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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree

Magister

Title: *Indigeneity and Political Identity: A study of the contemporary legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis in Mali*

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UNIVERSITY of the
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Department

Political Studies

Faculty

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Abstract

Title: Indigeneity and Political Identity: A study of the contemporary legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis in Mali

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Madmin Full Thesis

Department of Political Studies

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The limited investment of the colonial authority into the development of the colony and its people are sometimes offered as explanation for why African states seem to fail at the democratic project. This together with the arbitrary manner within which colonial borders were drawn without regard for culture and ethnicity have been touted as the main reason for violent upheaval and political instability. While this may be true it is nonetheless insufficient to explain, understand and describe the embeddedness of violence within various states on the continent. The thesis will counter the conception of violence in Africa as only an economic colonial legacy and will instead argue that the violence and political instability is also a product of complex identity formation. It is argued that specific historical contexts and narratives create identities. The creation of this will be explored and explained through the narrative of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The Hamitic Hypothesis is a theory of race and culture which was used, adapted, and promulgated by the colonial authority as it helped to explain and legitimate the practice of colonial rule. Through the Hamitic Hypothesis it will be shown that in the 'post-colonial' state specific political identities continue to be inhabited and they contest one another for representation and political power. This will be shown through the political identity formation of the Tuareg throughout North Africa and the contemporary violence of Northern Mali which calls for an independent state for the 'foreign' Tuareg. Using Foucault's understanding of subjectivity, the thesis will explain the creation of the 'other' in Mali. In focusing on the historical development of the Hamitic Hypothesis through key text it will also show the enduring legacy of this concept through the lens of Gramsci's hegemony. The Hamite and the subsequent Hamitic Hypothesis will be shown to be a discourse which influenced the way in which identity was created and understood within Africa. Through contemporary examples of violence, it will be shown that these identities continue to be inhabited and represented and it is these identities more so than that of ethnicity that underscore the violence

Key words: Political violence, political identity, political identity formation, colonialism, Hamite, Hamitic Hypothesis, Indigeneity, Land, Political Access



Declaration

I declare that *Indigeneity and Political Identity: A study of the contemporary legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis in Mali* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Full name: Robyn Justine Pasensie

Date: 25 October 2022

Signed.....



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Acknowledgements

I would firstly like to thank my supervisor Prof Suren Pillay for his expert knowledge and patience as I completed this thesis. In addition to his decisive input, I would also like to extend my deep-felt gratitude and appreciation to the Political Studies Department for the guidance and support. In particular I would like to thank Profs Cherrel Africa and Joeliën Pretorius in helping me cross the finish line, Prof Laurence Piper for all the opportunities given to me, Dr Mark Hoskins for his robust conversation, Dr Matshanda for her editorial assistance, Ms Meshay Moses for her friendship and support and Ms Nadia Jansen for always extending a helping hand. This work could not have come to completion without the love and support of my family and to this I would like to thank my grandparents Charles, Bridget and Diane, my parents Nina and Kenny and my siblings Kersten, Alessandra and Ethan. This work was only truly made possible with their love, insight and support. I hope this dedication repays in small measure the large debt of gratitude I owe you all.


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Tribal or ethnic conflicts is not new to debates about the sources of Africa's problems (Bouhars, 2020). These types of conflict have been identified in places like Nigeria (with regards to the Biafra war), between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the oft cited example of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda (Bouhars, 2020).

While the occurrence of these conflicts cannot be denied the presence of the tribes or ethnic groups which cause these conflicts should perhaps not be taken to be naturally occurring or as unquestionable entities of the state. But what has caused this lasting impression of tribes and ethnic groups? Where did these groups come from? These two questions serve as the central theme of this thesis. The preoccupation with tribal conflict and the mere presence of such groups as 'natural' groupings hinders a more nuanced look at what is possibly to blame for the upheaval on the continent (Brubaker & Leitan, 1998). The investigation of this thesis is to understand the underlying mechanisms that give rise to conflict and to provide an analysis of the source of the group creation. The thesis contends that it is due to overarching ideas like the Hamitic Hypothesis that give rise to very specific racialised ideas of belonging and which therefore account for the intensity and frequency of violence on the continent. To do this the research is focused on the case study of Mali as the country has undergone multiple coups in the last decade, is beset by a harsh secessionist struggle, has a conflict with racial overtones and historically was deemed to be home to Hamites. The research question is therefore: Can the violence in Mali be attributed to racial and identity formation as a result of the Hamitic Hypothesis?

To chart the origin story of these racialised groups is to look at the power dynamics that exist between creating something and making sure that it has an enduring legacy and presence. Therefore, the thesis draws on the expertise of Michel Foucault who provides a novel approach to understanding how ideas begin and become knowledge, Edward Said whose work on orientalism shows how certain ideas can practically take root and become embedded in society and the Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci who provides a framework for understanding how an idea is sustained and how it proliferates. This will provide an overarching theoretical framework which seeks to explain:

1. How and why certain ideas, like who and what constitutes accepted groups (like ethnic or cultural groupings) are created,
2. How these ideas take root and become part of formal knowledge and
3. The mechanisms by which these ideas continue to hold relevance today.

This thesis takes its starting point as the onset of colonisation in Africa. This was a crucial time for the development of ideas on race which this thesis will show had bearing on the ways in which people and groups were formally produced (and reproduced) by the state (Hall, 2011). It does not however take an excessively broad view of colonisation instead it seeks to analyse how a theory of knowledge around who can belong (to and in the state) and who cannot, was produced during this time. This kind of classification is important for the modern understanding of the tribal and ethnic groups that each claim primacy in their state and who fight amongst each other to assert dominance in the state they believe is theirs.

TRIBE OR ETHNIC GROUP?

While used interchangeably the terms tribe and ethnic group indicate different things. 'Tribe' has been a highly contested term with its roots in colonial ethnography and anthropology (Khan, 2016, p. 82). However, in the years since there was an attempt to shake the colonial history of the 'tribe' (Khan, 2016). Previously a term meant to describe a homogenous group of the same biological characteristics (Crone, 2003, p. 48), 'tribe' was deployed with special reference to primitive societies of the untameable dark continent and used to describe the groupings and communities of 'unruly' and 'uncivil' inhabitants (Thiong'o, 2009, p. 22). The connotation of race stuck very closely to 'tribe' and while the word is still used to describe a more or less homogenous collective it is difficult to subtract the ideas of biological race that has been read into it. It is worth noting that the term tribe is still used in an uneven manner between the Global South and the Global North (ref). For example, one may describe the Kikuyu in Kenya as a tribe but the Appalachian people in America are not described as tribe.

The dimension of race and location has not been read out of the term 'tribe' despite its turn to discard its colonial roots. As to ethnicity it is equally as perplexing as tribe. Moving away from racially based definitions of community or identity, ethnicity sought to embrace a shared or common culture or understanding (Antweiler, 2015, p. 25). The crucial point is that members of ethnic groups must each feel as though they belong, are accepted by other members as belonging and are part of the 'in group' (Antweiler, 2015, p. 27). Commonality is usually a shared language or religion (Antweiler, 2015, p. 27). Often used to describe a collective that

has come together because of these shared ideas and over time become an immovable force that seems to have always existed as a group. Thus, tribe and ethnicity both seem to want to describe a group of people who either by phenotype or language or 'culture' who appear to occupy the same space. A slight difference between the two but ultimately working towards the same goal of labelling a way of being or identity. An additional consideration is the use of 'tribe' in particular parts of Africa, most notably in those parts with a significant Islamic tradition. The Al-qaliba can be loosely translated as tribe however it's meaning can be complex. Qabila (pre-colonisation) were initially defined as autonomous groups of people who were linked together by a patrilineal ancestor (Hart, 1981, p. 250). The idea of the qabila is most prominent in North Africa including with the Berber. The significance of the qabila is important to the history of conflict in the north since this pre-colonial concept and method of familial organisation also suffered through colonial influence and became infused with ideas on race and class (Morone, 2021). As outlined in chapter five the apparent social stratification of Arab or Arab like societies such as the Berbers would provide a foundation upon which colonialist sentiment could take. While the idea of the 'tribe' in North Africa has a distinct history it has nonetheless come to represent a similar concern as 'tribe' as used in the rest of the continent: a unit of contestation.

The 'tribe' in Africa has been used to account for many of the continent's ills and where the tribe appears to have splintered it is blamed on the differing ethnicities that may be living within the tribe or close to it (Thiong'o, 2009).

THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS IN AFRICA

To explain the ways in which ideas on race were created during colonisation this thesis will focus on one case study that has a contemporary example of violence and which has had a chequered history with competing groups: Mali. It will look specifically at one theory of knowledge as a foundation for the creation of certain ideas on race and belonging. For this, the thesis will present the Hamitic Hypothesis as the theory of knowledge that has created the idea of race and belonging in Mali. Therefore, the Hamitic Hypothesis is viewed as the key ingredient in the formation of these ideas. It does so to provide an account of the violence and upheaval that is seemingly so common on the continent. However, what precisely is the Hamitic Hypothesis and why is it necessary for this research?

The Hamitic Hypothesis states that any development in Africa is because of a race known as the Hamites and that the Hamites are a Euro African race (Sanders, 1969, p. 521). Although living in Africa for many generations their origins cannot be traced back to the African

continent instead their origin resides outside of the continent (Sanders, 1969). The contact of the Hamites with the rest of Africa is categorised as the civilising force that allowed some pockets of Africa to develop with the pre-eminent example being Egypt (Sanders, 1969). The view of a Hamitic race residing in Africa that was racially superior and had greater mental capacity was supported by prominent ethnologists and anthropologists of the time like Charles Seligman (Eltringham, 2006, p. 426). In his work *Races of Africa* published in 1939, Seligman set forth to categorise and catalogue all racial groups in Africa. His work was considered to be one of the prominent texts on race in Africa (Eltringham, 2006).

Casting the Tuareg as outsider is in part due to their apparent ‘unbelonging’ based on culture and race or look (Lecocq, 2010, p. 301). The Tuareg were themselves cast in this category of Hamite during colonization and their administration during this time was a reflection of the slightly vaulted status as being only part African (Hall, 2011). While the word Hamite has fallen out of favour in common usage it is argued that the rationale behind this idea still exists in the way it has shaped belief around race and belonging.

To link the Hamitic Hypothesis to present day violence, the genesis of the Hamitic Hypothesis must be described to show how the idea was established and used. It is in this description that the mechanisms of identity formation will be explored to show how it influences violence. Specifically, the thesis uses a selection of written works to show the progression of thought on the Hamitic Hypothesis and how it influenced modern ideas of race.

THE CURRENT VIOLENCE IN MALI

At this point it is important to explain why Mali presents the ideal case study to speak to these issues of identity formation and political violence and what the history of Mali’s formation itself can tell us about the foundation that was laid for the Hamitic Hypothesis to take root.

Mali, a country in West Africa, has suffered under protracted conflict since uprisings in 2012 including its most recent coup in 2021 (Hegazi, et al., 2021). The uprising of 2012 was spearheaded by Tuareg groups who were fighting against the Malian state which it felt had long since forgotten them (Hegazi, et al., 2021). They were also fighting back against a country in which they felt they ultimately did not belong. In the intervening 10 years conflict has increased and has taken on an added dimension of jihadism (Raniera, 2022). The continued political insecurity in Mali is perhaps characterised by many competing groups with competing goals, who continue to destabilise the country (Raniera, 2022). The vein of belonging and trying to

assert dominance based on this, runs throughout. To understand how violence in Mali has become what it is, it is necessary to provide a succinct analysis of the conflict, some of its major combatants and areas of conflict. This sets the stage for understanding the formation of the competing groups.

In January of 2012 Mali was beset with conflict by groups of armed Tuareg insurgents (Hegazi, et al., 2021). Following this insurrection Malian soldiers, apparently disenchanted with the government's handling of the situation instigated a coup (Hegazi, et al., 2021). By 2015 after continued instability a Peace Agreement was signed in the northern regions of Ménaka and Kidal who remained under the control of armed rebel groups (Molenaar, et al., 2019). The region of Kidal was controlled by the pro-autonomy coalition Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA – Coordination of the Azawad Movements) (Molenaar, et al., 2019). The dominant forces in the region of Ménaka were the pro-state militias that were grouped under the Platform coalition (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). The conflict in both these regions was characterised by a protracted intra-communal struggle that is pitted against the backdrop of other radical armed groups (Molenaar, et al., 2019). During this time education, healthcare and justice slowly deteriorated (Molenaar, et al., 2019). Fast forward to 2020, the military staged another coup this time preceded by many months of protests by the public and various civil society organisations who remained dissatisfied with the handling of the continued Tuareg insurgency in the north (Fornof & Cole, 2020). Ultimately, this second coup, in less than 10 years, led to the resignation of President Ibrahim Keita and helped to usher in a new era of violence marked by Islamist extremism (Fornof & Cole, 2020). However, the regime change would not last long because in 2021 Mali experienced yet another coup.

Despite the significance of the 2012 uprising and ensuing coup it is not the start of the violence and issues facing Mali. Prior to the 2012 Tuareg insurrection there were many other instances of Tuaregs fighting back (Lecocq, 2010). Tuareg rebellions have occurred throughout Mali's history and have coloured the nature of the present conflict. Various there have been Tuareg rebellions that have taken place in 1963, 1990, 2006 and 2012 (Lecocq, 2010). In general, Tuaregs were dissatisfied with the French expansion into their territory and upon independence further resented their reintegration into the Malian state which they saw as a further incursion and erosion on their way of life (Molenaar, et al., 2019).

The roots of the consternation between the Malian government and Tuaregs are in old power dynamics dating back to colonisation that deeply affected Tuareg conception of self (especially

in relation to the rest of Mali) (Hall, 2011). The dynamics of the 1990-1996 rebellion were very much characterised by power struggles within Tuareg confederations and across ethnic lines (Molenaar, et al., 2019). One of the prominent contentions was between the noble class and the Islamic cleric class (Hall, 2011). The noble class dominated Mouvement Populaire la Liberation de l'Azawad (MPLA) which was a group initially centred on Tuareg autonomy and who drove the 1990 rebellion (Hegazi, et al., 2021).

The 2006 rebellion also re-instigated violence between the Tuareg tribal groups the Ifoghas and the lower-tier Imghad caste, who were both designated as lower class Tuareg tribes (Molenaar, et al., 2019). Lieutenant-Colonel Elhajji Ag Gamou, an Imghad ex-rebel who had been integrated into the Malian armed forces, was co-opted by the Malian state to quash the rebels (Molenaar et al, 2019).

Following the 2006 rebellion was the 2012 rebellion which served as an intensified culmination of all previous rebellions, and which continues to serve as the reason for sustained conflict in Mali (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). Post 2011 young Tuareg revolutionaries alongside Tuareg fighters who had returned from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 had begun to lay the foundations for the 2012 rebellion (International Crisis Group, 2021). Initially they formed part of the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), which was conceptualised as a Tuareg-led but multi-caste and multi-ethnic organization (Molenaar, et al., 2019). The MNLA were therefore fighting for an independent state however the Tuareg rebel movement soon succumbed to fragmentation along ethnic, caste, tribal and generational lines (Molenaar et al, 2019). In addition, although the MNLA's initial military success was based on a murky alliance with radical armed groups, the latter quickly turned on their allies and took over key northern cities such as Kidal, Gao and Ménaka in mid-2012 and it was this move which sparked the French intervention 'Operation Serval' (Molenaar, et al., 2019). The move led to the recapturing of major northern cities with the support of Malian army units under the command of the Imghad Lieutenant-Colonel Elhajji Ag Gamou (Molenaar et al, 2019).

This has all brought Mali to its most recent coup in 2021 and given the ongoing violence the research problem for this thesis is presented as a deficit in the understanding and analysis of conflict in Africa. While conflict on the continent may be deduced as being a result of ethnic or tribal conflict the problem that arises with this is that it takes for granted the ethnic and tribal groups. In its analysis it does not seek to investigate the formation and presence of these groups themselves are part of the reason for the prevalence of the violence as well as being the main

constituents to the violence.

Some insights into the prevalence of the violence and general instability of post-independence Mali have pointed to lack of economic structures and growth (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). The question of the Tuaregs has caused confusion in Northern Africa due to their perceived nomadic nature and complicated colonial history. The Tuaregs are still viewed in the categories of nomad, herder and hunter (Hall, 2011)

DEFINING 'BELONGING' IN MALI

Given all this how does identity coalesce to form violence? The notions of those who belong and those who do not have stemmed from processes of identification (or identity politics) exemplified in the post-independence efforts to create the nation state (Hegazi, et al., 2021, p. 5) The ideal of the nation state, a state that houses a people of similar language, history, culture, and tradition, in the overall African context has not been entirely, or successfully, achieved (Huntington, 1993). Deciding on the identity of the nation (who belongs) is a process of agreeing upon a set of requirements for citizenship which must be governed by the state. Framed in this way the politics of identity, or identification of the people who constitute the state, could be encapsulated as a question or perhaps problem of citizenship. This point is crucial when considering the place of the Tuareg in the broader Malian society and why they continue to agitate for a separate identity away from the Malian state.

To be a citizen implies that one is a part of the state. But what the law says about who legitimately belongs and who the people believe belong are two different notions. For if legality or adherence to the law was the only criterion that determined belonging and citizenship in a state then anybody who met these requirements would be deemed a citizen and therefore should be accepted on equal footing with every other citizen in the state. However, this has not always been the case. This is most readily seen in issues of xenophobia but also in recent trends that have seen the emergence of the indigenous and non-indigenous, declaring a distinct difference between legal citizenship and those who *truly* belong. The Tuareg are such a contested group. Their agitations for a state of their own and their sustained insurgency in the North of Mali are evidence of a deeply held belief of not belonging and not being seen or represented by the state of Mali (Molenaar, et al., 2019).

In this highly politicized way belonging can be described as a relationship between the 'true'

citizens and the interlopers. In English to express the sentiment of true and original inhabitant the word indigenous is used. However, this is a borrowed sentiment from the Greeks who used the terms autochthonous and endogene/allogene (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005) . Both terms centre on priority of time, in other words who came first (autochthonous) and who came after (allogeneous). To be an autochthon was to be a son/daughter of the soil (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). Therefore, to be an allogene was to be an outsider. These terms were introduced by French and British colonial authorities and used to describe what the colonial authority thought was the difference between ‘real’ Africans and ‘settler’ Africans (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). The complexity of the indigenous or the autochthon is then tied up with conceptions of who is the son/daughter of the soil and who is not.

The line of division between the Tuareg and the rest of Mali is a longstanding one and this thesis contends that this is a result of inherited knowledge systems that reinforce ideas of difference and separation based on race. For Mali like much of North and West Africa it laboured under the French colonial government’s conception of race (Hall, 2011). The Berber population and its subsets such as the Tuareg, were labelled as being part of the Hamitic race due to their being ‘light skinned’ and more ‘European looking’ features. This set them apart from the ‘black’ Malians where race was directly related to intelligence and status in society.

INDIGENIETY

A return to indigeneity and indeed an alluding to nativeness or primitiveness is highlighted by Kuper in his article ‘The return of the native’. The crux of Kuper’s argument rests on the fact that he rejects the use of an essentialist ideology since it colludes with a colonial ideology and its continued use in modern anthropology will lead to, as he has pointed out, the ‘primitive’ simply being replaced by the ‘indigenous’ (Kuper, 2003). A change in semantics does not change the foundation of knowledge that led to the formulation of the label. This is what the study of the Hamitic Hypothesis will hope to show; that it has assisted in creating a specific knowledge and understanding of social relations. Kuper (2003) is suggesting a re-articulation and reformation of the concepts of culture and identity. It is here that the research is situated, to understand the formation of the label and the process which have given importance to these labels in present day. In other words, how, knowledge of and in society has been created, interpreted and used. The concept of indigeneity highlights that there is a growing trend toward accepting that there are sections of society that are different or more special than others. Those that are original or indigenous must be protected.

Understanding political identity as a product of social construction through knowledge and power allows for the understanding that race and ethnicity are not a given. In understanding ethnicity Berman (2010) offers a historical context to the modern democratisation problems of Africa that seem to be riddled with ethnic conflicts and cleavages. A major point of departure for Berman is the fact that it is the idea of ‘sons of the soil’ expelling those who are not that seems to drive the political violence in democratic Africa (Berman, 2010, p. 29). He makes a bold statement that ethnicity in Africa is not old rather it is a new phenomenon that has resulted as a response to colonial modernity (Berman, 2010, p. 31). Unlike other scholars Berman (2010, p. 4) describes African identities pre-colonisation not as static and rigid but rather as being characterized by a fluidity and hybridity that existed in a social context of multiple and alternate identities. These identities were signified by large movements of people across borders or boundaries and led to an intermingling of communities and shared cultural practices and language (Berman, 2010). What Berman introduces is an argument that relates the very formation of the colonial state to the way in which identity is expressed. It is the position of this paper that identity is indeed a fluid concept that takes on different meanings in different contexts as in the example of the Berber before and after French colonialism in the North of Africa.

Explanations for the various episodes and types of violence have focused on economic underdevelopment and political instability stemming from simmering tensions between competing ethnic groups (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). These groups fight for equal political recognition and access to resources. Providing a different take on these analyses is the work of authors such as Berman, Geschiere and Nymanjoh. They have begun to offer alternate explanations for the instability of the democratic project in Africa and of the shortcomings of these modern political regimes (Mamdani, 2001; Berman, 2010; Geschiere and Nymanjoh, 2001). These authors draw on the historiography of Africa and of individual states to explain how this impacted process of identity formation and it relates to present day governance. While many tribes and ethnicities may be identified throughout the African continent these are not directly the identities that are being referred to. Instead, the identity that has become most salient is the one that designated belonging (Kuper, 2003).

