


**FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
PROCESS IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA**

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Student number: 2110419



A mini thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters in Public Health in the School of Public Health, University of the
Western Cape.

Supervisor: Dr Mickey Chopra

June 2004

**FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
PROCESS IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA**

Megan Renay Prinsloo

KEYWORDS

South African Police Service

Transformation

Criminal investigation process

Crime prevention

Court impact

Convictions

Police officers

Detectives

Training

Constraints




ABSTRACT

FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

M. R. Prinsloo

MPH mini thesis, School of Public Health, University of the Western Cape


The World Health Organization (WHO) considers violence to be a global public health problem. It is estimated that 1.6 million people worldwide lost their lives to violence in 2000. This translates to a global rate of 28.8 deaths per 100 000 population.



The end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994 brought about various economic, social and political transitions within the country, resulting in rapid urbanization, increasing unemployment and deepening inequalities. Consequently, these conditions also brought about increased incidences of crime and violence. The South African Police Service (SAPS) recorded approximately 2.58 million crimes in 2000. The SAPS faced many challenges in transforming the eleven South African Police Forces to a combined South African Police Service in 1994. Literature has indicated that while serious crimes increased, the chances of an offender being caught and punished declined between 1994 and 2000.

During the 2002-2003 financial year the SAPS recorded a national homicide rate of 47.4 per 100 000 population. The Western Cape and Limpopo province had the highest and lowest provincial homicide rate of 84.8 and 12.1 per 100 000 population respectively. Other studies indicated that city-specific homicide rates for Cape Town increased from 84 to 88 per 100 000 population between 1999 and 2001.

A pilot study conducted in Cape Town during 2003 to determine victim-perpetrator relationships and motives for homicide that occurred in 1999 was hampered by difficulties in tracing police docket, inconsistencies in data capturing, and the absence of perpetrator information due to some court cases not being finalized.




It was therefore decided to conduct a qualitative, descriptive, comparative study between two police stations in Cape Town. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers at different ranks to document the procedures and route of reported crimes and to explore the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process. The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic content analysis.

The interviews provided an insight to the contextual environment and the attitudes of police officers regarding the transformation of the SAPS, and identified the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process at the two selected police stations. Issues discussed are discipline, restructuring and motivational factors

regarding the transformation process, as well as training courses, the court impact and the relationship between the detectives and prosecutors. The main constraints identified at both police stations were human resources, training courses and vehicles. Social support and community factors are also discussed.

The interviews with police officers revealed that there are various issues of management at national and provincial level that need to be addressed, such as detective recruitment standards, training courses and the management of different crime types to reduce the workload of detectives. The need for closer collaboration with the courts to avoid the misplacement of dockets and to minimise delays in the finalisation of court cases was also identified. Previous studies have also identified blockages within the South African criminal justice system and it is hoped that this study could highlight those issues that still need to be addressed.



June 2004

DECLARATION

I declare that *Factors Impacting on the Criminal Investigation Process in Cape Town, South Africa* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Megan Renay Prinsloo

June 2004

Signed:



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


I would like to thank:

The South African Police Service, in particular the office of the Western Cape Provincial Commissioner for granting me permission to conduct this study.

A sincere thank you to all the members of the South African Police Service who participated in this study and agreed to be interviewed.

The School of Public Health, University of the Western Cape - especially my supervisor Dr Mickey Chopra, for his valuable feedback and guidance.

My colleagues at the MRC-UNISA Crime, Violence and Injury Lead Programme, who provided feedback and support.



Ms Anneli Heinaste who assisted with the recording and transcription of interviews & Mrs Annelise Krige who also assisted with interview transcriptions.

The Department of Health and Society, Linköping University, Sweden - in particular Prof Jan Sundin and Dr Gunilla Tegern and a grateful thank you to the Linnaeus-Palme Exchange Programme.


A final, special thank you to my family and friends for their support and understanding.

CONTENTS

Keywords	ii
Abstract	iii
Declaration	vi
Acknowledgements	vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW	6
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY	12
3.1 STUDY DESIGN	12
3.2 SAMPLING	12
3.3 DATA COLLECTION	13
3.3.1 DATA COLLECTION AT POLICE STATION 1	14
3.3.2 DATA COLLECTION AT POLICE STATION 2	14
3.4 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS	16
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS	17
4.1 THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS	17
4.2 FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS	18
4.2.1 TRANSFORMATION	18
4.2.1.1 Discipline	19
4.2.1.2 Restructuring and Equity	21
4.2.1.3 Motivational factors	23
4.2.1.4 Duration of transformation process	25
4.2.2 TRAINING	26
4.2.3 COURT IMPACT	28
4.3 CONSTRAINTS	32
4.3.1 RESOURCES	32
4.3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS	36
4.3.3 SOCIAL SUPPORT AND COMMUNITY FACTORS	39
4.3.4 GANGS/SYNDICATES	40
4.4 POLICE OFFICERS' RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFICIENCY	42
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	46
REFERENCES	50
APPENDIX A	57

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization (WHO) considers violence to be a global public health problem. It is estimated that 1.6 million people worldwide lost their lives to violence in 2000. This translates to a global rate of 28.8 deaths per 100 000 population. Approximately half of these were suicides, one-third were homicides and one-fifth were casualties of armed conflict. The rates of violent death in low- to middle-income countries (32.1 per 100 000) were more than twice that of high-income countries (14.4 per 100 000) (Krug *et al* (eds), 2002).



The WHO believe that mortality and morbidity due to violence can be prevented in the same way that public health efforts have prevented and reduced pregnancy-related complications, workplace injuries and infectious diseases among others, in many parts of the world. It is believed that the attitudinal and behavioural factors as well as the larger social, economic, political and cultural factors contributing to violent responses can be changed (Krug *et al* (eds), 2002). The WHO's World Report on Violence and Health (Krug *et al* (eds), 2002) provides evidence of successful violence prevention strategies, from small-scale individual and community efforts to national policy and legislative initiatives.

Since the end of Apartheid in South Africa a decade ago, the country has experienced various economic, social and political transitions, resulting in rapid urbanization, increasing unemployment and deepening inequalities (Chopra, *et al*,

in press). Consequently, these conditions also brought about increased incidences of crime and violence and in 2001, homicides accounted for nearly half of all non-natural deaths in South Africa (Prinsloo, 2002).

The South African Police Service (SAPS) reported a national homicide rate of 47.4 per 100 000 population for the 2002-2003 financial year. Homicide was not equally distributed across geographic areas. Of the nine provinces, the Western Cape and Limpopo had the highest and lowest provincial homicide rates of 84.8 and 12.1 per 100 000 population respectively (SAPS, 2003a). While the SAPS reported a decrease of 29.5% for homicide throughout South Africa from the 1994 to 2002-2003 financial year (SAPS, 2003a), homicide rates have increased in the Mpumalanga and Western Cape provinces (SAPS, 2003b).


South Africa's major cities reported varying homicide rates of 41 per 100 000 population for Pretoria to 100 per 100 000 population for East London in 2001 (Matzopoulos (ed), 2002). City-specific homicide rates for Cape Town indicated an increase from 84 per 100 000 population in 1999 to 88 per 100 000 population in 2001 (Prinsloo *et al*, 2003).

The SAPS Annual Report (2003a) indicated that more than half of all homicides occurred in 11 of the 43 national police areas, of which the Eastern and Western Metropole in Cape Town accounted for 6% and 5.6% of cases respectively. One-fifth of all homicides occurred in only 23 police station precincts, which accounts for 2.1% of all the stations in South Africa. Six of the 23 police station precincts

were from Cape Town, namely Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Kuilsriver, Kraaifontein and Mitchell's Plain. These areas and police stations were also among those with the highest reported incidence of attempted murder and assault with grievous bodily harm.

Transformation of the South African Police Service


The capacity of law enforcement agencies to apprehend perpetrators of violence and collect sufficient evidence for prosecution is an important part of a public health response to violence. The South African Police Service is a microcosm of the sort of changes that many institutions are undergoing in South Africa. An understanding of how these changes are impacting upon its ability to cope with the epidemic of violence and homicides is therefore critical.



A study conducted in 1996 identified some of the blockages for South Africa's criminal justice system (CJS) and recommendations were made towards its improvement (Schönteich, 2002a). However, a study conducted in 2000 (Vetten, 2003) to identify possible strategies for the prevention of intimate femicide, revealed many issues that still need to be addressed by the criminal justice system. The study found that many dockets from 1990 to 1999 in Gauteng province had either been destroyed or mislaid and post mortems were sometimes filed in the wrong dockets. In other instances, the information recorded on the police Crime Administration System (CAS) bore no resemblance to the contents of the docket. It was suggested that the quality of evidence gathering and prosecution be

improved, not only to ensure that a full picture of the case comes before court but to also do justice to the victims.


A pilot study conducted in Cape Town during 2003 to determine victim-perpetrator relationships and motives for homicide that occurred in 1999, was hampered by difficulties in tracing police dockets, inconsistencies in data capturing, unknown police case numbers, the inaccessibility of certain dockets and the absence of perpetrator information due to some court cases not being finalized (Prinsloo, 2003). This resulted in difficulties to access information on victim demographics, perpetrator relations and motives for homicide, which is essential to inform policy development towards crime prevention strategies. These factors may be related to the transformation process that occurred within the SAPS.



