knowledge, we resolved the situation by going to the communities to sensitise the CMC members and the village government on their roles, telling them openly that the CMC is a sub-committee in the village council and

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that they should report to and inform the village council on all their undertakings. Therefore as for now, the committees knows their roles and their limits (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014).

It is evident from the interviews that disputes of this nature arose due to the fact that not all local government officials are familiar with the TASAF operational manuals and guidelines. They also occurred because grassroots leaders had not taken the initiative to familiarise themselves with the provisions of the TASAF guidelines and manuals. It was also suggested that TASAF had not distributed their guidelines sufficiently widely, nor had they adequately trained stakeholders in how to interpret them. This was evident, it was stated, in the fact that the mandates of village councils are clearly spelt out in the TASAF Operational Manuals (TASAF 2005 and 2013).

Some councillors did, in fact, admit that they did not have the TASAF guidelines, and that even when contributing in the finance committee they did so without knowing the limits of their 'decision-space'[38] (Councillor Tanga, 21.02.2014). Some grassroots administrators also admitted that they '…have not internalised the TASAF guidelines, apart from hearsay from colleagues' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014 & 12.02.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Nevertheless, councillors criticised the TASAF guidelines for creating an accountability vacuum on the part of CMCs. Their argument being that the TASAF operational manuals do not fully subject the CMC to the village council but instead to the TASAF District Coordinator (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014).

Local political office bearers interviewed in Lindi district stated that in some CMCs, there are politically motivated conflicts of interests and unrest that affect their relationship with the village government of the day (Village Chairmen, Lindi 03.05.2014). The political conflict of interests was also observed in Kisosora ward in Tanga where one *mtaa* chairman praised the relationship between the *mtaa* committee and CMC responsible for the construction of MACECHU secondary school, but another *mtaa* chairman with a different political stance perceived the same CMC as a breeding ground for institutional conflicts (*Mtaa* chairmen, Tanga 15.08.2014).

It was also stated that the way in which national leaders have reported on the successes of TASAF projects without acknowledging the efforts of LGAs has created tensions

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[38] The term decision-space was initially used by Bossert & Beauvais (2002).

between CMCs and village leadership (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; WEO Tanga 03.02.2014). According to these respondents, many of the TASAF projects have been praised by national leaders without giving recognition to local government actors, as if such projects had been implemented by an agency completely separate from the LGAs (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

It is worth noting, however, that not all the CMCs were reported to have had conflictual relationships with the village councils. Respondents revealed that some CMCs were loyal to the village government and recognised the role of the village council in the implementation of sub-projects. The *Mtaa* Chairman in Tanga, for example, said that 'In our TASAF project we had positive and harmonious relations with the CMCs and, of course, because of such relationship, our project was very successful' (*Mtaa* Chairmen Tanga 15.08.2014). Similar assertions about positive relationships between CMCs and village councils were raised by participants in the focus group discussions in Tanga, Lindi and Morogoro respectively (FGD Mabokweni & Kisosora, Tanga 02.04.2015; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.20; FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2014). In Morogoro District Council, the village chairman also acknowledged that the CMC for the construction of dispensary buildings in Mikese ward had a positive relationship and cooperation with the village council (Village Chairman, Morogoro 11.07.2014). These positive relationships were confirmed by CMC members themselves (CMC member, Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMC member Tanga 15.08.2014; CMC members Lindi 03.05.2014), and according to a CMC member in Morogoro 'Our committee had a very good relationship with the village council which in return enabled us to win the participation and contributions of the residents' (CMC member, Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Over and above complaints about local level disputes, some political office bearers interviewed claimed that TASAF has reduced citizens' trust in local government leadership, particularly at the grassroots level. As a consequence of parallel structures like the CMCs, it was argued, whenever a project was initiated CMC members and beneficiaries groups created the perception that the village council was incapable of implementing development projects and that their leaders were not sufficiently trustworthy to manage TASAF money (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). In similar vein a ward administrator in Tanga observed that 'Because TASAF is financially well-off, and most of the councils are financially weaker, people build the perception that councils are meaningless and less important' (WEO Tanga

03.02.2014). Under such circumstances, a politician in Morogoro argued, 'We are not strengthening the grassroots LGAs structures but weakening them because the people are made to distrust them' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This was a view shared by a *Mtaa* Chairman in Tanga who observed that 'TASAF has eroded the value of village leadership by creating structures like the CMCs in villages and *mitaa*' (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). What these accusations suggest is that the TASAF model has created competition over legitimacy at the community level and this has disrupted the *status quo* maintained by the village leaders.

However, this accusation is not supported by the responses of ordinary citizens surveyed in the case-study areas. As Table 6.2 below demonstrates, similar levels of trust were recorded in CMS and village councils. Thus, whilst 42% of respondents stated that they trusted CMCs "somewhat" or 'a lot", this was only slightly higher than the 40% who similarly trusted *Mtaa* or village councils.

Table 6.2: Citizens' trust in government institutions (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Not at all	Just a little bit	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know
Deconcentrated institutions					
Central Government	25	25	27	22	1
TASAF	12	33	34	14	7
CMC	18	32	35	7	8
Decentralised institutions					
Local Council	22	35	32	8	3
WDC	27	35	29	3	6
Mtaa or village council	24	33	33	7	3

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

Claims that TASAF operations had reduced citizens' confidence in LGAs were also not supported by the quantitative survey data which reveal relatively small difference in the levels of trust in the two structures. Thus, while 81% of respondents trusted TASAF 'just a little bit', 'somewhat' or 'a lot', the figure for LGAs was 75%. The figures for those trusting TASAF and LGAs "somewhat" or 'a lot' were 48% and 40% respectively.

In order to determine levels of citizens' trust in key individuals in local government, respondents were asked how much they trust administrators and political office bearers in both decentralised and deconcentrated institutions. The survey results in Table 6.3 below

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reveal similar patterns of trust across the three study areas although there were outliers in each. Hence levels of trust in LGA executive directors, ward executive officers, and village executive officers were highest in Tanga (with 45%, 65% and 68% respectively trusting these official 'somewhat' or 'a lot').

Table 6.3: Citizens' trust in appointed officials (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Not at all	Just a little bit	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know
Trust in LGAs Administrators					
Executive Director (DED/CD)					
Tanga	10	34	35	10	11
Morogoro	6	62	26	4	2
Lindi	19	55	22	2	2
Ward Executive Officer (WEO)					
Tanga	11	19	54	11	5
Morogoro	8	44	40	6	2
Lindi	9	47	37	7	0
Village Executive Officer (VEO)					
Tanga	9	18	53	15	5
Morogoro	12	42	34	10	2
Lindi	13	35	37	13	2
Trust in TASAF District Official					
TASAF District Coordinator					
Tanga	13	39	18	7	23
Morogoro	4	28	57	11	0
Lindi	11	43	26	15	5

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

Of interest is the fact that, overall, levels of trust in administrators were highest at the village level where between 44% and 68% of respondents in the three municipalities reported trusting village executive officers "somewhat' or 'a lot'. This level of trust was higher than that recorded for the TASAF district coordinator (between 25% and 68%), which further dispels the view advanced by local politicians and administrators that the hybrid model of decentralisation had delegitimised LGA structures and particularly those at the local level.

Regarding citizens' trust in political office bearers, the results in Table 6.4 indicate a similar response patterns across the three municipalities with higher levels of trust in local politicians in Tanga than in Morogoro or in Lindi, where 63% of respondents stated that they did not trust the local councillors 'at all'. Of significance is the fact that the highest levels of trust in elected officials was for village chairpersons (between 42% and 70% of respondents stated that they trusted these office bearers 'somewhat' or 'a lot').

Table 6.4: Citizens' trust in political office bearers (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Not at all	Just a little bit	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know
Trust in local political office bearers					
Councillors					
Tanga	14	17	44	20	5
Morogoro	32	38	20	4	6
Lindi	63	17	16	4	0
Village Chairmen					
Tanga	12	13	52	18	5
Morogoro	6	44	34	14	2
Lindi	25	33	29	13	0
Trust in TASAF elected members					
Community Mgt. Committee members					
Tanga	17	36	17	7	23
Morogoro	8	36	56	0	0
Lindi	20	37	34	8	1

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

Respondents were probed to see whether the low levels of trust in their councillors was because politicians do not care much about what ordinary people thought and again there were variances in the responses. In Morogoro the majority (58%) disagreed in Lindi (94%) and Tanga (86%) the majority felt that politicians do not care much about what ordinary people think.

6.6 Mainstreaming Tanzanian Social Action Fund into formal government structures: Towards taking over changed donors' interests in the social action fund model?

TASAF and World Bank officials reported that there is an ongoing donor agenda to shift focus from the social action fund towards social protection programmes or safety nets. Although the government may wish to maintain TASAF in its current format, given its demonstrated achievements, it is left with limited options to do so since the major portion of its budget is donor funded. World Bank officials are fully aware that most sub-Saharan African countries 'still want the social action fund model to be there because it also has an added value, it does a good job, it does a lot of good work'. However, the Bank official's stance is that social funds should not be conceived as permanent institutions funded by donors, but as evolving ones (World Bank Official 23.03.2015). Pronouncing his verdict on the future of TASAF, a World Bank official asserted: 'Social funds are dying; they must die" (World Bank Official 23.03.2014). However, from a national

perspective, the question remains, if social funds like TASAF are performing well, why would governments seek to change them.

Ministry officials stated that having deconcentrated programmes like TASAF was not their optimal policy choice due to the fact that they were only sustained by donor money, however they had decided to let them operate the way they do for a period of time, hoping that they could soon be mainstreamed into the D-by-D framework (Ministry official$_{01}$ 12.06.2014). Some ministry officials also believed that because of their dependence on donor money, the parallel structures of TASAF are destined to failure once that funding ceases (Ministry official 12.06.2014). In that regard one ministry official observed that 'Of course, in terms of structures, TASAF may not be efficient because anything established outside the existing government system will definitely fail (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014). Another added that 'There will come a time when any system operating outside the government administration will have no space in local government' (Ministry official 12.06.2014). A World Bank official supported the idea of integrating TASAF into formal government structures, observing: 'I will be happy if the structure TASAF holds for now will be integrated into the government structures; and especially the local government structures' (World Bank Official, 23.03.2015). Accentuating the need for the formal incorporation of TASAF structures and system into existing state structures, the Bank official asserted:

> Since TASAF is now considered a national institution with a Cabinet approval, then all its structures at all levels, and the local levels in particular, should be approved as well and should be recognised within the local government system to make it more sustainable. I don't want these committees to be dispersed once TASAF is gone (World Bank Official 23.03.2015).

However, TASAF officials held a different view. Those interviewed in Dar es Salaam and in the case-study areas believed that the success of the TASAF initiative was a product of both its organisational structure and its location in the administrative hierarchy (TMU official 30.03.2015; TASAF Tanga 02.04.2015). A TASAF official, for instance, declared that 'Experience shows that TASAF has survived mainly because of the approach adopted compared to other development projects' (TMU officials 14.05.2014; 30.03.2015). As a consequence, the mainstreaming or integrating of the Fund (as an institution) into sector ministries at the central level was not something envisioned by TASAF officials. Many respondents believed that TASAF's special status, and especially the fact that it operates under the President's office, gave it the strength to ensure

efficiency and accountability in utilising public and donor resources (TMU official 14.05.2014). Illustrative of this view, a TASAF official stated that: 'For us, being under the President's office is an advantage because from there we can work with other ministries and LGAs, otherwise, you cannot hold them accountable if you are at the same level' (TMU official 30.03.2015). World Bank officials also acknowledged that TASAF's accountability to the President's office has an added advantage in the efficient use of resources as well as in the effective delivery of its services (World Bank 23.03.2015; 19.04.2015). Nonetheless, donors, and the World Bank in particular, are putting pressure on the government to reconfigure the structural orientation of TASAF as they are longer interested in the generality of such funds (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

The forces pushing TASAF towards a reconfiguration of its structures and operations are both internal and external. A TMU official observed: 'We have pressure from development partners, but that pressure comes because the government did decide that we need to go this route, to have the fund decentralised and then think through these channels' (TMU official 30.03.2015). However, even under this pressure the leadership of TASAF is thinking of changing its structure to an executive agency model in order to remain outside the normal ministry structures (TMU official 30.03.2015). However, TASAF officials understood that in order for TASAF to remain in its current form, the bulk of its funding would need to be sourced from the government budget in order to lessen its dependence on loans and grants (TMU official 30.03.2015). The extent to which the proposed agency model will be funded from the central fiscus and the extent to which it will continue to be effective remain uncertain. Bank officials believe that the government is facing a dilemma because of the pressure it is under from donors to change the format of TASAF:

> I think there is a dilemma. They still want to see that they work with TASAF while TASAF is going to an end or it won't be there. We need to mainstream it to different sectors and concentrate on safety nets. Let others assume their normal responsibilities, ministry of education take building schools; health take building clinics; roads authority take responsibility for roads construction (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

The dilemma faced by the government is illustrative of the challenges faced by LDCs in the face of powerful geo-political forces. Despite the fact that social funds such as TASAF have demonstrated their effectiveness in a number of developing states, and despite the reluctance of governments to reorientate their focus, the fact that they remain

heavily dependent on foreign aid means that they are vulnerable to the changing agendas of multi-lateral an bi-lateral funding agencies.

6.7 Conclusion

From the responses in the three case-study municipalities, it is evident that, despite the introduction of the D-by-D programme, the administrative capacity of local governments continues to be highly constrained due to a lack of resources and the expertise necessary to deliver basic services and engage citizens in a meaningful way. In contrast, the influence of TASAF in strengthening the capacity of local government institutions was apparent in all three local councils. However, not all respondents acknowledged TASAF's achievements in building the capacity of LGAs. Some (though not all) councillors and ward administrators felt side-lined by the parallel structures established to implement TASAF projects. Local political office bearers and some ministry officials also felt that TASAF served to weaken rather than to strengthen village government because it assigned more decision-space to the CMCs and council technocrats than it did to village councils. Ministry officials, however, had mixed opinions about the TASAF model. While a few believed that the TASAF system of funding would in the long run serve to reduce the commitment of government to devolve, the majority of officials from the central government ministry and regional administrations believed that the TASAF model had, in fact, advanced the process of decentralisation in the country.

It is also evident from the survey data, that ordinary citizens hold different views about the effectiveness of TASAF than do local politicians. The concerns raised about the fact that the hybrid model of decentralisation was undermining the legitimacy of LGAs, and hence impeding the development of local democracy, was not supported by empirical data, which revealed similar levels of trust in both administrative systems.

The chapter which follows looks at the perceptions of different stakeholders on the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation has influenced the delivery of public services in LGAs and, in particular, in poor communities.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION ON PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation was perceived to have strengthened the capacity of local councils. Following in this vein, this chapter assesses the extent to which the model has served to improve local service delivery. It does so by analysing national trends in the delivery of basic services and by reviewing the perceptions of officials from central government ministries, regional administrations, local governments, the World Bank, local political office bearers, community leaders and ordinary citizens.

7.2 Perceptions of the impact of decentralisation on access to and quality of public services

There was broad consensus amongst ministry officials interviewed that the level of service delivery in LGAs had significantly improved in the decade and a half since rollout of the current decentralisation model. The number of facilities such as schools, health centres, clinics, water and road networks has increased significantly as a result of more financial and human resources being allocated to and reaching the local councils (Ministry official$_{-02}$, 11.06.2014). For example, a Ministry official commented that the number of available health facilities has increased from year to year since the inception of the D-by-D policy, as a consequence of various programmes such as MMAM and TASAF (Ministry official$_{-01}$, 12.06.2014). In support of this view, a regional administration official in Lindi confirmed that health facilities have increased in the local councils in the region in recent years (RA official Lindi 12.03.2015), and evidence of the significant increase in the number of public health facilities nationally is to be found in the government's economic status reports (JMT, 2009, 2014) and the report on the analysis of Comprehensive Council Health Plans 2013–2014, (URT, 2013b) as summarized in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 below. The table shows that from 2005 to 2014 the number of hospitals countrywide increased by 44% from 86 to 124, the number of

health centres increased by 52% from 331 to 505, the number of dispensaries increased by 53% from 2,949 to 4,523, while an additional 10 special clinics were constructed (JMT, 2009, 2014).

Table 7.1: Number of public health facilities 2005 – 2014[39]

	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Dispensaries	2450	2949	3038	3348	3649	3526	3773	3843	4322	4469	4523
Health Centres	-	331	331	379	395	431	449	454	498	489	505
Hospital	-	86	87	90	117	114	97	108	112	124	124
Special Clinics	-				0		269				10
Total		3366	3456	3817	4161	4071	4588	4405	4932	5082	5162

Source: Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa 2009, 2014 [Country Economic Status 2009, 2014]

Following increased investment by TASAF and LGAs in the construction of health facilities such as dispensaries, health centres and hospitals within local councils, the population living within 5km of health facilities has significantly increased countrywide (URT, 2013b). Figure 7.1 shows an increase from 48.0% in 2009 to 50.6% in June 2010 and to 71.9% by June 2013 (URT, 2013b).

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[39] The decrease in the number of health centres from 2012 to 2013 could be a result of upgrading of some health centres into district hospitals following the recent creation of new district councils. Alternatively, it could also be an error in official records. However, it was not possible to establish the reasons that might have been behind the decrease in public hospitals between 2009 to 2012 from the previous record in 2008, and in the numbers of so-called special clinics between 2010 and 2014, as most of these are not local government facilities.

Figure 7.1 Percentage of population in Tanzania living within 5km of health facilities 2009–2013

Source: Summary and Analysis of the Comprehensive Council Health Plans 2013-2014

In terms of educational services, ministry officials and local government administrators confirmed that under the current decentralisation arrangements, responsibility for the provision of primary and secondary education has been decentralised to local councils (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014; CMT member Morogoro 10.07.2014). Commenting on this a ministry official stated:

> In the past, secondary education was provided centrally by the Ministry of Education but now the provision of both primary and secondary education is decentralised to LGAs with supervision by both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of local government (PMO-RALG) (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014).

Under this arrangement, according to a CMT official, central government finances education service delivery by providing LGAs with operating funds and capital investment funds (for building education infrastructure) through discretionary and non-discretionary transfers (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014).

Ministry officials stated that shifting responsibility for service delivery to local councils and communities had made a significant contribution to the growing number of secondary schools and classrooms due to an increase in dedicated funds and public participation (cost sharing) (Ministry officials 11.06.2014; 12.06.2014). The increase in the number of public primary and secondary schools and classrooms is evident in national education

statistics.[40] Figure 7.2 below shows that public primary schools increased by about 10% from 14053 schools in 2005 to 15525 in 2012. Public secondary schools increased by 192%, from 1202 schools in 2005 to 3508 schools in 2012. This followed TASAF's increased involvement in the school building programme when the second phase (TASAF II) was rolled out countrywide as part of the broadened scope of local government reform (JMT 2009, p. 223; JMT, 2011, p. 172; URT, 2013b). The trend in school building prior to the establishment of TASAF in 2000, as Table 7.2 below indicates, was lower with a 2% increase in primary schools from 11,220 in 1999 to 11428 in 2000; and a 45% increase in secondary schools from 350 to 527 schools over the same period.

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[40] Although the researcher gathered education statistics for the case study areas at source from local education authorities, it was not possible to establish their authenticity. Some of were clearly unreliable. For example, the data for the number of public primary and secondary schools in Tanga, Morogoro, and Lindi regions published by Prime Minister's Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG) (2014) reflected uneven and unexplained fluctuations in the numbers of schools over a short period of time. Moreover, the data on primary education enrolment for the three case study districts showed a high number of students drop outs (about eight thousand students in each district) over a short period (from 2010 to 2013), without any explanation. Such a trend differed considerably from the national data, which were much more reliable and verifiable by multiple sources.

Table 7.2: TASAF II contribution in local government service delivery within case study areas 2005-2013

Sector	Type of project	Tanga		Morogoro		Lindi	
		Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)	Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)	Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)
Education	Classrooms, office, staff quarters and laboratories construction for secondary and primary education.	31 (62 classrooms built)	896878903	16 (51 classrooms built)	457253773	54 (70 classrooms built)	1731722430
Health	Dispensary construction	-	-	9	284494318	9	227274064
	HIV care and sensitisation	17	75126200	4	16593280	9	42065140
Water	Borehole drilling, shallow wells, irrigation and catchment conservation	9	245721006	2	51784400	16	417776887
Roads	Local roads and bridges construction and rehabilitation	2	71191565	20	606035084	35	1048454829
Economic	Market place construction	1	10478600	-	-	7	180321900
	Income generating projects	43	579294482	48	359550890	101	1068710797
Total		**103**	**1878690756 (US$ 1252461)**	**99**	**1775711745 (US$ 1183808)**	**231**	**4716326047 (US$ 3144217)**

Source: Analysed by the Author from the TASAF subprojects implementation status report, 30th June 2013.

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Ministry officials stated that shifting the responsibility for education service delivery to local councils and communities had contributed significantly to current improvements in student enrolment and to better results in the final examinations. They maintained that this was due to both the increased number and improved quality of schools and classrooms, as well as to closer supervision of teachers by local administrators and local political office bearers (Ministry officials 11.06.2014; 12.06.2014). National education statistics shown in Figure 7.2 support this assertion. While the number of students enrolled in secondary schools (Form I to Form VI) in 1997, prior to the local government reform (LGRP) and TASAF, was 116556, this number had increased by 205% to 355192 students in 2005 when the LGRP and TASAF were rolled out countrywide. It increased by a further 327% to 1515671 students in 2011 following increased investment in the construction of secondary schools and classrooms by local governments and TASAF (JMT, 2012).

Figure 7.2: Trend in public secondary education enrolment 1997–2011

Source: Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa 2011 [Country Economic Status 2011]

TASAF officials, local government officials and local politicians interviewed, believed that improvements in the quality of educational infrastructure, and especially the increased numbers of schools and classrooms, had positively impacted on local government's provision of education services and on students' achievements in their primary and secondary school leaving examinations although these claims are not backed

up by national statistics (TMU official$_{01}$ 14.05.2014; CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). In Tanga city council, LGA officials indicated that 'the percentage of students passing exams has increased and students passing grades are gradually but progressively improving' (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). This suggests that the infrastructural investments made by LGAs and TASAF have impacted positively on the quality of education services in the municipality.

The education statistics in Table 7.3 below indicate that more than half of students consistently pass their final examinations in primary and secondary schools in the urban authority of Tanga. However, only roughly a third of students who sat for the exams in the rural councils of Morogoro and Lindi passed. Table 7.3 further indicates uneven trends, in all case-study areas, in the percentage of primary school pupils who passed their PSLE between 2011 and 2013, despite an increase in the numbers of schools. Thus, while the number of pupils who passed the PSLE in Tanga increased from 68% in 2011 to 85% in 2012 this achievement was not sustained and the number decreased to 68% in 2013. The trend in Morogoro differed as the number of pupils who passed the PSLE was on an upward trend until 2011, when 50% passed, and then declined to 44% in 2012 and to 33% in 2013. In Lindi, the number of pupils who passed the PSLE increased from 37% in 2011 to 45% in 2012, before dropping to 31% in 2013.

In terms of secondary education, in Tanga more than a half (55%) of the students who sat for the Form IV examination in 2011 passed. This number dropped to 35% in 2012 and rose again slightly to 50% in 2013. In Lindi, the number of students who passed was consistently below 50% of those who sat for the exams, fluctuating from 38% in 2011 to 31% in 2012 and 46% in 2013. Student achievement in the Form IV exams was much lower in Morogoro than the other two case-study areas over the same period. Only 28% of students passed the exams in 2011, 27% in 2012 and 40% in 2013. This variation in student achievement in secondary school leaving exams explains why citizens surveyed in Morogoro district rated their council lower than the other case-study areas in terms of service delivery levels in education. In that regard it is worth noting that while improvements in the quantity and quality of physical infrastructure can be achieved quite quickly, improvement in the quality of teaching is a process which is likely to take a lot longer. This is because teachers must be recruited, teaching methods must be improved, curricula must be revised and deep-seated institutional cultures must be changed.

Table 7.3: Students achievement in primary and secondary education examinations

	2011			2012			2013		
Achievement in Primary Schools Leavers' Exams									
	Sat	Passed	Percent	Sat	Passed	Percent	Sat	Passed	Percent
Tanga	6966	4705	68	6528	5547	85	6261	4266	68
Morogoro	7448	3756	50	7009	2730	44	6631	2217	33
Lindi	4309	1525	37	3800	1689	45	3533	1112	31
Achievement in Form IV Secondary Exams									
	Sat	Passed	Percent	Sat	Passed	Percent	Sat	Passed	Percent
Tanga	3253	1785	55	3485	1212	35	3332	1680	50
Morogoro	1718	485	28	1,922	519	27	1,672	585	40
Lindi	1194	451	38	1155	223	31	964	264	46

Source: Councils' PEDP and SEDP reports, 2011–2014; Council profiles and data from
Education departments

Local government officials and local politicians in the study areas agreed that the current model of decentralisation has improved the provision of public services in local communities. In Lindi district council, grassroots local government officials and local political office bearers confirmed that the combination of TASAF and the council's efforts have significantly improved access to public services such as education, health and water supply in many areas (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2014, Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). In Morogoro district council, likewise, grassroots administrators maintained that the council has undergone a significant change in service delivery, thanks to the infrastructure investments made by the government under D-by-D and by TASAF (WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). Council administrators and local political office bearers in Tanga stated that the combination of the D-by-D and TASAF approaches had resulted in significant improvements in local government service delivery and particularly in terms of service infrastructure (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014; FGD Kisosora Tanga 02.04.2015). In affirming this trend, a focus group discussant in Mikese ward, Morogoro, asserted:

> Nowadays services work for the people in local communities because the point of delivery is drawn nearer or located within the community (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014).

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A CMT member in Tanga stated: 'Nowadays communities access education services such as enrolment or registration of their children in schools closer to their residences' (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). Participants in focus group discussions in all three LGAs asserted that, along with drawing services closer to the people (Mtaa Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014), decentralisation has also improved peoples' use of such services (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014; FGDs CMT Lindi 02.05.2014 and 11.03.2015; FGD Kisosora Tanga 02.04.2015). Members of council management teams and grassroots administrators also confirmed that people can access public services like education, health and water more easily than they could before due to the decentralisation approaches adopted by the government (CMT members Morogoro 10.07.2014, Tanga 14.08.2014 and Lindi 02.05.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014, VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014).

