SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES:

A CASE STUDY OF BLACK COMMUNITIES IN THE CEDERBERG AND MATZIKAMA MUNICIPALITIES IN THE MID-2000s

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By

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Abstract

Transforming economic growth into tangible benefits for poor communities appears to have frustrated development practitioners and policy makers. Despite the net positive growth achieved between 1994 and 2014 the face of poverty and inequality remains largely unchanged in South Africa. In such circumstances there is a pressing need for scholars to rethink the social foundations of economic activity and policy (Chang, 2006; Fine, 2001, 2005).

One specific line of enquiry that has attracted attention among economists (Stiglitz, 2000; Woolcock, 2001; Fine, 2001) is that of social capital. This thesis seeks understanding of the relationship between social capital and the socioeconomic advancement of poor African/Black residents, particularly those in rural municipalities where there is a lack of financial and other resources. With this in mind, Robert Putnam's path-breaking theory will be reformulated to explore the relationship during the mid-2000s between social capital, trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes in two rural municipalities in the Western Cape province of South Africa, namely Cederberg and Matzikama.

The research questions the adequacy of Putnam's theory of social capital, arguing that it is conceptually simple and inadequate as a description of how membership in social groups (networks) lead to better socioeconomic outcomes in the context of marginal, rural African/Black communities residing in under-capacitated municipalities. The thesis argues that an alternative conceptual framework is required, capable of depicting the complexity of the social processes required to translate social group membership into tangible benefits for poor households, as an explanation of why African/Blacks in Cederberg experienced better socioeconomic outcomes than their counterparts in Matzikama.

To answer the address the research question, a number of sub-questions are investigated:

- What are the different levels of social group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama amongst the African/Black population group?
- To what extent is the Putnam thesis adequate as an explanation of the transmission mechanism from social group membership to better socioeconomic outcomes in the context of marginal groups residing in rural municipalities?
- What are the insights from the literature that needs to be considered in the design of an alternative conceptual framework which is more nuanced and complex, capable of

explaining the social processes in the transmission mechanism from social group membership to better socioeconomic outcomes?

- Which forms of organisations are best suited for transmitting social capital into socioeconomic outcomes?
- What type of leadership is necessary for transmitting social capital into socioeconomic outcomes?

The thesis postulates an alternative to Putnam, arguing that social groups (networks) differ in terms of the characteristics with which they are imbued, making some of them more effective than others and that agency, often in the form of community or state agency, is more likely to be the driving force in the transmission from social networks to better socioeconomic outcomes.

The scope of the research is limited to the municipal boundaries of Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities in the West Coast region of the Western Cape province of South Africa. Although the quantitative findings are reported for all race groups for illustrative reasons, the research is primarily focused on the comparative experiences of the African/Black residents.

The study uses a mixed method approach—i.e. both qualitative and quantitative methods to measure social capital. The quantitative research method entailed the conducting of municipality-wide surveys in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. A fully structured face-to-face interview technique was used for the survey method. The data was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics and path analysis.

The findings shed light on the nature of social capital in rural municipalities and showcase how social capital impacts on socioeconomic outcomes. It is hoped that the research will deepen our understanding of how communities can mobilise their social capital more effectively towards the improvement of public policy outcomes.

Keywords

Social capital; Networks; Associations; Putnam; Political participation; Civic engagement; Collective action; Political trust; Government effectiveness ; Socioeconomic outcomes

Declaration

I declare that *Social Capital and Developmental Outcomes: A Case Study of Black Communities in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities in the mid-2000s* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination at any other university, and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Amiena Bayat June 2015

Signed: …A.Bayat……

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List of Abbreviations

AGM	Annual General Meeting
ANC	African National Congress
CAS	Cape Area Study
CDW	Community Development Worker
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDPR	Gross Domestic Product (Regional)
HR	Human Resources
ID	Independent Democrats
IDP	Integrated Development Plans
IV	Instrumental Variables
KPA	Key Performance Area
LED	Local Economic Development
MEC	Member of the Executive Community
NESF	National Economic and Social Forum
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Square
PM	Performance Management
2SLS	Two-Stage Least Squares
SDBIP	Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plans
SES	Socioeconomic Status
SGM	Social Group Membership
SOCAT	Social Capital Assessment Tool
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
VLIR	Flemish Interuniversity Council (Vlaamse Interuniversitaire Raad)

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Transforming economic growth into tangible benefits for poor communities appears to have frustrated development practitioners and policy makers. Despite the net positive growth achieved between 1994 and 2014 the face of poverty and inequality remains largely unchanged in South Africa. In such circumstances there is a pressing need for scholars to rethink the social foundations of economic activity and policy (Chang, 2006; Fine, 2001, 2005).

One specific line of enquiry that has attracted attention among economists (Stiglitz, 2000; Woolcock, 2001; Fine, 2001) is that of social capital. This thesis seeks understanding of the relationship between social capital and the socioeconomic development of poor African/Black[1] residents, particularly those in rural municipalities where there is a lack of financial and other resources. With this in mind, Robert Putnam's path-breaking theory will be reformulated to explore the relationship during the mid-2000s between social capital, trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes in two municipalities in the Western Cape, South Africa, namely Cederberg and Matzikama.

The two South African municipalities under study are similar in socioeconomic status, are in the same geographic region, and are characterised as rural municipalities with severe capacity constraints. These municipalities differ from the Italian municipalities in the northern and southern regions of Italy studied by Putnam (1993) and described in his famous study, *Making Democracy Work*—they are more ethnically heterogeneous and have a much shorter history of electoral politics than the Italian regions in the Putnam study. Despite the differences

[1] A note of explanation is necessary here: The terms African and Black have been used to describe the ethnic identity of that segment of the two communities that formed the focus of the study. The reason for this is that "Black" in the South African context includes those formerly designated as "African," "Coloured" and "Asian." "African/Black" is therefore a subset of Black people. The use of racial categories in this study should not be interpreted as acceptance of the system of racial segregation practiced under Apartheid. They have been used purely because the legacy of racial division, both in social and spatial terms, persists in many forms and continues to influence a range of outcomes in South African society.

highlighted above, this thesis will explore the value of Putnam's thesis in a South African rural municipal context.

1.2. RATIONALE/BACKGROUND

Approximately 33% of South Africa's population and 55% of South Africa's poor households live in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2014, p. 46). Apart from the desperate social conditions faced by most residents of rural municipalities, the local authorities (sometimes as a consequence of the environment in which they find themselves) also have to deal with myriad challenges—they have a meagre tax base to draw from because they have poor industrial and commercial sectors and are institutionally weak and have severe capacity constraints that make it difficult for them to fulfil their mandates. They are also less resourced to nurture state-civil society participation which is paramount to legitimising what "government wants to implement" and, more essentially, "achieving power in terms of access to, and control of, resources necessary to protect livelihoods" (Hemson, Meyer, & Maphunye, 2004, p. 38).

Given the desperate conditions faced by rural populations and the constraints that rural municipalities face, this research investigates whether social capital improves the socioeconomic status of communities. In addition to the common characteristics shared by the two municipalities mentioned above, they are also predominantly agricultural, with their populations dispersed in rural areas and small towns, a large proportion of which are poor. They have high unemployment rates and the local economic base lacks diversity which limits their ability to increase revenues. A consequence of this is that it is difficult to raise development finance. In many ways their characteristics mirror those of other rural municipalities in South Africa.

It is with these conditions in mind that the proposed research aims to ascertain whether social capital can improve the wellbeing of poor communities in rural areas which are governed by resource-constrained local authorities. Drawing on data collected in the mid-2000s, the research explores the relationship between social capital, trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. It examines how under certain circumstances, social capital can be developed spontaneously by communities themselves, of their own volition and without relying on external resources. The research also shows how, when social capital is mobilised or activated in poor rural municipalities, it makes

a positive difference to the way in which poor communities can influence the allocation of state/public resources towards their needs.

1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The aim of the study is to assess the effect that social capital has on developmental outcomes in the municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama in the mid-2000s. The study examines the Putnam thesis in the context of marginal rural African/Black migrant communities that are governed by poorly resourced local authorities.

The specific aims of the thesis are to:

- Ascertain whether the presence of social capital can improve the wellbeing of poor African/Black residents in resource-constrained local authorities in rural areas.
- Rework Putnam's theory of social capital so as to provide an analytical framework capable of describing the transmission mechanism necessary for social capital to impact on socioeconomic outcomes in the South African small towns and rural context.
- Examine how marginalised African/Black rural residents who belong to networks and associations bring pressure to bear on municipalities to deliver better services.

1.4. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research questions the adequacy of Putnam's theory of social capital, arguing that it is conceptually simple and inadequate as a description of how membership in social groups (networks) lead to better socioeconomic outcomes in the context of marginal, rural African/Black communities residing in under-capacitated municipalities. The thesis argues that an alternative conceptual framework is required, capable of depicting the complexity of the social processes required to translate social group membership into tangible benefits for poor households, as an explanation of why African/Blacks in Cederberg experienced better socioeconomic outcomes than their counterparts in Matzikama.

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The thesis postulates an alternative to Putnam, arguing that social groups (networks) differ in terms of the characteristics with which they are imbued, making some of them more effective than others and that agency, often in the form of community or state agency, is more likely to be the driving force in the transmission from social networks to better socioeconomic outcomes.

Many studies have attempted to examine the relationship between social capital in the form of networks and associations and socioeconomic outcomes but the Putnam thesis has not been applied to study a specific marginalised racial group living in rural areas governed by local authorities that have capacity constraints. The municipalities that are studied here have been identified as 'Project Consolidate[2]' municipalities because they lack the necessary financial and human resources to fulfil their legislative mandate and operate efficiently according to criteria established by central government. This marks the point of departure of this research

[2] Introduced in 2005, Project Consolidate was the government's strategy to transform underperforming municipalities into entities capable of service delivery.

from the Putnam thesis in that it questions whether his theory applies to marginalised rural communities governed by poorly resourced local authorities with severe capacity constraints.

The scope of the research is limited to the municipal boundaries of Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities in the West Coast region of the Western Cape province of South Africa. Although the quantitative findings are reported for all race groups for illustrative reasons, the research is primarily focused on the comparative experiences of the African/Black residents.

The dissertation has several limitations. Firstly, the research is limited in that it investigates social capital and its impact on socioeconomic outcomes of African/Black residents of Cederberg and Matzikama. The reason for this was to focus on the experiences of the African/Black residents with a view of determining possible features that differentiate them from one another. In addition, the broader aspects of political economy such as the social, political and institutional make-up which favours elite formation were also not brought into the purview of this study.

It was initially thought that the findings would be discussed and interpreted according to the broad thesis of the Putnam model. As the findings were interpreted and analysed, however, it led to further refinement and subsequent development of an augmented analytical framework. This can best be described as a deductive process that flows from repeated iterations. The implications of such a deductive approach means that data collected did not always lead to a point of convergence to some of the refinements to the framework that were later added.

The thesis examines the impact that networks and associations have on socioeconomic outcomes. In the measurement of socioeconomic outcomes, technical criteria such as increases in per capita income or variations in the distribution of products were firstly difficult to obtain by race, and secondly considered to be influenced by factors that were partly exogenously generated. Thus socioeconomic outcomes were largely measured as residents' perception of their quality of life and access to the provision of basic services.

1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION

The thesis consists of seven chapters.

Chapter One presents background information on social capital, trust and participation in contemporary South Africa and the Western Cape. This is followed by the problem statement, purpose and objectives of the study, the questions posed in the research as well as the scope and limitations of the study.

Chapter Two reviews the latest international and local literature on social capital. The literature review covers the divergent views expressed on social capital, particularly its attitudinal and structural components and highlights the dominant schools of thought on the subject. The topics discussed include the different definitions and conceptions of social capital as well as the key criticism levelled at the social capital premise.

Chapter Three discusses Putnam's thesis on social capital. The aim of this literature review chapter is to provide an overview of Putnam's framework as a reference point to develop a comprehensive account that depicts how associations/networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. Putnam's work will be augmented with other insights from the literature.

Chapter Four develops an augmented framework of the Putnam thesis. It unpacks the salient features of networks, trust, political participation and government effectiveness that were discussed in Chapter Two. A typology of networks is developed which identifies different network characteristics including horizontal versus hierarchical characteristics, active versus passive membership, homogeneous versus heterogeneous membership, public versus private goods provision and political versus non-political characteristics. The framework further defines trust as being either formal or informal and examines state-civil society interactions. The augmented framework is used to analyse the quantitative and qualitative findings in later chapters.

Chapter Five discusses the research methodology employed in the study. It deals with the research design, methods, tools and instruments that were used throughout the research project life cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation. It demonstrates how the approach and methodology that was developed is relevant and appropriate given the research question and how, in addition to standard analysis, innovative instruments were employed to capture the information required. Both quantitative as well as qualitative methods were used in the research process. In Cederberg, the sample was selected to be representative of approximately 800

households, for 2,900 persons. In Matzikama the sample was designed to be representative of approximately 667 households in the municipality, for a total of 2,200 persons.

For data collected, path analysis was used to estimate whether there was a significant relationship between networks and associations, trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes. Data obtained from the qualitative interviews was used to further augment the research findings.

In **Chapter Six** data collected from the household surveys is presented and evaluated. A profile of social capital, trust and participation in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities is presented. This is supplemented with the results of the qualitative interviews with the sample of informants. The research findings form the basis of Chapter Six.

Chapter Seven outlines the main conclusions from the research and explores some possible contributions that could be made to the theory of social capital.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The term social capital entered the vocabulary of the social sciences in the 1990s. Portes (1998, p. 3) and Sobel (2002, p. 139) credit the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) with the first contemporary exploration of the term social capital. Coleman (1988) introduced the concept to American sociology. However, it was Putnam (1993) who catapulted the concept to the forefront of political science and economics with his famous study of Italian politics—*Making Democracy Work.*

This does not mean that the underlying ideas in the concept were not alive in economic scholarship before this period. Economists as early as Adam Smith acknowledged the role that social values and moral sentiments play in the economy. According to Van Staveren (2000, p. 11) social capital (although not by that name) has been in the discourse of the economic sciences literature since the time of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor and Thorstein Veblen—all of whom recognised the economic value of moral sentiments. Although not termed "social capital" at the time, these early economists acknowledged that caring values or "moral sentiments" were essential for well-functioning markets and states but this was never fully explored in a coherent manner in the economics literature. Van Staveren (2000, p. 11) also states that

> the lack of attention (until recently) to social capital in economic science, and the attempts to explain social capital within the neoclassical framework can at least be partially attributed to the marginalisation of research on the care economy.

Spies-Butcher (2003, p. 183) investigated the emergence of social capital in the economics discourse and implicitly questioned the sociological roots of the concept. He concluded that the concept of social capital was better understood as a result of the changes within economics rather than the coming together of economics and sociology. According to Spies-Butcher (2003, pp. 183–187) the rebuttal of the "abstract and reductionist methodology of rational choice theory" is in part a result of attempts by some economists to develop a more complex

"social methodology in economics that takes historical and social context seriously." It is also part of a "broader move in economics to recast economic methodology in a way that takes complexity, contingency and agency more seriously" (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 187). He observes that this was especially prevalent in the development of game theory (2003, p. 188). He points out that North, Ostrom, and Putnam all used game theory's "empirical evidence of how decisions at times contradicted the traditional account of rationality" in their understanding of collective action situations to inform their own work and in the build-up to a theory on social capital (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 187).

It is important to note that Putnam's original work on social capital was informed by the work of Douglas North who is a "significant contributor to the new institutional economics which has been at the centre of both the development of social capital and broader moves in economics to include social structure" (Spies-Butcher, 2003, p. 191). According to North (1997, p. 4) economic growth is primarily dependent on the structure of incentives and disincentives that make up the institutional framework of an economy and polity and that it is the belief system, social values or both that ultimately determine the institutional framework. In his view, "the structure of incentives and disincentives that make up the institutional framework of an economy and polity is more important than the superficial aspects of economic growth such as technology, human and physical capital." In one way economic growth is contingent on stable political and economic institutions which provide low transaction costs in impersonal political and economic markets (North, 1997, p. 4). The underlying belief systems of societies and the way in which these systems evolve is a key determinant "of institutions and their evolution" (North, 1997, p. 5).

There appears to be consensus among most of the authors considered here that an understanding of social values—the way in which they are constructed and their effect on incentives (how they shape the institutional framework of the economy)—is vital to grasping the economic performance of societies.

2.2 DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

As noted in the previous section, early economists acknowledged the role that social values/belief systems play in the functioning of the economy and state. Although not theorised as social capital at the time, the role of social values was discussed by economists particularly

as they attempted to move away from rational choice theory toward a more comprehensive social methodology in economics—a methodology that attempted to incorporate social structure more solidly in economics (Spies-Butcher, 2003).

The term social capital has been open to many interpretations in the literature. According to Spies-Butcher (2003, p. 184), the literature on social capital "prior to the 1980s was isolated and lacking in analytical foundation." It is interesting to note that economists were not the first to theorise the concept even though a debate was raging in the discipline as to how to incorporate more historical, contextual and social aspects into economics thinking. Spies-Butcher noted that a "theoretically grounded conceptualisation (of the term social capital) was developed by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam" (2003, p. 184).

This "theoretically grounded conceptualisation" of the term social capital in the literature has its roots in sociology albeit in a discussion on the political economy of class and the reproduction of privilege.

Portes (1998, p. 3) and Sobel (2002, p. 139) attribute the first[3] contemporary analysis of the term social capital to Bourdieu (1986) who introduced the concept in an article on "Forms of Capital." In his work, Bourdieu (1986) contends that one's connections play an important part in the reproduction of class and privilege. In a sense, Bourdieu sees social capital as an instrument of power (Harriss, 2002, p. 4).

Bourdieu defines the concept as "the aggregate actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual

[3] Note: In the mid-1980s several articles appeared about research into the use of social networks (not necessarily expressed in these terms) in job search and employment activities in the labour market. In general, these studies found that people with stronger networks were more successful at finding work or getting promoted in jobs they already held. Among the interesting findings in these studies was that social networks were more important among marginalised sections of society such as immigrant communities. While not using the term, these researchers were essentially discussing the idea of social capital around the same time as Bourdieu, although he was among the first to articulate a more coherent theoretical framework of social capital.

acquaintance or recognition" (Portes, 1998, p. 45). Portes believes Bourdieu's analysis is arguably the most theoretically refined among those that introduced the subject. Bourdieu's treatment of the subject focuses on the accrual of benefits to individuals by virtue of their participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource. Bourdieu also acknowledged that social networks must be deliberately created through investment strategies so that group interactions and relations can be used as a reliable source of potential benefits. In Portes's view, Bourdieu's definition of social capital reduces all forms of capital, including cultural capital, to economic capital.

> Hence through social capital actors can gain direct access to economic resources (subsidized loans, investment tips, protected markets); they can increase their cultural capital through contacts with experts or individuals of refinement . . . or they can affiliate with institutions that confer valued credentials . . . Bourdieu insists that the outcomes of possession of social or cultural capital are reducible to economic capital. . . . For example; transactions involving social capital tend to be characterized by unspecified obligations, uncertain time horizons and the possible violation of reciprocity expectations. But, by their very lack of clarity, these transactions can help disguise what otherwise would be plain market exchanges (Portes, 1998, p. 45).

Lin (2001, p. 25), Khan, Munir, and Willmott (2007, p. 7) and Baron, Field, and Schuller (2000, p. 8) suggest that Bourdieu's (1986) analysis is primarily focused on the use of contacts or networks by the dominant class and nobility to reproduce their privileges. In this instance Bourdieu's analysis provides a structural view of social capital. A structural view relates primarily to the structure of networks—in terms of who interacts with whom, how frequently, and on what terms—which have a major bearing on the flow of resources through that network. Those who occupy key strategic positions in the network, especially those whose ties span important groups, can be said to have more social capital than their peers, precisely because their network position gives them heightened access to more and better resources (Burt, 2000, cited in Bayat, 2005, p. 3). Baron et al. (2000, p. 8) point out that in contrast to Bourdieu (1986), who used social capital to denote the ways in which elite groups used their contacts to reproduce their privilege, Coleman (1988, 1994) expanded the concept to include the social relationships of non-elitist groups.

Coleman is cited as being instrumental in introducing the concept in American sociology (Lin, 2001; Portes, 1998). In his paper, *Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital*, Coleman put forward his definition of social capital. He describes it in the following terms:

> Social capital is not a single entity, but rather a variety of different entities that have two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure (Coleman, 1994, p. 16).

Coleman's (1994) definition of social capital is primarily written from the perspective of a sociologist and also emphasises the role of network structure—thus reiterating the structural aspect of social capital. In his definition, Coleman (1994, pp. 19–22) explained that virtually all social structures facilitate some form of social capital since it is common that individuals purposefully establish relations for benefit and they continue with such relationships for as long as benefits are expected. However, Coleman is of the opinion that there are certain kinds of social structures that are more important in facilitating social capital, such as where there are greater levels of expectation, obligation and trustworthiness.

In Coleman's view (1994, p. 22), norms can sometimes also act as a fragile form of social capital. He explains that if A does something for B and trusts B to reciprocate in the future then this establishes an expectation in A and an obligation on the part of B. Coleman states that this form of social capital depends on two elements: (i) trustworthiness of the social environment (which means that obligations will be paid), and (ii) the extent of obligations held. He gives the example of the rotating-credit associations of Southeast Asia and elsewhere where friends or neighbours meet (typically) on a monthly basis, each person contributing to a central fund that is then given to one of the members on an arbitrary basis, until, after a number of months, each of the *n* persons has made *n* contributions and received one payout. But without a high degree of trustworthiness among the members of the group the institution could not exist, since a person who receives an early payout could abscond and leave the others with a loss.

Coleman (1994, p. 22) is of the opinion that individuals with high levels of obligations outstanding at any time have more social capital on which they can draw. Individual actors in a social system also differ in the degree of obligations outstanding. He illustrates this with the example of a village chief who, by virtue of his power and influence, has more social capital to draw from. Similarly certain wealthy families, because of their wealth, have built up credits that they can call upon. Woolcock (2001, p. 12) concurs with this by observing that family, friends and associates can be called upon in a crisis as well and can be leveraged for material gain.

Coleman (1994, pp. 19–22) emphasises the nature of social structures and the assemblage of norms governing interpersonal behaviour as important underlying factors, explaining that social capital has both an attitudinal and a structural aspect. Both Coleman and Bourdieu speak of social capital as being embedded in groups and social networks which can be realised by individuals.

According to Crudeli (2002, p. 3), the original theoretical contributions on social capital were in the field of sociology where social capital was primarily used and analysed in the context of small groups and individuals. However a subtle transition took place when the concept was exported to other disciplines and the unit of analysis moved from individual and small groups to the community and later, to nation states. This jump is credited to Robert Putnam and his book, *Making Democracy Work*. Putnam has been criticised for this because he was seen as simply aggregating individual level data upward to the geographical unit required, leaving unexplored the dynamics of participation and engagement (De Filippis, 2002, p. 791). Crudeli (2002, p. 19) asserts that because this transition was never theorised it has led to the current state of confusion around the nature of social capital in the literature. Unfortunately very little has been done in the past few years towards providing a theory that harmonises individual and group (micro aspects of social capital) to the broader macro aspects of social capital. This is quite a moot point as macroeconomic theory without clear microeconomic foundations is frowned upon in the discipline of economics.

Crudeli echoes the sentiment of Harriss (2002, p. 6) who points out that it is Putnam who suggested that social capital could become the property of a whole society, departing from the ideas of Bourdieu and Coleman.

Thus social capital is either defined as personal or individual social capital—which is concerned with a private individual's special access and advantages as a result of his or her ties (the Coleman tradition), or is defined (the Putnam tradition) in terms of a group/community or nation state realising benefits because of their participation in social networks and groups (Savage, Tampubolon, & Warde, 2004, p. 26).

Putnam defines social capital as "features of social organisations such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (1993, p. 167). Dasgupta (2005, p. 2) contends that this description suffers from a weakness in

that it combines strikingly different concepts, namely "beliefs, behavioural rules and such forms of capital assets as interpersonal links (or 'networks'), without offering reasons as to why such an inclusive definition would prove useful for our understanding of the social world." In Dasgupta's view, social capital should be primarily understood as interpersonal networks.

While I find the more intangible features of social organisation such as beliefs, attitudes and values to be present in Putnam's work, they are not fully analysed and contextualised in his discussion. It is not clear from Putnam's theory how these intangible features of social organisation influence the nature and character of networks/associations nor does his theory explain how beliefs, attitudes and values are formed or evolve in a given society. These intangible features can influence the formation of informal associations but they can also influence other formal institutions such as those found in local government. In Chapter Four, an attempt is made to incorporate these intangible features into an augmented analytical framework based on Putnam's thesis to illustrate how they can affect the character and nature of networks /associations and how these, in turn, influence the effectiveness of institutions.

Coleman (1994) and Bourdieu (1986) emphasised that attitudes and norms play an important role in social capital. Putnam (1993, pp. 172–177) postulated that the nature of economic outcomes is not only dependent on the relationships and networks an individual establishes but is strongly influenced by social norms, particularly attitudes towards trust. Certain social and cultural norms are also characterised as cognitive or attitudinal dimensions of social interactions (although many researchers see "trust" not so much as social capital but an outcome of social capital). Norms related to trust include such things as the keeping of promises, maintaining strong family ties, and so on.

In the same vein, and using Putnam as a reference point, Ostrom (2000, p. 176) defines social capital as

> the shared knowledge, understanding, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interaction that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity. They are more productive with whatever physical and human capital they draw on if they agree on the way that they will coordinate activities and credibly commit themselves to a sequence of future actions.

The National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) takes the view that social norms and shared values which underpin behaviour and motivation are broader dimensions of social capital (OECD, 2001 and Fukuyama, 1997). These shared norms and values

> such as believing that it is unacceptable to cheat, take money not belonging to oneself or treat others, especially strangers, with disrespect or violence are seen as an integral part of the context in which social norms of behaviour and co-operation work. Citizens decide to vote even when one extra vote, of itself, is most unlikely to change the overall outcome. Neighbours watch out for an elderly person living on their own or report child abuse. These, and many other examples of civic behaviour, constitute a vital and beneficial community-level resource. They are reinforced by patterns of co-operative behaviour and interaction at the community level and as well they contribute directly to civic engagement (OECD, 2001, p. 32).

Since Putnam's work the definition of social capital has been expanded to areas beyond the personal and community units of analysis. Narayan and Pritchett (2000), as cited in Bayat (2005, p. 4), also separated social capital into three streams. The first stream is concerned with country-level politics (including the growth aspect), whereas the second focuses on the meso-level (efficacy of institutions). The third stream views social capital as a resolution of market failures at the micro-level.

Turner (2000, pp. 94–95) holds that narrow views of social capital as "social networks" or "civic associations" are useful but if integration of sociological knowledge into economic thinking is to occur, a broader conception of the term needs to be developed. He defines social capital "as those forces that increase the potential for economic development in a society by creating and sustaining social relations and patterns of social organisation." He advances the notion that there are different levels of analysis that represent ways of looking at the ebb and flow of how social activity at a macro, meso and micro-level gives us a somewhat different picture of how social capital is formed. At the macro-institutional level, Turner (2000, p. 95) holds that social capital is formed as a population becomes organised to meet its basic needs of production, reproduction, regulation and coordination. Turner (2000, p. 95) states that at the meso-levels, "social capital is formed as corporate units organize human capital and as categoric units generate social distinction influencing how members of society are treated," while at the micro-level social capital is formed as social encounters in the form of face-to-face interaction.

In brief, the easiest way to think about social capital is to see it as a benefit that exists because of an individual's social relationships (Portes, 1998, as cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 50). From the various definitions given of the term, much of the characterisations speak explicitly or implicitly of the benefits of social capital. These benefits are often indicated as positive externalities that are generated in the process of social interaction. Gillinson's view (2004, p. 25) is that society benefits from the positive externalities of cooperation of others and the networks they create. These externalities could potentially manifest, for example, in the form of a crime-free neighbourhood thanks to the activities of a neighbourhood watch group[4].