The SAPS faced many challenges in transforming the eleven South African Police Forces of the Apartheid era to a combined South African Police Service in 1994. In Cape Town, public service restructuring to resolve racial imbalances led to the transfer of investigating officers from specialist crime fields to general detective branches in different communities. A Cape Argus survey found that these specialist investigators have been inundated with general crime dockets and had neither the time nor the motivation to probe cases properly, even in their field of expertise (Anon, 2003).

The transfer of investigating officers was thought to be one of the possible reasons for the number of crime dockets still pending without investigators and delays and postponements in court cases (Smith, 2003) but this, along with the exploration of other factors impacting on the investigation process, can only be confirmed by further research.

After the public service restructuring in Cape Town, the national deputy police commissioner announced that a large portion of the R20-billion national police budget would be spent on the overhaul of the Western Cape police service. As part of a phase to reduce crime levels in the Western Cape, specialist officers from around the country were called to intervene and to provide training to detectives and detective branch commanders (Damon and Van Zilla, 2003; Smith, 2003).



Due to the findings of the pilot study (Prinsloo, 2003) and the matters concerning public service restructuring in Cape Town that was highlighted by the literature (Anon, 2003; Damon and Van Zilla, 2003; Smith, 2003), it was therefore decided to conduct this descriptive, comparative study between two police stations in Cape Town. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers at different ranks in order to document the procedures and route of reported crimes and to explore the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process.

Chapters two and three to follow will provide a review of the literature and the methodology used to conduct this study. The results will be discussed in chapter four, followed by the concluding chapter with recommendations.

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature concerning the extent of crime and violence in South Africa and how it compares to other countries with regard to prosecution and conviction rates. Literature relating to the impact of policy changes on the police and the investigation process is also reviewed. The chapter concludes with a section on 'crime information management' and assesses the various approaches; their advantages and associated costs involved in developing integrated criminal justice information systems.

Crime and convictions in South Africa

In South Africa, the Western Cape had the highest recorded homicide rate during the 2002-2003 financial year (SAPS, 2003a). Research has shown that city-specific homicide rates for Cape Town continue to increase (Prinsloo *et al*, 2003). Homicide has been identified as the main cause of premature mortality among ten of the eleven sub-districts in Cape Town and was most prevalent among males aged 15 to 34 years (Groenewald *et al*, 2003). This indicates that violence and homicide is a growing public health problem among communities in Cape Town.

The WHO defines the public health approach to understanding and preventing violence as a science-based, multidisciplinary approach, not just for use by public health professionals, but for all different actors involved in violence prevention, including educators, health care workers, government ministries responsible for

social policy and the police among others (Sethi *et al*, 2004). The need for collaboration among the police, department of justice and all other associating agencies involved in violence prevention strategies is therefore crucial to its success.

In 2000, the SAPS recorded approximately 2.58 million crimes. Of these, 610 000 (24%) went to court, and the prosecution service took 271 000 cases (11%) to trial. These resulted in approximately 211 000 convictions, which represented a conviction rate of 78% for cases going to trial, but only 44% for cases going to court and an 8% conviction rate for the 2.58 million recorded cases. Despite the high number of convictions for cases going to trial, the number of cases withdrawn or settled is of great concern. While the number of serious crimes increased by 24% between 1994 and 2000, the number of prosecutions decreased by 23% and convictions by 19%. This indicated that the chances of an offender being caught and punished consequently declined between 1994 and 2000 (Schönteich, 2002b).

While ‘conviction rates’ measure the success of trials, ‘detection rates’ measure the success of investigations. A comparison of South Africa’s crimes for 2000 to those of England and Wales for 2001/2002, revealed a similar crime detection success rate of 23%. However, comparisons of individual crime types revealed that South Africa had a poor detection rate (25%) for murder investigations in 2001/2002, while the British rate was 87%. It should be noted, however, that the

British police only had 886 incoming cases for that financial year, compared to the more than 21 000 cases in South Africa (Leggett, 2003a).

Policy changes and the criminal investigation process

A national survey of crime recording by police in China between 1987 and 1991 revealed significant under-representation of crime in the police-produced statistics and clearly identified the police as the source of error (Yu and Zhang, 1999). Even though serious crimes were found to be under-recorded to a lesser extent than other crimes, their under-recording rates were still high and varied between 30% and 45%. An exploration to the systemic and social factors of the problem revealed that officers under-recorded crimes in pursuit of high clearance rates, which was the measure by which the effectiveness of an officer's work was determined. The impact of social and economic transition on the police was also highlighted, as the survey was conducted during China's economic reform period when social instability and crime were on the increase, and police lacked adequate strategies and resources with which to respond. The authors concluded that the identification of under-recording problems has brought about changes in institutional policies and consequently in the police's crime recording in China.

A national survey of police policies and practices regarding the criminal investigation process was conducted on a sample of the 18 000 police agencies in the United States in 2001 (Horvath *et al*, 2001). The questionnaire explored organizational matters, the role of patrol officers, the role of investigators, investigation management, investigative support services and investigative

effectiveness. Personnel strength, technology and training were identified as the main factors affecting crime clearance rates and were also in greatest need of additional funding and research. Increased training for investigators was suggested to enhance investigative outcomes. It was thought that the lack of investigative training would cause investigators to have difficulty with complex computerized crime information management systems, and the effective application of other sophisticated technology during the conduct of their routine investigations.

Crime Information Management

Information management plays an essential part in successful policing. Police agencies in the United States had overcome backlogs for police records processing by using alternative methods of managing files. One of these methods is the optical disk image retrieval system, which transmits a report's image to an optical disk for permanent storage (Arkenau, 1990). The advantages of this system are that the entire process takes approximately 30 seconds, reduces record storage space, allows for easy and multi-user access to the same document, ensures data accuracy and the virtual elimination of misplaced files or lost documents (Arkenau, 1990; Harris and Barton, 1994).

Statistics submitted by the United States police, courts, probation departments, and jails were found to be insufficient to support most policy-related research (Myrent, 2000). To date, much progress has been made towards integrated criminal justice information systems (ICJIS) throughout the United States.


Integrated systems were found to increase worker productivity, eliminate redundant and inaccurate data entry, improve access to imaged documents and to allow instantaneous communication between law enforcement, prosecution, courts and defence agencies. Despite these benefits, the efforts of integrating criminal justice systems have been hampered by existing, expensive but disparate systems, to which people have grown accustomed. There was a reluctance to share information with other agencies within the justice system due to a lack of understanding, while a lack of funds and effective organisational structures were also identified as obstacles to integration (Prisoc, 2000a).

Integrated criminal justice information systems are quite costly and range from about \$3 million (Prisoc, 2000b) to \$5.1 million for more sophisticated systems (Monti, 2000). Prisoc (2000a) suggested that motivation to integrate systems could be achieved by an audit or report highlighting the inefficiencies of fragmented systems or the risks of missing or inaccurate information to law enforcement officers and the public. It was found that the key to successful integrated systems was to ensure that the actual users be involved in its planning, design, development and implementation (Monti, 2000).

Prisoc (2000b) discussed another approach for developing an integrated system, which was to implement small, manageable modules in successive phases. An ideal start would be a police records management system, which record all arrests and incidents and would be the originating point for a criminal case. This data could then be passed to other systems and be the key player of an integrated

system. Once the police records management system is in place, other modules can be implemented.

A review of the literature revealed very little recent information from both high-income and low- to middle-income countries on the actual management of police investigations and dockets. For high-income countries such as the United States, these matters appear to have been addressed as early as the 1970s and 1980s with the implementation of computerized criminal justice information systems (Anon, 1977; Becker, 1978). Therefore, the current focus for the United States is merely to improve the efficiency of their existing computerized justice information systems (Monti, 2000; Myrent, 2000; Prisoc, 2000a). A lack of funding and other resources in low- to middle-income countries could be reasons why extensive research on police docket and investigative management is not a major priority.



However, recent investments have been made into new technology to facilitate the tasks of the SAPS (2003c). An Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) was implemented at 35 identified remote sites throughout South Africa from September 2002, and is expected to reduce the time taken to match fingerprints from 40 days to 48 hours. This is expected to accelerate the production of criminal records for awaiting-trial prisoners, bail applicants, the identification of wanted criminals and any previous criminal offences of suspects (Anon, 2000), but the success of these efforts will only be established in the years to come.

CHAPTER 3:

METHODOLOGY

3.1 STUDY DESIGN

This descriptive, comparative study used semi-structured interviews to document the procedures and route of reported crimes at two selected police stations, as well as to explore the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process. A qualitative approach was selected as opposed to a quantitative one in order to gain insight to the criminal investigation process and the contextual environment regarding policy changes and the attitudes of police personnel at different ranks. According to Neuman (1997) consideration to social context implies that a qualitative researcher would note what came before or what surrounds the focus of the study, and that the same events or behaviours can have different meanings in different cultures or historical eras.

3.2 SAMPLING

Purposive sampling was used and one police station from the Eastern Metropole and one from the Western Metropole's police stations in Cape Town was selected. The stations were labelled as Police Station 1 and Police Station 2. As a result of Police Station 1 being closest to the researcher's place of employment, it was accessed first and the labelling does not indicate any preference of the researcher. Both stations were previously selected as part of the pilot study conducted in 2003 to determine victim-perpetrator relationships and motives for homicide that occurred in 1999.