It is argued that the Hamitic Hypothesis is a discourse that has helped make this distinction. The politics of indigeneity is a very real and contemporary struggle that highlights the process of identity formation. In other words, how the indigenous and the non-indigenous has come to be

constructed.

CONCLUSION

It is within this backdrop of violence and political upheaval that identity formation is being scrutinised. Firstly, as a way to provide another account for prevalence of violence on the continent, secondly to interrogate the role of knowledge in creating ideas on race and lastly to understand how these manifests in the present day.

Encapsulating violence centred on identity, race and belonging in this frame can help to provide a different understanding for the origin (and possible measures for its end) for the violence. To try and mark a beginning for the process of learning the research is squarely focused on the emergence of racial thinking and knowledge creation from the onset of colonisation. While the colonial period provides clear examples of racial classification and specific modalities of thinking it will be argued that colonialism was not the creation or onset of this kind of thinking. Instead, the colonial period represents a period where these ideas became entrenched. The mechanism by which this was done was through the use and internalisation of the central tenets of the Hamitic Hypothesis. Colonialism is thus understood to be the tool that provided the machineries to proliferate and reinterpret a particular knowledge system informed and created by the Hamitic Hypothesis. In describing the institutionalisation of the Hamitic Hypothesis this thesis begins its research firstly by providing a thorough account of the history of Mali. This historicizes the current violence and lays the foundation for the forthcoming discussions on colonialism and how it used existing social hierarchies and the Hamitic Hypothesis to reinforce racial ideas. This is of course all couched within the broad framework of providing an account for why, and how, the Tuareg came to be a contested group in Mali fighting a violent secessionist battle with the Malian state. It operates on the understanding that belonging is the central element to the violence and that this belonging is a learned process with deep historical roots. The thesis further proves this point by drawing on the work of Foucault, Gramsci and Said to show how ideas become knowledge and common practice. It does this by tracing the genesis and evolution of the Hamitic Hypothesis through various academic and other written works which show how the ideas of the Hamitic Hypothesis came to be imbedded in colonial rule and then everyday practice. In this way the research is making a clear link between theory and practice.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH AIM

The central aim of this thesis is to explore how political identity has been formed through the evaluation of the enduring legacy of specific knowledge systems. The thesis aims to critique established understandings of violence that credit it simply to a convergence of multiple ethnicities by showing that the violence is instead centred on the exercise of power relations established in specific knowledge systems. These aims are all centred on the research question: Can the violence in Mali be attributed to racial and identity formation as a result of the Hamitic Hypothesis?

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The central research question for this thesis is ‘Can the violence in Mali be attributed to racial and identity formation as a result of the Hamitic Hypothesis?’

It is necessary from this question to identify the central concepts which are:

- i. Identity
- ii. Race
- iii. The Hamitic Hypothesis

The key objectives therefore are to:

1. To provide an account of how ideas of identity were created in relation to colonial expansion.
2. To present the Hamitic Hypothesis as basis upon which ideas of race were founded and the mechanism by which these ideas proliferated.
3. To show through the example of various scholarly works how the ideas espoused by the Hamitic Hypothesis took hold and became accepted knowledge.
4. To situate the current problem in Mali as a continuum of the identity formation process.
5. To analyse the current violence in Mali as an inheritor of the identity formation process.

This thesis situates itself within the broad theme of political identity and violence in Africa especially the ways in which violence is used to further violence. To understand the way in which political identities are used and represented within acts of violence it is necessary to understand how and why political identity has been formed. The specific knowledge system to be analysed is the legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis as it unfolded in North Africa and more specifically within Mali. The thesis will explore the nature of the formation of the Hamitic Hypothesis and how it was used, in specific historical and political context, to create a system of knowledge and understanding on race and belonging. This will be to show that discourse can create complex identity categorisations and how these in turn can be used for political ends. The analysis of the Hamitic Hypothesis is done within a theoretical framework which uses Foucault's understanding of knowledge and power in the creation of a subject. However, while Foucault's work in this area is important, to describe the enduring legacy of these ideas a theory of hegemony according to Gramsci will be used.

How knowledge can shape political identity is understood to have an enduring influence. Within the research that is understood to be the Hamitic Hypothesis in Mali. The thesis explores how the overall Hamitic discourse helped to shape modern conceptions and understandings of who belongs within a state, who has the right to political access and resources and how these are contingent upon an understanding of political identity as either a true African inhabitant or as a settler inhabitant (Hamite). Discourse is defined according to Foucault and it is taken to mean the ways in which knowledge is constituted (Weedon, 1987).

The study of political identity formation will be placed within a historical context to show the effect of colonialism and its legacy on the political identity categories of the present day. The emphasis in the thesis on the place of history and colonial knowledge is to situate present conflicts within a broader framework of understanding that shows that the violence is not only a result of 'modern' problems. Placing identity formation within the context of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial (understood here in the literal sense as the period after the end of colonialism) state formation will show how political identity has been shaped and the prevailing socio-political environment of the time will provide context to this formation. The historiography of a country will point to how a people remember, create and re-create their identity. This will be a crucial point of the thesis to evaluate the place of these embedded political identities as they manifest in present conflicts.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The overall framework of the research is conducted within a post structuralist perspective and is a qualitative research project. Post structuralism does not come with set theory however it does place at its centre certain assumptions. One of the main assumptions is that it does not accept that there is a single reality or truth (Burr, 2015). Instead within a post structuralist understanding reality is understood to be constructed by discourse which allows us to perceive our reality as we think it is. This means that given different contexts the knowing of reality will be different. This places language at the centre of how we chose to live and interact (Burr, 2015). Therefore, in its epistemology, or in its knowing of reality, post structuralism seeks to interpret and discover meaning in what is assumed to be a given or truth (Burr, 2015). The research design falls within a broad post structuralist perspective.

A qualitative approach is one that is marked as being exploratory research that aims to gain an understanding of social phenomena by exploring their underlying reason and motivations (Silverman, 2005, p. 37). As Jennifer Mason (2002, p. 56) points out qualitative research can be said to fall within the broad frame of interpretivist research. Qualitative research is based on methods of analysis and explanation that uses a complexity of understanding that is based in detail and context (Mason, 2002, p. 11). Through this qualitative research aims to provide holistic understandings based on the use of detailed data (Mason, 2002). Qualitative research then is less preoccupied with quantifying social phenomena and reducing it merely to an interpretation of statistics (Mason, 2002, p. 13). Since the research is based on an understanding of how ideas create thought and practice qualitative methods such as participant observation, focus groups or structured/semi-structured and open-ended interviews may not be suitable. This research was desktop based.

The research uses several key texts (written academic and other scholarly works and news articles) in the analysis of the research question. The research area was limited to the case study of Mali. While a case study is hyper focused on one area, and its critics will draw attention to the fact that it is difficult to generalise based on the findings of a case study, (Gerring, 2004, p. 341) it is nonetheless useful when wanting to understand specific phenomena. A case study can thus be defined as “*An intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units*” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). The case study of Mali, while focused only on this country, offers a look into the process of identity formation. It is especially useful for this given its history, as outlined in Chapter 1, and given the continued presence of sectarian

violence in the country that is based in large part on race and ideas of belonging attributed to identity. These cover two of the central concepts of the research i.e race and identity, and acts as a way to explore the third concept of this research: the Hamitic Hypothesis. Using Mali as a case study provided an opportunity to look intimately at the source or reasons for violence based on identity that could perhaps be used in similar contexts in the African continent to account for the high prevalence of political instability.

Mali represents the social phenomena to be studied in a real-life contemporary context of violent upheaval in the North of the country. Mali is also significant because it is historically understood to be one of the countries in North Africa where the Hamite settled.

The research therefore focuses on the way in which knowledge produces certain kinds of understanding of who is indigenous and who is not indigenous and how this feeds violence in Mali.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Within the context of this research, an emphasis on the Foucauldian understanding of discourse and knowledge was used. The use of Foucault was necessary because he outlines a way of understanding the relationship between knowledge and power.

Foucault himself did not set out a particular method for ‘discourse analysis’ instead he did provide some broad dimensions that assist in the study of discourse. The first dimension of the Foucauldian approach to discourse takes into account the historical specificity of the discourse (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008). Secondly through discourse an analysis of the mechanisms of power is created which offers something toward understanding its function (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008). Lastly the discourse analysis of Foucault is directed at the subjectification of the discursive object. In other words what are the signifying practices that create the subject (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2008). This type of discourse analysis will allow for an analysis of discourse and power and the subjectivity of the discourse i.e the relationship between discourses and how people react and relate to it. Carla Willig (2008) presents a broad methodological framework for utilising Foucault as discourse analysis.

To refine the scope of the research a timeline was constructed to order the selection of written works. A timeline limits the area of study to specific historical periods that are of importance in the formation of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The timeline uses as a reference point the period of

the Enlightenment since it was during this time that the Hamitic Hypothesis underwent its formulation as we understand today. Following this is the colonial period from 1892 until 1960 (independence) and then the post-colonial period from 1960 till present. Each period will be studied according to key scholarly texts, interpreted within the theoretical framework of Said, Foucault and Gramsci. These scholarly works were chosen to show the movement of the idea of race and identity in Mali as informed by the Hamitic Hypothesis. These written were chosen to show:

- a.) the Hamite was composed or how it originated,
- b.) How the Hamite was perceived in each period,
- c.) how the Hamite was described and used in historical and scientific texts
- d.) the change in the use and understanding of the Hamite from Enlightenment to Post Colonial and
- e.) to show a progression of thought and practice.

SOURCES OF DATA

The thesis makes use of Foucault, Gramsci and Said in a broad theoretical framework in which to interpret the data. The data is derived from a selection of written works or texts. The selection of texts is secondary data. The secondary data used is newspaper articles, reports and books. Access to secondary data did not present any problem since these are easily available via online resources and in various libraries. The selection of texts is as follows:

1. Charles Seligman 'Races of Africa'-This work by Seligman is a distillation of theories of race particularly as they pertain to Africa. 'Races of Africa' was published in 1930 and provides an example of how race was conceived scientifically during the colonial period.
2. Maurice Delafosse 'Blacks of Africa' and 'The Negro'-Maurice Delafosse was a French ethnographer and colonial official. His works provide a description of Africa from the standpoint of both colonial official and social scientist. These texts are an example of how scientific classifications influence colonial administration.
3. Gustav Le Bon 'The crowd: A study of the popular mind'.
4. Heli Chatelin 'African races'. This work by Chatelin provides an early account of the Hamitic Hypothesis as the foundation for racial theory. His work was also referenced by

Charles Seligman who based some of his scientific assumptions on the work of Chatelin.

5. Sergi Guiseppe 'The Mediterranean Race: A Study of the Origins of European Peoples'. A fundamental resource for academic like Seligman and the general proliferation of the idea of humanity not originating from one source. Guiseppe would provide a scientifically rigorous theory for the development of different races traced in part due to phenotype. It would provide a scientific reasoning for why 'all God's creatures' could not be treated equally because they were in fact not the same.
6. Various news media articles

At the centre of the analysis will always be the understanding that ultimately the knowledge of the Hamite infused colonial practice and present ideas on race. Written text is an example for the institutionalised social practice that has been informed by the knowledge system. The analysis of the key texts then is to show how discourse is embedded and has created at present the notion of the indigenous and the non-indigenous in Mali.

LIMITATIONS AND FEASIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH

Accessibility to some of the texts needed for the analysis as well as language were limitations to the research. Since Mali is a former French colony some of the texts, both primary and secondary, are written in French. I was already in position of having a basic understanding of French through my undergraduate studies. The importance of understanding French allowed me to thoroughly interrogate the material as it was written instead of simply through translated text where the meaning could have been lost or misconstrued. I advocated to be further skilled in French so as to adequately carry out the analysis of my chosen texts and through the Centre for Humanities Research I was awarded a research award that covered the cost of additional French lessons. Through those French lessons I become more conversant and knowledgeable in the language since this was necessary skill for my research where there were academic sources in written in French.

As this was a desktop study the research would have been made better by fieldwork and greater use of empirical data. The possibility of being able to interview people living in Mali especially those involved in the violence would have assisted in providing a first-hand account of how the violence in the area has been internalised. Instruments could have been designed to probe further into the way in which Malians view themselves and if they believe the conflict represented a struggle for belonging. However, given the highly volatile nature of the region,

travelling to Mali would not have been possible. Given that the scope of this research is also confined to the parameters of Masters research, further inquiry into questions of citizenship, migration and competition over state and political resources could not be accommodated. These parallel lines of enquiry can perhaps be best undertaken at the doctoral level.



CHAPTER 3

AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF MALI

INTRODUCTION

The present-day violence in Mali is best understood within the context of its history. This chapter will provide a succinct overview of the country's history with a focus on its geography, socio-political landscape and demography. It is a succinct abridged version of the country's history which describes firstly the imperial history of Mali, secondly the people of Mali with a focus on the dominant social and ethnic groups, colonialism and its effect on the Tuareg and concludes with a brief description of the modern socio-political Malian landscape.

Since this research is focused on the historical roots of a present day issue a focus on the formation of Mali is a way to glean key points in its history that may have aided the creation of certain ideas, ideals, traditions and practices that may continue to hold prominence or sway in modern Mali.

It is important to note that precolonial Malian society was not necessarily a homogenous and well-defined society, and that warring factions and contested power structures were part of society (Lecocq, 2010). For example, in the early 15th century, led by Sunni Ali, the Songhai sought to expand west from their capital, Gao, further into the Niger Delta to incorporate them into their empire (Hegazi, et al., 2021). Similarly, In Timbuktu they clashed with Tuareg confederations who had previously captured the town from the Mali empire in the early 15th century, and they also engaged in a bloody conflict with the Fulani in their conquest of Jeune (Molenaar, et al., 2019). For the most part it was the Songhai who dominated these confrontations and ultimately won control of a vast expanse of territory that they maintained for more than a century (Lecoq, 2010; Molenaar et al, 219). The Songhai were able to do so in the aftermath of the fall of Mali Empire and during a power vacuum (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). For Mali its pre-colonial legacy power structure was characterised by horizontal relations of competition between ethnicities and tribes such as in the case of the Tuareg and the Songhai (Lecocq, 2010). Additionally, they also experienced vertical competition struggles between different castes within the tribal group (Lecocq, 2010). For Mali the introduction of the French colonial style of governance meant that tribal and ethnic configurations were reordered and thus

it altered the horizontal and vertical tribal hierarchies. This created a dual or bifurcated system of administration that incorporated chieftaincies at local level (Mamdani, 1996). As described in the section on the Mande and the Bambara, hierarchies were exceptionally important, and it was the same within the Tuareg community. The attempted co-existence of both French civilian rule and various traditional rule would ultimately lead to a more fractured state.

IMPERIAL MALI

Mali's history is well-documented through oral tradition and by Arabic scholars such as Ibn Khaldun and Ahmad Baba who provide a rich account of the rise of the Malian empire (Lecoq, 2012). It has been documented that out of the fall of the Ghana Empire, Mali arose as a powerful kingdom around the 13th century (MacDonald, et al., 2011, p. 59). Through the consolidation of smaller kingdoms, the Mali Empire was formed and Sundiata Keita widely credited as its founder (Conrad, 2010, p. 17). The imperial years of Mali were marked by great expansion and the establishment of some of the country's most well-known sites (Conrad, 2009). The importance of the imperial history of Mali cannot be overstated as its rich history has been used to further the political agendas of various regimes and to create a sense of an illustrious and golden past (Hegazi, et al., 2021). This is none the more evident than in the story of Sundiata Keita which is held up as an origin tale of sorts for Modern Mali (Conrad, 2010).

The oral tradition of Sundiata (Sunjata) Keita is an epic tale of the creation of the Mali Empire which has been co-opted into the national narrative of present-day Mali (MacDonald, et al., 2011). The long history of changing kingdoms has played an important role in the creation of a national identity for modern Mali and which in some ways has, perhaps inadvertently, served to prop up certain groups (Lecoq, 2010). The intertwining of the rich history of the country with its modern persona was in many ways a tool to create a more cohesive national identity in the aftermath of colonisation, however its emphasis on the Mande and Bambara peoples is perhaps one of the clearest signs of the trouble to come with competing identities within the country (Lecoq, 2010).

Following the decline and fall of the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire was established, and its eventual decline ushered in a new era of occupation by its neighbours most notably Morocco in the mid-15th century (Lecoq, 2010). Out of this came the various smaller kingdoms of the Mande and the Bambara (Conrad, 2010).

THE PEOPLE OF MALI

The Mande and Bambara are ethno-linguistic groups found in Mali and within the broader West African region. The Bambara or *Bamana* are defined as a linguistic group linked to the Mande linguistic family, as a social group and as a term to refer to former soldiers resisting Islamic rule (generally seen as pagans) and as a general term for so called southerners (people in the south of Mali) (MacDonald, et al., 2011). The complexity of defining who and what the Bambara are was explored in great length on the work of anthropologist Jean Bazin who alluded to the convoluted ways in which the Bambara draw their identity (Bezin, 2015). Under colonial rule the Bambara would also variously be described as an ethnic group or tribe in addition to being a linguistic and socio-religious grouping (MacDonald, et al., 2011). The Bambara are one example of the complicated ways in which a group and its criteria for belonging are defined.

One of the progenitors of the modern conception of the Bambara was the French colonial ethnographer and administrator Maurice Delafosse who studied the Bambara in his book *Haute-Senegal Niger*. According to Kevin Macdonald and Francois Richard (2011) Delafosse relied excessively on colonial documents and was one of the leading voices in pushing for a Bambara ethnic group based on these colonial sources. In early works such as in *Histoire de Bambara* published in 1942, the Bambara are characterised as uncivilised pagans, the antithesis of the 'lighter-skinned' Tuareg and Peulh counterparts who were deemed not only more civilised but more suitable to rule (MacDonald, et al., 2011).

Delafosse himself would also declare the Peulh to be Hamitic in origin thus proving their superiority. These were the beginnings of racial discord between the various groups in Mali and all predicated on the idea of some being more civilised and thus better suited for governance. In a twist of fate, it would be these traditionally marginalised groups deemed in many ways undesirable that would gain dominance in post-colonial Mali and who would later bemoan the presence of 'foreigners' like the Tuareg (International Crisis Group, 2021, p. 5).

For the Mande people it is the epic of Sundaita or Sunjata that it most closely linked to its identity. Just like the Bambara the Mande are located in the South of Mali and are also viewed partly as a linguistic group that is spread across West Africa (Conrad & Conde, 2004, p. xxvi). If the Mali Empire that began with Sundaita is key to the modern identity of Malians then the Mande as the group from whence Sundaita came is also inextricable from their identity (Conrad & Conde, 2004) The Mande then are viewed as the creators of one of the most powerful

kingdoms in Mali and Africa.

Mande society is especially stratified with a strict hierarchy which includes a noble class consisting of farmers and warriors, a slave group and the Nyamakalaw, a professional class (artists, blacksmiths etc) to which the griot belongs (Conrad & Frank, 1995, p. 67). Some of the splintering of nationalistic groups in modern Mali have been blamed on this rigid adherence to hierarchy by a group who has also dominated post-colonial Malian society. Against the backdrop of the early dominance of the Mande and the Bambara is the rise of the Songhai, who claimed prominence after the fall of the Mali Empire and established its capital in Gao (Hall, 2011)

In the early days of the Songhai empire, it was led by Sunni Ali Beer who took the empire in a more Islamic direction (Hall, 2011). While the Songhai was eventually overthrown by Morocco it nonetheless began an important association with a perceived Arabization of Mali particular with the rise of the Peulh or Fula (Conrad, 2010). This is significant because geography was increasingly being used as a proxy for race: white Arabs in the north (Sahel) and black Africans in the south (Hall, 2011). The Bambara, Mande and Songhai are the 'in' group but what of the out group the Tuareg?

The Tuaregs, a subset of the Berber, live in Northern Mali and have long since argued that they have been under-represented and marginalised by the Malian government. The perceived marginalisation and lack of opportunities led many Tuaregs to seek employment elsewhere and have stoked feelings of discontent that have led to many rebellions (Körling & Hegberg, 2012). The Tuareg have a long and complicated history in Mali which has seen its race and place in the country being questioned. The creation of many of the modern sentiments of the Tuareg are best explained by a parallel discussion of French colonialism and its effect on the Tuareg.

FRENCH COLONIALISM IN MALI

Prior to the French eventually settling in and colonising Mali, the Tuareg held vast tracks of the Sahel Sahara region (Perrin, 2014) However, the dominance of the French meant that the Tuareg, as with the rest of Mali, were eventually forced into submission but not before their protracted struggle against the French incursion divided them social and politically (Perrin, 2014). Scholars such as Andrew Alesbury (2013) argue that it is the very presence of the French that led to the drastic reshaping of Tuareg society and identity. As coloniser it was incumbent on the French to create a stable political set up in its colonies to reach their ultimate goal of

making the colony profitable and beneficial. This meant that dissent had to be quelled and the presence of a war like proud noble people like the Tuareg would not serve the empire well if they could not be brought under control (Alesbury, 2013). In pursuit of these goals the longstanding raiding traditions of the Tuareg were put to an end. This ultimately threatened their socio-economic and political life (Alesbury, 2013).