Collier (2003, p. 19) believes that social capital is social because it generates externalities arising from social interaction. It is capital only if its economic effects persist. Externalities are the benefits that arise as a result of interaction. Social capital is thus the economic benefits that arise from social interaction. He also observes that social capital enhances the capacity for coordinated action and solves the free rider problem.

Collier (2003, p. 19) sees social interaction as also providing knowledge with regard to the reliability of the network. For him it does so through the gossip that (the network) assigns and updates a reputation for each agent known to the network. He observes (Collier, 2003, p. 19) that in more traditional societies social interaction within the village solves the problems of asymmetric information since the reputation of virtually all agents are known.

The benefits accruing from social relationships discussed by Collier are formally described by Sandefur and Laumann (1988, p. 486) as information, influence and control, and social solidarity. The authors hold that benefits arise from the timeliness, relevance and trustworthiness of the information provided. In their view, access to diverse sources of information help individuals to access timely reports on relevant facts which could lead to socioeconomic attainment and labour market success. Sandefur and Laumann (1988, p. 487) describe influence and control benefits as the ability to influence others and the ability to be free of others' influence. They define influence as the ability to induce another to behave or think in a certain way. An individual's ability to influence the behaviour of others can be

[4] The negative side of social capital will be discussed in section three of this chapter.

attributed to his position in the social structure. The authors describe social solidarity benefits as

> those that arise out of conditions of repeated interaction among the same actors over time, during which forms of capital such as trust and mutual obligations accumulate . . . solidarity relationships are characterized by some degree of cooperation in which all parties contribute to collective gain (Sandefur & Laumann, 1988, p. 487).

Social capital can be used as a resource by either individuals or groups and communities and can therefore play itself out at the micro, meso or macro-levels.

2.3 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

The literature on social capital often refers to different types of social capital in the form of bonding, bridging and linking social capital.

The concept of bonding refers to the links that individuals form with people perceived to be similar to themselves who may aid them in some or other aspect of their lives (Amlani, 2010, p. 12). Bridging social capital, in contrast, refers to the links individuals have with people perceived to be dissimilar to themselves who may aid them in some or other aspect of their lives. Linking in social capital literature, on the other hand, refers to the links individuals form with people at a different level on the social ladder to gain access to resources and/or knowledge (Amlani, 2010, p. 13). For Woolcock (2001, p. 13) it is the different combinations or mix of bonding, bridging and linking social capital that explain the various outcomes observed in the literature.

Bonding occurs more frequently in families or other relatively similar groups and can provide important emotional, personal, financial and other benefits to its members through close ties and support (NESF, 2003, p. 34). Bonding typically arises in homogeneous groups, based on connections among families and, ethnic groups, may include class and religion-based groups, and seems to be more common in more traditional societies (Mani, 2001, p. 3). These groups often have strong levels of internal solidarity and trust. For example, poor people in both urban and rural contexts rely on bonding social capital for access to credit during periods of crisis (Mani, 2001, p. 5). This is part of their survival strategies. Using the example of immigrants as a case in point, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 2) note that, without initial financial support from

strong community groups, small businesses fail to get started or go bankrupt in the early stages of their development in their adopted countries.

Bonding social capital represents the construction of intra-group ties (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 239). There are, however, cases in which bonding social capital can be harmful. Hjerppe (2003, p. 12) cites the example of criminal groups like the Mafia who have strong internal "bonding" social capital that is not meant to be used for the good of society. Hjerppe (2003, p. 13) also observes that strong group formation may be harmful to economic growth if such groups prevent innovation and flexibility. Narayan and Cassidy (2001, p. 2) hold that social groups embedded in tightly knit social orders that are not accountable to citizens at large could fuel corruption and cronyism and impact on the functioning of political and government institutions. Bonding social capital is also negative when "groups who are not alike" are excluded from the "club" or "mainstream group" and do not enjoy mutual support.

Bridging social capital connects different types of people and groups (e.g. ethnic, social, gender, political or regional) and can be particularly effective for people seeking social and economic gain beyond their immediate society. It can be categorised as horizontal links between distinct communities (Mani, 2001, p. 3). This type of social capital arises when associations and connections are made across social, geographical, race or identity lines. Varshney (2000, cited in Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 242), notes that cross-cutting ties that connect different groups give groups a better chance of dealing with differences than groups that lack such ties. Narayan and Cassidy (2001, p. 12) concur with this by observing that the influence of social capital is most profound when networks and associations exist between heterogeneous groups. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 242) appropriately see bridging social capital as referring to extra-group networks. Weak levels of bridging social capital are seen as a possible reason for conflict between groups.

"Linking' social capital connects groups and individuals to others who occupy a different social position (e.g. more powerful or socially advantaged persons)" (NESF, 2003, p. 34). Mani (2001, p. 3) sees linking social capital as establishing vertical linkages between communities and institutions in a socioeconomic hierarchy. Woolcock (2001, p. 13) is of the view that linking social capital is characterised by the connections between those with differential levels of power or social status, for example links between the political elite and the general public or between individuals from different social classes.

As for the effects of either too much or too little of these types of social capital the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF, 2003, p. 34, and cited in Healy, 2003, p. 8) had this to say:

> Too much bonding and too little bridging can stifle and restrict personal initiative and innovation. Too much bridging and too little bonding can leave individuals personally vulnerable. On the other hand, insufficient linking social capital can leave specific social groups isolated from the centres of power and influence necessary for the realisation of their rights and interests.

Research conducted by Fox (1996) and Heller (1996), cited in Woolcock (2001, p. 14), found that poverty is largely a function of exclusion and powerlessness which can be better tackled if development practitioners and policy makers reach out and scale up (through linking social capital) the activities of the poor. This means that policy makers can facilitate the establishment of vertical linkages between communities and institutions in a socioeconomic hierarchy. However, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 3) observe that communities often develop along a path where extensive intra-community ties (or extensive internal "bonding" ties) progress with time to more extra-community ties (bridging social capital). Initial bonding is thus important in the development of communities or groups.

Once this initial bonding has taken place, Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 3) note that the poorer communities need to

> forge and maintain linkages transcending their community so that: (i) the economic and non-economic claims of community members can be resisted when they undermine (or threaten to undermine) the group's economic viability and expansion; (ii) entry to more sophisticated factor and product markets can be secured; and (iii) individuals of superior ability and ambition within the business group itself are able to insert themselves into larger and more complex social networks. In successful community-level development programs, linkages to outside institutions are forged incrementally; a community's stock of social capital in the form of internal ties can be the basis for launching development initiatives, but it must be complemented over time by the construction of new forms of social capital, i.e. linkages to non-community members (Rao & Woolcock, 2001, p. 3).

A deficiency in bridging and linking social capital can leave communities underdeveloped and vulnerable. This is particularly the case among certain ethnic groups and minorities where a lack of bridging and linking social capital can expose them to continuing marginalisation and disempowerment.

Jooste (2005, p. 5), in a study using data from the Cape Area Study (CAS) 2003, found that bonding social capital appeared to be more widespread than bridging forms of social capital in the Western Cape.

The review of this aspect of the literature suggests that a mix of bonding, bridging and linking social capital is desirable to maximise developmental outcomes for communities, particularly if they are poor and marginalised, and interested primarily in their own survival. Furthermore, the review reveals that poor communities are able to improve their wellbeing when they develop their networks beyond their own community.

2.4 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CAPITAL

In the literature reviewed there is a body of thought that sees social capital as encompassing several dimensions, each of which relates to different social formations. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, pp. 228–239) suggest that there are various perspectives that one can take on social capital, whether it is used at a micro, meso or macro-level. They classify the four perspectives as (i) the communitarian, (ii) the network, (iii) the institutional and (iv) the synergistic perspective.

Social capital in the communitarian perspective is equated with local organisations such as associations and social and civic groups in a given community. Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 230) see this perspective as measuring social capital by the number and density of groups in a given community and by how social ties are used to reduce the vulnerability of the poor. For them, the communitarian downside is when productive social capital is replaced by perverse social capital which hinders development. They point out that even though there are considerable benefits to being part of a group there may be several disadvantages which could outweigh the benefits. The communitarian perspective sees communities as homogeneous entities that include and benefit all, ignoring inequality, ethnic exclusion and gender. They state that even though some communities have dense and integrated groups, these groups might provide social solidarity and cooperative behaviour but do not necessarily lead them to economic prosperity. For Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 230) it is conceivable to have high social solidarity yet have pervasive poverty. The negative side of social group membership will be further discussed in this chapter.

For Woolcock and Narayan the "network perspective" emphasises the role of vertical and horizontal linkages and associations between people and the relations within and among other organisational entities such as community groups and firms. In the network view social capital is a double-edged sword. It can provide a range of valuable resources for community members, but there are also costs when these same ties place considerable non-economic claims on members' sense of obligation and commitment that have negative economic consequences (Woolcock, 2000, p. 230).

Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 232) show that as the diversity of the networks increases, so does the welfare of the poor. The optimal amount of intra and extra-ties changes throughout the life cycle of the person. The nature of the networks is also different among the poor and the rich. The rich may have networks that advance material enhancement while the poor are more likely to use them for protection and risk management. Solidarity networks that reduce risk and uncertainty among the poor involve sharing personal information. For Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 233) the clear challenge to social capital theory, research and policy from the networks perspective is to identify the conditions under which the many positive aspects of bonding social capital in poor communities can be harnessed and its integrity retained

> and, if necessary, its negative aspects dissipated, while simultaneously helping the poor gain access to formal institutions and a more diverse stock of "bridging" social capital. It is a process fraught with multiple dilemmas, however, especially for external NGOs, extension services, and development agencies, since it may entail altering social systems that are the product of long-standing cultural traditions or powerful vested interests (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 233).

Studies on social capital in poor communities in South Africa such as by Jooste (2005) point to the strong bonding social capital prevalent in these communities, primarily on the basis of race. Very little bridging social capital seems to be present. These findings are also manifested in the areas of Cederberg and Matzikama among the poor African/Black community. A deeper analysis of the findings of this research will shed light on which factors give rise to this situation and how important bridging and linking social capital are to the development of better socioeconomic outcomes in these communities. In the typology of Woolcock and Narayan (2000) the network

> minimizes the "public good" nature of social groups, regarding any benefits of group activity as primarily the property of the particular individuals involved. As such it is highly sceptical of arguments

> that social capital can (or should) be measured across larger social aggregates, such as societies or nations. Neither does it explicitly incorporate macro-level institutions such as the state, and their capacity to both shape and be shaped by local communities. To be sure, the networks perspective recognizes that weak laws and overt discrimination can undermine efforts by poor minorities to act in their collective interest, but the role communities play in shaping institutional performance generally, and the enormous potential of positive state-society relations in particular, is largely ignored (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 234).

In the institutional perspective, Woolcock and Narayan stress the centrality of the state in facilitating the capacity of social groups to act in their collective interests. The institutional view also differs from the network and communitarian perspectives in that social capital is not treated as an independent variable. Instead, it is treated as a dependant variable influencing the behaviour of groups. In their view, "performance of states and firms themselves depends on their own internal coherence, credibility, and competence, and their external accountability to civil society" (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 234).

The synergistic perspective is an attempt by a number of scholars to integrate the various perspectives discussed above. Woolcock and Narayan summarise three of the more important arguments of this new perspective:

- The first proposition is that

> contrary to some public choice and communitarian theorists, neither the state nor societies are inherently good or bad; governments, corporations, and civic groups are "variables" in terms of the impact they can have on the attainment of collective goals (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 236).

- The second proposition is that

> states, firms, and communities alone do not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors are required. Identifying the conditions under which these synergies emerge (or fail to emerge) is thus a central task of development theory and practice (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 236).

- The third proposition is that the state's role in facilitating positive development outcomes is both problematic and important. According to the authors this is so

> because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public goods (stable currencies, public health, universal education) and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law (property rights, due process, freedom of speech and association); it is also the actor best situated to facilitating enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion. One of the primary contributors to this view concludes that synergy between government and citizen action is based on complementarity and embeddedness (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 236).

Therefore the synergy view stresses that inclusive development takes place when representatives of the state, the business sector, and civil society establish common forums through which they can identify and pursue common goals thus having important impacts on development outcomes (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 238).

These perspectives are important in highlighting the different permutations of networks/associations in poor communities. They also provide an important lens through which to interpret the findings in the rural Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.

2.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATES IN THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE

Social capital entered the realm of economics as economists tried to understand the nature of several problems related to collective action and the management of issues related to market failure (Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000; Ostrom, 2000). Many of the benefits of social capital (as outlined in the earlier section) arise in some way or the other out of the need to improve individual and community outcomes through collective action and improved market efficiency.

Stiglitz (2000, p. 64) sees the one important function of social capital as the complementarity or substitutability it provides for market-based exchange and allocation. This was particularly true in primitive economies and in the early stages in the development of market economies, when markets were thin and incomplete and a thick network of interpersonal relations functioned to resolve the allocative and distributive questions.

Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 45) observe that at the micro-level, social capital can improve the way markets function, especially in the case of market failure. Where there is information asymmetry, according to them, optimal decisions are often difficult to make because of uncertainty (2000, p. 47). In this instance “social” institutions can help disseminate

accurate information that allows market players to make appropriate, efficient decisions. The authors looked at group-based lending schemes such as the Grameen Bank as a case in point. This role of social institutions is confirmed by Arrow (2000, p. 3) who concurs that social networks guard against market failure caused by asymmetric information. In the words of the above authors, social networks are "supplementary activities that exploit monitoring devices not otherwise available."

Social capital also helps in making collective decisions—a necessary element in the provision of public goods. It resolves problems relating to collective action by allowing individuals, groups and communities to address these problems more easily. In the view of Côté (2001, p. 30), collective action involves use of norms and networks in situations where individuals might otherwise be reluctant to be cooperative or socially engaged. Thus, norms of reciprocity and networks help ensure compliance with collectively desirable behaviour. In the absence of trust and networks to ensure compliance, individuals tend not to cooperate because others cannot be relied on to act in a similar way. Many social scientists refer to such coordination problems by various labels including "the prisoner's dilemma" or the "free rider problem."

Ostrom (2000, pp. 194–198) finds that in coordination problems humans recurringly face a wide range of "potential equilibria", that is, when they face a social dilemma or circumstance involving collective action, she finds that participants may easily follow short-term, maximising strategies that leave them worse off than other options available to them. Somehow participants must find ways of creating mutually reinforcing expectations and trust to overcome the inefficient short-run temptation they face. This is akin to the classic case of the prisoner's dilemma in which both prisoners are worse off if they do not cooperate. Thus, through the sharing of information, associations can also help disseminate reliable information that allows groups and communities to make efficient and appropriate decisions (Ostrom, 2000, p. 198). For Mani (2001, p. 4), where social capital is high, there are strong interpersonal communication channels improving the likelihood of innovation being diffused to members of a specific community.

Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 48) reinforce this idea and note that uncoordinated or opportunistic behaviour by economic agents lie behind the failure of many irrigation projects because these projects often lack formal or informal means of imposing equitable agreements for sharing water. According to the authors this often leads to some farmers either using the

water needed by others or failing to contribute to the maintenance of irrigation projects. In their view effective social capital in the form of water use groups can overcome such uncoordinated behaviour since these associations reduce opportunistic behaviour and create a framework within which individuals interact repeatedly—instilling trust among members.

There are conditions under which such institutions have positive "collective action" outcomes. Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 49) concur that local and voluntary associations do not always effectively maximise their ability to make collective decisions. They find that local institutions are more effective at enforcing common agreement and cooperative action when the assets are distributed relatively equitably and benefits are shared equally. Sharing provides an incentive for improved coordination and the management of local public goods, increasing productivity for everyone.

Furthermore, Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 49) observe that social interaction can either produce coordinated action spontaneously or result in conscious decision making. Spontaneous coordination generally occurs as a result of established norms and other initial conditions.

The authors offer four reasons why coordinated action works. The first involves the use of social sanctions which are used against opportunism to lower transaction costs. In addition, it enables common pool resources to be managed, economies of scale to be reaped in non-market activities and public goods to be provided. In this scheme of things, the need for social capital diminishes as the market becomes capable of performing a wider range of activities. In Africa, where firms and governments are under-developed and transaction costs high, there is a need for greater coordination through social interaction (Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000, p. 49).

For Mani (2001, p. 4), social capital also serves as an informal social safety net for the poor. Where social capital is high there is a greater sharing of household risks. This happens in the form of help from relatives and the community (for example, through the informal issue of credit provision). In this way, social capital provides insurance for the poor where markets fail to do this.

It would appear that theorists do not agree on the reasons for differential levels of social capital within or between countries. The view of Stiglitz (2000) that social capital is likely to be strong in less developed economies where functions of resource allocation have to be carried out

seems plausible. This, however, would have to be contrasted with the theory of Serageldin and Grootaert (2000) that social capital diminishes as markets perform a wider range of activities. But is social capital largely a response to market conditions? Even in more developed markets social interaction increases in response to what groups see as infringement of their rights, a call for moral imperatives or a relegation of their economic status by market forces. Environmental groups, anti-abortion coalitions and anti-crime forums may be some of the best examples of this.

The importance of social capital to economics is still a fertile field for research not least because it postulates a form of capital that purportedly influences socioeconomic development, albeit not with the same quantitative rigour that is to be found in physical or finance capital. This is perhaps best articulated by Coleman and others as the section that follows will show.

2.6 THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Since the publication of Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*, a considerable body of literature has emerged that is either critical of the fundamental thesis of social capital or has sought to reveal its negative aspects (Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Portes, 2014). This section reviews some of these published works on social capital.

Baker and Faulkner (2004, p. 104) highlight the negative side of social capital with reference to white collar criminals who exploit social ties and networks for their own selfish ends. They note that when people use social ties to make economic decisions they are "substituting trust in social relationships for due diligence" (Baker & Faulkner, 2004, p. 104). They found that investors who only use within-network exchange have a higher probability of loss of capital than investors who use the same network exchange and still conduct due diligence. Their conclusion is that the harmful role of social networks may be limited to pre-planned frauds, that is, in those cases where businesses are created for the sole purpose of economic crime and where the sellers have only criminal intentions. When this happens social ties facilitate economic crimes (Baker & Faulkner, 2004, p. 106).

Ostrom (2000, p. 177) also speaks of the negative side of social capital. She shows how gangs use social capital as the foundation for their organisational structures and how cartels use social capital to keep control over industry so as to reap more profits than would otherwise be the

case. The main reference points of the criticisms of the social capital thesis, though, are its economic aspects and that of social history.

2.7 CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

From a social history perspective, Krishna (2000, p. 72) criticises Putnam's view that social capital is a legacy of long periods of historical development. Present generations cannot, in his view, add productively to their inherited stock of social capital in the short run. Krishna, by deduction, argues that this view leads to accepting that people are destined to live with the fruits of their legacy—if they are rich in social capital then they will develop faster and vice versa. If this is true then prospects for the mobilisation of social capital for better developmental outcomes are dismal. However, this dismal prospect is disputed by a number of recent empirical studies, some of which have been briefly articulated earlier in the literature review. For example, a study undertaken by Schneider 1997 (cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 72) shows that the design of the institutions delivering local public goods can indeed influence levels of social capital.

Another criticism leveled at Putnam is that he does not indicate the transmission mechanism of how civil society actually impacts on government performance. According to Booth and Richard (1998, p. 782) there is no clearly defined explanation of how group involvement (networks and associations) affects citizen behaviour so as to influence government performance. Is Putnam implying that people are socialised through their involvement and participation in social groups to take a greater interest in political issues and engage in greater political participation (unfortunately this question is not tackled in the literature examined and will be dealt with in the qualitative part of the dissertation)?

In their criticism of Putnam's theory of social capital in North America, Portes and Vickstrom (2011, p. 468) argues that history, particularly historical patterns of migration in the USA, are the most important predictors of social capital. Non-Southern states in the USA

> with a homogenous white and better educated population are the places where you find higher stocks of social capital. One group of Europeans like Norwegians, Finns and Icelanders (who migrated to the USA and) who tended to settle in the harsh areas of America had to form tightly knit, self-sufficient communities where strong egalitarian traditions and participation in collective activities required for survival were the norm. No other group migrated so disproportionately to northern Michigan and

> Wisconsin, Minnesota and the Dakotas and no other group established such strong, independent institutions of community life. . . . These are the states that show the highest stocks in the map of social capital.

Portes and Vickstrom (2011, p. 468) go further to state that

> these historical traditions may be at the root of both different levels of economic inequality and of civic and social activism observed a century later. The percentage of Scandinavian origin in a state's population becomes, by far, the strongest influence on social capital.

Thus for Portes and Vickstrom (2011, p. 469)

> social capital is an outcome of historical forces buried deep in a nation's past and there is little point in promoting it as a cure for social ills or exhorting citizens to become more participatory. Because social capital cannot be willed into existence but arises out of complex historical processes, such exhortations would have little effect on alleviating present social problems.

From a political economy perspective Harriss (2002, p. 2) illustrates how work by well-intentioned social scientists draw from and add to a "hegemonic social science that systematically obscures power, class and politics." He goes further to state that the work on social capital (particularly the work on trust and participation) has come to "constitute new weapons in the armoury of the 'anti-politics machine' that is constituted by the practices of international development" (Harriss, 2002, p. 2). He states that these ideas suit the interest of global capitalism because they present problems that are rooted in the political economy of power and class as "purely technical matters that can be resolved outside the political arena." He goes on further to infer that the social capital theses are directed against "the movements of the political left for progressive socio-political and economic change which do identify roots of poverty and social deprivation in class differences" (Harriss, 2002, p. 2).

According to Harriss (2002, p. 7) the book *Making Democracy Work* has become "a charter for the view that social capital is crucial for economic development." In fact, Putnam's work on social capital has

> been purported as the missing link and as such provides strong conceptual support for programmes that emphasise such tasks as identifying pockets of social capital and using participation to deliver

> projects or programmes that identify the construction of social capital with encouragement for participation (Harriss, 2002, p. 7).

Harriss (2002, p. 7) states that in the end funds are channelled to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rather than local government bodies. Yet according to Harriss (2002, p. 7), these NGOs are not necessarily

> democratically accountable institutions and might appear to offer the possibility of a kind of democracy through popular participation but without the inconveniences of condensational politics and the conflicts of values and ideas which are a necessary part of democratic politics.

Harriss (2002, p. 9) also shows that the political economy issues of power and class cannot be ignored in the context of local associations. These associations are not always neutral. He points to research showing "that when assets are unequally distributed local associations may well be dominated by and used to further the interests of more powerful people" (Harriss, 2002, p. 8). In fact the research shows that locally powerful people can capture these arenas to project their agendas. He concludes that "the application of social capital in development is not a distribution neutral process and that by themselves—without other resources—local associations may not make very much difference" (Harriss, 2002, p. 9).

Ben Fine (2001, p. 15) who is probably one of the fiercest critics of social capital, shares views with Harriss, particularly with respect to the issues of class and power. Fine (2001, p. 15) believes the term social capital, as an economic category, is an oxymoron because capital is in itself social. For Fine all capital is social and historical especially that which is rooted in capitalism (2001, p. 25). However, he acknowledges that the positive side to the interest in social capital is that it attempts to integrate economic with non-economic analysis, since one of the features of modern mainstream economics is that there is an explicit understanding that capital is first and foremost to be understood as asocial (2001, p. 26).

For Fine (2001, p. 28) the recent interest in social capital

> can be seen as an intellectual product of the crisis of faith in both the capitalist state and the capitalist market in late twentieth century capitalism since it represents a desire in both analytical and policy terms to find alternatives to the neo-liberal agenda of market versus state.

He implies that the term social capital should be rejected because the use of the term would mean an

> "implicit" acceptance of the stance of mainstream economics in which capital is first and foremost a set of asocial endowments possessed by individuals rather than an exploitative relation between classes and the broader social relations that sustain them. The social can only be applied to capital because it has been forcibly and artificially torn away in the first place (Fine, 2001, p. 38).

Fine's rejection of the term social capital manifests the stark contrasts between the concept of capital in Marxist and mainstream vocabulary. The use of the word "capital" in the mainstream lexicon does not denote the accumulation of material wealth and the exploitative relationship between classes that accompanies such an accumulation process. The agglomeration of social processes, however, yields forms of wealth that precede capital accumulation as emerged in the period of early industrialisation. Pre-capitalist "tribal" societies are an example of this—communities that were self-sufficient in the absence of capital and the "state and state institutions" for centuries.

Social capital can then be said to be an intrinsic part of material progress, albeit not sufficient on its own. While its impact on socioeconomic outcomes cannot be dismissed, its theoretical plausibility (meaning a theory of change) still poses some daunting challenges.

2.8 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THESIS

The literature review reveals the intense debates and discussions around the theoretical concepts and constructs articulated in the social capital debate. Unpacking the types and approaches to social capital showed the importance of social capital to economic theory.

The main conclusions that can be drawn from this section is that social capital can be either structural or cognitive or both at the same time. However, it is the structural part of social capital—that is, the network aspects—that has been endorsed in the literature.

Social capital can be used as a resource by individuals, groups and communities and can therefore be found at the micro, meso and macro-levels. Social capital can also be broken down into different types in the form of bonding, bridging and linking social capital.

This chapter examined the views of analysts who are critical of social capital as an economic and historical theory of development. In the overview of their work, this brief sample of the works of analysts who are critical of the social capital thesis has given an indication of the theoretical debates that have been raging in the literature on the subject. Their contributions continue to shape the discourse on what is a relatively young school of thought. Whatever the standing of social capital theory at this stage, it has nevertheless cast its influential net over several disciplines in the social sciences and it is only the continuing accumulation of empirical evidence that will pronounce a verdict on its efficacy as a mode of analysis for the development of societies. It is in the analysis of research findings that I try to add to this body of empirical evidence.

CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW ACHIEVING SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES - THE PUTNAM THESIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In his pioneering work, Putnam (1993) advanced the theory that social capital in the form of networks and associations had an impact on economic and political outcomes even if these associations had no connection to politics or the economy. In Putnam's (1993, p. 91) view, members of associations displayed more political sophistication, and had higher levels of trust, political participation and civic competence. His explanation was that this was because civic participation instils skills of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility in individuals. This, in turn, results in a better quality of government and better social and economic outcomes for more civic communities. He elaborated on this by saying that this is because citizens in civic communities demand more effective government and are more prepared to act cooperatively to achieve their shared goals. Those in less civic regions are distrustful of others and likely to be less prosperous than the former group. Putnam concluded that social capital is a powerful variable affecting the overall level of achievement in a society (or among a particular group).

The Putnam framework illustrated in Figure 3-1 depicts how associations/networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. In this chapter the various key concepts and constructs of the Putnam thesis are reviewed. Each aspect of the framework is discussed and the shortcomings highlighted. The different characteristics of associations/networks are explored and assessed, including how they function and under which circumstances they arise. The relationship between networks/associations, trust and participation is also explored. The concept and definition of the term "generalised trust" are examined. In particular, its limitations and alternatives to the concept are considered. In unpacking the concept of civic engagement and participation, different modes of engagement are described, with the focus on the factors that impact on civic engagement and participation, how they affect the functioning of government and, ultimately, how they impact on development outcomes.

Figure 3–1: A Graphical Illustration of my Interpretation of Putnam's Framework



The reasons for cataloguing the criticisms levelled at Putnam and probing the insights in the key concepts of Putnam's framework lie in the need to augment the framework (Chapter Four) so as to describe a detailed transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes in the context of rural municipalities in South Africa. The augmented analytical framework will later be used to explain the different outcomes in the two study areas of Cederberg and Matzikama.

This section is organised according to the concepts articulated by Putnam and illustrated in my interpretation of the Putnam thesis:

- Networks and associations
- Trust
- Civic participation
- Government effectiveness and
- Socioeconomic outcomes.