Further criteria applied in the selection of these stations were according to their “status”, as determined by the Provincial Commissioner during each financial year. The “status” of a police station in essence determines the support and resources allocated to them. “Presidential” and “priority” stations are allocated more in terms of resources and capacity than “gang-infested” and “normal” stations (Nyalinga *et al*, undated).

Police Station 1 was classified as a “normal” station, while Police Station 2 was classified as “gang-infested” for the 2003-2004 financial year. Police Station 1 is situated in an urban, low-to-middle-income community and serves an approximate population of 78 000, whereas Police Station 2 is situated in a peri-urban, low-income community and serves approximately 120 000 people.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION

Prior to the commencement of the first interview at each police station, the researcher contacted and informed the Senior Superintendent about the study and a meeting was arranged. During this meeting, a copy of the written permission granted by the Office of the Provincial Commissioner was presented and the names of officers within the different units were established and followed-up for possible interviews.

The units, areas and topics within the SAPS and the criminal investigation process that were covered by the interviews were management, restructuring, human resources, logistics, the detective branch, court linkage, and crime prevention. All

the officers who were approached and who agreed to be interviewed were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix A), which stated the aim of the study and that confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. It was decided to conduct individual interviews as opposed to focus group discussions, since it was probable that more in-depth information would be disclosed using this method.

3.3.1 DATA COLLECTION AT POLICE STATION 1

The semi-structured interviews at Police Station 1 were conducted between 03 to 09 March 2004. There were nine audio-recorded interviews but 10 participants, as a result of one interview that was conducted with two police officers. The interviews were conducted with six Inspectors, three Captains and the Senior Superintendent, also known as the Station Commissioner. In order to maintain the police officers' anonymity, the quotes of the six Inspectors have been labelled 'A' to 'F', the three Captains 'H' to 'J' and Senior Superintendent 'Y'.

3.3.2 DATA COLLECTION AT POLICE STATION 2

The semi-structured interviews at Police Station 2 were conducted between 12 to 19 March 2004. There were five audio-recorded interviews and the participants were one Inspector, two Captains, one Superintendent and one Senior Superintendent or Station Commissioner. At Police Station 2 the quotes of the officers were labelled as Inspector 'G', Captains 'K' and 'L', Superintendent 'M' and Senior Superintendent 'X'.

A total of 14 audio-recorded, semi-structured interviews were therefore conducted with 15 police officers at different ranks. Two additional informal discussions at Police Station 1 were unrecorded but written notes were taken. The results chapter therefore mainly comprises the information from the 14-recorded interviews, unless stated otherwise. The 15 participants' years of service, both within the SAPS and the previous South African Police Force ranged from 14 to 29 years.


Taking into consideration that the study commenced at Police Station 1, the researcher conducted more interviews at this station to ensure that all the necessary departments or units within the SAPS were adequately explored in order to gather all relevant information. Therefore, even though fewer interviews were conducted at Police Station 2, adequate information was still gathered on all the relevant departments or units at the station. For a description of the criminal investigation process, the scenario of a homicide case was taken as example; from the moment the police arrive on the crime scene until the eventual court case. The responses at both police stations were similar and will be jointly summarized in the 'Results Chapter'.

The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed between 04 and 24 March 2004 with assistance from Ms Anneli Heinaste, an exchange student from the Department of Health and Society, Linköping University, Sweden and Mrs Annelise Krige, secretary at the MRC-UNISA Crime, Violence and Injury Lead Programme at the Medical Research Council. The transcriptions were promptly read by the researcher upon reception and at times, the original cassettes were

checked in order to ensure that the meanings of statements were not inadvertently altered during the transcription process.

3.4 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS

The data was analysed using thematic content analysis. This was done separately for both police stations. Firstly, the transcripts were coded according to broad common statements that transpired through the interviews. The quotes selected from the transcripts were then grouped according to themes that emerged from the interviews. The results of the two police stations were then compared and will be reported on in the next chapter. Even though the interviews resulted in many interesting themes, the results reported only focus on information relevant to the aim and objectives of the study.



CHAPTER 4:

RESULTS

This chapter provides a description of the criminal investigation process, as well as an assessment and comparison of the factors impacting on this process at two selected police stations in Cape Town. The contextual factors, for example the policy changes that occurred at the end of Apartheid in 1994, and how these impacted on police stations, associated staff and the community are reviewed. The chapter concludes with a section on constraints, as identified by the participating SAPS staff members, and their recommendations to improve the efficiency of their tasks.



4.1 THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS

Two detectives at Police Station 1, both at the rank of Inspector were interviewed jointly, as well as the Superintendent at the detective branch of Police Station 2, and were asked to describe the criminal investigation process. Their responses were similar and a description of the process is summarized below:

Firstly, an officer of the uniform branch is called to the crime scene, where the necessary paperwork is completed and the public and any unauthorized persons are controlled. Once the detective arrives, an initial investigation is conducted at the scene, the collection of evidence by relevant specialized units is arranged and any witness statements are taken. A pathologist conducts the post mortem and the results along with other specialized reports are included in the docket, which is

sent to the detective. The detective follows any leads in order to apprehend a suspect. An arrested suspect should be charged to appear in court within 48 hours and the case docket is sent to the prosecutor. If any further investigation is required, the prosecutor notes it in the docket and sends it back to the detective investigating the case. Once the detective has gathered all the necessary information, the docket is once again sent to the prosecutor, who places it back on the court's roll after scrutinization. The duration of the criminal investigation process and the eventual final court verdict depends on several contextual factors which impact on all social actors or individuals involved and will be discussed in the sections to follow.



4.2 FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS


4.2.1 TRANSFORMATION

One of the most significant changes during the transformation process of the "old" South African Police Force in the Apartheid era to the "new" South African Police Service in 1994, was the change in rank structure from Commanders to Managers at station level. It was discovered that this brought about a change in the management process at station level. Where the Commanders of the past were "militaristic" or "autocratic", the Managers of the present have to be more aware of the police officers' rights as employees.

A general comment was made by an officer at Police Station 1 about some of the "old Commanders" still living "the commanding way" but said that it did not apply to that specific station:

Inspector A: So the definition[s] about commanding and managing are different now. We [have] got managers in place now, supposed to have managers in place [but this is] not always [the case]... because the people that we appointed in those posts were the old commanders... Some of them still live in the commanding way although they're supposed to [have] change[d] to managers already. [There has been and continues to be] a lot of skills development. ...They are doing their job. On the ground they are doing their job but many of them, a number of them are not managers yet. They're still commanding. Where managers would go and work with these people and get the hands on approach, the development part of it, the involvement part, and especially when it comes to involvement, the old commander never had made people involved. And that is where they differ between managers and commanders.

Even though a militaristic manner of police management was not found within the two police stations reviewed, a study conducted by Khumalo (2001) among detectives in the Gauteng Province revealed that the detectives found bureaucratic and paramilitaristic applications of legal procedures as factors hampering detective team relations. This was thought to result in absenteeism, transfers and job dissatisfaction.



4.2.1.1 Discipline

Two of the police officers interviewed at Police Station 2 commented that even though the management process of the past had its disadvantages, the discipline and respect that was enforced upon them at that time was lacking since the transformation in 1994.

Captain K: ...the Commanders, the discipline and the respect, and the way the job was done, [even though it was in a] militaristic manner, ...the job was done well, the place was kept clean and everything. Our shoes shined, our hair was short and our uniform was there, but now... the manager must see to those things. And now the manger can't shout at us ...The manager can do nothing...he can just talk...
...when somebody gives us a small finger then we take the whole hand, and that is the scenario here.

Senior Superintendent X: ...at the beginning when I started until I became an officer... it was very autocratic, that's a fact. And then afterwards, after 1994 so it changed to a, to a demilitarised... SAPS, but that also has disadvantages, whereby discipline actually is very confusing to the people and a lack of discipline also came into being, ...for instance [at a] certain stage before 1994 if I as [an] officer

[gave an] instruction it will be done without you ever [having] to look over the person's shoulder and see if it's been done. Now ...you need the skills to cope in that specific job.

The Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 stated that, while the advantage of the past was discipline, the disadvantage was that "...the people didn't have to think, the lower ranks". He illustrated this by an example:

Senior Superintendent X: ...we have a problem with murder and the gangsters. And then I brought my intelligence people, detective, one of my crime prevention unit, and one of the investigating services people. I brought them together. I said, look, what are we gonna do? The people were shocked, I mean, never ever a Station Commissioner asked us in the past... And that's a disadvantage of an autocratic system.

He expressed the wish to have the discipline "returned" to the SAPS and said that he could see the difference among those that received formal skills training as compared to those who had not. It seemed like he had already experienced a certain tension among members at the station, with employees claiming their rights and "seniors" not always agreeing with him. E

Senior Superintendent X: ...If I could have the discipline back again it would help a lot for [me as] manager. But for the person that was taught the skills, I do work with the people and you can see the difference with... the members that I work with. Although a lot of seniors don't ...eh ...agree with it when they come to the station. Because to me, I don't see that I'm the Station Commissioner here. I see this is the same person who has been employed by SAPS and whatever work they must do, I must be willing to do it before I delegate it to them. ...they will say, 'but Superintendent X, ...this is my right'. Then I tell them 'look, you forgot one thing-what is your duties?' ...In the past if I was Station Commissioner 10 years ago, that wouldn't have been an issue.