A local government official in Tanga asserted that the planning methodologies put in place by the D-by-D policy and TASAF had enabled the local councils to 'make sound plans for public service provision and local development with a valuable input from local communities' (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014). Grassroots local government administrators in Tanga and participants in focus group discussions in Lindi and Morogoro concurred that the plans developed and the investments made by LGAs and TASAF had led to significant improvements in service delivery. They maintained that almost every ward now has a secondary school and each village has a primary school (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014; FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2015; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). Respondents also stated that water facilities, such as new wells and dams, have been constructed in peri-urban and rural areas, and roads were constructed and rehabilitated in most *mitaa* and villages (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 12.03.2015; RA official Tanga 01.04.2015).

In order to ascertain the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation is perceived to have led to improved services within local communities, ordinary citizens were asked how well or how badly they felt their LGAs were in providing public services. Generally, people in all three case-study areas indicated that the performance of their LGAs had been above average in the education sector. However, there were significant variations in their perceptions of the health, water and roads sectors.

Table 7.4 below reveals that, overall, 67% of the respondents surveyed regarded local governments as performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in providing primary and secondary education services to communities. Slight variations in responses were recorded in the different case study areas, with district councils perceived to be performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' by 76% of respondents in Tanga and by 79% in Lindi, whilst only 50% of respondents in Morogoro felt this way about their municipality. It is evident that this difference in perception was influenced by the consistently lower achievement rate of Morogoro in the secondary school Form IV examinations since 2011, as indicated in Table 7.3 above. However, this finding on education shows a more favourable response than previous studies on the topic. For example, Makorere (2012, p. 236) found that 66.7% in Maswa district 'had the view that local government does not improve education service'. Table 7.4 below reflects a more positive perception in the three case-study LGAs.[41]

Table 7.4: Perceptions on the levels of service delivery under the hybrid model of decentralisation (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Very bad	Fairly bad	Undecided (Don't know)	Fairly well	Very well
Education services					
Tanga	4	14	6	67	9
Morogoro	2	46	2	50	-
Lindi	9	12	-	52	27
Total	*5*	*26*	*3*	*57*	*10*
Health services					
Tanga	13	16	3	63	5
Morogoro	12	30	4	54	-
Lindi	34	38	1	21	6
Total	*18*	*27*	*3*	*49*	*3*
Water and sanitation					
Tanga	15	14	5	64	2
Morogoro	6	42	2	42	8
Lindi	70	18	1	7	4
Total	*25*	*25*	*3*	*42*	*5*
Local roads					
Tanga	5	12	3	66	14
Morogoro	42	36	2	18	2
Lindi	29	55	3	11	2
Total	*25*	*32*	*3*	*34*	*6*

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

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[41] There is no statistical evidence available to indicate whether the population of Maswa still maintains the same views about the delivery of education services.

The overall results of the citizen survey indicate that over half (52%) of the respondents in all three case-study areas perceived their local government to be performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in the delivery of health services. However, major differences were recorded between Lindi and the other two. Table 7.4 indicates that unlike Tanga (68%) and Morogoro (54%), where the majority of the respondents said that their local government performed 'fairly well' or 'very well', 72% of respondents in Lindi felt their LGA performed 'fairly badly' or 'very badly' in providing health services. However, analysis of official health data reveals that access to health facilities is more favourable in Tanga and Lindi regions than it is in Morogoro. Table 7.5 below shows that in June 2013 the proportion of the population living within 5km[42] of health facilities in Tanga (87.9%) and Lindi (79.5%) was above the national rate of 71.9%, while Morogoro (71.5%) fell slightly below it (URT, 2013a, p. 21).[43]

Table 7.5: Population living within 5km of health facilities in study regions 2013

Region	Total Population	Population <5KM	% Population <5KM
Tanga	2,051,273	1,802,451	87.9
Lindi	979,391	778,486	79.5
Morogoro	2,468,595	1,766,187	71.5

Source: Summary and Analysis of the Comprehensive Council Health Plans 2013/2014

The data in Table 7.5 above shows that Lindi region appears to have a higher population living within 5km of health facilities than Morogoro region. At 79.5% it is also above the national rate of 71.9%. The discontent of the people in Lindi with the level of service delivery in their LGA (as shown in Table 7.4) could, as discussed elsewhere, be explained by factors other than limited access to health facilities.

With regards to water and sanitation services, less than half (47%) of respondents in all three case-study areas perceived their local government to be performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in service delivery. However, similar to the patterns in the delivery of health services, major differences were recorded between Lindi and the other two local councils. As Table 7.4 above reveals, while 66% of citizens surveyed in Tanga and 50% in

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[42] The national standard for allocation of health facilities.
[43] The reported percentage of population living within 5km of health facilities countrywide by June 2013 was 71.9% (URT, 2013a, p. 21).

Morogoro stated that their local government performed 'fairly well' or 'very well', while 84% of respondents in Lindi said their local government performed 'fairly badly' or 'very badly' in providing water and sanitation services. Regional Administration officials in Tanga confirmed that, according to their official evaluation, the performance of the water and sanitation sector in Tanga City Council is above average, and possibly 'much higher than what the citizens perceived in the survey, except in some depleted industrial areas' (RA official, Tanga 01.04.2015). The findings on access to water in Tanga and Morogoro suggest similar patterns to the national data. The government report *Tanzania in Figures 2012* indicates that, 'access to safe drinking water in Tanzania is more of an urban phenomenon, whereby about 74% of urban households have access to safe drinking water as compared to about 40% of their rural counterparts' (URT, 2013b, pp. iv–v).

However, the survey results for water services in Lindi district are significantly lower than the national data cited above. It is important to understand why this might be so. A regional administration official in Lindi confirmed that 'the situation of water services in Lindi district council is not good because there is no piped water; only a few wells are available to communities; and the water projects have not yielded big results in this district' (RA official Lindi 12.03.2015). A participant in a focus group discussion with CMT members in Lindi noted that 'the actual performance of Lindi district in provision of water services is less than 50% of the policy requirements of the national standards, so to say' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). Official records from Lindi District Council also indicate that, based on the national water policy, the proportion of the population served with clean water at present is between 45% and 49.25% of the total population (LDC, 2014a, p. viii, 2014b, p. 29).

It is evident that the TASAF funding would have had a bigger impact on water supply in Lindi District Council had the people and the district administration identified the water sector as a priority for TASAF infrastructural development during the participatory planning phase. However, a number of factors, such as the national budget guidelines which prioritise spending on the education and health sectors, and the tendency of council administrators and local political office bearers to spread the allocation of development funds over many sectors, influenced the amount of TASAF funding available for the water sector. This, inevitably, impacted on the water services delivered.

Participants in focus group discussions with CMT members in Lindi maintained that there are multiple factors affecting both access to and the quality of water services in this rural council (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). For instance, participants said that when the World Bank project for rural water supply commissioned a feasibility study, some village areas were approved for the drilling of deep wells based on expert recommendations. However, despite the time and money invested, in some areas water was never found and the project was either shifted to nearby villages or abandoned (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). This, according to focus group participants, led to the low ratings respondents assigned to water service delivery (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015).

Comparing the water sector with education, another participant stated that 'it is easier to build a school in any place, say for example in each village, but not a water facility because its supply depends on various geographical factors such as the water table and water current' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). Given that geographical factors significantly affect the water sector, another focus group participant asserted, 'not all the places or villages will have access to potable water within the national norm of 400m^2' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015).

The results of the citizen survey shown in Table 7.4 above, indicate that less than half (40%) of the respondents in all three case-study areas perceived their local government to be performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in maintaining roads. However, significant variations were recorded between the urban and rural respondents. Whereas the majority of respondents in Tanga City (80%) said that their local government performed 'fairly well' or 'very well' in maintaining local roads, the majority in Morogoro (78%) and Lindi (84%) felt their local government performed 'fairly badly' or 'very badly'. Confirming this variation, a participant in a CMT focus group discussion in Lindi stated that in some areas in rural councils, like Mpembe in Lindi District Council, it is very difficult to construct a road network, even if this has been identified as a priority by the residents in those areas in their local plans (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). By way of explanation, a local government official said[44] that the Mpembe and Ruo villages in Kiwalala ward are situated across Lukuledi River, which has a wide valley. The river is full throughout the year, and much of the land area of the two villages is wetland. This makes it difficult to construct a bridge and a road network to these villages given the current resource

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[44] Telephone interview, 28th August 2015.

constraints in the local council (LG staff, Lindi 28.08.2015). Another focus group participant in Lindi maintained 'if the people in those areas are asked about the quality of and access to road services, they must rate us very badly because taking a road to such areas is almost impossible or alternatively it would be very expensive' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). However, the council has taken some steps to ease the transport problem in this area by constructing a temporary (although unreliable) pedestrian bridge.

In response to the government's perceived inaction in solving the road and health services problems in Lindi, the residents of Luo and Mpembe Villages of Kiwalala ward in Lindi boycotted the local government elections held in December 2014 and refused to participate in village leadership elections. This was an effort to pressure the government into addressing their long-standing concerns about poor road and health services in their communities.[45] Interestingly, the boycotting of local elections was observed by the supporters of all political parties in the area. The main concern of these villagers was that the village dispensary was not serving the community adequately due to a lack of staff and a shortage of medicines, and as a consequence of the poor road system, patients were unable to travel to alternative health facilities in other parts of the district. The decision by the villagers in Lindi to boycott the 2014 local elections suggests, following Lange (2008, p. 1140), that aspirant community leaders might be correct in thinking that they will have a far greater chance of fulfilling their role of 'providers' for their communities by becoming members of the TASAF CMCs than by contesting for the village council leadership. In other words, this suggests that the people have come to realise that local democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for their development, and that they 'can't eat democracy'.[46]

Table 7.4 above suggests that the quality and quantity of services provided by local governments differ from area to area. This could be attributed to a number of factors including inequalities in resource allocation by central government and unequal capacity in local revenue generation among LGAs. The TASAF funding could have been used to

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[45] TBC is a public service broadcaster. URL: http://www.tbc.go.tz/read/?id=1810 accessed on August 22, 2015.

[46] A catch phrase most used in South Africa. See for example, Jacob Zuma's speech at the 20th World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa, reported on *World Economic Forum News release* May 07, 2010, URL: http://www.weforum.org and *fin24*, May 07, 2010, URL: http://www.fin24.com; and *NPR Parallels*, December 14, 2013, URL: http://www.npr.org;

even out these resource inequalities, but because of political pressure[47] and the diversity and complexity of poverty, the Fund's financing ends up being distributed countrywide, even to relatively well-off councils. In that regard, a councillor in Lindi maintained that:

> If local councils are assigned the responsibility of providing all services including the TASAF ones, some councils would fail to deliver and would practically become non-existent because of resource limitations (Councillor Lindi, 02.05.2014).

Another councillor confirmed this, saying that it is of no value to push for greater council autonomy under the current constricted funding regime and the fact that local governments are not ready for a complete devolution (Councillor Lindi, 19.06.2014). The views of councillors interviewed in Lindi suggest that without TASAF support local governments in that area would largely fail in their delivery of services.

Local political office bearers in all three local councils understood that the performance of their local authorities fell short of what was expected of them by their residents, particularly in terms of the operational delivery of service. A councillor in Morogoro, for example, maintained that, 'in terms of service delivery, the performance of our council is almost 50% of peoples' expectations for now' (Councillor Morogoro$_{02}$ 11.07.2014). This assertion matched the perceptions of the ordinary citizens surveyed in Morogoro about almost all sectors, except local roads, as shown in Table 7.4 above.

Key informants from the World Bank, ALAT, central government ministries and local councils, together with the participants of focus group discussions, believed that sectoral variations in local councils' performance are the result of the approach adopted by the government in implementing its decentralisation policy (World Bank official 19.04.2015; ministry official 11.06.2014; ALAT official 01.07.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). The approach adopted, according to respondents, seems to be more one of deconcentration than devolution. This is because decisions on what percent of the LGAs' resources should be spent in each sector are made by the central government (World Bank official 19.04.2015; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). Such funding decisions, moreover, tend to be biased in favour of some sectors, such as education, while others like water and local roads remain disadvantaged (FGD Lindi 11.03.2015). A participant in a focus group discussion in Lindi stated that, 'it

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[47] For example, in response to pressure in the Parliament, the government extended TASAF to all the districts of the country from the second phase (Braathen, 2005).

is a national policy that funding for the education sector be prioritised over other sectors like water and local roads' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015). As a consequence, another focus group participant stated, 'it is obvious that peoples' perceptions would also be biased towards the education sector than toward water and roads, in the belief that the council is not doing its work properly' (FGD CMT Lindi 11.03.2015).

To confirm the reliability of the survey data in Table 7.4 citizens were further probed about their experiences in service delivery failures in the education, health and water sectors. They were asked how often, if ever, they have encountered shortages of clean water, and expensive services, shortages of supply, overcrowded facilities and absent staff in the education and health sectors. Table 7.6 below indicates that the majority in all three LGAs (Tanga 79%; Morogoro 76%; Lindi 61%) had 'never' encountered the problem of expensive fees in local schools to the extent of failing to register their children during the past year. However, while a small majority of citizens surveyed in Morogoro (56%) 'never' encountered the problem of expensive services in the health sector, the majority in Lindi (55%) and Tanga (50%) have done so 'once' or 'always'.

Concerning shortages of educational and medical supplies, while the majority of respondents in Morogoro (86%) and Tanga (54%) had encountered a lack of textbooks in local schools 'once' or 'often', the majority in Lindi had 'never' experienced this problem. As for medical supplies, the majority of respondents in all three LGAs had encountered a lack of medicines or other supplies at their local clinic or hospital either once or often during the preceding year (Tanga 85%; Morogoro 90%; Lindi 87%). However, a regional administration official in Lindi maintained that 'the situation of the availability of medicines in public local clinics and hospitals in Lindi had improved over the past two years' (RA official, Lindi 12.03.2015).

In terms of overcrowded facilities, the problem of overcrowding in public schools, which simply means an insufficient number of classrooms, was experienced 'once' or 'often' by the majority of respondents in Morogoro (90%) and Tanga (66%) but not in Lindi where 57% said they had 'never' experienced this phenomenon. This finding suggests that, as a consequence of the increase in schools that brought about by the TASAF construction programme, new schools have created a greater demand for schooling and have raised expectations. TASAF Management Unit officials confirmed that the initiative to increase the number of service facilities in local communities had both improved utilisation and

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also created a higher demand for the services on offer. As a result, the education sector is now facing the challenge of overcrowded classrooms due to increased enrolments (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). However, as indicated, the enrolment statistics do not always confirm this trend. In respect to the quality of teaching in local schools, whereas the majority of respondents in Tanga (59%) and Lindi (85%) 'never' encountered poor teaching, the majority in Morogoro (80%) claimed they had done so a 'few times' or 'often' over the past year.

As for the problem of overcrowded health facilities, which normally leads to long waiting times in public clinics, most citizens surveyed in all three areas said that they had encountered the problem 'once' or 'often' (Tanga 86%; Morogoro 90%; Lindi 72%). A regional administration official in Lindi said that the problem of overcrowded health facilities had been slightly improved by the growing number of public dispensaries and clinics built by LGAs and TASAF within local communities (RA official, Lindi 12.03.2015). However, overcrowded health facilities remain a challenge because, as a TASAF official maintained, 'improved health services have created shortages of supplies and overcrowding in health centres and (a shortage of) hospital beds due to the rising number of patients, expecting mothers and children attending clinics' (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). The problem of overcrowded facilities, a Ministry official maintained, may be attributed to the fact that a number of health facilities and classrooms, and especially those which are not TASAF funded projects, remain unfinished due to the LGAs' limited financial capacity (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014). The number of unfinished buildings for school and health facilities is also attributable to the longer implementation time for council projects. Many take up to three years, unlike the TASAF projects which take less than a year to be completed.

Although the majority of respondents in Tanga (68%) had 'never' encountered a shortage of water supply for domestic use, the majority interviewed in Morogoro (76%) and Lindi (61%) had encountered shortages (or had gone without enough clean water) 'several times' or 'always' during the preceding past year.

Table 7.6: Frequency of citizen experiences with service delivery problems in LGAs (N=400)

	Never	Once	Few times	Often	Always	Don't know
I. EDUCATION						
Expensive school fees						
Tanga	79	7	3	3	1	7
Morogoro	76	4	14	6	–	–
Lindi	61	23	4	6	4	2
Lack of textbooks						
Tanga	41	3	23	28	–	5
Morogoro	8	2	30	54		6
Lindi	84	10	2	2	–	2
Poor teaching						
Tanga	59	1	9	19	–	11
Morogoro	16	2	26	52	–	4
Lindi	85	3	1	1	–	10
Overcrowded classrooms						
Tanga	31	1	22	40	–	6
Morogoro	6	2	10	78	–	4
Lindi	57	10	12	12	–	9
II. HEALTH						
Expensive health services						
Tanga	49	9	23	16	2	1
Morogoro	56	2	30	6	6	–
Lindi	43	38	8	9	–	2
Lack of medicines						
Tanga	15	5	41	39	–	1
Morogoro	6	0	28	62	–	4
Lindi	12	18	38	31	–	1
Overcrowded clinic						
Tanga	12	1	46	39	–	2
Morogoro	8	6	50	34	–	2
Lindi	26	12	26	34	–	2
III. WATER						
Shortage of clean water						
Tanga	68	9	13	4	3	3
Morogoro	24	10	38	4	24	–
Lindi	38	1	6	15	39	1

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

It is worth noting that official statistics (for example in the water sector in Lindi), and the justifications given by regional officials and local administrators during interviews and focus group discussions serve to confirm the reliability of citizens' perceptions about the level of LGAs performance in public service delivery presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.6 above. However, these data tell us very little about the impact of TASAF as most of them are related to the operational problems of local councils' delivery of physical services, such as administering treatment in health facilities and teaching students in schools, over which TASAF has little influence. This, inevitably, clouds popular perceptions of the impact of TASAF investments in service infrastructural development as citizens tend to

evaluate health and educational services according to their operational efficiency and effectiveness.

7.3 The contribution of the Tanzania Social Action Fund to public service delivery

World Bank officials maintained that social funds in Sub-Saharan Africa, TASAF among them, have contributed significantly to the provision of public services and have 'done a good job, and a lot of good work' (World Bank official 23.03.2015). In similar fashion, TASAF Management Unit (TMU) officials said studies have shown that TASAF is meeting its objective of improving local service delivery. The research cited by the TASAF officials includes the work of Tenga (2013); Tungaraza, Mbise, Msengwa and Mlele (2012) and ACHRID (2011), among others. TASAF officials maintained that the Fund supported service delivery in the areas most in need of it, and in highly deprived communities. A TASAF official asserted that the fund's public works projects 'apart from putting money into the pockets of the poor who work in them, have also opened up the remote areas in terms of roads' (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014).

Local government officials and local political office bearers interviewed in all three LGAs agreed that TASAF had contributed significantly to improving the provision of public services and to reducing the shortage of service infrastructure by constructing more classrooms, dispensaries, bridges, roads and wells. A council administrator in Tanga stated that, 'the impact of TASAF support for infrastructural development was more evident in areas that had been underserved by the council' (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). The TASAF infrastructural development programme had thus:

> constructed dispensaries, classrooms, teachers' houses and administration blocks and had furnished them with the necessary furniture as evident in such schools as Tongoni, Mwapachu, Pande, Mabokweni, Chongoleani and MACECHU secondary schools, Chuma primary school and many other places (CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014).

A grassroots local government administrator in Tanga also confirmed that the projects in which TASAF assisted LGAs were completed and commenced delivering services to communities within a considerably shorter time than it would have taken if such projects had been implemented by the councils on their own (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). Officials from all levels of government, together with local politicians, acknowledged that whereas

TASAF projects took about 12 months to be completed, it could take council projects up to three years before a facility began delivering services. This reality is supported by the fact that TASAF operational manuals specify that only those service facility installation projects which can be completed within 12 months are eligible for funding by TASAF (TASAF, 2005, 2013).

In the same vein, participants in a CMT focus group discussion in Lindi maintained that TASAF had helped in ensuring equity in the distribution of service facilities among local communities by complementing the Council's investment efforts in primary and secondary school classrooms, teachers' houses and administration blocks; dispensaries, water supply schemes and village roads (FGDs CMT, Lindi 02.05.2014; 11.03.2015). A council administrator in Lindi said that 'one of the visible impacts of TASAF in Lindi district is that it has made available badly needed village roads' (CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014), while a CMT member in Lindi district council maintained that:

> Whereas the LGAs road fund grants addressed the district road network, TASAF went as far as addressing the village roads in communities that were most in need. That way, I can say TASAF has helped our LGA to ensure equity in the provision of road transport services to local communities' (CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014).

This favourable assessment runs counter to the findings of Table 7.4, which indicate that 83% of respondents in Lindi thought the roads were 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. In addition, as previously noted, citizens in some villages in the district refused to participate in local elections due to their dissatisfaction with local roads. However, divergence in the opinions of local officials and community members surveyed could be attributable to the fact that, notwithstanding the construction of village roads with TASAF funding, many were not linked to the urban areas feeder roads, which were the responsibility of local councils.

This was confirmed by CMC members in Lindi who maintained that the village roads built by TASAF have not been that useful to the respective communities because the council has not linked their villages to the main roads (district roads) (CMC members Lindi, 03.05.2015). As a consequence, it was stated, TASAF's had not had that bigger impact on the road sector in Lindi due to the Council's financial constraints and its failure to top up TASAF investments. However, notwithstanding this shortcoming, according to CMT focus group discussants in Lindi, the deconcentration of TASAF funds down to local communities had 'helped in building more roads with inputs from the communities,

hence improving communities' access to markets and other economic service institutions' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014).

A CMT member in Tanga felt that 'the hybrid model of decentralisation is effective because, it is good to maintain different approaches in service delivery so that if one approach fails to deliver another one complements it' (CMT member Tanga, 14.07.2014). The effectiveness of this approach, however, as noted above, was only evident in the development of infrastructure but not in strengthening the operational activities of local councils (such as in improving teaching in schools and treatment in dispensaries), where TASAF had less influence. Grassroots local government officials and local political office bearers acknowledged the complementarity of TASAF and LGAs efforts in the delivery of public services to local communities. Grassroots politicians in Lindi district maintained that, in some villages, the only service facilities available were the ones installed by TASAF (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). Focus group participants in Majengo ward in Lindi also claimed that the local council had failed to support such facilities (FGD Majengo Lindi, 03.05.2014). Local politicians and focus group discussants in those areas asserted that had it not been for TASAF, some communities would have gone without health and education services for a long time due to a lack of funding as, hitherto, the district council had not prioritised development in these localities (Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2014). A participant in a focus group discussion in Majengo Lindi stated that:

> In our ward, it was only TASAF who built classrooms and the road. The District Council did not add any classrooms at Mbagala primary school apart from the two classes built by TASAF. As you can see, there are only two classrooms for all existing five classes from standard one to five. It means that Mbagala primary school would not have been there without the TASAF project (FGD Majengo Lindi 03.05.2014).

Apart from complementing the service delivery of LGAs, council administrators and focus group participants revealed that the TASAF model has created a positive form of competition between the CMCs and local government institutions for improved delivery of public service infrastructure to local communities. Members of the CMT interviewed in the three LGAs confirmed that competition with TASAF in delivering service infrastructure helped to bring about changes in how communities are served and in the quality of services provided (CMT member Tanga, 14.07.2014; CMT Morogoro 10.07.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014; 11.03.2015). In communities where both the

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council and TASAF infrastructure projects were implemented, neither the CMC nor the local government institution (village council or ward administration) implementing council projects was willing to be outdone by the other, for example, by being seen as having constructed a substandard facility. This was because the CMC leaders and village council leaders understood that local communities were comparing their performance and that they would hold them accountable.

Local government officials and local political office bearers in all three municipalities asserted that TASAF has assisted in improving the economic and living conditions of the people in their local communities through its investments in agriculture, livestock and other household income-generating projects, especially for poor and vulnerable groups (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; CMT member Tanga, 14.08.2014; WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). A participant in a focus group discussion with CMT members in Lindi confirmed that, 'TASAF has had an impact on agriculture, livestock and other income generating projects. In fact, it has improved the living conditions of the people in local communities' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014). Participants in focus group discussions with the village leadership and the CMC leaders in Mabokweni, Tanga, also confirmed that TASAF has significantly assisted poor households by providing them with working capital for investment in small business, fishery, poultry farming and livestock keeping (FGD Mabokweni Tanga 02.04.2015).

Analysis of official records from TASAF in Table 7.7 below supports the assertion that TASAF had contributed significantly in improving service delivery in local councils. The table shows TASAF's contribution in terms of the number of subprojects or facilities financed in the various sectors. In the education sector, the data indicate that in its second phase (TASAF II) between 2005 and 2013, the Fund had implemented 31 projects in Tanga City Council which, amongst other facilities, included 62 primary and secondary school classrooms. In Morogoro District Council, the 16 projects implemented put in place 51 classrooms and other educational facilities, and in Lindi District Council, the 54 projects implemented, included the construction of 70 classrooms and other facilities such as staff houses, offices and laboratories. While there was no subproject implemented for the construction of dispensaries in Tanga, about nine were implemented in Morogoro and Lindi. In the water sector, nine projects were implemented in Tanga, two in Morogoro and 16 in Lindi. These included the installation of water service facilities such as wells,

boreholes, water kiosks, sewerage and drainage systems, as well as water catchment conservation. In the road sector, TASAF II implemented two projects in Tanga, 20 in Morogoro and 35 in Lindi, which constructed or rehabilitated local roads. In the economic sector, TASAF II implemented 43 income-generating projects in Tanga, 48 in Morogoro and 101 in Lindi. Through these projects grants were issued to vulnerable or targeted groups as operating capital to establish income-generating activities such as fish farming, poultry, dairy farming, and horticulture.

Table 7.7: TASAF II contribution in local government service delivery within case study areas 2005-2013

Sector	Type of project	Tanga		Morogoro		Lindi	
		Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)	Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)	Number of projects	Expenditure (shillings)
Education	Classrooms, office, staff quarters and laboratories construction for secondary and primary education.	31 (62 classrooms built)	896878903	16 (51 classrooms built)	457253773	54 (70 classrooms built)	1731722430
Health	Dispensary construction	-	-	9	284494318	9	227274064
	HIV care and sensitisation	17	75126200	4	16,593,280	9	42065140
Water	Borehole drilling, shallow wells, irrigation and catchment conservation	9	245721006	2	51784400	16	417776887
Roads	Local roads and bridges construction and rehabilitation	2	71191565	20	606035084	35	1048454829
Economic	Market place construction	1	10478600	-	-	7	180321900
	Income generating projects	43	579294482	48	359550890	101	1068710797
Total		**103**	**1878690756 (US$ 1252461)**	**99**	**1775711745 (US$ 1183808)**	**231**	**4716326047 (US$ 3144217)**

Source: Analysed by the Author from the TASAF subprojects implementation status report, 30th June 2013.

