Portrait of a mobile political subject:

The figure of the Afghan *Mujahedeen* in South Africa in the 1980s

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DECLARATION

I declare that *"Portrait of a mobile political subject: The figure of the Afghan Mujahedeen in South Africa in the 1980s."* is my own work and has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university. All the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

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ABSTRACT

This mini-thesis engages with the period of the Cold War between 1979 and 1989 to examine the shifts and contradictions that emerged around the figure of the "terrorist" and the "freedom fighter with a focus on the Afghan *Mujahedeen*. From 1979 to 1989, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. This period was witness to the formation of the *Mujahedeen* who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and also against the political ideologies of communism. In so doing, the *Mujahedeen* became political allies for the South African apartheid government as well as others fighting against the communist agenda. Through an analysis of alternative media discourses in the *Muslim News* reporting on the war in Afghanistan this dissertation traces the contradictions that emerge in the conceptual categories of the "terrorist" and the "freedom fighter" in South Africa through the different relationships that the Muslim community of Cape Town across generations and political views shared with the *Mujahedeen*. Through the analysis of the *Muslim News*, the figure of the *Mujahedeen* is analysed as it emerged discursively and became a contentious figure between two generations of the Muslims of Cape Town. The mini dissertation then analyses the figure of the *Mujahedeen* as it emerges in relation to the apartheid state's counterinsurgency strategy and the USA's Reagan Doctrine of the mid-80s. Read alongside one another, the dissertation argues that the figure of the *Mujahedeen* is a mobile one, holding different meaning in the different discursive and political spaces in which it appears.

Introduction

The Mujahedeen as “Freedom fighter,” “Terrorist” and Political subject:

Moving pieces during the Cold War

This MA dissertation is situated in the apartheid state of South Africa in the period of 1979-1989, during the Cold War; it also intersects with the circumstances in Afghanistan at the same time. The idea for this thesis was prompted by a meeting with Professor Shamil Jeppie, a well-known historian of the Islamic world. In this meeting a passing comment was made about the *Mujahedeen* having visited South Africa. This comment sparked the idea of a figure that could represent both “terrorist” and “freedom fighter” at the same time in different spaces.

My idea was initially to analyse how the figure of the *Mujahedeen* represented within South African media could play a part in influencing conceptual framings around politics and warfare, more specifically conceptual framings of the “terrorist” and the “freedom fighter”. I also asked myself the question: how did this figure of the *Mujahedeen* shape and influence people who faced similar struggles? To various degrees I believe that the thesis addresses these initial ideas, however, more questions began emerging after investigating the different spaces in which the *Mujahedeen* appeared in South Africa during the 1980s. My interest in the actual idea of the *Mujahedeen* having visited South Africa sparked something new for me. I wanted to prove that not only were the *Mujahedeen* in South Africa during the 1980s, but that the reason for their visit had much to do with a direct relationship that they shared with the apartheid state. Following this lead was important for me throughout my research because if that relationship could be proven then my idea of a mobile political subject could be developed through a demonstration of the blurring of the lines between "friend" and "enemy".

My research began by analysing the concepts of the "terrorist" and the "freedom fighter". The majority of the academic research that I had consulted that were dedicated to these concepts paid much attention to definition. Where there was no clear definition, researchers attempted to find one or at least come to some mutual agreement through shared characteristics they felt were inherent of those given the label of "terrorist" or "freedom fighter". I began my analysis at the beginning with Walter Laqueur's book *The Age of Terrorism.* [1] I continued with Dr Eqbal Ahmed and his 1998 presentation on "terrorism" at the University of Colorado[2] and Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hoefler's "The Challenges of conceptualizing Terrorism."[3] I also analysed the work of Anthony Richards in "Conceptualizing Terrorism" [4] and Gilbert Ramsey's "Why Terrorism can, but should not be defined." [5] These debates all had one thing in common: they all agreed that the concepts of the "terrorist" and the "freedom fighter" had no universally agreed upon definition. Theoretically the concepts were unclear and ambiguous, but there was one thing that all authors agreed upon: the psychological element of intent that they felt distinguished the "terrorist" from the "freedom fighter".

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[1] Walter Laqueur, *the Age of Terrorism* (Boston, Toronto: Brown and Company, 1987).
[2] Eqbal Ahmed, "Terrorism: Theirs and Ours," (Presentation given at the University of Colorado, October 12, 1998.) https://youtu.be/7zGqZ0Ma-0A
[3] Leonard Weinburg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan, H. Hoefler, "The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2004): 777-794, https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/095465590899768.
[4] Anthony Richards, "Conceptualizing Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 37, No. 3, (2014): 213-236.
[5] Gilbert Ramsey, "Why terrorism can, but should not be defined," *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (2015): 211-228.

I did not want my research to be another attempt to define these concepts of the “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” or try and distinguish them from one another, but rather to look at what could be found within the blurred lines between these concepts that this ambiguity created. The very ambiguity of these concepts is what brings me to the idea of the mobile political subject that this mini-dissertation explores. The mobile political subject is a figure that does not take the role of either “terrorist” or “freedom fighter”, but slides across these blurred lines. A mobile political subject cannot be confined by a label, definition or a concept. The mobile political subject can be seen through various layers of ideas and in different spaces in which it appears that allows for its mobility between conceptual framings.[6]I explore this in the chapters that follow.

South Africa, Afghanistan and elusive figures of the “terrorist” and the “Mujahedeen”

Afghanistan had been dependent on the Soviet Union for both military and economic support since the 1940s[7]. At the same time it presented itself as a non-aligned country[8] during the Cold War. In 1978 the government of Afghanistan, under self-declared president Mohammed Daoud Khan, was overthrown by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan which was a political party formed by a group of Marxists under the leadership of Nur Muhammed Taraki. Soon after the party had gained power, they released a manifesto which outlined the main problems in Afghanistan, the focus of reforms and the identification of which, “its strategic objective would be the foundation of a national government.”[9] Despite a new agenda for the way in which Afghanistan was to be governed, the new government inherited the situation wherein Afghanistan was still dependent on the Soviet Union. But Taraki, however, wanted to make their non-alignment policy a point:

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[6] This project was not originally conceived as an oral history project. However as I went deeper into my search of documentary traces. I had informal conversations with people associated with the *Muslim News* archive and came to understand that there is a very rich oral repertoire of memories and experiences carried by many of these people. This oral history will constitute the subject of my proposed Doctoral research.

[7] Beverley Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), 88-89.

[8] Non-alignment refers to a foreign policy taken up by countries that opposed the Cold War or any alliances within the Cold War. It was taken up by countries that sought to stand independent in their foreign relations with other countries without the influence of alliance with any side of those involved in the Cold War. (Authors interpretation).

> Our relations with all countries including the Soviet Union and all our neighbours […] will be based on the extent of their support of our revolutionary government and their help in political and economic areas […] We will be non-aligned and our friendship with others will depend on the measure of their help and support to us.[10]

The new government’s urge to keep the independence of Afghanistan seemed to have caused strain on its relationship with the Soviet Union. In order to keep that peace, a new treaty known as the Afghan-Soviet Friendship treaty was signed on 5th December 1978 in Moscow. The signing of this treaty caused uncertainty amongst the people of Afghanistan about the extent of influence that the Soviet Union had on the government of Afghanistan and its leader Taraki. At the same time within the government there was a power struggle between Taraki and his Defence Minister of the time, Hafizullah Amin. Having won this power struggle in 1979, Amin became the new president of Afghanistan. Despite the “official” friendship between the elected Afghan government and the Soviet Union, those relations were contested and Communism was unpopular amongst certain public circles in Afghanistan. Soon after Amin came into power, he released a statement wherein he warned against anyone opposing the relationship that Afghanistan had with the Soviet Union:

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[9] Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, 88-89.

[10] Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, 120.

> Any person and any element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enemy of our people and enemy of our revolution. We will not allow anybody in Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.[11]

In December of 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. According to Male, there are still debates as to why the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, however, she puts forth that the most common belief is that it was because the Soviet Union grew weary of the growing local opposition to the Communist government.[12] The Soviet Union felt that the Afghan government would not be able to handle the situation and they would lose the leverage and influence that the Soviets had over Afghanistan and its government, especially given the fact that the local opposition was backed and supported by the United States.[13]In other words, if the Soviet Union lost its influence over the elected Afghan government in the face of the threat of the Afghanistan oppositional groups who were backed by the United States, there would be consequences of geopolitical strategic influence which would sway the outcome of the Cold War. The United States would have gained influence over Afghanistan which geographically is situated next to what was the Soviet Union, thus making the Soviet Union vulnerable to attack and infiltration from the West. The Soviet Union would have lost Afghanistan which acted as a buffer state against any outside infiltration to the Soviet Union.

The formation of armed resistance fighters in Afghanistan in the 1970s became known as the *Mujahedeen*. These were made up of three groups in particular which were the Jamiat-

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[11] Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, 157.
[12] Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan,* 6-193.
[13] Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan,* 6-193.

e-islami, Hizbe Islami and Harakat-e-Inqilab, these merged together with the intention of fighting off the Soviet Union and its communist influence. The *Mujahedeen* were anti-communist and they were backed by many Western countries like the United States of America for political purposes. America's interests here were to defeat the Soviet Union, force it to retreat from Afghanistan and gain a victory or upper hand in the larger geo-strategic stakes of the Cold War.[14]America's interests however were not just confined to Afghanistan. Its strategy to defeat the Soviet Union expanded globally and its proxy influence as well as alignment with other anti-communist countries expanded as far as Southern Africa which included the apartheid state of South Africa.[15] In other words, the further they could influence and align themselves with other countries, the better their chances of defeating the Soviet Union and blocking the influence of communism globally.

The geopolitical situation of Southern Africa from the 1960s created an environment that led to increased pressure on the apartheid state.[16] The apartheid state's involvement in former South West Africa in the 1960s was one such result of this increasing pressure to secure the apartheid state and protect its territories:

> The border war was not a directly existential conflict for South Africa, but the strategic imperatives driving it were existential indeed, due to the potential for threats to the territorial integrity of the country.[17]

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[14] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (The Penguin Press, 2004), 1-712.

[15] Coll, *Ghost Wars,* 1-712.

[16] Thomas E. Ricks, "Annals of Wars We Don't Know About: The South African Border War of 1966-1989," *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015.

[17] Ricks, "Annals of Wars We Don't Know About."

In other words, South Africa, from the beginning of the 1960s began experiencing intense internal pressure with growing political and civil opposition from the ANC and the PAC and other organisations as well as international pressure, criticism and isolation due to its apartheid laws. The threat of destabilisation of the apartheid state was increasing and the state had to find ways of protecting itself. Armed resistance against the apartheid state also started increasing and it took two forms: firstly was the opposition against the apartheid state such as the ANC within the borders of South Africa. This opposition to the state was then backed by liberation movements based in the countries bordering South Africa, specifically South West Africa (later known as Namibia after independence in 1989.) The guerilla movement against South African rule in South West Africa began in the late 1960s and was led by SWAPO which was the South West African Peoples' Organisation. Part of the fight between the apartheid state and SWAPO happened in Angola where SWAPO members had set up a base and this formed part of the reason that the apartheid state sent its troops to Angola and backed UNITA.[18] By backing UNITA, the apartheid state had allies in Angola that would help in fighting SWAPO and it would also decrease the number of casualties of their own SADF soldiers. The MPLA Angolan government that UNITA was fighting against was backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union also contributed huge amounts of military for FAPLA, the Angolan army.[19]

The national liberation struggle against the unjust political system in South Africa was not an isolated situation. It was intertwined and understood within wider anti-colonial struggles across Africa, as well as the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and its allies, and the United States and its allies. This conflict not only affected South Africa, but its effects could be seen across Southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique. Apartheid South Africa was one of the countries in this ideological conflict that looked to the USA and its allies while South African national liberation organisations looked to the Soviet Union, China and East Germany for military and other support.[20] The politicisation of the armed forces and the militarisation of politics would become a further consequence for those countries most directly influenced by the ideological struggle.[21]

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[18] Ricks, "Annals of Wars We Don't Know About."
[19] Ricks, "Annals of Wars We Don't Know About."