3.2 NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITY

In the literature on social capital, the terms "networks" and "associations" are often used interchangeably. Yet networks and associations are not completely the same thing. Networks are distributed groups of people that communicate with one another and work together as a unit or system for a joint purpose. Networks are more characteristic of individuals and small groups while associations are broader than networks.

From the review of the literature, what is clear is that both networks and associations are vital components of social capital. Networks are often characterised as informal links while associations are deemed to be formal entities. According to Rose (2000, p. 149), networks are

defined as face-to-face relationships between a limited number of individuals who know one another and who are bound together by "kinship, friendship and propinquity." For Rose, networks are institutions in the sociological sense of having patterned and recurring interaction. He sees networks as generally lacking in legal recognition without written rules or funds. This, according to Rose, is what gives them their informal status. He further notes that even if networks have a formal identity (formal networks), such as a choir or rural cooperative, face-to-face networks tend to be horizontal and diffuse. They generally have a reputation for helpful cooperation which is more important than cash payments and bureaucratic regulations. He notes that most outputs of networks are unrecorded in national accounts.

In the literature, associations are sometimes characterised as organisations. In Rose's view organisations are different to networks in that they are generally constituted as formal entities and hence, are rule bound, bureaucratic, have a legal personality and obtain some form of revenue from the market, the state or donations from philanthropists. A formal organisation can have individuals as its members or its members can be organisations. Formal organisations for Rose (2000, p. 149), are a feature of modern society which requires functional units that are made up of impersonal bureaucratic organisations of the state, the market or both, that routinely produce a range of complex goods such as automobiles and university education.

3.2.1 Characteristics of Networks

Networks and associations provide a host of benefits at an individual level as well as at the level of the community, the state or both. According to Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, pp. 48–49) associations and institutions provide a framework for sharing information, coordinating activities and making collective decisions. Bardhan (1995, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 46) argues that what makes this model work is peer monitoring, a common set of norms and sanctions at the local level.

The broad utility of networks, as noted earlier, is that they are a means through which opportunities can be accessed. But networks can also close off opportunities to others. For example, Tonkiss (2004, p. 21) points to the role of trade unions in keeping black workers and women out of certain jobs in the USA. Similar arguments have been used to understand why certain family businesses have problems expanding—because they are closed to outside

expertise and financial assistance (Tonkiss, 2004, p. 21). Closed networks, are characteristic of "bonding" behaviour.

Networks can be interpreted from the perspectives of the individual and small groups and the perspectives of the community and state. The individual perspective usually forms part of the sociological branch of social capital. Lin (2001, p. 45), a sociologist by training, observes that social capital provides benefits for individuals who act for a purpose. In this context interaction in a network is seen as a means to attain the goal of action. For Lin there are motives for interaction in a network. The primary motive is to protect existing resources and gain additional ones. Thus the actions of individuals in a network are rational and are motivated to maintain or gain valued resources in order to survive. In his discussion on action, he deals with the concept of instrumental action, which he defines as triggering actions and reactions from others leading to more allocation of resources (2001, p. 46).

In his seminal work, *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam (1993, pp.172–173) reinforces the positive role of networks and associations, remarking that membership in associations strengthens political and economic efficiency even if the associations themselves play no role in either the polity or the economy. Putnam distinguishes between the effects of different types of associations. In his work on Italy, Putnam also found that the northern parts of Italy have been richer than the southern parts for several centuries despite having been on par at the beginning of the second millennium[5]. Helliwell and Putnam (1995, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 253) found that the differences in associational life were matched by differences in societal structure with horizontal structures in the north and hierarchical structures in the south, and by differences in the extent of civic community, citizen involvement and governmental efficiency. According to Putnam (1993, p. 116) these "horizontal" networks can be characterised as social networks since they are not hierarchical. In his opinion communities in social networks often value social solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation and honesty more than in hierarchical ones.

[5] That is, from the 11th century of the Christian era.

For example, Putnam (1993, pp. 107–108) found that membership in hierarchical associations, such as the Catholic Church in Southern Italy, "which do not create mutuality and equality of participation," do not have the same effect as membership in more "horizontal" groups such as civic associations. He also found that civic associations contributed to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government because these networks and associations instil in their members "habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness." Civic associations were also found to be more equitable and more densely populated than hierarchical ones.

Putnam (1993, p. 173) also found regions characterised by horizontal networks had more cooperatives, cultural associations, mutual aid societies, neighbourhood associations, religious fraternities and guilds. These Italian regions have been able to establish higher levels of output per capita by virtue of greater endowments of social capital. According to Helliwell and Putnam (1995, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 265) social capital was linked to higher levels of regional satisfaction and greater economic growth in the northern regions of Italy which were endowed with more horizontal or "social networks".

Boix and Posner (1996, p. 3) remark that

> the difference between horizontal and vertical associations lies in the fact that vertical relationships, such as exist between patrons and clients, are characterized by dependence instead of mutuality, and are thus highly limited in their ability to generate norms of reciprocity, social trust or a shared sense of responsibility for collective endeavours.

Putnam (1993, p. 174) explains how networks of "civic engagement" or horizontal networks have this powerful side effect in that it fosters norms of reciprocity, facilitates communication and improves the flow of information.

One of the correlations drawn from Putnam's work is that the higher the number of networks and associations, the greater the capacity for community members to collaborate for mutual benefit. Network density and horizontally structured networks impact positively on civic participation.

Both these arguments were somewhat contested by Ikeda (2002) and Savage et al. (2004) who carried out work in Japan and the United Kingdom respectively. For Japan, Ikeda (2002, p. 17) found that membership in both horizontal and vertical associations impacted positively on

political participation, with the effect of vertical associations being stronger than that of horizontal associations. His observation that vertical associations "influence the fermentation of civic mindedness" opens up an area that warrants further investigation.

In their work on two organisations in the UK, Savage et al. (2004, p. 35) concurred with Putnam that hierarchically structured organisations had lower levels and a lower quality of activism than that of more horizontal organisations. The structure of membership also differed between the two organisations studied. However, unlike Putnam, Savage et al. found that density of membership is not vital for organisational vibrancy and "that membership figures are not an adequate proxy for the internal features of processes within associations" (Savage et al., 2004, p. 35). It is not the number of associations but rather the degree of activism in these associations that impact on development outcomes.

For Savage et al. (2004, p. 24) there is a need to know exactly what the features of networks are as well as the precise mechanism through which associational activity leads to engagement. Essentially Savage et al. ask about the mechanisms through which networks generate trust and activism. In the development of the analytical framework in Chapter Four, an attempt will be made to identify which characteristics of networks have the greatest impact on trust and participation. Later in the chapter on findings, I explore how networks evolve to incorporate these more important characteristics which result in improved impacts on trust and participation, using the example of the rural African/Black communities in Cederberg and Matzikama.

3.2.2 Networks: Scope, Intensity and Type

Associations socialise their members by instilling in them "habits of the heart" Putnam observed in 1993 (cited in Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 35). Associations also perform an educational function by schooling members in public life and encouraging them towards civic engagement. Wollebæk and Selle (2002, p. 35) sought to discover the types of participation (in associations) that are likely to generate the benefits of social capital by tackling the question along three dimensions—intensity, scope, and type. When examining the first dimension of intensity, they looked at the types of associational affiliation more likely to provide the intensity of face-to-face interactions to promote social capital—or differently put—the type of interactions that lead to generalised trust and civic engagement. They examined memberships

in both secondary and tertiary associations where secondary institutions are civic organisations and tertiary institutions are characterised by "centralized, paid-staff leadership; they tend to be non-democratically structured; and the support of the members tends to be channelled through money rather than time" (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 35).

The authors find that even though membership in secondary institutions can increasingly be characterised as "passive" rather than "active", this passive form of membership is not necessarily negative "since the longer individuals remain in their passive roles, the more influence the association has on their attitudes" (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 37). Since this may be the case, the authors feel that the role of passive membership in associations may be understated.

The second dimension of scope examines the extent to which the number of affiliations (to voluntary organisations) impacts on social capital. It was found that belonging to dense, multiple cross-cutting organisations is much more conducive to creating social capital than (intensely) belonging to just one association. Even if one passively belongs to many associations it may be more beneficial than being actively engaged in just one association. Their empirical estimation of data reinforced this statement, indicating that scope matters in the promotion of social capital (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 53).

The third dimension of "type" tests whether certain types of association activities are more conducive to social capital formation than others. Wollebæk and Selle (2002, p. 38) point out that Putnam (1995) implicitly gives priority to non-political associations rather than political associations in promoting social capital. The authors quote a few influential studies that question the effectiveness of associations (without an expressed political purpose) to act as intermediaries between the individual and the state. In their empirical studies they show that membership or participation in multiple associations with different purposes was the best way of forming social capital.

Using data from the USA, Sweden and Germany, Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155) found that membership in different types of associational activities have different impacts on aspects of the social capital thesis. For example, membership in cultural associations exhibit high levels of public social capital. Membership in community associations exhibit high levels of generalised trust and reciprocity; membership based on personal interest and economic groups

have higher levels of political trust and efficacy; membership in political associations have the least levels of generalised trust, political trust and efficacy, and so on.

Even though Putnam's theory describes how individual, micro-level interactions aggregate and influence institutions at wider scales, Prakash and Selle (2001) are critical of the fact that it does not refer to how macro-level phenomena, such as changes in political institutions influence and, in turn, are affected by, micro-level interactions and behaviour. They are therefore concerned that social capital is treated as an exogenous variable which is not impacted on by the institutional context in which it is situated. In this regard, Prakash and Selle are embracing what Woolcock calls an "institutional" view of social capital where social capital gets impacted on through the institutional context in which the social groups reside. In a sense then, social capital is also a dependent variable rather than a purely independent catalyst.

In their work on citizenship and civic participation, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) argue that the voluntary associations that people are most likely to join are homogeneous and incapable of generating the benefits claimed. In particular they theorise that membership in homogeneous groups would not improve the extent to which trust would be generalised to people outside the group. In their view it is not membership in associations per se that impact on generalised trust but rather the nature of such memberships. To get the full benefits of associational involvement, they argue that groups must be heterogeneous so that people interact with others who hold different opinions from them. Even in this context social capital is dependent since empirical investigations show that there is no consensus on the extent to which diversity builds trust. There are strong regional differences that exist in this regard. For instance

> McLaren & Baird (2003) find that, among Italians, heterogeneous group members have higher generalized trust than homogeneous group members; however, Stolle (2001) finds that this relationship obtains only in certain countries. In Sweden, group diversity (defined as involvement of foreigners in the groups) was significantly and positively related to generalised trust, but in the United States, group diversity (defined as racial diversity) was significantly and negatively related to generalised trust (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p. 235).

Even if it has not been conclusively established that heterogeneous networks build generalised trust, Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p. 233) contend that as the diversity of the networks increase so does the welfare of the poor. The authors also assert that the nature of the networks is different among the poor and the rich. In their view, the rich may have networks that advance

material enhancement while the networks of the poor are primarily there for protection and risk management. The authors believe that these networks can best be described as solidarity networks which reduce risk and uncertainty among the poor through the sharing of personal information and resources. This resonates with the work on social capital in South Africa by Adato, Carter, and May (2004, p. 26) who found that most bonding networks are "subsistence" rather than "development" networks.

In order to understand the significance of social capital, Rose (2000, p. 166) feels that attention should be drawn to the functioning of networks in specific situations. For him this is a logical step because the output of the network depends on the situation. Networks that are used to maintain health are, for him, different to those that are used to produce food or repair homes. This confirms Coleman's (1994) proposition that networks differ greatly between situations. He therefore finds it problematic to collectively add up membership in associations and networks into a single index or number.

3.2.3 Networks and Ethnicity

Campbell and McLean (2002, p. 4) examine the role that ethnicity (ethnic identity) plays in the likelihood of people's participation in local community networks. In their study they found that members of Black and minority ethnic groups (particularly African-Caribbean residents in a small suburb in London) had difficulty in participating in beneficial community-level networks that would advance the interests of their community. In their view there are circumstances where certain ethnic groups may face barriers in accessing beneficial community-level networks.

Even when ethnic minorities access community-level networks, research has shown that it is often the wealthiest and educated members of a community who participate in beneficial community-level networks with the unintended consequence of increasing, rather than decreasing, social equity (Baum et al., 2000, cited in Campbell & McLean, 2002, p. 9).

The aforementioned authors turn to the literature on social psychology to point out the obstacles that some minorities face in participating in community-level networks. Here the literature indicates that a precondition for participation in community-level networks is a sense of

collective identity and collective agency or collective efficacy—factors which are often lacking in such communities. The authors found that even though the

> African-Caribbean identities played a key role in inter-personal networks (family and friends) the strong sense of interpersonal solidarity did not serve to unite the African-Caribbean people at the community level even though numerous opportunities existed for them to become involved in a range of activist networks including the provision of facilities for children . . . policing and leisure and entertainment facilities" (Campbell & McLean, 2002, p. 12 and p. 16).

Furthermore, the sense of exclusion in school and the workplace constructs collective identities that makes it unlikely that people will identify with local community networks as representative of their needs and interests in the public spheres of local community, work or politics. In addition to this, African-Caribbean communities were not often located in the same geographical neighbourhood making it difficult to draw on a critical mass of people for collective agency.

The ability of the African-Caribbean communities to act as a collective was undermined because they were small in number, dispersed and lacking in economic and political power, as well as psychological confidence. That this is sufficient explanation for the lack of social capital is doubtful and it would appear that research on other communities who possess similar characteristics would be useful (e.g. people who migrated from countries with similar histories as the Caribbean, are geographically dispersed, had similar experiences with regard to settlement, and share the same socioeconomic status), if only to understand the factors that influence the formation of social capital in immigrant communities. It is my intention to examine which factors are responsible for the different outcomes in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities, with their large African/Black migrant population which experienced similar cultural and social displacement to the African-Caribbean communities in London.

In summary, the review of the literature on networks and associational activity shows that the effectiveness of networks and associations is dependent on a host of variables and is often influenced by the environment in which they operate, particularly the underlying belief system. They can be either vertical or horizontal, have active or passive membership, be homogeneous and heterogeneous and differ in the activities they undertake. The literature also showed that a

sense of collective identity and collective agency are key factors influencing the ability/desire to participate in networks and this is often determined by the underlying belief system/values.

These variables do not necessarily refute the central idea of Putnam's thesis but are meant to show that studies on associational activity can be enriched by incorporating them to give a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of social networks and their impact on socioeconomic outcomes. This is taken up in the development of the augmented framework in Chapter Four.

3.3 TRUST

According to Putnam (1993, p. 171) social trust arises from networks of civic engagement. Hence after networks, an important concept in Putnam's framework (See Figure 3-1) involves trust. There is a tendency among some analysts to use the terms social capital and trust interchangeably—as one and the same thing (Fukuyama, 1995, 1997). This is also evident in some of the empirical studies undertaken to measure the effects of social capital where trust is used as a proxy variable for social capital. Some scholars see this as problematic since trust (especially the term generalised trust) is a specific component of social capital (e.g. Hooghe, 2007, p. 3, and Adler & Kwon, 2000, as cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 101). If trust is social capital then high levels of trust are required to facilitate cooperation and coordination. Yet Adler and Kwon (cited in Lesser, 2000, p. 101) refer to Granovetter's (1973) discussion on the importance of weak ties in facilitating access to jobs as evidence that trust is conceptually distinct from social capital. According to Granovetter, weak ties do not require high trust since the levels of trust required for weak ties are close to neutral.

Trust has been defined in many different ways in the literature on social capital. Uslaner (2006, p. 3) sees trust as allowing us to

> put greater confidence in other people's promises that they mean what they say when they promise to cooperate. The "standard" account of trust presumes that trust depends on information and experience.

The concept of trust refers to the understanding that individuals or members of social groups will operate in a manner that is equally advantageous and that the norms established through that relationship will ensure that they adhere to shared values.

The concept of trust also implies the presumption that organisations and institutions (not just individuals and groups) are worth the confidence ascribed to them (Crête, Pelletier, & Couture., 2006, p. 4).

For some analysts like Denzel and North (1994, cited in Rothstein & Eek, 2006, p. 5) trust can be seen as an informal institution based on the established systems of beliefs about the behaviour of others. The authors contend that informal institutions such as trust lower transaction costs facilitating many mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

3.3.1 Generalised Trust

The theory on social capital draws heavily on the notion of "generalised trust." According to Muhlberger (2003, p. 7)

> generalised trust is an expectation that other people in society will generally abide by commonly held social norms, roles, and ethical dictates. People who have generalised trust expect their society to function as it should.

James and Sykuta (2004, p. 1) see generalised trust as relatively stable and independent of group characteristics since it is

> considered alongside with associational activity (networks) to be the core of social capital, although it is also seen by some researchers independently from associational life as a constituent part of social capital.

In the literature the term generalised trust is often used interchangeably with the term social trust (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). According to Putnam (1993, p. 171) social trust arises from networks of civic engagement. Trust can further be characterised as being either thick or thin. Thin trust is trust among individuals having weak social ties, such as strangers. Thick trust refers to trust among family and friends or individuals having strong, close personal ties (James & Sykuta, 2004, p. 7). Thin trust is associated with the notion of generalised or social trust, whereas thick trust has stronger affinity with the concept of particularised trust. Thin trust is based on norms and beliefs about society in general whereas thick trust is based on information and the nature of a particular group. Generalised trust diminishes with greater uncertainty and particularised trust increases with interaction (Uslaner, 1999).

According to Uslaner (2006, p. 6) the differences between particularised and generalised trust is similar to the distinction drawn between "bonding" and "bridging" social capital. Homogeneous group members develop "personalised" trust among themselves that may exclude "outsiders". The evidence gathered by some analysts' shows that strong bonds between members increase participation and mutual help. Heterogeneous groups' members develop generalised trust (learning to trust others that are not necessarily like them).

Pollitt (2001, p. 3) observes that both generalised and particularised (or specific) trust have an impact on economic activity. He argues that generalised trust impacts on the level of aggregate economic activity and particularised trust affects the distribution of economic activity. In his view, trust is especially important within cooperative economic activity where transaction costs of enforcing and drawing up contracts is high (Pollitt, 2001, p. 3).

Supporting the points made above, Putnam (1993, p. 171) states that the social trust that exists in complex modern settings arises from "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement." He also states that such "trust is generated . . . within a larger structure of personal relations and social networks" (1993, p. 172). Where people believe that "trusting" will be reciprocated rather than exploited, there is bound to be lower transaction costs, greater cooperation and reduced transaction costs (Putnam, 1993, pp. 172–173).

3.3.2 Problems with the Concept of Generalised Trust

Prakash and Selle (2001, p. 2) contend that there are problems with the measurement of the concept of generalised trust "since the instrument measures micro-level interactions of individuals and researchers make assumptions and draw conclusions from this data concerning civil society and political governance."

They point out that other studies have found little evidence that trust can be generalised perfectly or equally across a society. They believe that the consequences of

> membership in different types of associations—political or social, deliberative or interest-based, hierarchic or egalitarian, voluntary, ascriptive or hybrid—need to be further analysed and differentiated in terms of their impacts on civil society (Prakash & Selle, 2001, p. 2).

This is echoed by Fatorre, Turnbull, and Wilson (2003, pp. 172–173), who argue that trust in neighbours, friends and governments cannot be amalgamated into one variable called generalised trust because we expect different things and have different relationships with each of these groupings. They assert that personal trust (family and friends) cannot be lumped together with impersonal trust (government and other public sector organisations) into a variable called generalised trust. They devised a set of econometric tools to test whether the factors that explain trust in friends, neighbours and governments are the same. Not only did they find that there are different factors explaining personal and impersonal trust, but they also found that trust in government and strangers cannot be explained by associational density as implied by Putnam.

Apart from these concerns, Hooghe (2007, p. 714) also finds

> that generalized trust should not be considered as an attitude that exclusively entails positive consequences for a community . . . since trust functions as a mechanism of social control, as dominant groups in a society have more resources available allowing them to express more trust than marginalised groups.

A critical issue emerging from the literature on generalised trust is the way it is measured, which affects the validity of empirical work on the subject. In particular, scholars are concerned about the question from the World Values Survey that is used to measure generalised trust. The question is usually phrased as "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Some analysts have expressed concern with the wording of the question. For Nannestad (2008, p. 417), the generalised trust question is underspecified and may not be able to be partially or totally compared because it lacks the quality necessary for comparison across individual groups or countries. It might also result in unreliable information. Nannestad uses this as evidence that groups have limits when it comes to trust since the boundaries of their trust are not fully declared. In summary, the notion of generalised says little about the nature of trust, its limits and boundaries.

There have also been studies that indicate that some respondents could apply a political interpretation to the question of generalised trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997, cited in Muhlberger, 2003, p. 22), caution that people could in part be interpreting questions about generalised trust as questions about a more politically related type of trust. For the authors there is the danger

that some respondents confuse questions about generalised trust with political trust. If true, then for Muhlberger (2003, p. 21) the relationship between civic engagement and generalised trust may prove to be dependent on the degree to which respondents interpret the generalised trust questions in a political way for a given survey.

Drawing on Fukuyama's work, Tonkiss (2004, p. 18) believes that trust leads to associational activity. Hence the levels of associational activity in a country can be indicated by the levels of generalised trust. In Fukuyama's work, countries are characterised as either being high trust or low trust societies on the basis of levels of associational activity. Tonkiss (2004, p. 18) sees this as problematic since the formation of trust in different societies stems from diverse sources. To aggregate levels of trust and lump countries into high trust and low trust, in his view, undermines the role of history and path dependency.

3.3.3 Political Trust and Generalised Trust

Social capital as a resource available to groups can only be realised (or spent) between trusting individuals. This is the view of Sturgis, Patulny, and Allum (2007, p. 2), who ask whether trust in neighbours, family and friends automatically leads to trust in institutions of the state—or whether a well-functioning state impacts on personal trust in other members of the community. Sturgis et al. (2007, p. 5) discuss three perspectives from the work of Newton and Norris (2000) that influence trust. The first perspective, based on social and cultural theory, sees trust as an outcome of people's congregation in voluntary organisations (networks and associations). This endogenous approach to social trust resonates with the work of Putnam (1995) and Nannestad (2008). Theorists, including Putnam (1995), seem to underscore the role of networks and organisations in the development of trust. Cohen and Prusak (2001, cited in Pollitt, 2001, p. 5), observe that networks are important for the development of norms and trust since they facilitate the efficient gathering of information. One is more likely to cooperate in a business deal with members of one's own network because of the relationships that have been developed already. A similar argument is made by Newton and Norris (2000, cited in Sturgis et al., 2007, p. 3) who note that the

> ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and socialisation, especially those found in the sorts of voluntary association of modern society that bring different social types together to achieve a common goal.

The second perspective sees social trust emerging as a result of good governance. This perspective has much in common with the work of Uslaner (2002, pp. 245–246) who believes that good governance is the most essential condition for generating trust and creating a space for voluntary organisations to flourish. In his study on Nigeria and Ghana, Kuenzi (2008, p. 22) finds that confidence in public institutions impacts on interpersonal trust. In Kuenzi's words, "where people see the political institutions that govern society are trustworthy, that perception is likely to trickle down to the individuals who make up that society." This confirms the second perception on generalised trust—that public institutions and governance impact on public trust.

The third perspective relates to socio-psychological perspectives of trust. For example, empirical work by Allum et al. (2007, p. 22) found that generalised and political trust are stable within individuals and are primarily influenced by early experience, socialisation and learning, which differs from the two perspectives discussed above. The second and third perspectives are not mutually exclusive since trust can be instilled through socialisation and early experience as well as through the actions of good governance[6].

Proponents of the second perspective have influenced the literature on political trust. For example, Muhlberger (2003, pp. 9–11) examines the notion of political trust and defines the concept in relation to generalised trust. Political trust, according to Muhlberger (2003, p. 10), refers to the expectations that other members of a community will abide by norms that make it possible to act collectively to achieve political ends. These include perceptions that "people in the community are willing to work together on common problems, that they are willing to talk reasonably to each other and that they care about community problems." His view is that political trust might be a more politically relevant concept than generalised trust. Muhlberger

[6] There are other socio-psychological perspectives on the emergence of trust. One aspect is that social trust emerges as a result of personality—meaning one's propensity to trust. This perspective is not reviewed here as it does not relate to the subject of generalised and political trust.

(2003, p. 22) finds political trust to be superior to generalised trust in explaining civic engagement involving political action.

While Muhlberger defines political trust as a relational concept centred on civic engagement involving political action, Kim (2004, p. 3) sees it as the trust that citizens put in their political institutions and actors. Here the political actors and institutions are central to the notion of political trust. Stokes (1962, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) and Miller (1974, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) conceive of political trust

> as a general evaluative orientation towards the government based upon citizens' normative expectations of government operation and effectiveness or it can be viewed as an individual's assessment of how well the government is performing compared with how well they think it should be performing.

Low political trust can, according to Kim (2004, p. 3), have quite serious consequences. This is particularly so in

> fledgling democracies where there are no dependable cultural and historical roots of democracy and where citizens have high expectations and a very instrumentalist conception of democracy, political distrust can easily develop into a menace to democratic stability.

Low political trust coupled with poor institutional development at the level of the state could either lead to more or less political participation depending on whether communities are cohesive and/or have effective leadership.

This link of trust with political participation is important because trust relationships in and within public institutions are crucial for ensuring social and economic outcomes. In the words of the proponents of this view

> participation in local networks reinforces attitudes of mutual trust which make it easier for groups to agree on collective decisions and implement collective action. Thus trust makes it easier for people to enter into relationships of dependency and cooperation since people are willing to take more risks and make themselves vulnerable in order to attain a good they could not get on their own. In trust relationships people become less inclined to claim protection against the possibility of betrayal and they tend to avoid costly sanctioning mechanisms to defend their interests (Askvik & Bak, 2005, p. 5).

Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1002) use structural modelling to tease out the relationship between (civic and political) engagement and trust and find a stronger relationship from engagement to trust than from trust to engagement. Muhlberger (2003, p. 4) also cites numerous studies that find a weak or non-existent link between generalised trust and (civic and political) engagement. He contends that where trust is high people may have an incentive to either participate or not. High levels of trust may therefore become an inhibitor of collective action because people trust that community and political leaders will act in their best interest—decreasing the propensity to participate. Increasingly the argument is made that political trust rather than generalised trust is correlated with participation. In their analysis of the Canadian elections, Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, p. 137), found that politically distrustful voters were significantly more likely to abstain, indicating that trust impacts on participation.

It is useful to note here that in the literature, the term "political trust" or "institutional trust" emerges as a concept that captures trust in government, rather than the more vaguely defined term generalised trust.

Given the difficulty with the term generalised trust, Putnam's theory can be developed further to incorporate the concept of political trust. It is the contention of the authors cited in this section on trust that political trust is an important concept (less amorphous than generalised trust). In the development of the augmented framework in Chapter Four, I explore how political trust can be incorporated into the Putnam framework thereby further describing the transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes.

3.3.4 Trends in the Levels of Trust

In his seminal research on the subject of trust, Putnam (2003) showed that trust in other people has been slowly eroding in the USA in recent decades. Evidence gathered by other researchers show that this trend is a worldwide phenomenon affecting both developed and developing countries (Fattore et al., 2003, p. 167). Uslaner (2006, p. 7) cites evidence from the World Values Survey conducted across 24 countries and regions that showed that generalised trust is declining. In 1981, 38.5% of people thought that most people could be trusted. This declined to 26.9% in 2001.

Some of the literature examined in this study (see below) show recurring themes of declining political trust at all levels of development. Several reasons have been advanced to explain the decline in political trust including poor government performance, institutional fatalism and high public expectations.

Kim (2005, p. 5) reports that political trust has been in decline in South Korea. He cites data from the Korea Democracy Barometer Survey (1996–2004) that shows a decline in trust in virtually every public institution in South Korea. He also points out that such distrust is widespread among all socioeconomic groups and is particularly prevalent in relation to core state institutions. Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, p. 122) also show declines in political trust in Canada during the period 1984 to 1993 and indicate that this had an effect on political participation, particularly voting behaviour.