It should be noted that the Station Commissioner was younger than some of the other police officers at Police Station 2, and even though he had less years of service in the SAPS, he had the required qualifications to perform his tasks efficiently. It could therefore be possible that certain "seniors" with more practical experience would disagree with him:

Senior Superintendent X: ...I attended a private business course... It was fantastic. I mean you could feel it, you're on a different atmosphere, scenario and everything and you actually, you could feel it if you don't fit in, because of the people's ...value as well as inspiration and motivation to do something for that company and when I came back I implemented a lot of things... But the people around me thought that 'what is this guy doing?' And it's hard for you that's alone to try and change the field of people that are one track minded.

The only time a lack of discipline was mentioned at Police Station 1 was when the Station Commissioner commented on the lack of discipline during training, which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. The Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 did acknowledge however, that these days discipline is being brought back "slowly but surely":

Senior Superintendent X: But here, the rank structure here ...as you can see, physically it's there, but the people know that the discipline is not as it used to be and for me to discipline the person... I can actually say, this morning I disciplined a person, in writing and everything. But for us both it is a bit uncomfortable because we're not used to it.

Leggett (2002) also discussed the loss of meaning of rank among non-commissioned officers since the transformation. He discussed the fact that there were too many officers employed in the higher ranks, which led to a collapse of field supervision in some areas and that rank seems to be more of a designation of pay scale than function. Associating authority with job title rather than rank was thought to be a possible solution.

4.2.1.2 Restructuring and Equity

When the Station Commissioners at both police stations were asked how restructuring and the Equity Act affected their specific police stations, their responses varied. The Station Commissioner at Police Station 1 was rather vague in his response but generally appeared pleased with the changes that occurred.

Senior Superintendent Y: ...personally I think...eh...you have to be careful when you answer a question like that, because sometimes people will have the misperception of the specialized units. ...If there's no impact but if there's efficiency then yes, I don't see any problems with the specialized units being structured at the station level. ... talk about equity-wise. Women, men, disabled, all of these situations. So, yes we are tackling with this concern. I'm happy as the Station Commissioner that that thing is in place. ...So you'll experience that it is not always that gloomy, especially in the police service, especially at station level. You will pick up here and there; you will pick up your misunderstanding of ...your unhappiness. ...You respect me; I respect you. I can't see you as disadvantaged person because I'm a police member. When you come and lay down a complaint then I must listen to you. So that kind of things all goes down to the individual.

The Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 was more straightforward about how restructuring and the Equity Act affected his police station. He commented that the station members were predominantly white in the past and that "... two years down it will be [an] all black station". Even though he had no personal issues working with people from different population groups, "...and I just say to myself look, this is not black, this is not white, this is not coloured, but this is a human and I must work with him"; it seemed like he did not agree with decisions made at national level that were generalized to, and enforced at provincial and community level. The downfall of these decisions was often reflected by the community's complaints:

Senior Superintendent X: ...The Equity Act that states that there must be so many coloureds and so many blacks and so many whites and so on. But, I personally feel that you should take it in a certain context. And to me there's no use...eh...putting national demographics on a province and it's just how you interpret the act. ...It's fine to have your equity because the Act say[s] so, but what does the community want? ...There is no use promulgating Acts and [when it] come[s] to the ground level, the practical side of it, and then I get community in this office telling me, 'I came to this station, I asked the people, I need the affidavit and then the police officials ask what is an affidavit?' Do you understand? ...I have nothing against change, ...but it's no use putting a person here that, ...that [the community] feel [they] cannot communicate to. Because when I phone to the station in [an] emergency, that person mustn't be able to tell me that I don't know what you want from me. ...maybe we can... breach that gap by training, maybe.

An October 2002 national poll by Afrobarometer Media Briefing (2002) found that only 41% of respondents thought that the South African government is better at delivering services today than it was under Apartheid. Leggett (2003b) suggested that the South African Police Service should bear in mind the dynamics of public opinion and that public reception to policies must be continually reevaluated.

The ambivalence of the Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 regarding the equity changes is indicated in the statement to follow. It seemed like he would agree with equity changes, provided that there was a valid reason behind it. The fact that he mentioned the transfer of police officers as a form of “punishment” may reveal a certain underlying issue, perhaps not at this specific police station, but within the South African Police Service:

Senior Superintendent X: [pause] Look, we mustn't stand against change. Change must come... If the service is not good, then definitely you must change. I mean, I will feel bad, if they change me to another station, to punish me or fire me or whatever, transfer me because that two things wasn't ...that wasn't the reason why they transferred me...the crime and the service. And to me is it...that is what the constitution wants, us to decrease crime, as well as to give a service to the community.

4.2.1.3 Motivational factors

The detectives interviewed at Police Station 1 kept referring to “the old days”, and commented that the standard of recruitment was not the same as before. The decrease in the requirements for becoming detectives could also have negatively affected their status as detectives. Their increasing workload and having to work overtime without additional remuneration could also be one of the factors that may contribute to a lack of motivation in performing their tasks.

Inspector C: ...Detectives obviously, in the old days, that was the upper class policemen. Because he knows more, he's got more intelligence ...in the old days. Now the guys [do not] wan[t] [to] work there [be]cause there's too much stress on them. There's too much work, ...too much overtime to do work but they get the same salary. So there's nothing in it for the guys becoming detectives... nobody wants to be there [pause] ...you see where I'm going to? That's basically the problem I think. Because you haven't got the guys with the necessary knowledge...

Inspector D: Nowadays the detectives are so glad if someone are willing to come and work here, we accept almost everybody [laughter], so in the old days, as he explained now, you have to ...eh... they will class you.

Inspector C: ...go into your background. ...then you get a six-month probation ...period ...at the station. Then after that, they will say he's fit to be a detective or not. Now, they stay. Once they're here, they stay.

Khumalo (2001) reported similar findings among the Gauteng Province detectives, who regarded themselves as professionals with clients to serve and performance standards to maintain. They also suggested that the "detective hiring policies and procedures" be improved.

At both police stations the police officers interviewed mentioned that some of the detectives had ended their police service since the policy changes in 1994. In most cases they were not replaced by new detectives and the remaining detectives had to deal with a reduced number of staff and an increasing workload. This caused many of them to work under severe stress and pressure, leading to even more detectives being booked off by their doctors as a result of stress. This affected the remaining detective's productivity, which was especially the case at Police Station 2.

Superintendent M: I put it in this way. A couple of years ago, three or four years ago, there were 20 detectives at this station. Just from the detectives' side, there were 20 detectives to do the job. [pause] Now at this stage we have 11 on record, as I said of which today eight are off sick. Six of them are off with stress at this moment... and that's severely affecting our productivity at this stage. But not due to the fact that people aren't working. The fact remains that the burden gets bigger now.

According to Leggett (2002), the number of staff within the South African Police Service has been in decline since 1994. Many ideologically committed members left the service since their rank and training made them marketable in the private sector, while others retired as a result of anticipated affirmative action and the uncertain future of the police.

However, the retirement of officers from the police service following its transformation does not appear to be unique to South Africa. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Central and Eastern Europe were faced with having to decide between transforming their policing services according to Western models, but to also ensure broader economic, culturally sensitive and socio-political transformations. The number of police officers leaving the service rose sharply during the first two years of political changes in these 'post-socialist' countries. However, where they differ from the South African situation is that the number of new officers joining the service in Albania and Lithuania increased three fold since 1992, while this tendency was more moderate in Poland and Hungary (Koci, 1996).

4.2.1.4 Duration of transformation process

Two of the interviewees at each of the two police stations acknowledged that transformation is a long process and even though many changes have already occurred in the SAPS, it would still take years before the process is complete.

Inspector A: Transformation is [a] thing that don't take a day or two, it takes years. So, yes, we're still busy doing transformation now. ...But I think from 1994 up to now we have seen a lot of changes. ...Commissioner Petros, he will make a difference, he has made a difference already.

Senior Superintendent Y: I think the most difficult process was the transformation. I'm talking about the transformation of the eleven police agencies... So for the police members ...it's still a mind shift. Because you can't expect them to have that drastical change of 30 years or 40 years back into 1 year, or 10 years, or 11 years, because they can't. It's not easy. So the transformation aspect, yes, it is a problem. We're going there slowly but surely.

Captain K: I think it will take another ten years for the people to ...realize that we are busy in the reality, you know. And its not really necessary for a man to stand with a knife or a gun behind you and tell you 'pick up that paper there' or 'do your work'...

Senior Superintendent X: ...we had a trial now for ten years, I can see we're moving there slowly but surely. We're moving into that direction when it comes to discipline.

4.2.2 TRAINING

Training methods seemed to have changed since 1994 from a previously militaristic manner to a softer approach or a "kind of laissez-faire style". Even though both Station Commissioners emphasized the importance of training, the Station Commissioner at Police Station 1 especially emphasized the lack of discipline within training courses. It seemed like the changes surrounding training methods were especially difficult for him, since he was a trainee officer prior to 1994 and experienced the decrease in the standard of training first-hand.

Senior Superintendent Y: After '94 we moved into a new dispensation [pause] of training where certain things were said by...we are moving away from the military aspect. ...The reason why I quit training as a trainee officer is that...With our democracy our training methodology changed also... because we didn't have that military [pause] that military aspect into the training anymore. Because now the police members are being trained in a kind of laissez-faire style. ...They come to your classes as they like. ...I wasn't used to that kind of things. ...When it comes to training, discipline must be there. ...and when you change from that to a more soft approach then I said no, training is not for me anymore. I rather go out and go see if I can work on the station and help members there. And up to now yes, I'm successful. I'm still helping them, still supporting them. So, this... I'm still enjoying it; I still got a passion.