Crucial to the French way of dealing with the Tuareg was the use and manipulation of its social hierarchy (Alesbury, 2013, p. 109). Fundamental to Tuareg society was its stratification of the social classes which had a rigid social order of the Imajeghen (ruling nobles), Imghad the (vassels), Ineslemen (Islamic clerics), the Iklan (slaves) and the Inaden (artisans) (Alesbury, 2013, p. 109). Each social group earned their keep directly as a result from their social position and the imposition of the French colonial empire would disrupt this hierarchy and its earning potential. Because of the disruption to traditional Tuareg practices it meant that raiding and war could no longer be practised, and thus social standing achieved through that was gone as well as the alliances that it brought (Alesbury, 2013, p. 109). The split among these various Tuareg can also be seen in the factionalism of the later Tuareg rebellions.

The social stratification of Tuareg society was in some ways also a classification by class (Bonte, 1981, p. 36). This is important when considering how identity could be attached to social class i.e society can derive meaning from one's social position. As Bonte notes, each category or class in some way reinforces or reproduces the other categories. It is this classification and recognition that is also reminiscent of Foucault's understanding of subjectivity.

Due to this system of the French, it meant that the Imajeghen as the ruling class were no longer able to maintain the role as protectors and defenders because they were defeated by the French and their position undermined by the French presence (Alesbury, 2013). It is within this fertile ground of social upheaval that the French were able to make the Tuareg more malleable and amenable to their rule.

The French continued to entrench their rule by continuing to bypass the traditional authority and power structure of the Imajeghen and instead recognise the lower social class of the Inselman as 'proper' rulers and bestowed upon them chieftaincies (Alesbury, 2013). Other lower classes were free from paying tax to the nobles and instead had to pay that tax to the French (Alesbury, 2013). Similarly, to the British, the French were able to simultaneously

introduce a tactic of divide and rule which centered power around a base which they could control. The destruction of traditional Tuareg society also meant that lower caste members of Tuareg society were now free to make their own way which included joining the ranks of the French army as paramilitary installations (Alesbury, 2013).

MODERN MALI AND THE TUAREG

In the post-colonial landscape Tuareg increasingly resented their integration into a new Malian state dominated by the southern Bambara ethnic group (Molenaar, et al., 2019). During the factionalism that occurred among the Tuareg during colonisation some Tuareg groups such as the Kel Adagh, unlike the others, did not offer up much resistance to the French and in turn received a relative degree of autonomy in return (Molenaar, et al., 2019). Promises were made to groups like the Kel Adagh that their autonomy would be guaranteed in the new Malian state however these promises were not kept (Molenaar et al 2019; Alesbury, 2013). Instead, the new Malian administration took a more Marxist turn and assessed the set-up of the colonial administration to be feudal and thus they could not honour the promise of autonomous states (Molenaar, et al., 2019).

Upon independence the newly formed Malian state freed the northern Tuareg population of its colonial yoke but retained the colonial chiefs (Molenaar, et al., 2019). Thus, the Malian government abolished the tribe as a political group and instead emphasised the idea of the village as the social and political unit. For the Tuareg this meant that its lowest caste, the Inaden, where seen as the de facto type of social arrangement that the Malian government was trying to create (Molenaar et al, 2019; Alesbury, 2013). These all aided in the furthering of resentment toward outside forces which were seemingly corroding Tuareg culture. What compounded the new mix of formal and tribal political domains was the new order of natural resource governance (Molenaar, et al., 2019) The nomadic Tuareg conception of territory had historically been defined by ideas of mobility and shared, yet strictly governed, access to natural resources among different ethnicities, clans and caste; the new Malian state laws were about to change these beliefs.

What had happened during colonial and postcolonial administrations was that the governance structures were created that linked various groups like the Bambara, Mande, Songhai and Tuareg to their own territorially delineated administrative zones (Molenaar, et al., 2019). In doing so it very clearly linked each region of the country to a specific group as if they were

static entities. The troubles of trying to create a unified national identity in the aftermath of colonisation also proved to reinforce the certain notions about the mythology of former great empires and people, to the denigration of others.

The conflicts that marked post-colonial Malian life were in most instances fought out in a violent manner (including during the various Tuareg rebellions), but also reproduced themselves as struggles over boundary allocation and control of administrative offices (Molenaar, et al., 2019). The Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s and beyond were decidedly marked by race with the Tuareg as the ‘non-black’ waging war against the ‘blacks’ Mali (Hall, 2011). It was geographically represented as war between north and south. It could not be avoiding the racial dimension when the set-up of the Malian state very much identified race and tribe to specific areas.

CONCLUSION

The ongoing conflict in the North is a continued expression of Tuaregs dissatisfaction at the way they have been treated by the Malian state (Körting & Hegberg, 2012). The lack of development policy or focus by the Malian government have been cited as reasons for the Tuareg discontent. However, despite this understanding of the violence it nonetheless does not take into account the historical formation and place of the Tuaregs within the wider Malian context. Lack of economic development and infrastructure is not rigorous enough to explain the depth of discontent and unrest that has plagued the north of the country. This reasoning also does not consider why the Tuaregs as a Berber people were maligned by the post-independence Malian government or why their status as Malians is contested. The fight for a land of their own in the north is also a representation of a broader struggle for nomadic peoples to claim an area for their own since land is seen as a physical representation of citizenship and history. As Mamdani (2001) has noted the question of who belongs and who does not speak to larger issues of citizenship. This points to how one is perceived and categorised that will determine if one ‘belongs’.

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

The starting point for this research is that it does not assume that identity as presently expressed in Mali is a given. In other words that the way in which social categories are assigned in Mali is a genuine reflection of the natural state of the persons assigned to these categories. This is to show that the way in which people are viewed is crafted or constructed through a specific social process, as described by Foucault. The research then is focused on the mode of construction. The process of this formation is attributed to the Hamitic Hypothesis as the agent of the construction.

The key concepts of this thesis are race and identity. Power and knowledge are the mechanisms by which these two concepts have evolved, and which will provide the overarching theoretical framework for interpreting how the Hamitic Hypothesis created the identity of the non-believing Tuareg. The Hamitic Hypothesis within the context of this thesis is used to explain the complex process of identity formation and how this relates to violence and conflict. In drawing on Michel Foucault, I will illustrate the link between knowledge and action and will draw on the work of Antonio Gramsci to illustrate how knowledge is upheld and proliferated by power. I will also use Edward Said to show the practical effects of an enduring inherited knowledge system. To do this I will firstly provide a brief history of the Hamitic Hypothesis as a form of colonial knowledge and then provide a detailed description using Foucault and Gramsci of how the Hamitic Hypothesis can be thought of as an enduring inherited knowledge system. This will be contrasted with the similar example of Orientalism as explored in the work of Edward Said.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS

Understanding that what we believe may be constructions can be placed within the ambit of social constructionism. Social constructionism argues that there are no essences inside people that make them what they are (Burr, 2015). This would be to contradict the very nature of the Hamitic Hypothesis which is based on the understanding that the essence of a person is clearly shown in distinct racial classification. Though difference in phenotype may be observable and

tangible it does not necessarily relate to constituting the nature of the person. However, as the thesis aims to prove, the understanding of the Hamite as a distinct and superior race in Africa has become accepted and has led to social practice that reifies this understanding. Authors such as Edward Said have taken the ideas of authors such as Michel Foucault and used them to interrogate established concepts and ideas.

Said in 'Orientalism' describes how the notion of orientalism has continued to persist as an example of hegemony (Said, 1979, p. 5). Of critical importance for Said was showing that the internalisation of the concept of orientalism was happening in tandem with the process of hegemony (Said, 1979). It is through hegemonic practices that certain ideas could be allowed to flourish, dominate and be accepted as common knowledge. In a similar manner to Said this thesis also makes the argument that it is through hegemony that concept of the Hamite has persisted. What is crucial for this argument is that it recognised that the word Hamite may have fallen out of favour in our lexicon, its ideas however continue to persist. That is to say, the idea of a Euro African or white African race exists in Africa and the idea is that they do not belong.

Said outlines a methodology in 'Orientalism' which seeks to identify key texts which speak to the establishment and institutionalisation of the idea and practice of orientalism (Said, 1979). The point for Said was to show that it is not just in academic texts that knowledge is passed and created but it is in all canon, academic and the non-academic, that we have the proliferation of ideas. These ideas would be disseminated to the public on a large scale through books, laws, educational texts, songs and the like. Said identifies the seminal works that had a hand in forming the idea of orientalism.

Said drew upon Foucault heavily in his work 'Orientalism'. In Orientalism Said explains how the idea and practice of orientalism was established, how it became entrenched and how it persists in modern day. He explores orientalism as a dominating structure that has direct influence and bearing for what is geographically known as the Orient (Said, 1979, p. 3). For Said was using Foucault's understanding of knowledge creation as the source for directly influencing what we believe to be true and then acting in accordance with those views (Said, 1979). Said uses Foucault's 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' and 'Discipline and Punish' to identify orientalism. He does this to show that orientalism is a discourse (as Foucault would describe it) that European culture has managed, produced, to create an orient of a specific social, cultural, political, ideological and imaginative understanding (Said, 1979, p. 3). Said thus interrogated the authoritative position of orientalism. However, what use is Foucault in

understanding the concept of knowledge?

The Foucauldian understanding of discourse, subjectivity and power is explained in his works such as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and *The Subject and Power*. Foucault emphatically stated that he was not providing an analysis of power rather he was providing an account of how the subject is created (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). How the subject is created describes the process of knowledge creation i.e the creation of the subject explains the foundations of our beliefs about the subject (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). To attain power, one must rely on and use knowledge and it is power that keeps reproducing knowledge for its own purposes (Foucault, 1982, p. 783). For Foucault power is everywhere, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth (Foucault, 1984, p. 54).

Instead of viewing power as an act of coercion, an instrument wielded to bring people into submission *a la* John Kenneth Galbraith, for Foucault it is instead an embodiment of a way of thinking and being (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2018, p. 173). Unlike the historic explanation of power as espoused by Max Weber that power is the ability to exercise one's will over other, Foucault takes an approach that power is ubiquitous and not just vested in the political arena (Foucault, 1982, p. 788). It is in every aspect of our lives and it depends on our perception and understanding of life. Although Foucault stated that his work was not in fact an exposition of power rather an analysis of how human beings become subjects, it is a process that involves power and knowledge (Foucault, 1984).

To do this Foucault introduces an analysis of history through different modes by which our society has objectified itself and turned itself into subjects (Foucault, 1982, p. 777) Thus, in sum to interrogate the very nature of the potency and importance of the Hamitic Hypothesis it must be necessary to analyse, describe and explain how the Hamitic Hypothesis came to embody certain ideas about race and power. Therefore, it takes knowledge and power to create the subject that then becomes the object of our study, focus and being.

While the subject is what is under interrogation for Foucault it is the concept of power/knowledge or *savoir/pouvoir* that is the main unit of inquiry in Foucault's research (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2018). For some like Bertrand Russell power is reduced to a quantitative measure, simply the ability to achieve your desires and that of others which therefore makes you more powerful, a similar sentiment to that of Weber (Russell, 1986, p. 20). These definitions focus on the aspects of power as rule and domination, the control over people to act

in accordance with your wishes (Lucas, 1986). However, for some like Hannah Arendt power does not only live in the exercising of one's will over others or the extent to which you can influence other's actions instead power is made manifest in political institutions, it is therefore collective action not coercion (Arendt, 1986). Arendt's thesis as expressed by Jurgen Habermas in *Communications concept of power* shifts the needle perhaps closer to what Foucault had in mind in his conception of power (Habermas, 1986). For Foucault power was in the everyday power, it is 'not given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised and that is only exists in action (Foucault, 1982, p. 777).

However, if power is everywhere how is it sustained? For Foucault this is of course done through the creating of the subject (Foucault, 1982). The process of identifying, categorising and naming oneself as subject. This process continues in perpetuity (unless interrupted by another process of the subject). The sometimes-dense writing of Foucault does not easily lend itself to the creation of an analytical framework however Edward Said applies the rigours of Foucauldian thought to his exploration of Orientalism and he does so with the added benefit of including Antonio Gramsci. In *Orientalism* Said attempts to show the field's shape and internal organisation by highlighting its pioneers, authorities, seminal text, dogmatic ideas, standout figures and adherents and its current authorities (Said, 1979). In this way he highlights a collective body of texts that have shaped the knowledge that is orientalism. Orientalism denotes the presumption of superiority by the Global North through a stereotyped lens of what the 'Orient' is. For Said, Orientalism is thus an academic pursuit, a worldview and a tool for social and cultural domination (Said, 1979, p. 25). Said meets Foucault in his assertion that there is no one objective truth or reality and Said's exploration of orientalism is an attempt to show how the identity of the 'oriental' was shaped from one supposed objective truth and imposed on another creating a new 'objective truth'. In offering a critique of the essentialist narratives from the Global North (or the West) that gave rise to the orient and the oriental, Said upholds the Foucauldian understanding of creating the subject by explaining its persistence in history through the idea of hegemony. The very idea of Orientalism is categorised by Said as a hegemonic discourse, a story or system of knowledge that is upheld as truth. Applying Said's approach here provides a practical way of interpreting Foucault however it is through Gramsci that the mechanism by which knowledge is institutionalised is truly crystalized.

Antonio Gramsci, the oft-cited Marxist philosopher introduced to us the concept of hegemony in his collection of writing entitled the Prison Notebooks, written from his jail cell (Heywood,

1994). The Gramscian understanding of hegemony was influenced by two points the first being the debates surrounding the strategy for the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the socialist state and the second came from the writings of Nikolai Machiavelli (Cox, 1994, p. 49). Gramsci drew upon the debates of the Bolsheviks to describe hegemony as that which was exercised by workers over allied classes and that which would become a dictatorship when exercised over enemy classes (Cox, 1994). Here Gramsci was drawing on the Marxist idea of the 'third power' or the 'invisible power' which describes the pervasive power of ideology, values and beliefs (Heywood, 1994., p. 85).

Gramsci identified the capitalist state as being comprised of political society and civil society (Gramsci, 1971). Political society rules through force and civil society rules through consent (Heywood, 1994). Gramsci's conception of civil society is different from the modern understanding of civil society which understands it to be a sector which is comprised of various voluntary and non-governmental organisations (Gramsci, 1971, p. 445). However, for Gramsci this was not the way in which he saw civil society. Instead, civil society was the public space where trade unions and political parties gained concessions from the (bourgeois) state (Heywood, 1994, p. 100). It was in this sphere that beliefs and ideas were shaped and where the bourgeois hegemony could be reproduced in cultural life through outlets such as media, universities, and religious institutions (Heywood, 1994, p. 101). This leads to the qualifying statement by Gramsci that civil society is the space that rules through consent (Heywood, 1994). Civil society then represents the space in which ideas can be created and reinforced by a social elite who controls the spaces for learning and information dissemination. The information is filtered from the elite to the proletariat (working class) and this ensures an even spread of the information. It thus becomes 'common sense', knowledge that just 'is' because it has always been there and is thought to be true.

In a turn to the coercive and forceful nature of power, Gramsci concludes that it is only when these ideas and beliefs are not followed that the state will follow through in its exercise of power and physical force to make sure that those ideas are adhered to (Gramsci, 1971, p. 506). Gramsci echoes Foucault here in that power, albeit forceful, physical power, is derived from knowledge or ideas. Power is then constituted by ideas and knowledge and importantly it is expressed through consent rather than through force or at least initially. Power is ideology for Gramsci, and it is ubiquitous for Foucault. Drawing on both we can view power both a concept based on a system of ideas and as an omnipotent presence. The Hamitic Hypothesis is thus understood

to be an example of that idea or knowledge that constitutes power and that which allows for the consent of the exercise of power. In providing an analysis of power through hegemony not coercion Gramsci relates the power dynamics found in society (and politics) to the dynamics of society, in a similar way to Foucault (Daldal, 2014).

In drawing on these authors an analytical framework for understanding the Hamitic Hypothesis begins to emerge. It represents the ubiquitous, all-encompassing knowledge of the colonial era with its place as the knowledge *de jour* for understanding and conceptualising race and people. It was established and remained the preeminent guiding principle for the colonial authority bringing into being a subject (the colonised). It's move from elite scientific knowledge to common knowledge of the people was facilitated through the sustained efforts of various forms of written and verbal communication.

Just as Said put it so logically and coherently in 'Orientalism' this thesis highlights the scope for the Hamitic Hypothesis, through the mechanisms for its development, structures for its enduring popularity and presents its current formulation. Discussing the scope of the Hamitic Hypothesis will outline the origin and extent of the Hamitic discourse. This will be identified through the analysis of the work by Charles Seligman, Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon. These authors are important because they mapped, physically and figuratively, the terrain that would become known as the home of the Hamite. In their documentation of North Africa, they had already begun classifying the people which they encountered and were using terms such 'Hamitic' in that description. The explorations of these thinkers both came before and during the start of colonialism proper and coincided with the age of scientific exploration and discovery.

What each experienced and noted in their respective historical and academic works would not be relegated to the annals of travel romanticism instead it would be read alongside later more scientific texts that would expound upon the idea of separate (and superior) races in Africa.

CONCLUSION

There is a specific process of identity formation in Mali that has its roots in deep and ongoing historical legacies. Specifically, these identities are formed through the continuous entrenching of particular ideas and notions around race that become of the social make up. These ideas do not exist in a vacuum, and it will be shown that they have had real, tangible effects on the way

in which states in Africa were governed. While not necessarily a creation of the colonial project the Hamitic Hypothesis came into its own during the colonial period and its ideas had a lasting impact on the way in which colonial subjects would be governed. Through Foucault we can begin to sketch an idea of how the Hamitic Hypothesis created the subject, the various people and groups in Mali, and how the knowledge created gave power to those in charge and through the exercise of that power gave legitimacy to the knowledge that created the subject. In his description of the ubiquitous nature of power/knowledge, Foucault presents an understanding of this phenomenon as being part of our lived experience not merely a force that is enacted upon us or on behalf of us. In a similar way Gramsci describes power through the lens of hegemony, the cultural and moral leadership of an elite group over their perceived lesser counterparts. For Gramsci, it is not merely brute force that will ensure the success of a regime but rather it is the facilitation of beliefs and ideas throughout every sector of society that will ensure that a certain status quo exists. Here both Foucault and Gramsci are in conversation with one another because they both recognise the power of the ideas or knowledge in the creation of those who are 'in' and those that are on the 'outs'.

The use of the Hamitic Hypothesis changed over time but in each substantiation, it gave credence to a set of ideas meant to establish the superiority of one race over another. Its roots in biblical knowledge was not enough to have it discarded during the Age of Enlightenment, as the folly of the overly religious, instead its ideas melded with the modern moment and created the scientific reinterpretation of the Hamite. This version of the Hamite probed the idea of the hierarchical nature of society through scientific inquiry that would come to recognise the Hamite as a special class of person, a good example of the Foucauldian process of creating the subject. The subject springs into being through concerted efforts at knowledge creation and seeps into our consciousness as being true because we can now easily identify said subject. In placing the foundation of the reinvented Hamite at the heart of colonial science and government a hegemonic structure then develops around this idea. A structure that sees the reification of the Hamite across political and social institutions.

In the following chapters this reification will be explored to show the movement of the Hamitic Hypothesis as system of knowledge or ideas that has created an idea of race that persists today in Modern day Mali.

CHAPTER 5

HEGEMONISING POWER/KNOWLEDGE: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

The examination of tribal or ethnic conflict has sometimes assumed that these groups are a given in other words that they always were and therefore always will be. An interrogation of the group itself has not always featured in the analysis of the conflict. Some authors who have taken up this line of enquiry (as it pertains to identity in the African context) include Mahmood Mamdani and Achille Mbembe. These authors have taken as the starting point of their analysis, that what appears as tradition (and social status quo) cannot be readily assumed to be so. Instead, an interrogation of the very make up of African society is beneficial to understanding how its socio-political climates are formed. To further reinforce the premise of interrogating what is assumed to be real is the work of philosophers such as Michel Foucault. For Foucault there was a direct link between discourse and power or more broadly between knowledge and power. In later years Edward Said would show in greater detail, drawing on the works of Foucault, how the idea of Orientalism became an entrenched way of living and being.

The lasting impact of inherited knowledge systems can be seen in present day Mali. The most obvious example of this legacy is in the conflict it arouses. Inherited knowledge systems can be described as discourses that influence not only ways of thinking but also relate to the actions that they influence.

The idea of who are what an African (person) is, is perhaps the most pressing and topical issue to emerge in post-independence Africa. Once the colonial power had left and the newly independent state could decide for itself how it would be governed a pressing question that came to the fore was: how do we build national unity? This was important for a number of reasons including the need to cultivate a sense of unity and national pride in the face of decades of colonial segregation, classism and oppression. To ensure success for a coherent and well managed state there needed to be a coherent and well-ordered people living in those states. Following this would then be how to practically express this need for a nation, in other words, how would belonging to the nation (state) be determined? Would it be determined on grounds of tribe, kinship, ethnicity or race and would the categories of the colonial government be used

in the post-independence era? This problem was not easily solved, and each country took its own unique approach to it (Berman, 2010) For example, in Tanzania a source of commonality between people was bred through the use of a common language: Swahili. While in Nigeria, following its independence from the British in 1960, it pursued a federalist route which would accommodate the three main ethnic groups (a follow on from the British colonial classification of the Igbo, Hausa Fulani and the Yoruba as constituting the main ethnic groups of Nigeria) (Njoku, 2019). In the case of South Africa following its first democratic election in 1994 it established a multi-ethnic route of nationalism; trying to celebrate the uniqueness of each racial and tribal group in the country giving itself the name of the ‘rainbow nation’ (Henrad, 2006). While states may have approached the creation of their nation state or nation building differently, they all were centred on the politics of identity or rather how to correctly identify who belonged as members of the state. Mali did not escape this sentiment and it too struggled with forging a shared Malian identity post-independence (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). One of its struggles was how to reign in the perceived unruly Tuareg of the North. The many rebellions of the Tuareg are evidence enough that this strategy did not work and instead bred further animosity toward the state (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021).