However, in their studies on Europe, Allum et al. (2007, p. 24) find that levels of political trust and generalised trust in European counties are quite stable. This poses an interesting question for further research (beyond the scope of the present study)—do European societies have a better way of fostering and maintaining trust or is there something in Putnam's methodology that does not translate well to other countries?

3.3.5 Heterogeneity and Trust

Community heterogeneity and its relationship to trust is a subject of much debate in the literature where heterogeneity is primarily (although not exclusively) identified in terms of income inequality or ethnic diversity, as discussed below.

The subject is treated in some depth by Rothstein and Stolle (2001) and Rothstein and Uslaner (2004, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2006, p. 1057) who find that income inequality is negatively correlated with generalised trust. That is, high levels of income inequality are generally associated with lower levels of generalised trust. This is supported by Hooghe (2007, p. 1056) who notes that citizens from different socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to share the same set of values and norms. His theoretical explanation for this is that income inequality makes those who have access to scarce resources afraid to lose them, and fosters envy among those who lack access to these resources. Feelings of injustice in more economically unequal societies further impact on the generation of generalised trust. For Rothstein and Uslaner (2004,

cited in Hooghe, 2007, p. 1056), the distribution of resources plays a key role in establishing perceptions about people sharing the same values, norms and destiny.

More recently, there has been a proliferation in the literature dealing with trust and diversity (Coffé & Geys, 2006; Rothstein & Stolle, 2001). The discussion and debate has centred largely on the issue of how diversity impacts on trust. Delhey and Newton, 2005 (cited in Hooghe, 2007, p. 710) observe that "generalized trust is strongest where we have something in common with others, especially when we are from the same ethnic background." People have a greater level of generalised trust when they commonly interact with people who are similar to them in terms of culture, income, ethnicity, history and status. This is possibly why levels of generalised trust are higher in the relatively more homogeneous Scandinavian countries (Paldam, 2007, p. 7). As indicated earlier, many empirical studies seem to confirm that generalised trust decreases as diversity increases. The issue of diversity and trust is particularly relevant for countries that have large or emerging immigrant populations. Studies on trust and diversity have proliferated in Europe in the recent past (Gerritsen & Lubbers, 2010; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle & Trappers, 2009; and Kresler, Christel & Bloemraad, 2010) as demographic and labour market conditions change in response to the increase in the number of immigrants. With the advent of political democracy this becomes particularly relevant to South Africa. Several urban centres and towns in the Western Cape have seen dramatic changes in their demographic profiles as large numbers of the African/Black population group migrate into these areas in search of employment opportunities. As the studies in Europe demonstrate, this has serious implications for social cohesion. Putnam (2007, cited in Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle & Trappers, 2009, p. 199) concedes that diversity impacts negatively on trust and social cohesion in the short run.

In their empirical work on diversity and trust, Hooghe et al. (2009, pp. 204–209) use multi-level models to test whether diversity indicators influence individual levels of generalised trust in a variety of European countries. They find that at the individual level, men, older people, lowly educated respondents and the unemployed are less trusting of diversity. Their analysis, however, shows that diversity does not exert the consistent and strong negative effects often ascribed to it by researchers (Hooghe et al., 2009, pp. 211–213).

Knack and Keefer (1997, p. 1257), in a cross-country study of 29 countries in the World Values Survey, found a negative relationship between trust and heterogeneity. This, however, is

contested by others including Uslaner (2006, p. 14), who finds no cross-country evidence to suggest that diversity per se leads to less trust. He explores the relationship between religious diversity and trust and finds there is only a weak relationship, even though religious conflict is at the heart of many inter-state and intra-state wars—and hence the expectation that religious diversity would be more strongly (negatively) related to generalised trust. Diversity, in his view, seems to be uncorrelated with trust.

There is growing evidence in the literature that suggests increasing diversity is not generally associated with a breakdown of social order, despite other findings to the contrary. Rather than see diversity as having negative consequences for trust some analysts call for different forms of social cohesion, where more attention is being paid to diversity and recognition of differences (Gutmann, 1994; Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2005).

3.3.6 Trust and Outcomes

In the process of examining the relationship of trust to diversity, analysts of social capital also began to enquire about the outcomes that result from both generalised and political trust. This section reviews the literature on this aspect of social capital.

In the literature, low trust societies are often correlated with crime and low socioeconomic status. Rothstein and Eek (2006, p. 3) present an overview of trust to outcomes analysis and contend that we should be interested in generalised or social trust. The reason is that generalised trust is correlated with favourable social, economic and political conditions—that is, countries where generalised trust is high are characterised as richer, with more economic growth and better performing government institutions[7]. Income inequality is also said to be lower. The degree of causality in some of these studies, however, is often difficult to establish. In some instances, generalised trust acts as a catalyst influencing socioeconomic outcomes. In other instances high levels of generalised trust emerge as a response to these factors. Differently put, socioeconomic factors (i.e. low levels of income inequality, homogeneous population groups) sometimes facilitate the emergence of generalised trust. For example, some theorists find

[7] The study does not indicate if causality has been established.

generalised trust to be associated with higher levels of GDP per capita and a higher ratio of GDP to investment (Knack & Keefer, 1997 cited in Pollitt, 2001, p. 7).

La Porta et al. (1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, pp. 311–317) find that the effects of trust on economic performance are both statistically significant and quantitatively large. Among their findings is that trust enhances economic performance across countries, and that it has a relatively small but significant effect on infrastructure quality and adequacy, a significant effect on infant mortality and a large effect on educational achievement. At a macro-economic level, La Porta et al. (1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000) found trust to be associated with lower rates of inflation and weakly associated with higher per capita GNP growth.

The review of various theorists on the concept of trust has prompted the use of the term political trust instead of generalised trust. Putnam's theory can therefore be developed further to incorporate the concept of political trust as seen in Chapter Four.

3.4 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In articulating Putnam's framework, networks and associations are seen as engendering trust which, in turn, has an impact on civic participation. According to the transmission mechanism articulated in the Putnam framework, civic participation impacts on both government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes, but with the former having an independent causal effect on the latter. Reflecting on the entire institutional context, it is networks and associations (the core of social capital) that ultimately affect social outcomes. Following the causal link in Putnam's thesis, this section explores the relationship between social capital and civic (and political) participation.

Theorists who turned their attention to this subject have arrived at divergent but interesting views. Uphoff (2000, p. 216) makes the observation that social capital is more amorphous (vague, shapeless) than participation. Putnam's theory emphasises the role of social capital as a catalytic variable influencing social, economic and political outcomes (1993, 1995, and 2001). In political science, Lowndes and Wilson (2001, p. 629) confirm that Putnam's theory has had a major impact on the discipline particularly in the areas of political theory (i.e. the role of civil society in a democratic polity), political economy (i.e. the link between civic

communities and economic success) and comparative and historical analysis of democratic practices in countries.

3.4.1 Defining Civic and Political Participation

There has been much debate on the concept of "participation" in the literature on social capital. In general, there is consensus that it is a form of active citizenship that enables people to develop responses to social and economic problems and communicate them in different areas of public life and in a multiplicity of ways. There are numerous debates on the definition of civic participation. Some authors, whose contributions are discussed below, view it as analogous to political participation while others see the two as distinct concepts.

For Best and Dustan (2006, p. 6) "civic participation can be categorised as 'civic engagement,' 'political participation,' and 'political engagement' among other labels." They go on to say that definitions of civic participation are often subjective and comprised of different ways of categorizing activity

> from individual voluntarism to organizational involvement to electoral participation. It can include efforts to directly address an issue, work with others in a community to solve a problem or interact with the institutions of representative democracy (Carpini, 2005, as cited by Best & Dustan, 2006, p. 6).

In their view, civic participation includes political participation and engagement—it is not only limited to the political sphere but includes non-political activities as well. It is in the political sphere, however, where civic participation has its most profound and direct effects.

As a distinct concept political participation is defined as taking part in the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies (Parry et al., 1992, cited in Lowndes, 2006, p. 542). Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) define political participation as "activities by private citizens that are aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take . . . in acts that influence government decisions."

To borrow from Klesner's (2007, p. 3) simple definition, political participation is basically our relations with political institutions. Through political participation citizens can hold governments accountable and influence the types of policies that are adopted. Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, and Zukin (2003, p. 4) view political engagement as positively tied to the

functioning and representativeness of the political system because ultimately the system affects "who gets what." Elaborating on this they point out that when large numbers of people are absent from being politically represented, extreme viewpoints may be over-represented to the detriment of the middle. For Donovan, Bowler, Hanneman, and Karp (2004, p. 410) political engagement

> is a sort of spill over effect of social group membership, and refers to something larger than standard conceptions of political participation such as voting. While voting may be an element of political engagement, political engagement is assumed to be part of a larger attachment to civic life and interest in public affairs.

Narayan (1999 notes that communities can have high levels of public engagement because they are ignored by public institutions or if they enjoy highly complementary relations with the state. However, it is the "absence or weakness of the state that is often compensated for by the creation of informal organizations" (Narayan, 1999, p. 15).

Political engagement can manifest itself in three types of political behaviour, that is, "electoral activity, civic activity, and political voice" (Jenkins et al., 2003, pp. 1–2).

> Electoral behaviour is understood to be that which is involved with voting and political office. . . . political voice is those activities that allow for political expression which may include communicating with those in power or decision-making positions, participating in boycotts, petitions and other demonstrations. These types of political action are also sometimes known as 'unconventional' (Jenkins et al., 2003, pp. 1–2).

Having examined the definitions of political participation the review proceeds with a breakdown of the factors that affect political participation.

3.4.2 Factors that Affect Political Participation

It is interesting to note that the same factors affecting participation also affect trust, indicating that trust and participation are inextricably linked. Klesner (2006, p. 9) identifies a few factors that shape political participation. The more important ones include socioeconomic and demographic factors, social capital, leadership, institutional opportunities and constraints and other contextual factors.

The following section identifies the factors that affect participation and groups these factors according to (i) demographic factors, (ii) associational activity (iii) leadership and (iv) institutional opportunities and constraints.

3.4.2.1 Economic and Demographic Factors

According to Klesner (2006), Jenkins et al. (2003), Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) and Verba and Nie (1987), socioeconomic and demographic factors have a definite impact on political participation. Verba and Nie (1987, pp. 129–133) observe that socioeconomic status (what they term SES factors) has a key impact on participation. In a seminal paper by Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969, p. 808) the authors posit that as an economy of a country becomes more developed because of economic growth, the social structure of a nation is altered which leads to changes in attitudes and cognitions which in turn impacts on political participation.

Demographic factors, especially age, have been extensively studied in the literature as key factors impacting on participation. According to Klesner (2006, p. 10), older citizens are more likely to participate in political activity because they are more experienced and have a greater stake in society that they need to defend. Jenkins et al. (2003, cited in Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p. 238), report that younger people find civic participation more appealing than political participation, and the percentage of young people who are involved in political engagement is significantly lower at 11% than the percentage of people aged 38 and older (18%). Older people are equally active in both political and civic participation. Young people who are involved in civic participation may not be involved in political participation, particularly those who hold the view that democratic processes are messy, inefficient, unprincipled and filled with conflict (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p.237). Klesner (2007, p.10) also finds political participation to be higher among educated and wealthier people. The views of these authors are discussed below.

There is no clear-cut evidence that membership in heterogeneous groups has a greater impact on political participation. Among White communities in America group homogeneity impacts positively on political participation (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005, p. 238). This also seems to be the case with Japan where Ikeda (2002, p. 17) found that homogeneous social networks have a greater effect as facilitators of political participation.

3.4.2.2 Associational Activity as a Factor

The second factor that has an impact on participation is social capital—or as Klesner (2006, p. 3) puts it, "one's relationship with others." The social capital factor often refers to social networks and associations and even trust. Since this is central to the thesis the research will review what the literature has to say about communities with higher levels of associational activity and levels of participation. In Klesner's (2006, p. 30) work on Latin America, he found that people who participated in non-political associations were more likely to participate in politics.

Donovan et al. (2004, p. 407) used New Zealand as a case study to test the same hypothesis and found that membership in voluntary associations impacted on democratic virtues. Because of the high rate of participation in sports groups in that country, they see New Zealand as an interesting case study to test whether membership in non-political associations such as sports clubs and other voluntary organisations promotes political engagement. They find that not all types of groups/associations are alike in terms of their effects on political engagement. The effects on political engagement for membership in a community or cultural group were higher but were the highest for sports groups. Sports groups were "also associated with higher dimensions of engagement that included voting and discussing politics" (Donovan et al., 2004, p. 415). In summary, the authors find that there is

> individual-level evidence that membership in private, non-political associations corresponds with greater political engagement in New Zealand. Although correlation does not establish causation, we have controlled for various alternative explanations so as to suggest that membership in these groups generates higher levels of political activity. However, of those social groups that are expected by neo-Tocquevillians to be breeding-grounds for democratic virtues, membership in church groups may be less consequential than membership in sports groups, cultural groups and community organizations (Donovan et al., 2004, p. 409).

As we see later, the study by Donovan et al. sheds light on the two study areas of this research because of a similar phenomenon in Cederberg, that is, the community's very high incidence of membership in sports groups.

Membership in church groups has also been associated with higher levels of participation (Verba, 1995). Djupe and Grant (2001, p. 303) refer to previous research on religious

institutions and political participation which found that churches can increase participation among their members through the development of civic skills and the distinct political histories of religious traditions.

Booth and Richard (1998, p. 782), in a study involving six Central American states, breaks up associational activity into formal associational activity and communal activity where the former represents membership in institutions like professional bodies and unions and the latter includes membership in schools, church organisations and other self-help projects. By breaking up associational activity into formal associational activity and communal activity they were able to see how these types of associational activity impacted on political engagement. They found that communal activity was statistically related to "contacting public officials." This led the authors to conclude that communal activity enables citizens to convey their demands to government. Formal associational activity as a mechanism of political engagement was statistically related to "contacting public officials" and "campaigning." Even though both types of activities were "participatory in nature", in the Central American case, formal groups have a greater effect on democracy than informal communal groups. Unfortunately, there was no investigation of who belonged to the formal and communal groups. The authors assumed, however, that wealthier individuals are more likely to belong to formal associations than the poor and are therefore better able to influence (through their campaigning) policies that are more in favour of their interests than members of communal groups. The authors also believe that in the case of Central America communal groups have a very narrow mechanism for exchange with the political regime in power. They *may*[8] be co-opted by repressive regimes rather than becoming more democratic, leading the authors to suggest that "contrary to the expectations of the developmentalists who promote communal organisations and the theorists who laud them as fronts for democracy. . . communal groups may not generate the anticipated systemic democratisation because it helps regimes buy off local activists" (Booth & Richard, 1998, p. 797).

[8] This has not been empirically tested as yet.

Booth and Richard (1998, p. 797) also point to a reciprocal or iterative rather than linear relationship between associational activity and political participation.

3.4.2.3 Leadership as a Factor

The literature has highlighted leadership as a key activator of collective action and political participation in communities (McCallum & O'Connell, 2009; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Bankoff, 2015). For example, Bodin and Crona (2008, p. 2771) recognise the important role that associational activity plays in collective action but argue that it is leadership which is necessary to activate collective action and to potentially produce a flow of benefits to communities. According to Purdue (2001, p. 2221) community leaders act as key points of contact between the state and local communities, putting them at the interface between internal "communal" and external "collaborative" social capital. Leadership provides communities with the know-how of how to manoeuvre bureaucracy (Bodin & Crona, 2008, p. 2775).

Leadership is therefore a critical component necessary to unlock the benefits manifested in networks. According to Oh, Labianca, and Chung (2006, p. 574), leaders have the ability to connect various sub-groups, determining the relative efficacy of the group. According to these authors, the greater the number of sub-group connections, the greater the leaders' access to a diversity of information and social support from which the leaders can draw. They state that "groups that communicate more frequently with other groups have greater access and more potential resources to draw from" (2006, p. 575).

The downside of centralised leadership (mostly found in hierarchical structures) is dependency and vulnerability. According to Bodin and Crona (2008, p. 2777), depending solely on leadership for collective action leads to vulnerability and dependency because the community is dependent on a single person's prioritisation and decision making. According to the authors this dependency on leadership reduces a community's resilience.

Effectiveness of Leaders

According to Balkundi and Kilduff (2006, p. 420), the network approach to leadership does not locate leadership in the attributes of individuals but rather in the relationships connecting individuals. According to the authors, the network approach locates leadership in relational, contextual and systemic understandings. Writing in the context of organisations, the authors

state that leaders are vital in perceiving and managing network relations which are the key to leadership. If they cannot do this they will lack authority, allowing informal leaders to frustrate organisational functioning and hence their ability to mobilise collective action (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, pp. 419–420).

According to Balkundi and Kilduff (2006, p. 428) the extent to which leaders are effective in terms of accessing important resources and mobilising collective action depends on the social structural positions they occupy in the key networks within and between organisations. The authors believe that individuals who have "social connections connected to each other have dense social circles whereas individuals whose social contacts have few connections have sparse social circles" (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, p. 48). It is their contention that members of a dense network share similar attitudes and values towards the leaders of the organisation. According to the authors

> whether members of a dense network tend to enhance or neutralise the leaders' effectiveness is likely to depend on whether the shared attitudes are negative or positive since a dense network of people favourably disposed towards the leader represents a pool of social capital available to the leader. Messages transmitted to this group are likely to be favourably received and expeditiously transmitted. In their view dense networks can enhance or distort leadership initiatives. (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2006, p. 428)

Leadership initiatives can also be enhanced through structuring of interpersonal networks to reach diverse constituencies, using relatively few ties to expand the range of resources and information accessed (Burt, 1992, as cited in Balkundi & Kilduff 2006, p. 429). In the context of communities, leaders can build links with key communities and different constituencies through delegation to trusted lieutenants.

Women and Leadership

According to Warren, Thomson, and Saegert (2001, p. 20) there is a big difference between the leadership styles of men and women. According to the authors, men are more concerned with developing contacts and power positions with mainstream institutions such as government departments whereas women are more enabling, "nurturing broad based ties in the community and investing in human development at all levels of development." The authors highlight that women tend to have a comprehensive approach to community development which is based on

human and needs-centred programmes and an open style of leadership. The authors state that women develop strategies that are diverse but that emphasise the integration of public and private spheres—"with a key focus on strengthening family and friends." They state that organisations that lack significant numbers of women in leadership positions tend to focus solely on jobs, economic development and housing construction.

According to Warren, et.al (2001, p. 20) female leadership is vital for building, promoting and using social capital in poor communities. The authors state that it is women who primarily bring together neighbours and relatives to support issues of daily life which are not met through the economic and political system. They conclude by saying that the leadership approach of women tempers the clash of interests that dominates in the political realm (Warren, et.al, 2001, p. 21).

Leadership as a feature of the transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes is largely ignored in the Putnam framework, thereby necessitating an augmentation of the framework in the context of this thesis.

3.4.2.4 Institutional Opportunities and Constraints

In their work on social capital and urban governance, particularly political participation, Maloney, Smith, and Stoker (2000, p. 803) criticise Putnam's treatment of the exogenous state because he fails to take into account the role played by political structures and institutions in influencing social capital. The authors offer a more state-centred approach to the treatment of participation and note that institutions play a key role in promoting and sustaining participation. They believe that more attention needs to be given to the interpenetration of state and civil society in the development and promotion of participation. It might be that state/civil society interactions are primarily between civil society and officials rather than councillors who impact on policy making. They are also critical of Putnam's assertion that knowledge of associations and their density is the key to participation, stating that this does not tell us anything about the quality of governance in the area and that it is primarily the quality of governance that impacts on participation (Maloney et al., 2000, p. 803). The authors find that strong civic vibrancy has been maintained in Birmingham as a result of government policies that have been pursued to encourage and sustain participation (2000, p. 804).

In an article on factors driving local participation, Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker (2006, p. 540) highlight the role that rules play in promoting participation. According to the authors, rules shape participation and influence results. Their focus is on formal rules and informal rules, customs and conventions that structure participation (2006, p. 542). They consider how resources, socioeconomic factors, relationships (networks and associations) and rules in use interact to produce distinctive local contexts for participation. In their article on participation they were primarily interested in the actions taken by citizens in seeking to influence decisions made by public officials and elected representatives.

For Lowndes et al. (2006, p. 546) "rules provide a structure of incentives and disincentives to political actors and they also express norms on what is appropriate and inappropriate behaviour." Public authorities, in their view, can have a huge impact on participation if they provide people with the right incentives. They show that actors can shape and bend institutional forces in a new direction (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 559).

Putnam (1993, 1995) is also criticised for his "society-centred approach" which undervalues state agency and associated political factors (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 629). The authors are of the opinion that state agency has an important role to play in harnessing participation and that the underlying institutional framework must be examined to determine the factors that impact on the promotion of participation. The authors quote numerous studies that examine the extent to which social capital can be developed by the state. Their underlying argument is that the institutional framework/design is an important variable that is not considered in Putnam's study. They point out that there are a few interacting dimensions of institutional design within government that shape the creation and mobilisation of participation (Lowndes & Wilson, 2001, p. 633). The first of these include factors such as the institutional relationships that local authorities in particular have with the voluntary sector which supports and recognises these organisations. Secondly, local governments can provide opportunities and prospects for the formation of new groups. The third factor that impacts on the formation of participation is the responsiveness of decision making by local authorities. A fourth factor is that of democratic leadership and social inclusion.

The role of state agency in the development of social capital has gained currency in the last few years. The state according to Wallis, Killerby, and Dollery (2004, p. 250) can play an active role in the development of social capital by forging dynamic alliances and partnerships between

and within state institutions and civil society. There is sufficient opportunity for the establishment of complementary relationships between government and civil society, so that the synergies between state and citizen action ameliorates resource access problems and creates a virtuous circle of social, institutional and economic improvement.

Wallis et al. (2004, pp. 250–252) note that the level of voluntary activity may be boosted by local government through a host of initiatives such as grants and partnerships. New associations and stocks of social capital may be influenced by the degree to which local bodies engage in participatory governance. In their unpacking of the state's role in the development of social capital they infer that particular attention must be paid to the institutions of local governance since this affects not only the overall level of public participation in policy making but also the distribution of opportunities to participate in different social groups.

Variables affecting political participation have been the subject of much debate and analysis since the 1960s. Demographic factors, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, geographic location, educational attainment, gender and religious affiliation have all been part of the political analyst's vault of possible explanatory tools to understand why and how citizens participate in the political process. The review sheds light on social capital's contribution to the analysis with its focus on types of associational activity (religious institutions, sport organisations, formal and communal bodies) and the interaction of state/civil structures. Both are seen as influencing and being influenced by political participation, sometimes to the detriment of democracy but more often enhancing it. In the empirical research participation is given particular attention—the role of the state in the promotion of social capital, particularly the institutions of local governance and the effects they have on public participation. The augmented analytical framework developed in Chapter Four incorporates institutional and policy design in the creation and mobilisation of political participation.

3.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

An area that has also entered the discourse on social capital is government effectiveness, since political engagement and participation impacts on the functioning of governments. One of the propositions by Putnam is that the effectiveness and efficiency of government activity is dependent on the prevalent social capital in that region or locality. Government effectiveness is then related to better developmental outcomes, that is, in the form of better socioeconomic

outcomes and even higher economic growth. In the case of the latter, Serageldin and Grootaert (2000, p. 45) see this as a macro-level effect and show how institutions, legal frameworks and the government's role in the organisation of production affect market performance.

Several studies have been undertaken to determine the relationship between social capital and government effectiveness. Knack (2000, pp. 2–3), in his paper on social capital and the quality of government, shows that large-scale collective action generated in part by pervasive social capital can improve government functioning. The author lists three mechanisms through which this happens: firstly, that it stimulates government accountability; secondly, it facilitates compromise and agreement where polarised political preferences exist; and thirdly, it makes governments more responsive to communities, in part, through innovative policy making. The study is extensive and provides a detailed analysis of social capital variables and various aspects of government performance for 50 American states. The measures used to determine government efficiency were compiled and analysed in a previous study undertaken by Barrett and Greene (1999, cited in Knack, 2000, p. 6), and were concentrated across five areas of government performance, including financial and capital management, human resources, information technology and what Knack (2000, p. 22) refers to as "managing for results." Under the five performance areas, a total of thirty-five criteria were used to determine government efficiency. These included adequacy of financial auditing, effective procurement management and involvement of stakeholders in developing strategic plans. After controlling for higher income, better education and the "potential for polarised preferences" such as racial heterogeneity and inequality, the results showed that social capital was positively related to more effective governance (Knack, 2000, p. 13). The study found that the quality of governance is also more pronounced where social capital is more prevalent (Knack, 2000, p. 16).

Unlike social capital, education and income were not significant determinants of government performance (Knack, 2000, p. 16). The evidence showed that if the quality of government performance is high, it reinforces a virtuous cycle where communities run smoothly with reduced criminality and social strife, generating more trust and reinforcing more civic cooperation (Knack, 2000, p. 19). Like Putnam, Knack's study implies that people with more horizontal networks had better governments.

According to Evans (1997, p. 66) the extent to which a state is "developmental" or "predatory" is crucially dependent on the capacity of its public institutions and the nature of state–society

relations. In the case of a developmental state, government is more likely to play an interventionist role, especially in sectors of the economy where the prospects for creating employment and alleviating poverty are relatively high. Without strong participation of civil society, however, the state runs the risk of bureaucratising development, with the decision-making process resting solely in the hands of state officials. The absence of accountability provisions can often give rise to a culture of impunity which endangers democracy and development. Government effectiveness is therefore dependent on the degree to which the public can engage officials and politicians. Put another way, to the extent that the effectiveness of government is strongly influenced by the level of social capital in a given society, social and economic outcomes are likely to reflect growth and distributional achievements.

Many studies have tested Putnam's hypothesis at a regional, state and country level. Few, however, have focused their attention on the level of local government. As local government is the tier in a political system that is responsible for the direct delivery of basic services, testing Putnam's hypothesis at the level of local government provides a more rigorous test of his social capital hypothesis.

Cusack (1999, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 486) and Rice (2001, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 486) show that high levels of social capital are correlated with higher subjective approvals of local government performance. Coffé and Geys (2005, p. 486), in their analysis of social capital in Flemish municipalities, tested the effect that social capital has on local government performance. They used financial management as an objective indicator of government performance.

They found that social capital affects government performance in three ways. First, it improves performance as it makes "citizens sophisticated consumers of politics" (Boix & Posner, 1998, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487). This means that social capital makes it easier for people to monitor how effective socioeconomic outcomes are under political parties and to use their voting powers to vote less effective governments out of office. In societies where there are higher levels of social capital it increases people's monitoring of government performance. Citizens in high social capital communities demand that governments, particularly at the lower level, become more effective and efficient at meeting their constitutional obligations.

Second, they found that it creates an atmosphere of cooperation and compromise or, in Putnam's words; social capital contributes to a society in which "habits of cooperation, solidarity and public spiritedness" between people are facilitated (Putnam, 1993, pp. 89–90). Third, it creates an environment that encourages compliance with the necessary regulations, reducing the costs associated with enforcing compliance and freeing up resources which can then be more productively used. It therefore garners

> greater ease of cooperation among politicians and bureaucrats and reduces the possibility of gridlock in decision-making which makes it therefore more likely to lead to a higher quality of governance (Boix & Posner, 1998; Knack, 2002, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487).

Social capital might also change the nature of people's preferences from particularistic (or selfish) towards more community-oriented concerns (Boix & Posner, 1998, cited in Coffé & Geys, 2005, p. 487).

Thus in a political economy sense, social capital infers that there is a relationship between civil society and the state that impacts on the effectiveness of democracy (Booth & Richard, 1998, pp. 795–796).

According to Mani (2001, p. 4), social capital ensures better governance since "well-organized communities demand better services from public agencies as well as government staff that interact closely with these communities."