Through the interviews with both Station Commissioners it was found that a "Performance Enhancement Programme" was in place, which assessed the need for skills training of component heads at station level. The information on

required skills training courses would then be fed back to area level. However, it seems that even though this programme was in place, it was not followed through to completion, since seven of the fourteen police officers interviewed mentioned that training courses were not regularly available. The reason for this was mainly stated as "due to financial constraints". This impacts on the productivity of the station, as senior police officers now have to provide their new colleagues with in-service training, despite having to deal with their own daily workload.

Inspector D: Besides our own work in the investigations ...we must train them. ... I won't say its an impossible task, but its almost impossible.

Inspector C: It gets to you after a couple of months.

Superintendent M: ... half of this time he has to sit with that [new detective] trying to teach him. So its obviously got a ...its a snowball effect. He has to do ...less work on his job to see that this [new detective] gets trained on this side. ...we'd love him to go to college first, get the necessary training. ...But we haven't got the time, we don't get those courses at this stage, so we have to ...make do with what we have. And that's the only other solution, is to give him in-service training.

A definite need or "hope" for regular training courses was expressed by many of the police officers interviewed. However, one of the police officers interviewed at Police Station 2 said that in reality, it would mean they would have to make do with even less staff during these periods of training.

Superintendent M: ...the problem is, if you have to take someone out of the field now, for example to go and do that training course, ...we can use him, he's being utilized here ...to carry specific dockets. So he is ...part of our manpower. But the minute we have to send him to a training college for a couple of weeks, somebody else will have to carry his burden. You see its a ... actually a sick cycle. But we haven't got other choices at the moment.

According to a 2001 national survey, the United States police agencies have identified similar factors impacting on their crime clearance rates. Personnel strength, technology and training were identified as the main factors and were also in greatest need of additional funding and research (Horvath *et al*, 2001).

4.2.3 COURT IMPACT

The communication process and the relationship between the police officers and court prosecutors were also assessed in order to identify any “best practices” or constraints. It was found that the police officers and the prosecutors mainly communicate via the docket and they consult to negotiate if further time is required for investigations:

Superintendent M: ...they discuss the matter with an investigating officer and there are two ways of communicating. Either verbally, but normally the prosecutor... everything that's still outstanding on the case, he writes down at the back of the docket, called column C of the docket, whereby they communicate. ...So he [the investigating officer] obviously complies with these instructions. Then it gets sent back to court and the public prosecutor will scrutinize the docket again. If he or she is happy with it -the investigation, then they proceed, then they tell the magistrate they have it for court. Otherwise they ask for postponement, because of the fact they haven't finalized the case. In other cases you need to wait for forensic reports, etc.

Inspector C: Obviously the investigator will speak to the prosecutor beforehand and visit the post mortem. ... if there's any investigation still to be outstanding you will ask the prosecutor to give you a couple of days further. ...But you consult ...you consult.

The officer at Police Station 2 thought that the communication process (sending dockets from the police station to court and vice versa) between the investigating officer and prosecutor was not a lengthy process. However, he commented that the particular court served many police stations and had its own issues that are caused by a lack of human resources and a heavy workload.

Superintendent M: ...it isn't such a long process. What happens is ...if it's meant for the senior public prosecutor to peruse, then obviously you hand it in there. And now you must remember, this is only for [Police Station 2], but [court B] has a lot of situations under its command and under its control, and all those dockets goes to [court B]. And there are only a few prosecutors that deal with these cases. So they have a huge workload to work on, so you get first in - first out service...so you have to wait in the line. And that's obviously a part of the problem that we experience.

At both police stations it was pointed out that the actual preparation of the docket and the collection of evidence were what caused the delay in taking the case to court. It could be that the collection of evidence and preparation of the docket for court impacted heavily on their workload and that waiting for the docket to return from the prosecutor was not regarded as a problem, since there were other cases to investigate during that time.

Superintendent M: That can take up to two years to get everything; ... it differs from case to case. Murder dockets ...you never close a murder docket. That always stays on the table, ...until you get a hold of that suspect. But if it's a[n] open and shut case it depends on, it can be a couple of months and then you have everything ready. But I've seen cases [that] take up to two years before it's been ready for court.

Inspector D: It sounds a very quick way of doing things but ...in practice its ...a couple of months I think... to obtain all the evidence, to get all the reports from all the other specialized units that visited the scene... So it's a very lengthy process...

Inspector C: Especially post mortem reports.

However, if the detective and the prosecutor had the kind of relationship in which they could stay in contact throughout the investigation, it could reduce the number of dockets returned from the prosecutor for need of further investigation. Two of the officers interviewed thought that the communication process or linkage between the police and the court could be "narrower". The officer at Police Station 1 acknowledged that certain "miscommunications" can occur and stated that "They should communicate definitely better".

The officer at Police Station 2 thought that a computer linkage between the court and police station would help to eliminate the search for misplaced dockets, which seem to have occurred many times before:

Captain L: ...many a times the prosecutor phoned... when they look for a docket, they can't find a docket. But, in the mean time the docket is there. The investigating officer look for dockets, but then the docket is with him, so... Somewhere along the line things doesn't work out because they do it manually by book.

The withdrawal of court cases also contributed to the investigators' frustrations and stress of their workload. According to the detectives interviewed at Police Station 1, it does not happen on a "regular basis" and it is usually the petty crimes that are withdrawn to save time for the court and the prosecutors. In other instances cases are withdrawn if there are insufficient witnesses.

Captain I: There isn't enough witnesses, they won't take that case to trial because it's gonna be a waste of time, maybe...how can I explain...For the time's sake they don't prosecute if they can't prove...It's a waste of time. You see. So, they actually know of years of experience that it's gonna be a waste of time. Other than that... there is some cases that definitely need to be investigated more.

However, there are instances when cases are withdrawn after much work done by the detectives and this is very frustrating to them. They felt that the possibility of the case being withdrawn could have been pointed out to them at an earlier stage of the investigation.

Inspector C: ...you do get the cases that you feel you got a solid case against the guys ...charged in court.

Inspector D: ...and unfortunately that... that wastes our time very very much.

Inspector C: You see ...you do a lot of work to get the docket prepared for court ...you can understand, they haven't got time as well, to get all the dockets in court ...eh... you see... through the court system. They're either withdrawn, but it's a lot of our time that's been wasted. Why didn't they withdraw the charge from the beginning? Get somebody at the police station to say...'This is not worth going to court'.

An interesting comment by Leggett (2003b) indicated that the prosecution would not accept cases that they perceive to be without adequate investigation, since their failure to secure a conviction after acceptance is seen as a negative performance indicator on their part.

Another frustrating issue for the police officers was the impact of the accused person's rights when going to trial. The study conducted among the Gauteng Province detectives also found that they perceived the constitution as an obstacle to their daily work activities (Khumalo, 2001).

Superintendent M: I'll tell you what. It's frustrating. ...and I've seen cases being postponed for eight times, eight times for the suspect, or the accused to get legal aid. But now it goes to court, they want all your witnesses to go and testify. The minute one of them doesn't show up they withdraw the case. So you have to put the case on the roll again, you have to go back to them, if you get a court date you have to go back to them, you have to subpoena them again, you start all over again. And that to me is wrong. I mean, the accused got all the rights lately. But the minute there's something wrong on the investigation part they withdraw the case or they throw it out. That's just basically what happens, and to be quite honest, pisses one off [laughter].

The withdrawal of court cases does not only affect and frustrate the detectives, but especially the people of the community for whom it is an even more personal matter. Those community members are often left with feelings of helplessness after such case withdrawals, as pointed out by one officer at Police Station 1:

Captain I: Well, I've got something that happened the other day. The whole investigation was done. ...docket was already in court. So the chief prosecutor refused to prosecute. And the lady was sitting there, obviously very upset, ... and asking that why the case has been withdrawn... Someone was knocked down by car, Ok. And there was a witness here that saw the car drive away. ...asking me now what can she do now to get this case to court. I said 'what can I do to help you?' I'm not a state prosecutor or the senior prosecutor to explain what in this instance happened. But for my knowledge maybe it is on technical points, but this is a serious case, why didn't it even [go to] trial.

4.3 CONSTRAINTS

The police officers were asked what they thought the constraints to efficiently performing their daily work activities were. Four themes were identified from their responses, and were classified as constraints regarding resources, organisational matters, social/community factors and gangs/syndicates.

4.3.1 RESOURCES

At Police Station 1, the resource constraints ranged from computer equipment and a lack of computer training courses, to budgetary allocations, vehicles, human resources and limited office space. The police officer in charge of finance commented that not enough money was allocated to Police Station 1 “specially when it comes to your overtime...” He commented that the budget is allocated from the national head office, to the provincial and then the area office. Only then is it allocated to each police station:

Captain J: You can put your reasons in to say what your needs are, but you don't get what you need, so [pause] actually, you got no control over what you receive at the end of the day. ...What I basically control and see that the expenses are authorized and legit. But when it comes to the budget itself, I only monitor it; I got no control over it. I would like to... If you want to do a decent job you should have control over budget.