The TASAF officials, council administrators and local political office bearers interviewed indicated that the Fund had improved service utilisation by making available such facilities as classrooms, dispensaries, water kiosks and feeder roads in local communities (TMU official 30.03.2015; CMT members Morogoro 10.07.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). A member of the council management team in Lindi confirmed that the construction of health service facilities such as dispensaries, staff quarters, and wards by TASAF and the local council 'has increased access to and utilisation of health services in the district' (CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014).

Moreover, TASAF Management Unit officials and council administrators confirmed that, by making school enrolment and clinic attendance the key preconditions for the safety nets grant provided by TASAF to poor households, the Fund had improved the utilisation of health and education services in local communities (TMU official 30.03.2015; CMT members Morogoro 10.07.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). The scaling up of cash transfer (safety net grants) to all people 'living under the basic needs poverty line' (that is 33.6% of the Tanzania's population) (TASAF, 2013, p. 2) in the third phase (TASAF III) which was still being rolled out in the case study areas at the time of this research, might influence clinic and school attendance still further.

TASAF had contributed significantly to improving financial control and accountability at the local level. By adopting a deconcentrated administrative system and broadening citizen oversight of its interventions, TASAF has influenced local government accountability in both a top-down and bottom-up way (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). Ward administrators in all three local councils maintained that, through conditional transfers and citizen participation, thefts, embezzlement of public funds and sabotage of projects have declined in LGAs (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; WEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). Local government officials stated that non-discretionary transfers, especially TASAF funding, made it difficult for dishonest staff and local political office bearers to tamper with the use of such money as it was attached to a specific activity and a specific expenditure point (i.e. the community) (CMT members, Lindi 05.05.2015; Morogoro 10.07.2014). A TASAF management unit official also maintained that councillors might not be very much happy with the way TASAF operates because it denies them a chance to reallocate or misuse project money to suit to their own ends or political objectives (TMU official, 30.03.2015). Evidence to support the fact that TASAF projects have sound accountability mechanisms is to be found in the Controller and

Auditor General's 2010/2011 annual report, which states that 'TASAF is a very good example of a project owned by local communities and (that) is doing well relatively' (National Audit Office (NAO), 2012, p. 170).

A councillor in Tanga claimed that because councillors are not fully in charge of the implementation of TASAF projects under the current set up, CMCs leaders use the opportunity to engage in corrupt practices and enrich themselves at the expense of the quality of services delivered in those projects (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). A ministry official in Dodoma also raised suspicions that CMCs may not be effective in delivering services, based on his belief that such committees are vulnerable to a number of accountability issues. However, these appear to be minority opinions as a ministry official, local government administrators in Lindi and Tanga and a councillor in Morogoro all maintained that the committees had been very efficient in delivering service infrastructure and that they had experienced very few cases of financial irregularity in TASAF projects (Ministry official$_{01}$ 12.06.2014; CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This, according to a ministry official, was because 'TASAF has strong financial management at the community and LGA levels' (Ministry official$_{02}$ 11.06.2014).

The national audit report cited above indicates that about 95 councils out of the 130 local councils audited in 2011, including Tanga City Council and Morogoro District Council, were issued with unqualified opinions, meaning that they had clean audit records. Lindi District Council was among 30 councils issued with unqualified opinion but with queries about specific matters.[48] Only four councils had qualified opinions and one had an adverse opinion (NAO, 2012, pp. 39–46). In essence, of the four major donor-funded projects audited in 2011, including the Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP), Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP), TASAF and the Health Basket Fund (HBF), TASAF emerged as the best both in terms of the largest number of clean project audits and fewer qualified and adverse opinions among its implementing councils (NAO, 2012, p. xvii).

TASAF Management Unit officials in Dar es Salaam also confirmed that, in dozens of projects, they had rarely encountered accountability issues or the misuse of funds by

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[48] Lindi was queried about partially implemented TASAF activities, such as construction of Namupa secondary school, a primary school at Majengo and two classrooms at Kitomanga and Luwale primary schools (NAO, 2012).

CMCs and councils (TMU official 14.05.2014; 30.03.2015) and, according to a TASAF official:

> If it is proved that our money is misused by the local government authority, the TASAF's stand is that the local government must pay back the money in compliance with our memorandum of understanding, and it is up to the respective local council to deal with their staff who might have led them to such a situation (TMU official 30.03.2015).

The approach was possible because of the strategic positioning of TASAF in the President's Office, which, of previously discussed, lends added authority and command over the use of the Funds money in LGAs. This points to the effectiveness of a top-down accountability mechanism, although some respondents believed that it undermines formal local government accountability since some institutions like the WDCs are not fully engaged in and have little influence over TASAF projects (Ministry official$_{01}$ 11.06.2014).

Another contribution of TASAF to local government service delivery is the introduction of simplified and more efficient procurement methods for community-based implementation of projects. The TASAF procurement system is well documented in its operational manuals (TASAF 2005, 2013) and includes such methods as local purchasing based on quotations obtained from three qualified local contractors/suppliers; direct contracting; and the implementation of projects by communities' own skilled and unskilled labour (force account)[49] (TASAF 2005, p. 2). Local political office bearers interviewed and participants in focus group discussions with ministry officials asserted that, unlike the LGAs' competitive tendering system that creates loopholes for the embezzlement of public funds in the form of kickbacks, procurement fixing or price hiking, the TASAF' procurement system is more efficient and delivers good value for money. This is because it allows for local sourcing of project materials at the lowest cost and direct spending of money on project costs (Councillors Lindi, 19.06.2014, Morogoro 11.07.2014; FGD PMORALG, 11.06.2014). As a consequence, TASAF's procurement system was considered to be better suited to the grassroots implementation of projects

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[49] Force account refers to the part of the expense account of a public institution (i.e. municipality) resulting from the employment of own labour to carry out a construction project instead of contracting out to commercial agencies('Force Account [Def. 1]', n.d.)

than the competitive bidding system most used by local councils (Councillors Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMT member Morogoro 10.07.2014).

7.4 Citizen satisfaction with public services under the hybrid model of decentralisation

Ordinary citizens interviewed in the case study areas were asked about their level of satisfaction with the quality of public services delivered by LGAs under the D-by-D policy and deconcentrated TASAF projects. As Table 7.8 below reveals, 33% of respondent in all three municipalities stated they were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the services provided under the D-by-D decentralisation programme. This number was lower than the 44% who stated that they were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the services provided under the deconcentrated services of TASAF. However, there were significant variances in the responses recorded in the different local councils. Thus, whilst over a third (38%) of respondents in Tanga were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with LGAs services, less than a quarter (13%) were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the quality of services provided by TASAF. Conversely, whilst 38% of respondents in Morogoro were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with LGAs services, over three quarters (82%) held the same view about the quality of services provided by TASAF. In Lindi District Council, less than a quarter (18%) of respondents were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with the quality of LGAs services, while a third (33%) were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with services provided by TASAF. Significantly, 55% of respondents in Lindi were 'not at all satisfied' with the performance of their municipality in contrast to the 12% who felt that way about TASAF.

Table 7.8: Levels of citizen satisfaction with public services under the hybrid model of decentralisation (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Not at all satisfied	Less satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Very satisfied	Don't know
Services provided under decentralisation (D-by-D)					
Tanga	15	46	33	5	1
Morogoro	16	44	36	2	2
Lindi	55	27	18	-	-
Total	*25*	*41*	*30*	*3*	*1*
Services provided under deconcentration (TASAF)					
Tanga	22	49	11	2	16
Morogoro	6	6	76	6	6
Lindi	12	55	30	3	-
Total	*14*	*34*	*40*	*4*	*8*

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

Whilst these result point to greater satisfaction with TASAF projects than those delivered through the D-By-D programme, it is evident that overall levels of citizen satisfaction could be influenced, as previously suggested, by poor service delivery in the new facilities provided; in other words, this could be an operational problem. Supporting this argument, a previous study by Makorere (2012, p. 226) confirmed that 'poor social service delivery including education service has an implication to the citizens' level of satisfaction'. It was also suggested that the relatively low levels of satisfaction were influenced by the fact that some citizens are still not that satisfied with current achievements because they expect more from their local governments (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014). In that regard a councillor in Lindi maintained:

> Because of the infrastructural development programme and the ongoing improvements in the provision of services in their communities, people are increasingly appreciating the role played by TASAF and so their levels of satisfaction are rising (Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014).

A participant in focus group discussions in Mikese ward, Morogoro, also acknowledged that:

> The level of community satisfaction with the services delivered by local government is improving with the recent special interventions by TASAF, and government policies to promote the provision of such services as education, health and water' (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014).

7.5 Challenges facing TASAF in the delivery of services to local communities

Notwithstanding the significant contribution it has made towards the improved provision of services, and improved levels of citizen satisfaction with the access to and quality of services delivered, the TASAF model is faced with some challenges which might influence its future effectiveness. TASAF's infrastructure development programme has faced the challenge of unmatched LGA funding and staffing support and this, in turn, has limited the service delivery capacity of some newly constructed facilities (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

Income-generating projects, likewise, have in some instances faced challenges that have limited their impact. These challenges include a lack of local economic expertise, the need for integration of income-generating activities with other government departments, and relatedly, problems with the sustainability of the projects initiated. Participants in focus group discussions with beneficiaries of income-generating interventions in Tanga, Morogoro, and Lindi indicated that some of these challenges had impeded the smooth running of their projects (FGD Kiwalala Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014; FGD Mabokweni Tanga 03.04.2015).

Some ministry officials, regional administration officials and local government administrators also expressed concerns about the sustainability of TASAF projects and services (Ministry official 12.06.2014; RA official, Morogoro 09.07.2014; CMT member Lindi 012.03.2015; WEO Tanga, 14.02.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014). Local politicians in Tanga and Morogoro maintained that a handful projects, especially ones aimed at economic empowerment (income-generating activities) had not been sustainable; some had started well but had failed as time progressed (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).). *Mtaa* and village

administrators, although acknowledging that income-generating projects had indeed been beneficial for poor people and communities, also observed that there is a need for a greater focus on the sustainability of these initiatives (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014; VEO Lindi 02.05.2014).

A TASAF Management Unit official interviewed in Dar es Salaam maintained that, among the challenges of supporting income-generating activities was the tendency for 'every group to opt for a similar type of project, such as poultry keeping, and as a results the market was flooded and prices fell' (TMU official 30.03.2015). Participants in focus group discussions with the beneficiaries of the income-generating projects in Tanga confirmed that many people in their communities are engaged in commercial chicken production, leading to lower sales and lower market prices and, inevitably, increased production costs (FGD Mabokweni Tanga 03.04.2015).

Further challenges, according to a political office bearer in Morogoro, related to the fact that 'many of the livestock-keeping projects established by TASAF for vulnerable groups, including the elderly and HIV victims, failed because of animal diseases and mishandling' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). A TASAF district official in Morogoro acknowledged that some livestock-keeping projects had suffered from diseases which led to many livestock deaths (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). Participants of a focus group discussion with CMCs leaders in Mabokweni, Tanga confirmed that their projects, especially the poultry and goat-keeping projects, have been extensively challenged by diseases but had received limited veterinary support from the local council (FGD Mabokweni 02.04.2015).

Local politicians felt that, by relying on a prescribed list of options (i.e. a shopping list)[50] for the identification of fundable projects, TASAF's economic empowerment and income-generating interventions have not paid sufficient attention to the existing economic activities of targeted beneficiary populations. They argued that this oversight could affect the sustainability and quality of TASAF interventions in the long run (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). For instance, because some projects funded by TASAF were seen to be more demanding than their existing income-generating activities, some vulnerable households lost interest in the longer-term goals of an intervention and

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[50] But participants of a focus group discussion with *mtaa* leadership and CMC leaders in Mabokweni, Tanga, confirmed that the 'TASAF list of projects was very broad and all-inclusive'; enough to give communities a wide choice of subprojects (FGD Mabokweni, Tanga 02.04.2015).

focused instead on short-term, and unsustainable, gains. The example given in this instance was of the *memelas* (chicken cooperatives) (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). Some beneficiaries also lost interest in co-operative projects and decided not to continue participating in them (FGD Mabokweni 02.04.2015; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Councillors understood that this happened because people lacked the knowledge to make informed choices about the kinds of projects they should choose for TASAF funding. Furthermore, they were adequately informed about the advantages of cooperative production and the potential returns on the long-term investment of TASAF grants (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

7.6 Conclusion

The survey results presented in this chapter indicate that the hybrid model of decentralisation has had an impact on the provision of public services countrywide, and especially in the three case-study local councils. However, the quality and quantity of services provided by local government differed from area to area owing to factors that include central government policy priorities, inequalities in resource allocation by central government, and the unequal capacity of local councils. Similarly, the impact of TASAF on service delivery varied from place to place, and while Tanga and Morogoro appear to have strengthened all of their services, Lindi has, in many cases, lagged behind.

Nevertheless, respondents believed that without TASAF, LGAs would have struggled to improve levels of service delivery, particularly in regard to the strengthening of infrastructural development. It is evident that TASAF's achievements are not approved by all stakeholders and while some councillors and ministry officials lauded its achievements, others felt that it had undermined local democracy. In general, however, the findings of this research indicate that most local government administrators and communities believed that that TASAF got things done much more quickly and more effectively than the local councils.

The chapter which follows looks at the extent to which officials, local politicians and community believe that the hybrid model of decentralisation has contributed towards citizen participation in the case study municipalities.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PERCEPTIONS ON THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

8.1   Introduction

Previous chapters identified citizen participation as one of the three key elements of decentralisation along with the strengthened capacity of local governments and improved service delivery. As indicated in chapter seven, the majority of the citizens interviewed in this survey regarded enhanced citizen participation as the main improvement in local councils following the introduction of the hybrid model of decentralisation. This chapter analyses different stakeholders' perceptions of the effectiveness of participatory systems which have been introduced and, in particular, the direct forms of engagement introduced by TASAF.

8.2   Dimensions of participation

Article 21(1) and (2) of the Constitution defines participation as a citizen's entitlement to:

> take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected by the people […]' and to 'participate fully in the process leading to the decision on matters affecting him, his well-being or the nation' (*CURT*, 1977).

Participation, as defined by central government ministry officials, includes such processes as: the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) planning exercise; transparency in local institutions (releasing revenue and expenditures information); and popular attendance of meetings such as full councils and village assemblies (Ministry officials, 11.06.2014; 12.06.2014).

Regional administration officials interviewed took this idea further, arguing that participation should also include the communication of government orders, instructions and policies, and compulsory engagement of the people and local institutions to carry out such orders (RA officials: Morogoro 09.07.2014, Lindi 12.03.2015, Tanga 01.04.2015).[51]

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[51] The idea of compulsory participation is a legacy of the *Ujamaa* era which considered engagement in public projects as a civic duty.

The local government officials and political office bearers interviewed defined participation as:

- involving people in public affairs, especially on issues that affect them or that are of interest to them;

- collecting or soliciting the views of every individual citizen at the grassroots;

- giving people opportunities to contribute to decision-making;

- citizen awareness of what is going on in government;

- reaching the people and engaging them in planning;

- the obligation to inform the people and agree with them on policy issues;

- popular attendance in village assemblies and other meetings;

- direct involvement of the people in the delivery of public services;

- *Msalagambo* (obligatory participation); and

- cost sharing (MEOs Tanga 12.02.2014; 19.03.2014; WEOs Tanga 28.01.2014; 03.02.2014; WEOs Lindi 03.05.2014; CMT members Lindi 02.05.2014; Village Chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Morogoro 10.07.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014) .

TASAF officials conceived of participation formalistically, as a concept that involves all the processes in the project life cycle, including 'project identification, implementation, accountability, ownership and sustainability' (TMU officials 14.5.2014). To this end, a TASAF official stated that it 'calls for every individual to take responsibility for his or her own development while the government supports them in that endeavour' (TMU official 14.5.2014). Participation, they maintained, connotes community ownership of socio-economic initiatives (TMU officials 14.5.2014). The World Bank officials interviewed expanded the TASAF definition, noting that community participation, given that it covers the life cycle of a project, should not be conceived as making people work freely (at no cost), but as providing them with financial incentives to compensate their labour and time, especially when the participants are from vulnerable groups in the community (World Bank officials, 23.03.2015; 19.04.2015).

According to these officials, although compelling people to work freely in public works programmes could be interpreted as an act of promoting citizenship, this was 'the old thinking' about participation (World Bank official, 23.03.2015). The World Bank view coincides with CMC members' view that labour charges should be considered in

community projects because in areas where people are busy with their own productive activities, one should not expect free labour (CMC members Morogoro 11.07.2014, Tanga 14.08.2014; FGD Majengo Lindi; 03.05.2014). In a similar vein, a CMC member in Tanga observed that 'Because people in towns are very busy, the government should not expect them to provide free labour in public works; rather they should be compensated a bit' (CMC member, Tanga 14.08.2014). To summarise, the dimensions of participation cited respondents suggests that they understand participation to be a product of institutionalisation (regulated community meetings and planning processes), coercion[52], and incentives or inducements.

8.3 Citizens perceptions on the degree of participation in local governments and the Tanzanian Social Action Fund

With regard to the degree of participation in decentralised and deconcentrated institutions, citizens surveyed in the case-study areas were asked about their perceptions of how participatory they believed local government authorities and TASAF to be. Over three quarters (78%) of the respondents felt that local governments are participatory but that they are faced with both minor and major problems whilst two thirds (67%) expressed similar views about TASAF. However, significant differences were recorded in the three case-study areas. The perception that both LGAs and TASAF are participatory was much higher in Morogoro than in Tanga and Lindi. Table 8.1 shows that while the majority in Morogoro (90%) perceived their local governments to be participatory but faced with minor or major problems, this support fell to 73% in Lindi and to 68% in Tanga. Similarly, where 90% of respondents in Morogoro and 73% in Lindi believed that TASAF is participatory (with minor and major problems), only 41% of respondents in Tanga felt this way.

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[52] Despite its history, it is evident that the coercive dimension of participation is becoming more contentious as understandings of local democracy deepen. This is evident, as indicated, in the demand to be paid for work hitherto offered voluntarily.

Table 8.1: Perceptions on the levels of participation in LGAs and TASAF (percentage) (N=400)

Degree of Participation	Tanga		Morogoro		Lindi		Total	
	LGA	TASAF	LGA	TASAF	LGA	TASAF	LGA	TASAF
Non participatory	19	38	8	6	18	25	15	23
Participatory with major problems	28	27	16	10	46	46	28	25
Participatory with minor problems	35	11	64	72	23	18	43	36
Full participatory	5	3	10	8	4	9	7	6
Don't know	13	22	2	4	9	2	8	10

Source: Author's field survey, 2014.

Table 8.1 suggests that the majority of respondents believe that both LGAs and TASAF promote citizen participation, albeit with some qualifications. The data reveal that perceptions about the levels of participation in TASAF were lower in the urban authority of Tanga because a large number (22%) responded that they 'don't know' or that they were not aware of TASAF. This, in part, appears to be due to the fact that TASAF projects are more concentrated in rural communities than in urban centres.

8.4 Effectiveness of participatory mechanisms in local government authorities

Interviews with officials and political office bearers revealed that the government has put in place a number of mechanisms to stimulate citizen participation in local government and in local service delivery. The following subsections explore their effectiveness in LGAs.

8.4.1 Village assemblies

The village assemblies (or *Mtaa* Assemblies in urban municipalities) are one of the main spaces for citizen participation used in local government for both decentralised and deconcentrated service delivery. According to the grassroots local government officials interviewed in the three case-study municipalities, village assemblies are supposed to be convened every three months and are open to all adults (both men and women) living in the village or *Mtaa* (MEO Tanga, 19.05.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014; VEO Lindi, 03.05.2014). Officials, councillors, *Mtaa* and village chairmen maintained that key decisions on the running of grassroots local government and the deconcentrated institutions of TASAF should be made at village assemblies, which elect both the village

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council and TASAF's CMC (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga, 14.04.2014). The functions of village councils and CMCs are detailed in the institutional configuration of decentralisation presented in chapter 5. Participatory planning for both local government and deconcentrated service delivery also takes place in the village assemblies (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

Interviews with officials and political office bearers revealed that people are informed about local government revenue and expenditure in their communities through the village assemblies (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). This includes information about grants received from the central government and revenue collected from local taxes (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). Council officials stated that, through village assemblies, decentralisation gave a voice to the people and empowered them to demand accountability on the part of local government (CMT member, Morogoro 10.07.2014). The ward administrators confirmed that 'Nowadays, communities can question their leaders and local officials about revenue and expenditure, and even hold their leaders accountable' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014).

Local government officials and political office bearers confirmed that ordinary people participate in local governance and service delivery through their village assemblies. In these gatherings, residents have a chance to discuss and deliberate on development projects and service delivery plans, and determine their contribution to the planned projects (CMT member Tanga 13.08.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). A grassroots local government official maintained that 'participation of the people in various sectors is practically taking place' in the LGAs (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014).[53] Political office bearers in the three case-study municipalities also confirmed that 'community participation is observed' in their village councils and *Mtaa* committees (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; Village Chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014). It is worth noting however, that officials operating at the grassroots observed that participation in TASAF projects is more satisfactory for community members than participation in LGAs projects, because it is understood that there is higher probability of getting grants when summoned to attend a village assembly to discuss TASAF issues (VEO Lindi, 03.05.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014; WEO Tanga 14.02.2014). An *Mtaa* executive officer in Tanga revealed that

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[53] In this thesis, the word 'grassroots' means the lowest levels of local council administrative structure (that is a village in rural LGAs or *Mtaa* in urban LGA).

'Participation in *Mtaa* assemblies for TASAF activities has been slightly higher because people always want to be selected into the CMCs for subprojects due to the knowledge that there are some incentives paid by TASAF to the CMC members' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). In support of this view, TASAF district officials interviewed also confirmed that peoples' attendance in village assemblies to discuss TASAF activities has increased in recent years (TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014; TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014).

However, a general observation made by officials operating at the grassroots level was that 'Not all the adult residents attended the village or *Mtaa* assemblies' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). As a result, another official stated, 'Participants in village assembly meetings often never reached the quorum and in many instances people come late to the meeting' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). An *Mtaa* chairman in Tanga City maintained that *Mtaa* assemblies had been very difficult to convene in urban areas because people do not have a practice of participating in meetings on a regular basis (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). In support of this, a council administrator in the Tanga City Council asserted that 'The attendance of the people in village assemblies is not good because people are busy with their jobs and businesses (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). In that regard it is evident that productive activities in rural and urban areas differ as does the scheduling of assemblies and these influence meeting attendance and participation more broadly.

Findings from the citizen survey indicate that the level of participation in village assemblies was much higher in Morogoro than in Tanga and Lindi. Table 8.2 below reveals that the majority of Morogoro respondents (70%) attended village assemblies a 'few times' or 'many times', whilst 29% did so in Tanga and 22% in Lindi. The majority of respondents in Tanga (70%) and Lindi (77%) attended village assemblies 'once' or 'never'. Tanga had the highest proportion of respondents (53%) who had 'never' attended village assemblies. These results deviate from earlier surveys by Afrobarometer in 2005 and 2012, where in both Round 3 and 5 it was found that about 80% of the respondents said they 'at least somewhat' attended community meetings (REPOA & Michigun State University (MSU), 2012; Aiko et al., 2015).

Table 8.2: Citizen participation in village assemblies (N=400)

	Never	Once	Few times	Many times	Don't know
Tanga	53	17	22	7	1
Morogoro	28	2	28	42	0
Lindi	38	39	13	9	1
Total	40	19	21	19	1

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

8.4.2 Participatory planning

The O&OD is a national participatory planning framework developed by the PMO-RALG. In addition, various planning and budgeting mechanisms, such as the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) approach used by TASAF, exist at the community level parallel to the O&OD (Tidemand et al., 2008). Officials and local political office bearers interviewed in the three case-study areas confirmed the use of these two different participatory planning approaches in planning and project identification for LGAs and TASAF respectively. In other words, despite having O&OD in place, 'What actually happens is that TASAF plans parallel to what the overall council plan says' (ALAT official, 01.07.2014).

Officials said councils have been using the O&OD planning approach to provide a space for citizens to participate in identifying their development initiatives and service delivery plans (CMT member Lindi, 02.05.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014; CMT Morogoro 10.07.2014). The O&OD planning process begins with the preparation of a village plan in rural local councils and a ward plan for the urban local councils.[54] In rural local councils the WDC's technical advice is sought prior to approval of the village plan by the village assembly. After their approval it is submitted to the local council. In the urban local councils, the ward plan is prepared at the ward level by representatives selected from all *Mitaa*. The WDC discusses and provides technical advice on the content of the ward plan, which is thereafter submitted to the urban local council. These

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[54] This is because a *Mtaa* does not have the status of a legal person, or body corporate, like a village does. A *Mtaa* only acts as an administrative unit but as not a proper local government structure with legal mandates.

community plans are expected, in theory, to be incorporated into the local council's plan and budget (Tidemand et al., 2008; JICA, 2008).

LGA officials and political office bearers maintained that councils used a different approach for the TASAF projects, the PRA, to assist ordinary citizens to participate in the identification of TASAF-funded projects (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMT Tanga, 15.08.2014; CMT Lindi 05.05.2014). The PRA planning approach adopted by TASAF involves such activities as business plan and budget reviews, environmental reviews, and pairwise ranking exercises in which village residents are called to a meeting, divided into groups based on various demographic factors and asked to come up with project suggestions (Baird, McIntosh, & Otzler, 2009, p. 7). The village assembly then votes on potential projects to ensure that the project for which TASAF funding is sought is indeed the one desired by the village as a collective (Baird et al., 2009; TASAF 2005).

However, these officials noted that both approaches (O&OD and PRA) follow more or less the same process in identifying development initiatives and service delivery plans, although each has unique features, including their own planning cycles (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). A grassroots administrator, for instance, maintained that in both approaches, council officials and local political office bearers 'must summon the people to attend the village assembly' as that meeting is used as a platform for community engagement (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). A ward administrator in Tanga affirmed: 'It is in the village assemblies where participatory planning had been taking place' (WEO Tanga 03.02.2014).