In this chapter I will present formation of the Hamitic Hypothesis as a knowledge that evolved to heavily influence conceptions of race. This will be supported by the analysis of the selected works of Maurice Delafosse, Charles Seligman and Gustav Le Bon, Heli Chatelin and Sergi Guiseppe as examples of how these strong sentiments in Mali were created through concerted academic efforts at producing knowledge on race drawn from the Hamitic Hypothesis. This will be further supported by extracts from media which show the internalisation of race and belonging in modern Mali which follow the same logic of the Hamitic Hypothesis. These extracts will use the framing of creating the subject as espoused by Foucault to show how the Hamitic Hypothesis was engineered and used to create a knowledge system upon which the colonial government thrived. It will further illustrate through the use of hegemony, as described by Gramsci, how this knowledge persisted and filtered into all aspects of life.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS

One of the seminal texts on the origins of the Hamites and of the Hamitic Hypothesis is written by Edith Sanders. In her piece *The Hamitic Hypothesis: its functions and origins in time perspective*, Sanders sets out very clearly how the Hamitic Hypothesis has functioned to create

the idea that 'true' Africans were 'black' and that they were devoid of any civilising features (Sanders, 1969).

The role of religion and religious understanding of the world and humankind played an integral part in the initial understanding and use of the Hamitic Hypothesis (Sanders, 1969). This fact is very clearly laid out in Edith Sanders' piece. According to a biblical understanding of mankind and the world all humankind came from one race. Genesis 8:18-19 states that:

'The sons of Noah who went out of the boat were Shem, Ham and Japheth. (Ham was the father of Canaan). These three were the sons of Noah and from them the whole earth was populated'.

This understanding was to change and to be challenged with the discovery of new and different lands and people (Farelius, 1993). This was especially true of Africa and African peoples. The initial story of the peopling of the world dictated that each son of Noah sought out a specific area of the globe and thus those regions can be recognised to be direct descendants of those sons (Sanders, 1969). The difference of peoples found in Africa was explained in part to their being descendants of Ham and his sons. Ham is noted especially because he is known as the cursed son of Noah. Ham and his four sons Cush, Mizriam, Canaan and Put and their progeny were said to be cursed (Sanders, 1969, p. 527). The curse of Ham as the father of Canaan is stated thusly:

Cursed on Canaan. He will be a slave to his brothers Give praise to the Lord, the God of Shem! Canaan be the slave of Shem! May God cause Japheth to increase! May his descendants live with the people of Shem! Canaan will be the slave of Japheth

(Genesis 9:25-28)

Within the biblical context no reference is made to race or skin tone. According to Sanders (1969, p. 525) it is later in the Babylonian Talmud, a collection of Jewish oral traditions, that race is explicitly read into this. In the Talmud it states that the descendants of Ham are cursed by being black and that Ham is a sinful man and therefore all his progeny would be equally sinful and degenerate (Sanders, 1969, p. 525). Authors such as Eric Williams have been at pains to point out that initial discoveries of new peoples and lands did not immediately result in racist classification or in a racial understanding of this 'other' that they had come into contact with

(Williams, 1945).

Differences in appearance were noted but first contact in William's view was more likely to be devoid of racist connotations that may exist today (Williams, 1945). For authors such as Jordan Winthrop, Eric Williams, Tom Jeannot, Colette Giullaumin and Robert Miles the premise of the argument was to question the origin of 'race' and then to point to a historical formation that ran parallel to the differing conceptions of race. Of crucial importance to these authors is to place an understanding of race within its specific historical context and not to analyse race as naturally occurring. It is then argued that race is a category created out of social and economic imperatives. It is not accepted that race is a category that predates history, i.e. that has always existed. Instead, it is understood that our conception of race and the connotations that we attach to each 'racial' group is cultivated (Williams, 1945). This argument is premised on the following core assumptions:

1. That the initial meeting of European voyagers to Africa (and other parts of the world) were not characterised by racist intention (voyages that set out to immediately colonise based on racial inferiority),
2. The naming of the native people as 'black' spoke to the stark observable differences notwithstanding inherent notions of racial superiority and;
3. The change in attitude toward 'black' people was due to an admixture of special socio-political and economic circumstances that merged understanding of black as inferior and the exploited.

It is further argued that because of this a complex association of social cues or signifiers have been used to mark those deemed as less than or other. The initial conception then of the Hamite as one of the branches of mankind through Noah is supported by these ideas of the first encounter. However, as Sanders (1969, p., 521), would point out this would inevitably change.

As the notion of Hamite persisted so did the expansions of the Hamitic theory and the degree of denigration for blackness which was supposedly the mark of the cursed (Sanders, 1969). Scholars have noted the intense need to continue to exaggerate the story of Ham could have been a way for Israelites to justify their subjugation of Canaan (as the land of the cursed) (Sanders, 1969, p. 522).

The source of the curse was said to be the fact that Ham woke up his father Noah who was drunk, asleep and naked in public to the very fact of his public drunkenness and in fury Noah

cursed his son Ham (Farelius, 1993). The remaining sons of Noah Shem and Japheth were spared the curse because they averted their eyes to their father's nakedness and drunkenness and sought to protect him from shame (Farelius, 1993, p. 109) hence the exultation of all future descendants of these two sons. The link between Africa and Ham was easily discerned here by the acknowledgement that Africa was populated by black people.

RACE AND THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS: CREATING KNOWLEDGE

While this research is focused on identity formation crucial to its study is understanding the place of race. The Hamitic Hypothesis in its formulation has an emphasis on distinct racial groups. These racial groups are the Hamite described as European descendants named Caucasoid and Negroid, the black native counterpart of the Hamite (Farelius, 1993). In the Hamitic Hypothesis the Hamite as descendant of the superior race had a privileged position in society while the Negroid as the inferior race was not afforded the same privileges (Sanders, 1969). The descriptive category of Hamite was used as a racial classification and within the Hamitic Hypothesis this descriptive category found greater meaning (Law, 2009). Through the exploration of the origin of the Hamitic Hypothesis histories past, future and present can be rewritten. This means that a re-interpretation of the concept can be used as befits the needs of the social and political context.

The biblical telling of the Hamitic story is important because it establishes both a religious and scientific origin story for how the world is populated and the racial groups that exist. The initial casting out of Ham as son of Noah is crucial to understanding the mark of shame that would follow the children of Ham and the significance of this race of people in the grand scheme of scientific racial hierarchy (Law, 2009). Early expeditions that encountered native populations used the story of the cursed children of Ham to explain the 'barbarity' of the people they encountered (Farelius, 1993, p. 108). Sanders acknowledges that Hamite was at first associated with 'blackness' since the cursed children of Ham were to be punished for the original sin of exposing their father's nakedness and drunkenness to him (Sanders, 1969, p. 522). Being black was therefore a symbol of the degenerate nature of the Hamite (Sanders, 1969).

The 'Negro' of Africa was thus identified as the cursed descendant of Ham and was associated with an undesirable character (Sanders, 1969, p. 522). The view of the Negro Hamite persisted

well into the 18th century however within the age of Enlightenment that was to follow new conceptions of man's place in the world would be formed that would challenge this idea (Sanders, 1969). More specifically this would be done based on scientific theory and not on religious doctrine. Consequently, new theories about polygenism or the theory of separate races would be developed (Sanders, 1969). The impetus that would drive the change in the Hamitic theory would be the discovery of ancient Egypt and its advancements. The former biblical understanding of race had already proved insufficient and now with the discovery of ancient Egypt presented a new way of trying to scientifically conceptualise race in Africa and beyond. Napoleon's discovery of Egypt and the ensuing scientific inquiry into Egyptian civilisation would yield a new interpretation of the Egyptian as Negroid instead of Negro because they were an advanced African race (Sanders, 1969, p. 525). This was due to the major technological and scientific advancements noted in Egypt that seemed to pre-date those of the ancient Roman and Greek empires (Sanders, 1969). The science of Egypt was studied alongside that of polygenism which posited that because each race group was created separately it also had its own language (Sanders, 1969, p. 526). The Egyptians were identified as belonging to the Coptic group which was Arabic and thus could not then be Negroid (Sanders, 1969). The formation of the Hamite as cursed child was also reformulated biblically in the wake of the discoveries of Egypt since a cursed people could not have produced the marvels of ancient Egypt (Sanders, 1969). Instead, Egyptians were now cast as the children of another of Ham's children named Mizraim and only the children of Ham's son Canaan were to be cursed (Sanders, 1969, p. 526). The Egyptians would then emerge as Hamites otherwise described as Caucasoid, uncursed and the bearer of civilisation in Africa (Sanders, 1969, p. 527). This would then be the basis for the Hamitic Hypothesis: everything of value found in Africa was as a result of the Hamites, a population descended from Europeans (Sanders, 1969).

INSTITUTIONALISING THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS: FRENCH COLONIAL ETHNOGRAPHY AND SEMINAL TEXTS

Texts: Charles Seligman 'Races of Africa' and selected work of Sergi Gusieppe, Heli Chatelin,, Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon

According to Robert Montagne writing in the French Provisional Government Report of 1945 he noted that colonial administration must be the purview of the 'cold reason of specialists' (McDougall, 2017, p. 184). Montagne's view was that to create effective colonial government there needs to be a calculated and rational approach to learning the colony to better administer

it. Some of the disciplines in the social sciences owe their history to this kind of sentiment. As Edward Said has noted anthropologists are the interlocutors of the colonialist and what he and others have since articulated is that words are not just a means of communication but rather that they carry with them a kind of representation of ideas (Said, 1989). Therefore, the language of race as it became entrenched as knowledge and not just colonial jargon is an important aspect in understanding how the Hamitic Hypothesis has influenced identity. This chapter provides an explanation for the enduring legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis, its internalisation and use as fact by analysing the mechanism by which it came to proliferate. It does so by positing that the key mechanism is knowledge production through text (text as a representation of ideas that could be easily disseminated on a mass scale). This chapter identifies key texts from the colonial and post-colonial period to show the trajectory of the Hamitic Hypothesis as scientific knowledge and how this came to be accepted in present day.

When looking at colonialism and more to the point that Montagne made so long ago, it is the ‘cold rational’ minds of specialists and the language of their discipline that has helped to categorise persons, to create the subject and the object of study (McDougall, 2017). This approach informed the way in which France was to govern its territories and inextricably link it with a sort of scientific rationalisation of race, culture and society (Asiwaju, 1978). Works like Charles Seligman’s ‘Races of Africa’ is an archetypical example of a codification and homogenisation of these kind of ideas. In the previous section the history and context of the Hamitic Hypothesis was extensively laid out and an overview of the French style of colonial administration was also described in the previous chapter. The next step is to now explain what role specific texts on race, importantly the Hamitic race, played in this makeup of the French colonial empire. If the previous chapter heled to establish the French empire as relying on race and other social norms to form a hierarchy then this chapter offers a look into how the knowledge systems upon which the hierarchy was built, was constructed.

To begin in earnest the exploration of the influence of the Hamitic Hypothesis in text we begin first with a look at one of the preeminent scientists on race: Charles Seligman. This will be followed by an equally important academic Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon whose work extended well beyond the confined of the university and was used extensively in French colonial Africa.

CHARLES SELIGMAN

Charles Seligman was not the first scholar to discuss race. He followed on from a line of scholars who debated and researched the origins of man, the peopling of the world and the divergence in human appearance. Notable scholars in this regard are Sergi Giuseppe and Charles Darwin for his contribution on evolution which would influence a host of scholars across many different disciplines. Of particular interest to the French was the work of Gustave Le Bon who presented a new and ground-breaking thesis on crowd psychology in the late 19th century (Belmessous, 2005).

For Charles Seligman, his work was based on leading scientific research of the time. And while science moved ahead and dispelled most of the notions upon which Seligman based his work, his ideas continued to endure. The enduring popularity of his thinking is best described by Gramsci who described the ability to maintain power and supremacy through hegemony. This is achieved through (i) domination or coercion and (ii) intellectual and moral leadership (Femia, 1987, p. 25). *Races of Africa* was definitely in the second group. It was a seminal academic text on race which propped up the Hamitic Hypothesis for decades (Law, 2009). Hegemony of this kind works to mold how a person thinks and feels to eventually create a replica of the cultural norms of the time (Femia, 1987). Seligman's work presents a crucial point at which research up to that point could now be properly codified and presented and which could now serve as an intellectual and moral base for the cultural norms of the time. The last revised edition of 'Races of Africa' was published in 1966 and it continued to be published up until 1979 (Law, 2009). Seligman's work served as the intellectual basis upon which domination could rest.

SELIGMAN AND THE HAMITE

Scholars like Seligman who fully embraced the concept of the Hamite and allowed for its designation as fact for their rigorous scientific undertakings to prove it so. In *Races of Africa* Seligman authoritatively asserts that:

Apart from relatively late Semitic influence . . . the civilizations of Africa are the civilizations of the Hamites, its history the record of these peoples and of their interaction with the two other African stocks, the Negro and the Bushman, whether this influence was exerted by highly civilized Egyptians or by such wider pastoralists as are represented at the present day by the

Beja and Somali. The incoming Hamites were pastoral 'Euro-peans'-arriving wave after wave-better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural Negro

Seligman (1939, p. 96)

Seligman's statements were meant to be interpreted as scientific fact however it came after a long process of rearticulating the Hamitic story, one which moved from biblical story to scientific fact. Seligman was perhaps well known for his use of the Hamite and the Hamitic Hypothesis as explanation for the development of Africa, but he was not alone in this. Other scholars such as GWB Huntingford (1966), famous for his work 'The Southern Nilo Hamites' asserted that it was the Hamite's arrival in Africa that began a political and social development on a very large scale (Foster, 1974). Seligman further claimed that the Negroid was simply too agricultural to be responsible for this kind of development. In Seligman's view it was quite clear that Africa was divided broadly into two categories:

Racially Africa may be divided into two portions . . . The northern division is essentially white or light skinned; inhabited by the Hamites and Semites of 'European' type; the southern essentially Negro, with peoples almost everywhere characterised by their dark skin and spiralled hair.

(Seligman 1939, p 97)

Seligman goes further to illustrate how truly pervasive and important the Hamite in Africa is by stating:

To emphasise the importance of the Hamites and the part they played in Africa it is only necessary to refer to the map (Fig 1.) which shows the distribution of languages at present day. It will be seen that Hamitic languages are spoken by people spreading over perhaps one fifth of Africa.

(Seligman 1939, p. 96)

These groups are evidence enough for Seligman that the Hamite is not only alive and well in Africa but their reach is quite extensive. In his assessment of the Tuareg as an example of the Northern Hamite, Seligman shows both the absurdity and the intensity to which he believed his science to be true. The following excerpt from *Races of Africa* shows, in Seligman's own words how difficult it was to differentiate Tuaregs from others (namely the servants and slaves in their

group) in terms of skin colour, yet they were somehow biologically different:

Although the servile class shows no great difference in head-shape, stature, skin colour, hair and the nasal indices do, however, indicate a considerably larger admixture of negro blood, for though the averages do not greatly differ, there is a much greater straddle among the lower class; moreover, the skin is often darker and hair may be frizzly, a character not noted among the nobles.

(Seligman, 1939, p. 147)

In one fell swoop Seligman admits to noticing little to no perceptible differences between the 'dark' lower class and the lighter skinned noble class yet he attests to that very fact based on little more than a perception of slightly darker skin tone. Here Seligman provides an example of dividing practice.

To further expound on the difference between the Hamite and other races in Africa and in fact other races in the world, Seligman leans heavily on proving inherent intellect in the races he identifies. Seligman's exposition of the races in Africa can be described as part of the first step toward making the subject. Firstly, we must subject ourselves to scientific inquiry and then separate ourselves through dividing practices. Seligman's works do both. However, this is not yet evidence of the enduring effect of the Hamitic Hypothesis nor its internalisation. For that we must look more closely at the work of Delafosse and Le Bon. However, before embarking on that journey it is first necessary to look at Sergi Guiseppe, the academic who Seligman drew upon heavily in his work, especially *Races of Africa*. It is important to note how the same knowledge was used and added on to which each new academic or scientist. This contributed to the growing scientific literature that would be used as the burden of proof by society at large that this was in fact true. A crucial component in the establishment of hegemony.

SERGI GUISEPPE AND HELI CHATELIN

Seligman's work was built upon earlier work of Sergi Guiseppe who authored the book '*The Mediterranean Race: a Study of the Origins of European Peoples*'.

It was Guiseppewho made the clear distinction of there being a Hamitic race. For Guiseppe the earliest Europeans originated in the Horn of Africa and then migrated to Europe (Guiseppe, 1901). This created a distinctEuro-African race that was distinct from other races in Africa (Guiseppe, 1901)

Prior to the publication of Seligman's *Races of Africa*, Heli Chatelin in 1894 published his own work entitled *African Races* in which he clearly delineated the idea of the Hamite and in turn furthered the idea of the Hamitic Hypothesis. For Chatelin the Hamitic family in Africa consisted Libyans and Berbers (Imoshags) or western Hamites; the old Egyptians and modern Copts; the Cushites, or Ethiopians; and the Punas, including possibly the Puls or Fulas (Chatelin, 1894, p. 292). Chatelin goes on further to note that Hamitic peoples are usually named as part of the 'white race' but their complexion becomes darker and darker as one proceeds from west to east and south (Chatelin, 1894, p. 293). It is at this point that the Hamite can merge according to Chatelin in the 'typical color of the Negro race' (Chatelin, 1894, p. 293). Although Chatelin does not offer it as a reason, this explanation is useful to describe away black Egyptians as simply darker skinned Hamites (but still Hamites nonetheless) instead of Negoid or Bantu. For Chatelin the Berbers are what he terms 'western Hamites' that:

have a fine physique; well- proportioned, medium-sized, long-headed, as are all Africans, with white though tanned complexion, wavy hair, regular nose, and somewhat receding forehead.

(Chatelin, 1894, p. 6)

This is contrasted with the 'Negro' of the south who instead has darker skin, thicker lips, wider nostrils, and more protruding cheekbones (Chatelin, 1894, p. 291).

Interestingly Chatelin notes that the Kabyles are very blonde and blue eyes and they could easily be mistaken for Vandals and it is these that could be co considered to be the purest Berber type (Chatelin, 1894, p. 293). For Chatelin Berber is simply a nickname given to western Hamites by Arabs. He further attributes the Egyptians to the Hamites as a vestige of great bygone civilisations such as ancient Rome (Chatelin, 1894, p. 293). It is in this description that Chatelin continues the myth of the Berber as fiercely independent, nomadic and individualistic who have now adopted Islam. While attempting to present a scientific account of the races of Africa, Chatelin nonetheless presents an argument that is steeped in the racial overtures of the Hamitic Hypothesis:

Here we have a branch of the white race, naturally the equal of any other, showing no sign of

degeneration, and from the first in contact with the best civilizations, yet proudly stationary on a level of culture but slightly superior to that of the Central African Negro, who for thousands of years has had no civilization within his sight or reach

(Chatelin, 1894, p. 7)

A predecessor to both Seligman and Guiseppe was John Hanning Speke, a British explorer who tried to discover the source of the Nile. Speke could be described as the ‘grandfather’ of the Hamitic Hypothesis (Sanders, 1969, p. 528). During the mid-19th century during his expeditions through the Great Lakes Region of Africa Speke would come to identify the Tutsi as one of the ethnic groups of Rwanda and one which clearly was Hamitic (Sanders, 1969, p. 528). Here Speke’s assumption that the Tutsi were Hamitic was not based on scientific study as was the case with Seligman and Guiseppe. Rather Speke drew his conclusion from a Biblical standpoint. Speke identified the Tutsi as being the descendants of the Biblical figure Ham and he made this on the grounds that the Tutsi had, in his view, a lighter skin tone and other Hamitic like features that differentiated them from their ‘Bantu’ Hutu counterparts (Sanders, 1969). While all three of these prominent figures espoused an idea of the Hamitic race, they did not have the same justification for their claims. To understand the distinction between these justifications one must study the biblical understanding of Ham as crucial to the development of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The biblical interpretation of the Hamite provides an overview of an earlier more elaborate Hamitic theory. However, if one were to explain how the work of Guiseppe and Seligman could possibly take hold one must also look at the structure of the colony that allowed these ideas to flourish and seep into ‘civil society’ as Gramsci terms it (Gramsci, 1971).

According to Marshall-Fratani (2006, p, 13) biological definitions and understandings of race are what the colonial power used to subjectify the ‘native’. The designation of the authentic inhabitants has a twofold approach to identify firstly, that of binary biological definitions of race such as black and white and secondly internal ethnic categories that are influenced by normative classifications and social dynamics (Marshall-Fratani, 2006, p. 14). This is another example of the creation of the subject by study and dividing practice.