An unrecorded discussion with the logistics unit of Police Station 1 revealed that even though 23 vehicles were allocated to them, not all were functioning. They commented that some were being repaired, while others were written-off completely and that it could take months or up to a year for these vehicles to be replaced.

The impact of having limited vehicles and human resources was further worsened as a result of staff members that were booked off on stress-related sick leave. This made patrolling of the area very difficult for the uniformed officers and the community consequently complained about the service provided by the police.

Inspector F: ...you can't function if you only have one police patrol van outside, because it's impossible. Thinking about... our area is about [pause] it's very, very big. ...the people are waiting for about an hour, two hours to get to them. To attend to their complaint... and then they get angry about it.

According to one of the police officers in the crime prevention unit, ways of overcoming these constraints were by motorcycle and foot patrol:

Inspector E: ...you have [to] use what you have... [pause] make the best of it. That's where the foot patrol comes in, motorcycle patrol. Its part of your work you must do... Everybody does exactly the same, from the Inspector to the Constable, from the Constable to the Captain.

At Police Station 2, the two main resource constraints reported were vehicles and human resources and their attitudes to these varied. One of the police officers complained about the difficulty in providing a useful service to the public, as they are expected to deliver their best with limited resources:

Inspector G: ...how can you go outside and serve the public if you don't have transport, you can't get to them. ...We are actually the service providers, so we must provide the service, go to them, you know. But as it's going now, that is terrible.

However, he made the same comment as an officer at Police Station 1, saying, "you have to make do with what you have" to avoid becoming "negative and miserable at the end of the day". Another officer commented that even though the logistics played a part, it was not "of that hundred percent utmost importance".

Captain K: ...If I am very positive in doing my work, then I will do my work without even a vehicle, I will walk...you know. It depends on the policeman himself, and not on the logistics.

The Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 was more diplomatic and said: "...vehicles go with human resources". He commented that due to the staff decrease it could not be expected to still have the same amount of vehicles as before, since the "norm" was that it should be two officers per vehicle, which was their current situation, after receiving three extra vehicles this year.

All five police officers interviewed at Police Station 2 commented on the lack of human resources. Besides being 50% understaffed, more than half of the detectives were booked off as a result of stress-related illnesses:

Superintendent M: ... almost all the stations ...are always 30-40% understaffed. This branch for example is 50% understaffed; ...detectives are off sick, with stress-related illnesses; that leaves three investigating officers to do all the work. It's impossible. ...and, I mean there's wishful thinking, hoping for other people to be transferred to your station because each and every station got the same burden. You don't have the people. So, at this stage we do what we can with what we have.

Inspector G: ... human resources, main problem here, obstacle. There isn't enough people to do the job. If there's people willing to... You get 50% that is willing to do the job.

As a result of their colleagues being on leave due to stress-related illnesses, the remaining detectives at Police Station 2 not only have to deal with an increasing workload, but are also subjected to risky situations without a partner to assist them when performing their duties in the evenings:

Inspector G: ...whenever I worked on the stand-by, the people died or people got shot and I had to go out you know, in the evenings, go to the scenes, go interview the witnesses, try to get hold of the perpetrators, and follow up leads. Yeah, that's one thing, then sometimes you're alone. Because of the resources.

The current situation at Police Station 2 is that the doctors of the detectives who are on stress-leave have recommended that they be moved to other units at the

station and the police officers feel that they have no other option but to comply with the doctors' recommendations:

Superintendent M: ...some of the doctors...eh...in fact make ...a written report where they say that this person can't be utilized at this unit anymore due to the stress and the fact that he can't cope here. And what's gonna happen now is, at the end of the day we'll have to think of transferring those people to other units, not necessarily to other stations but to the ...mobile unit or...the uniform branch for example. ...If the doctor says that they can't work here anymore, we have to seriously think about moving him... because if something happens, tomorrow morning they're gonna ask us 'what did you do? Since you know about the problem. What did you do to prevent it?'

This would result in other police officers having to receive in-service training by those detectives who are currently working at Police Station 2, which again raises the problems caused by a lack of formalized training courses.

Senior Superintendent X: And now we are ...currently sitting to move those that are on stress leave and to put new guys there. Unfortunately for us, they must be trained. Whereby the stress person is the person that have the training and can move forward, this person won't have, and we'll have to train that person and that could take some time. In-service training will be 98% of the time, in-service training.

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When interviewees at both police stations were asked about counselling services available to them, they acknowledged that it was available, but that it was often up to the individual how he dealt with stressful situations. This may indicate a possible stigma associated with counselling services available to the police.

Senior Superintendent X: Certainly, they do have counselling services available to them. It's up to them; it's voluntary. If they wanna use it ...yes or no. ...what also will have a huge impact on them is the human resources.

Senior Superintendent Y: Yes, the support will be always there. ...people differ from one another. So your perception maybe to a certain problem will be otherwise towards mine.

The general response was that these incidents were to be expected and that a dedicated policeman should be able to cope with such stressful situations. It was

interesting to note how the respondents referred to their work as a “calling” or a “passion”:

Senior Superintendent Y: ...If you haven't got that passion to deal and work with people then you are a loser. So it all goes down to the individual.

Captain I: The police service is a very good job, but you must be born to be a policeman. ...[or] you're gonna get lost here. You're definitely gonna get lost. You might get wrapped up in corruption. So I totally say from the bottom of my heart that it's definitely a call, it's definitely a call.

Inspector G: ...Only if you are a person with a strong character, principles and discipline, then... [that's] the only way you're gonna survive.

When the interviewer asked if it was possible to make contact with the detectives on stress-leave, she was informed that their doctors have recommended them to not have any contact with their colleagues. None of the detectives on stress-leave could therefore be interviewed for their perspectives.

4.3.2 ORGANISATIONAL MATTERS

The reduction in human resources led to an increased workload for the detectives and consequently many of them have certain “cold” or unsolved homicide cases, besides having to investigate more recent homicides as well as other petty crimes. The detectives at Police Station 1 said that they therefore have to prioritize certain cases:

Inspector D: ...So obviously the other cases don't get the necessary attention. And humanly it isn't possible to do all the other investigation on that cases. So ...you have a snowball effect. ...Where you have a suspect and you can arrest him and you have enough evidence and stuff to arrest the suspect.

Inspector C: If there's a suspect you must go after him. All the other cases can hold on. If there's a suspect...

Inspector D: It can wait...the other cases can wait.


It seemed that in the early 1990s police detectives had more support with the investigation of petty crimes. A separate “uniform unit” was available, which

investigated all the petty crimes, leaving the detectives to focus on more serious crimes. The closure of that unit led to all the work being passed to the detectives.

Inspector C: '91/'92

Inspector D: Roundabout there. They got rid of that unit [uniform unit] and some of the guys went back to the uniform branch, some of the guys ... joined the detectives. But the work was passed on to the detectives. All that cases and all that new dockets and so forth. That is part of the whole system that waste the time that we can spend on the serious crimes like rape and murder and that kind of thing. ...Ja. That was part of the uniform branch and they handled all the petty type of crimes like the assaults eh... accidents, culpable homicides, shoplifting, ja... all the petty type of crimes.

The detectives also stated that another reason for their high workload was the fact that they had to do preliminary investigation on victims from other cities or suburbs who died at the nearby tertiary state hospital before passing the docket to another police station.



At Police Station 2, the situation of having a lot of cold cases and prioritization was similar to Police Station 1. Their high workload and number of cold cases were attributed to the fact that they were 50% understaffed. The increasing pressure that's created on the remaining detectives might not be good for their morale and they are possibly also in danger of being severely affected as a result of the stress created by their work environment.

Superintendent M: At this station we have quite a few [cold cases], ja. Due to the fact that we are understaffed, and ...people are being pressurized now to perform and do other people's work... I mean, if you are already 50% understaffed you are working twice as hard as normal in order to cope. ...The workload gets bigger, and at some stage they just fold under the pressure. And that's one of the major issues that we need to address. ...we need to investigate each and every docket. The community expects it from us... And unfortunately ...we have to decide which is the most important. If you come and report a theft out of a motor vehicle case and you come report a rape case, obviously I will have to say to myself, 'look man, it's a theft out of motor vehicle, so she's probably got insurance, so she's covered. I have to help the other person.' So we have to look into the severity of the matter to decide which people are we gonna help first. That's obviously ...that's not the healthy situation, but at this stage, it's the only solution.

One of the police officers commented that “people have drained through the system”, referring to officers who have applied and qualified to move to other units. According to the Station Commissioner, he had certain support strategies in place to reduce the workload of detectives. He continued to explain that, even though the formal investigative capacity was still between 8am and 4pm, as soon as a crime was reported any immediate leads were followed-up. Assault cases were also dealt with and finalized as soon as possible.

Senior Superintendent X: So I started with a 24-hour detective thing. ...Investigation capacity is still between 8 and 4. But ...eh ...first contact. So it means that if I phone, I was being robbed, then the uniform branch will go out, they will take the statement, as they're busy with the statement, the detective will arrive. Not two weeks, there and then. ...and ask certain questions, leads and whatever. ...Then they will follow up leads. ...Arrest the person, if there's a fine that could be given to the person, fine him... assaults, normal dagga (cannabis), one, two sticks of dagga,... You fine him; the docket is done. Now the docket won't go to the investigating officers. ...that workload will decrease.