The opposition against the apartheid state within the borders of South Africa came from the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party and other groups that were formed within South Africa against the apartheid state, fighting for a South Africa free from white minority rule. In order to control such oppositional organisations as well as to outlaw the spread of communism, the apartheid state enacted the Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of 1950:

> To declare the Communist Party of South Africa to be an unlawful organization; to make provision for declaring other organizations promoting communistic activities to be unlawful and for prohibiting certain periodical or other publications; to prohibit certain communistic activities and to make provision for other incidental matters.[22]

The deployment of this act led to the oppositional organisations going underground from which they began operating. Others set up bases outside South Africa in bordering countries from which they also operated. The ANC and the PAC and other anti-apartheid groups were also regarded by the apartheid state as “terrorists” under the late Terrorism Act of 1967[23], due to acts performed within the state such as opposing the apartheid regime, public disruptions and the bombing of property to name a few[24].

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[20] Ian Van Der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa* (South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2015), 1-377.

[21] Van Der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, 246.

[22] Disa.ukzn.ac.za/leg19500717028020044

These acts became the apartheid state’s way of keeping opposition within the country under control and they continued to be amended as stated so as to provide the apartheid state with broader powers of control as the internal opposition to the apartheid increased. The apartheid state’s strategy to control threats within bordering countries is seen through their alliances with oppositional movements like UNITA in Angola.

South Africa and the Soviet Union were connected before the Cold War through their lucrative trade with one another. However, their economic ties came to an official end when the Soviet Union “instituted a full trade embargo prior to a 1962 United Nations resolution that called on member states to cut economic connections with the apartheid regime.”[25] The mid 1970s saw the Soviet bloc influence expand into Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Kampuchea and the country of interest for this paper, Afghanistan. The governments of these countries were beginning, however, to prove to be more of a

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Terrorism under the policy of apartheid in South Africa’s Terrorism Act of 1967 under the General Laws Amendment Act No. 83 was defined as: “any act committed with the intention of endangering the law and order or inciting to or conspiring in the commission of such an act, a separate offence and equated it to treason. Terrorist acts included murder, the possession of arms, ammunition or explosives and the receiving of military training.”[23] To further protect the internal security of South Africa from growing opposition to the state, the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act was later amended under The Internal Security Amendment Act. The Internal security Amendment Act NO. 79 of 1976 allowed for the state to broaden its powers over oppositional groups against the state, the Act was amended as follows:
To amend the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, so as to make provision for declaring organisations promoting activities endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of public order to be unlawful […] to regulate the release on bail or otherwise of persons arrested for certain offences and to provide for the detention of certain witnesses […] and to amend the Terrorism Act, 1967, so as to delete the provisions as to the release on bail or otherwise of any person detained in custody on a charge of having committed an offence under that Act […]

[24] Hussein Solomon, *Jihad: A South African Perspective* (Bloemfontein: Sun Media, 2013), 1-139.

[25] Thula Simpson, “Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974”, session 4 in *Critical Oral History Conference series*, (2013):456-457.

liability than an asset to the Soviet Union because of their internal conflicts. By the end of the 70s, the Soviet Union started facing military resistance from within these countries.[26] Ironically, according to Thula Simpson, one of the main focus points in the Soviet Union's foreign policy at the time was "Third World people's waging anti-imperialist struggles".[27] For the Soviet Union, supporting national liberation and anti-imperialist struggles was an advantage as it forced Western powers to retreat politically and militarily. In the "Third World," this anti-American policy took shape by supporting struggles that would unite against America. South Africa was one such national liberation struggle that fell into this category of anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore, the Soviet Union supported the struggle against the apartheid regime.[28]

> Soviet assistance to the ANC came in the humanitarian, educational and military forms. In the early 1980s Soviet bloc countries provided an estimated 90 percent of the ANC's military supplies. Yet in terms of overall support to the ANC, their aid probably fell well below the 60 percent claimed by the Reagan administration. The aid raised the prestige of the communist nations within the ANC, which perhaps exaggerated the per capita magnitude of this support. ANC National Executive Committee member James Stuart later stated that the USSR's eventual collapse was "partly due to the fact that they had to sacrifice the bread of their own people to give to us and to liberation movements all over the world,"

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[26] Thula Simpson, "Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974", session 4 in *Critical Oral History Conference series*, 455-470.
[27] Thula Simpson, "Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974", in *Critical Oral History Conference Series*, 455.
[28] Simpson, "Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974", 455-470.

> because "if they did not have to make those sacrifices, the Soviet Union as a state would now have been one of the strongest in the world".[29]

In the 1970s, the *Mujahedeen* were in many ways regarded as "freedom fighters;" not only to their own people but also to other Muslims as well as non-Muslims in South Africa fighting against the apartheid state, such as the well-known local anti-apartheid activist group, Qibla.[30] Members of anti-apartheid organisations were not all anti-communist, but they were against the occupation of Afghanistan. This raised the question, how did the Muslim community of South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s interact with the larger struggle for liberation in South Africa? The apartheid state, on the other hand, had an interest in the *Mujahedeen* for their anti-communist advancements, to push against the spread of communism, so how did the duality of the apartheid state perception on "freedom fighters" and "terrorists" play out?

How did the people of South Africa relate to a universal community undergoing similar struggles like that of the anti-apartheid struggle? When did the meaning of "terrorist" and "freedom fighter'" tend to be conflated? When did these meanings change and under what circumstances? How did media discourse in apartheid South Africa influence the perspective on "terrorism" of the South African community thereby influencing the common accepted meanings of what characterised both the *Mujahedeen* and the national liberation movement as "terrorists" or "freedom fighters?" These are questions that I have asked myself when thinking about the struggles both in South Africa as well as Afghanistan.

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[29] Simpson, "Southern Africa in the Cold War, Post-1974", 457.

[30] As Farid Esack explains: 'Qiblah was established in 1980 and it was intended to be a mass movement of superconscious Muslims […] The idea of an Islamic revolution in South Africa is essentially that of Qiblah.' Farid Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam and Politics, (1988): 484-485.

This thesis will address aspects of these questions by examining the Mujahedeen as a figure that emerged within the spaces described above. I will address these questions through my analysis of the figure of the *Mujahedeen* in a South African Muslim newspaper, called the *Muslim News*.

Through an analysis of the Cape Town-based Muslim newspaper, the *Muslim News*, this study will examine the ways that concepts like "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" blur, but also politics and religion, suggesting that the meanings of concepts that appear fixed are fluid and change over time. This study will also show how new meanings for concepts are produced through the reproduction of certain rhetorical features associated with the *Mujahedeen* the media, it is through this analysis that the idea of a mobile political subject will be developed.

The Cold War period under analysis demonstrates how each conflict was not just fought within its own borders, but rather its links, material support and trans-national alliances drew connections and created relationships that read these struggles beyond borders with effects that were felt globally.[31]

> These various resistance movements, each had their own characteristics, but through common purpose, regional cooperation and the sharing of human and other resources, they become inextricably intertwined.[32]

As political figures circulated across borders, concepts like the "terrorist" or "freedom fighter" appeared less stable. The West, the *Mujahedeen* and the apartheid regime were fighting an anti-communist war against the Soviet Union whilst the Soviet Union backed the South African liberation movements against the apartheid regime, this reads the words "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" literally: "the Cold War acted as an important ideological foundation for the white minority regimes and the various liberation movements. Both sides exploited this ideological rivalry for their own ends, but had ultimately opposite goals."[33] This also begs the question of what makes the liberation struggle of Afghanistan against the Soviet Union any different from that of the ANC against the apartheid regime? This was not about cause or means, but about ideas and how the "other" or the "enemy" was viewed. More broadly this was an ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. In apartheid South Africa, the unjust segregationist policies were a complete violation of human rights, then the politics of the Muslim communities living under apartheid are analysed further, conflict between politics and religion between different generations within the same communities raise to the surface including disagreements about politics in South Africa.

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[31] Van Der Waag, *a* Military History of Modern South Africa, 246.
[32] Van Der Waag, *a Military History of Modern South Africa*, 246.

The "ideological conflict" according to P.W Botha saw South Africa play a vital role in the Cold War as part of the West. P. W Botha was South Africa's Defense Minister from 1978 to 1989 and according to Ian Van Der Waag, he dominated both South Africa's military and politics. He became President of South Africa in 1984 until 1989. He implemented what came to be known as 'total strategy'. The Soviet Union and its policy of communism was seen as a global threat and Botha believed that this would ultimately lead to a direct attack on South Africa. Botha believed that if such an attack should take place, South Africa would not be able to withstand it without the help of a superpower or access to weapons needed in defense of such an attack. The response taken by the SADF was a strategic doctrine: "embodied in the 1977 White Paper on Defense which called for the marshalling of all state resources to combat revolutionary warfare while simultaneously engaging in domestic reforms […] This doctrine formed the basis of the South African response during the Botha Premiership." [34] South Africa had to create defense lines and steps were taken post-1966[35] to do so. South Africa deployed military forces to both South West Africa in response to SWAPO and to then Southern Rhodesia to assist the Rhodesian government against Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) and ANC guerillas.[36] Daniel cites an SADF source which claims that: "these units were dispatched to fight against men who were originally from South Africa and were on their way back to commit terrorism in South Africa."[37] Here the ANC were marked as being what the apartheid regime regarded as "terrorist" under its terrorism laws. The apartheid state's response to the national liberation groups was one of the ways that the concept of "terrorist" became fixed on a particular object, people or organisation even though the lack of definition made it a "sliding" concept.

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[33] Mathew Graham, 'Cold War in Southern Africa,' *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (2010): 132.

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[34] Van Der Waag, *a Military History of Modern South Africa*, 247.

[35] According to Ian Der Waag, South Africa was involved in low-level insurgency since 1960. But 1966 was a defining year because firstly P. W Botha was elected Defense Minister of South Africa in April of 1966. In July of 1966, the International Court of Justice ruled in favour of South Africa over the South West Africa mandate. But after the matter was taken up in the UN General Assembly by concerned countries, the mandate was revoked. On the 26 August 1966, South African security forces attacked a guerrilla base at Ongulumbashe and this was the event that marked the beginning of the 23 year war the state called its "Border War". Lastly in September of 1966, the UK Labour government announced its intention to withdraw from Simons Town Naval Base, 1966 became a defining year in military and defense strategy and policy for South Africa. Van Der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, 247.

[36] John Daniel, *The Impact of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall on Southern Africa*, 138. https://www.kas.de

[37] Daniel. *The Impact of the Cold War and the Fall of the Berlin Wall on Southern Africa*, 138.

Sources and Methodology

The available research on the relationship between the *Mujahedeen* and the apartheid state is little. This created a difficulty in developing the project whose foundation was based on the suggestion that a relationship existed. The sources used in analysing the *Mujahedeen* have been primarily journalistic. What I received from journalistic sources was slim but sufficient information which lead to other information. An archive had to be gathered using these slim sources. These were drawn from various newspaper articles that reported on the Cold War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The main archive used for analysis was is the local Muslim community paper *The Muslim News.* Other available international online news articles from the *New York Times* and the *Mail and Guardian* have also been analysed. Various secondary sources by South African authors on the struggle against apartheid are used to verify reports from the newspaper articles and to provide detail on the context in which the argument unfolds. The difficulty in having gathered an archive from scratch based primarily on media news lies in the fact that the leads I followed sometimes led nowhere.

I began by analysing newspaper articles from the Cape Town community newspaper, the *Muslim News* between the years 1979-1989. The information on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the emergence of the *Mujahedeen* and their oppositional stance and fight against the Soviet invasion that was reported on in the *Muslim News* provided various leads to other reports in international news media which I then went on to analyse further. Due to the clampdown and banning of “alternative” media under the apartheid state, reports were also quite vague. This meant that information had to be pieced together by investigating entire subject matter in order to piece together an event, like the Democratic

International discussed in Chapter Two. This assisted me to develop a layered argument to trace how the *Mujahedeen* emerged within three different spaces during the 1980s: in Afghanistan as “freedom fighters” against the Soviet invasion; Cold War proxies of and allies to the United States and the apartheid state against communism; and within the Muslim community in South Africa, the *Mujahedeen* also became ally to anti-apartheid student organisations. What is important for this mini-dissertation is that the *Mujahedeen* represented something different politically in each space within which they emerged.

The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how the *Mujahedeen* emerged in these three different spaces, through different trajectories, as well as how through the *Mujahedeen* these spaces converged at a point. It is through points of convergence that have been demonstrated in this mini-dissertation that conceptual framings of the “terrorist” and the “freedom fighter” that are seemingly fixed become disrupted.