While the first identifier of authenticity is perhaps rooted in a colonial understanding the second refers to taught experiences of race and ethnicity that has been informed by practice

and custom. In other words, people have been acting in a certain way toward each other based on normative assumptions of races in relation to who belongs, who does not and who can govern. It is argued that this normative assumption of race (and belonging) is informed by perceptions that there are some individuals who are superior. These same normative assumptions fit well with the colonial administration and ideas of biological race. This meant that the colonial administration could build upon pre-existing normative ideas of ‘belonging’ and within colonial law divided the colony according to the native ethnic groups, that is, groups they thought were the original inhabitants of the area and part of the Negro class (based on biological features) and the settler races (Mamdani, 2020). In this way the start that people like Guiseppe and Seligman had made in classifying races would now be made practical in the lives of everyday people. The cementing of these kinds of ideas is found best in the work of Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon. Both were academics and involved in colonial administration. Their work was directly used by the French government (either commissioned or used after the fact) to inform local colonial administrators and the broader French colonial empire on how people should be understood and catalogued. A furthering of hegemony and the establishment of that ubiquitous power that Foucault warned was everywhere.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SELIGMAN, GUISEPPE AND CHATELIN

In an even longer view of the construction of race and its primacy of place in our understanding, one can look at the early work of scholars like Winthrop Jordan. In this exposition of the first encounters of the English in Africa Jordan presents an argument that sees the evolution of how the African was perceived. The point of departure for this was crucially that, the first encounter with Africans was not immediately viewed as an interaction with a racially inferior group. Instead through a process that involved contributions of religion, social values and scientific inquiry the African came to embody a certain set of characteristics. However, despite these later ~~and~~ associations of Africans and their way of life it was not yet expressed as a necessity to subjugate merely based on these associations.

Instead, the Negro as identified by the English would come to embody a new identity that was marked by its economic usefulness. So, while early understanding of the peopling of the world would not dictate its understanding in purely racist terms it has nonetheless resulted in the racial partitioning of the world. As Jordan (1968) points out it is through the confrontation of what certain ideas meant that lead to the initial re-imagining of what people and their

appearance represented. Jordan's arguments echo that of Sanders in the importance with which religious understandings had in the formation of ideas. However, as Sanders would also point out this would change given new social inquiry which challenged the role of the Church as the pre-eminent source of knowledge. What the religious view of the time did was to create early traditions of associating blackness with sinful behaviour. As Jordon (1968) has highlighted the connotations of blackness as evil and degenerate behaviour made black people the physical embodiment of this and therefore also evil or cursed. Ham as the father of the sons who populated the areas of Africa and Southwest Asia then also found justification in the bible for the resultant cursed populations. Black people or people in Africa were therefore according to their physical attributes classified as Hamites since they were descendants of Ham.

A few decades later at the beginning of the 20th century, Seligman's *Races of Africa* would build upon this sentiment. In a similar manner to Chatelin, Seligman sought to provide a comprehensive scientific analysis of African races. The enduring legacy of *Races of Africa* cannot be overstated. It was only in 2018 that a library bearing Charles Seligman's name at the London School of Economics was renamed to the Old Anthropology Library (O'Byrne, 2019). While none can suggest that Seligman's work has remained in circulation and use in the present day it is nonetheless interesting that a man who championed such a controversial notion as the Hamitic Hypothesis legacy continued to endure such that he was still being honoured up until 2018.

As early as 1913, Seligman was already writing extensively on the Hamitic Hypothesis. In a paper entitled *Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* published in 1913, Seligman notes that he and his wife, on behalf of the French colonial administration in the Sudan, collected physical material from the inhabitants of the region and came to realise that they were neither Negro nor Islamic in origin (Seligman, 1913, p. 595).

Given the collection of more evidence from Egypt and North-eastern Africa, Seligman goes on to state that what is present in these areas is the Hamite. The key feature for Seligman is that Hamitic languages are spoken in far greater number in the North of the continent, as borne out by the fact that most Hamitic people live there (Seligman, 1939). Besides attributing the features of the Hamite in much the same manner as Chatelin, Seligman goes one step further by inferring from more warlike, 'progressive' tribes who are mostly Negroid also contain an 'drop' or element of Hamitic blood (Seligman, 1939). For this, Seligman offers up the Zulu of South Africa as a key example. What is interesting here is that it seems as though even the example

of the stereotypical Negroid phenotype, as described by Seligman and Chatlein, is present in the Zulu, their development still cannot be ascribed to themselves. For Seligman he easily identifies the area between the Red Sea to the Nile as the home of the Hamite thus relegating any other Egyptian outside of this area as some type of Negroid.

From Chatelin to Guisepe to Seligman, these academic works were becoming the cornerstone on which racial theory of the time was being built. It created a clear framework within which to understand race, and which ultimately influenced the way in which people thought and acted. This is the key feature of hegemony. The move to this kind of racial thinking was not predicated upon brute force but rather the public was swayed by the strength of the argument, which in turn was meant to be supported by accurate science. The propping up of the legitimacy of this kind of racial thinking was further supported by Seligman's later work *Races of Africa*. In this book Seligman boldly asserts that the 'civilisation of Africa are the civilisations of the Hamite' (Seligman, 1939, p. 85). As part of the so-called Northern Hamites, Seligman sees it of great importance to emphasise that generally Berbers have a light skin tone (Seligman, 1939, p. 114). It is only when it is exposed to the sun that it becomes darker and therefore, they must not be confused with the Negroid or Bantu groups (Seligman, 1939). In much the same manner as his earlier work on the matter, Seligman points to the size of the head (cranium) and physical features as indisputable evidence of the European influence on the Hamite (Seligman, 1939, p. 114).

As Edith Sanders (1969) described, the shift from biblical definitions of the peopling of the world to scientific ones, did not in fact change its underlying logic. It merely translated the justification into the language of the time. With the hegemony of the Hamitic idea now firmly established at this point the practice of divide and rule based on this was implemented. This was not merely in the example of the colony but also in the more generalised dividing practices of the time, which was most notably that black was an indication that one would not be capable of much.

Hegemony as exercised through the 'coercive machinery of the state' (Femia, 1987). Involves the use of a collection of 'machinery' notably a collection of religious, educational and civil society institutions (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2018). These institutions work together to shape how people function. This is in a similar manner to how Foucault describes power being derived from specific knowledge systems. Gramsci clearly understood civil society as a kind of overarching ideological framework that creates specific modes of thought. Seligman's work

was therefore critical to establishing a framework on understanding race. Prior to the publication of *Races of Africa*, Maurice Delafosse the French colonial ethnographer and administrator published *Haut-Senegal-Niger* in 1912 which described the Sahel region as being occupied by Berbers, Arabs and Moors and in particular having mixed races of which the Fula were one. The Songhai are described as ‘negro’ (Delafosse, 1912). In France ethnographic research was central to colonial administration. One of the best-known colonial ethnographers-cum-administrator was Maurice Delafosse who established the *Institut ethnographique international de Paris* in 1910 (Ginio, 2002, p. 338). Delafosse and Seligman were instrumental in creating the kind of ideological framework as described by Gramsci.

MAURICE DELAFOSSE AND GUSTAV LE BON

In trying to get a better picture of how the Hamite actively created the subject it is again worth noting that Delafosse is another one of those academics who used and added onto the existing body of literature on race and the Hamite. Driving home the point even more about the everyday effect of the idea of the Hamitic Hypothesis is the use of Delafosse’s ideas by science in *Races of Africa*. Seligman explicitly draws upon the work of Delafosse, citing *Haute-Senegal Niger* amongst the key works he used. It constitutes a continual flow of information from colonisation to more modern conceptions of race. The expressions of race in the colony found legitimacy in the work Maurice Delafosse and of Seligman. As a colonial administrator and ethnographer, Delafosse’s work would have had legitimacy in that it was grounded in practical experience.

Seligman draws upon Delafosse for his chapters that deal with the ‘Negro’. In his other work *Les noires de l’Afrique* Delafosse makes clear that the subject of the book is the ‘black African’ but does offer this insight into the other races that may live in Africa:

There will be no question, therefore, of the peoples of the white race who, either in antiquity or since, have played such an important role in the development of North Africa, and whom we find to-day, more or less mixed and transformed, scattered from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean and from the shores of the Mediterranean to the southern limits of the Sahara: ancient and modern Egyptians, Phoenician and Punic peoples, Libyans or Berbers, Arabs and Moors. More precisely, no mention will be made of them except in the measure of their influence on the progress of Negro societies, an influence which has often been considerable.

(Delafosse, 1912)

Although reticent to focus too much on the other races in Africa, Delafosse nonetheless makes clear that there is a race of people in Africa that has wielded extensive influence over the darker skinned Negro population.

Delafosse's career began as a colonial administrator in the Ivory Coast where he wrote his scholarly work that would later win him esteem (Conklin, 1997). He would return to Paris to teach African languages and history at the Ecole des Langues Orientales and the Ecole Coloniale (Conklin, 1997). What Delafosse taught was an amalgam of what he had learned in his travels across Africa. It rested upon the fact that Africans were in fact different to Europeans however Delafosse was at pains to emphasise that they were not necessarily inferior (Conklin, 1997). Together with *Haut-Senegal-Niger, Les civilisations négro-africaines* published in 1925 were two of the key works of Delafosse.

This work by Delafosse was considered by some to be the founding text of French africanisme or African studies (Dulucq, 2018). Africanisme was a vast subject area that was more or less interdisciplinary in nature (Dulucq, 2018). In *Haut-Senegal-Niger* Delafosse described the people and culture of this region of Africa, most notably that of the Fula people whom he described as light-skinned people of Judeo-Syrian origin (Dulucq, 2018). It would go on to describe the customs, history and ethnology of this region of Africa. Delafosse led a charge of young ethnologists in the early 20th century who were intent on using ethnography to provide a more scientifically relevant study of Africa (Sibeud, 2012).

The rise of Delafosse's work as central to colonial administration was perhaps in part due to his association with Francois Colzel, who replaced William Ponty as the head of Upper Senegal-Niger (Conklin, 1997). Colzel as governor in the region marked a shift in colonial practice as Colzel was deeply interested in studying the customs of the local people and established the Comité d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'AOF, whose objective was to promote and publish research on the history of West African peoples and their civilizations (Conklin, 1997). As an expert in African history, Delafosse was appointed as director of political affairs under Colzel. By this time Delafosse's works were widely read and disseminated and he sought to educate policy makers and the public (Conklin, 1997). Key to this stance was Delafosse's assertion that colonial subjects need not be ruled through direct contact but instead could be ruled through indigenous political structures (Conklin, 1997). This move of Delafosse is a clear melding together of civil society institutions described by Gramsci to create hegemony. Delafosse made use of both the educational institutions he worked in along

with the bureaucratic and civil ones to extend a particular kind of knowledge to the general public. It matters not here what Delafosse's intention was i.e if he meant to do this out of a place of racism or not, but it matters instead that this admixture of institutions was able to create a preferred set of norms and standards for governance in the French colonies.

Firstly, Delafosse through his research was able to establish a body of work that was deemed to be an accurate representation of the world (or at least of Africa) and this afforded him the legitimacy to speak and teach on the subject. This first step is the phase of scientific inquiry in the making of the subject as described by Foucault. While not his intention, the work of Delafosse would inform the dividing practices of the colony. As Conklin (1997) points out, Delafosse's work went the way of many such academics who work in the service of the state: only those parts deemed necessary were used. This meant that the Colonial Ministry only listened to the parts of his advice that fit in with the own political and economic objectives. As described earlier in this thesis that objective was in large measure simply to maximum extraction.

Despite this, Delafosse's work on the peoples of French West Africa were instrumental in describing how the colonial empire should proceed in its governance over them. A crucial point of Delafosse's work, especially in Haute-Senegal-Niger was that African people as a whole should be understood as different to Europeans but not inferior. To make governing them easier and simpler it would make sense to use their own socio-political structures than direct French rule (Asiwaju, 1978). While Delafosse may have been noble in this idea it nonetheless presented an opportunity for the French empire to continue to exert extensive control by using local power structures and elites for their own purpose. However, it must be noted that much of Delafosse's work drew upon pre-existing ideas of the people and customs of the area must notably by such scholars as Ibn Khaldun, who wrote extensively on the Berber peoples, including the Tuareg of Mali (Conklin, 2013).

Khaldun would note that to assert that being black was as a result of a curse was wholly incorrect (Conrad & Frank, 1995). Khaldun was writing in the 14th century and was already combating the effects of the Hamitic Hypothesis (at this point still in its biblical iteration). In his extensive work Khaldun also chronicles the early history of the Malian empire and which scholars such as Delafosse drew upon (Austen and Jansen, 1996). Khaldun, however, was not the only preeminent scholar to tackle the issue of race. Ahmad Baba was a prolific Islamic scholar from Mali who authored over 50 works (Jeppie, 2008, p.10). Baba contributed

massively to the formation of knowledge on the continent and very clearly stood against the prevailing idea of the time that blackness and slavery were one and the same, in fact part of the Hamitic Hypothesis. Baba in *Mi'raj al-su'ud* noted that there is no difference between races (Jeppie, 2008, p. 26). While Khaldun and Baba provided a summary judgement of the Hamitic story simply as myth, the myth of the Hamite continued to prevail in the many centuries after their death (Alesbury, 2013). Khaldun's historical accounts of Africa served to inform the ethnographic research of Delafosse but his dismissal of the Hamite was not enough to stop it from being an important feature of colonial science.

While ethnographers like Delafosse may not have been as explicit as Seligman there were other French racial theorists who were also building a scientifically orientated idea of race. For example, Gustave Le Bon was instrumental in presenting how race should be understood by the French society at large and how it should be viewed and dealt with in the colonies (Conklin, 1997). Le Bon's work influenced leaders to varying degrees and on opposite ends of the political spectrum such as Theodore Roosevelt, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler (Nye, 1973, p. 437). The seminal text for which Le Bon is known for is his publication *The crowd: A study of the popular mind*. Le Bon's work took an even more racialised tone than Seligman's and offered an account of the African as rabid and uncontrollable and which was supported by his interpretation of science (Nye, 1973). The main assertion for Le Bon in this work is that crowds are not the sum of their parts and instead what crowds present are new forms of psychological entities in which characteristics are determined by the racial unconscious of the crowd (Nye, 1973, p. 429).

By this Le Bon meant that a crowd is in of itself a psychological entity which creates its own unconsciousness (Laursen & Møller, 2016). A group of people will gather until they form a crowd, and this crowd will combine in such a way that they will give off an intrinsic influence and character which will become the default behaviour and thinking of the entire group over and above their own thoughts (Nye, 1973). This will result in a group mind being established. This would ultimately result in the individual being entirely surrendered to the group mentality, the non-existence of the individual in the group (Nye, 1973). Of critical importance is that it is within the group entity that the savage or base instincts of the individual will come to the fore and be presented on a larger scale as group thinking or group unconsciousness (Nye, 1973). The crowd therefore can deny or repudiate desire and therefore is like a savage in that it cannot

chose between its desire and rationality (Nye, 1973).

For Le Bon then, as part of a crowd the individual is conscious of the power given to him/her by the number of the group, which can suggest ideas which as a member of the group he/she cannot easily turn down (Betts, 2005). The influence of Le Bon's work on crowd theory and race is that it employed an essentialist thinking. For Le Bon, the individual becomes base because of the crowd, however the degree or level of this baseness is dependent on the individual (Betts, 2005). In other words, the individual themselves will have an intrinsic nature which when used in a group will come to the fore. The group will not entirely create the base nature rather it will use what exists already, but which is usually denied by the individual outside of the group (Laursen & Møller, 2016). The measure of being civilised then was the degree to which the individual could use his/her own thought to repress the savage or base desire. The person who could not repress the urge to transgress was therefore not sufficiently or adequately civilised (Nye, 1973).

Le Bon under the auspices of the French government travelled across North Africa to study the people there (Nye, 1973). From these travels Le Bon produced *La Civilisation des Arabes* and in 1889 presented a report entitled *On the Influence of Education and European Institutions on the Indigenous Populations of the Colonies* to the Congress Colonial Internationale de Paris (Lewis, 1962). In his report Le Bon condemned the idea of assimilation and referred the people in the colonies as inferior and state thusly:

These theoretical views have led us and are leading us more and more to organize our colonies as French departments. It matters little what their population may be: Negroes, savages, Arabs, yellow peoples, should benefit from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and that which we are pleased to call our great principles. All have universal suffrage, municipal councils, arrondissement councils, general councils, tribunals of all degrees, deputies and senators to represent them in our assemblies. Negroes, scarcely emancipated, whose cerebral development corresponds hardly to that of our Stone Age ancestors, have jumped into all the complexities of our formidable modern administrative machines.

Le Bon In Lewis (1961, p 11)

It must be noted that his strong views did receive some pushback and criticism although ultimately it was agreed that the mental capacity of the native in the colony was not at the same

level as the Frenchmen (Lewis, 1962).

In a similar way to Charles Seligman, Gustave Le Bon was another example of where scientific inquiry was used to uphold notions of superiority and which place race indubitably at the centre of the scientific investigation. For Maurice Delafosse his approach was far more tempered than that of Le Bon, but his extensive research on the language, land and people of French West Africa was crucial for French administrators in the governing of the region. His research allowed for the discourse of French moral justness and civil authority to be entrenched in colonial society (Asiwaju, 1978). In building upon the work of earlier theorists such as Sergi Guiseppe, Charles Seligman was able to draw on the work of French ethnographers and his own experience to offer new ways of understanding race in the French empire, and the world as a whole. The interaction of these thinkers and sometimes agents of the French colonial empire, was that they melded together the civil institutions of the state as described by Gramsci.

By harnessing the knowledge of scientific inquiry and research, education and political/government administration a set of clear ideas on race in Africa could be formed. The hegemonic nature of this kind of knowledge system is such that it remained an enduring part of the social milieu long after its proponents has died like Charles Seligman. In Seligman's work the overtones of the Hamitic Hypothesis are clear and it is in the work of Delafosse and Le Bon (and others like them) that the stage was set in the French colonies for this to take hold.

The use of works by Delafosse and Le Bon, who themselves drew upon the works of other, and influenced more, was made all the more pervasive for its use by the French colonial empire. The era of colonialism was one the most important events for the proliferation of the ideas of the Hamitic Hypothesis through its reliance on the expertise of people like Delafosse and Le Bon who themselves relied on the ideas of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The colonial era is viewed as the mechanism but which the hegemony of the Hamitic Hypothesis was established however what was it exactly about French colonialism that allowed that to happen?

The classification of the Tuareg as Hamitic followed on from a long process of reinventing the idea of the Hamite. This was a process which resulted in the Hamite not being understood merely as a biblically cursed people but rather a scientific reality which identified them as being a unique, partly African race (Sanders, 1969). In this conception of Hamite, it is understood then that the origin of the Hamite lies outside of Africa since they are a people who find their ancestry in Europe and not Africa. Here Hamitic is understood to reference those groups that

were not considered indigenous. The idea of the scientific Hamitic race would be taken up by the French through the work of French explorers, ethnologists and anthropologists who would build upon the growing work of scientific inquiry into race. Napoleon's discovery of Egypt and the ensuing academic field that would arise out of this and was integral in bringing race into the consciousness of the French.

FRENCH COLONIALISM AND THE CREATION OF IDENTITY

Preceding the establishment of colonialism proper, which followed the Berlin Conference of 1885-1885 (Craven, 2015), the Trans-Atlantic slave trade was the preeminent source of labour (Williams, 1945). The end of the slave trade would be brought about by various lobby groups who would highlight the fact of the injustice of enslaving a fellow human and the subjugation of a people to such harsh working conditions (Jordan, 1969). These groups were highlighting what was believed to be the fallacy of a system that could seek to justifiably enslave people based on perceptions of utility and later on that of racial inferiority (Williams, 1945). In just over two decades after the end of the slave trade in America, the Berlin Conference was held to oversee the proper management of the ongoing process of colonisation (Craven, 2015). Here the arguments had moved away from bold exploitation which commodified the slave and proof of racial impurity and inferiority based merely in quasi-religious justifications and instead moved to scientific understandings of race which spoke clearly and rationally to the separation of races.

Colonialism could be justified on the grounds that it was bringing development to otherwise backward civilisations. As Mamdani (2012) points out, at this point the classification of the colony was integral in ensuring that it could be effectively managed. For France the view of the Hamitic people was taken up by French ethnologists like Maurice Delafosse who studied language in Africa and who also was instrumental in educating colonists at the French Colonial School which trained colonial administrators. Delafosse was writing and teaching during the early half of the 20th century and his linguistic mapping of French colonial Africa was used by France in its administration of the colony (Belmessous, 2005). Delafosse mapped Africa spatially according to the languages that he discovered in each region. Each language was tied to a specific group of people who inhabited this area (Asiwaju, 1978). In this way Delafosse's work was especially crucial for France in mapping out its colonies and determining how to

govern in those regions. French colonial rule is sometimes thought of as having a different end point than that of its British counterparts: the creation of a French citizenry in its colonies. This has led to the assertion that France is archetypal of a direct system of colonial rule and Britain is the archetype of the indirect system of colonial rule (Mamdani, 2012). The varied outcomes of these two systems of colonial rule have arguably resulted in the two being characterised as opposites. The creation of groupings in these two systems would also be different.