The study by Coffé & Geys (2005, p. 489) used data for the 2000 fiscal year and was based on a cross-section analysis of 305 (out of a potential 308) Flemish municipalities. The authors found that where social capital was high, government performance was more efficient and effective, confirming Putnam's social capital hypothesis at the local level. However, it may be the case that participation gets reduced because the ruling party is not seen as being efficient – so government inefficiency creates disillusionment and decreases political participation. This perspective will also be added to the analytical framework discussed in Chapter Four.

The literature reviewed examined the effect of social capital on government effectiveness. Other than Putnam, the studies examined did not look at the other intermediate variables as expressed in the analytical framework, that is, trust and political participation. The studies also examined a host of criteria used to determine government efficiency but did not focus on other

"subjective" factors of government efficiency, that is, the extent to which governments' actions impact on the social welfare function of the communities that they serve. The review also showed that there were no studies that examined the effects that social capital has on government effectiveness in so far as local governments that experience considerable capacity constraints are concerned. This absence constitutes a compelling reason to undertake a study of this nature.

3.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

In Putnam's thesis the ultimate effect of social capital is to be assessed according to the social and economic outcomes. The process, as illustrated in the Figure 3–1, sees social and economic outcomes as being influenced by civic participation and government effectiveness. In the preceding section, the relationship between participation in the political process and government efficiency was explored. This section deals with that part of Putnam's theory regarding how social capital impacts on social and economic outcomes.

Social capital has been linked to a wide range of social, economic and development outcomes (Helliwell & Huang, 2014; Kwon & Adler, 2014). The literature reviewed in this section cites empirical evidence to show that social capital makes societies healthier and wealthier, gives them better government and improves overall socioeconomic wellbeing.

The several ways in which social capital can lead to better developmental outcomes have been extensively treated by a number of analysts. The literature has generally concentrated on the following themes: economic growth and development, poverty alleviation and livelihood support, and access to basic services.

Support for the link between social capital and development comes from Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000, pp. ix–xii) who point to growing evidence that social capital has an important impact on development outcomes, including growth, equity and poverty alleviation. Maluccio, Haddad, and May (2000) examines the relationship between social capital and household welfare in South Africa's largest province and found that social capital had a positive and significant effect on welfare in one of the two years considered (1998).

For Jooste (2005, p. 2) the main argument underlying these theories is that social capital spurs a host of behavioural and attitudinal mannerisms which contribute toward the strengthening of democracy, the development of cooperative culture and the establishment of harmonious social interaction. Among others, she concludes that social capital may help address the rational choice dilemma of collective action.

Social capital is a key determinant of whether communities collaborate to generate, manage and maintain local resources. In poor countries, especially in the rural areas, collective action is important for the generation and management of local resources. In this regard, high levels of community social capital improve the management of such resources. Several studies have also pointed to this in the literature (Ostrom, 2000, p. 178).

Since social capital improves the potential for cooperative action it can be leveraged as a resource. This is especially so in the context of developing countries, where governments are unable to cope with the demand for basic services because of a lack of capacity and resources. Private contractors sometimes fill the gap in the absence of government provision, but when the private sector is reluctant, community-based efforts can help fill the gap (Latt et al., 2002). The aforementioned authors document their findings with respect to community participation in the provision of basic services with actual case studies.

Reid and Salmen (2002, p. 101), in their qualitative analysis of the effects of social capital on agricultural extension services in Mali, found that the degree of social cohesion in the form of residents' propensity to attend association meetings was the most important determinant of whether a community would be successful in implementing external development interventions such as the agricultural extension services that they studied. What this means is that social capital impacts on social and economic outcomes by coordinating behaviour and thereby facilitating the interventions of external development agencies.

A study by Pantoja (2002, p. 143), found that bonding capital can be high (in the form of bonding between members of the same group) but can also lead to exclusion for those not part of the "in group". In this sense it can be "*fractured"* on the basis of race or class. He finds that even though social capital can be used by certain groups to secure a greater share of resources, the lack of social capital can present a major challenge to the successful implementation of community-driven development. Pantoja cites a case study in India where community

development strategies are dependent on community-level social capital but as "one of a variety of assets available in different degrees to individuals and groups in a community" (Pantoja, 2002, p. 143).

One study that integrates qualitative and quantitative data is that by Narayan and Pritchett (1997, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 269). They show that social capital can have an important role to play in determining positive developmental outcomes at the local/village/community level. In their survey on social capital and household income in rural Tanzania they show that social capital had an impact on village-level developmental outcomes.

Their survey instrument incorporated questions on village life as well as on various dimensions of social capital including membership in groups, membership characteristics of groups and their attitudes on issues like trust and social cohesion. Analysis of their data found that the level of social capital of the households interviewed (an index of the social capital measures) had an impact on incomes. According to the authors, the estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the village social capital index increases the income of all households in the village by approximately 20% (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997 as cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 274). Narayan and Pritchett further explain that if half of the village are members of one group, this village would have a social capital index that is higher by one standard deviation than a village in which group membership is zero. If average membership were to increase, the estimates suggest that this would increase expected income by an impressively large amount—more than what it would increase if they were to add three years of schooling per adult. The implication of this is that social capital is an important instrument in the fight against poverty (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997, as cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p. 290).

Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 80) showed through developed country urban studies literature and developing world documents, that the nature and extent of social networks are key components of the risk management strategies of the poor. The authors examined the case of Mexicans in San Diego and Haitians in Miami and showed that despite their population size, they are denied the benefits of considerable economic resources and social opportunities because of their low levels of social capital and internal cohesiveness.

Unlike the above example, other groups, like the Koreans in Los Angeles or the Chinese in San Francisco, are able to "call upon and develop both cohesive internal ties and more extensive ties into the mainstream economy, because a range of indigenous social institutions exist for meeting basic credit and security requirements" (Rao & Woolcock, 2001, p. 2).

The analysis of social capital theorists whose works were reviewed here appears to endorse Putnam's thesis that social capital has a positive impact on social and economic outcomes. These findings have important implications for the formulation of policy and the development of strategies for poverty alleviation, especially at the local level. In the interpretation of the research findings for this thesis, which are discussed in Chapter Seven, it will be argued that even small differences between local areas with respect to social capital can deliver significant differences in outcomes.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The analysis of the constructs, causal linkages and analytical prescripts in the Putnam thesis led to an elaboration on the concepts of networks and associations, trust, civic participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. In terms of networks and associational activity, the review shows that the effectiveness of such organisations and groups is dependent on a host of variables and is often influenced by the environment in which they operate. Network characteristics were shown to be vertical or horizontal, with active or passive membership, were homogeneous and heterogeneous, and differed in the activities they undertook. A new approach for network effectiveness needs to take account of the extent to which networks and associations are imbued with combinations of the characteristics mentioned above. This idea is further developed in Chapter Four.

When analysing the second concept of trust in the Putnam framework, the notion of generalised trust was critically examined and found to be fraught with empirical and conceptual problems. Given the difficulty with the term, the literature focused on the concept of "political" trust.

Civic participation was found to include political participation and engagement. Factors that affect participation were identified and included demographic, associational activity and institutional opportunities and constraints. The role of institutional design was critically examined along with state agency in the promotion of civic participation. A point of note was

the lack of attention paid to the concept of leadership in the promotion of both social capital and political participation and engagement. This is considered an important factor in the research findings on Cederberg and Matzikama.

On government effectiveness, the extent to which a state is “developmental” or “predatory” was found to be crucially dependent on the capacity of its public institutions and the nature of state-society relations. Measurements of government effectiveness, however, relied primarily on objective indicators collected from government departments or agencies. Government effectiveness in the literature was not found to be dependent on the extent to which local governments’ impact on the welfare function of communities, particularly poor communities. This was found to be a caveat and is incorporated into the augmented analytical framework developed in Chapter Four.

The review on socioeconomic outcomes gave an account of how social capital has been linked to positive social and economic outcomes in the development literature. It traced developments in both the developed and developing world and discussed the studies documenting socio-economic outcomes. The chapter has demonstrated that the Putnam thesis can be augmented with insights from the literature so as to reflect a comprehensive transmission mechanism from networks to socioeconomic outcomes capable of providing answers to the research question.

CHAPTER FOUR: AUGMENTING PUTNAM'S TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the key aims and objectives of the thesis is to rework Putnam's theory of social capital so as to provide an analytical framework capable of describing the transmission mechanism necessary for social capital to impact on socioeconomic outcomes in the South African small town and rural context. I intend to develop the analytical framework in this chapter based largely on the insights gleaned from Chapter Three. The analytical framework will be used to analyse the findings in the two study areas in Chapter Six.

Using the Putnam framework as a point of departure, I begin this chapter with a discussion on networks and associations. The salient points of networks/associations as elaborated in the literature review are incorporated into the analytical framework. The various characteristics of networks/associations are discussed and diagrammatically represented. The relationship between networks/associations and trust and participation is then sketched. This is followed by a discussion on trust and its attributes and how this affects and is affected by participation. In the discussion on participation, the factors affecting participation are incorporated into the analytical framework and linked to government effectiveness. The administrative and technical aspects of government effectiveness are then worked into the analytical framework which is further extended to apply a welfare approach to the Putnam construct. Socioeconomic outcomes are incorporated into the analytical framework as the final outcome of the process.

4.2 NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS

From the literature review, social networks or associations were seen as a structure for sharing information, coordinating activities and making collective decisions. According to mainstream proponents, the system works because of common values and norms as well as sanctions of undesirable conduct. Social networks are a medium within and through which information flows and decisions are made. This medium is dynamic and helps to interpret and assess the information that flows through it. The type of network or association also influences the information that gets disseminated through it and the actions that emanates from it. For

example, membership in a church organisation might be given a moral or ethical dimension as a result of the medium through which it is disseminated, and the actions that stem from it might be mediated by this moral dimension. The different types of networks and their varying aspects have a bearing on the other concepts discussed in the analytical framework.

A brief summation of the findings from the literature review in Chapter Three will help to distinguish the following characteristics of networks:

4.2.1 Horizontal Versus Hierarchical

Networks are described as being either horizontal or vertical. A horizontal network is also described by Putnam (1993, p. 116) as a social network. A horizontal network is one in which the structure of the network has mutuality and equality of participation. According to Putnam (1993, pp. 107–108) these horizontal associations are more equitably and densely populated than hierarchical ones. As people begin to interact with one another (in the context of these networks) generalised reciprocity as well as social trust is engendered and enhanced. Greater trust impacts on relationship building by increasing communication and cooperation which in turn impacts positively on civic engagement.

In contrast to horizontal networks, hierarchical ones are characterised by dependence (Boix & Posner, 1996, p. 3) rather than mutuality, which limits their ability to generate reciprocity and trust. For Ikeda and Richey (2005, p. 241), hierarchical relationships are characterised by coercion and compliance. This could create mistrust, which makes relationship building harder and, as a consequence, more difficult to arrive at common goals. The sharing of opinions is also more of a challenge which, in turn, negatively impacts on civic mindedness. Ikeda and Richey (2005, p. 256) show that in Japan, by contrast, vertical or hierarchical networks/associations impacted positively on political participation because of the culture of the society. A probable explanation is that this is because of the culture and belief in Confucianism which enforces the notion that superiors in the social structure have more knowledge than those who occupy lower positions (Ikeda & Richey, 2005 p. 242). This is however not the norm in Western urban societies that are governed by liberal values where hierarchical networks usually have negative consequences.

4.2.2 Active Versus Passive Membership

The degree of activism in an association/network also impacts on trust, participation and socioeconomic outcomes. This is the finding of Savage et al. (2004, p. 35) and Kankainen (2009, p. 11). The latter found that active membership in hobbies and cultural associations correlates positively with trust.

However, passive membership is not necessarily negative since the longer individuals remain in their passive roles the more influence these associations have on their attitudes (Wollebæk & Selle, 2002, p. 37). Passive membership therefore impacts positively on the belief system. In a study in Finland by Kankainen (2009, p. 11) though, a correlation was established between lower levels of trust and passive membership in certain associations.

From the research conducted then, there appears to be general consensus that passive membership has a lesser impact on trust and participation than active membership. In the analysis of the differences between networks in Cederberg and Matzikama, I assess the degree of activism in the existing networks, look at how network activism differs between the two municipalities and, if they do, what the possible explanations for these differences are. I also investigate which types of membership lead to action and political participation.

4.2.3 Homogeneous Versus Heterogeneous Membership

From the work by Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) we learn that people are more likely to join groups that are homogeneous in their membership. This is because people find it easier to mix with "their own kind." Even though Putnam (1993) and others argue that heterogeneous membership is more likely to generate public trust (because people get to socialise with others from outside their established circle), Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) show that the empirical evidence on the matter is inconclusive. In the investigation of Cederberg and Matzikama I examine the extent to which membership is heterogeneous or homogeneous. In the context of South Africa, it should be noted that the extent to which social group membership is heterogeneous in both racial and income terms is important since it will help identify the extent to which groups have managed to develop relationships beyond their particular race and income categories. This could have important implications for the country

in terms of our understanding of trust between racial groups and the factors that promote or inhibit participation and engagement across class lines.

The analytical framework also identifies homogeneity and heterogeneity in the type of social groups that are available in the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama. The greater the heterogeneity (in terms of the diversity of activities that they undertake) the more likely they are to impact on trust and participation. The more heterogeneous social groups are in a given community, the more likely it is that such a community will link up with other institutions and race groups. It is believed that this increases the opportunity for bridging and linking social capital which connects groups and individuals to others as well as with those who occupy different social positions (e.g. the more powerful or socially advantaged).

4.2.4 Public Versus Private Good-Provision

Boix and Posner (1996) found that the effects on trust and participation are different depending on whether networks are based on the generation/production of private or public-type goods. They explain (1996, p. 6) that

> the existence of a private goods-producing group depends on convergent interests rather than trustworthiness whereas the existence of an association set up to supply a universally consumable product like better schools or safer streets, on the other hand, would appear to be a better indicator of the presence of social capital in the community because its very existence depends on the ability of its members to trust one another and overcome the organization's built-in incentives for free-riding.

It is thus safe to assume then that social networks engaged in the provision of public goods are more likely to be an indicator of civic mindedness than private good-producing groups. Under certain conditions, however, certain “private” goods can also be provided by social groups if such goods confer a public benefit. For example, in the Black community of Cederberg, community associations have taken the initiative to play a role in the formation of soccer clubs for the youth in their areas.

The analytical framework should enable us to examine the extent to which public and private good-producing groups have an impact on social cohesion and collective action in the two study areas. While both groups have to deal with the free rider issue, the focus in the analytical framework specifically identifies this for public good-producing groups since the emphasis in

the analytical framework is on the greater impact of trust, political participation and developmental outcomes.

4.2.5 Political Versus Non-Political Associational Activity

Some of the studies referred to in the literature review have shown that the scope and type of associational activity have important implications for trust and participation. In Wollebæk and Selle (2002, p. 38) and Putnam (1993), non-political associations had different impacts on trust and participation and hence socioeconomic outcomes when compared to political associations. This was confirmed by Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155), who showed that political organisations have the least levels of public and political trust and efficacy.

Non-political associations like stokvels, choirs and sport groups would appear to not only enable people to bond and stand together but also offer an opportunity for them to engage with other racial groups (in the context of South Africa) and thereby build trust and cohesion between them. This clearly facilitates the flow of information and enhances communication between and within these groups. This is said to facilitate engagement with the political authorities. For example, in New Zealand it was found that membership in non-political associations like sports clubs promote political engagement (see Donovan et al., 2004, p. 415). Verba (1995) echoes this with his work on church groups, showing that they are associated with higher levels of participation.

4.2.6 Typology of Networks

Having discussed the various types of characteristics of networks, the following table illustrates their relationship with trust and participation.

Table 4-1: Typology of Networks

TYPE	CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORKS	DESCRIPTION	IMPACT	
			TRUST	PARTICIPATION
Horizontal versus Hierarchical	**Horizontal**	• Mutuality and equality of participation • Densely populated • Enhances communication and cooperation • Facilitates generalized reciprocity • Equal division of power	√	√
	Hierarchical	• Dependence rather than mutuality • Characterized with coercion and compliance • Unequal division of power	×	√
Active versus Passive	**Active**	• characterized by active engagement and involvement	√	√
	Passive	• Passive participation in a network involves not participating actively, and usually letting others make decisions	×	√
Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous	**Homogeneous**	• Networks/associations that have the same kind of constituents – • Generally racially and culturally based networks • Can also be defined in terms of the homogeneity of social groups	×	×
	Heterogeneous	• Networks/associations that have unrelated constituents • E.g. Racially and culturally diverse • Can also be defined in terms of the heterogeneity of social groups (diverse social groups)	√	√
Public-good versus private-good producing	**Public-good producing**	• Public-good producing networks/associations are set up to supply a universally consumable product like better schools • Public-good producing networks/associations existence depends on the ability of its members to overcome built-in incentives for free-riding	√	√
	Private-good producing	• Private goods-producing networks/associations depends on convergent interests	×	√
Non-political versus political	**Non-political**	• Examples of non-political networks/associations include sports groups, cultural groups etc.	√	√
	Political	• Unions, government agencies	×	√

Having outlined the attributes of various networks we now look at how they can be integrated into the analytical framework. This is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

The aim in this section is to understand how the types of networks illustrated in Figure 4-1 have an impact on trust and participation. Two observations that can be made about networks are that their characteristics are not mutually exclusive and that each network can have a host of different attributes. Figure 4-1 shows that networks/associations that are horizontal, active and heterogeneous in their membership, public good-producing and non-political in their scope have the strongest impact on trust and participation. These positive attributes are demarcated by the red dotted line.

Although Figure 4-1 illustrates the effect that networks and associations (social group membership) has on trust and participation, it is important to bear in mind the potential endogeneity between trust and networks since high levels of trust may also facilitate social group membership. However, it is unknown at this stage if political trust leads to the proliferation of social groups which is an area of further future research.

4.3 TRUST

The second component in the analytical framework deals with the concept of trust. The literature speaks of generalised or social trust. Trust is considered to be thick or thin. Thick trust refers to trust among family and friends while thin trust resonates with generalised trust which implies weak social ties (James & Sykuta, 2004, p. 7).

The concept of trust is a critical element of social capital. Generalised trust is an outcome of belonging to multiple cross-cutting associations. We noted that Muhlberger (2003, p. 7) defined generalised trust as “an expectation that other people in a society will generally abide by commonly held social norms, roles and ethical dictates.”

Prakash and Selle (2001, p. 2) and Fatorre et al. (2003, pp. 172–173) identified problems with the concept of generalised trust in so far as assumptions are made and conclusions drawn from the data concerning a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society and political office bearers. In their analysis they combine impersonal trust (in government and public sector organisations) and personal trust (family and friends) into one measure.

This is underscored by others such as Brehm and Rahn (1997, as cited in Muhlberger, 2003, p. 22) who find that people interpret questions about generalised trust as political trust. In the course of their research the link between trust and civic engagement was explored. It appears that the responses to their questions depended on generalised trust being interpreted in a political way.

The definition of political trust as given by Muhlberger (2003, p. 10) refers to "people in a community who are willing to work together on common problems . . . willing to talk to each other and [who] care about community problems." For Muhlberger, political trust is better than the concept of generalised trust in explaining civic engagement involving political action (2003, p. 22).

The concept of trust that has been used is based on the following rationale: trust is comprised of thick (personal) or thin (impersonal) trust. Thin trust resonates with generalised or social trust. However, because of the interpretation of generalised or social trust, and the interest I have in the relationship between trust and civic engagement or participation, I opted for the more banal notion of political trust which is essentially trust in political actors and institutions.

To illustrate the nature of the relationship between trust and participation in the analytical framework, I examine the following three points from the literature review:

(i) Brehm and Rahn (1997, p. 1003) investigated the relationship between trust and engagement and found that it is not one dimensional—that is, it does not necessarily follow that trust leads to participation because it may also be the other way around. In their work they find that a stronger relationship exists from engagement to trust than from trust to engagement. This has definite implications for the analytical framework since the relationship can be illustrated as moving in both directions, that is, from trust to participation and from participation to trust. Using the analytical framework as a reference, the qualitative part of this study investigates the relationship between political trust and participation for Cederberg and Matzikama and explores the direction of causality between the two concepts. The statistical significance of the correlation is examined as well as the sign of the coefficient to see the directionality of the relationship.

(ii) Bélanger and Nadeau (2005, p. 137) found that politically distrustful voters were more likely to abstain from participation. This implies a positive relationship between trust and participation, for example, if trust is low (high mistrust) then participation is low.

For Muhlberger (2003, p. 4), when trust is high, it may become an inhibitor of collective action and hence, of participation, because people believe that the community, the political leaders, or both, will act in their best interest, thereby decreasing their propensity to participate. This implies a negative relationship between trust and participation—high trust, low participation.

This point speaks to the nature of the relationship between trust and participation, that is, whether the relationship is positive or negative. This is very different from the issue of directionality referred previously above. There are several reasons why any one of the above might hold that can be attributable to a number of social phenomena. It is important here then to interrogate other factors or characteristics of a particular community—is there an entrenched culture of apathy, or has the history of exclusion indelibly left its mark on what the community feels about the political system, or are there other social dynamics at play such as high rates of alcoholism, intimidation by gangs and high levels of violence which erode trust and subsequently militate against participation? Figure 4-1 below incorporates the discussion on trust into the analytical framework.

4.4 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND PARTICIPATION

The third strand in the analytical framework centres on the concept of civic engagement and (political) participation. The definition of civic participation adopted here is taken from Best and Dustan (2006, p. 6), namely that civic participation is seen as "civic engagement, political participation and political engagement."

Some of the same factors that shape participation also influence political trust. These factors include:

- ***Economic and demographic factors***: This refers to socioeconomic status, social structure of population and diversity (marginal effects). These factors arguably cut across all the concepts discussed in the analytical framework.

Other factors which are not necessarily cross-cutting and which can have a direct bearing on participation include the following:

- ***Relationship with the state***: Communities can have high levels of engagement/participation either because they are ignored or because they have high complementary relations with the state (Narayan, 1999, p15). However, a complementary relationship with the state does not necessarily produce the type of participation which is required for accountable and efficient governance. For example, Booth and Richards showed that in the case of Central America, communal social groups may be co-opted by repressive regimes, leading the authors to suggest that "*communal associations ….. help regimes buy off local activists*" (1998, pp. 796–797). Informal communal social groups are at risk of either being co-opted into accepting outcomes which do not maximise their social welfare or of having their leadership bought off in the process. The analytical framework therefore needs to include "the relationship with the state" as one of the factors affecting participation. In South Africa this point may deserve more attention because of the way the new state (post-1994) has structured its relationships with a range of interest groups, including civil society organisations. As in several other countries, some groups enjoy preferential access to power and resources while others feel marginalised. How this affects participation would appear to depend largely on who occupies positions of power and the connections they have to their communities or some other reference group. Race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status are the likely variables influencing the relationship that communities have with the state. In the case of marginalised groups participation might follow from an adversarial stance, with groups making demands on the state to alleviate their harsh circumstances.
- ***Political structures and institutions***: complementarity of relations with the state is dependent on the political structures and institutions which bind the state and citizens in such a manner that the expectations and obligations of both are mediated. Political structures and institutions differ in the extent to which they are effective in facilitating meaningful participation. Related to this is the issue of how the state and civil society interpret their roles and how this is given effect in the policies of the state.

In the South African context, ward committees were created in the new democratic dispensation to facilitate meaningful participation by the community in local government decisions. It is thus an important aspect to incorporate into the analytical framework. Since the democratic elections, a spate of legislation has been passed to promote local economic development. Ward committees were given a crucial role in the governance model developed for this process. The results of what these new structures have achieved need to be assessed for their effectiveness in Cederberg and Matzikama. In particular, ward committees need to be examined to see if their levels of interaction with local authorities are greater or lesser than other community-based organisations and whether this has any bearing on development outcomes, or even if they have added to the dysfunctionality of municipalities.

- ***The aspect of rules (related to the previous factor)***: formal and informal rules, customs and conventions affect participation (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 540). Here Lowndes echoes the work of North which emphasises "rules of the game" and correct incentives which structure participation. This includes institutional and policy design as a factor (that influences participation), including responsiveness of decision making by local authorities.
- ***State agency***: state agency refers to the capacity of the state to forge dynamic alliances and partnerships between and within state institutions and civil society. However, agency is not confined to the state alone. Agency also manifests itself in communities where strong community leadership is responsible for improved participation. The issue of state agency and particularly community leadership is largely unexplored in the literature and will be incorporated as a key variable impacting on participation.
- ***Leadership:*** leaders are crucial activators of social capital and community members are dependent on leadership for collective action. Leaders are therefore crucial for linking social capital.

Each of the factors listed above have been referenced in the analytical framework. Civic engagement/participation is an outcome of the compendium of factors discussed and is illustrated in Figure 4:1 below.

4.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS

The nature of state-society interactions determines whether a state is predatory or developmental (Evans, 1997). Stated more simply, effective participation by civil society impacts on the performance of government. This is the next step of the framework that is discussed below.

Consider the case of an interventionist state that gets involved in sectors of the economy where the prospects for creating employment and alleviating poverty are relatively high. Without strong participation of civil society, the state runs the risk of "bureaucratising" development, with the decision-making process resting solely in the hands of state officials. The absence of regulations which enforce accountability and good governance can give rise to a culture of impunity endangering both democracy and development. Hence government effectiveness is therefore dependent on the degree to which the public can engage officials and/or politicians and hold these office bearers accountable if they transgress or do not deliver. Put another way, all other things being equal, to the extent that the effectiveness of government is strongly influenced by the level of associational activism in a given society, social and economic outcomes are likely to reflect growth and distributional achievements.

Studies that have sought to examine the relationship between social capital and government effectiveness have used financial, human resources (HR), management and other technical indicators as measurement tools. In addition to incorporating these technical criteria into the analytical framework, a "welfarist" approach is also factored into the analytical framework. In a welfarist approach, which augments the more technical aspects of effectiveness, the framework incorporates the extent to which government maximises the social welfare function of the poor. Financial, HR and other management indicators of government performance, which other studies such as the one by Coffé and Geys (2005) rely on to determine government effectiveness , tell us about the administrative and technical efficiency of government's performance but say little about municipalities that have capacity constraints such as Cederberg and Matzikama. This study looks at more subjective measures of performance—particularly from the perspective of the poor. It asks whether there is an improvement in the social and economic conditions of the lives of the poor. The treatment of government effectiveness in the analytical framework thus covers both a technical and welfarist perspective.

4.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

The literature has generally focused on the following themes: economic growth and development, poverty alleviation, livelihood support, educational attainment and access to basic services. In Putnam's thesis, however, the ultimate effect of social capital is to be assessed according to social and economic outcomes.

Social and economic outcomes can be maximised in different ways, with or without government intervention. In developing countries that are characterised by poor service delivery, poor communities can collaborate, manage and maintain local resources (as they often do) to compensate for the lack of government provision of services. This type of collective action improves the management of local resources (Ostrom, 2000, p. 178). Rao and Woolcock (2001, p. 80) show that social networks, in particular, are a key component of the risk strategies of the poor.

In the analytical framework, social and economic outcomes reflect this specifically—an outcome that is the result of belonging to an association/network, as illustrated in the preceding discussion. Given the limited capacity of community associations and networks to provide services, especially bulk infrastructure, they are likely to concentrate on activities that relate to reducing their vulnerability to shocks or minimising the effects of poverty, or improving their safety and security. It is in their engagement with state institutions that their role is expanded to facilitate the provision of housing, job creation and provision of basic services. Here the impact of associations and networks on socioeconomic outcomes is likely to be most evident and it is where Putnam's thesis can be seen to validate its claim of the positive contribution of social capital.

4.7 COMPARISON OF FRAMEWORKS

The framework illustrated in Chapter Three is a static interpretation of Putnam's thesis. The necessity of developing an augmented framework was informed by the literature review in Chapter Three. The enhanced framework showing the insights and ideas obtained from the literature review and the more nuanced and dynamic interpretation of the relationship between networks/associations and socioeconomic outcomes is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

When comparing the two diagrams the following differences are highlighted:

- The Putnam thesis does not distinguish between *all* the different types of characteristics of networks which are vital for an understanding of the extent to which networks impact on trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. This is incorporated in the augmented analytical framework.
- In the Putnam thesis, generalised trust is a direct outcome of membership in networks and associations. In the analytical framework trust is not defined as "generalised" but rather as "political" trust.