Since I did not undertake an oral history research, the only way to explore the relationship between the *Mujahedeen* and the South African Muslim community was through media which reported on the events of the 1980s. The *Muslim News* reported on events of the 1980s. Some of the main members and editors were also instrumental in the struggle against apartheid while sharing the same faith of Islam as the *Mujahedeen*. The first chapter of this mini-dissertation that follows will analyse the archive of the *Muslim News* between the period of 1979-1989 as one of the first spaces in which the *Mujahedeen* first appeared.

Chapter Outline

In chapter one, *Emergence through Media: The Muslim News, The Mujahedeen and a Generational Struggle Amidst the Struggle Against Apartheid,* I focus on the archive of the Cape Town Muslim community[38] newspaper, *Muslim News*. I analyse articles published during 1979-1989 that specifically focus on reports on the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, written by local journalists. I also analyse articles that were published about South African news regarding political figures, specifically Imam Haron and his role in the struggle against apartheid. The *Muslim News* as an "alternative" Cape Town media outlet is analysed in this chapter as the discursive space in which the *Mujahedeen* emerged. I pay specific attention to the language that has been used in the articles, how and if the events reported on had any effect on the Cape Town Muslim community directly. Since *Muslim News* was a conservative Muslim Newspaper, it reported much on aspects that affected the Muslim community either positively or negatively. I chose to analyse the articles regarding the Afghan *Mujahedeen* and Imam Haron through events and language in order to trace a convergence in political ideology as well as to explore a generational fracture that occurs amongst the Cape Town Muslim community through disagreements on politics in the late 1970s.

The second chapter, *Using an enemy to fight an enemy: The Mujahedeen, the Apartheid State and Counter-mobilisation Strategies,* focuses on the apartheid state and its relationship with

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[38] For the purpose of this thesis I use the term 'community' simply to refer to the larger Muslim population of Cape Town. I understand that this concept is contested and not without its problems, however, it is used in this thesis for the sole purpose of referring to the Muslim population of Cape Town as a whole and questions of its contestation are pointed at further on.

the Afghan *Mujahedeen* through its fight against communism. Through an analysis of online international news articles, this chapter analyses the Democratic International meeting held in Angola which placed the *Mujahedeen* and the apartheid state in the same space, aligned as part of the same cause against communism. I also analyse the International Freedom Foundation as a front which formed part of the counter insurgency strategy used by the apartheid state in order to dismantle South African anti-apartheid organisations. My discussion provides a demonstration of another space in which the *Mujahedeen* as a figure emerged as a political subject in relation to the apartheid state and the United States of America. The various trajectories of political and discursive spaces of emergence are further detailed and unpacked in order to demonstrate the *Mujahedeen* as a political subject that becomes mobile through these spaces and events that unfold within these spaces. I revisit chapter one so as to draw connections and links between discursive and political space to show how these converge and at which point conceptual framings become disrupted.

Chapter One

Emergence through Media: The Muslim News, The Mujahedeen and the Generational struggle amidst the struggle against apartheid.

The Imam
They placed him in a prison cell
This man who had a dream
That every man should be father
To his brother's son
And love should not be tempered by
The colour of their skin
Was he
Patriot or Terrorist?
His concern for children not his own
Made of him the keeper of his brother
A widowed mother found in him courage
And a women wronged compassion
Was he
Patriot or Terrorist?
In a prison cell they placed him
His guilt his plea for justice

That would not be a tyranny for most
For his dream, he died
What was he
Patriot or Terrorist?

A poem by James Mathews in dedication to Imam Haron.[39]

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[39] James Matthews, *Cry Rage*, (Spro-cas Publications, 1972).

This chapter engages with articles published in the Cape Town-based community newspaper *Muslim News* from 1979-1986. It analyses articles which reported on Afghanistan during the 1980s as well as articles on local struggle figure Imam Haron and events surrounding his death. I have chosen to analyse these particular articles focused on Afghanistan and Imam Haron in order to highlight a moment at which the events of Afghanistan and South Africa seem to meet. This moment is seen in the discursive space through which the Mujahedeen, the Muslim community of Cape Town and, later, the anti-apartheid struggle converge. A discursive trajectory is mapped through which the Mujahedeen emerged as both a political figure and a figure of faith. Black Consciousness politics in South Africa and the Muslim Students Movement also seem to align at this point with students disrupting the political conversation of the older Muslim generation. In mapping how the *Muslim News* articles represent the Mujahedeen across the discursive space of the newspaper over this period, the figure of the Mujahedeen appears to become a mobile political subject.

The "Alternative" Press in Apartheid South Africa

The "alternative press," is a definition employed to a specific category of print media whose focus, objectives and audience is different to that of the commercial press[40]. According to Jackson, newspapers published as "alternative" press were focused on reporting issues that concerned communities that were oppressed over the years. The alternative press was previously referred to as "fringe" because it reported on issues about marginalized communities.[41] In apartheid South Africa, these papers were "alternative" because as Haron states, they emerged as advocates for their own respective communities and were answerable only to their respective communities.[42] These papers represented those that were not legally represented within government or parliament and therefore acted on their community's behalf: "In this way the papers were the rightful opposition of the Nationalist apartheid government and its ilk."[43]

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[40] Johnson in Keyan Tomaselli and Eric P, Louw, *the Alternative Press in South Africa* (Lake View Press, 1991), 1-240.

[41] Gordon S, Jackson, *Breaking Story: the South African Press* (Westview Press, 1993), 63-66.

According to Lez Switzer, there were three periods in which the "alternative press" evolved during the last generation of the apartheid regime. The resistance movement, which Switzer says was part of the first phase in the 1940s, saw the end of a period that consisted of mainly protests in South Africa that had begun eighty years before: "Virtually all African nationalist newspapers which were dominant organs of the alternative news and opinion before the 1940s had been bought out, closed down or depoliticized in the aftermath of the Great Depression."[44] The only surviving independent publications within the African Nationalist framework in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s were pamphlets and newsletters that also did not last very long. These included *Inyaniso*, *Africanist*, *Isizwe* and the *African Lodestar*. However, they were produced for a very small audience made up of political activists. The resistance movement mentioned by Switzer in the 1940s and the 1960s was mainly represented by Socialist newspapers that were aligned with or allied to the Communist party which were banned in 1950s. The ANC and the Congress Alliance found their voice and ally during this period in publications like *Liberation* which lasted from 1953 to 1959 and *Fighting Talk* which lasted from 1942 to 1963. The second phase of the "alternative press" according to Switzer was most commonly associated with the

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[42] Muhammed Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, (2004): 460.

[43] Haron, 'the Alternative South African Muslim Press', 460.

[44] Lez Switzer, Muhammed Adhikari, 'South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid', Ohio University Centre for International Studies, Research in International studies, *Africa series*, No. 74, Introduction, (2000): 39.

Black Consciousness Movement[45] and its allied press in the 1970s. The SASO newsletter which was the official publication of the South African Students Organization played the most important role during this period. There was also the *Black Review* and *Black Viewpoint*, but they did not last very long either. There was only one issue of a scholarly journal that was published called *Black Perspectives* and it was intended for an academic and professional audience. Despite the short lifespan of these publications, the Black Consciousness Movement still played a very crucial and influential role in the mobilisation of students and youth. The ideas of the Black Consciousness Movement was also to be found in publications of the newspapers *The World* and *Weekend World*. The third phase which was during the periods of the 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of alternative press that was closely aligned to the UDF and its organisations.[46]

Switzer states that there were four main commercial press chains in the 1980s controlled by the apartheid government. Two were English language chains which were the Argus Printing and Publishing Company and the other was Times Media Ltd. The other two were Afrikaans language chains known as Nasionale Pers and Perskor. In opposition to these commercial chains, the community press played a very vital role. It documented the history of the struggle during these periods: "disseminating the tactics and strategies of specific organisations and helping to

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[45] According to Mzamane and Howarth in 'South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid.' The Black Consciousness Movement started to emerge after the Sharpville massacre and the massacres in Langa and Vanderbijl park as well as the banning of the ANC and the PAC in 1960. Switzer puts forth that the Black Consciousness Movement emerged in order to develop a way of thinking that was the alternative to the dominant way of thinking about 'identity' and 'race'. It dedicated itself to deconstructing the language of oppression. As Steve Biko in Switzer put it: "Black Consciousness is an attitude of mind and a way of life…its essence is the realization by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression-the blackness of their skin…at the heart of this kind of thinking is the realization by blacks that the most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed." (Introduction, p.14-15).

[46] Switzer, Adhikari, South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid.

build a level of defiance in town and countryside that sustained and broadened the resistance movement."[47]As Ineke Van Kessel observes, community papers or "alternative press" sought to document "the everyday struggles of ordinary people."[48]One of the main publications that sought to do this was *Grassroots* established in 1980. *Grassroots* became the standard for community press. Unlike the other community publications, *Grassroots* lasted a full decade before it stopped publication in 1990. *Grassroots* reported on issues ranging from how to treat ailments of children, taxes, inflation, unemployment amongst other everyday struggles: "*Grassroots* would introduce the message that people can improve their own situation through organisational effort […] Bread and butter issues were a means to an end, stepping stones in a process of mobilisation against racial and class oppression."[49]

The *Muslim News* Newspaper

Even though the "alternative press" seemed to have been designed to bring those considered oppressed together, Van Kessel argues that "in terms of organizing and mobilizing people, the composition of the Western Cape population posed obvious problems."[50] This was due to the introduction of the Coloured Labour Preference Act in the mid-1950s, eventually abolished in 1980. This Act helped the apartheid government in reducing the size of the African population in the Western Cape: "the racial divide was not the only dividing line, the fracture pattern also ran along ideological, religious, linguistic, generational and socioeconomic lines […] The coloured Muslim population of the Cape also tended to be conservative."[51]

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[47] Switzer, Adhikari, *South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid*, 45.

[48] Ineke Van Kessel, 'Grassroots: From Washing Lines to Utopia,' *South Africa's Resistance Press: Alternative Voices in the Last Generation under Apartheid*, eds, in *Africa Series,* (2000):45.

[49] Van Kessel, 'Grassroots: From Washing Lines to Utopia,'285.

[50] Van Kessel, 'Grassroots: From Washing Lines to Utopia,' 286.

Most Muslim religious leaders in Cape Town were part of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC)[52] which was established in 1945. They took a conservative stance when it came to the politics of South Africa under the apartheid regime: "As long as religious matters were not endangered by the government the *ulema* found no necessity for any resistance."[53]

The strategies and tactics of organisation and mobilisation employed by *Grassroots* in order to get ordinary people in their everyday lives to stand together would seem to be similar to that of the *Muslim News* newspaper. The manner in which these "alternative" newspapers advocated for everyday things that affected more than just one person was an effective strategy, this helped to make the community aware that there was power in the masses.

> They reported on what was happening in the heart of their communities, they reported on the economic hardships, the social problems, the unhealthy conditions in their respective areas and a host of other issues […] The list of points mentioned thus define and describe "the alternative press", which committed themselves to the struggle for freedom.[54]

The *Muslim News* was established in Cape Town at the beginning of 1960 and was based in Belgravia Road, Athlone. It transformed according to and against the social and political conditions of South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. This was when it became considered as one of South Africa's "alternative press."[55]At the same time it sought to maintain its "religious identity"[56] through publications on Quranic scripture and daily spiritual reminders. The newspaper reported on issues taking place within a marginalised community. It deviated from the norm of commercialised press and became an advocacy paper that was unapologetic in its reporting and was only accountable to its "constituencies" which in this case was the Muslim community in Cape Town.[57] The paper began as a very conservative paper which meant that they were concerned with maintaining an "Islamic identity."[58]

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[51] Van Kessel, 'Grassroots: From Washing Lines to Utopia,' 287-288.

[52] Established in 1945, the Muslim Judiciary Council is a religious non-profit organization whose functions relate to religious guidance, education, Halaal certification and social issues according to an Islamic code of conduct under laws pertaining to Islam and the Quran. The MJC is the a religious body established and based in the Western Cape, but recognized nationally and Internationally, https://mjc.org.za/about-mjc/

[53] Ursula Gunther, 'the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle,' *Journal for the Study of Religion*, Vol. 17, No. 1, (2004): 120.

[54] Haron, 'the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam,' 460.