On the other hand, the purpose of British colonial rule was not to create British citizens or to anglicise its colonies but rather it was to organise the colony for production and extraction (Mamdani, 2012). A small contingent of colonial officials would be present and the wider reach of the colonial authority would be diffused through traditional authorities (Mamdani, 2012). It became necessary to identify authority and power structures within the colony to facilitate this but also to ensure co-operation between the natives and the colonists. It is noted that direct or assimilative colonial rule that was a feature of French colonialism did not lend itself to this situation precisely because its aim was to create French people in its colonies in addition to using the colony for economic purposes.

In pursuit of both these goals it is argued that the French did make use of a similar methodology to that of the British and that was to create intermediary power structures. Although in theory people in the colony could become French citizens very few did and were able to. To evidence this, this thesis uses the example of the Tuaregs of Mali. Tuaregs were conceived as ‘white nobles’ and ‘lords of the desert’ (Lecocq, 2010). They were thought of as being like Arabs in style, dress and culture and as nomadic which meant that they had no ‘real’ or ‘fixed’ home and this put them in a different social and racial class (Hegazi, et al., 2021).

For Baz Lecocq (2010) French colonisation can be split into three phases. Phase 1 is that of conquest and pacification which is followed by a phase 2 which consists of functional administration and exploitation and lastly followed by phase 3 which consists of decolonisation and slow development of the colonised (Lecocq, 2010, p. 48). In these three phases France made use of pre-existing ideas in identifying the nature of the people in the land and how best to conquer it following that.

The phase of administration and exploitation would rely upon the pacification of ‘natives’ (Lecocq, 2010, p. 48) and as pointed out by Gregory Mann this was done by the institution of the ‘Indigenous Code’ (Mann, 2009, p. 332) which functioned in a similar manner to the native

law identified by Mamdani. This is also quintessential of Foucault's idea of dividing practices in the making of a subject or 'other'. In Mali in the case of phase 1, the Tuareg did put up a military resistance to the French incursion (Lecocq, 2010). While the Tuaregs were acknowledged as being reticent to colonial rule the French nonetheless continued to hold them in high esteem as noble warriors and racially distinct people (Lecocq, 2010, p. 49). Of particular interest was the notion that the 'white' Tuareg society was a feudal society which used slaves, especially 'black' slaves (Hall, 2011, p. 80). There was a fascination from the French with regards to what they perceived as white nobles ruling over an unruly black population (Lecocq, 2010) This is an example of where Hamitic overtones are present in the conceptualisation of the Tuareg in Mali. A dividing practice has already been established at this point where to be black was already considered to be uncivilised, a sort of common knowledge. As Gramsci noted (ref), hegemony makes concrete prevailing social norms. Crucially Gramsci's theory of hegemony rests upon the idea that this dominance is won not by force but by consent (Femia, 1987). To Foucault's thesis of creating the subject, this consent is given by the internalisation of the dividing practices whereby the subject accepts what society says it is.

Explorers like Henrich Barth would note that the Tuareg appeared racially superior, and this was echoed by French Colonial Administrator Lieutenant Barthe who noted that the Tuareg were of nobility and while they could be classified in some cases as being phenotypically black that this was not their race (Glover, 2010, p. 282). It did not help that in Tuareg social organisation those who were religiously impure i.e., not Muslim were considered to be black and those who were pure were given a title that meant bluish black (Hall, 2011, p. 283). The other ethnic groups in Mali like the Fulani and the Songhai at various times also claimed to be 'less black' but the French did not take up this argument as they argued that the Fulani and the Songhai did not fit all the characteristics displayed by the Tuareg (Lecocq, 2010, p. 133). Colonial historiography thus presented the Tuareg as alien invaders and their enslavement of the 'black' people led to civilisation developing. Thus, social and political structures were down to Tuareg innovation, and the stratified nature of the society was also an invention of the Tuareg political system.

In the third phase of French rule the pace of development increased and was geared more toward the Tuareg befitting their perceived social status as 'lords of the desert' and slave rulers (Lecocq, 2010, p. 90). The French government sought to protect and enhance the cultural status of the Tuareg, and this was partly built on the conceptions of white is good and black is bad.

THE FRENCH COLONIAL MIND

According to Martin Thomas (2011, p. xxiii) in discussing French colonial thinking., the French colonial project formed part of a wider colonial movement which sought to build successful colonies on the basis of a science of acclimatization. As Foucault notes it is imperative to the creation of the subject to catalogue and understand the 'other' and then what follows is a governing style that is recompense with the nature of the 'other'. This was true of both French and English colonies whereby successful economic extraction, pacification of the locals and establishment of a settlement would have to be predicated on a deep knowledge of the environment and social set up of the colony (Thomas, 2011, p. xii). These efforts were around understanding the plant and animal life in the colony, mental illness and disease that may afflict European settlers and other potential problems (Thomas, 2011, p. 14). The underlining assumption was that scientific knowledge of the colonial environment will lead to its taming (Thomas, 2011). Western science would therefore be used to harness the colonial environment for the colonial power. Here Thomas, much in the same way as Mamdani, is highlighting the integral role of science in the colonial project. More specifically that of classification and categorisation. It must be accepted that the host of colonial representatives and agents ranging from the doctors, nurses, colonial officials, missionaries and scientific professionals such as ethnologists not only worked to 'tame' the colonial environment but they also served to create it (Thomas, 2011). It was a subjectivity derived from a specific historical context. This is the first step according to Foucault in the creating of the subject.

These identities were created in relation to a colony that sought to order it in such a way as to be of maximum benefit to the metropole. All administration of the colony would therefore be geared towards this end (Mamdani, 2012). However, it would appear that contrary to what some would say, in French colonies this was no different. The process of colonisation was not a straightforward process and successful conquest did not equate to successful colonisation (Thomas, 2011). The conquest could only be supported and maintained through collaboration which would result in the co-option of legal codes, customary practices and local elites who would work alongside colonial clerks, administrators, translators and a host of other colonial functionaries (Thomas, 2011). This indicates a far greater level of co-operation and compliance between the colonial power and the colonised in a similar manner to that described of British colonies. Sustained colonial presence therefore needed a greater level of crossover between colonised and coloniser.

French theorists such as Gustave Le Bon, basing his assumptions on his work on crowd psychology, was of the opinion that this implicit relationship between coloniser and colonised should not be endorsed for fear of the corruptive nature that this could have on the French and their innate superiority (Thomas, 2011). Despite the lacklustre endorsement and approval of these tactics by scholars like Le Bon, he is nonetheless a prime example of a theorist whose work was influential in determining how race was viewed particularly in relation to the French citizen. Le Bon supported biological determinism; the belief that human behaviour is in part as result of one's genes (Snow & Owens, 2013). He supported the hierarchical view of the races because of this. More pertinent to this research is Le Bon's research of Arab peoples who in his estimation were influential in the establishment of advanced civilisation but noted that Islam was responsible for the stagnation of Arabs (Snow & Owens, 2013).

Edward Said has noted in his work *Orientalism* that Le Bon in particular was instrumental in creating the orientalist conception that Said was investigating (Said, 1979, p. 207). While the endeavours of scientists, colonial officials and others appeared to be to be guided by a sense of duty or the need to understand the unknown he asserts that they in fact still drew upon pre-existing notions. This was done in most cases by comparing what they were confronted with, with other foreign examples which appeared to be similar (Thomas, 2011). What this emphasises is that there were external points of reference that were being used to try understanding phenomena that may not have been related to it. What we may accept today as extreme thought or science that skirts at the fringe of moral and ethical consideration was at the time of the nineteenth and early twentieth century more mainstream and widely accepted (Thomas, 2011). Fears of racial mixing and societal degeneration were legitimate and justified concerns for a person of this time and the science of the time investigated and, in some ways, added to these fears. These tendencies were exemplified in the colonial context where every fact of life within the colony was investigated and minutely managed. Colonial codes of practice and legal systems had to be built around the effective management of the colony which in turn was based on the first instance of scientific acclimatization (Thomas, 2011). In the case of this thesis, it is argued that the most salient external reference point was that of the Hamitic Hypothesis.

FRENCH COLONIAL RULE IN PRACTICE

What is unique of the French colonial set up is that from the outset it was hierarchical in nature (Conklin, 1997, p. 111). For the French it was readily accepted that in the colony there must be

a stratification of power and distribution because this was essential for the proper and feasible political management of the colony (Conklin, 1997).

Mali is a good example of how French colonial law operated. As noted by Wooten (1993, p. 420) by the close of the 19th century France had resolved to administer its colonies according to a native custom and not to necessarily extend the arm French civil law into the colonies for the purpose of creating French citizens in the colony. As Wooten (1993, p. 427) asserts, and which echoes statements by Thomas is that the move to governance by local or native law implies an understanding of said customs and people. What is important to identify at this point is the difference in the French conception of assimilation and association. This distinction was a clear dividing practice, the second step to creating a subject.

The French method of colonial rule is usually one of assimilation or 'direct rule' (Belmessous, 2005). Here assimilation is meant as the act of being governed by the same laws in the colony as in the metropole. This was particularly true of the early stages of French colonialism (Wooten, 1993). However, by the close of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century this had fallen out of favour and given way to a policy of association (Wooten, 1993). Here the emphasis was on maintaining native institutions and customs which co-existed with civil law of the coloniser. What is crucial here is that assimilationist policies centred on the idea of accepting and advancing common identities while associationist policies tended to be centred on accepting differences but learning to live with them and not beyond them (Wooten, 1993, p. 421). A key caveat of the associationist policy is that the native custom or law would only be accepted as to the extent that it fit in with the moral considerations of the metropole (Wooten, 1993).

A moulding of the 'native' according to what was acceptable about their practice was ultimately based upon what was 'good' and what was 'bad'. According to Betts in *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890-1914*, the French initiated various strategies on how to find the most appropriate administrative policy (Betts, 2005, p. 19). This was done in a climate where assimilationist thinking had begun to fall out of favour and people began to accept with greater certainty that race and development or achievement were linked (Wooten, 1993). In deciphering which approach was the best the French would look to their counterparts like the British for administrative models (Wooten, 1993). However, it was in fact the scientific community that would provide the indisputable evidence that races were different, and that difference justifiably meant alternate ways of governing each race would be necessary. Betts

argues that there is a clear link between dominant scientific and social theories and the practice of French colonialism (Betts, 2005, p. 14). Here Betts points to authors such as Gustave Le Bon and Maurice Delafosse whose work in the respective fields influenced understanding of the colony and its administration.

Olatunji Oloruntimehin (1974) notes that while the ideas of assimilation seem to have its roots in the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, it was nonetheless not so in practice. He bases this assertion on the nature of assimilation which assumes that one culture is better than the other and the inferior one must be absorbed into the superior one (Oloruntimehin, 1974). There is a built-in assumption of superiority in assimilation, and it requires the assimilated to discard and disregard their prior lives and beliefs. In practice this process was achieved partly through the French penal code and through education (Betts, 2005). Education would prove useful to circumvent the competing norms and cultural practices that the colonised may have had (such as Islam) and instead propped up French culture as the right one while using the penal code to punish those behaviours deemed out of step with French morality (Betts, 2005, p. 20). The act of forcing colonies to behave for fear of punishment and moulding them into shape through education is perhaps the clearest example of the last stage of subjectification where the subject accepts what has been produced as truth.

Authors Jennifer Anne Boittin, Christina Firpo and Emily Musil Church (2011, p. 61) in their work on the hierarchies of race and gender in the French Empire note that the French created authority by stripping away power from traditional leaders and families and using race-based policies to govern. Education was crucial to this project because it allowed for a broad-based education of the colonised by allowing them enough resources to increase productivity and to create a class of people who would be 'native elites' (Sabatier, 1978, p. 247). Here in practice the French operated in much the same manner as the English by creating colonial intermediaries that they could depend on and who would act as their functionaries in the colony. However, counter to the principle of full assimilation and the right of every colonised person to become a Frenchman, the educational opportunities were limited and the content of what was taught was severely limited (Sabatier, 1978, p. 247). This was important to stifle any possibility of protest or the mass mobilisation of the colonised. The French provided an aspiration to which the colonised could cling and further push them toward change it wanted to see but did in fact honour this aspiration completely. Coercion through idea not force.

As in Britain, the French created traditional leadership that was useful to them (Sabatier, 1978).

For example, General Louis Faidherbe created a school for the sons of local chiefs in 1855 and sought to create a younger class of future chiefs who would be well groomed in the ways of the French (Oloruntimehin, 1974, p. 349). This soon became common practice throughout French West Africa. As these flourished a new prerequisite was established that if men wanted to be chiefs and the families put in positions of power, they would have to send their sons to these schools (Oloruntimehin, 1974, p. 352). As Sabaiter (1978, p. 249) asserts this educational drive was still limited to basic primary school level of education. Just enough to make students proficient in French, basic arithmetic and the history and geography of France (Sabatier, 1978, p. 260).

At the heart of the French colonial practice was the focus on rule by exception (Mann, 2009). Crucial to this was the creation of the *indigénat* or Native Code which was a set of rules and sanctions and a code which defined who and what the native was (Mann, 2009, p. 335). According to Mann the revised code in 1924 listed 12 offences (down from 50 in previous versions) and included such punishable offences like failure to pay taxes, failure to do work in the interest of the public good, committing any act that was considered to weaken French authority and not accepting French money in circulation (Mann, 2009, p. 336). As Fanon (1961, p. 35) would point out, the rule of the colony depends in large measure on coercion. This echoes Gramsci who acknowledges that the power of hegemony is predicated on coercion and not physical violence. The subjugation of the 'native' was thus a central component of the French empire. A. I Asiwaju (1978, p. 91) states that the principle of the coloniser is to operate on the same level as the police state. This kind of power is not just built on brute force but on a kind of relationship that allows one party to exercise more control over the other. For Foucault (1982) power must be understood as a being built upon knowledge which is as a result of a particular way of thinking about the world. Subjects are born out of a specific system of knowledge and therefore power is derived from these specific systems as well. Therefore, we must understand power as an entire sum of the possibilities and processes for understanding how to deal with people and the entire set of social relationship based on this.

THE ACADEMY AND FRENCH COLONIALISM

Through processes of co-operation and collaboration scientific breakthroughs and science in general was used in such a way in the colony as to tame the various wildness's that it presented. An implicit relationship was established between science and the colony. The same kind of

relationship existed between science and the Hamitic Hypothesis which offered a taming of the 'black' person, the colonised. That is not to say however, that scientific pursuits were inherently racist or colonial. Instead, what this establishes is the place of unfolding knowledge plays in our understanding of our world. Dominant ideas of a time can influence or shape a generations perception and understanding of a thing (Said, 1979). While science continues to evolve by continually testing and re-testing its hypotheses to ensure the veracity and accuracy of its claims the enduring legacy of knowledge created of and for a particular time is not as ready to move. By no stretch of the imagination are people today discussing or vehemently debating the place of the Hamite or pursuing the Hamitic race as relevant line of scientific enquiry, but it nonetheless created a way of seeing the 'other'. While we have improved our understanding of race, the legacy of the Hamite persists, and this is none the truer than in its internalisation in the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001).

In support of using the ideas of science to give credence to belief, academic disciplines like physical anthropology, have long been associated with colonial rule (Sibeud, 2012) which became a necessary science when the need for a practical management of the colonised was recognised (Salemink & Pels, 1999, p. 30). Physical anthropology involves the study of the biology and behaviour of human beings to further illuminate why they are the way they are and it had a unique place in the French empire with the Paris Anthropological Society since its main proponent held sway with colonial administrators (Sibeud, 2012, p. 87). The emphasis on biology led to an inordinate emphasis on physical attributes as an outward sign of the biology that confirmed a presence of colonial races (Sibeud, 2012). The institutionalisation of race within the French academy and subsequently in colonial administration is a complex one. Funding for new sciences such as anthropology were in part due to it being necessitated by colonies (Conklin, 1997) It was not until 1950 that scientific racism would be condemned and this by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Conklin, 2013, p. 1). Just two decades prior scientific racism was still the order of the day for the French Empire. The 19th century was a burgeoning period for 'physicians and naturalists' who studied the degrees of physical variance between races on a much larger scale (Conklin, 2013, p. 19). The great need and interest in this kind of study was accompanied by the establishment of societies, journals, schools and museum i.e a professionalisation of the study of humanness (Conklin, 2013). During this heady time two schools of thought emerged in the French academy: one led by Paul Broca and the other by Jean Louis Armand de Quatrefages de Bréau.

Paul Broca was a physician and anthropologist who helped pioneer physical anthropology in France (Conklin, 2013, p. 21). His legacy on neuroscience lives on in the naming of a section of the brain as 'Broca's area' (Conklin, 2013, p. 21). This behemoth of French anthropology and neuroscience was instrumental in the creation of a more scientifically rigorous approach to race (Sibeud, 2012). This coincided with the general shift towards scientific rationalism that was taking place in the 19th century. The prevailing thought at the time was that human beings were naturally inclined to sort themselves into a hierarchical structure and that this was in part due to the size of the skull (Conklin, 2013). Craniometry or the study of the human skull became an important tool of physical anthropology and was used widely not in France but in the rest of the world as well (Sibeud, 2012). Crucial to this explosion of interest in race was the fundamental question of the origin of humanity; specifically, if it originated from a single source (monogenesis) or from multiple sources (polygenesis) (Conklin, 2013, p. 24). While the monogenesis view at first seemed connected with the Bible i.e that only one man and woman were the progenitors of the human race it came under scrutiny with the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (Conklin, 2013, p. 23).

It seemed untenable that if all humans were ultimately part of one family that some could become slaves. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade made clear that there were some races that were more primitive than others and raised a question which further complicated the study of humanity, which was if primitive races could exist were, they capable of improvement? (Conklin, 2013).

It would help to not only professionalise the study of anthropology but also to cement it as a discipline that was so critical to the understanding of the human race that the French colonial empire could not do without it (Salemink & Pels, 1999). The Paris Anthropological Society brought together many subfields such as archaeology and medicine and Broca orientated the main focus of the society towards understanding the variance in human beings (Conklin, 2013). Broca's career trajectory shows the move from initial scientific inquiry to installation of that inquiry as common knowledge. The conflation of his work and the establishment of the Paris Anthropological Society illustrate the link between Gramsci's civil society and the institutionalisation of knowledge as its acceptance as truth by the common folk.

In the context of French colonial practice and the leading scientific theories of the time theorists, academically trained policy makers and colonial officials were well placed to make a significant

contribution to French colonial practice and knowledge production on race. Chief among these theorists and government officials were Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon. Each through their writing and in various positions for the French government helped in some way to further the idea of the Hamite and conceptualise France's position on race. In later years academics like Charles Seligman would provide an even more scientifically rigorous understanding of the Hamite that would persevere for many years.

THE LEGACY OF THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS TODAY: TUAREG NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM IN MALI

The Malian state at independence was an inheritor of a very distinct social and political identity formation that traces its roots to the very make up of Malian society pre-colonisation, the prevailing global ideas on race especially that of the Hamite, and the colonial experience. As the previous chapter described this was an admixture of ethnography, travel-based research, global shifts in race theory and nature of governance in French colonies. While the previous chapters have focused on sketching the background to the Hamitic Hypothesis, French colonial thinking and the endurance of the Hamitic legacy, this chapter presents a modern-day example of the culmination of all these processes: the Tuareg separatist movement in Mali. As a country central to the creation of the racial theories that emerged during French colonisation, Mali presents an opportunity within which to view the contemporary legacy of these processes. As a Berber group, the Tuareg are also a remnant of the Hamitic influence in Africa and in charting the legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis, Mali is also a modern-day example of the internalisation of this discourse. In Mali it is a convergence of these things that have led to the very complex identity formation of the Tuareg, and the Berber as a whole and which have given rise to modern sentiments of belonging.

The emphasis of the Tuareg and Berber as 'other' continues to be played out through racialised discourse with some groups in Mali naming themselves as protectors of the 'sons of the soil'. Media report since the 2012 have shown how ideas of race and belonging have manifested in the present, aided by this very long process of identity formation. Just a year after the 2012 coup reports surfaced in Western media of 'blacks' being driven out of Mali

Black residents of the tense northern Malian city of Kidal say that rebels from the lighter-

skinned Tuareg ethnic group, who currently rule the city, are attempting to expel the city's dark-skinned inhabitants.

"This morning, the people of the NMLA read a communique on the radio in Kidal informing us that all blacks that are not known as having been long-term residents of Kidal will be expelled in the direction of Mali, meaning towards Gao, to the south of Kidal," said Ali Cisse, a black resident of the town.

(Associated Press 2013)

In 2019 the BBC reporting on the story of a young woman who had fled Bamako printed the following quote from her:

"They call him Ahmed. He was so huge and so wicked," she says. "He said, 'You are a slave, you are black. You people are from hell.' He told me when somebody has a slave, you can do whatever you want to do. Not only him. Sometimes he would tell his friend, 'You can have a taste of anything inside my house.' They tortured me every day."

(Whewell 2019)

This quote has strong overtones of the black is bad connotation with it resulting in extreme violence against the so called 'black' person. Writing in an investigative piece for the Guardian newspaper in 2012 journalist Afua Hirsch noted that:

Skin colour is rarely discussed as a factor in Mali's current conflict, but its importance cannot be ignored. Some analysts I met in Burkina went so far as to say that the events in Mali – an uprising by Tuareg separatists the MNLA, a military coup in the south, and the ongoing near collapse of the political economy – amount to a war on skin colour, plain and simple.