Council administrators interviewed, as well as those who took part in focus group discussions, maintained that although the O&OD is comprehensive, the TASAF's PRA planning tool is more participatory (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014; CMT Tanga 14.08.2014; CMT member Morogoro 10.07.2014). A factor pointed to in support to this assertion was that, 'In most cases, TASAF preferred to let the people themselves decide and plan on everything during the village assembly meetings' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). A TMU official maintained that 'We provide a wider space than local governments for the people to participate in our projects from A to Z (TMU official$_{02}$ 14.05.2014). Likewise, in support to the assertion that TASAF's PRA planning tool is more participatory than the O&OD, the International Development Center of Japan (IDCJ) (2009, p. 1) maintains: 'The current O&OD process does not necessarily promote

citizen's participation and local governance to a significant extent.' Addressing participants of the Tanzania Osaka Alumni meeting in Tanga,[55] a JICA official asserted that the current O&OD procedure is very complicated and difficult for ordinary community members to use (JICA official 02.07.2014). A ministry official in Tanga concurred that the current O&OD approach is particularly ineffective in engaging citizens to meaningfully take charge of their development as it creates a dependence on the government to finance participatory plans, while the LGAs' finances are very limited (Ministry official, 01.07.2014).[56]

However, communities are not fully aware of what the LGAs' O&OD planning or the TASAF's PRA entail, or how the two differ, as they tend to be less concerned with the processes than the outcome. For this reason they tend to buy into whatever method of engagement is employed as long as they believe it will be funded (MEO Tanga 12.02.2014). A participant in a focus group discussion with CMT members in Lindi District Council stated that the people 'perceive PRA and O&OD equally and they treat the two as similar because to them the main goal is attaining development and accessing public services' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014). This finding is consistent with a previous study by ACHRID (2013, p. 60) in which key informants reported that there was 'harmony in planning and implementation of TASAF sub-projects with broader community development objectives' based on an understanding that TASAF's PRA complemented the O&OD planning for LGAs. These responses suggest that the existence of multiple planning institutions or approaches does not necessarily result in contradictory outcomes at the operational level. This would seem to refute the presumption of institutional theory that the existence of multiple institutions within a given policy environment will have a contradictory effect at the field level. A previous study by ACHRID (2013) also maintained that the TASAF's PRA process had no contradictory effect on local government planning.

Councillors interviewed understood that combining O&OD and PRA in the local planning process created a broader space for communities to engage with LGAs on matters relating to socio-economic development and service delivery. According to these local politicians, local communities are now identifying their own projects for social

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[55] The author attended the TOA meeting as a non-member participant.
[56] The O&OD is being reviewed for improvement, and the proposed versions are being piloted with funding and technical assistance from JICA in Morogoro and Coast regions, and GIZ-SULGO in Handeni district of the Tanga region.

development and improved economic wellbeing (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014). People are also happy with TASAF because it, too, is engaged in identifying social and economic challenges, planning for interventions and providing financial support to implement them (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014). This was also confirmed by council administrators who believed that the hybrid model of decentralisation has enhanced citizen participation since key decisions for the delivery of social and economic services under both devolution and deconcentration are made by local communities (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014).

8.4.3   Cost sharing

Cost sharing has been used in both TASAF and LGGAs projects under the LGCDG as a participatory mechanism to ensure citizen engagement in local development and service delivery. Officials and political office bearers revealed that people participated by contributing some of their own monies towards the development of such facilities as dispensaries, schools and water kiosks (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro, 11.07.2014). In LGA projects under the LGCDG, communities are obliged to contribute, financially or in kind, up to 20% of the total cost of the facility to be constructed. Similarly, in TASAF's projects, communities contribute between 5% and 20% of the total cost of an undertaking, depending on the nature of a particular project (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014; WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Cost sharing, however, is not limited to financial contributions, but includes in-kind contributions of labour provided in the construction of service facilities. According to a ward administrator in Tanga City Council, in-kind contributions included 'collecting sand for construction of classrooms and the digging of water wells' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014).

TASAF district officials and political leaders in Tanga and Lindi noted that although many communities have contributed financially or in-kind to TASAF subprojects, in some places this has not been easy (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). In some communities, for example in Kiwalala Ward in Lindi, obtaining the 20% community contribution for TASAF projects proved to be a big problem. People were not willing to provide their labour as an in-kind contribution because they believed that the local council had sufficient funds to pay workers (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Similarly, in Morogoro district, a TASAF official noted that collecting the community's 20% had been a big challenge (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014).

8.4.4 *Msalagambo* (obligatory participation)

Msalagambo is a participatory mechanism rooted in *Ujamaa* policies, wherein people were compelled to participate in communal activities (Kaduma, 2004; Rubin 1982 cited in Clarke, Khogali, & Kosiński, 1985). It is a non-voluntary or obligatory participation mechanism in which residents in a local community are compelled to do public works on a particular day and at a particular place, as part of their civic responsibility. CMT members in Tanga stated that it is based on a national directive that LGAs should set one day a month for *Msalagambo*, specifically for maintaining the cleanliness of the local environment (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). In Tanga City Council, this day is commonly known as 'Kalembo's day', since it originated from the order issued by the then Regional Commissioner, Said Kalembo, that, once a month, all the residents in *Mitaa* and villages should participate in *Msalagambo* to promote environmental cleanliness (sanitation) (Councillors Tanga 21.03.2014; 14.04.2014).[57] However, local government and regional administration officials maintained that *Msalagambo* is coercive because it often involves a penalty or fine of up to fifty Tsh.50000 (US$35) for those who fail to attend (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014; Lindi RA Official 12.03.2015).

Nevertheless, CMT members maintained that *Msalagambo* often yields more positive results than voluntary participatory processes. In Tanga, a CMT member observed that 'Experience shows that *Msalagambo* has been more successful than O&OD because the people participate more often in public works in their communities every first Saturday of a month owing to a fear of being penalised' (CMT member Tanga 14.08.2014). However, responses from grassroots local government administrators in all three case-study LGAs seem to contradict this view. According to them, although village and *Mtaa* leaders and administrators constantly encourage the people to implement the central government's order of *Msalagambo*, popular participation in *Msalagambo* activities is low (FGD Mikese Morogoro 10.07.2014; MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). A local government administrator operating at the grassroots level added that although the directives for *Msalagambo* prescribed penalties for non-participants, 'It has been very difficult for us to impose sanctions because the people would normally tell you that it is the council's duty to clean the streets because the people pay rates and taxes to the government' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014).

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[57] See also Sembony, 2013, online at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/DC-announces-city-s-cleaning-schedule/-/1840340/2123838/-/l3ih5f/-/index.html

8.4.5 Community Management Committees

CMCs, which, as indicated, are de-concentrated structures introduced by TASAF for managing and implementing subprojects at the grassroots level, have also served as an important participatory mechanism in local communities. In TASAF projects, apart from the formal village councils, people are involved in a practical way in decision-making through their CMCs (*Mtaa* Chairman 15.08.2014). This was also observed by the CMT member in Lindi who submitted that 'TASAF initiatives are much more participatory since such projects are managed and implemented by the people themselves, not by government institutions' (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014). The ward administrator in Tanga further added that: 'The people in their committees are the ones given funds for project implementation' (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014).

TASAF district officials stated that CMCs were formed on the first day on which a community project is identified (TASAF officials Morogoro 10.07.2014; Tanga 03.07.2014). On that day, following the identification of the project they wish TASAF to support, the village assemblies elect CMC's members and office bearers, who will manage and implement the project once their proposal is approved (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; Lindi 02.05.2014). It is worth noting that respondents from all stakeholder groups interviewed (ministry officials, local administrators, local political office bearers etc) maintained that through the CMCs people were involved in decision-making, subproject management and the practical delivery of services to their communities (Ministry official 11.06.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; CMT member Morogoro 10.07.2014; CMC member Tanga 14.08.2014; TMU officials 14.05.2014; World Bank official 23.03.2015; ALAT official 01.07.2014). Grassroots administrators and political leaders also stated that CMCs have been effective not only in promoting participation but also in delivering the intended services or the desired development (FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

8.5 Impacts of administrative decentralisation on citizen participation

Overall, officials and local politicians concurred that TASAF had helped councils to stimulate community participation. This is because in almost all TASAF projects, participation is a principal condition for funding although, as indicated, this did not yield positive results in all communities. They revealed that administrative decentralisation of the TASAF programme has contributed to the deepening of democracy by enhancing the

usage of existing formal participatory spaces in local government, including the village assemblies (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 10.07.2014; TMU official 14.05.2014; FGD TMU 29.05.2014; FGD PMO-RALG 12.06.2014).

TMU officials indicated that by making the village assemblies the principal decision-making body in managing subprojects at the grassroots, the frequency of their meetings has increased (TMU official 14.05.2014). According to this TMU official, although the law requires village assemblies to sit every three months, 'TASAF has made this happen more often in the areas where it has subprojects than is the case elsewhere' (TMU official 14.05.2014). A councillor in Morogoro District Council confirmed that the frequency of village assemblies had increased in recent years following the central government's introduction of programmes like TASAF and LGCDG, which make participation a necessary condition for accessing grants (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). These views suggest that the increased frequency of *Mitaa* and village assemblies is, to some extent, a result of the TASAF requirement that village assemblies are convened for identifying projects, selecting CMCs, reporting progress and launching service facilities financed by TASAF (TASAF, 2005).

LGA officials revealed that administrative decentralisation has also deepened democracy by gendering participation. An official in Lindi stated that 'Women who were previously disadvantaged have been awakened and are now in the frontline for managing development activities through CMCs' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). The inclusion of women in the CMCs was not by accident or chance, but a deliberate condition set in TASAF guidelines (TASAF, 2005; 2013). The TASAF Operational Manual stipulates that at least 50% of CMC members should be women except in subprojects where the beneficiaries are of same sex (for example HIV/AIDS widows' groups) (TASAF 2005, p. 6). It is worth noting that a significant number of women were found among the CMC members, including in leadership positions, in most of the CMCs visited during the fieldwork. The results of the citizen survey also support the claim that TASAF has served to improve gender representation in village assemblies and other participatory spaces. The data suggests insignificant variations between the numbers of men and women participating in village assemblies. These findings are consistent with previous research by Massanyiwa (2014).

Administrative decentralisation has localised private sector involvement in the delivery of services by contracting local small and medium enterprises. Interviews with the TASAF officials, local government officials and political office bearers revealed that TASAF has broadened local private sector participation in the delivery of public services by promoting the use of local contractors to implement community projects. This has improved the living conditions of local people who provide services and labour in such projects. According to a CMT member in Lindi and a councillor in Morogoro, the practice of sourcing service providers locally marked a point of departure from the LGAs' formal procurement approach, wherein contractors are recruited centrally through competitive tendering and mostly from the urban centres (CMT member, Lindi 03.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This approach, according to a councillor in Morogoro, means that 'TASAF has created employment for the local people and maintained efficiency in the use of resources of the poor' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Respondents revealed that the administrative decentralisation of TASAF has positively impacted on local government planning by complementing the existing participatory planning approaches with the addition of the targeted PRA planning tool. In that regard, a World Bank official in Dar es Salaam stated that the national planning framework (the O&OD) has been a starting point for TASAF's participatory planning. However, because of the nature of the Fund's programme, which is intended to reach vulnerable people through proper targeting, TASAF had had to 'inject additional tools for enhancing participation into the national participatory planning framework' (World Bank official 23.03.2015). A TASAF official maintained that 'PRA was used to confirm the findings of O&OD for reliability purposes' (TMU officials 14.05.2014).

Local political office bearers affirmed that the planning approach introduced to LGAs under administrative decentralisation had given people a broader space in which to engage with local councils on local socio-economic development issues (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; Village Chairmen Tanga 15.08.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Officials and local political office bearers alike indicated that administrative decentralisation has reduced the political filtering out of the interests of disadvantaged

groups in the local communities, and has allowed for more technical analysis of targeted interventions. TASAF gives more power to the people, and the poor in particular, to decide on the kind of interventions they think will best address their socio-economic plight, and to put their decisions into action through direct implementation and management of the projects selected (World Bank officials 23.03.2015 and 19.04.2015; TMU officials 14.05.2014). Curbing the political filtering out and adulteration of public interests, particularly of the poor, has been achieved by reducing the 'decision space' of political office bearers, particularly the councillors. This suggests a deliberate effort to depoliticise the management of TASAF subprojects. The levels of decision-making authority in TASAF projects have been reduced in such a way that, once projects identified by the community and endorsed by TASAF have been forwarded to local councils, councillors can only provide advice but have no authority to reject them (CMT Member Tanga, 15.08.2015; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014, TASAF Tanga 02.04.2015). Councillors in the case-study municipalities complained that their scope of influence is deliberately reduced in TASAF activities. In that regard a councillor in Tanga reported that 'Councillors are not fully involved in the TASAF projects but only receive information on the progress of such projects' (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014).

Political office bearers, however, had mixed views on the limitations imposed on their involvement in TASAF projects. Most councillors did not perceive their diminution of power in the TASAF initiatives as a problem. The inclusion of councils' finance committees and the use of LGA staff and the CMT in managing TASAF activities was not seen as a reduction in councillors' power, because the two are accountable to the council leadership (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This perspective was confirmed by a councillor in Lindi District Council, who declared:

> Councillors are happy with the level of citizen engagement in TASAF and they themselves [councillors] participate within the framework of administrative decentralisation even though the space for political actors has deliberately been narrowed in the services offered under deconcentration (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014).

Reinforcing this view, TASAF officials stated that political office bearers in the LGAs have been cooperative because they tend to capitalise on the successes of TASAF subprojects and claim them as their own (TMU official 30.03.2015). This is accentuated by the fact that most LGAs are under-resourced and councillors have little in the way of

development projects to present to their constituents. In that context, cooperating with TASAF becomes a strategic investment for councillors, as the outcomes of TASAF projects are increasingly seen as valuable political capital during elections.

Administrative decentralisation has promoted the idea of cost-sharing in local governance among the community members and various stakeholders. TASAF, as indicated, made community contributions to projects, whether financially or in-kind, a pre-condition for accessing grants (Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014). Officials and political office bearers confirmed that TASAF has taken the idea of cost sharing further by assigning responsibility for the management and implementation of sub-projects to the communities themselves (FGD PMORALG, 12.06.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This, according to ward administrators, has broadened the space for the people to 'practically participate by taking part in subprojects management and implementation' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). A CMT member in Lindi confirmed this, stating that 'TASAF initiatives are much more participatory since such projects are managed and implemented by the people themselves, not the grassroots LGA institutions' (CMT member Lindi 04.05.2014). The successful and timely completion of most TASAF projects and the quality of service facilities delivered by them, suggests a strengthening of human capital within the targeted communities. It also suggests that LGAs could optimise the usage the of this human capital in the delivery of their own projects. In support of this view, a World Bank official asserted that, where local government structures remain weak, CMCs can still be engaged to carry on some functions in the villages and *Mitaa* (World Bank official, 23.03.2015).

The administrative decentralisation of the TASAF programme has proved effective in maintaining a balance between planning and implementation and in ensuring that most community priorities are put into action. The key to this has also been the availability of dedicated funding. This has helped to restore popular trust in participatory planning processes since people had lost faith in the unfulfilled promises of local government leaders (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). Local government has faced the challenge of planning with no action. This is due to ineffective planning procedures that lead to a long lists of priorities which do not tally with the resources available to LGAs. In that regard an *Mtaa* chairman in Tanga admitted that 'Whenever we made O&OD development plans with the community there was neither implementation of those plans nor feedback from the council as to what has transpired' (*Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). Grassroots

local administrators observed that owing to 'too much politics' in the council budget and the multilevel screening of O&OD plans, 'It is only by luck to find that your *Mtaa* or village is allocated funds for implementing a project, otherwise it may take up to three years before you get one' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). Such a situation, the *Mtaa* Chairman observed, means 'People are losing interest in attending participatory planning meetings' (*Mtaa* Chairman$_{-01}$ Tanga 15.08.2014). Another local political office bearer complained that 'even in meetings, the people keep telling us that we are feeding them with empty words and the obvious' (*Mtaa* Chairman$_{-02}$ Tanga 15.08.2014).

In contrast, grassroots political office bearers understood the planning process in TASAF to be well targeted and well matched to the funding available, and it was observed that 'people understand that the money is readily available whenever the council engages them for TASAF activities' (Village Chairman Morogoro 11.07.2014; *Mtaa* Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014). This suggests that TASAF has embraced a 'plan follows resources' approach in addition to the 'resources follow plans' approach commonly used in the decentralised local government system. As a World Bank official noted, this approach had been used to strengthen the national planning framework and to assist LGAs to reach vulnerable groups with limited resources but well-targeted interventions (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

This research has shown that the perception held by ordinary people that TASAF projects are managed differently from those of LGAs, has encouraged greater participation in local communities, and particularly in TASAF sub-projects. According to a grassroots local government administrator in Tanga, 'The district facilitation teams that came for TASAF planning told the people that this is a different project, and you know, the people would like to benefit from both LGAs and the new project (TASAF) so they often participated' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). A councillor in Lindi district added that, since the Fund delivered on its promises of project, ordinary people, and especially the poor, 'feel that TASAF values them the most' (Councillor Lindi 02.05.2014).

Local government officials and political office bearers asserted that the deconcentration of TASAF has invented a new form of citizen engagement, which strengthens a system of informal democracy (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014). The establishment of the CMCs, and the manner in which they are used by local communities to develop their own facilities, has served to create new participatory institutions in the

local government service delivery system. In that regard, a ministry official in Dodoma asserted that 'TASAF committees have made positive contributions towards broadening participation' (Ministry official-02 11.06.2014).

Local government officials interviewed agreed that the CMCs have deepened democracy as their members are democratically in the village assemblies (WEO Tanga 14.02.2014; CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014). This was confirmed by political office bearers in all case-study municipalities and a councillor in Morogoro, for example, declared that 'It is true that the selection of CMC members and leaders follows democratic processes during the village assembly attended by the ordinary residents in the village' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014).

Notwithstanding the factors that serve to restrict effective participation, there was a general agreement among officials and political office bearers that decentralisation has broadened the participation of ordinary citizens in local government decision making on service delivery (CMT member Lindi 05.05.2014; Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; FGD PMORALG 12.06.2014).

The results from the citizen survey support the proposition that the hybrid model of decentralisation has promoted local democracy. When asked whether they considered their local governments to be democratic, 82% of respondents stated that they were democratic although they suffered from minor and major problems. However, the results in Table 8.3 reflect significant variations in the perceptions held in different case-study areas, with 74% of respondents in Morogoro stating that they considered their municipality to be either fully democratic or democratic with minor problems, as opposed to the 58% in Tanga and the 31% in Lindi who felt the same way. Significantly, only 14% of citizens in all three case-study areas perceived their local governments to be undemocratic.

Table 8.3: Citizen opinions on the degree of local democracy (in row percentages) (N=400)

	Tanga	Morogoro	Lindi	Total
Undemocratic	15	8	22	14
Democratic but with major problems	18	18	47	25
Democratic but with minor problems	52	68	29	52
Fully democratic	6	6	2	5
Don't know	9	0	0	4

Source: Author's Field Survey, 2014

The results in the table above do not reflect a clear urban-rural divide and this they differ from the findings of the 2012 Afrobarometer Round 5 survey which found that 72% of urban populations perceived their local governments to be democratic, compared to the 66% recorded amongst rural populations (REPOA & Michigun State University (MSU), 2012, p. 21; REPOA & Afrobarometer, 2012; Aiko et al., 2015).

The respondents were probed further about their commitment to supporting democracy processes in local government through their participation in local elections. Since councillors are elected in national elections while village council chairmen and their committee members are elected in local elections (Warioba, 1999), the citizens surveyed were asked whether they voted in the most recent local and national elections.[58] This study found that the majority of citizens had little or no interest in voting in the 2009 local elections. With the exception of Lindi, where 69% voted, less than a half of the respondents in Tanga (46%) and Morogoro (40%) participated in the 2009 elections. A noticeable proportion of respondents in Tanga (54%), Morogoro (60%) and Lindi (31%) stated that they had consciously decided not to vote. Their decision to boycott the local elections was attributed to a lack of confidence in the capacity of grassroots local government leadership and, as noted in the previous chapter, the limited role played by the village councils in socio-economic development and service delivery, when compared to the achievements of deconcentrated structures like the CMCs. Perhaps as a consequence of this, Lange (2008) maintains that in Tanzania people would rather compete for CMC leadership than for a post in a village council because the former has a

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[58] Specific questions asked were: *Question 16: With regard to the most recent national election in 2010, which statement is true for you?* and *17: With regard to the most recent local government elections, which statement is true for you?*

more visible impact and thus presents a better opportunity for ascending to a councillor position in the national elections.

With regard to the 2010 national elections, which elected councillors, MPs and the President, this study found significantly higher voting patterns in both rural and urban settings. The number of respondents who stated that they had voted in the national elections was, however, higher in the rural authorities of Lindi (81%) and Morogoro (64%) than in the urban authority of Tanga (59%). This variation in the number of voters in the urban and rural local councils is consistent with earlier research findings in Tanzania. REPOA and MSU (2012, p. 16), for example, reported that 82% of the respondents surveyed in rural authorities voted in the national elections compared to 78% in urban municipalities. The findings in this study and those of the Afrobarometer round 5 (REPOA & MSU, 2012) suggest greater popular confidence in national elections than in elections at the local level.

8.6 Factors constraining citizen participation in local governance and service delivery

The perceptions of officials and political office bearers were that, although popular participation in local government governance were at a satisfactory level, a variety of factors continue to constrain effective participation in local communities in both decentralised and deconcentrated service delivery systems. These include low levels of interest in public affairs and especially in local governance; the existence of multiple and sometimes contradictory participatory mechanisms (for example obligatory participation versus compensated participation); leadership problems; and political factors (TMU official 14.05.2014; Ministry official, 11.06.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014; WEO Tanga 28.01.2014). In focus group discussions with CMT members in Lindi, a participant maintained that, 'Overall, our communities are little interested in volunteering for public affairs' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014).

The assertion by key informants that the people in local communities have limited interested in public affairs is partially supported by results from the citizen survey shown in Figure 8.1 below. When asked about the level to which they are interested in public affairs, especially relating to local governance and local politics, the majority of citizens surveyed in Lindi (76%) stated that they were 'less interested' or 'not at all interested'.

However, the majority in Morogoro (68%) and Tanga (51%) said they were 'fairly interested' or 'very interested' in public affairs, especially those relating to local governance and local politics.

Figure 8.1: Citizens' interest in public affairs (N=400)

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

These findings are slightly lower than those recorded in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey (REPOA and MSU; 2012, p. 12), which found that about 78% of households in urban areas and 81% in rural areas were 'fairly interested' or 'very interested' in public affairs. The lower level of interest in public affairs in Lindi is attributed to the previously discussed discontent with the government following its failure to satisfactorily address their social service problems. Reflective of this, Figure 8.2 below shows a poster erected by the residents of Ruhokwe village in Lindi which states 'Health facilities, water and electricity first, politics later'.

Figure 8.2: A poster erected by the residents of Ruhokwe village in Lindi

The existing tension between residents of Lindi and Mtwara regions with the government over the issue of gas extraction, as noted in a previous chapter, also influenced citizens' perceptions and interests in public affairs, especially those relating to governance and local politics in Lindi District Council.

In the citizens' survey, respondents were probed further as to whether or not they value participation. The results in Table 8.3 reveal that most respondents in all three case-study municipalities (77%) embrace citizen participation and local accountability. Thus, the majority in Tanga (67%), Morogoro (74%) and Lindi (94%) 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with the statement: 'It is more important for citizens to participate and be able to hold local government accountable, even if that means making decisions more slowly'.

Table 8.4: Perceptions on the Value of Participation (N=400)

	Statement 1 *It is more important to have a local government that can get things done, even if we do not participate and have no influence over what it does.*			Statement 2 *It is more important for citizens to participate and be able to hold local government accountable, even if that means making decisions more slowly.*	
	Strongly Agree	**Agree**	**Don't Know**	**Agree**	**Strongly Agree**
Tanga	10	17	6	31	36
Morogoro	14	8	4	28	46
Lindi	2	4	-	22	72
Total	10	11	4	28	49

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

The data indicate that do citizens care about participation and local accountability and that there is no urban/rural divide on this issue. This finding runs counter to the 2012 Afrobarometer study (REPOA and MSU; 2012, p. 19), which reported that urban communities (61%) cared more about participation than did rural ones (52%). The high percentages record in this study suggests that there has been an improvement in people's perceptions about the value of participation in the intervening three years.

Officials in the local councils mentioned that leadership problems have also constrained citizen participation in some communities since the nature and commitment of local leaders often determines the level of citizen engagement (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; CMC member Tanga 14.08.2014). Members of the CMTs understood that in wards with opposing and conflicting leadership, public participation was difficult to achieve (CMT member Morogoro 10.07.2014; FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014; CMT member Tanga 15.08.2014). A grassroots administrator in Lindi District Council stated that the lower citizen participation in some communities has been 'a result of the political leaders who convince the people not to participate for their personal interests' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Local political opposition leaders, it was stated, feel threatened by TASAF because, despite its proclaimed a-political status at the local level, at the national level its successes are celebrated by the ruling party. Mmari, Sinda and Kinyashi (2014) affirm that TASAF had been praised by central government leaders for the role it had played in local socio-economic development. As for local political leaders from the ruling party, it was asserted that their main concern is that they are side lined by the parallel structures of TASAF and have little chance of celebrating its achievements. In that regard, Pal (2008) and Mitlin (2004) maintain, elected politicians may oppose some forms of participatory governance because they see themselves as the legitimate decision makers who have been elected by citizens through a formal democratic process.

Officials of the TMU also stated that, as a way of opposing TASAF initiatives, 'some councillors would tell the people not to contribute' to sub-projects (TMU official 30.03.2015). This was confirmed by a participant in focus group discussions in Lindi, who stated that 'The multi-party system has to some extent encouraged a non-participatory culture because opposition parties have often convinced the people not to contribute to public projects' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014). By way of example, the informant narrated an incident where 'the leader of the CUF in the community convinced

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the people not to contribute for the construction of Mipingo Secondary School' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014). In similar vein, a CMT member Morogoro asserted that 'In wards with conflicting political leaders, like Mvuha, participation has rarely been a success; and implementation of projects was often delayed' (CMT Member Morogoro 10.07.2014).