According to Esack, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a rise in Muslim opposition to apartheid as this was the time they experienced the most difficulties under apartheid starting with forced removals which included removal from mosques under the Group Areas Act of 1950.[59] Muslims began to gather and form organisations within their communities to oppose the Group Areas Act. Many of these gatherings, like that of City Hall in Cape Town on May 7th 1961, were under the leadership of Imam Haron who attempted to organise Muslims together for the first time against social and political oppression instead of just religious oppression. The goal of this particular gathering was in order to launch what was known as the *Call of Islam*. An organisation that aimed to be a voice for the Muslim community against the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Urban Areas Act of 1923 and Pass Laws. The *Call of Islam* was "a political protest publication with an Islamic impetus."[60]The *Muslim News* reported on the *Call of Islam*, but being a conservative

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[55] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam."

[56] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam."

[57] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 461.

[58] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 461.

[59] Farid Esack, "three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," *Third World Qauterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988): 473-498.

[60] Ursula Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle,"121.

paper at this time, it condemned the *Call of Islam* for "dragging the Muslim community into the dirty arena of politics."[61]In other words, the *Muslim News* asserted through its publications before the 1970s that there a distinction must be drawn between religion and politics. As we will see, after the 1970s when the younger generation became more politically radical as did the newspaper itself, reportage on the Mujahedeen blurred and further solidified that distinction between politics and religion. Judging from the way in which the younger generation in the 1970s and 1980s responded to the struggle against apartheid, it would seem that the reportage blurred these lines between religion and politics.

The *Muslim News* later transformed into a more politically radical newspaper in the 1970s, reporting on the socio-political issues in South Africa as well as those socio-political issues beyond the borders of South Africa. The transformation of the paper saw the weaving together of Steve Biko's Black Consciousness ideology, which impacted greatly on members linked to the *Muslim News* and that of Islamic discourse. This transformation came in the 1970s because of the various conditions under apartheid regime affecting the Muslim community in South Africa[62] as well as in what Haron refers to as the "Muslim Heartlands."[63] The Muslim heartlands can be considered as those countries with whom Muslims around the world share the same religious belief of Islam, specifically the Middle East from where Islam first emerged and spread.

It was between 1982 and 1987 that the largest contribution by Muslims in South Africa to the struggle for justice against apartheid could be seen. Before this period, Esack explains that the Muslim community were not silent and did confront the state in various periods in South Africa.

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[61] *Muslim News*, 28 April 1961 in Ursula Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle," 121.

[62] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 473-498.

[63] Haron. The Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam, p. 458.

This confrontation, however, always had to do with those issues that affected their faith of Islam directly: "At a public meeting in the Cape's Plein Street in 1882, Muslims made it clear that their objections to these measures was religious and that their religion was superior to the law."[64] Muslims in the 1880s therefore were prepared to rally for their spiritual beliefs. According to Esack, at this point there was no evidence to suggest that Muslims of the Cape identified with the struggles under apartheid or that they were interested in "spreading a more comprehensive, 'political' form of Islam."[65] There were, however, prominent Muslim figures that were involved in politics in the 1920s, but Islam did not play a role in their thinking nor was there a call from them to the Muslim community to rally for society. The 1950s and the early 1960s was when the Muslim community started feeling the difficulties of apartheid directly. Under the Group Areas Act of 1950, they were forcibly removed from their homes. A gathering was held on 7th May 1961 in the City Hall of Cape Town under the *Call of Islam*. It was a body of different Muslim organizations and individuals coming together in response to their new situation under the Group Areas Act and the injustices caused by apartheid. Many protest meetings were held after this gathering and this "represented the first attempt to organise Muslims as a community within South African society, against social and political, as opposed to purely religious oppression."[66] The organization of the *Call of Islam* did not last more than a year. Organizations that were gathered under it, however, like the Claremont Youth Movement continued the rally against apartheid and played an important role in establishing a socially and politically relevant Islam within South Africa against apartheid.

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[64] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 474.
[65] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 474.
[66] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 475.

The ideas of Maulana Maududi, founder of the Jamiat-i-islami in Pakistan[67] also had great influence on the editors and writers of *Muslim News* and South African Muslim youth movements. Maududi was an Islamic scholar who founded the student movement Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan in 1941. Maududi's teachings[68] laid the foundation to what has come to be known as "Islamism"; a theory that advocated for an Islamic state doing away with secularism, communism, socialism and liberal democracy.[69] This is what created a link between Muslim communities in South Africa and the "Muslim Heartlands" where these ideas were the dominant ideologies. The "Muslim Heartlands" refers to those countries and societies that were majority Muslim and where political Islam was the ideology of the state and system of rule.

According to Farid Essack, there were three Muslim movements that actively embraced the struggle against apartheid. These three particular movements were a centrist grouping led by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) which was established in 1970; a Pan-Africanist trend with

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[67] Born Syed Abul Ala Maududi on the 25th September 1903 in Deccan, India. Maulana Maududi was born into a family of Sufis and received both a Western education as well as a traditional education. He used the combination of the two to develop in philosophies. Maududi's writing career began at the age of seventeen when he worked for a paper for a few weeks in Medina. He was then given the task of editing the newspaper *Muslim* which belonged to the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind organization from 1921 to 1923. Maududi was then appointed the editor of *Al-Jamiat* paper from 1925 to 1928. Within the same period in 1927, he completed his first published book *Al Jihad fil Islam*. After *Al Jamiat*, Maududi left the life of journalism completely with the ties to the journal 'Tarjuman-ul-Quran'. He edited this journal for nine years from 1929 to 1937. This journal paved the way for the Islamic movement in Pakistan and after nine years of editing the journal, it then took shape into the Jamiat-e-Islami organization. Maududi first established the Darul Islam in 1938. It was to be an education academy for research and training in Islamic teachings. It also served to prepare students for a revolution. Jamiat-e-Islami was formed in 1941 and the Darul Islam was merged with it. Jamiat-e-Islami was more of an ideological movement when it began, it sought to pave the way to an Islamic revolution through its philosophies. (Maulana Maududi, *Sarwat Saulat*, International Islamic Publishers, (1979).

[68] See Also Kumar, M, "an Outline of the Structure of an Islamic state as Depicted in the writings of Maulana Sayyid Abul ala Maududi," *Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (2017):71-80. 'Maududi understood secularism as being without religion, and that Islamic values should be restored through the exemplary conduct of Muslims while an Islamic society "should be rebuilt through specific practical actions". For Maududi, "the absence of religion has an implication for the morality of a society."

[69] Coll, *Ghost Wars,* 1-712.

their strongest component being Qiblah[70] established in 1980; and a South Africanist grouping whose strongest component was *The Call of Islam.*[71]

There were many reasons for the rise in 'radicalism' amongst the Muslim youth. Young Muslims felt betrayed by the *Ulema's* (Islamic scholars)[72] silence on the death in detention of Imam Haron. The community were riled by the killing of the Imam as he was detained by the South African police force and held for four months under the Terrorism Act of 1967 under section 6[73]. On September 27th 1969 he was killed by police, but the police statement gave as reason for his death that he had fallen down a flight of stairs[74].

The *Muslim News*, being more of a conservative paper at the time of the Imam's death published an editorial after his detention stating:

> Muslim News is not a political paper and does not publish political views or news. It only concerns itself with the religious and social needs of the Muslim community…Whatever political views

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[70] Esack in Three Islamic strands in the South African Struggle for Justice, (1988). Qiblah was established in 1980. The movement saw itself as "local defenders of the Islamic revolution." Their ideas were based primarily on the slogan "neither East nor West, Islam is best."

[71] Esack, "Three Islamic strands in the South African Struggle for Justice,"478.

[72] See also Zaman, MQ, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*, (Princeton University Press, 2002), 1. The Ulama are seen as Islamic scholars or clergy amongst the community who have trained and specialised in all areas of Islam and the Quran. Also seen as leaders within the Muslim community: "Guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge, of Islamic doctrine and law."

[73] Section 6 (1) of the Terrorism act of 1967 stated that "if an officer of or above the rank of lieutenant colonel had reason to believe that someone was a terrorist, terrorism being defined widely, or was withholding from the police information about such terrorists, or offences under the act, he might cause the person in question to be arrested without warrant and to be detained for interrogation. The section also provided that detention was to last until the commissioner of the police was satisfied that the detainee had satisfactorily replied to all the questions or that no useful purpose will be served by his further detention." South Africa's Terrorism Act of 1967 under General Laws Amendment Act No. 83. O' Malley archives. www.omally.nelsonmandela.org

[74] Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle," 127.

> Imam Haron expresses is entirely his own views and not in the capacity as Editor of the Muslim News.[75]

It was only a week later that the *Muslim News* decided to further elaborate on the editorial that they had published the week before on the detention of Imam Haron stating as follows:

> Imam Abdullah Haron, editor of the *Muslim News* had been taken into custody by the authorities and detained under the 180 Days Law; the reason for his detention is not known to *Muslim News*. But it is safe to assume that Imam Haron is not being detained for his religious views and he is not being detained for spreading the doctrine of Islam. If Imam Haron is being held because of his political views, then there is nothing *Muslim News* can do about the situation, as Imam Haron's position as editor was to express the religious aspects of the community. *Muslim News* would not hesitate for one moment to register the protest of all Muslims if our Deen (Religion) were imperiled.[76]

According to Gunther, it was only from 1975 that the death of the Imam started to be commemorated by the *Muslim News*.[77] The death of the Imam from that time onwards was seen to be the "turning point for the awakening of political consciousness."[78]This development of political consciousness also affected the *Muslim News*. This period saw the paper transition from being conservative and complacent to political awareness in line with the Black Consciousness Movement.

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[75] *Muslim News*, 31 May 1969, cited in Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle,"127-128.

[76] *Muslim News*, 6 June 1969, editorial titled 'Editor Detained' cited in Gunther "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle," 128.

[77] Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle," 133-134.

[78] Gunther, "the Memory of Imam Haron in Consolidating Muslim Resistance in the Apartheid Struggle,"133.

The Black Consciousness Movement espoused ideas expressed by Steve Biko who "recast the notion of Blackness as being a positive rather than a negative identity."[79] In other words the Black Consciousness Movement helped to promote a new sense of being Black amongst those who were oppressed, all those who were racially oppressed and discriminated in apartheid South Africa were considered Black under the BC Movement. This challenged the apartheid state's racial categories and what it meant to be Black. It also challenged the apartheid state's hierarchies of those racial categories. The Black Consciousness Movement was highly influential on certain writers who had ties to *Muslim News*. Its key ideas of taking one's identity which under apartheid was made a political negative and making it a positive made a strong impression on the members of the *Muslim News.* This includes the likes of writer, poet and cultural activist James Matthews who contributed to the paper, founding member and first editor of the paper Imam Abdullah Haron, who was a writer, activist and respected community leader as well as Achmat Cassiem[80], columnist for the *Muslim News* but also known for his political involvement in the Pan African Congress and Qibla, which led to his imprisonment on Robben Island. It was after he was released that he became a columnist for the *Muslim News*.[81]

The 1976 national student uprising against the apartheid state's Bantu education also had influence. The writings of scholars like Maududi inspired the younger Muslim students:

> "The impact of local political realities, the impact of international Islamic tendencies, the excitement about developments in Iran could only lead to searching questions regarding the

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[79] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 461.

[80] Achmat Cassiem headed the Islamic Unity convention and founded Qibla in 1979. He was also a member of the Pan African Congress (PAC). Achmat Cassiem got arrested and detained on Robben Island under the Terrorist Act of 1967 and remained on Robben Island for eleven years. (Staff reporter: 16 August 1996)

[81] Haron "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 457-480.

> relevance of Islam for South Africa and a search for an authentic South African expression of Islam."[82]

This opposition to apartheid by Muslim youth was frowned upon by the conservative *ulema* who believed that, "There is no such thing in Islam as 'Muslim radicalism,'" the radicalism, or more appropriately, the anarchy and corruption which we are observing is termed as *fasaad* (evil) in the Quran. Such *fasaad* in our day and land, irrespective of the causes operate under communist influence and direction."[83] Gunther observes in "The Memory of Imam Haron," (2004), that the political consciousness and awareness was provoked by two socio-political events that transcended the divide between the populations of South Africa. One of these events was the Iranian revolution which was taken by many Muslims as being a victory for Islam over oppression.[84] Esack explains that Iran was proof of the belief held by South African Muslims that "Islam represented the alternative path for Nations to follow."[85] The other event was the Tri-cameral parliament in 1983 and the elections of 1984 in South Africa. Muslim organizations in South began to re-focus on the context of South Africa and apartheid. One example of the new upsurge of Muslim youth 'radicalism' was reported in *Muslim News* on February 22nd 1980, titled "UCT Muslims in militant mood". The article focused on Muslim students from the University of Cape Town (UCT) who organized an Iran week exhibition at the university to demonstrate their support for Muslim movements around the world: "The militancy or rather commitment to Islam's revolutionary nature is reflected by the UCT Muslim students support for the Islamic revolution in Iran, solidarity with the Palestinians, backing for Afghan Mujahids and support generally for movements struggling against unjust forces."[86]

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[82] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 478.
[83] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 478.
[84] Gunther, 2004.
[85] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 478.