In contrast the enhanced framework depicts the drivers behind networks, trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. The framework also highlights the original contribution that the thesis makes to the analysis of the transmission mechanism that exists between networks and socioeconomic outcomes.

Figure 4-1: Augmented Analytical Framework



The framework postulates two paths from networks and associations to political engagement and ultimately socioeconomic outcomes.

i. The one path is through political trust. When members of networks and associations deal with a political party/regime that they do not trust they might be tempted to exert direct pressure on the regime. Conversely, if they trust the political regime/party then they might explore ways to effectively negotiate their demands and express their concerns, or as noted earlier, might be co-opted into accepting outcomes that do not maximise their welfare.
ii. The other path shows that trust might not be relevant. The line from networks and associations to political engagement is instructive here. Members in networks and associations can directly engage politicians and officials whether they trust them or not. This is a form of effective democracy. If the correct factors are in place at the level of the local authority (like the ones illustrated under civic engagement and participation in the diagram above), then this enhances/facilitates engagement.

Apart from being influenced by political trust, participation is influenced by a host of other factors which were not originally postulated in the Putnam hypothesis. For example, where there are strong political institutions and structures at the level of local government, formal and informal rules that enhance participation, leadership, strong state agency, and so on, then even in a climate where the citizens are distrustful of officials and politicians, there are mechanisms through which they can interface with the local authority which reduce the probability of violent forms of protest.

The analytical framework also implicitly shows that the types of characteristics of networks and associations do influence the development of effective leadership and a sense of collective identity which facilitates collective action/ political engagement.

In the analytical framework government effectiveness is more broadly defined than in the Putnam framework. In areas where governments are ineffective in terms of technical criteria, it is important to establish whether the pressure exerted on the local authority by

poor communities, organised in networks and associations, actually impacts on their wellbeing. Given the developing country context of our case studies, the augmented framework differs from the original framework in that it allows for both technical efficiency criteria as well as social and economic welfare criteria. The augmented analytical framework implicitly argues that in (poor, marginalised) communities where there are numerous networks and associations of the kind that engender positive outcomes, the welfare function of such communities is by and large formulated and established through the ebb and flow of information in such structures. The social welfare function of communities then is determined by what communities need/prefer. Thus social networks influence the formation and constitution of the social welfare function of poor communities. This can then be communicated to the local municipality through political engagement.

4.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter described the development of the analytical framework which will be used to discuss the research findings in Chapter Six. The analytical framework developed departs from the Putnam framework (illustrated in Chapter Three, i.e. Figure 3–1). The analytical framework is based on the literature review in Chapter Three and the research question posed in Chapter One.

Figure 4-1 describes the relationship between networks/associations and socioeconomic outcomes. It also provides a framework through which the findings of the two study areas can be interpreted. The analytical framework is intended to provide insight into the transmission mechanism from networks to outcomes. While the study areas are located in rural parts of the Western Cape, the framework is generic enough to test in both urban and rural contexts.

The analytical framework demonstrates that the relationship between social networks and socioeconomic outcomes is complex and contingent upon several factors that are themselves the product of multifaceted social and institutional conditions. For social

networks and associations to impact on socioeconomic outcomes requires a great deal of confluence between a number of other variables as the analytical framework illustrates. It also shows that not all networks and associations are the same and that it is the characteristics of networks that influence the extent to which better socioeconomic outcomes are realised.

The analytical framework also makes reference to the type of trust that is generated through membership in an association and how this political trust impacts on the way in which communities interface with political authorities.

Community participation—both the way it occurs and its extent—is also determined in large measure by the community's sense of collective identity and agency which, in turn, is influenced by the types of associations of which they are members. However, other influences such as the institutional make-up of the municipality concerned, as well as factors relating to those illustrated in the analytical framework (such as state agency) also have a bearing.

The combination of all these factors appears to have a determining effect on government effectiveness. The pressure exerted on government through a community's collective action is bound to influence the maximisation of welfare functions of that community. Furthermore, the incorporation of an ethos of community service into the broader legislative instruments allows for potential enhancement of the welfare functions, just as government administrative competencies are indispensable for developmental outcomes.

It is with this in mind that I proceed to examine the methodology of the research, which follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the methodological framework for the study. It deals with research design, methods, tools and instruments that were used throughout the research project life cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The chapter aims to demonstrate how the approach and methodology used were relevant and appropriate given the research question and how, in addition to standard analysis, innovative instruments were used to test the research question.

This chapter describes the methodology used to measure the effect that social capital has on socioeconomic outcomes (as illustrated in the augmented analytical framework). The methodology was developed to measure how social capital manifests itself in communities that are marginalised, rural and poor, including the transmission mechanism to socioeconomic outcomes. Accordingly, the intention is to establish the link between the theoretical framework developed in the thesis and the empirical methods used to assess the impact of social capital on socioeconomic outcomes. This necessitates the development of a framework for empirically investigating the existing level/s of social capital and a review of the methods used to measure it in light of this framework "by drawing upon examples of both secondary and primary social capital research conducted to date" (Stone, 2001, p. 2).

The chapter is structured as follows. It starts out with the operationalisation of the concepts identified in the theoretical framework and identifies some of the indicators that can be used to measure the constructs. This is followed by a description of the research design and a discussion of the research methods employed which included a quantitative as well as qualitative approach. In the quantitative component, municipality-wide surveys were conducted in both Cederberg and Matzikama to capture the relevant data. In the qualitative

component the case study method was employed using key informant interviews to capture data. I also discuss how single-method bias was reduced through the use of triangulation.

The chapter concludes with a discussion on the quantitative analysis of data where descriptive and inferential statistics are used to provide baseline data on the concepts in the analytical framework. Path analysis will also be used to capture the "interactional" relationships that exist in the analytical framework. The qualitative analysis of the data will be briefly described before concluding the chapter.

5.2 DATA NEEDS AND OPERATIONALISATION

Several ad hoc methods have been employed to measure social capital. Unfortunately the multiplicity of methods is primarily related to the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the topic. As indicated in the literature review, social capital is a multidisciplinary concept that has been defined in different but related ways across disciplines. Hence Bjørnskov and Svendson (2003, p. 8) are of the opinion that because economists, sociologists and political scientists differ in their definitions of social capital they also differ in their approaches to the measurement of the concept. For example, Bjørnskov and Svendson (2003, p. 8) observed that there were at least ten different approaches to measuring social capital in the literature. The authors (2003, p. 6) state that social capital has been measured in a host of countries and that an equal number of proxies have been used to measure social capital across the literature.

5.2.1 Operationalisation of Concepts and Identification of Indicators

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 159) operationalisation is intended to "specify concrete empirical procedures that will result in the measurement of variables. It is the final specification of how one would recognise the different attributes of a given variable in the real world."

In this section I examine the operationalisation of the concepts dealt with in the framework developed in Chapter Four. Here I review how the different concepts have been dealt with

at an operational level and touch on the types of indicators that have been used to measure the concepts to date as well as the indicators used in this study. The review is by no means exhaustive and was selected primarily on the basis of its relevance to the research question.

The augmented analytical framework identified several concepts that needed to be operationalised so that they could be empirically observed in Cederberg and Matzikama. These included networks and associations, political trust, civic engagement and participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes.

As noted in the literature review, networks and generalised trust are two of the key indicators used to measure social capital in the literature (see Inglehart, 1997, and Putnam, 2000). In the literature review the deficiencies of the concept of generalised trust were noted and hence this study does not consider its application here as a measure of social capital. I do, however, accept the conceptualisation of social capital in terms "of voluntary participation in associational activity, which entails interaction with others in the formal context of a club, organisation or association of some sort" (Jooste, 2005, p. 2). This is endorsed by Krishna, 2002 (as cited in Gomulia, 2006, p. 38), who argued that networks are the only important variable to be operationalised when measuring social capital.

As far as associational activism is concerned, the operationalisation of social capital must enable the identification of the existence of such networks, the types that exist as well as the characteristics with which they are imbued. Putnam (1998, p. vi) as cited in Stone (2001, p. 8) differentiated between formal and informal networks, where informal networks examine family, kin, friends and neighbours while formal networks include membership to voluntary associations such as sports groups, church and cultural groups. According to Stone (2001, p. 14) measuring the extent to which people are "attracted to formally constitute social groups of one kind or another is a method frequently employed for the measure of group-based relations in social capital research." Therefore in this study social capital is operationalised as membership in formal networks and associations. When operationalised in this manner, it also enables the measurement of network density in a particular locale.

Operationalising social capital as formal social groups also allows for the identification of the types of social groups to which people are likely to belong. For example, sports groups, cultural groups and volunteer groups. The conceptual framework also identified particular characteristics with which groups are imbued, that is, whether they encouraged active or passive membership, are horizontal or vertical, homogeneous or heterogeneous, political or non-political, and whether they are public or private good-producing, as this may influence the nature and extent of social capital. Passive/active membership is characterised by the frequency with which meetings are held and the turnout at such meetings.

Horizontal or vertical social groups are operationalised according to how decisions are made and the extent of discussion/debate allowed by the broad membership when meetings are held. Political and non-political associations are operationalised as networks and associations that have been initiated or funded by political or government entities. Operationalising public and private good-producing networks are characterised by the goods and services that they produce, such as the provision of basic goods and services (e.g. water and sanitation services).

The framework identified political trust as another key concept in the transmission mechanism from networks and associations to socioeconomic outcomes. As indicated in Chapter Two, Kim (2004, p. 3) sees it as the trust that citizens put in their political institutions and actors. Here the political actors and institutions are central to the notion of political trust. Stokes (1962, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) and Miller (1974, cited in Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005, p. 122) conceive of political trust

> as a general evaluative orientation towards the government based upon citizens' normative expectations of government operation and effectiveness or it can be viewed as individuals assessment of how well the government is performing compared with how well they think it should be performing.

When operationalising the term political trust, it refers to trust in both government and political entities and the indicators used to measure it are trust in political leaders, local

government and central government. The multiple indicators were then transformed into one composite indicator that measured political trust.

Conceptually the definition of civic participation adopted here is taken from Best and Dustan (2006, p. 6), namely, that civic participation is seen as "civic engagement, political participation and political engagement." When operationalising the term, it is identified as a form of active citizenship that engages with and in the local government and political arena. The aim here is to measure political participation in such a way that it is capable of capturing the active role that citizens play in their engagement with the state, including officials and institutions. In this study, the indicators used to do this included signing a petition, participating in an election campaign, attending a council meeting and voting in local elections. When comparing the list of indicators in the thesis with that of Putnam (1993, pp. 92–96 and 149) and Putnam (1993, cited in Gomulia, 2006, p. 37) under the banner of civic engagement, there is a distinction between his indicators and those used in this thesis, because his list encompasses both civic vibrancy and political action which include the following:

- Membership in mutual aid societies
- Membership in cooperatives
- Strength of the mass parties
- Turnout and voting in elections
- Longevity of associations
- Newspaper readership
- Density and vibrancy of clubs and associations in each region

The thesis makes a clear distinction between associational activity and civic participation and the indicators used to measure the concepts reflect this.

Studies that have examined the effects of social capital on government effectiveness have used several administrative and technical indicators to measure government performance/effectiveness. For example, the study by Knack (2000, p. 22) measured

government performance across five areas, including financial and capital management, human resources, information technology and what he refers to as “managing for results.” Under the five performance areas a total of thirty-five criteria were used to determine government effectiveness. The parameters that were set for the operationalisation of government effectiveness are based on the assessment criteria obtained from the Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing and the Provincial Treasury of the Western Cape. The lexicon of these measurement criteria includes municipal transformation and organisational development, basic service delivery, good governance, financial viability and local economic development performance. The operationalisation of these terms are given in the table below. The indicators (presented and discussed in Chapter Six) for each of the performance areas were also provided by the state bodies mentioned above.

With respect to the assessment of government’s welfarist performance, it is necessary that the research captures people’s perceptions of what they think their government is doing for them (service delivery or related issues) and the responsiveness of local government to the immediate and urgent service delivery problems they face. The operationalisation of this function, it follows, involves determining such responsiveness to problems relating to basic service delivery.

Table 5-1: Assessment Criteria used by Provincial Government

ASSESSMENT	DEFINITION
Municipal Transformation & Organisational Development	Included in this was the staffing situation, transformation (how representative the municipality is in terms of its demographics), HR policies and whether HR policies and systems are in place.
Basic Service Delivery	Included in this was an assessment of households without access to basic services, municipal backlogs in the provision of basic services, spending of the capital budget and provision of free basic services.
Good Governance	This was divided into development planning and performance management. Under development planning the indicators included goal alignment with provincial and national goals; Integrated Development Planning (IDP) processes (the extent to which the IDP is included in all sectoral plans, whether the IDP is approved and submitted on time); Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plans (SDBIPs)—a plan that municipalities need to submit to the Provincial Treasury which links the priorities and projects identified in the IDP with the budget and service delivery targets of the municipalities). Under the second indicator of good governance, namely, performance management, the indicators included performance management system (PMS) implementation and whether this was implemented on all levels, PMS linked to IDP targets, the PM policy and framework. It also included performance on delegations of authority, whether regular council and mayoral committee meetings are held, the quorum at meetings, the changes in political leadership, and anti-corruption policy implementation.
Financial Viability	Included in this measure was management of debtors and income, liquidity, audit reports, credit control and indigent policy, supply chain management processes, valuations, asset management, tariffs and accounting policies. Existence and attendance of Public Participation and Intergovernmental Forums. This included a public participation strategy, a communication strategy, whether ward committees were established, the functioning of these ward committees and attendance to intergovernmental relations where different tiers of government interact to discuss intergovernmental matters.
Local Economic Development (LED)	Including LED and poverty alleviation strategies, jobs created through LED projects, and temporary positions filled.

The socioeconomic outcomes variable is operationalised as people's perceptions of government's impact on their socioeconomic conditions. This is captured in an indicator that measures those perceptions.

5.3 RESEARCH METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 74) the research design of a study differs from the research method, in that it is the blueprint of how one intends to conduct one's research. The research design posed in this thesis is an empirical one and therefore requires an appropriate set of methods.

5.3.1 Making the Case for a Mixed Method Approach

The research design is an empirical one which requires the collection of primary, secondary, numeric and textual data. The research methodology therefore employs a mixed method approach that is, comprising both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches to collecting and analysing data.

This is not unique to this thesis as a number of authors have endorsed the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the measurement of social capital because they are deemed complementary (see Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002, and Dudwick, Kuehnast, Nyhan Jones, & Woolcock, 2006).

According to Kawachi, Kim, Coutts, and Subramanian (2004, p. 688) a mixed method approach introduces greater methodological sophistication and yields more comprehensive and complex results. Hughes and Stone (2002, p. 3) state that

> social capital measurement remains an emerging field, in which it is important to test and validate numerous approaches to measurement, the refinement of which will happen over time, through retesting, re-use and ongoing development of both conceptual and empirical understandings of social capital.

In light of the emerging status of social capital it is useful to use a well-thought-out combination of methods, since this increases the analytical richness of a study and provides an investigational basis for making policy and project recommendations (Dudwick et al., 2006, p. 1).

Dudwick et al. (2006, pp. 2–3) point out that the weakness of quantitative research is the strength of qualitative research and vice versa. For example, quantitative research is a few steps removed from the individuals/households from whom data is collected. The authors state that by collecting and subsequently analysing data in this way, quantitative methods uphold empirically rigorous, impartial and objective research standards. According to Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 3) quantitative analysis can be replicated at a later stage by some other researcher. The drawback of quantitative research however, is that it often misses out on the broader important contextual issues.

Quantitative surveys are also expensive to administer and require good planning and pre-testing and cannot describe the complex deliberations of local politicians in an area or how certain events have occurred.

In contrast, Babbie and Mouton (2001), Dudwick et al. (2006) and Jankowicz (2000) all emphasise the value of qualitative research. Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 270) state that qualitative research emphasises the actor's perspective and allows us to understand social action in specific contexts rather than attempting to generalise to some theoretical population. In this way, qualitative methods help us understand process, context and causality issues or, as Dudwick, et al. put it, "*context specific depth*" (2006, p. 4). From the perspective of the case studies selected, the qualitative approach allows the researcher to explore some of the historical and catalytic issues in the community that can account for the variations in social capital in Cederberg and Matzikama.

Qualitative approaches allow for nuanced perspectives to come through from the different groups being interviewed. According to Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 4) "various groups within a community may have overlapping or very different experiences of social norms and networks. Qualitative methods that allow researchers to explore the views of homogeneous as well as diverse groups of people help unpack these differing perspectives within a community."

Several authors, such as Dudwick et al. (2006, p. iv), Oliver-Hoyo and Allen (2006, p. 47) and Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 75), concur that the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods can yield better results by minimising single-method biases and by triangulating findings. Triangulation is the use of multiple methods of data collection in order to develop a full picture of the situation and to determine corroboration (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2006, p. 47). According to Brinberg and Kidder (1982), as cited in Oliver-Hoyo and Allen (2006, p. 43)

> each method would measure the same construct while having a different error type inherent in that method. The deficiency of each method would then average out, leaving a true estimate of a single result. Therefore triangulation yields a more accurate and valid estimate of a result when each method of measurement converges on the same answer.

The process of triangulating methods and findings creates a system of checks and balances to ensure greater validity of results. It allows us to determine the validity and reliability of data collected. For example, it can be used to check whether data collected in one form corresponds/validates/confirms data collected in another form. Combining the different methods allows for a more complete perspective of how social capital influences social and economic outcomes in the municipalities under consideration.

The research methodology combines both quantitative and qualitative measures and triangulates findings so as to minimise the negative effects of any one approach. The rest of the section on research methods will be devoted to discussing both the tools and instruments used to collect the data.

5.4 QUANTITATIVE METHOD

Quantitative studies include the use of surveys and statistical analyses (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 49). According to Jankowicz (2000, p. 222) “the survey method is useful when you want to contact a relatively large number of people to obtain data on the same issue or issues, often by posing the same question to all.” This is especially relevant in this case where data is required on all the key concepts in the augmented analytical framework.

The usefulness of using a survey to collect primary data is reiterated by Sabatini (2005, pp. 6–7) and Durlauf (2002, p. 476), who states that there are limits to what can be learned about social capital from conventional data sources. This is because these data sources often use proxy indicators of social capital which are not always credible. According to Durlauf (2002, p. 474), where research has been undertaken on social capital from conventional sources, he has found a number of difficulties in these studies.

Given the problem with proxy indicators and the lack of available data on social capital variables, a number of studies and institutions like the World Bank have conducted surveys that capture data on social capital in communities, regions and countries. For example, one of the most widely cited studies is that of Narayan and Pritchett (1997) who examined social capital in the context of rural Tanzania. The study was primarily done at the micro and meso-levels with interviews of 1,376 households. The survey instrument quizzed respondents about their membership in groups, the characteristics of these groups and attitudes and values particularly related to social cohesion and trust (1997, p. 8). The authors also obtained data on a number of socioeconomic variables.

In the Western Cape, the Cape Area Study collected data in 2003 on social capital variables, including civic commitment and political participation. The study included 400 interviews from the various racial groups. Putnam (1993) also carried out six surveys for his comparative study of northern and southern Italy.

These discussions recognise the need for greater use of surveys for data collection, which was an important requirement for the theoretical framework developed for this thesis. At the time a municipality-wide survey was about to be undertaken in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities by the respective municipalities and, through a cooperative arrangement, the two efforts were combined. The survey provided a baseline understanding of the social and economic status of the community as well as baseline indicators of the social capital variables under consideration, including networks, trust, participation and social and economic variables. The researcher worked closely with a demographer to ensure that the correct protocols and procedures were followed during the survey. The

demographer assisted with the selection of the sample (to ensure that it was representative of the municipality), the training of enumerators and with ensuring that all procedures for collecting the data were quality controlled.

5.4.1 Survey Methodology

The survey was based on a random sample of residents to whom a structured questionnaire was administered to obtain data which was essential to the concepts in the analytical framework. The questionnaire was designed to capture information on demographic, socioeconomic and social capital variables at the level of the household (see Annexure D). The questionnaire drew from the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) questionnaire which was developed by specialists at the World Bank. However, the questionnaire differed from SOCAT in that all questions were structured and close-ended, which allowed for uniformity of responses. In the case of SOCAT the questions were open-ended and semi-structured "which often requires the researcher to interpret the meaning of responses, opening the possibility of misunderstanding and researcher bias" (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 233).

On the social capital side I incorporated questions on the following variables:

- Groups and networks
- Political trust
- Collective action and cooperation
- Information and communication
- Social cohesion and inclusion
- Political participation and engagement
- Government effectiveness
- Perceptions of government performance.

There questionnaire was divided into different content sub-sections. The sub-sections are described in the table below and illustrated in Annexure D.

Table 5-2: Content Sub-Sections of the Questionnaire

	CONTENT SUB-SECTIONS
1	Demographic data and social group membership
2	Events in the household
3	Housing
4	Access to basic services
5	Appliances
6	Household income
7	Household expenditure
8	Financial assets
9	Community visits
10	Access to services like schools, public transport, medical professionals, etc
11	Migration
12	Health
13	Employment
14	Trust
15	Access to help
16	Access to information
17	Social cohesion
18	Safety and security
19	Political action
20	Perception of honesty of public officials
21	Household economic activity

The questionnaire attached in Annexure D was designed to demonstrate the linkages between the different concepts used. Data was collected from a representative sample of households in Cederberg and Matzikama and reviewed by a statistician who specialises in survey methods. Given the nature of the research question, the survey collected information on a broad range of social, demographic and economic variables including questions on associational activity, trust, social cohesion, institutions and political parties. The result was a rich database on socioeconomic variables which allowed for comparisons with traditional social capital measures. It was also possible to correlate socioeconomic variables with social capital ones and thereby reveal findings that were not purely academic but are of interest to policy makers as well. The household survey also provided a general framework in which the results of the survey on social capital could be better understood from an economic development perspective.

5.4.2 Sample

Random sampling was used in this study. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 164) and Jancowicz (2000, p. 196) random sampling is a precise, scientific procedure which provides useful descriptions of the total population, since the sample of individuals drawn from the population must contain similar variations to those that exist in the population.

Sample Size

In estimating the sample size for both Cederberg and Matzikama, the degree of precision was between 7.5% with a 90% confidence interval.

In Cederberg the sample was selected to be representative of approximately 800 households/ 2,900 persons. The municipality was divided firstly into wards and further broken down into towns (district areas), and then into survey areas. The entire municipality was covered in the survey. In total, the sample frame comprised:

- 6 wards
- 9 towns (district areas)
- 15 survey areas.

The 15 survey areas covered the entire population distribution of the municipality, where a one level stratified sample was implemented, using a simple random sampling without replacement[9]. In each survey area, every second street was selected, and alternatively the enumerator surveyed odd number buildings in the first selected street and even number buildings in the second selected street and so on. In each household, the head of household (defined as the decision maker) was identified and qualified to be the main respondent. The first part of the questionnaire collected data on the entire household and on each member

[9] Without replacement means that once an individual is sampled, that person is not placed back in the population for re-sampling.

as well as the events in the household for the preceding 12 months. The rest of the questionnaire was dedicated to the head of household itself. Details on the response rate are listed below:

Table 5-3: Response Rate to Questionnaire by Place

ENUMERATOR	PLACE	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ENUMERATED	NUMBER OF ABSENT HOUSEHOLDS	NUMBER OF REFUSING HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL HOUSES VISITED
1	Clanwilliam	77	3	17	97
2	Clanwilliam	61	10	15	86
3	Clanwilliam	56	26	3	85
4	Clanwilliam	10	42	10	62
	Wupperthal	6	0	0	6
5	Citrusdal	93	2	3	98
6	Citrusdal	93	17	11	121
7	Lamberts Bay	90	0	0	90
8	Lamberts Bay	86	0	5	91
9	Lamberts Bay	72	31	31	134
10	Elands Bay	73	3	10	86
	Leipoldtville	5	1	1	7
11	Graafwater	61	0	5	66
12	Graafwater	41	0	0	41
	Elandskloof	10	0	0	10
	Paleisheuwel	5	0	0	5
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS		839	135	111	1085
Household Survey		Response Rate %	Absent Rate %	Refusal Rate %	Total %
		77	12	10	100

The same questionnaire was used in the entire municipality and was available in English and Afrikaans. When necessary, the questionnaire was translated by the enumerators into other languages of choice which, in this case, was isiXhosa. Using maps of the municipality, towns were divided into survey areas and clearly demarcated for enumerators to avoid any risk of overlapping or missing households. Each enumerator was provided with a map that showed the boundaries of the survey area and the starting point for the streets selected.

In Matzikama, the sample was designed to be a representative sample of approximately 667 households in the municipality, for a total of 2,200 persons. Here too, the entire municipality was covered and was divided into wards, each of which was further sub-divided into towns (district areas), and then into survey areas. In total the sample frame comprised:

- 6 wards
- 8 towns (district areas)
- 10 survey areas.

As was the case in Cederberg, the 10 survey areas covered the entire population distribution of the municipality, where a one level stratified sample was implemented, using a single random sampling. In each survey area, every second street was selected, and alternatively the enumerator surveyed odd number buildings in the first selected street and even number buildings in the second selected street and so on.

In each household, the head of household (defined as the decision maker) was identified and qualified to be the main respondent. The first part of the questionnaire collected data on the entire household and on each member as well as the events in the household for the preceding 12 months.

The rest of the questionnaire was dedicated to the head of household itself. The confidence interval was calculated on the fertility rate, using a probability of true value of 90%. Details on the response rate are listed below:

Table 5-4: Response Rate to Questionnaire by Place

ENUMERATOR	PLACE	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ENUMERATED	NUMBER OF ABSENT HOUSEHOLDS	NUMBER OF REFUSING HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL HOUSES VISITED
1	Vanrhynsdorp	80	14	3	97
2	Klawer	36	47	13	96
3	Klawer	79	49	7	135
4	Lutzville	68	0	0	68
5	Doringbaai	6	0	0	6
	Viswater	6	0	0	6
	Olifantsdrif	10	0	0	10
	Nuwestasie	3	0	0	3
6	Vredendal 1	69	0	0	69
7	Vredendal 2	67	0	0	67
8	Vredendal 3	98	0	0	98
9	Vredendal 4	84	0	3	87
10	Vredendal 5	61	0	0	61
Total Households		667	110	26	803
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY		RESPONSE RATE %	ABSENT RATE %	REFUSAL RATE %	TOTAL IN %
		83	14	3	100

The sample size permitted a reliable analysis at the municipal level. The population considered in the study was made up of the entire population of households for the social capital study.

It is important to note that training of the enumerators took place in both Cederberg and Matzikama and was conducted by the demographer (see Quantitative Method section above). The training comprised both theory and practical exercises. Three supervisors were trained one week earlier in order to pre-test the questionnaire in the area of Bellville during a pilot survey.

For these two surveys, as for most of the large-scale surveys, given the tools, time and resources available, the stratified sampling method adhered to the following criteria: scientific reliability, representativeness of the sample, efficiency of estimators, the improvement of data quality and administrative convenience (Steigler, 2006).

Sample Scheme

The simple random sampling without replacement (SRSWOR) method was used to select responding households. This method is used as all units distinct and is much more efficient than the sampling with replacement method.

According to the demographer, the procedure of selection of a sample of a size n from a population P = {p1, …., pi, …., pn} is as follows. On the first draw, one unit is selected from the population P of N units at random, that is, the probability of selection of any unit in the first draw is 1/N. On the second draw, one unit is selected again from the remaining (N-1) units which were not selected in the first draw. On the third draw, one unit is selected again from the remaining (N-2) units that were not selected in the first and the second draw. The procedure of selection of units is repeated until n units are selected (Steigler, 2006).