Officials indicated that costly participatory processes, especially the O&OD planning exercise, have also served to constrain effective engagement of the population in local governance processes. A CMT member in Lindi maintained that 'Of course, a comprehensive O&OD exercise is costly' because in LGAs like Lindi, which has about 138 villages, the budget for O&OD may not be less than Tsh.45 million (US$ 30,000) in all villages' (CMT member Lindi 02.05.2014). The high cost and limited funding compromised comprehensive participatory planning and led to continuous backstopping and snapshot planning exercises in some LGAs. This is partly due to the fact that the O&OD participatory plans generated at the grassroots level are not effectively tied to the local council budget, as most estimates for operational service provision do not cater for these participatory processes. The TASAF's PRA planning process, in contrast, was not constrained in this way as it was included in project budgets. Furthermore, as TASAF project budgets must be prepared at the grassroots level, rather than at council headquarters, there is little chance, if any, of council management compromising the PRA processes.

The lack of awareness about decentralisation and participation on the part of officials and political leaders, on one hand, and the ordinary people at the grassroots, on the other, is a further factor constraining effective citizen engagement and participation. Speaking of this, a councillor in Morogoro said: 'Because of the low level of understanding of our village leaders, you find that a village takes up to six month without conducting the village assembly meeting for the people to get information and discuss the matters of importance' (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). This was confirmed by a Tanga councillor, who asserted that, *Mtaa* chairmen in the area in which he operates have been remiss in convening village assemblies (Councillor Tanga, 21.03.2014). The failure of village leadership to summon and convene village assemblies has made it difficult for citizens in those villages and *Mitaa* to establish when these meetings and other

participatory forums will be held. Citizen survey[59] results indicate that, with the exception of Morogoro where majority of the respondents (54%) said it was easy for them to get information village assembly schedules, the majority in Tanga (57%) and Lindi (75%) found it 'difficult' or 'very difficult' to do so.

A councillor in Morogoro maintained that, as a result of their low level of understanding, village leaders have not regularly released their revenue and expenditure reports to the people in meetings or posted them on noticeboards, as required (Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). Citizens interviewed in this survey confirmed this assertion, with the majority of respondents (Tanga 83%; Morogoro 92%; Lindi 98%) saying it was 'difficult' or 'very difficult' for them to find out how their local governments spent the revenues from taxes and grants. It is likely that a lack of transparency in the expenditure of revenue will impact negatively on people's perceptions of the effectiveness of local government's delivery of services and leading to distrust of local government institutions and key individuals in office.

It was interesting to discover in the course of this investigation that even some administrators holding office in the villages and *mitaa* were not aware of TASAF, the national decentralisation policy, or participatory mechanisms such as O&OD and PRA. A grassroots local government administrator in Tanga, for example, confessed: 'To be frank, I have not internalised this TASAF to the fullest, apart from hearing it from colleagues' (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). Local officials also confirmed that people in many communities had little knowledge of the national decentralisation policy, TASAF or the concept of participation. Such low levels of awareness about decentralisation and participation, according to LGAs officials, has constrained people's participation in the delivery of public services and in the running of local government (WEO Tanga 28.01.2014; MEO Tanga. 12.02.2014).

Low levels of education and high levels of illiteracy were also identified as contributing to low participation. Grassroots LGA administrators in Lindi and Morogoro stated that in the communities they served, people with no education were normally the ones who refused to attend the village assemblies and other meetings (VEO Lindi, 03.05.2014; VEO Morogoro 11.07.2014). This view was supported by a ward administrator in Lindi

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[59] Question 10.2 Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to find out the schedule for Village Assembly and other participatory fora?

who asserted that 'villagers with little or no education do not participate in meetings' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Such residents, it was argued, feel that they have little to contribute in the community meetings, and that even if they do contribute, their contributions will likely be ignored by the leadership and other participants given that their illiteracy and low levels of education are well known. However, the assertion that people with little or no education were the ones who refused to attend community meetings, is not supported by citizen survey results. No significant differences were recorded in the attendance levels of respondents with no education and those with primary or secondary school education.

Officials and political office bearers also raised concerns about the different approaches to participation adopted by TASAF and LGAs and stated that this impacted negatively on participation within the LGAs. According to participants in a focus group discussion in Lindi, 'TASAF's system of service delivery brings some challenges to the council because it pays allowances to the CMC members, hence affecting the projects which are not TASAF funded' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014). This was confirmed by a grassroots administrator who observed: 'Paying financial incentives for participation in TASAF projects made people not willing to participate in community activities which do not offer financial compensation for their labour' (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). When CMT members and councillors were asked why it was difficult for the LGAs to adopt the TASAF approach and also pay participants, they pointed to the LGAs' financial constraints. They claimed that 'TASAF projects often have big budgets compared to the council ones' (FGD CMT Lindi 02.05.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). This suggests that, apart from getting things done more efficiently than LGAs, TASAF has the advantage of viable budgets and the ability to pay CMCs, but this, in turn, has also served to undermine people's interest in local government activities.

8.7 Conclusion

The findings of this research indicate that the hybrid model has thus far had mixed results in its efforts to strengthen citizen participation and to deepen democracy at the local level. It is evident that the new mode of citizen engagement brought in with TASAF's deconcentrated system of administration did help to establish a more informal but direct form of participation. Under this system, poor people were able to choose the development projects they wished to implement in their villages and *Mtaa* (albeit from a

predetermined list of options) and to oversee their implementation. Significantly, as a result of TASAF's assured and ring fenced funding, people involved in these projects were able to see the tangible results of their participation fairly rapidly and this was way their trust in the system was reinforced.

However, not all of the key informants interviewed during the course of this investigation were in favour of the hybrid model. Some local political office bearers, for example, believed that the CMCs undermined the authority of village councils and *Mtaa*. Some local councillors also felt that the system marginalised the governance structures of the LGAs and, in the process, it served to undermine local democracy as a whole. However, this was not a majoritarian view as some local political leaders (at both village and council level) had managed to turn the system to their advantage and were able to claim TASAF's successes as their own.

The chapter which follows provides a synthesis of the research findings and relates these back to the theoretical framework and guiding questions of the thesis.

CHAPTER NINE

ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

9.1 Introduction

Previous chapters have presented empirical evidence on the perceptions of different stakeholders in the decentralisation process about the effectiveness of Tanzania's hybrid model of decentralisation. This chapter synthesises the empirical findings and analyses the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation is fulfilling its stated objective of strengthened administrative capacity, improved service delivery, and greater citizen participation. The chapter also reflects on the extent to which the evidence generated supports the theoretical framework adopted for the thesis.

9.2 Factors that have served to shape the current configuration of decentralisation

Building on the literature review and theoretical frameworks discussed in previous chapters, this section sets out to analyse the national and international factors that shaped the current configuration of decentralisation in Tanzania through the lens of geopolitical theory. The current decentralisation policy and the local government system that was launched in the *1998 Policy Paper on Local Government Reform* reflects a shift from the centralised system of government adopted in the 1970s and 1980s to a hybrid model with both decentralised and deconcentrated forms of administration. In that regard, research by Brinkerhoff and Azfar (2010) and Massanyiwa (2014) found that, notwithstanding the policy statement that Tanzania is implementing decentralisation by devolution, actual implementation on the ground is mixed and reflects deconcentration more than devolution. Despite local government reform, deconcentrated projects and programmes like the TASAF are being implemented with the intention of supporting local councils' development activities, but their operations are often seen as a form of parallel local government (Lange, 2008, p. 1123; TASAF, 2013).

Tanzania's hybrid model of decentralisation, as discussed in previous chapters, was driven by both national politics and international influences, with the later playing a major role. An analysis of the domestic policy environment for decentralisation,

especially in the immediate post-multiparty democracy era, suggests the current decentralisation model is an outcome of the ruling party's commitment to strengthening local government. The aim was for LGAs to be able to improve service delivery and to engage the public effectively in governance processes. In many respects, disappointment with the achievements of earlier decentralisation reforms pushed the government to adopt the current model. This was because the previous move to shift responsibility for service delivery and citizen engagement from democratic local governments to regional and district administrations, which served solely as agencies of central government ministries had, unquestionably, contributed to the weakening of LGAs' capacity. The current local government reform programme, which includes the operations of TASAF, has aimed to address this shortcoming (Tordoff, 1994; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji & Peter, 2003; URT, 2005; Kessy & McCourt, 2010; TASAF, 2005, 2013).

The economic crisis which commenced in the 1980s reduced both the capacity and legitimacy of Tanzania's centralised socialist government system and it impacted negatively on public service delivery throughout the 1990s (Therkildsen; 2000, p. 64). The deterioration in the provision of the key public services, such as education and health, and higher levels of poverty owing to economic growth without redistribution, prompted government's introduction of the LGRP and TASAF. The economic crisis further pushed the government to adopt the neo-liberal decentralisation reforms advocated by Western donor countries. Notwithstanding several unsuccessful attempts to stimulate economic recovery, the government ended up embarking on an IMF-backed structural adjustment programme. This stressed the need to open up the economy, reduce the size of the government bureaucracy, decentralise, and introduce a multi-party political system as a way out of the crisis (Muganda, 2004; JMT, 2011, p.112). As a consequence of its heavy reliance on foreign aid, the Tanzanian government had little option but to adopt the reforms proposed by multilateral and bilateral funding agencies (Mmari, 2005; JMT, 2011).

As previously discussed, donors have long demanded political, administrative and economic reform as a condition for aid and loans to Africa (Robinson, 1993). According to Bermeo 'the source of aid and the intent of the donor have significant impacts on a recipient country in terms of democratisation' (quoted by Tripp, 2012, p. 3). Several other studies in Tanzania have reported that local government reforms in the country have been heavily donor driven and dependent on foreign aid (Ng'andwe, 2003; Lange, 2008;

Mgonja & Tundui, 2012; Warioba & Warioba, 2012). In 2000, following its adoption of the PRSP proposed by international donor agencies, the government formulated its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) and in the process TASAF was established as a mechanism for poverty reduction and a way of expediting service improvements. TASAF was set up to operate semi-autonomously as a central government project under the auspices of the President's Office, while co-opting decentralised local government structures both for reasons of efficiency and to gain local legitimacy (Braathen, 2005, p. 307). Because of its co-optation of local government structures (such as councils' finance committees, CMTs, village assemblies and village councils), TASAF does not directly by-pass democratically elected bodies but attempts to work alongside them. Although TASAF's operations and structures appear to be strongly influenced by the neo-liberal agenda and by New Public Management practices advocated by Western donors, this research suggest that it has more of a home-grown character because, unlike other social funds in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is infused into the existing local government project management systems at the local level. For example, whereas the Zambian Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF) operates through that country's Provincial Development Committee, which is the forerunner in administrative decentralisation (deconcentration) in Zambia (Braathen, 2004, p. 16), TASAF works directly with local councils and fulfils the role played by the provincial administration in Zambia (Carvalho et al., 2002).

Viewed through the lens of geo-political theory, the forces driving the decentralisation reforms in Tanzania were the aid conditionalities imposed by Western donors, domestic political considerations, and internal realities such as higher levels of poverty, an economic crisis and poor local service delivery. Of these forces, however, it is evident that aid conditionalities had the biggest impact on decentralisation reform. This is evident in the 1998 policy paper on local government reform wherein it the government conceded that it had agreed with the World Bank in 1997 'to introduce block grants and decentralised management of staff in education and health, as a condition for obtaining Bank support for these two social sectors' (URT, 1998, p. 13).

9.3 The extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation strengthened local government, improved service delivery and enhanced participation

This section seeks to analyse how the combination of decentralised and deconcentrated forms of administration have impacted on local government and the extent to which they have strengthened its capacity to improve service delivery and enhance citizen engagement. The section reflects on the empirical evidence presented in previous chapters and the theoretical framework described in chapter one and two. It integrates these with previous research in response to the third research question.

Empirical evidence in preceding chapters indicates that, one and a half decades after implementation of the hybrid model of decentralisation, citizens identified three major outcomes of the hybrid model of decentralisation. These were greater citizen participation (50%), strengthened local government capacity (29%) and improved service delivery (21%). From this, the evidence suggests that the model has been most successful in enhancing citizen engagement and in deepening democracy, and less so in strengthening the capacity of local government institutions and in raising service levels. This finding is consistent with previous research by the Research and Analysis Working Group, which found that little improvement in people's perceptions of the water sector where 70% of respondents stated that there was no change in distance access, cleanliness, cost, overcrowding (queuing time) or in the quantity of water supplied (Research and Analysis Working Group, United Republic of Tanzania (RAWG-URT), 2008, p. 39). These findings seem to support Therkildsen's (2000, p. 64) assertion that 'public sector reforms in Tanzania have not yet contributed to significant service delivery improvements on the ground'. The reason for, according to REPOA (2008, p. 7), is that 'local authorities have not yet been fully empowered to perform their functions and discharge their obligations effectively'. The following sections will examine each of these three outcomes of the hybrid model of decentralisation.

9.3.1 Strengthened capacity of local government authorities

Respondents interviewed, and those who participated in the focus group discussions, stated that over the years, local governments in Tanzania have lacked adequate capacity and financial resources to effectively fulfil their responsibilities. However, it was stated, the hybrid model of decentralisation had made significant progress in strengthening the capacity of local governments through a variety of capacity building interventions

introduced under the LGRP and TASAF. The views of the key respondents interviewed broadly supported the findings from the citizen survey discussed above. Nevertheless, not all respondent agreed with this conclusion, and some officials and local political office bearers raised criticisms that TASAF by-passed some formal local government institutions and individuals, such as the WDCs and the ward executive officers, side-lined local councils departments, and reduced the role of local representatives in the management of its projects. In general, councillors criticised TASAF because the current setup, in which there is a division of labour between formal local government structures and the CMCs, has reduced their influence as community representatives. Some WEOs were also not happy that TASAF had bypassed them when assigning responsibilities for sub-project implementation. The fact that these ward officials feel left out could be of significance in the future maintenance of TASAF projects. Tenga (2013), for example, found that there was a problem of ownership of the assets funded by TASAF at the ward level due to the fact that ward administrators had not been directly incorporated into the institutional arrangements for implementing TASAF II projects.

Councillors felt that the funding of projects through deconcentrated programmes was not a suitable way to nurturing effective local government in the long run, because it denied councillors the autonomy to decide where to invest funds. However, most grassroots administrators and village and *mtaa* chairmen interviewed felt that TASAF had improved the capacity of local governments in terms of financial resources and human capital (including additional free CMC labour), by providing grants for service infrastructure development and economic interventions. Respondents believed this to be so because TASAF had earmarked specific funds to the village councils for the supervision of CMCs and the monitoring of projects, in addition to the funds allocated to CMCs for project implementation. Through this arrangement, ministry officials maintained, TASAF funds are closely controlled but more decentralised. Moreover, the fact that TASAF has assigned some degree of decision-making authority to both the higher and lower levels of local government suggests that it is a support rather than an obstacle to LGA capacity building. This is consistent with Braathen's (2003) finding that TASAF is administratively well integrated with the local councils, and that it does not seem to weaken the local administrative structures.

Respondents in the citizens' survey also reported that they believed that local governments were truly decentralised but that they suffered various types of interference

from central government, which may affect their ability to respond to the needs of their communities. Although the administrative model adopted by TASAF could be considered more of a deconcentrated than a devolved form of decentralisation, the approach had much more visible impact at the grassroots level because it unleashed the potential of local communities to make decisions, plan and implement their own socio-economic development projects. As a consequence of the capacity building provided by TASAF, CMCs were able to implement such service projects as the construction of classrooms, dispensaries, roads and water wells. If, as indicated in theory, decentralisation is truly intended to transfer authority and resources to the people and to consolidate democracy as a means to accelerate development, then the findings of this study it would suggest that TASAF has made significant progress towards this objective albeit in an unorthodox and informal way.

Respondents reported that some minor conflicts had occurred at the grassroots levels between the deconcentrated structures of TASAF and the formal decentralised local government institutions, although this was rarely the case at the council levels. Conflicts emerged because CMCs were granted much more managerial and financial power and autonomy over TASAF activities than the formal local government institutions. The issue of CMCs having bigger budgets and more cash at their disposal than village governments was also evident in the research by Lange (2008). According to Manor (2004), this is a common phenomenon with social action funds in other parts of the world, where similar local level tensions have been recorded. In its early phases TASAF was perceived to be operating against local councils and in contravention of local government legislation. However, the amendments to the Local Government Act, 1982 introduced by section 21 of the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 6 of 1999 clarified central-local government relations, and this, along with the increased co-option of formal LGA structures, has meant that these tensions have dissipated for now. In the future, though, as geo-political theory emphasises, more open communication will be necessary between central government and TASAF, on one side, and local governments on the other, (Elgström, 1990; Drahos, 2003; Zartman, 2015). It need not overemphasised that conflictual relationships should be resolved amicably and their sources addressed. The detrimental effects of these structural conflicts were evident in places where CMCs and village councils could not work together harmoniously. The assumption of institutional theory, as discussed in earlier chapters, is that the existence of multiple

institutions with competing system of authority can lead to contradictory approaches, which act to the detriment of an organisation as whole, to role strain in the field organisation, and to greater unpredictability (Eckstein, 1966; Mann, 1986; Zucker, 1987; Clemens, 1997; Morrill, 1999).

In theory, it is believed that social funds can influence the way local governments work, and that they bring new accountability mechanisms and participatory processes into decentralized environments that can help to improve local governance (Wong & Guggenheim, 2005, p. 254). Evidence in preceding chapters seems to confirm this theoretical assumption. Officials and local political office bearers affirmed that TASAF contributed significantly to improving local accountability and local financial control. Being under the President's Office is seen as an advantage because it gives TASAF status and the ability to encourage excellence in service and financial integrity among the recipient local councils. TASAF's non-discretionary and ring-fenced grants have also made tampering with them difficult for dishonest staff and local political office. To ensure that the co-opted local governments implement the Funds objectives in an effective way, TASAF has put in place comprehensive operational procedures, monitoring and accountability systems (TASAF, 2009, p. 12). As a consequence of this, research by Kawa (2003) and Lange (2008) has shown that the credibility of local governments, which had historically been poor, had improved in recent years.

9.3.2 Improved service delivery

Over a period of roughly 15 years TASAF has focused on infrastructural development at grassroots level. The aim has been to strengthen local councils' capacity to deliver key services such as education, health, water and roads. However, TASAF has not been directly involved with the routine delivery of end-user services, such as the provision of treatment and medicines in dispensaries or the administration of teaching in schools which are the direct responsibility of local governments themselves. In addition, TASAF has focused on local economic development by providing grants for income-generating activities and safety nets for vulnerable groups within communities. Local governments have also focused on implementing these and other functions mandated to them by national policy following local government reforms.

National statistics indicate that over the past 15 years there have been significant increases countrywide in the number of dispensaries, health centres, primary and

secondary schools which have been constructed. Evidence from the three case-study areas also suggests significant improvements in service infrastructure. Officials and local political office bearers concurred that the hybrid model of decentralisation has been successful in promoting infrastructural development, especially in building schools and dispensaries. Respondents also acknowledged the significant contribution made by TASAF to infrastructural development in local communities. National statistics further indicate that the increase in the number of schools and health facilities, in particular, has significantly improved access to health and education services. Enrolments in primary and secondary schools expanded significantly following interventions by TASAF and LGRP, although not disregarding the role played by other government programmes like PEDP, SEDP and PHSDP. Research by Tidemand, Olsen, and Sola's (2008, p. 95) confirms that 'In the education sector both school enrolment and classroom construction have shown significant expansion'. Respondents stated that TASAF also influenced the utilisation of education and health services by making school enrolment and clinic attendance the key condition for the receipt of safety net grants provided to poor households.

The gains that the hybrid model has yielded in the delivery of services are consistent with previous research in Tanzania and other developing countries. Braathen's (2004) research, for instance, reported the construction of social services infrastructure as the major achievement of TASAF. Chase and Sherburne-Benz (2001) evaluated Zambia's ZAMSIF and reported that it contributed to increased school attendance. Increased use of primary care and increases in vaccinations children were reported outcomes of the presence of a health facility constructed by ZAMSIF, while in Peru research by Paxson and Schady (2002) found that the Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social had played a significant role in increased school attendance.

However, although the hybrid model of decentralisation was successful in infrastructural development this did not generally translate into the improved quality of services provided by local governments, as the findings of the citizen survey results indicated. Afrobarometer 2012 surveys in 34 countries, including Tanzania, also found that while schools and dispensaries are necessary for delivering services, infrastructure alone does not guarantee effective and quality services (Asunka, 2013). Tenga (2013) also found that out of the 97.7% of health infrastructure projects completed in TASAF II, 4.8% were not fully operational because they lacked medical staff, drugs, bed sheets, blankets and

mattresses. This would seem to indicate that in order to improve the levels of services delivered to communities, TASAF's investments should go beyond merely providing service infrastructure and should include ways to improve the provision of medicines and other hospital equipment and supplies, as well as textbooks and other educational supplies and equipment. Research elsewhere indicates that this type of intervention by social action funds is both necessary and feasible. Newman et al. (2002), for example, reported that the Bolivian social fund had made significant contributions to reducing under-five mortality as its investments in health went beyond infrastructural development to include medicine, furniture and other supplies.

In the same way, Asunka (2013, p. 3) maintains that the mere presence of service infrastructure such as schools and clinics plays a minor role in shaping popular views about government performance. This is because the majority of Africans hold largely negative views about their governments' performance in the provision of key services, including the delivery of water. The World Bank's (2006) evaluation report of TASAF I also stated that, even where communities indicated classrooms, clinics and staff houses as their immediate priority, the mere delivery of those facilities did not score higher satisfaction levels by the beneficiaries because they were not fully functional. In this case, the World Bank asserted, there is a need to 'consider other elements of the service, like staffing, water, desks to make to make the facilities full functional' (World Bank, 2006, p. 51).

The quantitative survey indicated that 67% of respondents in the three case-study areas felt that the delivery of education services by their local governments was implemented 'fairly well' or 'very well,' although Morogoro had lower scores than the other two areas. This data suggests significant improvements on the 55.5% recorded in REPOA's citizen survey in 2003 (Braathen & Mwambe, 2007; Tidemand & Msami, 2010) and the 55% reported in the 2012 Afrobarometer round 5 survey (REPOA & Afrobarometer, 2012; REPOA & MSU, 2012; Asunka, 2013).

The hybrid model has made some improvement in the delivery of services over levels prior to the decentralisation reforms. This is unlike the 1990s, when Therkildsen (2000, p. 64) reported that 'households surveys in rural areas in 1992 and 1992 indicate an overall perception of continuing declines in the quality of primary schooling and no significant improvements in health services' (see also Tanzania Development Research Group

(TADREG), 1997a, 1997b). Respondents identified poor teaching, overcrowded classrooms and a lack of textbooks as major problems that still limit the provision of quality education in their communities. Poor teaching was also identified in a study by Hausken and Ncube (2014, p. 82) who, in their analysis of the education and health services in Tanzania and Senegal, concluded that, 'in both sectors, and for both countries, teachers spend far less than the designated time for teaching students, and clinicians spend very little time with patients per day'. The study attributed this situation to poor monitoring and supervision of decentralised service delivery (Hausken & Ncube, 2014). The problem of overcrowded classrooms in the case-study areas in the present study was a result of increased enrolment due to the improved quality of school facilities. Research by Tenga (2013) also attributed the problem of overcrowding in schools to the improved quality of the schools and classrooms built by TASAF, which encouraged more parents to enrol their children and others to transfer their children from neighbouring schools.

The citizen survey indicated that 52% of respondents perceived their local governments to be performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in delivering health care services. This is significantly higher than the 37% recorded in a survey by REPOA in 2003 (Tidemand & Msami, 2010). It is also higher than the 43% recorded in the most recent 2012 Afrobarometer results on the same issue (Asunka, 2013, p. 25). However, citizens surveyed and focus group discussion participants indicated that the delivery of treatment had seldom improved to meet their expectations. This was due to shortages of staff, medicines and other hospital supplies, despite the greater numbers of health facilities. In a similar vein, a national survey by RAWG-URT (2008) reported that despite shortened distance to the health facility, citizens were not satisfied with the availability of drugs, with overcrowding in health facilities and with expensive services. Recently, the World Bank (2013) reported a shortage of essential drugs as a common phenomenon in many health facilities, with about a quarter of the main drugs being out of stock at the time of their survey in 2010. Kisumbe, Sanga, and Kasubi (2014, p. 1) also maintained that medical supplies in government facilities are often depleted. Thus, according to Asunka (2013), people who encounter dirty health facilities, lack of medicines and expensive health services are more likely to disapprove of government performance in the health sector, despite the physical healthcare infrastructure in place.

The quantitative surveys indicated that 47% of all respondents perceived their local governments as being performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in providing water and

sanitation services. This figure is significantly higher than the 20% and 28% recorded in REPOA's citizen surveys in 2003 and 2006 respectively (Tidemand & Msami, 2010). The data is also higher than the 34% recorded in the Afrobarometer results in 2012. The improvement in citizens' perceptions of the water supply and sanitation services are attributable to the hybrid model of decentralisation underway, and especially to TASAF's and local government's investments in this sector. However, the shortage of water supplies remains a critical problem. In that respect, there appears to have been relatively little progress since Braathen (2004) reported over a decade ago that the delivery in the water sector fell far behind education and health in citizen satisfaction ratings.

Perceptions on roads indicate that 40% of respondents held the view that their local governments are performing 'fairly well' or 'very well' in maintaining roads. This finding suggests significant improvements on the 18% and 28% recorded in REPOA citizen surveys in 2003 and 2006 (Braathen & Mwambe, 2007, p. 8; Tidemand & Msami, 2010, p. 25). The data is also slightly higher than the 38% reported in the *Views of the People 2007* national survey (RAWG–URT, 2008, p. 9). The urban-rural divide revealed in the three case-study areas is attributable to such factors as the vast size of the rural municipalities compared to urban municipalities, and to financial resource constraints. Tanga City Council's land area is 600 km^2 compared with to 6,623 km^2 and 11,925 km^2 land areas for Lindi and Morogoro respectively. Because of their smaller land area, urban municipalities are in a better position to make bigger impacts on road maintenance with the limited financial resources made available to them by the TASAF public works programme and other central government sectoral transfers. Research by RAWG–URT (2008) reported a similar urban-rural divide in perceptions of road quality with 59% of respondents in Dar es Salaam considering the roads to be fairly good compared to 30% in other regions.