> A strong mood of militancy prevails amongst the Muslim students at the University of Cape Town and there is firm determination to defend Islam and not adopt the apologetic attitude of the past.[87]

In relation to this newspaper, the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) seemed to stand out more than other student movements. The MYM, established in 1970, transformed from being an organization to a movement because of their close affinity to what has come to be referred to as the International Islamic movement.[88]

> The interaction of senior Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) officials with Islamists from other parts of the world in the mid-1970s was an important factor in its transformation from an organization to a movement. A close affinity developed between the MYM and what has been referred to as the International Islamic Movement. This was reflected in the frequent visits to South Africa by luminaries of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan such as Khurshid Ahmed and Khurram Murad […] The MYM's theoretical development was also strongly influenced by the availability of an extensive literature from these quarters, including such works as Maududi.[89]

According to Esack, there were frequent visits to South Africa by luminaries of the Jamiat-i-Islami of Pakistan who also had a faction in Afghanistan as part of the *Mujahedeen*.

All these factors contributed to the transformation of *Muslim News* from 1973. The socio-political situation of Islam globally saw the philosophies of academics and clerics like Maududi circulate internationally and gather a following around the idea that Islam represented the alternative path for nations under Western colonization to follow. In Cape Town, this became the main focus of the paper in the 1970s. Indeed, between 1975 and 1983, twenty one issues of the *Muslim News* were banned under the Publications Control Act of 1974 for "inciting communities against the government."[90]According to Muhammed Haron, the *Muslim News*

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[86] "UCT Muslims in Militant Mood," Muslim News, February 22nd, 1980.

[87] "UCT Muslims in Militant Mood," *Muslim News*, February 22nd, 1980.

[88] Esack, "Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 473-498. See also Esack (1988), according to Esack, the Islamic movement has all the same characteristics and tendencies that the West would refer to as 'Muslim fundamentalism'. In South Africa, the term was first used by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) when they spoke about themselves as an organization and their actions.

[89] Esack, "Three Islamic strands in the South African Struggle for Justice," 479.

> found institutional space despite operating under a dictatorial, despotic regime; the paper as a religious one acted as a symbolic resource which was mobilised to oppose the state; the editorial members of the paper connected ideologically with groups such as the Black Consciousness movement and within the international order; and finally the paper acted as an intellectual force.[91]

The Depiction of the Afghanistan Mujahedeen in *Muslim News* through language and image

From 1979 onwards, an increasing number of issues of the *Muslim News* addressed the situation in Afghanistan under the Soviet occupation. The *Muslim News* made public calls to support the struggles taking place around the world. In the analysis of articles that follows it is important to note that that no specific mention is made of the authors of articles as names of the writers were not published.

The first article that referenced Afghanistan was published on June 1st, 1979 under the international news section on page six of the *Muslim News*. A very short piece titled "Afghan Revolt" was published surrounded by other articles all related to newsworthy items in the broader Asian region. The *Mujahedeen* initially featured as rebels. They were referred to as

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[90] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 457-480.

[91] Haron, "the Alternative South African Muslim Press: Muslim News & Al-Qalam," 464.

‘rebel groups’, individual factions fighting alongside one another against communism. Three groups in particular were mentioned, Jamiat-e-Islami, the same group mentioned above that had been started in Pakistan by Moulana Maududi, Hizbe Islami[92] Afghanistan and Harakat-e-Inqilab e-Islami. At that point however, the article pointed out that “there seemed no indications yet of any civil political agitation in the country.”[93]In other words, various groups or organizations had come together for the same cause and formed a movement. However, they had not physically struck back at the Soviets by armed struggle.

The second article was published a little more than a month later on July 13th, 1979 under the title “Afghan leader’s call”.[94] It was another short piece with an interesting take on the “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”. The author quoted Prof. Burhan Uddin, then leader of the Tehrik Jamiat-e-Islami faction[95] making an appeal to the Muslim world to support the overthrow of the left wing government of Afghanistan. Burhan Uddin described it as “carrying out of a Liberation struggle while at the same time accusing the Taraki government of ‘terrorizing’ the people.”[96] Here we see the concepts of “liberation” and “terrorism” being used for the first time in the same article. For some Muslim people in Afghanistan, liberation suggested the fight and struggle against the Soviet backed Afghanistan government. Terrorism was, as Burhan Uddin’s description suggests, seen as the actions taken against Muslim citizens of Afghanistan by the

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[92] The Hizbe-I-Islami was led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who was a former student at Kabul University. The organization had been in operation for several years before Muhammed Taraki had taken over as president of Afghanistan. They had already started organizing resistance against the former government before the Taraki regime of Afghanistan and now had their focus on Taraki. See also Male, B. *Revolutionary Afghanistan*, 147.

[93] “Afghan Revolt,” *Muslim News*, June 1st, 1979, 6.

[94] “Afghan’s Leaders Call,” *Muslim News*, July 13th, 1979.

[95] This particular faction was based in Afghanistan. They called for a complete Islamic revolution against the Taraki regime and Communism. See also “Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan,” *Muslim News*, July 27th, 1979: “The main objective of the Jamiat is the establishment of an Islamic social, political and economic order in Afghanistan. We are Muslims and it is but natural that our society should be so organized.”

[96] “Afghan Leaders Call,” *Muslim News*, July 13th, 1979, 6.

government. . In the same edition, on the next page, a short piece made reference to President Taraki moving out of Kabul[97]. In that piece, the author made reference to anti-government fighters as ‘guerillas’ as the fight took on new forms to overthrow the pro-Soviet government. Armed conflict was then at full scale and on the rise. Indeed, the change in reference to those in the anti-government struggle seemed to take place as soon as mobilization in armed conflict began. The struggle was no longer just a difference in opinion or protests against the Afghan government. Rather it took on the form of full-scale armed opposition against the government by the Mujahedeen.

On July 27th, 1979, an entire page of the newspaper was dedicated to an article titled ‘Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan’. According to Burhanuddin Rabbani (leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami), he stated that “the people of Afghanistan were facing an extremist and fanatically communist regime.”[98] Burhanuddin was referring to the Soviet-backed Taraki government with the words “fanatic” and “extremist”. These concepts were equated in some ways with “terrorist”. Burhanuddin Rabbani was said to have made the statement that it was not the Muslim people of Afghanistan who rebelled but rather the Taraki regime which had rebelled against the faith and religion of Islam. This suggested that the Afghan Liberation Movement were fighting an armed struggle in defence of their freedom.[99] In other words, the Afghanistan Liberation Movement did not view their struggle as a political rebellion as that would have suggested opposition to the sovereign power of the state. For some Muslims of Afghanistan, the sovereign of all things was

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[97] Muhammed Taraki, president of Afghanistan was held up in a military strong hold in Afghanistan for protection from Afghanistan ‘rebel’ groups. The fight against Taraki’s pro-Soviet government became very heated in Kabul and armed conflict against the government based in Kabul at the time was at a rise. Out of fear for the life of Taraki, the military had to move him out of Kabul, “Taraki moves out of Kabul,” *Muslim News*, July 13th, 1979.

[98] “Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan,” *Muslim News*, July 27th, 1979.

[99] “Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan,” *Muslim News*, July 27th, 1979.

God which they would not oppose. For the Muslim people of Afghanistan, "the real superpower was Almighty Allah."[100] The Afghanistan Liberation movement believed that the state was in rebellion to the "real" power of God and they were defending Islam in this matter. The constant play on words, in relation to not only how the Afghanistan "rebels" viewed themselves as those fighting a righteous cause against oppression with the state being the oppressor but also how the authors of the article viewed these parties. The *Mujahedeen* were the "freedom fighters" and the state was the "terrorist," this revealed an interesting play on whom or what the figure of the "terrorist" and "freedom fighter" was.

A photograph from a news agency also accompanied this article, which reinforced visually the contents of the article. The image was featured in the top right hand corner of the page with a caption that read 'An Afghan *Mujahid* (a Muslim engaged in 'struggle') offers his prayers in the battlefield'[101]. "Struggle" here refers to the word Jihad in the Islamic faith. Jihad which literally translates into "struggle". Therefore the 'Mujahid' is one who engages in this struggle. In the Islamic faith, the 'struggle' comes in four different forms. There is the Jihad against oneself which is considered the highest form of jihad where a Muslim must fight to keep himself away from wrong and those things prohibited within the Islamic faith. There is then thereafter the jihad of the tongue. Also considered as one of the highest forms of struggle. A Muslim is required to speak out against oppression and injustice and to educate others in the best possible way. The third Jihad is considered the struggle of the hand. This struggle pertains to always striving to do good for others in action. The last Jihad is what is considered to be the struggle of the sword. This struggle is also referred to as the lesser Jihad and a last resort when peace talks and all else fails. This struggle refers to the taking up of arms against oppression only. It is where one is allowed to arm himself in order to defend himself, but defend himself only if he is being oppressed. (Author's translation). There the label of *Mujahid* was used for the first time along with a photographic image of the side view of a bearded man wearing a *kufiyah*[102] and an AK 47 strapped to his back prostrating to the ground. It also referred to the people of Afghanistan defending that faith against a state that sought to bring it down. Visually represented, the prostration represented the faith of Islam. While the AK 47 on the back of a man prostrating in prayer represented the defense of this faith.

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[100] "Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan," *Muslim News*, July 27th, 1979.
[101] "Muslim Revolution in Afghanistan," *Muslim News*, July 27th, 1979.

Another image similar to the one mentioned above was published on August 24th 1979. This time the image was of two bearded men with AK 47's strapped to their backs. Hands raised in praise to God, the caption read: "Two Afghani *Mujahedeen* offering prayers in the battlefield," They represent the truly Islamic *mujahid* who fights in the way of Allah for victory over injustice and oppression."[103] The caption came from the words of the unnamed author of the article. A third image was published on September 7th, 1979. In it, a *Mujahid* with a Quran in his hand could be seen with fellow *Mujahedeen* all sitting behind him with AK 47s in hand. The caption of the image reads, "The Islamic fervor of the *Mujahedeen* in Afghanistan can be seen everywhere."[104]The words of Barhanuddin Rabbani in the previous article along with these captions seemed to produce the same rhetorical effect evoking the defense of Islam. The images published also started forming a particular representation to South African readers associated with the defense of Islam or a fight for Islam. There was no mention of statements in defense of

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[102] The *Kufiyah* is a specific patterned piece of material, usually used as a headscarf. The *Kufiyah* and the AK 47 have been symbols of anti-imperialism and anti-colonial resistance within the visual language of Liberation politics. (Authors translation)

[103] "Eradicate Racism," *Muslim News*, August 24th, 1979.

[104] "Afghan Army brigade Rebels," *Muslim News*, September 7th, 1979.

the government of Afghanistan. The images so far were only of the *Mujahedeen.* There were none depicting the government of Afghanistan and its members. There was no opposition to or criticism of the ideals and actions of the “rebel” factions of Afghanistan by the *Muslim News* newspaper, its authors or its readers.

A *Muslim News* article from January 25th, 1980 titled “Muslims resist Soviet imperialism” demonstrated an open declaration by South African Muslims of their support for the *Mujahedeen’s s*truggle against the Soviets:

> The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan has been condemned by the Muslims of South Africa as another move by the so-called superpowers to subjugate the resurgence of Islam…Muslims have pledged to fight all forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. The *Mujahedeen* of Afghanistan have ably demonstrated this by their firm resistance to Soviet military might.[105]

This statement seemed to demonstrate both the religious and political significance of the image of the *Mujahedeen* for South African Muslims. Muslims of South Africa identified with the people of Afghanistan through a shared faith in Islam. They also found the *Mujahedeen* struggle against the Soviets as an image of the faith and determination against oppression that they as Muslims under the apartheid regime should live up to. The *Mujahedeen* being used as an example to the Muslim people of South Africa was made evident in a statement made by the Majlis al-Shura spokesman published in the *Muslim News:* “the Muslim intelligentsia must at all cost identify itself with the struggle of the oppressed and take a lead in reviving the spirit of Islam.”[106]

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[105] “Muslims Resist Soviet Imperialism,” *Muslim News*, January 25th, 1980.