She goes on further to say "But the manifestation of the Tuareg sense of discrimination lies firmly in their fair skin" and issues the following quote from a resident in Mali:

"I fought on the side of Mali. But when the MNLA rebellion started then it split us again, and

the Mali army turned on us Tuaregs. Two of the Tuareg officers had their throats slit. I knew I had to leave. After we left, everything was destroyed by the Mali army. Tuaregs are targets for them because of our light skin. Now I feel ashamed that I fought with the army – I still have the heart for fighting, but now I would fight against them, for us, for our independent state,"

However, it is perhaps this comment from the article that highlights precisely the embeddedness of racial categorisation and identity formation:

One NGO I came across in Burkina whose mandate was to help Tuareg refugees in camps like Mentao found that its black, Burkinabe staff were refusing to work with the Tuareg. These Burkinabes felt aggrieved by the reputation of the Tuaregs for enslaving black Africans – a history that still plays itself out in the Tuareg caste system – where "Bella", dark-skinned members of the tribe who were once slaves, still occupy the lowest positions in Tuareg society.

The persistence of a warring nomadic mythology that exists around the Tuareg further alienate them from claiming nationhood and belonging in a space that has increasingly inextricably linked land to identity (in the absence of which there can be no identity claimed) (Alesbury, 2013). The move of the Tuareg rebels to create a nation of Azawad can on one hand be described as the indigenous right to self-determination as set out in the UN declaration on the rights of Indigenous people or it can be seen as a move to create belonging and indigeneity out of a space that contests its very nature (Kuper, 2003). Tuaregs have a very sensitive relationship to state membership given their perceived proclivity to being resistant to the state as in the example of the colonial state but also in the mysticism that surrounds them as a noble nomad warrior people that is beholden to no one (Lecocq, 2010). The fact that the Tuareg inhabit the Sahel region provides a view that the Tuareg are a decentralised polity that span the desert with no fixed area of their own (Hegazi, et al., 2021). A consummate migrant community that is also an invading community. This coupled with notion of the Tuareg as racially different a superior has made it all too easy to present the Tuareg as the 'other' to create the dividing practice. The ultimate internalisation of this kind labelling is the last stage in creating the subject as described by Foucault and it appears as though the push for a separate state is proof that the Tuareg has taken this ultimate step.

The Tuareg recognise this 'otherness' as being different to other Malians but not necessarily as

the ultimate 'other'. In other words, as the other that is intrinsically not African. To this end Tuaregs and broader Berber movements have sought to highlight the African roots of the group as an indigenous community (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). During colonialism Tuaregs were thought of as African but of a special type. This is born out in the work of both Giuseppe and Seligman. It also echoes Mamdani in his assertion of the subject races and the existence of difference between 'natives' that the colonial power encountered. For Mali, as was a similar experience in other African states, was how to create a national identity that would unify all people as citizens of the state (Hegazi, et al., 2021). During colonialism fault lines would emerge between north and south which would remain in the aftermath of decolonisation.

OTHER ACCOUNTS FOR MALI VIOLENCE

This thesis has posited that the accounts for the violence in Mali lack a more nuanced understanding of the role that identity formation has played. The emphasis of the source of discontent in Mali-outside of identity formation-has been driven by peace and security concerns. It is interesting to note that some of these accounts will touch on the so-called 'Tuareg question' but only so far as to note that the Tuareg were a formally pastoral people-now being removed from that-and have regularly made their disaffection known through many rebellions (Baudais, et al., 2021). Added to this some scholars have noted the rise of jihadism globally and on the continent as a significant driving force of the current (and continued) upheaval in Mali (Tobe, 2017). It has also been argued that an incomplete turn to liberalisation and democracy has left the entire Sahel region vulnerable to conflict and susceptible to being overtaken by extremist groups (Boukhars, 2011). This link to terror has replaced some of the earlier conceptualisation of the violence as merely a regional concern between competing groups in the north to one that is centred on jihadi terrorism (Baudais, et al., 2021). What remains a salient point of analysis is the significance of Muammar Qaddafi and Libya. Given the context of perceived marginalisation, an ever-increasing limit on their mobility, lack of resources and jobs, the Tuareg moved to neighbouring countries like Libya (Baudais, et al., 2021). In Libya the Tuareg were able to become trained in military operations through their association with Qaddafi's army and had fertile breeding ground to nurture their resentment toward the Malian government (Baudais, et al., 2021).

These characterisations of the violence in Mali are not altogether inaccurate however they treat a significant driver of the conflict-Tuareg nationalist sentiment-as a mere continuation of

previous struggles. Even in that assertion there is little to no engagement on the cause of this consternation except to say that Tuaregs have long felt marginalised and underrepresented by the Malian government (and mostly because of their ‘pastoral’ way of life) (Bere, 2017). The global concern for the rise in extremist groups provides a clear explanation for the continued fracturing or splintering of armed groups in the north of Mali. The similarity in religion is perhaps what brings these groups together but ultimately competing end goals are what seem to drive them apart (Bere, 2017). The source of the difference in ideology and ideal end state is also not explored enough when assessing why Tuareg groups have not in the long run continued an association with the jihadist groups in the area. It has been long identified that Mali has had issues in integrating Tuaregs into the broader Malian society however this promising observation remains stunted by the lack of interrogation as to why the sentiment of not belonging remains a significant concern for the Tuareg. The perception of being the ‘other’ has long since galvanised Tuaregs into acting against the Malian government and as this thesis contends it is a sentiment based on ideas of inherent difference based on race and identity.

While the peace and security debates offer a practical look into the evolving conflict, and all the role players, its usefulness in charting the reasons for the protracted and enduring nature of the conflict cannot be fully explained only through these mechanisms. The history of Mali is pertinent to the current conflict not only in the short-term when recognising the most recent Tuareg conflicts, but also when taking a longer view to account for how and why Malians think and behave, the way they do. This view helps to account for the deep-seated ideologies that given whatever context, continue to grow. The lasting impact of where the Tuareg belongs has been conceived in a long process of identity formation that speaks to their seemingly inherent inability to belong to a state that is fundamentally not for or about them.

THE LASTING SUBJECTIVITY OF THE TUAREG

Pre-colonisation the north of Mali was central to commerce and trade and for its trade routes through the Sahel (Lecocq, 2010). However, during colonialism this northern centred power was shifted more towards the south (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). The rise of what was seen as southern dominance continued when, following independence, the Malian government abandoned the Common Organisation of the Sahara Regions because it wanted to avoid obstacles to nation building (Chauzal & Damme, 2015). This was seen as a move to abandon the needs of the north of Mali. Tuaregs felt that their traditional nomadic lifestyle was being

eroded particularly as the Malian state asserted its territorial integrity across the entire country. Tuaregs also have very limited representation in parliament and the government which has further fed the idea of marginalisation. For example, the Malian state has been accused of divide and rule tactics through their support of some anti-Tuareg groups such as Ganda Koy (protectors of sons of the soil) (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). Where I would like to place the Hamitic hypothesis is as part of way of discerning this who is who, who belongs and who does not. The Hamitic hypothesis was instrumental in helping officials to discern who inhabited the territories which they ruled over and as we have been discussing these colonial productions of race, class and identity have not disappeared in the post colony.

Pre-colonial social hierarchy in Mali was such that the Tuareg could not be ruled by black people (Lecoq, 2010). Black people were either left alone to rule over themselves or they would fall prey to slave raids. As Baz Lecoq notes in his work *Disputed Desert* the Malian authorities in present day had an image of the Tuareg that was in part inherited from their colonial past and which was also based in part on stereotype (Lecocq, 2010, p. 89). As pointed out previously the Tuareg were considered 'white nobles' and 'lords of the desert'. In its broadest sense the Tuareg were seen as colonial intermediaries and everyone else i.e the inhabitants of the South were uncivilised black people (Lecoq, 2010). On Mali, Gregory Mann notes that the country is both a post slavery and a postcolonial society (Mann, 2009). To explain the link between race, colonialism, Bruce Hall (2011) notes that it is an admixture of ecology, precolonial knowledge and racialised discourse.

Hall asserts that from the 17 century there has been a mixture of European racial attitudes with those found in Africa (Hall, 2011, p. 63). He notes in particular here the work Ibn Khaldun. Khaldun was clear in his dismissal of the Hamitic Hypothesis however he nonetheless still used a racially charged justification to explain the development and histories of the races in Africa. Instead of subscribing to the Hamite as the developing force in Africa, Khaldun instead spoke of difference that was evidenced on phenotype, culture and religion. For example, Khaldun positioned African and Slav populations as close to animals and that in the 7 climatic zones one could live, Africans and Slavs occupied two of the harshest (Lecoq, 2010). Crucially though the exposure to these harsh climatic zones could be remedied by conversion to Islam. For Bruce Hall this was important because it serves as the basis for the Sahara being seen as linked to Arab Muslim lineages (Hall, 2005, p. 354). Hall (2005, p. 355) moves further to assert that the idea of race was really read into precolonial life by the claiming of local ancestries of Berber peoples

to significant 'white' Arab Muslim figures.

Secondly local Berber scholars wrote the historical interactions between their ancestors and 'black' Africans that positioned the Berber as the holder of and authority on Islam and religion in the Sahel (Hall, 2005, p. 342). Therefore region, behaviour and lineage would come together as the critical defining concepts of race. Hall (2005, p. 343) also states that this worked on the reasoning of being black as related to the cursed Ham and white as being the true bearer of Islam (and therefore pure and good). What is interesting here is that this is still an early conception of the Hamitic Hypothesis where it had not yet shifted to the reinterpretation of the myth as only one son of Ham being cursed. What exists here is proof that the Hamitic Hypothesis remained a salient feature of society and in various ways was used to justify and rationalise behaviour. The Hamitic Hypothesis has therefore been shown to have the coercive nature of hegemony and the ability to create subjectivity.

Lecoq (2010, p. 9) notes that in present day Mali one can still see this play out through the Ifoghas of Northern Mali who claim to be the true bearers of Islam and the Imghad groups who say they are the true Tuareg, and they stand against the (Ifoghas) invading Arab class (Lecoq, 2010). This example and the preceding explanation offer an insight into race in Mali which is built on both lineage and the quality of that lineage (Lecoq, 2010, p. 4). This is a crucial point for the 'sons of the soil' debate: if one can trace their lineage back far enough then this proves beyond any doubt that one belongs i.e., one's ancestral ties are indisputable and bestow citizenship (and immovability) in the present. Another interesting feature that Hall and Lecoq note is that in Mali the element of slavery and the connotations of the Tuareg as slave owner cannot be ignored. They argue that this fact is of great importance in the post-colonial Malian state and is one of the reasons for the division and extreme racialisation.

Hall (2005, p 97) draws upon the work of Chouki El Hamel to explain that the interpretation of the black slave is based upon a specific view of Islamic law which states that only 'infidels' were allowed to be enslaved (Lecoq, 2010, p. 97). This broadly meant that anyone who was not Muslim was an infidel (Lecoq, 2010). El Hamel notes that this meant that the easiest place to acquire slaves was on the closest borders of the Sudan and in so doing brought the Tuareg into contact with people with a vastly different physical type (Lecoq, 2010, p. 96). This view of racism and slavery is similar to the arguments put forward by Jordan in that it was not initially because of skin colour that people were enslaved. Rather it was the juxtaposition of two facts that seemed coincidental and thus created the idea that these two facts or ideas were in fact

linked. What Lecoq (2010) sketches from this point on is an interesting link between language and race. The words for 'black' and 'white' as they exist in the English language do not have a similar counterpart in Tamasheq (Tuareg language) or at least they have different words to convey a similar meaning (Lecoq, 2010, p. 6). In Tamasheq to denote racial superiority the word 'white' is not used. Instead shaggaran (red) and Sattafen (bluish black) are used to describe people of noble status and a particular phenotype (Lecoq, 2010, p. 6). Sattafen is also used to describe people that are between free and not free. With the onset of colonialism and the emergence of colonial sciences such as anthropology and ethnology, there were already some ideas on race which the French colony used. To this was added the unique racial, social and class make up of Mali.

According to Lecoq for coloniser the shaggaran or the nobility were most easily associated with their idea of 'white' and the sattafen with their idea of 'black' (Lecoq, 2010, p. 97). Hall argues that in precolonial society it would have been understood that that the shaggaran were free but not noble and the sattafen were noble (Lecoq, 2010, p. 97). However, owing to their own prevailing norms colonisers reconceptualised this as white was shaggaran (pure and good) and black as sattafen (black and enslaved) (Lecoq, p, 97). This reconfiguration is a submission to the elite as Gramsci would describe in his theory of hegemony. There it is important and necessary for hegemony for the elite group to be in control of the knowledge that gets disseminated (Gramsci, 1971). This group bases it on the prevailing norms and standards, and it is followed as fact by everyone else. So, despite the pre-existing knowledge of precolonial Malian, its own understandings would inevitably be reinterpreted. In modern day Mali for example Baz Lecoq has noted that the word used to describe white or blanc is now shaggaran. The subject who uses the name created for it as their own has completed the process of subjectivity.

Given the historicized situating of the Hamitic Hypothesis and the making of the Tuareg, what does the conflict look like now? The Malian conflict can be best described as a conflict about the 'sons of the soil'; a battle between the indigenous and the settler, the allogene and the autochtone. Sons of the soil (SoS) conflicts are likely to occur in the following instances (Fearon & Laitin, 2011, p. 207):

1. In countries with large populations
2. The conflict is long and has been brewing over a length period. An SoS conflict is estimated at 15 years.

3. SoS conflicts appear to be more violent and deadly than ‘ordinary’ civil war since the ultimate end of the SoS conflict is to gain independence.

Mali scores on all three points. Its long and chequered history of racial and identity formation has primed it for conflict which is predicated on the very nature of belonging. With the feelings of belonging running deep on both sides of the conflict it is difficult to know if there will ultimately be an end to the conflict. The nature of this SoS conflict has its roots in the identity formation process as described throughout this thesis. It is predicated on the belief that only one group can belong and the other must simply leave. It must be noted that it is not just a timid acceptance of not belonging but rather the ‘other’ also moves to extricate themselves from a state that it feels does not acknowledge, understand or represent it. In the case of Mali, it is a centuries long process of identity formation that has caused it to arrive at the point of conflict it now finds itself.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately there has been a long and complex process that has helped to define what the Tuareg is and create a modern interpretation of its past. The guiding hand of the Hamitic Hypothesis was not far in the racialisation process of the Tuareg and its establishment as the superior race in Mali. The idea of the Tuareg as outsider or alien invader was thus a long, drawn-out process and it was scientifically supported by Seligman, Delafosse, Le Bon and others. Lecoq (2010) notes that the apparent mirror image that the French found in the supposed black slave owning Tuareg society was in part what endured them to it. The mechanisms of the colonial state such as the Penal Code and Native Code are examples by which the colonial state upheld these ideas. It is also an instrument for establishing hegemony in that it moulds thinking and behaviour according to certain patterns and ideas. Presently the sentiment of the Tuareg that does not belong in Mali continues and so does the deeply racialised language. After independence the Tuareg were still seen as ‘white’ settlers as the media excerpts show. The Tuareg are also seen interchangeably as nomads and this word has become a synonym for white in Mali (ref). Perception of what the Tuareg are i.e slave owners and traders is an image that persists in modern day Mali (Lecoq, 2010).

The Hamitic Hypothesis is an example of a knowledge system which has endured to shape modern perceptions of race on the continent. This is to say that race and identity formation must

be placed in a context which seeks to describe its formation from the earliest moment. Historicising of race leads to an understanding of the process which unfolded to create the present racial or identity categorisation as it is understood today. The enduring legacy of racial or identity categorisation has been shown to have had many moments of institutionalisation which created opportunities ripe for its internalisation as common knowledge and common practice. This chapter in drawing on the work of Charles Seligman, Maurice Delafosse and Gustave Le Bon has shown the importance of colonial era governance, the link between scientific inquiry and its support and establishment of knowledge and the use and reinterpretation of the Hamitic Hypothesis in the creation of racial identities in Mali.

In the present day, the Tuaregs through groups such as the Azawad are clamouring for the creation of an autonomous and independent state, free from the shackles of what they perceive to be the ruling elite of the black south. SoS conflicts are characterised as being slow with seemingly no end in sight and this is indeed the case with the Tuareg and the rest of Mali in general. As Fearon and Laitin note it is indigenous groups who feel a kinship with a regional base that will face a fierce competition for resources such as land from rebel groups. Because of this there is a tendency for this type of conflict where there is a 'son of the soil' pitted against a migrant that tend to conflict prone (Fearon & Laitin, 2011). The struggle of the Tuareg for recognition has long predated the onset of the war in 2012. It is in the conflict itself that we can see at play the formations of identity over time and this is none the more evident than in Mali.

In this chapter then the conflict in Mali has been describes as a knowledge system whereby the conflict presents a stage on which ideas of race are played out. They reveal entrenched notions of identity and identity formation. The character of the conflict in Mali leans heavily on rhetoric that emphasises who can and cannot belong and the secessionist nature of the conflict shows a deeply ingrained disdain for being associated with Mali by the Tuareg.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

From its earliest inception the idea of the Hamite has caused much consternation. It has been offered up as the source of the peopling of the world from at least biblical times. However how did a seemingly mythical and outdated idea continue to persevere in the present day, if at all?

To answer this question this thesis has taken at its core the understanding that identity formation plays a critical role in socio-political life. This is true the world over but especially so in Africa where this happens as a result of a unique set of circumstance, chief among these being colonialism. As its starting point this thesis aimed to show that:

1. There was a high degree of violence and/or conflict on the African continent
2. This was not only as a result of clashes between different ethnic or cultural groups and,
3. The reason for some of the violence can be attributed to the process of identity formation

Instead of basing the conflict in ethnic, tribal or cultural differences the thesis instead took identity formation to be the crucial point and genesis for conflicts. The process of identity formation is understood as a process guided and underpinned by power/knowledge which as Michel Foucault points out, is all around us (Foucault, 1984). The expression of power/knowledge is in the everyday and it is a relationship which reinforces the other. Knowledge becomes embedded (and is created) through various relationships of power. For Foucault one must understand that what *is* is created by knowledge. In other words, there is a direct correlation between how we behave or act and the knowledge that informs or inspires it. Knowledge is parlayed through discourse.

In Africa the singling out of tribal or ethnic conflicts are not new to the assessments of the source of Africa's problems. The examination of tribal or ethnic conflict has sometimes

assumed that these groups are inherent, unquestionable features of African life. Even though this thesis disputed tribal or ethnic issues as the sole cause of conflict, it nonetheless still recognises that similar practices are also at work here as in identity formation. An interrogation of the group itself has not always featured in the analysis of the conflict. Some authors who have taken up this line of enquiry (as it pertains to identity in the African context) include Mahmood Mamdani and Achille Mbembe. These authors have taken as the starting point of their analysis, that what appears as tradition (and social status quo) cannot be readily assumed to be so. Instead, an interrogation of the very make up of African society is beneficial to understanding how its socio-political climates are formed. To further reinforce the premise of interrogating what is assumed to be real is the work of philosophers like Foucault.

To chart the journey of identity formation from the colonial period was important because it provided clear examples of racial classification and specific modalities. The thesis did not argue that colonialism was the creation or onset of this kind of thinking, instead, that the colonial period represented a period where these ideas became entrenched. Colonialism is thus understood to be the tool that provided the mechanisms and machineries to proliferate and reinterpret a particular knowledge system. Of central importance to this thesis was the use of the Hamitic Hypothesis as the overarching mechanism of identity formation which proliferated through colonialism to present day. It is this very specific discourse that has been argued in this thesis as the basis for classifying who belongs and who does not in the state of Mali.

The Hamitic Hypothesis was created through a variety of historical periods of which each contributed something new to its eventual and final interpretation, internalisation and use. The ways in which it was interpreted and used was dependant on the present historical context of the time and the specificity of the socio-political context of which it was used within. The Hamitic Hypothesis is important for what it taught people about how to understand and interpret African society, not only for scholars of the continent but also for its inhabitants. The significance of the Hamitic Hypothesis today is not its explicit use as a theory used to explain the demographics or socio-political development of Africa today. Instead, its significance is the creation of the ultimate in and out group. Mali has had deep seated tensions between the Tuareg and the rest of society (Alesbury, 2013). Historically seen as a nomadic outsider, the Tuareg people have increasingly fought a space that is their own (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). This has manifested in an intense struggle for independence and extrication from the Malian state. At the heart of the matter is the feeling that the Tuareg are in every way so distinct from the rest of

Mali that they cannot possibly reside in and be governed by the same state (Ananyev & Poyker, 2021). It is in this that the Hamitic Hypothesis stakes its biggest claim as the source for part of this extreme feeling of difference and not belonging. Therefore, the Hamitic Hypothesis functions as an inherited knowledge systems whose lasting overtures can be seen in present day.

CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF RACE AND THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS

Chapters 1 to 3 of this thesis took a comprehensive overview of the history of the current problem in Mali, provided a succinct history of the formation of Mali and laid the foundation for understanding what the Hamitic Hypothesis is and how it performed and functioned through various time periods. It is in this, and using the framework that Foucault presents, that the 'other' is the designation given to the person/group that is viewed as being on the 'outs' or separate from oneself. This process of the dividing practice, drawing the line between us and them as Foucault describes, is the ultimate practice of defining who can belong and who cannot. The other becomes the subject, the object of both study and derision.