Evidence suggests that the hybrid model of decentralisation has had a significant impact on local economic development in the three case-study areas. Officials, political office bearers and community members indicated that TASAF had assisted in improving the economic and living conditions of vulnerable groups by providing grants for income-generating projects as well as a social safety net grant. Beneficiaries of the income-generating activity and safety-net grants affirmed the contribution such funds made to their economic wellbeing and living conditions. However, some respondents reported that their income-generating activities lacked support from extension services and this

affected their productivity and profitability. These views are consistent with the World Bank (2006, p. 51) report that 'during [TASAF I] project implementation, it was learnt that there were inadequate services of extension staff, while such services were much needed by beneficiary groups given the nature of the income generating community projects like livestock, agriculture etc.' The evidence suggests that several factors accounted for the lack of extension support services, includes limited LGA financial capacity and insufficient funding by TASAF for the administration of these services, together with geographical limitations with respect to the location of beneficiary groups. The lack of extension support was exacerbated by the fact that TASAF's income-generating activities are not integrated with other departments in the local government, and key sectoral departments seem to have been side lined. Research by the Economic Research Group (2011) affirmed that income-generating activities funded by TASAF lacked adequate extension support services from the local councils due to the high cost of making regular visits to project sites compared with the 5% of project funds retained at the council level.

The TASAF model of service delivery has complemented the work of local councils in delivering service infrastructure to communities. This has ensured community access to such service facilities as schools and dispensaries even when the local councils were not able to support them with their own funds. Research by ACHRID (2013, pp. 59–60) affirms that 'through investments in socio-development subprojects TASAF II has in various ways complemented the efforts by LGAs […] in the improvement of service delivery and consequently minimising the livelihood shocks of the targeted communities' (ACHRID, 2013, pp. 59–60). The TASAF model has also created competition between local government institutions and CMCs in infrastructural development projects, which in turn has brought significant changes in how communities are served and in the quality of facilities built under the hybrid model of service delivery. Tidemand (2005, p. 19), however, maintained that the quality of classrooms built by TASAF is superior to those funded by the LGAs primary education development programme because the Fund applied stricter quality standards and sector norms.

In general, respondents expressed satisfaction with service delivery received under the hybrid model of decentralisation, but they reported slightly higher levels of satisfaction with service delivery under the TASAF model of deconcentrated administration than with the devolved model. About 44% of all respondents were 'fairly satisfied' or 'very

satisfied' with the services provided by TASAF, while 34% of respondents felt this way about services provided by local governments under devolution. Respondents attributed this variation to the shorter time the TASAF projects take to be completed. In the same fashion, Tenga (2013, p. 21) reported a completion rate of 97.7% for TASAF projects, many of which were functioning and in use as planned by the end of TASAF II. The data on citizen satisfaction with service delivery is slightly higher than REPOA's citizen surveys in 2003 and 2006, which recorded citizen satisfaction ratings of 25% and 34% respectively (Braathen & Mwambe, 2007; Tidemand & Msami, 2010).[60]

9.3.3 Enhanced citizen participation

Similar to their view that participation was the leading achievement of the hybrid model of decentralisation, respondents expressed strong support for democratic processes in local government. About 77% of respondents stated that they valued participatory forms of local government and as opposed to the 21% who held the view that participation was not that important as long as local governments get things done. This data reflects as improvement over the 61% recorded in the 2012 Afrobarometer survey (REPOA & MSU, 2012).

Respondents expressed similar perceptions about the levels of participation afforded in the deconcentrated administrative model of TASAF and devolved local government administration. Survey results indicated no significant differences between the two approaches across the case-study areas in regards to their degree of participation. The hybrid model of decentralisation created various mechanisms for engaging citizens in governance and local socio-economic development. Respondents indicated that the devolved local governments had used village assemblies, democratic elections, O&OD participatory planning approaches, and non-voluntary or obligatory mechanisms to engage citizens to take part in decision-making and development processes. Along with the use of these mechanisms, with exception of non-voluntary ones, the deconcentrated model of TASAF created extra spaces for participation such as the CMCs, and additional participatory planning tools such as the PRA. Respondents felt that the CMCs and PRA promoted a much more direct form of participation as they allowed broader control over grassroots socio-economic development processes. The establishment of CMCs, in

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[60] These figures are averages computed by the author from the satisfaction ratings of different services (i.e. education, health, water, roads) because REPOA citizen surveys 2003 and 2006 do not indicate overall satisfaction levels.

particular, and their use in delivering community services by the people themselves have created new participatory spaces at the local level. Assigning community members responsibility for the management and implementation of TASAF projects has empowered them in ways that was previously not possible under the devolution programme.

Respondents expressed their satisfaction with what they identified as the more direct form of participation and local democracy practiced in TASAF's the deconcentrated model. This was founded on the fact that their participation in TASAF projects ultimately led to implementation of the projects they had prioritised, whilst this was often not the case with local council projects. Respondents also felt that unlike the TASAF model, both planning and budgetary control in local council projects were often elite dominated, and local elites would frequently use their power to systematically exclude or suppress issues that threatened their interests or which were of little interests to them. Following Peters (2012, p. 72) this seems to suggest that planning processes in most formal democratic local government institutions do not a represent a competitive struggle between relatively equal groups, but rather the systematic use of elite power to decide which issues the political system will or will not consider. Furthermore, despite its laudable objectives, participatory planning is often distorted when, in practice, the final authority over plans and budgets does not rest in the hands of the communities involved, as is the case is the case in normal local government planning processes. Following Gargarella (2001, p. 117) external interventions, such as those provided through the TASAF model, are necessary to build an institutional system that is more inclusive and responsive to participatory process. Such external interventions are also necessary to restrict the dominance of local elites who attempt to override the interests of the majority, since local political office cannot be relied upon to advance the best interests of their own constituents.

Respondents affirmed that major decisions on grassroots socio-economic interventions in the deconcentrated model of TASAF were made by the people themselves in their village assemblies, while ward councillors only played an advisory role. TASAF set a requirement that village assemblies should be convened to identify projects, select a CMC, and report on progress. As a consequence of this, meetings in the villages and *mitaa* have increased in frequency. Respondents reported that village assemblies convened more often in the areas with TASAF projects than they did elsewhere. Similarly, respondents' self-reported levels of participation in village assemblies

increased from 44% in the REPOA's citizen survey in 2006 (Tidemand & Msami, 2010) to 60% in the quantitative surveys in the three case-study areas. This suggests significant improvements in people's interests in attending community meetings.

The deconcentrated model was seen to have a bigger impact on reducing social inclusion in governance and socio-economic development processes at the grassroots. Respondents spoke of their satisfaction with the inclusion of women and vulnerable groups in TASAF interventions. Given that it is mandatory for 50% of the membership of CMCs to be women, the quantitative survey did not record significant differences between men and women participants in the village assemblies. This suggests significant improvements from previous research, for example by Tidemand and Msami (2010) and Masanyiwa, Niehof and Termeer (2014), which reported significant disparities in the attendance of women and men in village assemblies. Tenga (2013, p. 3) also maintains that studies commissioned by the government of Tanzania indicated gender parity in the composition and leadership of CMCs. These results suggest that the hybrid model has promoted greater inclusion of women in grassroots governance structures than is the case in similar committees in other countries. In South Africa, for example, Hemson (2002) reported that women tended to hold the least powerful positions in rural water committees.

In spite of its popular appeal, some respondents felt that such a direct form of participation was establishing an informal system of democracy which served to undermine formal local democratic institutions. Local councillors and village and *mtaa* representatives, for example, felt threatened by the deconcentrated model of TASAF, and raised claims that it was undermined their authority as formally elected representatives. However, not all councillors and village representatives felt this way as some had capitalised on the achievements of TASAF and had claimed them as their own. Some officials and donor representatives also maintained the view that the model served to marginalise local government authorities, and that it would, in the long run, retard capacity building and local democratisation processes. Tidemand's (2005, p. 19) also cautioned that a systematic bypassing of the village council in favour of a project-specific committee such as CMCs would undermine the capacity of village governments. However, Mmari (2005, p. 16) has argued that 'this exclusion is intended [as it does] to promote accountability and provide necessary checks and balances'.

Respondents felt that the existence of multiple and sometimes contradictory approaches adopted by TASAF and LGAs had served to limit participation in some communities. While TASAF paid participation allowances to CMC members, due to financial constraints the local councils relied mainly on volunteerism and obligatory participation (*msalagambo*). Because of this, it was stated, participation in LGA projects would be adversely affected. In that regard, research by Braathen (2004, 2005) indicated that the payment of stipends for participation in TASAF public works projects created social discord and dependency in the villages, which, in the end, undermined the value of self-help or voluntary community work as a long-term driver of community development.

9.4 Suitability and sustainability of the hybrid model of decentralisation

The preceding sections have demonstrated that the combination of the deconcentrated administration model with the devolved system of local government has contributed to the strengthening of local government capacity and has yielded significant achievements in the delivery of services and in enhancing citizen participation and deepening democracy. This section which follows analyses the empirical evidence with regard to the suitability of the hybrid model of decentralisation and the prospects of sustaining it in the longer term.

The majority of key informants and focus group discussants (including officials from the central government, TASAF, regional administrations, local governments, the World Bank and other non-state organisations, and local political office bearers and community members) concurred that the combination of the deconcentrated TASAF model with the devolved system of local government was suited to the Tanzanian context. Respondents maintained that, given local governments' persistently weak financial resources and limited human resource capacity, the country is not yet ready to progress to full devolution. Moreover, given Tanzania's long history of centralised administration, a hybrid model would serve to safeguard local governments from the political pressure to re-centralise the delivery of services as had happened in the 1970s.

However, despite its evident impact on local government development, the future of Tanzania's hybrid model of decentralisation is by no means assured due to its heavy reliance on donor funding. As previous chapters have revealed, the World Bank and other donor agencies have changed their priorities in supporting social funds, and are now directing TASAF to focus on the provision of social safety nets rather than on local

development. There is also evidence that some bi-lateral donors are urging the Tanzanian government to honour its commitment to greater devolution and to move away from the deconcentrated model characterised by TASAF. In other words, it would appear that the Funds principal donors have lost interest in funding TASAF's role in local socio-economic development, and now intend to limit their aid to social safety nets grants payable directly to poor households. The implication of this emerging donor agenda will be a significant decline in investment in service infrastructure at the local level. A World Bank official interviewed suggested that social funds ought not to be conceived as permanent donor-funded institutions but as temporary and evolving governance structures. The stated objective of the World Bank is that TASAF structures and functions should be integrated into formal government structures at both the central and local government levels, and for it to serve as a steering committee for the national social protection (safety nets) programme. This being the case, the Bank is considering bringing to an end the multi-sectoral social action fund model that TASAF adopted in favour of social protection programmes with a narrower focus. In the current phase of the Fund's operations, the Bank has only committed funding to the Productive Social Safety Nets programme, which forms just one part of the objectives TASAF III. Given the fact that a large part of the TASAF budget is donor funded, the government has little room to manoeuvre and it appears unlikely that it will be able to sustain the current hybrid model of decentralisation, and the format of TASAF in particular, in the foreseeable future.

Tanzania, however, is not the only country affected by this change in donor funding priorities. Other Sub-Saharan African countries, including Zambia and Malawi, are confronting the same challenge despite the demonstrated achievements of their social funds in promoting local socio-economic development and improved service delivery. World Bank staff interviewed acknowledged these achievements, suggesting that the decision to reorient the focus of aid is not due the success or failure of social action funds, but to changing thinking on the part of donors as to how poverty might be addressed in LDCs.

The pressure to refocus the social action fund model towards social protection programmes or safety nets is further reflective of how donors impose the conditionalities of aid to shape the development agenda and policies of developing countries. The concept of safety nets, especially cash transfers, is relatively new in Africa (Monchuk, 2014, p. 17). Some middle-income countries like Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius have

relatively long-standing experiences with safety nets and their governments pay cash transfers to some categories of poor people from domestic revenues. However, the majority of low-income countries, like Tanzania, Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia, have had limited experience of this form of social support and recent moves to establish them has generally been in response to pressure from donor agencies and the aid conditionalities which they have imposed (see also Monchuk 2014).

The World Bank, in particular, seems determined to ensure that its agenda promoting safety nets is implemented even by the resource-poor countries. It is pursuing this objective as part of its Africa Social Protection Strategy (2012–22) which is funding LDCs to up-scale their safety net programmes into more effective national schemes (World Bank, 2012; Monchuk, 2014). Notwithstanding the fact this initiative limits the ability of aid-dependent countries to formulate their own policies (and hence constrains the process of capacity building), questions also remain about the long-term sustainability of the safety-net programmes themselves, since they confront the same funding challenges as so the current social action funds.

In addition to the external pressure from donors, there has been some internal pressure to change the structure of TASAF on the part of some important stakeholders in the decentralisation process, who maintain a devolutionist perspective. Thus, some ministry officials and local political office bearers have also called for the mainstreaming or integration of the parallel structures created by TASAF (i.e. the CMCs) into formal local government structures. In particular, concerns have been raised that the CMCs are undermining the authority of village councils, which have extremely limited resources Lange's (2008, p. 1140). As a consequence, some officials from central government ministries, ALAT and local political office bearers have proposed that integrating the CMCs into the village government would serve to avoid this problem. This is consistent with Manor's (2004, p. 200) assertion that 'integration would ease one of the most crippling problems faced by multi-purpose councils [i.e. village councils] in most countries – their inadequate funds – since user committees tend to be generously resourced'. Lange (2008, p. 1140) further maintains that the integration of the CMCs and their resources onto village government would avoid the problem of resource fragmentation and power distortion. Somewhat paradoxically, as Manor (2004) has argued, many LDC governments have, historically, been reluctant to integrate into such structures into the mainstream of the state administration due donors' preferences for the

establishment of separate sets of user committees – CMCs for TASAF, school committees for the education sector, user committees for the water sector and many others – for each developmental sector.

It is evident from key informant interviews with ministry officials, that the establishment of deconcentrated programmes like TASAF was not initially favoured by the government, but that it had been encouraged to do so by donor agencies. However, the social fund model was adapted and domesticated to suit to the Tanzania context and TASAF developed into a home-grown strategy for alleviating institutional and individual income poverty, and was carefully infused into local governance structures thereafter. Despite some initial resistance, overtime, councillors interviewed stated that they had come to recognise the positive impacts of the fund in their local communities. Rather than calling for an end to TASAF, they were now calling on the government to grant then a broader scope of influence in the fund's activities.

However, it seems that the donor-driven change in the social action fund model has not come at the right time, nor for the right reasons. This assertion is based on the resistance to the proposed change, which the government, explicitly or implicitly, has expressed. Like, other sub-Saharan governments such as Zambia and Malawi, it is not convinced of the need to drop its social fund, or to change its name. TASAF officials also confirmed that discussions between the government and its development partners had been underway for quite some time but that no finality had as yet been reached. The government would like to retain TASAF and ensure that it continues playing a significant role in local socio-economic development along with other government institutions (i.e. ministries, local governments etc.). However, from the World Bank's perspective TASAF is not sustainable in its current form due to its dependence on donor support. According to a World Bank report published in 2002, both the autonomous status and permanency of social funds would need to be changed, and there would need to be a progressive increase in local financing (World Bank 2002, p.xxxi). It was argued that unless pressure was brought to bear on developing states to integrate social funds into the mainstream of government, there would be little incentive for them to do so. However, it is the contention of this thesis, that donors should be more receptive to the concerns of aid recipient countries, and that it should more carefully examine the functioning of social funds and should seek to retain their positive elements albeit in adapted format and with a progressive reduction of financial support.

The view of TASAF officials, and the government itself, is that the Fund should not be completely integrated into the formal structure of government structure. This is because it is believed that TASAF's success is largely attributable to its institutional positioning (in the Presidency) and to its modus operandi. Under the existing model, it has been argued, TASAF is able to achieve greater operational effectiveness and efficiency and there is far greater accountability over the expenditure of national and donor finances. Its location in the Presidency, it is maintained, means that it is able to work with sectoral ministries and local governments and to ensure greater coordination between than would be possible if operated solely at level of a line ministry.

Under the current donor pressure to reconfigure its operations, TASAF is considering changing its structure to become an 'executive agency', so that it can continue to operate outside the normal ministry structures. Executive agencies are semi-autonomous public institutions, designed to operate at arms-length from their parent ministries (President's Office Public Service Management (PO-PSM), 2005, p. 1). Sections 4(2) and 12(2) of the Executive Agencies Act, 1997 stipulates that an agency should manage its affairs in a business-like and cost-effective manner and in accordance with modern management practices and techniques. It should also design its operations in a manner that ensures provision of best services to its clients and maintain a high degree of responsiveness to the needs of its service users (Executive Agencies Act, 1997). The establishment of executive agencies in Tanzania has received considerable support from the UK since 2000s, whose own experience with the agency model became an important source of inspiration in aid programme (Therkildsen, 2000, p. 68). In that regard, it is of interest that the agency model remains one of the main features of New Public Management and the good governance agenda advanced by Western donor countries. In this context, the decision to adopt the agency model for TASAF would seem to support the presumption of geopolitical theory that aid-dependent LDCs will be very careful not to alienate their donors, and will seek ways to fit into the agenda set for them.

However, uncertainty surrounds the agency model proposed for TASAF. An evaluation of the performance of executive agencies in Tanzania found that their formation had resulted in only slightly improved service delivery, and that, of the 14 agencies evaluated, only eight had improved their service delivery while the performance of six either remained static or had deteriorated (PO-PSM, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, the reported performance improvement was mainly in terms of the levels of services delivered, not

their quality (ibid). It is likely that the performance of TASAF would be similarly affected since 'it takes time before structural changes are translated into service delivery improvement' PO-PSM (2005, p. 2). It is also uncertain how the introduction of an agency model would be impact on TASAF's current successes and whether changes in the model would reduce its effectiveness and efficiency. Following Therkildsen (2000, p. 68) it is unfortunate that 'the pressure to reform is such that there is no time to gain Tanzanian experiences with the new arrangements', and even when success is dawning on one model – as it is for the social action fund model in the case of TASAF – a new wave of best practices washes it away. It is evident that the changes imposed on TASAF and local government authorities as a consequence of the proposed reorientation of the Fund will not be introduced progressively, and the two would be expected to fulfil their new obligations with immediate effect (see also Tapscott, 2008, p. 222).

It is a tenet of institutional theory that a decision made at the central level of an organization is likely to affect, and can be used to explain, processes and outcomes at the field or local level (Zucker, 1987; Clemens, 1997; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Morrill, 1999). Given this, it is hard to escape the conclusion that local governments, which will be caught between donors' and government's re-programming of TASAF, will suffer immediate consequences in terms of their reduced capacity to deliver service infrastructure in the education, health, water and roads sectors. In order to avoid this scenario, and for TASAF to retain its current form, it is evident that the government will need to take over responsibility for its funding and will need to increase its budgetary allocations accordingly. The possibility also exists to diversify donor funding, for example, by pursuing multiple donors to finance different activities within TASAF. However, as things stand, it appears that although more donor agencies (such as DFID, USAID, UNICEF and WFP), have expressed an interest in supporting TASAF, many have only agreed to finance it within a social protection and safety net framework. As a consequence of this, the current phase, TASAF III, and especially its Productive Social Safety Net programme 'represents a significant reorientation of TASAF activities to incorporate a large-scale nationwide safety net' (TASAF 2013, p. iv).

What makes the new orientation of TASAF different, as has been noted, is that donors would like the functions previously performed by Fund to be mainstreamed into the parent sectoral ministries, freeing it to concentrate solely on the provision of safety nets. According to a World Bank official interviewed, other government actors should assume

their normal responsibilities for building schools, clinics and roads. Following Crouch (1987, p. 51), and consonant with the tenets of geopolitical theory, the thesis suggests that in order to lessen its dependence on foreign funding and to avoid the best practices imposed on it by the conditionalities of donor aid, the government will need to develop the human capital necessary to critically evaluate offers of external assistance to ensure that they are aligned to the country's development objectives and strategies. In order to lessen the impact of dependency, important differences in the priorities of the government and those of prospective donors will need to be unpacked and their likely influence on exiting policy analysed prior to the acceptance of development assistance. This is because aid that is accepted uncritically is likely to disrupt the coherence of recipient government decisions due to the differing interests of donors and information asymmetries (Mackinnon, 2003; Wolf, 2007, p. 655). Safety net support is clearly needed in Tanzania to enable very poor households to meet their immediate needs and to strengthen their ability to work their way out of poverty (Monchuk, 2014, p. 16). However, the option to disband the current TASAF model in favour of safety net cash transfers could prove to be counterproductive, particularly as it could jeopardize attempts to further strengthen the provision of essential services such as education, health and water, which are themselves of critical importance in alleviating poverty.

9.5 Conclusion

Tanzania's hybrid model of decentralisation had been shaped by both national politics and international influences. Analysed through the lens of geo-political theory, this chapter has shown that aid conditionalities imposed by Western donor countries and multi-lateral funding agencies were a driving force behind both introduction of the D-by-D programme and TASAF. It was further seen that internal realities and domestic political considerations also played a role in shaping the type of decentralisation adopted in the current phase of local government reform. The hybrid model, as has been shown, yielded significant achievements in enhancing citizen participation and in delivering services such as education, health and water to communities. In spite of these achievements, the future of the hybrid model of decentralisation is not guaranteed, given that it remains heavily dependent on donor funding, and there is not much prospect that it can last much longer. The concluding chapter which follows revisits the key research questions which guided this investigation and summarises the findings of the thesis as a whole.

CHAPTER TEN

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a synthesis of the findings of this study which set out to examine the process of political and administrative decentralisation currently underway in the Tanzania and measured its effectiveness against the objectives set out in legislation and policy. The investigation was based on a mixed-methods approach, making use of both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies which included key informant interviews, focus group discussions and a quantitative survey. The thesis was informed by three theoretical perspectives. In the first place, geopolitical theory provided an understanding of the impact of geo-politics (particularly the influence of international donor agencies) on the affairs of developing states like Tanzania. The second, institutional theory, provided an institutional understanding of the process of decentralisation. The third, broader decentralisation frameworks, informed the study about the theoretical justifications advanced in support of the devolution of government.

The main research aim was to assess the extent to which the current decentralisation policy in Tanzania has met its stated objectives. This was achieved by examining the operations of local governments and TASAF and the extent to which they interrelate and are mutually supportive. An examination of the interaction between the decentralised and de-concentrated systems of administration in place and the extent to which they are mutually reinforcing or conflictual was given particular attention. Specifically, the study addressed three primary research questions: 1) What national and international factors have shaped the current configuration of decentralisation in Tanzania, and with what effect? 2) What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders in the decentralisation process (donors, government officials, political office bearers, and ordinary citizens) about the model's effectiveness in strengthening local government, improving service delivery, enhancing participatory development and deepening democracy? 3) To what extent does the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration strengthen local government and assist in the improved delivery of public services and in enhancing citizen participation?

The empirical investigation concentrated on four thematic areas in response to these primary research questions. Chapter four investigated the factors that shaped the current configuration of decentralisation in Tanzania and their effect on the institutional arrangements. It applied geopolitical theory and institutional theory to respond to the first primary research question. In response to the second primary research question, chapters six, seven and eight presented stakeholders' perceptions about the effectiveness of the hybrid model of decentralisation, with specific reference to the three themes: strengthened local government capacity, improved service delivery, and enhanced citizen participation and deepened democracy.

Chapter nine integrated, synthesised and assessed the empirical evidence generated in the case-study areas to establish the extent to which they provide answers to the primary research questions posed and support the study's theoretical framework. The chapter considered the extent to which the policy of decentralisation, and the hybrid model adopted in implementing it, have fulfilled the stated objective of strengthening local government capacity, improving service delivery and enhancing citizen participation. Chapter nine applied all three theoretical frameworks in synthesising the empirical evidence and responding to key research questions.

10.2 General conclusions

Chapters four and nine have shown that the neo-liberal agenda of Western donors and the aid conditionalities imposed by them have been the main drivers of recent decentralisation reforms in Tanzania. Evidence of this is to be found in the national decentralisation policy paper (URT, 1998) which clearly documents the pressure and aid conditionalities placed on the government by donors. This paper reports that 'government's agreement with the World Bank in May 1997 to introduce block grants and decentralised management of staff in education and health, as a condition for obtaining Bank support for these two social sectors' (URT, 1998, p. 13). These chapters also showed that with a new focus on PRSP processes, along with an emphasis on the need to restructuring or liberalise economies, international donor agencies came up with the HIPC lending window and financing mechanisms for social funds, which eventually led to the establishment of TASAF.

These chapters further discussed the internal drivers behind the adoption of the hybrid model of decentralisation. These included the failures of the previous centralised

administration to deliver much needs services; the lack of capacity of local governments; the political aspirations of the ruling party following the adoption of multi-party democracy; and high levels of poverty in local communities. This finding is consistent with recent scholarship. Tidemand (2015, pp. 69–70), for instance, asserts that the decentralisation reforms carried out through the LGRP are significantly driven by donor, with limited domestic policy support. This is despite broader changes to the local government system and its hybrid institutional arrangements (resulting from resistance to many of the formal LGRP objectives) being driven and shaped by the incentives of domestic interest groups, particularly the ruling CCM.

There is evidence that the government is determined to maintain the hybrid model of decentralisation. This is so even in the current turbulent policy environment, where donors are pushing for greater change and modification of the TASAF model in favour of a minimalist role in poverty alleviation and a greater focus on safety nets. This study has shown that the government and CCM are not envisioning a complete devolution of local government in the near future, as suggested by Western donor countries. The ruling party has ambitions to redefine democracy and good governance towards a more developmental state model, shifting from the broad concept of devolution and local autonomy to a more top-down and centralised approaches (CCM, 2010). Implicitly, the CCM government seems to be adopting a pragmatic stance in its decentralisation policy. This is due possibly to what Tidemand (2015) has suggested is fatigue of imposed Western governance models.

This study has shown how, in many ways, donor support for a watered down form of decentralisation reflects a shift in thinking about local authorities' potential to deliver effective development programmes towards the view that devolution, while necessary, is an insufficient condition for grassroots poverty reduction (World Bank 2004; Turner & Hulme 1997; Priyadarshee & Hossain, 2010). The study has shown that democratic decentralisation or political devolution, which gained support from many bilateral Western donor countries, is not a panacea for all local socio-economic problems. Conventional models of political devolution, as discussed in this study, are not the only way to bring about meaningful decentralisation and citizen engagement in developing states. As demonstrated in the case of TASAF, if well designed, administrative decentralisation has the potential to reach grassroots communities with targeted services.

It also has the potential to create new spaces for participation and to accord a broader decision space to poor communities, especially to vulnerable groups.

The gains of administrative decentralisation, as shown in this study, have been recognised by the government, communities, individual citizens and the donor agencies studied. Increased donor interest in TASAF's administrative decentralisation has been well documented by the government, showing the involvement of Western donor agencies, such as the World Bank, DFID, USAID, UNICEF, WFP and European Commission, in the policy processes and in commitments for financing TASAF (TASAF, 2013). Evidence suggests that many of the bilateral donors (and the Western donor countries in particular) have begun to show an interest in joining the World Bank in funding TASAF, albeit in restructured form. This seems to support Booth's (2012: 67) assertion that due to the lack of strong evidence to prove itself as a developmental policy, democratic decentralisation has certainly lost some of its allure in national and international circles.