[106] “Eradicate Racism,” *Muslim News*, August 24th, 1979.

The language used in the publication of these articles in the *Muslim News* all present the *Mujahedeen* positively. Concepts like “freedom” and “liberation” which rang synonymously with the struggle against apartheid were constantly used to refer to the *Mujahedeen* and their plight. The way in which the author words the article created the impression that the author related to the *Mujahedeen* and their struggle. The author was South African, and even though he wrote about the struggle in Afghanistan, the way in which the events of the article are relayed evokes the struggle against apartheid. The articles relating to the *Mujahedeen* and the events of Afghanistan, were a constant call to the Muslim community of South Africa to support the larger Muslim community abroad because of the faith of Islam that they shared as well as the struggles against oppression to which they could relate. It would seem that there was not just a call for support for Afghanistan or a call to identify with the struggle going on in Afghanistan, but rather there seemed to be a call for consciousness, for the Muslim community to become aware of what was going on abroad in order to understand their own plight in South Africa. It seemed that the newspaper was calling for a liberation from conservative thinking and calling on the Muslim community to start thinking in ways that allowed for their religion to motivate a more active involvement in the politics of their own country. By rallying with and in support of international Islamic movements and their struggles. This was a strategy for readers to become more conscious of their own struggle and ways in which they could pursue liberation. The shift in the publications from the 1950s to the 1980s of the *Muslim News* was a demonstration of the realisation in the Muslim community to become more politically conscious and involved. The shift in writings in the newspaper demonstrated how they could become more politically aware and involved in the search of liberation.

The political awareness of the Muslim community of South Africa through the discursive figure of the *Mujahedeen*

What emerged from my analysis of the *Muslim News* archive in this chapter is a figure of the *Mujahedeen* that is deployed discursively and presented to the reader for political ends. The figure of the *Mujahedeen* was used in these articles firstly to raise awareness of the geopolitics of the globe, it also became a reminder to the Muslim community of South Africa that there were other Muslims around the world who faced political struggles, but they were not taking oppression silently. Instead the Muslim communities abroad like the *Mujahedeen* are fighting against oppressive powers for their freedom while their religious faith drove them to remain steadfast in their struggle. This became the message that the *Muslim News* over time as it became more radical and political wanted to get out to their readers, a message that made the Muslim community of South Africa aware that the struggle against apartheid was one that they should be a part of, and that they should no longer have regarded their religious beliefs as standing in isolation to their politics.

My analysis of these articles uncovers what seemed to be a generational struggle that took place during the 1970s and 1980s amongst the Muslim community, in South Africa. There was a struggle between an older, conservative Muslim generation who regarded their religion as being separate from the politics of South Africa, and who preferred to remain silent on the struggle against apartheid, and a younger generation growing up in the 1970s and 1980s amidst the struggle against apartheid who become more politically conscious of their own opinions. This generation believed that their religion was one of the motivating reasons to get involved in the struggle against apartheid instead of viewing their faith as separate to politics. The figure of the *Mujahedeen* was a contested figure in this struggle that stood between religion and politics. This image emerged through the way in which disagreements over religion and politics in South Africa are staged so fiercely within this newspaper. These contestations between the older and younger generations of the Muslim community also disrupted the idea of "community," as a single entity.

Chapter two

Using an enemy to fight an enemy: The *Mujahedeen*, the Apartheid state and contra-mobilisation strategies.

The Apartheid state and its strategy of counter-mobilisation

In this chapter, I examine the Democratic International, which was a meeting held in Angola in 1985 of anti-communist alliances. This led me to examine the International Freedom Foundation (IFF), an organisation that was set up as part of the apartheid state's counter insurgency strategy. There are three trajectories of this argument which can be translated into the three spaces in which the *Mujahedeen* emerged and moved across. The first trajectory of this analysis has been the South African anti-apartheid struggle for political and human rights against the fundamentally unjust political system of apartheid, specifically, the Muslim community engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle as discussed in the last chapter. The anti-apartheid struggle in the Muslim community was lodged within the larger struggle involving the ANC, formed in 1913 and other anti-apartheid organisations and groups that continued to mobilize in the 1980s. The second trajectory involves the national liberation struggles that were being fought globally during the Cold War with very specific attention to the liberation struggle fought by the Afghanistan *Mujahedeen* against the Soviet invasion and occupation. Both these tie into a third trajectory which is the wider ideological conflict between the USSR and the West, and its fight against communism. There are various degrees to this ideological conflict and not just the idea that the conflict revolved around the fight against communism in the 1980s. The global conflicts of the 1980s in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, South West Africa and the like included ideological conflicts around religion, race and ideas of freedom and democracy, including a battle over how those who mobilised for a cause were perceived. This included political subjects that could be seen as mobile subjects, not because they were literally mobile but because what they represented was mobilized differently in different spaces. Such figures emerged in the larger ideological conflict between the West and the Soviet Union as well as in the national liberation struggles fought across the world. I would extend this theory to include the discourses used by states as part of strategies and tactics used for the destabilisation of oppositional organisations to the state. For example, how language is used, whether in community newspapers like the *Muslim News* analysed in the first chapter, , or the selection of legal terms or political rhetoric in documents like the pledge signed at the Democratic International analysed in this chapter demonstrates how the same political subjects had different meanings depending on which discourses were used in different contexts..

Most of this chapter is based on online journalistic sources, backed up by academic sources where available. The idea that the *Mujahedeen* visited South Africa in 1985, in alliance with the apartheid state following the Democratic International in Angola a month earlier, and at the same time had links to parts of the Muslim community who were in opposition to the apartheid state, demonstrated the words “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. It was difficult to understand the importance of this relationship initially because of the lack of sources until I came across the apartheid state's counter insurgency strategy known as “contra-mobilisation.”[107] This was a tactic which formed part of the broader apartheid state counter insurgency strategy which will be discussed in this chapter. The counter insurgency strategy of the apartheid state will be discussed alongside the Reagan Doctrine which had similar aspects as the apartheid state in its use of competing liberation movements or proxy organisations to fight conflicts in which the state would rather have not been seen as being directly involved..

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[107] *TRC Report*, Vol. 2(Cape Town: Jutas, 1998): Chapter 3, 297.

Contra-mobilisation and the *Mujahedeen*

In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Final Report, contra-mobilisation is explained briefly as “support to surrogate and opposition groups.”[108] In the paragraph following this explanation, the report mentions Major Craig Williamson.[109] Williamson stated to the commission that this particular theory or strategy was adopted from the 1980s “on the principle that my enemy’s enemy is my friend.”[110] The TRC Final Report describes contra-mobilisation as:

> An important principle of counter-revolutionary warfare developed by American military and intelligence analysts in the 1960s. It holds that, in revolutionary warfare, the most significant battle is for the hearts and the minds of the population, and that security strategies should therefore be 80 per cent political and only 20 percent military. This approach was increasingly incorporated into the SADF’s security perspectives from the 1960s and was reproduced virtually in text book form by senior SADF strategists.[111]

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[108] *TRC Report*, Vol. 2, Chapter 3, 297.

[109] Craig Williamson, notoriously known for the killings of Ruth First in Mozambique in 1982 and Jeanette and Katryn Schoon in Angola in 1984. He also bombed the London office of the ANC in 1982. Williamson was born on the 23rd April 1949 in Johannesburg. He matriculated in 1967 and joined the South African police force a year later as a sergeant. In 1971 he was recruited into the intelligence arm of the police where he became a successful spy, “High up in the apartheid regimes disinformation network.” Belinda Beresford, “Craig Williamson: Apartheid careerist,” *Mail and Guardian*, May 29, 2008. See also, Victoria Brittain, “outrage over amnesty for apartheid killer,” *The Guardian*, June 13, 2000.

[110] *TRC Report*, Vol. 2, 297.

[111] *TRC Report*, Vol. 2, 297.

In the context of South Africa and in the Cold War geopolitics of the region, the strategy of contra-mobilisation was used to organize and support what was referred to as "moderate blacks"[112] in opposing the oppositional movements against the apartheid state. This meant that as a covert strategy, the apartheid state would make use of "surrogate" forces made up of "moderate blacks." In other words, the strategy would make use of those who did not resist the state so that the state could conceal its own involvement in providing financial and logistical support to fight oppositional organisations. Contra-mobilisation was used to organize and support those considered non-white to oppose and resist revolutionary organisations. However, this strategy had another side to it that extended beyond the support of "moderate blacks" against local revolutionary movements:

> Of necessity, it was a covert strategy-concealing the hand of the state as provider of logistical, political and financial support-and making use of surrogate forces. Hence, the state would not be seen to be involved in the conflict and violence between groupings and the resistance organisations.[113]

The apartheid state's direct and indirect alliance with the *Mujahedeen* can be viewed and understood under the principle of contra-mobilisation. The apartheid state aligned itself with those oppositional organisations who, like the Afghan *Mujahedeen*, we're fighting against communism as well. The apartheid state gained an ally and proxy in the fight against communism whilst the Afghan *Mujahedeen* benefitted through global political support, economics and arms in their own battle against the Soviets. This strategy of alignment against communism was just one of many that came out of what was a larger global ideological conflict between the West and communism. Both the apartheid state and the *Mujahedeen* were allies of the West in this conflict, and through contra-mobilisation, had a shared interest in the larger global conflict that made a direct relationship possible.

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[112] *TRC Report,* Vol. 2, 297.
[113] *TRC report,* Vol. 2, 297.

With the tactic of contra-mobilisation in mind, I analyse other activities in which the apartheid state had been involved during the 1980s. One particular engagement stood out: the post-independence civil war being fought between anti-colonial movements in Angola, where the apartheid state under the tactic of contra-mobilisation backed the insurgency group of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.

There were many causes to the escalation of war in Angola in the 1980s. According to Birmingham, one factor was the role of the Soviet Union in Africa and the other was the role of the United States who had their own agenda in the Cold War.[114] Birmingham suggests that one of the main reasons that Savimbi survived for so long was because of his involvement with the United States. With the "Clark amendment" in 1976, the United States Congress put a stop to supplying weapons to parties at war. Soon after, the Carter administration which took office in 1977 condemned South Africa for its repressive policies. After Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, he attempted to get Congress to repeal the Clark amendment, but with no success. [115]This meant that Reagan had to support the Angolan war covertly whilst trying to reject attempts made by the United Nations to keep South Africa from attacking Angola. Reagan eventually got the Clark amendment repealed[116] and his support to Angola increased through what came to be known as the "Reagan Doctrine."

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[114] David Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 92.
[115] Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola,* 105.
[116] Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola,* 105.

During his State of the Union speech in February of 1985, Reagan made clear that Americans should not “break faith” with anti-communist resistance groups. Later in April of 1985, according to Chester Pach, Charles Krauthammer wrote a piece on Reagan’s speech in *Time* magazine naming it the “Reagan Doctrine.” This was because Krauthammer felt that there was a clear foreign policy hidden within the speech and that this support for anti-communist resistance groups was later reaffirmed by the American Secretary of State George Shultz.[117]Shultz stated in his speech that the necessity of support was due to the fact that:

> A Democratic revolution was sweeping the world. Anti-communist resistance forces in Afghanistan […] and Angola […] were part of that revolution, but so were advocates of democratic liberties and human rights in the Philippines […] South Africa, and Chile.[118]

Savimbi was later presented to the American people not as a “freedom fighter,” but as a champion of “democracy.”[119]Meanwhile the apartheid state needed to secure itself against interference from the United States in the domestic political agenda of racial segregation. Oneway to do this was to make the Soviet Union seem like a bigger threat at the time:[120]

> Whenever a Washington lobby demanded sanctions against South Africa […] Pretoria only had to point to the Russian “menace” for the appeal to be brushed aside and the alliance between the United States and South Africa to be reaffirmed.[121]

The apartheid state invaded Angola just after its 1975 independence because they were also involved in a conflict against the Namibian national liberation movement, the South West Africa

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[117] Chester Pach, ‘The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,’ *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, (2006): 1-17.