It was the Hamitic Hypothesis that was used to create the subject or the other. The Hamitic Hypothesis states that anything of importance relating to social, cultural or technological development in Africa is as of the result of the race known as the Hamites (rest). This race of people is of European descent and were classified as a separate race in Africa. The Hamite is opposite to the Bantu (Negroid) who is considered the real African. (real) The Tuareg, through their process of historical and colonial formation were identified as members of this elite group and were used by the colonial authority to diffuse their power in the administration of the colony.

To understand the significance of the Hamitic Hypothesis it was necessary to first historize the concept of the Hamite and its eventual formulation as the Hamitic Hypothesis. The Hamitic Hypothesis in its formulation had an emphasis on distinct racial groups. Edith Sanders in her piece *The Hamitic Hypothesis; its origin in time perspective* laid the foundation for understanding the idea of the Hamite. She outlined that the Hamitic Hypothesis was an idea that was constructed both politically and socially throughout various periods in history most notably through that of the colonial period (Sanders, 1969). Sanders shows through the exploration of the origin of the Hamitic Hypothesis that histories past, future and present can be rewritten. This means that a re-interpretation of the concept can be used as befits the needs of the social and political context.

Originally the Hamitic Hypothesis was understood chiefly in a religious context as the story of the peopling of the world (Sanders, 1969, p. 521). This view was widespread and prevailed for many years especially given the historical importance of religion as the source of knowledge at the time. However, at the onset of the Age of Enlightenment the infallible nature of religious understanding began to be questioned and slowly gave way to a new paradigm: science and rationality (Sanders, 1969). The confluence of these ideas and the exploration of Napoleon in Egypt would ultimately lead to a reconfiguration of the Hamitic Hypothesis. As described in Chapters 4 and 5 this process was due in large part to the realisation that it seemed implausible that a race of people formerly denigrated and derided could be capable of such great achievements (as witnessed in Egypt). This crisis of faith would lead to a reinterpretation of the Hamitic Hypothesis as only being true of a certain group of Ham's children, as per the new religious definition. As for the scientific explanation, the idea of the Hamite would be explored as a new and distinct race whose superiority and ultimately its difference from 'true' Africans could be scientifically proven.

Edith Sanders work in charting the trajectory of the formation of the modern The Hamitic Hypothesis shows how an idea can change and adapt and yet remain an enduring part of society. By the time Napoleon had happened upon Egypt, religion was already being questioned however its quaint understanding of the peopling of the world still provided the base upon which a new scientific theory was built (Sanders, 1969, p. 525). Today there is almost certainly no one who uses the term Hamite or who classifies a conflict as having Hamitic origins. Since its inception, the Hamitic Hypothesis has created clear and distinct groups of belonging bases almost entirely on a vague conception of race. In Mali how this has unfolded was in the creation of categories of people who are considered more 'original' than others. These categories are expressed as the indigenous and non-indigenous.

The conflict of Mali has an element of indigenous versus settler. In drawing on the work of Freitani and Leitan this thesis was able to draw a link between the present day violence and the sentiments of one group belonging (the indigenous) and the other not. A sentiment that is expressed as 'sons of the soil' against the invading settler.

To describe the enduring legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis and the way in which it created these categories of belonging this thesis has taken as its overall framework the work of Foucault to describe the idea of discourse and knowledge and the draws upon Gramsci to describe the enduring legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis as a hegemonic process.

THE MAKING OF RACE IN THE FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE AND ITS ENDURING LEGACY

Following the detailed explanation of the contextual understanding of the Hamitic Hypothesis the thesis went further to explain in detail the colonial logic and rationale of the French colonial empire. This was important to show how an idea like the Hamitic Hypothesis could come to be and by what means it was allowed to flourish. Key to the proliferation of the Hamitic Hypothesis was an admixture of prevailing social norms (including prejudices and stereotypes), culture, exploration and monumental shifts in science and reason. These factors would come together to create the ideal breeding ground for the ideas of the Hamite and the Hamitic Hypothesis to take hold. The evolution of the Hamitic Hypothesis itself is also crucial to mapping the importance that the idea of the Hamite played in racial configurations and classifications of the time. As Edith Sanders (1969) points out the Hamitic Hypothesis starts out as a somewhat folksy biblical tale about how the world came to be populated and the through first contact made with other people, reckoning with ideas of what makes a person, the Age of Enlightenment and the dawn of great explorers and conquerors like Napoleon, the Hamitic Hypothesis would finally end up as scientific explanation for race. More specifically for the advancement and development of Africa.

The enduring legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis is significant when it is understood that it became a crucial aspect for explaining race in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Crucial to the sons of the soil conflict, as evidenced in Mali, is an element of racial dynamics or belonging based on a specific idea of race. This thesis has posited that the foregrounding of race became important because it provided (a) a way to understand the world (b) justification for ill treatment of certain groups of people based on perceived racial inferiority. The way to understand race was also of critical concern for colonisers as a way to both justify the colonial project and to understand the land and peoples they were now governing over. The type of rule used by the French and the specificities of the socio-political landscape of Mali (and the rest of North Africa) provided an ideal breeding ground for the Hamitic Hypothesis to be used.

As is made clear in Chapter 5 the first encounters of the English in Africa is presented by Jordan as an evolution of how the African was perceived. The point of departure for this was crucially that upon first encounter Africans were not immediately viewed as racially inferior. Instead through a process that involved contributions of religion, social values and scientific inquiry

the African came to embody a certain set of characteristics. However, despite these later crude associations of Africans and their way of life it was not yet expressed as a necessity to subjugate merely based on these associations. Instead, the Negro as identified by the English would come to embody a new identity that was marked by its economic usefulness. So, while early understanding of the peopling of the world would not dictate its understanding in purely racist terms it has nonetheless resulted in the racial partitioning of the world. As Jordan (1969) points out it is through the confrontation of what certain ideas meant that lead to the initial re-imagining of what people and their appearance represented. Jordan's arguments echo that of Sanders in the importance with which religious understandings had in the formation of ideas. However, as Sanders would also point out this would change given new social inquiry which challenged the role of the Church as the pre-eminent source of knowledge. What the religious view of the time did was to create early traditions of associating blackness with sinful behaviour. As Jordan (1969) has highlighted the connotations of blackness as evil and degenerate behaviour made black people the physical embodiment of this and therefore also evil or cursed. Ham as the father of the sons who populated the areas of Africa and Southwest Asia then also found justification in the bible for the resultant cursed populations. Black people or people in Africa were therefore according to their physical attributes classified as Hamites since they were descendants of Ham.

In the African context it was the Tuareg groups and others of North Africa that were identified as Hamitic or at the very least as those having benefitted from Hamitic influence/exposure. Given that the French governed much of North Africa it was crucial to describe the approach of the French to colonial rule as this laid the groundwork for the interpretation of race in its colonies. The French colonial project formed part of a wider colonial movement which sought to build successful colonies on the basis of a science of acclimatization.

The importance of science inquiry is explained in great detail in Chapter 4 and 5 to sketch a clear picture of how this type of inquiry evolved alongside colonialism. This was because effective colonial rule required knowledge of the colony and in producing that knowledge it also reproduced a particular set of values espoused by the Hamitic Hypothesis. As described in Chapter 5 the impact of this was felt in the proliferation of Hamitic ideals in seminal texts particular academic ones that upheld the core notions of the Hamitic Hypothesis and held them up as scientific fact. As this thesis has noted the successful economic extraction, pacification of the locals and establishment of a settlement would have to be predicated on a deep knowledge

of the environment and social set up of the colony (Thomas, 2011). These efforts were around understanding the plant and animal life in the colony, mental illness and disease that may afflict European settlers and other potential problems. The underlining assumption was that scientific knowledge of the colonial environment will lead to its taming (Thomas, 2011).

In the context of Mali what this meant was that the division of race placed the Tuareg as outsider to other ethnic groups in Mali. This division is the first step in Foucault's outlining of the process on creating the other or the subject. In Mali and across North Africa explorers like Henreich Barth would note that the Tuareg appeared racially superior, and this was echoed by French Colonial Administrator Lieutenant Barthe that the Tuareg were of nobility and while they could be classified in some cases as being phenotypically black that this was not their race. It did not help that in Tuareg social organisation those who were religiously impure i.e., not Muslim were considered to black and those who were pure were given a title that meant bluish black. The other ethnic groups in Mali like the Fulani and the Songhai at various times also claimed to be 'less black' but the French did not take up this argument as they argued that the Fulani and the Songhai did not fit all the characteristics displayed by the Tuareg.

Colonial historiography thus presented the Tuareg as alien invaders and their enslavement of the 'black' people led to civilisation developing. Thus, social and political structures were down to Tuareg innovation, and the stratified nature of the society was also an invention of the Tuareg political system. The French government sought to protect and enhance the cultural status of the Tuareg, and this was partly built on the conceptions of white is good and black is bad.

THE HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS IN PRESENT DAY

Given the French colonial rule and the place of race within its empire it became necessary to drive this point home by illustration of the effects of identity formation through example of its hegemony. As outlined by Gramsci, hegemony can be understood as (i) domination or coercion and (ii) intellectual and moral leadership (Femia, 1987). As Gramsci noted, hegemony makes concrete prevailing social norms. Crucially Gramsci's theory of hegemony rests upon the idea that this dominance is won not by force but by consent (Femia, 1987). To Foucault's thesis of creating the subject, this consent is given by the internalisation of the diving practices whereby the subject accepts what society says it is. Therefore, the enduring legacy of the Hamitic Hypothesis was not achieved through force (not even necessarily the force that may have accompanied colonialism) but through coercion to change behaviour and thinking patterns. This

is Gramsci's understanding of hegemony; the practice of the institutions in a state working together to create elite groups who decide the moral and educational frameworks of the state and who entrench these via the institutions of the state.

For example, in the colony these institutions would be the colonial government, Native Code, Penal Code, religious organisations, educational establishments, media etc. Broadly Gramsci would put these under the banner of civil society, and they would operate in a manner that facilitated knowledge production and disseminated it. In turn this would create a moral framework in which people would live their lives. In other words, it would all work together to dictate how one would think and act. The hegemony described by Gramsci is a sentiment which is similarly touched on by Michel Foucault in his description of the modes by which one creates the subject. Foucault is clear in that this happens along 3 planes:

- i. Through scientific inquiry
- ii. Dividing practice
- iii. Acceptance of the norms (and names) given to the subject by the subject i.e an internalisation of the framework created by points i and ii.

In the case of the Hamitic Hypothesis it operates as the overarching knowledge that helped to guide scientific inquiry (as was shown by Charles Seligman, Gustave Le Bon, Maurice Delafosse and others in Chapter 5), through the scientific inquiry creates the basis upon which to establish rules or dividing practices (as shown by explanation of the rules and practice of the French colonial empire) and lastly through the modern day example of the conflict in Mali we can see the last step of subjectivity through the internalisation of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The seminal texts identified in Chapter 5 are selected works by Maurice Delafosse and Gustav Le Bon and 'Race of Africa' by Charles Seligman. Works like Charles Seligman's 'Races of Africa' is an archetypical example of a codification and homogenisation of racial ideas. In Chapter 4 the history and context of the Hamitic Hypothesis was extensively laid out and an overview of the French style of colonial administration was also described. The next step of thesis was then to explain what role specific texts on race, importantly the Hamitic race, played in this makeup of the French colonial empire. Dominant ideas of a time can influence or shape a generations perception and understanding of a thing. While science continues to evolve by continually testing and re-testing its hypotheses to ensure the veracity and accuracy of its claims the enduring legacy of knowledge created of and for a particular time is not as ready to move.

However, despite 'Races of Africa' being a prominent modern example of the Hamitic Hypothesis it was no means the first to attempt to lay scientific grounding for this theory. Prior to the publication of 'Races of Africa', Maurice Delafosse the French colonial ethnographer and administrator published *Haut-Senegal-Niger* in 1912 which described the Sahel region as being occupied by Berbers, Arabs and Moors and in particular having mixed races of which the Fula were one. The Songhay are described as 'negro'. In France ethnographic research was central to colonial administration. One of the best-known colonial ethnographers-cum-administrator was Maurice Delafosse who established the *Institut ethnographique international de Paris* in 1910 (Ginio, 2002). Delafosse and Seligman were instrumental in creating the kind of ideological framework as described by Gramsci.

As colonial administrators and academics both Delafosse and Le Bon showed the inextricable link between the academy and governance. Their ideas helped to shape policy and practice in the colony that was ultimately in process of deciphering who belonged and who did not. What they were able was the context necessary for the subject to accept themselves truly as the other. This process would reach its zenith with the publication of 'Races of Africa' which would serve to cement the Hamitic view of race and non-belonging of many people in Africa most notably in this instance that of the Berber/Tuareg.

While Chapter 4 served to concretise the process of identity formation by showing its effect on knowledge production and behaviour, it is in Chapter 5 that the thesis builds on the earlier theoretical work to present an example of how the Hamitic Hypothesis was crucial in creating the 'other' in Mali. This is offered as an explanation for the deep-rooted conflict in the region. This conflict is further established as being typical of 'sons of the soil' type clash which takes years to create and has lasting simmering tensions.

This thesis laid out the idea of belonging as central to the study of the Hamitic Hypothesis. It did this to show that what the Hamitic Hypothesis has done in the case of Mali was to create a deep divide between people where the very nature of their belonging in that space is so contested. It did this by describing a process of racialisation in Mali that cast the Tuareg cast as white slave owning nobility and who in modern day Mali have not been able to fully rid themselves of that title and continue to be seen as an outsider. As acknowledged in earlier chapters of this thesis in many ways the conflict in Mali can be seen as a 'sons of the soil' conflict. This type of conflict is predicated in the true indigenous as belonging as everyone else

is not and therefore cast out. The Malian crises does not seem to be abating and the conflict continues to centre on the aspects of belonging. To challenge the heart of this conflict would be to ask its combatants to challenge the very nature of who they think they are. As outlined in Chapter 4 the combatants in the Malian armed struggle are numerous with complicated alliances and trajectories. There is no one homogenous group that can claim to represent the interest of all people in Mali especially that of the Tuareg.

It was further argued, using Foucault, it is in the naming of the subject that the last mode of subjectification is complete. By the Tuareg accepting their status as other and moving for a separate state they acceded to the years long process of their identity formation. In charting the initial trajectory of racial identity formation this thesis drew upon Winthrop Jordan and his article 'First Impressions' (1968) which introduces the idea that race was not what characterised initial meetings between Europeans and Africans.

Race as we understand it today is presented in this thesis as a curated social category. To understand the ways in which people identify and relate to race in the present day it was necessary to understand how it is that we have come to accept race as an integral part of our own social make up and that of society at large. In addition to this it is necessary to know how it is that these modern conceptions of race as it is known, have come to be proliferated and promulgated. Jordan asserts that initial encounters between explorers and 'new peoples' were not ones where the explorer inherently displayed racist attitudes or tendencies. The remark that peoples in Africa or the New World were 'black' was more an indication of the observance of the difference in skin colour (Jordan, 1969). As Jordan points out the remark of colour did not reduce the perception that the native was 'yet civil' (Jordan, 1969). In other words, the proclamation that the African was 'black' did not indicate that she was savage or uncivil. The most salient quality perhaps then of early explorations of the 16th century was that there existed a variety of shades of people around the world (Jordan, 1969). What is of significance in this article is that Jordan highlights that the use of 'black' and 'white' as descriptors for Europeans and non-Europeans also took place within a specific context. While the remark of skin colour during first encounters was more of a commentary on physical appearance, the terms 'black' and 'white' in and of themselves described a particular understanding. Here Jordan situates the understanding of black and white within the English context since it is here that the concept of black or blackness has its most intense or polarising meaning (Jordan, 1969). For the English the concept of whiteness was tied to religious understandings of purity and virtue. It was also

coincidentally the colour associated with the perfect ideal of beauty with its complement being red and the Queen as the very embodiment of this beauty (Jordan, 1969). The antithesis then of this beauty and purity was the concept of blackness, which was the embodiment of dirt, filth and was associated with sinister, evil deeds and even death (Jordan, 1969).

For Jordan then the use of these terms reflected the most embedded social values of the English society. This echoes Foucault in the way in which the creation of the subject depends on dividing practices (for example between good and bad) and the internalisation of the dividing practice by the subject. The naming then of the newly encountered as black would also come with it the associations and connotations that these very words conjured up.

To name as 'black' or 'white' would then also imply a naming of that thing or someone with what each concept represents. The startling feature of the difference in skin colour helped to give rise to a fascination in trying to explain this difference. If the origin of the blackness could be determined then the significance of black people would then be apparent (Jordan, 1969). Initial explanations were exposure to the harsh sun however encounters with Native Americans who lived in similar harsh conditions disproved this as they were a lighter brown skin colour (Jordan, 1968). This reasoning was also further exacerbated by the fact that Africans taken to Europe were not getting any lighter given the much cooler climate (Jordan, 1969). The origin of the African also ran into further complications when viewed within the pervasive Christian ideology of the time which stated that all mankind were derived from the same source, i.e God. Thus, trying to explain the origin of the blackness of the African ran at odds with the understanding that all were made by God and in his image. A counter to this was presented in the revisiting of Biblical texts which re read the chapter on Ham discovering his father, Noah naked. In this story Ham awakened his father to his public nakedness (as a result of drunken intoxication) and the embarrassment he caused his father for alerting him to this fact was enough for Ham and his descendants were to be cursed (Sanders, 1969). The search for reason, whether biblical or scientific is the first step in creating the subject.

The mark of these cursed descendants was thus to be 'black'. The difference in the religious practice of the African and his European counterpart was also of significance since it served as a measure for Christianity. In other words, the non-Christian practices of Africans was the yardstick to which Christians could measure their proper and upright devotions (as the opposite of the paganism of the African). This yardstick then was the measure by which to separate the African. Later it would emerge that the African was indeed different in all aspects (Jordan,

1969). At this juncture it is noted that the main point of difference between the English and the African was notions of civility (which at first were judged to be more or less of equal stature). The African was cast as savage due to her strange practices, customs, religions, food and dress that by English standards were incomprehensible (Jordan, 1969). Here the supposed beastly nature of the African was alluded to and the very embodiment of the beast most like man was the ape (Jordan, 1969). Here the beastly nature of the African would come to be compared with the closest man like animal in all manners (Jordan, 1969). This process of forming knowledge on race, yet unattached to the Hamitic Hypothesis, created the initial assumptions upon which the reformulated Hamitic Hypothesis would be built. The very same connotation of black is bad and white is good continue today. The idea that black and white cannot co-exist is exemplified in the Mali conflict.

Despite the complexities of the violence in Mali and the many groups who are contesting the political space there remains a thread that runs through it all is belonging and how to categorise who can belong in Mali and who cannot.

The real-life conflict in Mali is taking place not only within a context of the country's recent history but also within a much broader context of a centuries long historical formation which has slowly and deliberately cultivated ideas of the 'other'. In a similar way to the outrage and scholarship that abounded in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the ideas of the Malian conflict have oft been described violence between two competing ethnic groups. These explanations do not interrogate the nature of the groups themselves and instead accept them as fact and as an inextricable part of life on the African continent. To place the Malian conflict within in a much broader context is to not only give it a wide berth in trying to understand all the players in the game but it is opens up the possibilities within in which to understand, in greater detail, the nuances of the conflict. This thesis has not taken as its starting point the idea that the any armed group in Mali necessarily touts Hamitic ideology explicitly as the reason for their armed struggle. Instead, this thesis has offered the Hamitic Hypothesis as a framework, in which identity in Mali can be understood and which in large part provided the fertile ground and contributing factors for the present idea of who can live in Mali, who can belong.

The prevalence of violence in Africa is not only true of Mali. Since the wave of independence that came to Africa in the mid-20th century roughly 31 states have had a successful military coup (some of those with multiple successful coups attempts as in the case of Nigeria and the Central African Republic). In addition to the coups there have been instances of civil war such

as in Somalia.

The most pressing and analogous example presently is the tense situation in Tigray. Charles Tilly (2011) has argued that historically state formation is a violent one but one which can eventually lead to the homogenisation of a state. In Ethiopia this process appears to be ongoing with its fraught historic and present day clashed between various ethnic groups. Similar to Mali, Ethiopia has also struggled with forging a cohesive and universally accepted nation identity. The move by the Tigray Defense Forces is similar to Tuareg insurgents who are pushing for greater recognition and political autonomy (Walsh & Dahrir, 2022). And like the Tuareg, the violence in Tigray is predicated on centuries old ideas of superiority and while the smallest ethnic group in Ethiopia Tigrayans dominated Ethiopian politics (Walsh & Dahrir, 2022). If we apply the argument used here in this thesis to an assessment of the violence in Ethiopia, we can perhaps see an overlap in processes of identity formation, belonging and the need to assert political dominance.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to provide an alternate explanation for the upheavals experienced in Mali. It has offered a deeper look at the mechanisms for behaviour based on belief by presenting an historicised look at the formation of race in Mali. It did this through presenting a preeminent source of knowledge during the pre- and post-colonial era, the Hamitic Hypothesis, as the agent for creating the basis of the belief of racial superiority and belonging as expressed by the Tuareg secessionist struggle. Ten years on there seems to be no end in sight to the war in Mali. In defiance of peace, more unstable elements like introductions of jihadi sentiments have buoyed the conflict and allowed it flourish. In looking at a way to bring an end to the violence and a resolution to the struggle of the Tuareg for a home of their own, the insights presented in this thesis perhaps offer a new way of designing resolutions to the conflict.

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