This study has also shown that local governments are capable of delivering pro-poor services effectively, but only when responsibility and authority are aligned strategically within local government structures. Shortening the decision-making route for TASAF activities within local councils has enabled local governments to cope with the speedy delivery of targeted pro-poor services. This was particularly evident in the use of the councils' finance committees, which include the chairpersons of all other standing committees, and which have scheduled monthly sittings, instead of the quarterly full council assemblies. The findings of this study seem to support the view that in developing countries with immature democracies 'local government is justified as the effective provider of services rather than the means of liberty, participation or democracy' (King and Stoker 1996; citing Hill, 1974:235). The research provided evidence that poor people are less concerned with formal democratic institutions and participatory processes like local elections, if such processes do not result in tangible outcomes in terms of effective service provision.

In respect to the third primary research question, the major finding of this study regarding is that the impacts of administrative decentralisation on participatory local government and public services delivery are mixed. Chapters seven and nine how shown how TASAF has been successful in delivering service infrastructure and economic empowerment interventions to vulnerable groups in the case-study local governments. There is evidence

of an increased number of schools, classrooms, dispensaries and health centres over the past 15 years following the increased funding of these service facilities by TASAF and other national programmes. The use of service facilities has improved significantly in some case-study local councils, but less so in those where the LGAs' limited financial resources were unable to complement TASAF's infrastructural development with improved service delivery. Moreover, access to education and healthcare has significantly improved in all three case-study local councils, but there was little progress in improving access to roads and water supplies, especially in rural areas. The higher levels of citizen satisfaction with improvements in education services support the results of previous evaluations of the TASAF II operations, which saw about 63.5% of total 4,348 approved community projects earmarked for the education sector (Tenga, 2013, p. 22). This study has shown that TASAF's extensive investment in education infrastructure by TASAF has influenced citizens' perceptions of education significantly.

Despite the increased availability of service infrastructure in all case-study areas, this study revealed that these improvements have not led to major changes in the levels and quality of the actual services provided by local governments. Prolonged investment in health infrastructure by local councils and TASAF has transformed Tanzania into the country with 'the highest densities of health facilities amongst African countries' (Ramsey et al., 2013, p. 2), but this is not matched by an equivalent improvement in the quality of health care provision. Infrastructure alone does not guarantee effective and quality services. Because TASAF was not directly involved with the routine delivery of end-user services like the provision of treatment in dispensaries, administering teaching in schools and supplying water to local communities, it has thus been less effective in its ability to influence and raise the levels of actual delivery of these services by local councils. The fact that it is not able to give attention to operational costs and supporting services is a weakness in the model. Service accessibility is still constrained or impeded by local governments' inability to deliver effective services in the available facilities. Citizens surveyed in the local communities made it clear that the services delivered by the local councils fell below their expectations and this has significantly influenced their levels of satisfaction with public services in general.

Evidence has shown that some TASAF projects are not well integrated with functional government activities such as agricultural extension support and local economic development support services. The lack of integration of TASAF's income-generating

activities into the relevant local government departments, in particular, has side-lined these structures, and, as a consequence, these projects faced a number of challenges. These include inadequate extension support services and entrepreneurial capacity building from local councils. Greater impact of TASAF investments will largely depend on local governments' financial and technical capacity to fully utilize the infrastructure put in place for local socio-economic development. However, as revealed in this study, local governments, and especially rural councils, are faced with severe resources constraints due to their inability to raise adequate revenue and insufficient central government grants to meet the high demand for infrastructure and services.

In respect of the impacts of the administrative decentralisation on citizen participation, there is evidence to suggest that local participation in Tanzania is a product of institutionalisation (regulated community meetings and planning processes), coercion, and incentives or inducements. The mechanisms and approaches used by TASAF to encourage people to take part in their interventions have proved to be effective in enhancing citizen participation and in deepening democracy, although in an informal way. The new forms of citizen engagement introduced by TASAF interventions have built confidence among the non-elite or uneducated citizens and elevated their levels of participation in meetings to the level of the more articulate and powerful. However, the study has shown that some small interest groups are not happy with these new forms of citizen engagement. In that regard, there was some evidence to suggest that the new forms of citizen engagement, such as the CMCs, are undermining *mitaa* and village council structures and side-lining local political office bearers (including councillors, and *mtaa*/village leadership) and limiting their role in local socio-economic development. Throughout this study, the concept of de-politicisation was used to describe this situation whereby communities and technocrats have been assigned a broader mandate to decide upon, manage, and implement community initiatives than have local political office bearers. In the process, the attempts to depoliticise TASAF operations in local communities, combined with ambiguity over the power relations between village councils and community management committees, and the lack of clarity about the roles and functions of these respective bodies (which perform more or less similar functions) have created tensions that have led to conflicts in some communities.

Evidence suggests that, apart from getting things done more efficiently than LGAs, TASAF had the advantage of a dedicated budget and the ability to pay allowances for

participation in CMCs. By offering incentives for participation in community projects, the levels of citizen participation in village assemblies have increased significantly, when compared to the findings of previous studies. However, the payment of allowances was seen by ministry officials, local governments and local political office bearers as undermining people's interest in local government activities. This is because local councils, owing to their financial and institutional limitations, do not pay allowances but rely on citizens' willingness to volunteer, and on the use of coercion for public works through *msalagambo*. The TASAF's PRA planning approach has emerged as an effective approach for maintaining a balance between planning and implementation by directing the planning process effectively, such that most community priorities are put into action. It also gives local people more influence over the decisions, plans and budgets of projects than the normal LGA planning processes. The empirical evidence generated supports the findings of previous research that suggests the PRA a practical and effective approach to solving local problems because it demonstrates to communities, and reinforces within them, the breadth, depth and validity of their own understanding of their needs and priorities (Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 2008; Mitlin & Thompson, 1995, p. 240).

This study has presented a different scenario to previous research on citizens' participation in community meetings such as the village assemblies. Whereas many previous studies have reported limited or no participation by rural population in such structures (Afrobarometer, 2005; 2012; Shivji 2000; 2006; Kateshumbwa, 2010, Tapscott & Thompson, 2013), this study found no clear rural-urban divide in the levels of citizen participation in community meetings. This is attributable to TASAF's extensive interventions in both rural and urban local communities, and especially in the areas where there is a high concentration of poverty.

Despite the impacts of the hybrid model of decentralisation on participatory local government and service delivery, it is the conclusion of this study that its sustainability is not guaranteed because of the donor-funded nature of TASAF and local governments. The over-dependence of TASAF on donor funding means the impacts and lessons learnt from its operations at the local level may not be sustained due the tendency of donors to attempt to set the agenda and direction of social action funds to suit to their own policy objectives. This study has shown that, while bilateral Western donors are pushing the government to honour its commitment to greater devolution, with an agenda to

mainstream deconcentrated programmes like TASAF, multilateral donor agencies, especially the World Bank, are also pushing for integration of TASAF structures and functions into formal government structures as an exit strategy. With all these donor influences, the survival of the hybrid model of decentralisation remains in the hands of government and its willingness and ability to take over the responsibility of funding TASAF from its domestic revenue. Chapter nine has shown that, as a survival strategy, the government is setting out to change TASAF's status from a social action fund to an executive agency to suit to donor preferences. However, this study remains ambivalent about the future of the hybrid model of decentralisation since it is not yet clear how effective the proposed agency model for TASAF will be in sustaining its current format, focus, and achievements.

10.3 Policy recommendations

The section which follows considers some of the operational challenges which face TASAF and the policy options which might address these problems. As previously indicated, TASAF's achievements in infrastructural development have not been matched with improved service delivery by LGAS. In order to address this shortcoming, there is a need to support infrastructural development through direct or targeted grants. In this context, the policy priority should focus on improving the delivery of services, like teaching in schools, health treatment, and the provision of important drugs in existing facilities before considering the construction of new ones. This is especially needed in areas where large populations live in close proximity to facilities. Improvements in the quality of service provided would serve to improve people's satisfaction with local government services.

In terms of the economic empowerment of vulnerable households, in order to maximise the sunk costs of income-generating activities, it will be necessary to continuously monitor and support their beneficiaries. Many beneficiary groups lack extension support services, entrepreneurial capacity building and access to operating capital to meet their projects' everyday expenses prior to realising any long-term benefits. In this regard, more positive poverty reduction outcomes would be achieved by integrating TASAF's economic empowerment interventions, (especially income-generating activities) with local government departments dealing with relevant support services (e.g. agricultural extension and community development services), and strengthening these departments to

offer support services to TASAF beneficiaries. In other words, there is a need for greater inter-governmental coordination at the local level.

For central government and TASAF to facilitate participatory governance effectively at the local levels, there should be positive central-local intergovernmental relations and supportive institutional arrangements between the two. Any structural impediments or institutional conflicts may impact negatively on citizen participation. In this case, therefore, the conflicts between CMCs and village councils described in this study should be assessed and amicably resolved if such parallel structures are to be effective. The focus should be on balancing and clarifying the roles and functions of these structures. Particular attention, however, should be paid to ensuring that the CMC structures are not formalised to the extent of transferring to them the red tape of formal local government institutions, as this would reduce their effectiveness. The position of local political office bearers and administrators (for example councillors and ward executive officers) in the oversight of CMCs should also be progressively, but cautiously, enhanced cautiously.

The government has a variety of options to bring development and deliver services to its citizens. This thesis study has revealed that the hybrid model of decentralisation has emerged as an efficient and effective model for strengthening the capacity of local governments to deliver service infrastructure and local economic development. However, its success in improving service delivery depends not only on its efforts to put in place urgently needed service infrastructure, but also its ability to improve local governments' provision of quality services through funding or grants in support of recurrent expenditure and adequate supplies like medicines and textbooks. Priority should be given to remote and very poor areas where alternative facilities, such as private health facilities, are not in place.

The impacts of aid conditionalities and the influence of Western donor countries and international donor agencies on the affairs of developing countries, as discussed in this study, include distortions of recipient countries' policies and development efforts. Although Tanzania has configured its hybrid model of decentralisation as a home-grown strategy for service delivery and local socio-economic development, the current donor agenda to reduce its role in decentralised service delivery seems set to distort this policy direction. Since the model has had significant impacts on local governments' service delivery and citizen engagement, and in view of the state's own conviction that there is

merit in retaining the model, this study recommends strongly that the Tanzanian government should increasingly allocate funding to TASAF from its domestic revenue and reduce the dependence on unsustainable foreign aid. However, at this stage, there is little indication that the government will be able to sustain TASAF without donor funding.

10.4 Contributions to knowledge

The results of this study contribute to existing knowledge, methodology, and theory of decentralisation governance policy and practice in LDCs. Methodologically, the pragmatic application of a mixed methods approach in examining the impact of administrative decentralisation on participatory local government and service delivery is original and innovative and, as such, it may be applied in contexts other than Tanzania. Theoretically, the innovative amalgamation of the three theoretical perspectives of geopolitical theory, institutional theory and general decentralisation frameworks, contributes to existing and ongoing discourses on why and how countries decentralise and with what effects.

It is believed that the theoretical framework is relevant to other development projects or countries seeking to examine the main drivers of policy change and to assess the impacts of such policy reforms on meeting their stated objectives. As applied in this study, geopolitical theory makes it possible to generate relevant pragmatic propositions, both inward- and outward-looking, in analysing government policy. Finally, the study has shown that the hybrid model of decentralisation in existence in Tanzania is a product of the influence of both Western donor countries and international donor agencies as well as domestic political calculations and internal realities. It has also shed light on the suitability of the hybrid model of decentralisation, and the factors that constrain its full potential in delivering the intended objectives. The constraints unpacked here are relevant to governance policy and practice because they draw attention to specific issues that need addressing in attempts to improve public service delivery, alleviate poverty and deepen democracy.

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ANNEXURE 1

Questionnaire

Ndugu Mshiriki

Dodoso hili ni moja ya njia kuu za kukusanyia taarifa katika utafiti unaofanyika kama sehemu ya mafunzo ya Shahada ya Uzamivu (PhD) katika fani ya Utawala ya Chuo Kikuu cha Western Cape, nchini Afrika Kusini. Kichwa cha Utafiti huu ni **" Uchunguzi wa Matokeo ya Ugatuaji wa Madaraka katika Utoaji Huduma na Ushirikishwaji wa Wananchi kwenye Serikali za Mitaa"**. Utafiti huu hauna dhamana ya Serikali wala Chama chochote cha Siasa. Utafiti unalenga kuchunguza mchakato wa ugatuaji wa madaraka kwa serikali za mitaa hapa nchini na kuainisha mafanikio ya utekelezaji wa sera hiyo katika kuboresha viwango vya utoaji huduma na ushirikishwaji wa wananchi katika kutoa maamuzi. Walengwa wa utafiti huu ni Mwananchi yoyote aliye na umri usiopungua miaka 18 na anayeishi katika eneo la utafiti. Washiriki wa utafiti huu lazima wawe wakaazi wa Wilaya ya Morogoro, Lindi na Jiji la Tanga. Taarifa zitakazotolewa na mshiriki zitabaki kuwa siri. Aidha, unaombwa kushiriki katika utafiti huu kwa ridhaa yako na siyo kwa kushurutishwa.

Dear Participant

This questionnaire forms part of research being undertaken towards award of degree Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape. The title of the thesis is **"An Examination of the Impact of Administrative Decentralisation on Participatory Local Government and Service Delivery in Tanzania"**. This study does not represent the government or any political party. The study aims at examining the process of administrative decentralisation underway in Tanzania and the extent to which it is meeting its stated policy objectives of improved service delivery and effective citizen participation. The target are any adults (18 years and above) living in the case areas. Participants must be residents in the selected municipalities of Tanga city, Lindi and Morogoro districts. Personal information will be kept confidential. You are under no obligation to participate in this survey and if you do so it must be of your own free will.

DODOSO LA TATHMINI YA WANANCHI KUHUSU UBORA WA HUDUMA NA USHIRIKISHWAJI KATIKA SERIKALI ZA MITAA [*QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES DELIVERY AND PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING AND POLICY PROCESSES*]
Mhojiwa lazima atoe ridhaa yake kushiriki. Kama ameridhia, endelea: [*The person must give his/her consent. If consent is secured, proceed as follows*]

Namba ya Mhojiwa [Respondent No.]					Wilaya [District]	
Namba ya Mhojaji [Interviewer No.]					Kata [Ward]	
Data Entry No.					Kijiji [Village]/Mtaa	

ANZA MAHOJIANO [BEGIN INTERVIEW]

TAARIFA ZA UTAMBULISHO [DEMOGRAPHIC/AREA DATA]

Tuanze kwa kurekodi taarifa chache kukuhusu wewe. (Let us begin by recording a few facts about yourself)

1. Umri wako ni miaka mingapi? *[Mhojaji: Kama umri wa mhojiwa ni chini ya miaka 18, sitisha usaili na uchague mshiriki mwingine katika kaya hiyo hiyo]* – [How old are you? – *Interviewer If respondent is aged less than 18, stop interview and select another respondent in the same household]*			

2. Jinsia ya Mhojiwa [Respondent's Gender] *[Mhojaji: Usiulize swali hili, chunguza na kurekodi]*	
Mme (Male)	1
Mke (Female)	2

3. Kiwango chako cha elimu? *[Mhojaji: Usimsomee majibu. Jaza kulingana na atakavyojibu* [What is your highest standard of education completed? *Interviewer: Do not read options, record from response.].*	
Sina elimu ya darasani [No formal education]	1
Elimu isiyo rasmi [Informal schooling]	2
Nimesoma lakini sijahitimu Elimu ya Msingi [Some Primary schooling]	3
Nimehitimu Elimu ya Msingi [Primary School completed]	4
Nimesoma lakini sijahitimu Elimu ya Sekondari [Some secondary schooling]	5
Nimehitimu Elimu ya Sekondari [Secondary school completed]	6
Nimesoma lakini sijahitimu Chuo Kikuu [Some university]	7
Nimehitimu Chuo Kikuu [University completed]	8
Shahada ya Juu [Post graduate]	9
*Sijui [Don't Know][61]	99

HALI YA MAISHA NA UCHUMI [ECONOMIC AND LIVING CONDITIONS]

4. Kwa ujumla, unaonaje: [Mhojaji: *Msomee majibu achague]* [In general, how would you describe: Interviewer, readout options]

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[61] Sijui [Don't know] / *Hakuna [No one] = Usimsomee Jibu hili, rekodi kutokana na atakavyojibu – Don't read out, record from response

	Nzuri Sana [Very Good]	Inaridhisha [Fairly Good]	Wastani [Neither Good nor Bad]	Hairidhishi [Fairly Bad]	Ni mbaya sana [Very Bad]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Hali ya sasa ya uchumi wa nchi hii? [The present economic condition of this country?]	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Hali yako ya maisha kwa sasa? [Your own present living conditions?]	5	4	3	2	1	9

5. Je unayaonaje maisha yako ukilinganisha na wananchi wengine? *[Mhojaji: Msomee majibu achague]*

[How do you rate your living condition compared to other citizens? *[Interviewer: Read the options]*

	Bora Zaidi [Much better]	Bora [Better]	Sawa [Same]	Duni/Mabaya [Worse]	Duni/Mabaya zaidi [Much worse]	*Sijui [Don't know]
	5	4	3	2	1	9

6. Kwa kurejea kipindi cha nyuma, je unayaonaje mambo yafuatayo kwa kulinganisha na miaka ya 1990? *[Msomee majibu achague]*

[Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to the 1990s? *[Interviewer: Read out options]*

	Bora Zaidi [Much better]	Bora [Better]	Sawa [Same]	Duni/Mabaya [Worse]	Duni/Mabaya Zaidi [Much worse]	*Sijui [Don't know]
A. Hali ya uchumi wa nchi hii? [Economic conditions of this country?]	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Hali yako ya maisha? [Your living conditions]	5	4	3	2	1	9

UPATIKANAJI WA TAARIFA   [ACCESS TO INFORMATION]

7. Je unamiliki vyombo vifuatavyo? [Do you personally own any of these things?]
   [Msomee majibu achague – Read out options]

	Hapana [No]	Ndiyo [Yes]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Redio [Radio]	2	1	9
B. Luninga [Television]	2	1	9
C. Gari au Pikipiki [Motor vehicle, or motorcycle]	2	1	9

8. Je unatumia simu ya mkononi? Kama ndiyo, ni nani anayemiliki simu unayoitumia mara kwa mara? *[Msomee majibu]*

[Do you ever use a mobile phone? If so, who owns the mobile phone that you use most often? - *Read out options]*

Hapana, sijawahi kutumia simu ya mkononi [No, I never used a mobile phone]	1
Ndiyo, Natumia simu yangu [Yes, I use a mobile phone that I own]	2
Ndiyo, Natumia simu ya mtu mwingine katika kaya yangu [Yes, I use a mobile phone owned by someone else in my household]	3

Ndiyo, Natumia simu ya mtu mwingine nje ya kaya yangu [Yes, I use a mobile phone owned by someone outside my house hold]	4
*Sijui [Don't know]	9

9. Je, mara ngapi unapata taarifa kutoka katika vyanzo vifuatavyo? *[Mhojaji: Msomee majibu achague]*
[How often do you get news from the following sources? *[Interviewer: Readout options]*]

	Kila siku [Every day]	Mara chache kwa Wiki [Few times a week]	Mara chache kwa Mwezi [Few times a month]	Mara moja kwa Mwezi [Once a month]	Sipati taarifa [Never]	*Sijui [Don't know]
A. Redio [Radio]	5	4	3	2	1	9
B. Luninga [Television]	5	4	3	2	1	9
C. Gazeti [Newspaper]	5	4	3	2	1	9

10. Kwa uzoefu wako, ni rahisi au vigumu kiasi gani kufanya mambo yafuatayo? *[Msomee majibu achague]*
[Based on your experience, how easy or difficulty is it to do each of the following?] *[Readout options]*

	Rahisi Sana [Very easy]	Rahisi [Easy]	Vigumu [Difficult]	Vigumu Sana [Very Difficult]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kujua namna Halmashauri yako inavyotumia mapato ya kodi na ruzuku. [To find out how your local government uses the revenues from people's tax and grants].	1	2	3	4	9
B. Kujua ratiba za mikutano ya Halmashauri ya Kijiji [To find out the schedules for Village Assembly meetings and other participatory forums].	1	2	3	4	9

11. Je ni kwa kiwango gani unavutiwa na masuala ya kijamii (mfano, siasa au serikali)? *[Msomee achague]*
[How interested are you in public affairs (e.g. politics and government)? - *[Read out options]*]

	Navutiwa Sana [Very interested]	Navutiwa [Fairly interested]	Sivutiwi [Less interested]	Sivutiwi Kabisa [Not interested at all]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
	4	3	2	1	9

IMANI KWA TAASISI ZA UMMA NA MAOFISA WA SERIKALI [TRUST IN KEY INSTITUTIONS/INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT]

12. Je una imani kiasi gani kwa Taasisi za Umma zifuatazo?
[How much do you trust each of the following government institutions?]

	Kiasi kikubwa [A lot]	Kiasi fulani [Somewhat]	Kiasi kidogo [Just a little bit]	Sina imani kabisa [Not at all]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Serikali Kuu [Central Government]	4	3	2	1	9
B. Mfuko wa Hifadhi ya Jamii (TASAF) [Tanzania Social Action Fund]	4	3	2	1	9
C. Bunge [Parliament]	4	3	2	1	9

D. Halmashauri ya Wilaya/Jiji [Your Local Government (District Council)]	4	3	2	1	9
E. Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata (WDC) [Ward Development Committee]	4	3	2	1	9
F. Halmashauri ya Kijiji [Village Council]	4	3	2	1	9
G. Kamati ya TASAF [TASAF Community Management Committee]	4	3	2	1	9

13. Je una imani kiasi gani kwa Viongozi na Maofisa wa Serikali za Mitaa Wafuatao? *[Msomee majibu achague]*

[How much do you trust each of the following key individuals in local government?] [Interviewer: Readout options]

	Kiasi kikubwa [A lot]	Kiasi fulani [Somewhat]	Kiasi kidogo [Just a little bit]	Sina imani kabisa [Not at all]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Mbunge [Member of Parliament]	4	3	2	1	9
B. Meya/ Mwenyekiti wa Halmashauri [Mayor/ Council Chairman]	4	3	2	1	9
C. Mkurugenzi wa Halmashauri [City/District Executive Director]	4	3	2	1	9
D. Diwani [Councillor]	4	3	2	1	9
E. Watumishi wa Halmashauri [Local Government Officials]	4	3	2	1	9
F. Mtendaji wa Kata [Ward Executive Officer]	4	3	2	1	9
G. Mwenyekiti wa Halmashauri ya Kijiji/Mtaa [Street/Village Council Chairman]	4	3	2	1	9
H. Mtendaji wa Kijiji [Mtaa/Village Executive Officer]	4	3	2	1	9
I. Mratibu wa TASAF wa Halmashauri [Council TASAF Coordinator]	4	3	2	1	9
J. Wajumbe wa Kamati ya Mradi ya TASAF kwenye Kijiji/mtaa [Members of TASAF project committee]	4	3	2	1	9

UGATUAJI WA MADARAKA NA USHIRIKISHWAJI WA WANANCHI [DECENTRALISATION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION]

14. Kwa mtazamo wako unadhani ni kwa kiasi gani Serikali za Mitaa zina mamlaka na uhuru wa kujiendesha hapa nchini? *[Msomee majibu achague]* [In your opinion how decentralised and autonomous are the Local Governments in Tanzania?]	
A. Zina mamlaka kamili na uhuru wa kujiendesha [Full decentralised and autonomous]	4
B. Zina mamlaka lakini huingiliwa kidogo na Serikali Kuu [Decentralised but with minor interferences by Central Government]	3
C. Zina Mamlaka lakini zinaingiliwa kwa kiasi kikubwa na Serikali Kuu [Decentralised but with severe interferences by Central Government]	2
D. Hazina mamlaka wala uhuru wa kujiendesha zenyewe [Neither decentralised nor autonomous at all]	1
*Sijui [Do not Know]	9

15. Kwa mtazamo wako unadhani Serikali za Mitaa hapa nchini zina demokrasia kiasi gani? *[Msomee majibu achague]* [In your opinion how democratic are the local governments in Tanzania?]	

A. Zina demokrasia kwa kiwango kikubwa [Full democratic]	4
B. Zina demokrasia japo kuna ukiukwaji mdogo [Democratic but with minor problems]	3
C. Zina demokrasia japo kuna ukiukwaji wa hali ya juu [Democratic but with major problems]	2
D. Hazina democrasia [Undemocratic]	1
*Sijui [Do not Know] *[don't read this]*	9

16. Kufuatia uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2010, kauli ipi kati ya hizi zifuatazo ni sahihi kwako? *[Msomee achague]* [With regard to the most recent national election in 2010, which statement is true for you? – *Read out options*]	
Hukuwa umefikia umri wa kuruhusiwa kupiga kura [You were too young to vote]	1
Hukujiandikisha kupiga kura [You were not registered]	2
Ulipiga kura katika uchaguzi huo [You voted in the elections]	3
Uliamua kutopiga kura [You decided not to vote]	4
Hukuweza kuona kituo chako cha kupigia kura [You could not find the polling station]	5
Ulizuiwa kupiga kura [You were prevented from voting]	6
Hukuwa na muda wa kupiga kura [You did not have time to vote]	7
Hukupiga kura kwa sababu hukuona jina lako kwenye daftari la mpiga kura [You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register]	8
Hukupiga kura kwa sababu nyinginezo [Did not vote for some other reason]	9
*Sijui/ Sikumbuki [Don't Know/ Can't remember]	99

17. Kufuatia uchaguzi wa Serikali za Mitaa wa hivi karibuni, kauli ipi kati ya hizi zifuatazo ni sahihi kwako? *[Msomee majibu achague]* [With regard to the most recent local government elections, which statement is true for you?] *[Readout options]*	
Hukuwa umefikia umri wa kuruhusiwa kupiga kura [You were too young to vote]	1
Hukujiandikisha kupiga kura [You were not registered]	2
Ulipiga kura katika uchaguzi huo [You voted in the elections]	3
Uliamua kutopiga kura [You decided not to vote]	4
Hukuweza kuona kituo chako cha kupigia kura [You could not find the polling station]	5
Ulizuiwa kupiga kura [You were prevented from voting]	6
Hukuwa na muda wa kupiga kura [You did not have time to vote]	7
Hukupiga kura kwa sababu hukuona jina lako kwenye daftari la mpiga kura [You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register]	8
Hukupiga kura kwa sababu nyinginezo [Did not vote for some other reason]	9
*Sijui/ Sikumbuki [Don't Know/ Can't remember]	99

18. Kwa mtazamo wako, unadhani Serikali za Mitaa hapa nchini ni shirikishi kwa kiasi gani? *[Msomee Majibu achague]* [In your opinion how participatory are the Local Governments in Tanzania?] (Read out options)	
A. Shirikishi kwa kiwango cha juu [Full participatory]	4
B. Shirikishi japo kuna ukiukwaji mdogo [Participatory but with minor problems]	3
C. Shirikishi lakini kuna ukiukwaji mkubwa [Participatory but with major problems]	2
D. Si shirikishi [Non-participatory]	1

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*Sijui [Don't Know]	9

19. Je, Halmashauri ya Jiji/Wilaya yako inawashirikisha wananchi katika kufanya maamauzi kuhusu utoaji wa huduma na shughuli za maendeleo kwa kiwango gani? *[Msomee Majibu achague]*
[In your opinion, to what extent does your District/City Council engage citizens to participate in decision-making for service delivery and development activities?]