[118] Pach, ‘the Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy, 78.

[119] Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola,* 105.

[120] Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola,* 105.

[121] Birmingham, *a Short History of Modern Angola,* 105-106.

People's Organisation (SWAPO) who had set up a base in Angola. Backing UNITA, the South Africans then had a proxy in Angola that could help in defeating SWAPO in order to protect the apartheid state from being destabilized. In the logic of contra-mobilisation, by backing one Angolan organization in the civil war, the state could reduce South African Defence Force (SADF) casualties and disguise their military involvement.

There were many similar features between contra-mobilisation as a counter insurgency principle of the apartheid state and the "Reagan Doctrine." Both were deployed with the intention of avoiding direct involvement of the state in the conflict against the "enemy," as some intelligence officials put it, "as if they were wearing a condom."[122] Both were also a way of avoiding direct casualties. The involvement in proxy wars read like a game where each player moved their pieces strategically around the board for their own self- interest while trying to safeguard themselves. Even though they presented their support under the disguise of wanting "freedom" and "democracy" for those they supported, each player sent those very same people they supported and for whom they sought "freedom" to the frontlines. Their proxy organisations seemed to have been more appealing for what and whom they opposed, as long as they helped in getting rid of the Soviet Union.

Amongst the sources pertaining to the civil war Angola information was found about a meeting that was held in Angola in Jamba at the headquarters of UNITA. This meeting had gathered a number of anti-communist allies from around the world to discuss and share strategies in the fight against communism. . This meeting was not just about Angola, but the larger counter-revolutionary alliances of the Cold War which involved the apartheid state and Angola, the USA and the *Mujahedeen* as well. The secret meeting in Angola that would be the key to uncover the relationship between the apartheid state and the Afghan *Mujahedeen* was known as the Democratic International, also known as the "Jamba Jamboree" as it took place in the province of Jamba in Angola where the headquarters of UNITA was located.

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[122] Pach, 'the Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy', 82.

The Democratic International in Angola

The Democratic International (DI) appears to have been an American backed initiative and according to Powerbase, Jack Abramoff[123] and Jack Wheeler[124] were involved. The gathering was known officially as the Democratic International or otherwise nicknamed the 'Jamba Jamboree' and took place in June of 1985. The DI was co-sponsored by the College Republicans National Committee (CRNC) in the United States, based in Michigan, and the National Students Federation (NSF) who had groups based on all the White university campuses in South Africa and was headed by Russell Crystal as an apartheid South Africa formation.[125] According to Mark Hemingway, journalist for the *Weekly Standard* in the United States of America, Abramoff

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[123] Jack Abramoff was an American lobbyist involved in a fraud and information scandal. In January of 2006, he pleaded guilty to fraud, tax evasion and conspiracy to bribe public officials. Dan Froomkin, "Jack Abramoff, In new book, Decries endemic corruption in Washington," *Huffpost*, December 28, 2011, www.huffpost.com. Abramoff was also the writer and producer of the movie *Red Scorpion* which was based on the story of a Soviet officer that infiltrated an African rebel group opposed the Soviet Union. The African rebel leader in the movie was loosely based on Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA. The movie Red Scorpion was shot in South West Africa and allegedly financed by the apartheid state's South African Defense Force. Sam Kleiner, "Meet the Conservatives who campaigned for Apartheid South Africa," *The Nation*, July 9, 2013. www.thenation.com. The film was initially supposed to be shot in Swaziland but the government of Swaziland eventually expelled them. According to Abramoff in Hemingway, the government were informed that the Western crew had allegedly been involved in a coup in another African country. *Red Scorpion* was eventually released in 1989, the same year that the Cubans withdrew from Angola and the Soviet Union collapsed. Mark Hemingway, "My Dinner with Jack," Weekly Standard, April 3, 2006. www.weeklystandard.com

[124] Jack Wheeler was a US conservative. According to Powerbase, Wheeler himself on his own website site, *To the Point* explained that "in the 1980s he conducted a series of extensive visits to anti-Soviet guerrilla insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan. He was an unofficial liaison between them and the Reagan White House." Through his visits with these insurgencies he developed a strategy to bring down the Soviet Union, a strategy which was incorporated into the Reagan Doctrine. www.powerbase.info

[125] Staff Reporter, "A Blast from the Past," *Mail and Gaurdian*, January 24, 2006. www.mg.co.za

stated that only two governments who publicly supported the Democratic International meeting in Angola were apartheid South Africa and Israel[126]. However, for matters of public relations, it was decided that neither of those countries were suitable as the meeting point at the time especially because apartheid South Africa was under global scrutiny for its apartheid policies and national conflict against the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations. Since the Soviets held summits like the Democratic International all the time, according to Hemingway, which helped to bolster support for proxies in war, it was thought that the same should be done for those considered as the "good guys."[127]

The decision was made to hold the meeting in Angola at the base of operations of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. The meeting participants included the Nicaraguan Contras, the Afghan *Mujahedeen*, a Laos rebel group and the Angolan UNITA.[128] This conference, according to Muekalia, was aimed at strengthening the "Regan Doctrine" and to force the administration to deploy a concrete "programme of support."[129]

The CIA handled the logistics and press coverage whilst the South African military handled security.[130]According to Alan Cowell, a group of conservative white South African university students were also in attendance.[131]Abramoff told Hemingway that there was trouble in getting some of the participants to Angola at first because Pakistan had blocked some of the Afghan *Mujahedeen* from leaving and Thai officials tried to stop the leader of the Laos rebel group from

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[126] Mark Hemingway, "My Dinner with Jack,' *Weekly Standard*," April 3, 2006. www.weeklystandard.com.

[127] Hemingway, "My Dinner with Jack,' *Weekly Standard*," April 3, 2006. www.weeklystandard.com

[128] These groups were all oppositional insurgent organisations formed within their respective countries in opposition to their respective governments. They were also all aided financially, militarily and politically by the United States of America as proxies to the West in the fight against communism. (Author's interpretation.)

[129] Jardo Muekalia, *Angola: a Segunda Revolucao* (Sao Paulo: Sextante Editora, 2012), 193, Transl. P Israel.

[130] Victoria Brittain, *Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War*, (Pluto Press, 1998), 23.

[131] Alan Cowell, "4 Rebel Units sign Anti-Soviet Pact," *The New York Times*, June 6, 1985. Archives. www.nytimes.com

leaving Bangkok. The organisers also faced a few other challenges like hosting the meeting in a rural area with facilities in grass huts and running out of food. Despite these challenges however, Hemingway suggested that the meeting had been successful.[132]

On the day of the meeting, with all participants mentioned in attendance, Lehrman read out a letter of support which he said had come from the then President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan.. Part of it read:

> Around the world, we see people joining together to get control of their own affairs and to free their nations from outside domination and an alien ideology. It is a global trend and one of the most hopeful of our times.[133]

Lehrman went on to clarify that he was not there as a presidential envoy, but that America's association with the insurgent participants was “not only an expression of the President’s sentiments but also an expression of the sentiments of the vast majority of the American people.”[134]All participants gathered at the meeting sat down and together signed a declaration that stood as a symbol of their solidarity with one another for the same cause. The declaration according to Cowell contained the following:

> Our common goals of liberty and constitutional democracy lead us to form this Democratic International [...] to cooperate to liberate our nations from the Soviet Imperialists […] The old colonialism of the 18th and early 19th centuries has passed into oblivion with the success of the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s […] Today there is only one colonial power in

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[132] Hemingway, “My Dinner with Jack’ in *Weekly Standard*,” April 3, 2006. www.weeklystandard.com

[133] Cowell, “4 Rebel Units sign Anti-Soviet Pact,” *The New York Times*, June 6, 1985. Archives. www.nytimes.com

[134] Cowell, “4 Rebel Units sign Anti-Soviet Pact,” *The New York Times*, June 6, 1985. Archives. www.nytimes.com

> the world, the Soviet Empire, an empire more vicious and oppressive than all others that passed before.[135]

Savimbi later went on to state in his closing speech in which he asked that his message be taken back to Reagan, that:

> We are here to stay, because we are Angolan; we are a people who, abandoned in 1967 by all, except by the enemy, freed a third of our country and fought in the other two thirds […] we are a people who fought and died in the name of freedom."[136]

The language used in the declaration seems to suggest a promise by those who signed it that they would gain "freedom" from oppression and by defeating the Soviet Union, they would gain control over their own countries and affairs. The Soviet Union in this declaration was viewed in the same light as colonialists. Both the idea and the language of this declaration however, seemed contradictory in that it's the counter-insurgency strategies examined here were doing the same thing they declared in this meeting that they wanted to be rid of. Even after the Soviet Union was been defeated, these proxy movements did not get rid of "outside domination" or "alien ideologies." The West still had influence and control within those countries and they held this power because of the aid provided to these organisations during the conflict.

According to Cowell, the group of white South African conservative students at the DI did not sign the pledge. However, their attendance seemed to symbolise South Africa's solidarity, not just with UNITA but with the idea of an alliance between the anti-communist groups.[137] John Daniels, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission researcher in South Africa, stated in an

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[135] Cowell, "4 Rebel Units sign Anti-Soviet Pact," *The New York Times,* June 6, 1985. Archives. www.nytimes.com

[136] Muekalia, *Angola: a Segunda Revolucao,* 193.

[137] Cowell, "4 Rebel Units sign Anti-Soviet Pact," *The New York Times,* June 6, 1985. Archives. www.nytimes.com

interview with the *Mail and Guardian* that a follow up conference was held in Johannesburg, South Africa a month later after the meeting Angola. The follow up conference in Johannesburg included the very same participants who had attended the meeting in Angola, including the Afghan *Mujahedeen*. All participants, according to Daniels,[138]had received a letter of support from former president of South Africa, P.W Botha.[139] The relationship between the apartheid state and the *Mujahedeen* adds to the seemingly contradictory images of the *Mujahedeen*, placing them between the lines of "friend" and "enemy", as they had both a relationship with the apartheid state whilst some of the *Mujahedeen* members had a relationship with those opposing the apartheid state in the local struggle against apartheid.

There were various developments that grew out of those meetings, [140]that involved the apartheid state's covert operations. For the focus of this project, one of these developments was the establishment of the International Freedom Foundation also known as the IFF and code named Pacman. The IFF also had bases in both South Africa and Washington.[141]

International Freedom Foundation

The International Freedom Foundation (IFF), as described by Powerbase which is an information site and project of Spinwatch,[142] was a "propaganda and lobbying front group funded by the apartheid regime in South Africa."[143] It was established in 1986, and founded as a conservative think tank. A report by Dele Olejede and Timothy M. Phelps for *Newsday* included a description of the International Freedom Foundation that they had taken from the 1993 Encyclopaedia of Associations which is a directory of all non-profit organisations in the United States of America. The description given according to Olejede and Phelps was quite the contrary to the description provided by Powerbase. The Encyclopaedia of Associations describes the IFF as follows:

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[138] John Daniel has since passed away. For these reasons a meeting as a follow up on his reports on the conference being held in South Africa was not possible for this project. (Author)

[139] Staff Reporter, "A Blast from the Past," *Mail and Guardian*, January 24, 2006. www.mg.co.za

[140] Hemingway, "My Dinner with Jack' in *Weekly Standard*," April 3, 2006. www.weeklystandard.com

[141] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

[142] Spinwatch is an organisation that investigates state, corporate, front company and lobby group propaganda and publishes its reports and investigations online at www.spinwatch.org

> Works to foster individual freedom throughout the world by engaging in activities which promote the development of free and open societies based on the principles of free enterprise, while recognising and respecting the sovereignty and cultural heritage of nations. Believes that freedom of thought and expression and free association without government interference is essential to human dignity and without protection from violent coercion, liberty and prosperity are impossible. Works to demonstrate the benefits of a 'parliamentary' democracy and expose the 'failures' of a 'people's democracy,' which the group says is often referred to as a system of 'freedom' but is actually a guise for totalitarianism. Considers totalitarian systems to be the 'enemies of freedom' and a threat to the security of the West. Encourages and mobilises support of indigenous movements. Organises forums for dialogues and discussion on issues of human rights and free enterprise.[144]

What is striking about the definition of this organisation is the way in which the language of "freedom" for all is used to create and portray an image of an organisation that sought "freedom" and "democracy" and "equality", yet ironically as a front it worked to create and foster "hatred" for or against the "other". Its very definition became a contradiction to its actual political agenda.