Estimates of Sampling Errors

The non-responses and refusal rate were recorded in a field work report to ensure that this information was available when the targets for each sample were achieved. The degree of non-responses during the interviews, as small as possible, was designed in a way that at least 80% of the questions were answered. All non-answered questions were noted in a separate report, and the degree of refusal calculated for each question.

Data Collection Exercise

In the case of Cederberg, the data collection took place from 27 November 2006 to 3 December 2006. In the case of Matzikama the data collection took place in the first quarter of 2007. Each enumerator was sent to a specific survey area, and had a specific supervisor to refer to and from whom to get assistance. The enumerators were provided with a detailed enumerator manual and a list of codes. The process went smoothly in all areas and no major problems were reported.

Supervision and Data Quality

In Cederberg and Matzikama data was checked by supervisors on a daily basis. Supervisors assisted with interviews. In Cederberg four interviews had to be re-conducted because of missing data. In Matzikama, seven interviews had to be re-conducted because of missing data. The demographer then checked all data.

Data Entry and Data Analysis

In the case of Cederberg, data entry commenced after all data was collected and checked for quality. Work on data entry started on 10 December 2006 and continued to 24 December. Two trained data entry clerks were employed after the demographer designed the data base. Data was entered in MS Excel, and later transposed to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences **(**SPSS) program. A final quality check was conducted after data collection and entry were completed.

In the case of Matzikama, data entry was carried out between 5 March 2007 and 25 March 2007. Trained data entry clerks were employed after the demographer designed the data base. Data was entered in Excel and subsequently analysed in SPSS and Excel.

The demographic analysis was done with the assistance of the demographer using cross tabulation tables, selecting the critical variables (age, gender, marital status, population groups, etc.).

5.5 QUALITATIVE METHOD

According to Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 270) and Jakowicz (2000, p. 127), qualitative research studies attitudes and behaviour within their natural setting—and is concerned with the nature and content of what is being said as opposed to the frequency with which it is said or the artificial setting in the surveys. This means that qualitative research is better suited to studying social processes over time. The qualitative researcher has a preference for understanding events, actions and processes in their contexts.

Different qualitative methods exist in the literature. These include case studies, historical reviews, biographical analysis and ethnographic studies (see Jakowicz, 2000, pp. 214–225, and Mouton & Babbie, 2001, pp. 278–288).

The decision to use the case study method was undertaken as this yields scientifically valid information on the settings in which they occur and where many variables are measured. Contextual knowledge is already rich and impressions and intelligent presumptions can be made about a particular group (see Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 281). Babbie and Mouton (2001, p. 281) also state that case studies take multiple perspectives into account and attempt to understand the influences of multilevel social systems on subject perspectives and behaviour. In their view, the defining characteristic of a case study is its emphasis on an individual unit where the unit can be anything from an individual to a community or country. In the case of the community, community case studies can be defined as a focus on a description and analysis of patterns of, and relations between, the main aspects of community life.

There are a number of ways in which data can be collected when using the qualitative approach. The types of approaches that have been used include informant interviews, focus group interviews and other participatory approaches. According to Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 11) participatory approaches rely on groups and their participants include representatives from all the major sub-groups in the community. The methodology is that if a group arrives at an agreement on a particular issue, then the consensus will be representative of the community. Dudwick et al. (2006, p. 11) states that for this method to be successful, good moderation of the process is necessary.

At the outset of the field research it was decided to use both focus groups and informant interviews. The poor response rate to focus group interviews, however, proved to be a constraint and informant interviews were then held with people holding eminent positions in the community and government, including community leaders and municipal managers as their opinions were relevant to the study.

In total there were ten key informant interviews conducted in each of the two municipalities used as case studies. Details of the key informants are given in the table below.

Table 5-5: Key Informants by Municipality, Gender and Race

	CEDERBERG		MATZIKAMA	
KEY INFORMANTS	**GENDER**	**RACE**	**GENDER**	**RACE**
Municipal Manager	Male	Coloured	Male	Coloured
Community Development Workers	Male	Coloured	Female	Coloured
Senior Community Representatives x 2	Male	African/Black	Male	African/Black
Senior Community Representatives x 2	Female	African/Black	Female	African/Black
Representative from the Youth x 2	Male	African/Black	Male	African/Black
Representative from the Youth x 2	Female	African/Black	Female	African/Black

For the informant approach, a semi-structured questionnaire was administered. In both Cederberg and Matzikama participants were given the opportunity to respond at length. In both instances respondents were encouraged to speak freely and to provide answers from their perspectives. The questions were designed thematically and focused on community history, history of associational activity, current associational activity, perceptions of political trust, political participation and socioeconomic outcomes. It must be noted that the themes corresponded with the analytical framework articulated in Chapter Four.

The use of case studies and interviews has been endorsed by a number of social capital practitioners. For example, Putnam (1993, p. 13) conducted more than 700 interviews with councillors between 1970 and 1989. He also interviewed a number of community leaders. Krishna and Shrader (1999, p. 7) point out that qualitative measures are able to capture empirically complex experiences which are not picked up if only quantitative measures are relied on. This is endorsed by Woolcock (2001) who states that the qualitative techniques are useful in unpacking the mechanisms behind the workings of social capital.

5.6 ETHICAL APPROVAL

Ethical approval was obtained from the University of the Western Cape's Higher Degrees Committee. The ethical approval covered issues relating to confidentiality, anonymity and participant's right of refusal to participate in the surveys and interviews.

Details of the survey were communicated via the local radio station in both municipalities and was also facilitated through the participation of certain ward councillors. The participation of ward councillors was directly related to the permission granted for the survey by the relevant administrative authorities, particularly the Municipal Managers of the local authorities concerned.

Fieldworkers at all times carried their identification and wore a survey vest especially designed for the data collection phase. These fieldworkers were required to always identify themselves to the respondents and to provide them with the necessary documentation, including letters of support from the municipalities concerned. All questionnaires and documentation were available in English, Afrikaans and isiXhosa.

5.7 DATA ANALYSIS

Data had to be analysed to illuminate understanding of the factors that affect the way in which social capital impacts on socioeconomic outcomes in the municipalities under consideration. This section provides an overview of how the quantitative and qualitative data were analysed and triangulated to provide a picture of social capital in the municipalities studied.

5.7.1 Quantitative Data Analysis

Data collected from the survey was analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics articulates data in manageable forms while inferential statistics assists in drawing conclusions from observations, typically from a sample about the characteristics of a population (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 458). For description

purposes, the data was presented in a cross-tabulation layout. The tables provided the count and/or the percentage.

For inferential purposes, the Chi-square test of association was used to examine any significant association between the two categorical variables that are given in the cross-tabulation (the variable in the row and the variable in the column).

> The Chi-square test of significance tells us about the yardstick against which to estimate the significance of associations between variables which helps to rule out associations that may not represent genuine relationships in the population under study (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 484).

In reviewing the methods of data analysis, a number of approaches were found to have been used to estimate the relationship between social capital and outcomes. One study, which focused on the effectiveness of social capital on institutional performance, particularly at the local government level, was undertaken by Coffé and Geys (2006, p. 1058), who explored the relationship between social capital and institutional performance among 305 Flemish municipalities. The authors employed two-stage least squares (2SLS) or Instrumental Variables (IV) regression techniques to overcome the endogeneity bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. They state that a similar process was followed by authors such "as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), Brehm and Rahn (1997), Knack (2002) and Bjørnskov (2003)" (Coffé & Geys, 2006, p. 1058). The study is a purely econometric study with no survey component. It relies on existing municipal data sources. Coffé and Geys (2006, p. 1063) point to the following limitations with their analysis. They state that there were problems of 'reverse causality'. For example, social capital leads to better local government performance, but it can be argued that better performance also increases confidence in the government and subsequently social capital in general. The direction in which the chain of causality flows in interpreting the (positive) association between social capital and local government performance is therefore ambiguous.

Narayan and Pritchett (1997) used instrumental variable estimation to examine what would happen to income if there was an exogenous shift in social capital measured by the village level social capital index:

> Instrumental variables estimation uses the correlation between social capital and another variable--the instrument--which is not determined by, and does not directly determine, income to estimate the impact of exogenous shifts in social capital on income. This eliminates the difficulty created by the potentially simultaneous determination of income and social capital. The drawback is that one must have valid instruments, and worse, the validity of an instrument depends entirely on theoretical arguments about the structure of the model since at least some set of the "just identifying" assumptions cannot be directly tested (Narayan & Pritchett, 1997, p. 18).

One of the most comprehensive research papers on the effects of social capital and democracy in South Africa as measured by tolerance of diversity, civic commitment and political participation, was undertaken by Jooste in 2005, based on data from the 2003 Cape Area Study. After a descriptive analysis of key aspects of the extent of civic engagement, local councillor engagement, political participation, collective action and tolerance of diversity, Jooste (2005, pp. 29–30) further explored the relationship between social capital and these variables. Using a correlation matrix approach (Kendall Tau-B Correlations) she shows that civic engagement is positively associated with associational activity.

Why Path Analysis

None of the approaches mentioned above were capable of estimating the "interconnected" relationship between social capital, political trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes, as illustrated in the analytical framework. Path analysis, however, seemed feasible for the following reasons:

- According to Webb (Garson, 2008, p. 1) path analysis, which was developed by Sewall Wright in the 1930s, represents an attempt to deal with "connecting" relationships. Path analysis is a straightforward extension of multiple regression which aims to provide estimates of the magnitude and significance of hypothesised causal connections

between sets of variables which, in this case, is social capital and the other variables in the framework.

- According to Suhr (2008, p. 2) path analysis places few limitations on the types of relations which can be specified since it is a "multivariate technique specifying relationships between observed (measured) variables in which multiple, related equations are solved simultaneously to determine parameter estimates."
- According to Wright (1960, p. 190) the method deals with a system of interrelated variables and the "construction of a qualitative diagram in which every included variable, measured or hypothesized is represented either as completely determined by certain others or as an ultimate factor."
- Finally, Suhr (2008, p. 2) states that path analysis offers a "graphical language" which is a convenient and powerful way to present complex relationships. Suhr (2008, p. 2) states that "a diagram, which is a pictorial representation of a model, is transformed into a set of equations which are solved simultaneously to test model fit and estimate parameters".

Mechanics of Path Analysis

According to Wuensch (2008, p. 2), path analysis can be presented as "a hierarchical (sequential) multiple regression analysis." Path analysis is an extension of general regression analysis which aims to provide estimates of the scale and importance of presumed contributory relationships between sets of variables. According to Wuensch (2008, p. 2) "a regression is done for each variable in the model as a dependent on others which the model indicates are causes."

In path analysis we distinguish between exogenous and endogenous variables. According to Garson (2008, p. 2), "*exogenous variables in a path model are those with no explicit causes (no arrows going to them, other than the measurement error term). Endogenous variables . . . are those which do have incoming arrows. Endogenous variables include intervening causal variables and dependents.*"

The correlation between two variables may be decomposed into four components:

- The direct effect of 1 on 4,
- The indirect effect of 1 (through an intervening variable or variables) on 4,
- An unanalysed component due to the direction of causation for a path being unknown, and
- A spurious component due to 1 and 4 each being caused by some third variable or set of variables in the model.

According to Meehl and Waller (2002, p. 283) paths drawn to endogenous variables are directional. Path analysis tests both direct and indirect effects on some outcome(s). In particular, path analysis determines if the relationships are positive, negative or not supported by the data.

According to Wuench (2008, p. 2), the beta weights from these multiple regressions are the path coefficients shown in the typical figures that are used to display the results of a path analysis, like in Figure 5-1. For example, the path coefficient from (1) Social Group Membership to (2) Public Trust is 0.09.

According to Garson (2008, p. 2) a path diagram is drawn beforehand to help plan the analysis and represents the "causal" connections that are predicted by the hypothesis. According to Garson (2008, p. 2) a path model has both path coefficients and an error term which is represented by e, see Figure 5-1 below. The statistical significance of the path coefficients is estimated to determine if the correlation between the different concepts/constructs in the hypothesis are statistically significant.

Figure 5-1: Path Model Representing Analytical Framework Under Discussion[10]



In Figure 5-1 the arrows indicate the links between the various constructs in the analytical framework tested in this research. Social group membership is the exogenous variable, whilst the other variables are endogenous. There are path coefficients from social group membership to political trust, from political trust to political participation, and so on. The arrows indicate association rather than causation. They capture the influence that social group membership has on political trust (and so on). The path diagram was estimated for Matzikama and Cederberg. In some instances the data fitted the analytical framework well while in other cases it did not.

Limitations of the use of Path Analysis and Mitigating Measures

Path analysis deals with the degree of correlation between variables, and requires the formulation of hypotheses beforehand. In this case it hypothesises causal connections between sets of variables which, in this case is social capital and the other variables in the

[10] Public Trust/Political Trust is used interchangeably

framework. The difficulty with establishing causal links between the various constructs is that correlations are observable phenomena whereas causality is inferred. It is important to note that the correlations observed in the data may be signs of causality but are never sufficient to infer causality (Schield, 1995, p. 1). Freedman states that "path models do not infer causation from association" but "estimate causal effects from observational data" (2005, p. 11). Despite the advent of statistical tools, it does not preclude the strong assumptions required to infer causation from association by modelling (Freedman, 2005, p. 1).

According to Garson (2008:15) one of the major shortcomings of path analysis is the under-identification or under-determination of the model. He states that *"for under-identified models there are too few structural equations to solve for the unknowns whilst over-identification provides researchers with better estimates of the underlying true values than does just identification"*. Whilst we know that path analysis is sensitive to specification, we erred on the side of caution by over-specifying the model than underestimating it since *"leaving out variables would mean that the path coefficients will reflect the shared covariance with such unmeasured variables and will not be accurately interpretable in terms of direct and indirect effects*" (Garson 2008:15).

This is precisely why path analysis is less suited for alternative specifications of variables not supported by the hypothesis and why the researcher was constrained in terms of the way in which the variables were specified.

Apart from the problems identified above, there is the added complication of how to use dichotomous variables in standardised regression models, as is the requirement in the thesis. As noted by Hellevik (2007), in using survey data it is not unusual for the dependent variable to be a dichotomy, as is the case here. He states that when "the research problem requires a multivariate solution, regression analysis is very convenient for handling large numbers of independent variables" (2007, p. 59). Hellevik also shows that contrary to popular belief, ordinary linear regression methods can be used with a binary dependent variable—dichotomy coded 0-1 (Hellevik, 2007, pp. 59–60). Hellevik therefore refutes the

"argument that the statistical tests for linear analyses are inappropriate with a binary dependent variable" since he finds that "the significance probabilities from linear and logistic regression analysis turn out to be nearly identical" (Hellevik, 2007, p. 60).

What is of consequence for the methodology used in this research is that the purpose of the analysis is not "prediction but rather causal decomposition of bivariate associations [as in path analysis]—hence the problem of "impossible predictions" (which is the main reason against the use of linear regression with binary dependent variables) is no longer relevant" (Hellevik, 2007, p. 61).

To illustrate that the results of linear tests do not differ from logistic tests, Hellevik (2007, p. 61) compares a series of parallel linear and logistic regression analyses involving two independent variables (the binary variable gender and the continuous variable age) and a series of binary dependent variables. He states that

> there was no systematic tendency for one of the two sets of p values to be larger than the other . . . and that the differences between the two sets of P values were extremely modest. The correlation between the two sets of P values was as high as 0.9998, which means an explained variance of 99.96% when one P value was regressed on the other (Hellevik, 2007, p. 61).

He states that the high agreement in test results may come as a surprise to all who firmly believe that the linear regression cannot be used with a binary dependent variable due to inadequacy of the significance test (Hellevik, 2007, p. 64). He states that the outcome is in line with the statement we find in some textbooks on regression analysis that the linear tests will give misleading results for significance tests only with small samples (Hellevik, 2007, p. 64).

Concluding, Hellevik states that the results for linear and logistic significance probabilities turn out to be nearly identical, even with small samples and skewed distributions on the dependent variable. Fortunately in the case of this analysis there was a compelling argument for preferring the linear approach, since the linear measures could be used to investigate the links illustrated in the analytical framework articulated in Chapter Four.

5.7.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

Data analyses were used to answer the research question. Data was interpreted and analysed by "breaking up" into "manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships" (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 108). The aim of the analysis was to understand the diverse aspects of data collected through an investigation of the relationships between concepts and constructs so as to determine whether there were any patterns that can be identified or isolated.

The first stage of the analysis entailed the transformation of data into a format conducive to interpretation. The main technique associated with interviews is called content analysis. The purpose of content analysis was to describe the content of the respondent's utterances systematically, and to classify the various meanings expressed in the material recorded. This took the form of identifying the main themes expressed (Jankowicz, 2000). Responses were coded according to the themes identified but no software was employed in the further analyses of the qualitative interviews.

The results of the semi-structured interview were presented in a thematic way corresponding to the analytical framework. A blending of the information obtained empirically was then integrated with my own interpretive comments.

The interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the interviewees, and their anonymity was guaranteed.

5.8 CONCLUSION

Measuring social capital in this study depended on the analytical framework that was developed in Chapter Four. In describing the methodological framework for the thesis, I elaborated on the research design, methods, tools and instruments that were used throughout the research project life cycle of data collection, analysis and interpretation, to demonstrate their appropriateness.

The methodology also demonstrates the necessity of using both quantitative as well as qualitative methods to measure social capital. While Putnam's methodological approaches were different, his and other perspectives were useful in testing the research question in the context of the communities in the Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.

Employing the mixed methods approach also allowed for the triangulation of findings so as to determine the nature of the relationship between the different constructs in the analytical framework discussed. Determining whether the hypothesised links are causal or not was an important part of the mixed methods approach as it helped to provide a comprehensive perception of social capital in the Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.

The survey provided baseline information on useful indicators of the social capital variables including networks, trust and participation.

Descriptive inferential statistics and path analysis brought into relief the investigation of the relationship between the different constructs in the analytical framework. Path analysis was used to (i) explore whether there is a statistically significant association between the different concepts in the analytical model, (ii) explore whether the model is relevant for Cederberg and Matzikama, and lastly (iii) to predict the scale and importance of the relationships explored.

CHAPTER SIX: SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES OF CEDERBERG AND MATZIKAMA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities are both located in the same region of the Western Cape province of South Africa, namely the West Coast, which stretches 400km along the Atlantic Ocean. The West Coast District Municipality consists of five local municipalities: Swartland, Bergrivier, Cederberg, Matzikama, Saldanha, and one District Management Area (DMA) named Bitterfontein.

Cederberg and Matzikama share similar geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. They have high unemployment rates and undiversified economies which puts a limit on their ability to increase revenues. Both municipalities are "*Project Consolidate*" municipalities which is a reference to their weak institutions and considerable capacity constraints in the areas of management and implementation.

Figure 6-1: Map of West Coast District Municipality

6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY AREAS

According to Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 6) the South African rural landscape is highly unequal and deeply divided between black subsistence and white commercial agricultural farmers existing side by side, with White commercial farmers (less than 20%) owning approximately 80% of all landholdings compared to the majority of African/Blacks. The authors see the current system of landownership as actively supported and developed on the back of the historical dispossession of the African/Black majority under colonialism and later Apartheid. According to Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 5) the Apartheid state

> operated as financial broker for white minority interests beyond its role as social, institutional, political, legal, and repressive central apparatus. It organized tax incentives and large subsidies for foreign and local companies through state corporations, facilitating links between different industrial sectors in order to lower their costs, subsidising the white farmers over decades and keeping many out of bankruptcy.

Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 7) further state that

> like other sectors of the economy, commercial agriculture is highly centralised. A small number of large conglomerates, either central cooperatives or agribusinesses dominate production and are involved in services, manufacturing and marketing of products as well. The lifestyle and standard of living of white farm owners stand in stark contrast to the poverty of blacks working for them in commercial agriculture as labour tenants or farm workers. Despite more than 20 years of post-Apartheid rule, landownership patterns and the face of the South African agrarian landscape have not changed much.

This scenario is mirrored in both Cederberg and Matzikama. According to Jacobs and Andrews (2009, p. 19) a survey carried out in Cederberg, Matzikama and Bergrivier among 600 households connected to the agricultural sector revealed that the majority of households described agriculture as the basis of their livelihoods. The survey found that farm workers depended on wage income, with the majority of the main decision makers in this rural category reportedly in permanent employment and nearly 20% in non-permanent jobs. They were also more likely to work on large commercial farms rather than for small

farmers who participated in this study. Resource-poor farmers, on the other hand, relied on their own labour rather than hiring non-family wage workers. According to the authors (2009, p. 19) land reform has evidently done little to visibly improve the livelihood strategies of rural households tied to agriculture in this region.

6.2.1 Locating Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities

Cederberg Municipality borders the Boland District in the south, Bergrivier Local Municipality to the west and the Northern Cape to the east. It includes the communities of Clanwilliam, Citrusdal, Lamberts Bay, Graafwater, Leipoldville, Elandskloof, Elandsbaai and Wupperthal.

Most of the towns in Cederberg originated from small farming communities. The African/Black migrants of Cederberg primarily relocated to the towns because of work opportunities on the large commercial farms and the rooibos tea factory that opened in the last two decades or so. In addition, more farm workers arrived from surrounding farms after farm fires forced them to move or they were evicted by farmers. These displaced farm workers settled in various towns in the municipality. The move was largely to the formal town of Clanwilliam or the informal settlement of Khayelitsha.

Matzikama is situated to the north of the West Coast district municipality, with the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the Northern Cape to the east. The Olifants River runs through the municipality supporting an agricultural sector that is primarily built on viticulture. Vredendal is the largest town in the area, is centrally located and also serves as the administrative centre for the municipal area. Vanrhynsdorp, Klawer and Lutzville are secondary towns with established business districts. Smaller villages include Ebenhaeser, Koekenaap and Papendorp. The coastal towns are Doringbaai (largely dependent on fishing/lobster) and Strandfontein (a holiday destination).

The major historical milestones in the development of the area included the building of the canal in the late 1920s and early 1930s.The second major development was the Group

Areas Act which negatively affected a large part of the Coloured population who were moved to designated second-class areas of the municipalities.

Most of the African/Black people in the area arrived after 1994. At an individual level, most African/Blacks were not born in Matzikama but came there looking for work, particularly on the commercial farms.

6.3 SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE

Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities are located in the Western Cape which is relatively well resourced when compared to the rest of the country. Data from StatSA (2014) show that individual poverty rates in 2006 in the Province were considerably lower, i.e. 37% compared to 57% for South Africa and 81% for rural areas as a whole.

During the same period, the Western Cape had one of the highest rates of basic service provision (StatsSA: 2014). For example, access to basic services like water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal were all higher, averaging 80%, compared to rural areas outside of the Western Cape like the Eastern Cape and Limpopo Province where coverage was considerably lower averaging 60% (StatsSA:2014).

This section provides a socioeconomic profile of Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities based on the 1996 and 2001[11] Census data. The Census data was used because it is representative at the municipal level and because it can be compared across the two different census periods (1996 and 2001) allowing us to compare these two municipalities over a period of time.

As noted earlier Cederberg and Matzikama share similar geographic and socioeconomic characteristics, namely they are predominantly agriculturally based economies with their populations distributed in rural areas and small towns, a large proportion of which are poor.

[11] The 2010 Census data was not used because it falls outside of the period of the study.

They have high unemployment rates and undiversified economies which limit their abilities to increase revenues. Both municipalities are institutional weak with considerable capacity constraints.

6.3.1 Demographic Profile

6.3.1.1 Population Group and Size

A comparative profile of the distribution of the population by race in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities, show that Coloureds were the majority in both municipalities between 1996 and 2001 and that African/Blacks made up a relatively small percentage of the population, i.e. less than 10 percent in the 1996–2001 period.

Table 6-1: Population Group and Size, 1996–2001 (%)

POPULATION GROUP	CEDERBERG		MATZIKAMA	
	1996	2001	1996	2001
African/Black	4	8	2	5
Coloured	78	78	77	77
White	17	14	20	18
Undeclared	1	0	0	0
All population groups	100	100	100	100

The population structure and profile for Cederberg changed slightly between 1996 and 2001. In 1996 African/Blacks accounted for 4% of the population; in 2001 the figure doubled to 8%. Population growth in Matzikama has been highest for African/Blacks when compared to other population groups. In 1996 African/Blacks accounted for 2% of the population; in 2001 the population had increased to 5%. The increase in the number of African/Blacks in the municipality can be attributed to migration from other parts of the country, particularly the Eastern Cape (and other parts of the Western Cape). Studies (Bekker, 2002) show that migration to the Western Cape has been a major policy question.

6.3.1.2 Birthplace of Residents

The table below shows the birthplaces of residents by population group for both municipalities for the 2001 period[12]. In the case of African/Blacks, a significant number (50% in Cederberg and 40% in Matzikama respectively) were born in the Eastern Cape. This is quite distinct from the White and Coloured population groups. When compared to the other race groups in both municipalities, African/Blacks are more likely to come from the Eastern Cape.

Table 6-2: Birthplace of Residents, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	AFRICAN/ BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**AFRICAN/ BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**
Eastern Cape	50	0	3	40	1	2
Free State	3	0	2	3	0	2
Gauteng	1	0	5	3	0	5
KwaZulu-Natal	1	0	1	1	0	1
Limpopo	1	0	1	2	0	1
Mpumalanga	1	0	1	2	0	1
Northern Cape	7	2	6	8	11	12
North West	2	0	0	1	0	1
Western Cape	33	97	77	38	87	73
Not applicable	2	0	4	2	0	3
Grand Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.3.1.3 Age Profile

The following table presents the age structure of the population for Cederberg and Matzikama in 1996. The table shows that African/Blacks in both municipalities were more

[12] The data is not available for 1996

likely to be concentrated in the 20-39 age group (50% in Cederberg and 46% in Matzikama) reflecting the influx of working age youth into the two municipalities.

Table 6-3: Population Profile by Age, 1996 (%)

	CEDERBERG				MATZIKAMA			
	AFRICAN/BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**	**AFRICAN/BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**
0-4	7	11	6	10	12	12	6	11
5-9	7	11	7	10	10	11	7	11
10-14	5	11	9	11	4	11	9	11
15-19	6	9	8	9	6	9	8	9
20-24	14	10	5	9	13	9	6	8
25-29	16	10	7	10	12	9	6	8
30-34	11	9	6	8	11	8	7	8
35-39	9	7	7	7	10	7	8	7
40-44	7	5	7	6	6	6	8	6
45-49	5	4	6	5	4	4	7	5
50-54	3	3	6	4	3	4	6	4
55-59	4	3	6	3	3	3	5	3
60-64	3	2	5	3	3	2	5	3
65-69	1	2	4	2	1	1	4	2
70-74	1	1	4	2	1	1	3	1
75-79	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	1
80-84	0	0	2	1	0	0	2	1
85-120	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

This trend is also reflected in the 2001 data for Cederberg and Matzikama where a distinct bulge in the 20-39 age group can clearly be seen for the African/Black population group.

Figure 6-2: Age Structure by Race, Cederberg 2001



Figure 6-3: Age Structure by Race, Matzikama 2001



6.3.1.4 Gender Profile

The gender profile of the Coloured and White population groups in Cederberg and Matzikama are closely balanced with a sex ratio of 1 and 0.96 respectively. This is however not the case for African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama where males make up a significantly greater proportion of the population than females (i.e. greater than 60%). This is largely attributed to the large number of male migrant workers flocking to the area in search of work opportunities.

Table 6-4: Gender Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
African/Black	64	36	100	62	37	100
Coloured	50	50	100	50	50	100
White	49	51	100	49	51	100

Table 6-5 shows a marginal decline in the sex ratio for African/Blacks in 2001, but still reflecting a high concentration of males, largely reflective of the migrant status of most African/Blacks.