	Kiwango cha Juu [Excellent]	Kiwango cha Kuridhisha [Fairly]	Kiwango cha Chini [Poorly]	Haishirikishi Kabisa [Not at all]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
	4	3	2	1	9

20. Kwa mtazamo wako, unadhani Mradi wa TASAF katika Wilaya yako ni shirikishi kiasi gani? *[Msomee Majibu achague]*
[In your opinion how participatory is the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) project in your District? Read out options]

A. Shirikishi kwa kiwango cha juu [Full participatory]	4
B. Shirikishi japo kuna ukiukwaji mdogo [Participatory but with minor problems]	3
C. Shirikishi lakini kuna ukiukwaji mkubwa [Participatory but with major problems]	2
D. Si shirikishi [Non-participatory]	1
*Sijui [Do not Know]	9

21. Ni kwa ubora au ubaya kiasi gani waweza sema kwamba Halmashauri ya Jiji/Wilaya yako inatekeleza mambo yafuatayo? *[Mhojaji: dadisi kujua upana wa mawazo yake]*
[How well or badly would you say the Local Government is practicing the following procedures?] (Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion)

	Vizuri Sana [Very Well]	Inaridhisha [Fairly Well]	Hairidhishi [Fairly Bad]	Vibaya Sana [Very Bad]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kuwapa wananchi taarifa za bajeti na matumizi ya halmashauri [Providing ordinary citizens with information about the council's budget and expenditure]	4	3	2	1	9
B. Kuwapa fursa wananchi kama wewe kushiriki katika kutoa maamuzi, utungaji wa sera na shughuli za maendeleo [Allowing citizens like yourself to participate in decision making, development and policy processes]	4	3	2	1	9
C. Kushirikisha Wadau mbali mbali kabla ya kufanya maamuzi ya kisera [Consulting different stakeholders before making policy decisions]	4	3	2	1	9
D. Kuweka utaratibu bora wa kushughulikia malalamiko ya wananchi [Providing effective ways to handle complaints of local people]	4	3	2	1	9
E. Kuzingatia usawa na uwiano katika mgawanyo wa rasilimali [Guaranteeing equality and equity in resource distribution]	4	3	2	1	9

22. Ni kwa ubora au ubaya kiasi gani waweza sema kwamba TASAF inatekeleza mambo yafuatayo? *[Mhojaji: dadisi kujua upana wa mawazo yake]*
[How well or badly would you say the TASAF is practicing the following procedures?] (Interviewer: probe for strength of opinion)

	Vizuri Sana [Very	Inaridhisha [Fairly Well]	Hairidhishi [Fairly Bad]	Vibaya Sana [Very	*Sijui [Don't Know]

	Well]			Bad]	
A. Kuwapa wananchi taarifa za bajeti na matumizi ya halmashauri [Providing ordinary citizens with information about the council's budget and expenditure]	4	3	2	1	9
B. Kuwapa fursa wananchi kama wewe kushiriki katika kutoa maamuzi, utungaji wa sera na shughuli za maendeleo [Allowing citizens like yourself to participate in decision making, development and policy processes]	4	3	2	1	9
C. Kushirikisha Wadau mbali mbali kabla ya kufanya maamuzi ya kisera [Consulting different stakeholders before making policy decisions]	4	3	2	1	9
D. Kuweka utaratibu bora wa kushughulikia malalamiko ya wananchi [Providing effective ways to handle complaints of local people]	4	3	2	1	9
E. Kuzingatia usawa na uwiano katika mgawanyo wa rasilimali [Guaranteeing equality and equity in resource distribution]	4	3	2	1	9

23. Katika kila kauli nitakayokusomea hapa chini, nieleze kama unakubaliana au hukubaliani nayo kwa kiwango gani. *[Mhojaji: Dadisi kujua upana wa mawazo yake]*
[For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree] *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Nakubali kabisa [Strongly Agree]	Nakubali [Agree]	Sikubali [Disagree]	Sikubali kabisa [Strongly Disagree]	*Sijui [Don't know]
Wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi hawana ushawishi wowote katika utendaji wa Serikali Kuu [Ordinary people like me do not have any influence over what Central Government does]	4	3	2	1	9
Wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi hawana ushawishi wowote katika utendaji wa Serikali za Mitaa [Ordinary people like me do not have any influence over what local government does]	4	3	2	1	9
Wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi hawana ushawishi wowote katika utendaji wa TASAF [Ordinary people like me do not have any influence over what TASAF does]	4	3	2	1	9
Viongozi wa Kisiasa hawatilii maanani mawazo ya wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi [Political office bearer do not care much about what people like me think]	4	3	2	1	9
Maofisa/Watumishi wa Halmashauri hawatilii maanani mawazo ya wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi [Local government officials do not care much about what people like me think]	4	3	2	1	9
Maofisa wa Mradi wa TASAF hawatilii maanani mawazo ya wananchi wa kawaida kama mimi [TASAF project officials do not care much about what people like me think]	4	3	2	1	9

24. Je, ni nani anapaswa kufanya yafuatayo? (msomee) **- [Who should be responsible for:** *[Read out options]]*

	Serikali Kuu [Central Govt.]	Bunge [Parliament]	Halmashauri ya Wilaya [Local Council]	Chama cha Siasa [Political Party]	Wapiga Kura [Voters]	*Hakuna [No One]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kuhakikisha kwamba baada ya kuchaguliwa, Madiwani wanatekeleza majukumu yao [Making sure that once elected, ward councillors do their jobs]	1	2	3	4	5	6	9
B. Kuhakikisha kwamba baada ya kuajiriwa Watumishi wa Halmashari wanatekeleza majukumu yao [Making sure that once employed local government employees do their jobs]	1	2	3	4	5	6	9
C. Kuhakikisha kwamba mara baada ya kubuniwa mipango shirikishi ya Serikali za Mitaa inatekelezwa. [Making sure that once formulated, participatory local govt. plans are implemented]	1	2	3	4	5	6	9

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25. Ni mara ngapi katika kipindi cha miaka mitano iliyopita umewahi kuwasiliana na Viongozi wafuatao ili kuwapa maoni au malalamiko yako? *[Msomee majibu achague]*

[During the past five years, how often have you contacted any of the following officials to give them your views or complaints?] *(Read out options)*

	Sijawahi [Never]	Mara moja [Once]	Mara chache [Few times]	Mara kwa mara [Often]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Diwani wa Kata yako [Local government Councillor]	1	2	3	4	9
B. Meya au Mwenyekiti wa Halmashauri [Mayor or Council Chairman]	1	2	3	4	9
C. Mkurugenzi wa Halmashauri [District Executive Director]	1	2	3	4	9
D. Mtumishi wa Serikali za Mitaa [Local Government Official]	1	2	3	4	9

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26. Katika kipindi cha mwaka moja uliopita ni mara ngapi wewe binafsi umefanya yafuatayo? *[Mosomee majibu achague]*

[For the past year, how often have you personally done any of the following?] *[Read out options]*

	Sijawahi [Never]	Mara moja [Once]	Mara chache [Few times]	Mara nyingi [Many times]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kuhudhuria mkutano wa Baraza la Kijiji [Attend a Village Assembly meeting]	1	2	3	4	9
B. Kuhudhuria Kikao cha Mipango ya Maendeleo ya Kata/Kijiji [Attended local government development planning meeting]	1	2	3	4	9
D. Kuhudhuria Kikao cha Mipango ya Miradi ya TASAF [Attended TASAF development planning meeting]	1	2	3	4	9
E. Kushiriki kwenye Maandamano au Mgomo [Attended a demonstration or protest march]	1	2	3	4	9
F. Kuhudhuria Mkutano wa Baraza la Madiwani la Halmashauri yako [Attended Full Council Meeting]	1	2	3	4	9

27. Katika kipindi cha mwaka moja uliopita, ni mara ngapi wewe au mtu mwingine katika familia yako aliwahi kukumbana na hali zifuatazo: *[Msomee majibu achague]*
[Over the past year, how often, if ever, you or your family member encountered the following:] *[Read out options]*

	Sijawahi Never	Mara moja [Once]	Mara kadhaa [Several times]	Mara nyingi [Many times]	Kila mara [Always]	*Sijui/Sik-umbuki Don't Know/ remember
A. Kukosa chakula cha kutosha? [Gone without enough food to eat?]	1	2	3	4	5	9
B. Kukosa maji safi kwa matumizi ya nyumbani? [Gone without enough clean water for domestic use?]	1	2	3	4	5	9
C. Kukosa dawa au Matibabu [Gone without medicines or medical treatment?]	1	2	3	4	5	9
D. Kukosa nishati ya kupikia chakula? [Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?]	1	2	3	4	5	9
E. Kukosa kipato/fedha [Gone without a cash income?]	1	2	3	4	5	9
F. Kushindwa kwenda kumwandikisha mtoto shuleni kwa kukosa ada [Failed to register a child in local school due to lack of fees]	1	2	3	4	5	9

28. Ni mara ngapi umekumbana na matatizo yafuatayo katika shule ya Serikali iliyoko katika Wilaya yako kwa kipindi cha miezi 12 iliyopita? *[Mhojaji: Dadisi]*
[How often have you encountered any of these problems with your local public schools during the past 12 months? *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Sina uzoefu na Shule za Umma [No experience with public schools]	Sijawahi [Never]	Mara moja tu [Just Once]	Mara chache [A few times]	Mara kwa mara [Often]	*Sijui [Don't know]
A. Huduma ghali sana/ kushindwa kulipa [Services are too expensive/ unable to pay]	5	1	2	3	4	9
B. Ukosefu wa vitabu au vifaa vya kufundishia [Lack of textbooks or other supplies]	5	1	2	3	4	9
C. Ufundishaji mbovu [Poor teaching]	5	1	2	3	4	9
D. Utoro wa Walimu [Absent teachers]	5	1	2	3	4	9
E. Mrundikano wa wanafunzi darasani [Overcrowded classrooms]	5	1	2	3	4	9
F. Majengo Chakavu [Poor conditions of facilities]	5	1	2	3	4	9

29. Ni mara ngapi umekumbana na matatizo yafuatayo katika Hospitali au Kliniki ya Serikali iliyoko katika Wilaya yako kwa kipindi cha miezi 12 iliyopita? *[Mhojaji: Dadisi]*
[How often have you encountered any of these problems with your local public clinic or hospital during the past 12 months?] *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Sina uzoefu na Hospitali za Umma [No experience with public Hospitals]	Sijawahi Never	Mara moja tu [Just once]	Mara chache [A few times]	Mara kwa mara [Often]	*Sijui [Don't know]

A. Huduma ghali sana/ kushindwa kulipa [Services are too expensive/ unable to pay]	5	1	2	3	4	9
B. Ukosefu wa dawa au vifaa tiba [Lack of medicines or other supplies]	5	1	2	3	4	9
C. Watumishi kutojali au kuwavunjia heshima wagonjwa [Lack of attention or respect from staff]	5	1	2	3	4	9
D. Utoro wa Madaktari [Absent doctors]	5	1	2	3	4	9
E. Ucheleweshaji wa huduma [Long waiting time]	5	1	2	3	4	9
F. Mazingira machafu [Dirty facilities]	5	1	2	3	4	9

30. Katika kipindi cha mwaka moja uliopita, ni mara ngapi umelazimika kutoa rushwa, zawadi au upendeleo kwa watumishi wa Halmashauri ili uweze ku: *[Msomee majibu achague]*

[In the past year, how often if ever, have you had to pay bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to local government officials in order to: *[Read the options]*

	Sijawahi [Never]	Mara moja au mbili [Once or twice]	Mara chache [Few times]	Mara kwa mara [Often]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kupata hati, leseni au kibali [Get a document, licence or a permit]	1	2	3	4	9
B. Kupata huduma za maji na uzoaji taka [Get water or sanitation services]	1	2	3	4	9
C. Kutibiwa katika kituo cha afya au hospitali ya serikali [Get treatment at a local health clinic or hospital]	1	2	3	4	9
D. Kupata nafasi ya mtoto katika shule ya msingi au sekondari [Get a place in a primary or secondary school for a child	1	2	3	4	9

31. Katika kipindi cha mwaka moja uliopita, ni mara ngapi umelazimika kutoa rushwa, zawadi au upendeleo kwa Afisa wa TASAF ili uweze: *[Msomee majibu achague]*

[In the past year, how often if ever, have you had to pay bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to the TASAF official in order to:] *[Read the options]*

	Sijawahi [Never]	Mara moja au mbili [Once or twice]	Mara chache [Few times]	Mara kwa mara [Often]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Kupata ruzuku ya chakula [Get food subsidy from TASAF]	1	2	3	4	9
B. Kufata ufadhili wa mradi kutoka TASAF [Get project funding from TASAF]	1	2	3	4	9

KURIDHISHWA NA UTOAJI HUDUMA KATIKA SERIKALI ZA MITAA [SATISFACTION WITH SERVICE DELIVERY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT]

32. Ni kwa ubora au ubaya kiasi gani waweza sema kwamba Halmashauri ya Jiji au Wilaya yako inashughulikia mambo yafuatayo? *[Mhojaji: Dadisi]*

[How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters?] *[Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion]*

	Vizuri Sana [Very Well]	Vizuri [Fairly Well]	Vibaya [Fairly Bad]	Vibaya Sana [Very Bad]	*Sijui [Don't Know]
A. Ukarabati wa barabara [Maintaining local roads]	4	3	2	1	9
B. Utoaji wa huduma za afya katika zahanati na hospitali	4	3	2	1	9

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[Providing health services in clinics and hospitals]					
C. Utoaji wa huduma za elimu ya msingi na sekondari [Providing primary and secondary education services]	4	3	2	1	9
D. Kusimamia viwango vya usafi katika migahawa na maduka ya vyakula [Maintaining health standards, for example in restaurants and food stalls]	4	3	2	1	9
E. Kusimamia matumizi bora ya ardhi [Managing the use of land]	4	3	2	1	9
F. Kusimamia na kukarabati masoko [Maintaining local market places]	4	3	2	1	9
G. Usafi wa mazingira (mf. kuzoa taka) na usambazaji maji vijijini [[Providing water and sanitation services (i.e. refuse removal)]	4	3	2	1	9

33. Ipi kati ya kauli zifuatazo inaonyesha msimamo wako? Chagua Kauli ya 1 au Kauli ya 2. *[Mhojaji: Dadisi]* **Je, unaikubali au unakubali kabisa kauli hiyo?**
[Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or Statement 2. *[Interviewer; Probe for strength of opinion]* Do you agree or strongly agree?

Kauli ya 1: Ni muhimu zaidi kuwa na Serikali za mitaa zinazoweza kutekeleza majukumu yao kwa ufanisi, hata kama hatushirikishwi na hatuna maamuzi kwa kile zinacho kifanya. [Statement 1: It is more important to have a local government that can get things done, even if we do not participate and have no influence over what it does.]		Kauli ya 2: Ni muhimu zaidi wananchi wakashirikishwa na kuwa na uwezo wa kuziwajibisha Serikali zao za Mitaa, hata kama kwa kufanya hivyo huchelewesha utoaji wa maamuzi. [Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to participate and be able to hold local government accountable, even if that means making decisions more slowly.]		Sikubaliani na Kauli yoyote [Don't Agree with either statement] *{Usimsomee - do not read out this}*	*Sijui [Don't Know]
Naikubali [Agree]	Naikubali Kabisa [Agree Very Strongly]	Naikubali [Agree]	Naikubali Kabisa [Agree Very Strongly]		
1	2	3	4	5	9

34. Kwa ujumla, unaridhishwa kiasi gani na upatikanaji pamoja na ubora wa huduma zinazotolewa na Halmashauri yako? *[Msomee majibu]*
[Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality and access to public services provided by your Local Government?]
[Read out options]

	Naridhishwa Sana [Very Satisfied]	Naridhishwa [Fairly Satisfied]	Siridhishwi [Less Satisfied]	Siridhishwi Kabisa [Not Satisfied at all]	*Sijui [Don't know]
	4	3	2	1	9

35. Kwa ujumla, unaridhishwa kiasi gani na upatikanaji pamoja na ubora wa huduma zinazotolewa na TASAF katika wilaya yako? *[Msomee majibu]*
[Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality and access to public services provided by TASAF in your District?]
[Read out options]

	Naridhishwa Sana [Very Satisfied]	Naridhishwa [Fairly Satisfied]	Siridhishwi [Less Satisfied]	Siridhishwi Kabisa [Not Satisfied at all]	*Sijui [Don't know]
	4	3	2	1	9

36. Kwa kuhitimisha, ni mabadiliko gani katika Serikali za Mitaa unadhani yamepatikana kutokana na utekekelezaji wa sera ya ugatuaji au ushushaji wa madraka karibu na wananchi? Chagua majibu matatu kati ya haya yafuatayo *[Msomee Majibu achague]* [Overall, what changes would you say have occurred in local governments in Tanzania as a result of the decentralisation reform and approaches adopted in implementing it?] Choose	Weka alama katika majibu matatu kati ya haya [Circle three choices from the following]

any three out of the following (Read out options)	
Kuongezeka kwa ushirikishwaji wa wananchi [More participation]	1
Huduma bora za umma hutolewa kwa jamii nzima na watu maskini [Improved services delivered to communities and the poor]	2
Maendeleo zaidi yamepatikana katika jamii [More development]	3
Maamuzi mengi hufanyika katika ngazi za chini [More decision making at the local level]	4
Mamlaka za Serikali za Mitaa zimepewa madaraka na majukumu 290zaidi [Local governments have more authority and responsibilities]	5
Rasilimali nyingi zinapelekwa kwenye Mamlaka za Serikali za Mitaa [More resources to Local government authorities]	6
Mamlaka za Serikali za Mitaa zimeimarishwa na kujengewa uwezo [strengthened capacity of Local government authorities]	7
Kukua kwa demokrasia katika Serikali za Mitaa [deepened democracy]	8
*Hakuna mabadiliko yoyote [No change]	0
*Sijui [Do not Know]	9

ASANTE SANA KWA MAJIBU YAKO MAZURI: [THANK YOU VERY MUCH; YOUR ANSWERS HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL]

HITIMISHA MAHOJIANO   [END INTERVIEW]

USISAHAU KUJAZA SEHEMU IFUATAYO [DON'T FORGET TO COMPLETE NEXT SECTION]

Maoni ya Mhojaji, kama yapo: [Interviewer's comments if any:]

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Mhojaji:

Nathibitisha kwamba usaili huu umefanywa kwa kuzingatia maelekezo niliyopewa wakati wa mafunzo. Majibu yote yaliyojazwa katika dodoso hili ni yale tu yaliyotolewa na msailiwa aliyechaguliwa kwa utaratibu uliowekwa.

[**Interviewer**: I hereby certify that this interview was conducted in accordance with instructions received during training. All responses recorded here are those of the respondent who was chosen by the appropriate selection method.]

Saini ya Mhojaji: Tarehe
[Interviewer's Signature] -   [Date] -

ANNEXURE 2

Interview Guide

An Examination of the Impact of Administrative Decentralisation on Participatory Local Government and Service Delivery in Tanzania
(January – June 2014)

Dear Participant

This Interview forms part of research being undertaken towards award of degree Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Public Administration at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. The title of the thesis is **"An Examination of the Impact of Administrative Decentralisation on Participatory Local Government and Service Delivery in Tanzania"**. This study does not represent the government or any political party. The study aims at examining the process of administrative decentralisation underway in Tanzania and the extent to which it is meeting its stated policy objectives of improved service delivery and effective citizen participation.

The interview intends to solicit opinions of government officials and political office bearers on the contemporary systems and processes of administrative decentralisation in Tanzania and how have these impacted the delivery of public services, participatory development and deepening democracy in the selected municipalities of Lindi Rural, Morogoro Rural and Tanga City. Personal information will be kept confidential. You are under no obligation to participate in this interview and if you do so it must be of your own free will.

Interview Guide for Government Officials and Local Political Office Bearers

1. Can you briefly highlight why the government of Tanzania introduced the decentralisation by devolution (D-by-D) policy in 1998?

2. How has the decentralisation policy (D-by-D) faired in terms of strengthening local government and improving public service delivery?

3. How has the decentralisation policy faired in terms of enhancing participatory development and deepening democracy?

4. What challenges do you face in implementing the decentralisation (D-by-D) policy?

5. Alongside decentralisation, the government of Tanzania implements de-concentrated forms of administration as it is the case of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF). Why do you think this is necessary in local government administration?

6. What do you consider to be the reasons for the government's decision to de-concentrate the TASAF's pro-poor service delivery functions instead of decentralising them to the local government?

7. In your views, do you think local government authorities in Tanzania are capable of implementing pro-poor policies and the poverty reduction function through devolution?

8. The de-concentrated administration of TASAF is neither bound to strict bureaucratic procedures (e.g. procurement procedures) nor strict political screening (e.g. Full Council's approval). In your opinion, how does this arrangement strengthen local government in terms of improving public service delivery, enhancing participatory development and deepening democracy?

9. With the creation of new structures such as the Council Management Committee and Community Management Committees in place of democratic local government institutions, how do you think TASAF strengthen democratic local government and assist in improved delivery of public services and enhancing citizen participation?

10. Generally, to what extent do you think the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration strengthens local governments in Tanzania?

11. In what ways has the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration improved delivery of public services in local government?

12. How far has the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration succeeded in enhancing participatory development and deepening democracy in local government?

13. To what extent do you think the current approaches and forms of decentralisation in Tanzania enable local government authorities to provide basic services autonomously?

14. What is meant by citizen participation in the current decentralisation policy in Tanzania?

15. How do the ordinary citizens participate in the local government administration and development? What mechanisms are in place to ensure their participation?

16. How do the ordinary citizens participate in the TASAF project? What mechanisms are in place to ensure their participation?

17. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that local peoples' priorities and demands for basic services are taken aboard in the LGA's and TASAF's budgets?

18. To what extent do you consider that participation of the local people influences the quality and quantity of basic services delivered by local government authorities?

19. With TASAF in place, what do you consider to be the future of the devolution policy and democratic local government authorities in Tanzania?

20. Overall, what are the citizens' attitudes towards the combination of decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration in local government?

21. In your view, how suitable is the model of combining decentralised and de-concentrated forms of administration in local government?

22. Overall, what changes would you say have occurred in local governments in Tanzania as a result of the decentralisation reform and the approaches adopted in implementing it?

23. Is there any other important information that you think can be a contribution to my research that I should know?

Interview Guide for TASAF Officials

1. Why did the government of Tanzania introduce TASAF?

2. What are the main sources of funding for the TASAF? Who is the main financier for TASAF?

3. Why did TASAF adopt deconcentrated form of administration instead of devolution to LGAs?

4. How does TASAF strengthen the capacity of democratic LGAs?

5. Why did TASAF establish parallel structures like CMCs in local councils? How important are these structures?

6. How do the parallel structures like CMCs assist in strengthening the capacity of LGAs, in improving service delivery, and in enhancing participatory development and deepening democracy?

7. How harmonious are the TASAF parallel structures operating within formal local government institutions?

8. What is meant by participation in TASAF?

9. How do the ordinary citizens participate in TASAF projects? And, what mechanisms are in place to ensure their participation?

10. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that local people's priorities and demands are taken aboard in the TASAF budget?

11. How does people's participation influence the quality of service delivered by TASAF?

12. Generally, how is the citizens' attitude towards TASAF?

13. What changes would you say have occurred in local governments and communities as a result of TASAF operations?

14. What challenges do you face in implementing TASAF activities within devolved LGAs?

Interview Guide for Officials of the World Bank and other Donor Agencies

1. How does the World Bank support local government in Tanzania?

2. How does the deconcentrated system of TASAF assist local government in terms of strengthening their capacity to deliver services and enhancing citizen participation?

3. Don't you think building the capacity of village councils would have been more sustainable than using the temporary structures (the CMCs)?

4. How about mainstreaming the TASAF structures like the CMCs into the formal government structures? Don't you think that merging CMC membership with the village council committees would make it more sustainable?

5. Do you think the people in local communities have enough knowledge about TASAF and about what it is supposed to do along with the local government authorities?

6. Why do you think it is necessary for TASAF to use a different participatory planning approach, and especially the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) alongside the O&OD approach used by the local councils?

7. Social services infrastructure projects like building of classrooms and dispensaries take long time (up to 3 years) to complete in LGAs but only a short time (mostly 12 months) in TASAF due to resource limitation facing LGAs. Why should one government institution be well resourced to do the same activities that another institution is struggling with?

8. There is a criticism that Social Funds do not build the capacity of local government because they bypass democratic structures by creating parallel structures alongside. How do you respond to this criticism in relation to TASAF? And, what do you think would be the future of the model of decentralisation underway in Tanzania, combining both decentralisation and deconcentration?

9. TASAF pays some incentives for participation within CMCs while LGAs do not have the financial capacity to pay village council committees, and the people for participation in community activities. Don't you think that this would serve to discourage volunteerism and citizen participation in local government and self-help projects?

10. Giving a few technocrats or a group of experts like the Council Management Team much decision-making power and influences over TASAF activities than local political office bearers would seem to by-pass formal democratic decision making bodies and depoliticise development activities. How do you respond to this?

11. The World Bank has been financing the TASAF since its first phase to the current phase (TASAF III). What would you say are the motives for the World Bank's continued funding of TASAF?