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[143] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

[144] Dele Olejede and Timothy M. Phelps, "Front for Apartheid," *Newsday*, July 16, 1995. www.bilderberg.org

A staff reporter in the *National Mail and Guardian* reported that in 1995 the *New Nation* released a statement made by former security policeman, Paul Erasmus. In his statement Erasmus referred to the IFF as a "STRATCOM military intelligence (MI) project designed to sway world opinion against the anti-apartheid movement."[145] The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa states that contra-mobilisation was the basic: "implementation of the principles of "strategic communication" or 'STRATCOM'"[146] (also known in military terms as communication operations, or 'COMOPS')-counter propaganda to motivate the population to oppose the revolution."[147]

Language takes different forms when it is used to generate a specific effect, to provoke a certain response, or to paint an image to influence a community.[148] This is why STRATCOM was vital to the apartheid state's contra-mobilisation principle.[149] As the discussion of the IFF shows further, language is a tool of propaganda and shaped the discourse on the political "enemy" or "friend". In this case, language was the tool of the International Freedom Foundation to sway public opinion on identifying the "other", to justify the actions taken against those labelled as the "enemy".

Russell Crystal, Jack Abramoff and Craig Williamson were reportedly the three main members who worked closely in developing the International Freedom Foundation. The idea of establishing the International Freedom Foundation was discussed during the Democratic International conference held the year before in 1985 in Angola. The office for the IFF in Washington was run by Abramoff and the one based in Johannesburg, South Africa, was run by Crystal. For apartheid South Africa, the IFF became an international platform which could present the ANC as "terrorists" to the world. Some of the points of departure in the IFF campaign against the ANC was blaming the "plight of the children of South Africa" on the ANC, as well as taking out newspaper adverts against Nelson Mandela and his visit to America in 1990. Craig Williamson was reported saying that the IFF was an instrument for "political warfare" against apartheid's "enemies":[150] "The South Africans spent up to 1.5 million dollars a year through 1992 to underwrite 'Operation Babushka',"[151] which was also another codename for the IFF.[152]

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[145] Staff Reporter, "A Blast from the Past," *Mail and Guardian*, January 24, 2006. www.mg.co.za

[146] According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission final report, the only aspect of STRATCOM that is covered in the report is with regard to contra-mobilisation. Due to the fact that there were still amnesty applications that were pending at the time, the broader coverage on the issue of STRATCOM would be further covered in the Amnesty committee's report. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final report*, Vol. 2, Chapter 3, Subsection 57, 297.

[147] *TRC Report*, Vol. 2, Chapter 3, Subsection 57, 297.

[148] See also, David Jay Brown interview with Noam Chomsky on "language, Politics, and Propaganda," In Conversations on the Edge of the Apocalypse, New York, 2005, 33-39, https://chomsky.info/2005

[149] See also, David Jay Brown interview with Noam Chomsky on "language, Politics, and Propaganda," In Conversations on the Edge of the Apocalypse, New York, 2005, 33-39, https://chomsky.info/2005

According to Thomas Frank, there was no direct attempt t made by the IFF to justify the apartheid regime and its policies,[153] in other words, the IFF did not put out any direct statement or publication stating that they were in support of the policies of apartheid. Rather they turned their sights on tarnishing anyone that was viewed as an "enemy" of apartheid—the ANC being the largest of those threats.[154] During a conference in Sydney (Australia), which Oliver Tambo attended, a crowd protested outside the hotel where the conference was held. Oliver Tambo was painted as a "terrorist" by the IFF because of his involvement with the ANC whilst the ANC were also being accused of committing the act of necklacing[155]. The crowd demonstrated in Sydney outside the hotel by putting tyres around their necks to demonstrate this act of necklacing. *The Telegraph* reported on the protest that took place against Tambo in Sydney, Australia.[156] It also reported that the International Freedom Foundation was an organisation that "promotes democracy through non-violence, said it would oppose the ANC until it renounced violence."[157] The International Freedom Foundation was a covert propaganda tool, part of the counterinsurgency strategy specifically designed to bring down "insurgent" groups that threatened the West and the apartheid state. To align oneself with one insurgent group on the one hand and then form an organisation used to bring another insurgency group down places different national liberation, revolutionary and insurgent organisations in opposition to one another. However, the same insurgency group the apartheid state called an ally also had relations through some its members with those opposing the apartheid state in South Africa. Members of the *Mujahedeen* and members of the anti-apartheid movement shared strategies and tactics , but the apartheid state had the power and authority to determine which group could be identified as "ally" or "enemy" using these counter insurgency strategies of propaganda.

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[150] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

[151] The covert operations of Operation Babushka can be analysed in greater depth. However for the purpose of this project those details will not be analysed. That particular analysis is the undertaking of a much larger project. The foundation of links that are to be drawn up in this project is what is necessary and sufficient for the formation of a foundation of information that demonstrates the influence over conceptual framings.(Author)

[152] Olejede and Phelps, "Front for Apartheid," *Newsday*, July 16, 1995. www.bilderberg.org

[153] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

[154] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

As far as we can surmise, the *Mujahedeen* visited South Africa as part of an alliance with the apartheid state of South Africa as reported by John Daniels. The question then becomes of what importance was this visit and alliance in the broader frame of this study? There are three trajectories to this analysis as I explained in the opening of this chapter, during the period of the 1980s. All three layers interlink with one another.

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[155] Necklacing, as it was known was the act of putting a tyre around the neck of the victim and setting the tyre on fire, thereby burning the person alive. (Author's interpretation.) [See Riedwaan Moosage's MA thesis for the broader field of meaning in the SA anti-apartheid struggle)

[156] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

[157] 'International Freedom Foundation', www.powerbase.info

Conclusion

The Mobile Political Subject

Anti-apartheid movements in South Africa, as discussed in the first chapter, were part of a struggle against the unjust political system of apartheid. This was a government that stripped people of their basic human rights based on an ideology of segregation of race. With specific attention given to the Muslim community in South Africa in the 1980s in this project, there was an intersection between politics and religion and the figure of the *Mujahedeen* discursively in the *Muslim News*. The younger generation's fight for freedom of their political consciousness from a religious community conservative in its ideas on politics played a big part in revealing the tensions around the meanings given to the figure of the *Mujahedeen*, as well as to the tensions of the struggle against apartheid and the tensions between generations. The *Mujahedeen* emerged in this space amongst the Muslim community of South Africa through the "alternative" press. There were also personal relationships between members of the *Mujahedeen* and members of anti-apartheid Muslim student organisations as well, as mentioned in Chapter One.

The *Mujahedeen* as a figure emerged as a contentious figure in a community that was generationally fractured due to their different political views. An older conservative generation which related to the *Mujahedeen* through shared faith struggled to reconcile their faith with the political situation out of which the younger generation felt the need to break. Going against the *Ulema*, the younger Muslim generation looked to the figure of the *Mujahedeen* as an example as to how they could reconcile their faith and their politics.

In the *Muslim News* articles, the idea of separation of religion and politics seemed to take precedence among the Muslim community in South Africa. The idea was that as long as the political system of apartheid did not interfere with the Islamic faith of the community then the community would remain passive in the struggle opposing the apartheid state. However, religion in the 1980s was one of the reasons that provoked a more radical youth. The younger generation of the 80s thought it unjust to not fight in the struggle as they felt it went against their faith to remain passive. Communism and religion intersected here as well. The older generation of the conservative Muslim community compared this new radicalism of their youth as being akin to communist sentiment. So while preserving a faith, an entire generation remained passive in politics, yet when the younger Muslim generation chose not to remain passive, communism was seen as the enemy of influence by the older Muslim generation in provoking the acts of mobilisation amongst the Muslim youth as indicated in a statement made by the *Ulema* in the *Muslim News*.

For the Muslim youth of the 1980s in South Africa, the figure of the *Mujahedeen* was seen not only as a symbol of motivation to rebel against the unjust system of apartheid. The image painted of the *Mujahedeen* in local media was not only an image of resistance or, in this case, a "freedom fighter". It was also an image of faith. Several images portraying prayer and faith with contrasts of the AK 47 and bowing down in prayer being depicted in one image. The Afghan *Mujahedeen* became a contentious figure between the realities of faith and politics during a period where the two ideas were viewed and practiced locally in isolation of one another.

The apartheid state's relationship with the *Mujahedeen* was somewhat different. Apartheid South Africa was aligned with the West, partly in an attempt to salvage all the international relationships that they could during a period when economic sanctions on South Africa were at their height. As demonstrated in the pledge of the Democratic International, the apartheid state aligned itself with all those fighting against the Soviet Union. Ironically though, the idea of the *Mujahedeen*, their struggle against an oppressive government and some of the military tactics deployed against the Soviet Union could be seen as similar to that of the anti-apartheid organisations that resisted and fought against the apartheid state. The Afghan *Mujahedeen* at face value were not as different in their mobilisation against an unjust political system as those who mobilised in South Africa. The apartheid state, however, in disguising their hand in international conflicts, chose to align themselves with a figure that looked all too familiar in their actions as those fighting in the struggle against apartheid. But as long as those actions were against an opposing regime that threatened the apartheid state, it was acceptable in those whom they referred to as an ally thereby aligning themselves with an "enemy" to fight an even bigger "enemy".

In choosing to align themselves with a movement that at any other given time and context might have been their enemy, the *Mujahedeen*, the apartheid state demonstrated duality of state perception, this contrast/contradiction was not about how they identified "ally" or "enemy", but rather about who and when they chose to identify an "ally" or "enemy". These perceptions were subject to change depending on who benefitted the state and when they did so. It begs the question as to how would one reconcile the "friend" and the "enemy"? How did these concepts shift in a time of political uncertainty, proxy wars and segregation? That is to say if a shift is what occurred. This contradiction of "friend" and "enemy" during the 1980s conflict and global fight against communism was the political space wherein the *Mujahedeen* emerged, a space wherein they were not clearly identifiable as "friend" or "enemy". The ambiguity of the *Mujahedeen* within this political space allowed for the political subject to continuously be mobile, to remain in play, able to be deployed as and when necessary across a range of different fields of meaning.

The language used in the pledge of the Democratic International and the work of the International Freedom Foundation called much into question. Calls for “freedom” were made, there was talk of “democracy”, pledges made to fighting for those “freedoms” and “democracy”. Language was deployed to create certain perceptions that gave the state a strategic upper-hand in the war that they are fighting, leverage over the minds of those they are trying to dominate and control. A few questions were raised: What is freedom then? And who was freedom for? If all sides were calling for it, fighting for it, then what did these concepts mean? And do they too change dependent on whatever it is that seem to separate one man’s freedom from another? In having a political subject that reads as mobile and that breaks the binary between “friend” and “enemy” how does one distinguish one person's freedom and democracy from another? How does one political subject manage to intersect itself in two very opposing spaces?

I pose these questions because the concepts of “freedom” and “democracy” are not without their own problems. They are problems that contribute to the fixed conceptual framings of a people or any community. These conceptual framings of the “terrorist” or “freedom fighter” should not be seen as fixed, but rather through the idea of a mobile political subject that is able to slide across these concepts. This figure of the *Mujahedeen* was deployed across different contexts, discursively and politically. The *Mujahedeen* appeared in two very different political and discursive spaces along very different trajectories in quite contradictory ways.

There was a contradiction when the apartheid state chose to align themselves with national liberation movements and insurgent groups while at the same time defend themselves against movements of a similar nature within the apartheid state of South Africa. The reading of the state's alliances would therefore have seemed to be only a matter of convenience. This relationship disrupted the seemingly fixed conceptual framings of the "terrorist" and the "freedom fighter" and demonstrated how state power was deployed in order to remain in control. The counter-mobilisation strategies used by the apartheid state demonstrated how language and propaganda in warfare could influence the minds of the people and how the "other" or the "enemy" is created.

The idea of a mobile political subject was developed from reading the circumstances described in this mini dissertation with the argument of the three trajectories of the different meanings that suggest mobile political subject. These three trajectories correspond to three spaces within which the Afghan *Mujahedeen* emerged in Southern Africa in the 1980s. They also show how the events that unfolded in Afghanistan and Southern Africa, where the *Mujahedeen* appeared as a political figure, created different roles for the *Mujahedeen* that were contradictory to one another.

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