However, it seems like not everyone at the station agreed with his methods, and only after a formal “instruction” from provincial level to have a crime office in order to finalize certain cases timeously, he could expect their co-operation:

Senior Superintendent X: ...there's something I can tell you, they were 23 six years ago, they came down to 10, and I mean this is remarkably down. And the crime went up. Now they're sitting with 300 dockets, the national average is 25. ...In your 300 dockets you get murder, rapes, whatever and that is, you need a specialized person to investigate that dockets. So I took the bulk of the things, I took away. But unfortunately, certain people don't see what I see. Management problem. ...Maybe there is a problem with my skills of conveying the message. ...But then, luckily for me, the provincial instruction came. ...they instructed us, each station must have a crime office, and it works exactly what I want. Exactly. So now there was an instruction behind me. So now I could go down and say... post '94, instruct you, that is what I need... And then we started with it, and I can say to you how many arrests came in... That attitude has changed to 'sorry, who assaulted you? Him? Come with me, here's a fine. There you go'. The docket is closed; it doesn't go up to the investigating officer. So now he has more time to focus on his murder and...for the first month, we have about 500 odd dockets that ... was reported, that was registered. Out of that, about 300 odd was done by the crime office. The investigating officers didn't see 300 dockets.

Another constraint mentioned by an officer at Police Station 2 was the leakage of information. It appears that there is a certain lack of trust among some of the officers at the station; since information on planned operations were leaked to the community. This hampers crime prevention initiatives and the police officer commented that they are taking precautionary measures for it not to occur again:

Captain L: ...what we've discovered is that... eh... I think it happens everywhere...the leakage of information you know. From out of circles. So if I say the leakage of information, then I say ...the confidentiality of members also. ...it's concerning operations that we plan. And then we always find that... or hear that the people [in the community] already knew about the operation that's been planned. ...So that's a problem that we have. ...we've decided that when we plan an operation we keep it between a few people...

4.3.3 SOCIAL SUPPORT AND COMMUNITY FACTORS

The social support that the police provide the community was one of the factors identified at Police Station 1 that contribute to their already high workload. The officer commented that the community always approached the police first regarding social problems, whereas this was the responsibility of the Department of Social Services:


Inspector A: ...people should start realizing that the police are not the alpha and the omega about everything because a lot of people come to the police with social problems; problems that are not supposed to be within the police. And ...the police are limited with staff, ...because of all the other concerns, and people come like the police are first stop. ...those are the things that's stretching out people and the load that they are going with. ...They're [Department of Social Services] not visible, they're not integrated yet, as in the national structures they're supposed to do. ...and all these things [lie] in front of the police's doors...

This appears to be an even bigger burden on the officers at Police Station 2. One of the officers commented that they couldn't refuse to help the community with social issues, even though it's the responsibility of the Department of Social Services, for fear of being reported:

Captain K: So, what other people don't know...they expect from the police, they say 'no you must help me'. You see, but they don't go to the civil services and tell the people: 'hey, listen here lady, you must help me, because you're the social worker'. But then they come to the police, the policeman are so scared man, because the people report us 'just like that', because all the doors are open, for the complaints against us, but there's no doors for us going in, to complain about... the community. Because, to whom do I go, if I got a complaint against one of the community members? They will tell me are you... making a joke or what? How can you complain about Mrs Brown there on ...street number so-and-so. Mrs Brown, if she comes to the police station and she say that the child is rude or whatever, you must go and speak to the child. ...and I'm not a priest...you see; I'm a policeman.

The officer continued to say that social services are never close to those communities who need it most: "...where the poor people stay". This was perhaps best illustrated by the example he gave of a woman who had to take the taxi to court to get an interdict against her husband. Since she could not afford the transport cost:

Captain K: ...she comes to the police station. Then now I must take the van and take the lady there, ...so that they can help her. And then I must bring the lady back but in that same time, there's no vehicle to patrol the area ...you see.



4.3.4 GANGS/SYNDICATES

Since Police Station 1 is situated in an urbanized central area, one of their main problems are syndicates, who can easily move in and out of the area due to the many railway stations and taxis available as "escape routes".

Captain H: The problem is with your criminal elements. Your syndicates, you haven't got power over your syndicates. ...You haven't got any control over syndicates. ...90% of our criminal elements is not staying in [this area]. ...That's why we [are] target[ing] theft of motor vehicle and theft out of motor vehicle, because people are coming with taxis, trains, buses, and local transport they use to get to this place. ...so there's certain escape routes...

As a result of Police Station 2 being situated in a gang-infested area, they are often faced with problems of trying to gain the community's trust. Gangsters often threaten the community by saying that they will police the area:

Captain K: They will say ‘...we maintain law and order here in our vicinity. If your husband is out of order, then we go there... we hit him. If your child is out of ...or somebody rob him, we will see to that guy...we will see to it’ ...you see? ...that’s what makes our work so difficult because people lose their eh ...confidence in us.

Two of the officers at Police Station 2 commented that their attempts to combat the intimidation of gangsters on members of the community appear to be successful.

Senior Superintendent X: ...they will say ‘look, we are scared, we are victimized by the gangsters. They will think nothing of killing us’, and I can tell you...it [does] happen. They will kill the witnesses. So, now I ask them how can you assist us? ...Then I can see what I can do, how my reaction can be to assist... By reacting quicker and then we will move forward. Then we will move forward by just implementing something with the community once.

Captain K: ...and, its amazing man sometimes we arrest up to 400 people in a month’s time. And that is brilliant, for such a small place. See, so we do make our mark now ...in the community. And the community [does] see that we are working and they do phone us even...and give information and stuff so...

The interviews at both police stations revealed that the officers rely on their relationship with the community to a certain extent in their efforts to prevent crime. As one officer stated: “...if you haven’t got a good relationship with the community, you haven’t got neighbourhood watches...” However, it seems like the level of community involvement differed according to the income-level of the area. The officers commented that, within higher-income areas, neighbourhood watches are usually scarce; since people can afford to pay security companies to patrol the area they live in:

Captain H: Your more economical type of areas, they don’t even think about neighbourhood watches. They’ve got the money to hire security companies to patrol the area, so they’re not concerned. In your lower- or middle-class you can get involved with neighbourhood watches. So money plays also a role.

Captain K: ...[pause] And the rich people, the people who get money, the middle class and the upper class, they don’t... the police station is fine for them. Because they won’t need them so often than the poor people...

One of the officers also remarked that, "...communities are up in arms when they've been the target or a victim of crime..." and this usually results in neighbourhood watches being initiated. However, he continued by saying that they usually only last for about six weeks until they are no longer the target of crime.

4.4 POLICE OFFICERS' RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THEIR EFFICIENCY

The police officers' recommendations to improve the efficiency of their daily work activities were connected with what they identified as their constraints. According to the officers interviewed, resources, empowerment, crime prevention and convictions were some of the main issues that needed to be addressed.

Resources ranged from logistics to human resources and money for periods of overtime. One of the detectives at Police Station 1 thought that the concept of detectives and their duties need to be re-visited and summarised it as follows:

Inspector D: ...I personally feel that the South African Police Service definitely must do something about ...the whole detective concept, ... regarding manpower and case dockets' ...working load. ...I think its in the European cities or towns its like that... If there's a murder case, there will be 4 or 5 detectives working on that case. In South Africa, it's just the opposite...

Inspector C: You've got one guy working on 3 murder cases. ...It goes down to manpower.

Inspector D: ...for instance you must go and speak to a suspect that's out of the province it will take you a couple of hours to ride to him and to come back and in that eight hours working shift or day you only obtain say, one or two eh... statements in that period. So you haven't done very much in that... you work overtime where you don't get paid for so... obviously it comes down to manpower and money.

The interviews revealed that the yearly "status" of a police station basically determined their fate for the remaining financial year. The status of a station

ranged from 'presidential' to 'priority' to 'gang-infested' and to 'normal' stations. While Police Station 1 was a 'normal' station, Police Station 2 was classified as 'gang-infested'. The status of a police station consequently determined the resources and support allocated to them:

Senior Superintendent Y: ...when you become a priority of the provincial or area then you will be allocated more support in terms of vehicles, in terms of manpower...

Senior Superintendent X: Presidential stations mean that they can say whatever they want, and they will get it. ...If you could put whatever human resources, and vehicle resources, and logistical resources in [a presidential station], ...you lower [the caseload] by thousands. So it makes sense. And that's presidential. The ...five priority stations below the presidential stations, they're actually also given the same capabilities.

According to the Station Commissioner at Police Station 2, stations in gang-infested areas also get certain priorities. It may not be as much as presidential or priority police stations, but it was more than certain 'normal' stations:

Senior Superintendent X: ...I must say we do get, and we're also prioritized higher than the normal stations like Camps Bay and Hout Bay, and Rondebosch, the previous privileged stations. I must say they got everything; that's one thing you can put in whatever you're writing. And, so now it's time that it's being changed.

Even though Police Station 2 was not selected as one of the presidential or priority stations as yet, the Station Commissioner tended to agree with the Provincial Commissioner's strategy of selecting five presidential and priority police stations each financial year, in order to make an impact on the reduction of crime:

Senior Superintendent X: ...so he is going to come to the other places in Cape Town, and Camps Bay and so on. So it's going to, but it's gonna take some time. It's no use me as a Provincial Commissioner say one to you, one to you... What impact is that gonna be? Zero. No impact. ...but if we take one station, we give that station everything, and we tell that Station Commissioner 'If you don't perform you're out because you are getting everything, and all the other Station Commissioners envy you'. And that is it, now he comes down the ladder. And my time is gonna come... next year I'm feeling positive. ...I feel that now the provincial commissioner is right. He's right with that type of planning.

Both Station Commissioners commented on the importance of teamwork and the empowerment of their staff members. However, the availability of training courses will influence the success of empowerment:

Senior Superintendent Y: Empower them, allow them to do...eh...courses and all that, then you will experience that those members are very, very positive... You'll experience that my components... I'm not like a boss looking over their shoulders. ...if you don't work as a team you won't be successful.

The prevention of crime will undoubtedly help reduce the detectives' workload. An officer at Police Station 2 said that enforcing the law on the minor crimes could prevent the occurrence of major ones. He also stressed the importance of education among the youth and policing in dangerous areas to prevent them from committing crime. He reflected on the Apartheid era and the difference in policing among the various neighbourhoods:

Captain K: ...what I've noticed in the old days, in the Apartheid era, all the white places had police stations, or most of them had police stations, and the police patrolled the white areas dominantly... Day and night, they patrolled them. So the white kid, he couldn't do crime. Because when he looked up he see the police van, when he looked left, he see a police van. But by us [coloured neighbourhoods], you see a police van once in a week. So that [boy], he can't call on the police for help... He must survive on his own... It's a second nature for him to be aggressive... So, yes...I would say to police and to educate the people from very small onwards, ...will help a lot, and the policeman must combat the smaller crimes...

Besides doing crime intelligence gathering and analysis to establish certain crime trends on a weekly and monthly basis, Police Station 2 also records the profiles of suspicious and arrested persons. This assists them and other crime fighting agencies with the tracing of suspects.

Captain L: What we do is we bring them in, ...under the Loitering Act. ...bring him to the station, ...write him a fine for loitering, and then we take a photo of him, get his home address and then we let him go again. ...we do profiles on each and every person that goes through the cells. Excluding [those] booked in for being under the influence of liquor. If ...we see that the person is a... gangster or a regular problem maker... we profile him. ...we write this data of ...where he stay, where he works. We check everything. Then we open a file, put his photo in. Then

we go to the computer, check our database whether there's any outstanding criminal cases against him, or if he's not being sought by other police units. ...so whenever somebody comes, people from serious violent crime, which normally happens, or from other units, the Scorpions or whatever agency. They always phone 'Don't you know such and such a person?' We can go to our file and say 'Ok, we've got him'.

These profiles could deter gangsters and others from committing crimes. It appears that Police Station 2 is quite pro-active with regards to crime prevention strategies, despite their human resource and other constraints.

Captain L: ...Just yesterday we were complimented by the zone ...eh...Commissioner. And he said that Police Station 2 is the only station that's running this whole system well. That's why we're having some good successes.

The Station Commissioner at Police Station 2 said that previously, the detectives could not focus on convictions because of their high workload. However, now that support strategies are in place to reduce the number of dockets for investigation, he expected the conviction rate to increase.

Senior Superintendent X: ...The detective with 300 dockets, he cannot focus on convictions, I'm sorry to say, with 300 you cannot...Now I'm forcing them to focus on [it] because ...eh ...his 300 dockets will become less every month. ...when he was normally on stand-by and received ...about, say 50-60 dockets per month, but now he will receive about, between 5 and 15 dockets per month. So that's a major decrease. So now I expect convictions. [If] the witness didn't pitch up, that's not an excuse. Waiting for the post mortem -that's not an excuse. 'Take your car and go to the doctor, you go fetch it, if he tells you it's still outstanding, then you tell him when is the date and time that I can come and collect it, then you go and collect it'. ...and that is what I zone into now, focusing into now. In the past I couldn't focus on convictions, but now I can. And I must say I feel relieved.

The previous statement and the comment made by Leggett (2003b), regarding conviction failures as a negative performance indicator for prosecutors, makes one wonder if convictions should perhaps be a sole accountability assigned to one of the two departments; or whether this only emphasizes the need for closer collaboration between the police and prosecutors.

CHAPTER 5:


CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The South African Police Service has certainly faced an enormous task of transformation since the end of Apartheid in 1994, and after ten years has achieved a number of successes. Even though many changes have occurred, there are still some challenges that remain to be addressed before the transformation process is complete.

The three main constraints identified at both participating police stations were training, vehicles and human resources, the latter being especially emphasized at Police Station 2 as a result of detectives booked off on stress-leave. These constraints were all generally attributed to another underlying issue, namely a lack of sufficient funding.

A review of the literature has shown that South Africa was not the only country faced with transformation challenges. Koci (1996) discussed the challenges and consequences of the transformation of police services within Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. Similarities between South Africa and these European countries were found in terms of police officers retiring from the service at the beginning of the transformation process, when many were faced with uncertainties regarding their future. However, the question remains as to how some of these 'post-socialist' countries managed to quickly overcome these challenges and increase their number of officers, a process that did not occur in South Africa.

When the officers at both police stations were asked for their recommendations regarding the improvement of their daily work activities, they identified resources, empowerment, crime prevention and convictions as some of the main issues that needed to be addressed. Even though Police Station 2 appeared to be severely affected by the lack of resources, the staff seems to be more pro-active in order to overcome their constraints. This makes one realise that a lack of human resources is perhaps not the only reason for the challenges faced by some police stations, and that management plays a key role in overcoming constraints. It is hoped that Police Station 2 will be taken into consideration for becoming either a presidential or priority station during the next financial year, to support the efforts they have made thus far in addressing their challenges.




The interviews with the police officers revealed that there are various issues of management at national and provincial level that need to be addressed. The consequences of a decline in detective 'recruitment standards' since 1994 was not only mentioned by some of the officers interviewed in this study, but also by the Gauteng Province detectives, who suggested improvements (Khumalo, 2001).

However, an improvement in detective recruitment standards cannot be expected without the improvement of training courses. The fact that so many of the officers interviewed mentioned a decline in training standards and methods since 1994 and expressed the "hope" for formalized training courses, should be cause for serious consideration of improvement. An increase in detective and conviction rates cannot be expected when senior officers have to devote the majority of their time

to in-service training of new recruits, and an alternative method or solution to this type of training should be sought. In the United States, personnel strength, technology and training have also been identified as factors impacting on crime clearance rates among police agencies (Horvath *et al*, 2001).

At both police stations, in order to deal with an ever-increasing workload, cases are prioritised according to the severity of the crime and the evidence available. Addressing the management of less severe or petty crimes will enable detectives to devote their time to the investigation of more serious crimes and the many unsolved or 'cold' homicide cases. The fact that the police are so often approached by the community to assist with social problems also appears to impact on their workload. The Department of Social Services should be made more accessible to those communities in need of their assistance.



The interviews revealed that the communication process between the police and prosecutors during investigations are mainly via dockets. Some of the officers acknowledged that certain "miscommunications" may occur and thought the communication process and relationship between police officers and prosecutors could be improved. The officers also suggested that a computer linkage between the courts and SAPS be established, to avoid the misplacement of dockets and to keep delays in the finalization of court cases to a minimum. Even though literature has shown the successes of integrated criminal justice information systems (Myrent, 2000), it was also reported as being quite costly within the United States (Prisoc, 2000b; Monti, 2000). It is unclear whether South Africa has the

technological capacity or resources to make such a system viable in the near future.


The withdrawal of cases after much time was spent on investigations was considered to be particularly frustrating for police officers who thought that they could have been informed earlier in the investigation process. This indicates the need for closer collaboration between the police and prosecutors. Further research is required to gain the courts' and prosecutors' perspectives regarding performance indicators for prosecutors and the accountability for conviction rates.

This study explored the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process at two police stations in Cape Town. A possible limitation or criticism could therefore be that the results cannot be generalized to the entire SAPS. However, literature has shown that crime in South Africa has increased while prosecutions and convictions dropped between 1994 and 2000 (Schönteich, 2002b). Blockages within the South African criminal justice system have been identified as far back as 1996 (Schönteich, 2002a), again in 2000 following a study on intimate femicide (Vetten, 2003), in a 2001 study to assess the accountability of Gauteng detectives (Khumalo, 2001), in a 2003 pilot study to determine the victim-perpetrator relationships and motives for homicide (Prinsloo, 2003) and again in the results of this mini thesis. The question therefore remains as to how many studies still need to be conducted before these issues are addressed.

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
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APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM

My name is Megan Prinsloo. I am a Researcher at the MRC-UNISA Crime, Violence and Injury Lead Programme. I am also a registered student at the University of the Western Cape and will be conducting this study for work purposes, as well as towards a Master's degree in Public Health.

My study is titled "Factors Impacting on the Criminal Investigation Process in Cape Town, South Africa". The purpose of this study is to explore and compare the factors impacting on the criminal investigation process at two selected police stations in Cape Town, in order to identify any best practices and possible constraints towards the efficiency of crime detection and convictions.

Please note the following:

- Participation in the study is voluntary.
- Please be assured that anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained.
- All information will be kept in a secure place by the researcher and will be reported on within certain limits.
- You may withdraw your consent to participate in the study at any point.
- Kindly sign the consent form if you agree to participate in the study.

I, (full name of interviewee) hereby give consent to participate in the aforementioned study. The study was explained to me by..... (researcher). I accept that my name will be kept confidential and only relevant information will be used for research purposes. I understand that I may withdraw my consent to participate in this study at any point. **Signed**..... **Date**.....