Table 6-5: Gender Profile by Population Group, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
African/Black	60	40	100	62	38	100
Coloured	49	51	100	49	51	100
White	49	51	100	49	51	100

6.3.1.5 Language Profile

The following table shows the languages spoken by the various population groups in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities for 1996. Ninety-nine percent of Coloureds and Whites spoke Afrikaans compared to only 23% and 31% of African/Black residents in

Cederberg and Matzikama respectively. The large percentage of native isiXhosa speakers in the African/Black population in both municipalities is testament to the fact that these groups are recent migrants to the areas.

Table 6-6: Language Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	AFRICAN/BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**AFRICAN/BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**
Afrikaans	23	99	95	31	99	96
English	0	0	4	1	0	3
IsiNdebele	0	0	0	0	0	0
IsiXhosa	64	0	0	61	0	0
IsiZulu	0	0	0	1	0	0
Sepedi	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sesotho	2	0	0	2	0	0
Setswana	7	0	0	2	0	0
Siswati	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tshivenda	0	0	0	0	0	0
Xitsonga	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other and Unspecified	0	1	0	1	1	1
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

The two figures below show that African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama are almost identical in their language profile in both the 1996 and 2001 Census periods, speaking primarily isiXhosa.

Figure 6-4: Language Profile by African/Black Population Group for Cederberg and Matzikama, 1996 (%)



Figure 6-5: Language Profile by African/Black Population Group for Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%)



6.3.2 Education Profile

The literature on development shows strong linkages between education, skills and socioeconomic wellbeing.

Table 6-7: Educational Profile by Population Group, 1996 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	AFRICAN/ BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	AFRICAN/ BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE
	1996	1996	1996	1996	1996	1996
No schooling	22.26	16.41	4.00	22.95	16.54	4.00
Some primary	31.25	32.72	10.24	27.10	30.61	9.90
Complete primary	12.24	11.14	25.60	8.85	10.37	2.55
Some secondary	21.83	20.18	30.34	22.4	23.51	26.89
Grade 12/Std 10	1.89	3.25	22.57	3.50	3.58	25.72
Higher	0.6	0.92	18.42	1.20	1.35	18.18
Unspecified	3.42	4.75	5.69	2.11	2.12	3.71
Not Applicable	6.51	10.64	6.15	11.80	11.92	6.05
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

In general the educational profiles of both municipalities are poor with relatively low levels of educational attainment for Coloured and African/Black residents. Whites in general have higher levels of educational attainment. There are similarities in educational attainment across the municipalities concerned. A comparison of the two periods shows improvements in education attainment between 1996 and 2001.

Table 6-8: Educational Profile by Population Group, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	AFRICAN/ BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	AFRICAN/ BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE
	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001
No schooling	13.08	12.56	3.91	14.30	12.39	3.25
Some primary	30.00	32.64	10.78	30.32	33.87	12.02
Complete primary	10.66	11.37	2.19	9.04	10.55	2.15
Some secondary	29.85	25.57	25.37	28.81	26.17	28.57
Grade 12/Std 10	6.62	5.83	33.49	6.34	5.59	33.89
Higher	1.08	1.18	18.24	0.70	1.44	14.39
Unspecified	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Applicable	8.72	10.85	6.00	10.48	10.29	5.72
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.3.3 Household Income

The income distribution for both municipalities is illustrated in the table and figure below[13].

[13] The data for 1996 was not comparable with 2001.

Table 6-9: Household Income Distribution in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG				MATZIKAMA			
	AFRICAN/BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**	**AFRICAN/BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**
R0 - R800	58	31	14	30	49	34	13	30
R801 - R1 600	24	30	10	26	26	30	10	25
R1 601 - R3 200	14	26	17	24	19	21	17	20
R3 201 - R6 400	3	10	24	12	4	9	22	12
R6 401 - R12 800	2	2	21	6	1	4	21	7
R12 801 - R25 600	0	0	9	2	1	1	11	3
R25 601 - R51 200	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	1
R51 201 - R102 400	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
R102 401 - R204 800	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
R204 801 or more	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The 2001 Census data shows that in general African/Black households are more likely to earn low incomes. In Cederberg 82% and in Matzikama 75% earned less than R1 600.

Figure 6-6: Household Income in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%)



6.3.4 Employment

An abundant literature in sociology and urban economics suggests that the spatial organisation of towns can exacerbate unemployment and deteriorate the income of disadvantaged communities. In this perspective, labour-market outcomes do not only depend on individual characteristics like age, education and ethnicity but also on location within the town. In their work on the city structure and unemployment, Rospabe and Selod (2003) state that under Apartheid, only Whites were authorised to live close to the town centre. The non-white labour force (i.e. Asians/Indians, Coloureds and Blacks) were forced to live on the periphery of cities, sometimes very far away from the city centre. Even though a certain amount of residential desegregation started to occur at the end of the 1980s, these spatial patterns of segregation still prevail in the 2010s. When one compares residential and job locations, it is clear that there exists a major disconnection between places of work and places of residence. Their results show that there are important spatial issues that exacerbate unemployment: distance to jobs, rural origin (especially for women), and the length of time spent in the present dwelling.

A comparison of Tables 6-10 and 6-11 show low levels of unemployment in 1996. Unemployment however increased considerably since 1996 to 13% in Cederberg and 30% in Matzikama for the African/Black population. This is mostly related to the influx of African/Blacks in search of work opportunities.

Table 6-10: Employment in Cederberg and Matzikama, 1996 (%)

	CEDERBERG				MATZIKAMA			
	AFRICAN/BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**	**AFRICAN/BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**
Employed	94	91	97	92	86	86	97	88
Unemployed	6	9	3	8	14	14	3	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6-11: Employment in Cederberg and Matzikama, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG				MATZIKAMA			
	AFRICAN/BLACK	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**	**AFRICAN/BLACK**	**COLOURED**	**WHITE**	**TOTAL**
Employed	87	89	98	90	70	82	96	83
Unemployed	13	11	2	10	30	18	4	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.4 ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES

The provision of basic services is a critical component in the development and health of communities since the quality of health can primarily be linked to conditions at the level of the household and the immediate living environment. Households that have access to basic services such as electricity, water, sanitation and refuse removal spend less of their time collecting water and firewood. Apart from the negative impact that firewood collection has on the environment, these services are particularly beneficial to women who would otherwise spend a large percentage of their time engaged in such activities. It frees up their time, enabling them to engage in other productive activities. The following section gives an overview of the provision of various basic services in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. The data compares the situation in 1996 with 2001.

6.4.1 Access to Electricity

The following tables examine access to energy for lighting, cooking and heating purposes. Table 6-12 indicates low levels of access to electricity for African/Blacks, intermediate levels of access for Coloureds and high levels of access for Whites in Cederberg in 1996, reflecting the preference given to White households during Apartheid. In 1996 in Matzikama there were intermediate levels of access for African/Blacks and Coloureds and high levels of access for Whites. In Cederberg in 1996 only 34.45% of people had access to electricity for lighting purposes which doubled to 65.84% in 2001. The progress from 1996 to 2001 for Matzikama residents was not as dramatic as that of Cederberg since only a marginal improvement was made in the provision of electricity for lighting purposes, i.e. increasing from 61.12% to 65.33%. The Coloured population group experienced similar marginal increases.

Table 6-12: Access to Energy for Lighting, 1996-2001(%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Electricity	34.45	65.84	71.57	97.87	97.31	97.87	61.12	65.33	68.12	77.04	98.44	96.10
Gas	0.95	-	0.22	0.15	0.55	0.15	0.23	0.92	0.21	0.24	0.30	0.26
Paraffin	1.67	4.01	0.70	0.40	0.44	0.40	9.60	15.02	1.22	0.65	0.38	0.11
Candles	61.48	29.72	26.95	1.21	1.26	1.21	29.04	18.72	29.89	21.39	0.51	1.11
Solar	0	-	0	0.15	0	0.15	0	0	0	0.4	0	0.14
Other	0	0.54	0	0.2	0	0.20	0	0	0	0.55	0	2.25
Unspecified	1.44	0	0.57	0	0.49	0	0	0	0.56	0	0.37	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

We witness a similar trend when it comes to the provision of energy for cooking purposes. In 1996, 25.84% of African/Black residents had access to electricity for cooking purposes which increased to 49.13% in 2001. African/Black residents in Matzikama only increased their access to electricity for cooking marginally from 51.76% to 56.07%.

Table 6-13: Access to Energy for Cooking 1996-2001(%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Electricity	25.84	49.13	57.10	69.51	91.70	91.65	51.76	56.07	55.19	65.92	91.26	92.10
Gas	13.46	5.75	14	7.08	5.99	6.04	25.76	12.76	22.72	15.14	8.23	6.68
Paraffin	44.54	32.97	1.41	1.29	0.05	0.05	9.60	19.03	2.06	1.78	0.03	0.4
Wood	15.83	11.50	26.2	21.25	1.59	1.51	12.65	10.49	19.32	16.28	0.2	0.56
Other	-	0.65	2.2	0.88	0.66	0.75		1.75	0.72	0.85	0.26	0.39
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Once again a similar trend in Cederberg when it comes to the provision of energy for heating purposes. In 1996, 21.05% of African/Black residents had access to electricity for heating purposes which increased to 37.74% in 2001. African/Black residents in Matzikama saw a marginal decline in their access to electricity for heating purposes from 48.48% in 1996 to 46.81% in 2001.

Table 6-14: Access to Energy for Heating, 1996-2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Electricity	21.05	37.74	48.36	56.08	93.57	84.70	48.48	46.81	48.11	57.97	91.60	93.00
Gas	1.68	1.19	2.23	1.20	2.25	3.07	4.92	1.74	2.82	1.657	5.32	2.27
Paraffin	5.02	17.03	0.95	0.41	0.05	0.25	2.81	12.34	11.63	0.68	0.30	0.23
Wood	60.29	28.74	37.90	35.30	2.25	4.63	40.28	23.67	39.24	30.95	1.28	1.73
Other	11.71	30.58	10.66	17.73	1.86	9.16	3.27	15.43	8.67	8.74	1.49	2.72
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.4.2 Access to Water and Sanitation Services

In 1996, 26.79% of African/Black residents had access to water inside their dwelling in Cederberg, increasing to 38.61% in 2001. In Matzikama municipality 32.08% of African/Black residents had access to water inside their dwelling in 1996 which increased top 37.96% in 2001. Most residents in both municipalities had access to water either inside their dwelling, inside the yard or outside the yard. No-access is very low.

Table 6-15: Access to Piped Water, 1996-2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Inside the dwelling	26.79	38.61	65.27	66.75	95.99	92.60	32.08	37.96	44.45	54.70	96.58	95.02
Inside the yard	32.30	40.02	25.9	26.46	0.93	4.53	35.36	32.61	40.81	27.93	0.71	2.19
Outside the yard	36.36	20.17	3.05	4.99	0.11	2.01	29.27	24.90	9.41	12.80	0.07	1.73
No access	4.07	1.19	5.77	1.80	2.87	0.86	3.29	4.62	4.89	4.58	2.44	1.02
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In 1996, 32.30% of African/Black residents had access to flush or chemical toilets in Cederberg which increased to 65.51% in 2001. In Matzikama municipality 54.33% of African/Black residents had access to flush or chemical toilets in 1996 which increased to 64.20%. There were still high levels of non-provision at roughly 30% in both municipalities in 2001.

Table 6-16: Access to Sanitation Services, 1996-2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Flush or chemical toilet	32.30	65.51	65.27	79.69	98.41	98.94	54.33	64.20	54.01	69.19	99.22	98.27
Pit latrine	4.78	2.82	7.33	2.93	0.60	0.20	13.34	4.73	18.47	7.53	0.20	0.20
Bucket latrine	21.29	1.30	11.63	4.39	0.11	0.45	3.27	1.23	15.85	7.30	0.30	0.28
None of the above	40.90	30.48	15.49	13.00	0.55	0.45	28.57	29.94	11.30	15.99	0.07	1.22
Unspecified	0.76		0.27		0.38		0.23		0.37		0.17	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.4.3 Access to Refuse Removal

Refuse removal remains a key problem in both municipalities. Table 6-17 compares the two municipalities and highlights the improvements made in Cederberg.

Table 6-17: Access to Refuse Removal, 1996-2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Removed by local authority at least once a week	21.53	48.26	43.83	49.19	65.44	62.46	50.82	66.97	45.13	56.26	66.78	64.15
Removed by local authority less often	3.11	1.19	0.62	0.96	0.16	0.40	1.17	0.31	0.74	0.51	0.68	0.23
Communal refuse dump	9.33	7.05	15.04	9.07	3.90	4.33	23.65	1.23	18.27	3.02	6.16	1.45
Own refuse dump	39.23	43.06	17.21	39.90	26.92	32.51	22.72	30.25	31.91	39.17	22.35	33.44
No rubbish disposal	24.16	0.43	1.89	0.91	0.99	0.35	0.70	1.33	0.63	1.05	1.66	0.77
Other	0.72	0	18.31	0	0.05	0	0	0	0.13	0	33.86	0
Unspecified	1.67	0	3.10	0	2.52	0	0.70	0	3.30	0	2.33	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

6.4.4 Access to Housing

The lack of adequate housing for low-income households has been found to reinforce the vicious cycle of disease, poverty and unemployment. Agnus Walker (2000) observes that in areas with high socioeconomic disadvantage there are higher rates of mortality than areas with lower levels of socioeconomic disadvantage.

The access to formal housing by race between 1996 and 2001 is shown below. There has been an increase in access to formal housing for all race groups. The low level of formal housing in the African/Black community is directly related to the fact that these residents are migrants, therefore they are new to the area compared to the other groups.

Table 6-18: Access to Formal Housing, 1996-2001(%)

	CEDERBERG						MATZIKAMA					
	AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE		AFRICAN/BLACK		COLOURED		WHITE	
	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001	1996	2001
Formal	49	77	93	94	98	98	68	58	90	90	99	98
Traditional	2	4	2	2	0	2	1	9	3	5	0	1
Informal	45	19	4	3	0	0	30	31	5	4	0	0
Other	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6-19: Dwelling Ownership, 2001 (%)

	CEDERBERG			MATZIKAMA		
	AFRICAN/BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	AFRICAN/BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE
	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001
Owned and fully paid off	33.73	37.77	48.77	23.05	32.95	48.14
Owned but not yet paid off	3.36	8.32	14.75	3.50	9.80	13.96
Rented	15.29	12.25	23.45	25.1	15.86	28.15
Occupied rent - free	47.61	41.67	13.03	48.35	41.40	9.75
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The data on dwelling ownership shows that 33.73% of African/Blacks in Cederberg and 23.05% of African/Black residents in Matzikama reside in homes they own, as opposed to 48.0% of Whites residents. The vast majority (45.9%) occupy rent-free dwelling types. More than 45.0% of African/Black residents in both municipalities currently occupy their homes rent-free.

6.5 ECONOMIC PROFILE

The municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama are both largely agrarian ones. During the period under study Agriculture comprised 28% of Cederberg municipality's (Gross Domestic Product (Regional)) GDPR. Between 1995 and 2005 Cederberg's average economic growth rate was 3.2. Despite being a relatively small municipality within the district, Cederberg's growth rate could be attributed to an increased demand for agricultural goods and the development of the secondary sector during this period. Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering and Accommodation was the second biggest sector at 22% followed by Manufacturing at 14%. The key drivers of economic growth during this period was Manufacturing which registered a growth rate of 10% followed by Construction with 8% and Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering and Accommodation with roughly 7%.

Figure 6-7: **Trends in Economic Growth: Cederberg, District and Western Cape, 1996-2005**



SOURCE: WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TREASURY CALCULATIONS, BASED ON QUANTEC RESEARCH DATA, 2007

Figure 6-8: Trends in Economic Growth: Matzikama District and Western Cape, 1996-2005



SOURCE: WESTERN CAPE PROVINCIAL TREASURY CALCULATIONS, BASED ON QUANTEC RESEARCH DATA, 2007

Like Cederberg, Agriculture is the dominant sector in the Matzikama Municipality with a contribution of 20% to GDPR. This was followed by the Wholesale & Retail Trade; Catering and Accommodation sector at 17% and Manufacturing at 14.4 percent. The key drivers of economic growth were Manufacturing, which registered a growth rate of 12.6 percent, followed by Construction with 10.7 percent and Community, Social and other Personal services at nine percent.

The two local economies are highly dependent on Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry but economic activity has increased in sectors such as General Government services, Manufacturing, Transport & Communication, and Social Services. In the mid-2000s international, national and local demand for products was strong presenting a pull for more unskilled migrant labour from other parts of the country. However, the supply of goods and services was more uncertain. This could be attributed to climate change, water scarcity, lack of available land and low levels of labour productivity. Even with strong growth, the traditional sectors were not likely to reduce unemployment or poverty.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTRASTING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN TWO SIMILAR COMMUNITIES

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reports on the quantitative and qualitative findings of the research undertaken in the Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities. Using the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four, this chapter begins with an assessment of formal social group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama and assesses how group membership has influenced political trust in the municipalities concerned. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between political trust and civic engagement/political participation to determine what influence, if any, it has had on the effectiveness of local government and ultimately the socioeconomic outcomes of the African/Black population in these two resource-constrained municipalities.

The period in which research was carried out for this study was between 2006 and 2007. The importance of this for social capital in Cederberg and Matzikama is that until then, supporters of the government among African/Blacks believed that their impoverished situation would be ameliorated, and gave their African National Congress (ANC) representatives a high degree of consent. The perception of communities (in South Africa in general) with regard to their local government has, however, changed dramatically in the past decade (Alexander, 2010, pp. 26–30). Whether this is true for the two locations since 2007 has not been established since the research does not account for this period.

7.2 NETWORK AND ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITY

This section sketches the differences in formal social group membership (as a measure of network and associational activity) in the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama using the survey data and data collected from the qualitative interviews with key informants from the municipalities concerned.

During the household survey respondents were questioned about their membership in formal social groups to which they themselves or members of their household belonged (including children over the age of 12 years). Table 7-1 below shows their responses by specifying the

distribution of formal social group membership by type of membership in Cederberg and Matzikama[14] in percentage terms.

Table 7-1: Type of Social Group Membership in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities

TYPE OF SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP	MUNICIPALITY		CHI-SQUARE TEST
	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA	
Association	3.19%	3.92%	χ^2 – value = 1.903 p value = 0.168
Volunteer Social Group	1.89%	0.92%	χ^2 – value = 8.128 p value = 0.004
Sports Group	9.85%	4.45%	χ^2 – value = 52.460 p value = 0.000
Cultural Group	1.85%	0.52%	χ^2 – value = 17.627 p value = 0.000
Other	0.77%	0.00%	χ^2 test invalid[15]
None	80.60%	90.10%	χ^2 – value = 86.470 p value = 0.000
Refuse to answer	1.85%	0.09%	χ^2 test invalid[16]
Total	100.00% *n=2 598*	100.00% *n= 2 293*	

Table 7-1 shows that membership of Associations (like ratepayers' associations) is relatively similar at 3.19% and 3.92% for Cederberg and Matzikama respectively. The p-value is 0.168 which suggests that the results are insignificant, confirming no difference in the percentage of Associations in the two municipalities.

Membership in Volunteer Social Groups in percentage terms is twice as large in Cederberg (1.89%) compared to Matzikama (0.92%). The p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant.

Membership in Sports Groups in percentage terms is twice as large in Cederberg (9.85%) compared to Matzikama (4.45%). Once again, the p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant—meaning that there is a significant difference in the percentage of Sports Groups in the two municipalities.

[14] Representative of the entire population of the two municipalities concerned.
[15] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.
[16] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.

Membership in Cultural Groups in percentage terms is three times as large in Cederberg (1.85%) compared to Matzikama (0.52%). Here again the p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant—meaning that there is a significant difference in the percentage of Cultural Groups in the two municipalities.

The population of Matzikama is more likely *not* to belong to any formal social group (90.10%) compared to Cederberg (80.60%). The p-value is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant. This means that there is a significant difference in the percentage of Social Group membership in the two municipalities concerned, with Matzikama recording a lower level of formal social group membership compared to Cederberg.

The findings show that there are higher levels of Social Group membership (Volunteer Social Group, Sports Group and Cultural Group) in Cederberg compared to Matzikama. A point worth noting is that membership in Sports Groups reflects the most recorded Formal Social Group activity in both Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities.

However, the percentages of "None" Social Group membership in both Cederberg (80.60%) and Matzikama (90.10%) show low levels of network activity which supports Jooste's conclusion (2005, p. 24) that membership in formal social groups in the Western Cape is generally low.

An estimated 504 individuals indicated membership in formal social groups out of a total of 839 households surveyed in Cederberg. This means that every second household surveyed in Cederberg had approximately 1 individual belonging to a formal social group.

An estimated 227 individuals indicated membership in formal social groups out of a total of 667 households surveyed in Matzikama. This means that every third household surveyed in Matzikama had approximately 1 individual in a formal social group.

In Table 7-2 race and Social Group membership in Cederberg and Matzikama municipalities are compared. For the purposes of this study, racial categories correspond to the nomenclature adopted during the Apartheid system namely, African/Blacks, Coloureds and Whites.[17]

[17] There were too few Asian/Indian residents in the municipalities concerned for any meaningful analysis of social capital.

Table: 7–2: Social Group Membership by Race Group in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities

TYPE OF SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP	CEDERBERG				MATZIKAMA			
	AFRICAN/ BLACKS	COLOUREDS	WHITES	CHI-SQUARE TEST	AFRICAN/ BLACKS	COLOUREDS	WHITES	CHI-SQUARE TEST
Association	2.82%	2.62%	5.30%	χ^2 – value = 6.653 p value = 0.036	1.67%	4.65%	2.08%	χ^2 – value = 8.565 p value = 0.014
Volunteer Social Group	1.88%	1.40%	3.43%	χ^2 - value = 6.425 p value = 0.040	0%	0.66%	2.67%	χ^2 – value = 15.329 p value = 0.000
Sports Group	33.33%	3.29%	11.84%	χ^2 – value = 347.322 p value = 0.000	7.11%	3.64%	6.53%	χ^2 – value = 10.018 p value = 0.007
Cultural Group	10.09%	0.06%	0.31%	χ^2 – value = 189.187 p value = 0.000	1.26%	0.42%	0.59%	χ^2 – value = 2.796 p value = 0.247
Other	4.46%	0.06%	0%	χ^2 test invalid[18]	0%	0%	0%	χ^2 test invalid[19]
None	47.42%	92.57%	66.04%	χ^2 – value = 500.727 p value = 0.000	89.96%	90.51%	88.13%	χ^2 – value = 1.7911 p value = 0.408
Refuse To Answer	0%	0%	13.08%	χ^2 test invalid[20]	0%	0.12%	0%	χ2 test invalid[21]
Total	100.00% *n = 426*	100.00% *n=1 642*	100% *n=321*		100.00% *n=239*	100.00% n=1 676	100.00% n=337	

[18] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.

[19] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.

[20] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.

[21] If more than 25% of cells have an expected count less than 5 then the Chi-square test is invalid.

Membership in Associations is twice as high amongst Whites in Cederberg (5.30%) compared to African/Blacks (2.82%). For Volunteer Social Groups it is roughly twice as large for Whites in Cederberg (3.43%) compared to African/Blacks (1.88%).

A more interesting picture emerges for membership in Sport Groups: in Cederberg it is highest for the African/Black community (33.3%), with Whites at 11.84% and Coloureds a low of 3.29%.

Cultural Groups membership in percentage terms is three times as large in the African/Black communities in Cederberg (10.09%) compared to the White and Coloured communities (<1.00%). The p-value in all cases is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant.

The p-values given in Table 7-2 show that African/Blacks in Cederberg are more likely to be members of formal social groups such as sport and cultural organisations when compared to Coloureds and Whites in the municipality.

We find some strikingly different levels when social group membership is compared in Cederberg. The African/Black population record 52.58%, Whites 33.96% and Coloureds 7.43%. A natural conclusion here is that race appears to be strongly correlated with social group membership.

Table 7-2 shows that the most popular forms of formal social group membership for the African/Black community in Cederberg are sport groups followed by cultural groups. A further breakdown of social group membership by households suggests that (i) both Whites and African/Blacks are more engaged in Cederberg, while Coloureds are less engaged in both and (ii) that each African/Black household in Cederberg has at least one member who belongs to a formal social group. This is not the case for any other race group in Cederberg.

Membership in Associations (like Rate Payers Associations) vary with each of the racial groups in Matzikama. Coloureds are more likely to belong to Associations (4.65%) compared to Whites (2.08%) and African/Blacks (1.67%).

Whites are more like to be involved in Volunteer Social Groups (2.67%) in Matzikama compared to African/Blacks (0.00%) and Coloureds (0.66%).

In Sports Group membership the findings showed markedly different levels for the three racial groups in Matzikama. African/Blacks are more likely to belong to Sports Groups (7.11%) compared to 6.53% for Whites and 3.64% for Coloureds.

The p-value for each of the three findings above is less than 0.05 which suggests that the results are significant.

The results show no difference in Cultural Group membership and "other" forms of membership among the different race groups in Matzikama.

For all three race groups non-membership in a formal social group is relatively the same in Matzikama that is, African/Black (89.96%), Coloureds (90.51%) and Whites (88.13%). Table 7-2 also shows that 10% of African/Black people in Matzikama belong to a formal social group compared to roughly 9.5% of Coloureds and 11.8% of Whites. From this it would appear that race is not strongly correlated with social group membership in Matzikama.

There are, however, significant differences in the types of Social Group membership by race group for Associations, Volunteer Social Groups and Sports Groups. The p-values show that Coloureds are more likely to belong to Associations, whereas African/Blacks and Whites are more likely to be involved in Sports Groups. Membership in Volunteer Social Groups seems to be more established among Whites.

Table 7-3 compares formal Social Group membership among the African/Black populations of Cederberg and Matzikama.

Table 7–3: Social Group Membership for African/Blacks in Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities

TYPE OF SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA
Association	2.82%	1.67%
Volunteer Social Group	1.88%	0.00%
Sports Group	33.33%	7.11%
Cultural Group	10.09%	1.26%
Other	4.46%	0.00%
Total	**52.58%**	**10.04%**

When comparing the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama, two immediate observations can be made:

- The African/Black population in Cederberg (52.58%) has a higher level of formal Social Group membership compared to its counterpart in Matzikama (10.04%).
- The African/Black population in Cederberg displays social behaviour that is quite different from its counterpart in Matzikama with regard to formal social group membership. Membership in all types of formal Social Groups (Associations, Volunteer Social Groups, Sports Groups, Cultural Groups and Other) is higher among African/Blacks in Cederberg when compared to their counterparts in Matzikama.

These findings presented in Table 7-1, Table 7-2 and Table 7-3 are provocative since there are no other differences to account for what is a remarkable difference in percentage terms and warrants further investigation, particularly qualitative insights into why this is the case.

This is particularly so if one bears in mind the following:

- The African/Black population arrived in the two municipalities around the same time (i.e. they are relatively new to both areas), yet the African/Black population in Cederberg managed to construct vibrant social group activities which are not found in Matzikama.
- On average, African/Blacks have been in Cederberg for 18 years compared to an average of more than 30 years for the Coloured and White groups, which differs from Putnam's view that social capital takes years to build up in one place and is generally found in more established communities.
- The African/Black population in Cederberg is more impoverished than the other race groups, yet there is a proliferation of social group membership in the area.

Evidence collected from this study indicates that despite the relatively impoverished nature of African/Black communities in Cederberg, membership of formal social groups is significantly higher than in other, wealthier race groups. Here it would seem that we encounter a different perspective of social capital compared to that of Jooste (2005), who held the view that membership in formal social groups among poor households is low because it is measured against the opportunity costs (time and effort) that they associate with such membership. The

Cederberg experience, however, contests this view and instead finds common ground with the work of Woolcock and Narayan (2000, p 229), who offer a communitarian view of social capital in which social group membership (and social ties) decreases the vulnerability among the poor. Time may certainly be a scarce commodity for poor communities whose limited resources are stretched beyond capacity and hardship leaves them physically and psychologically exhausted. On the other hand, they may have an abundance of time if they are unemployed, and reducing their vulnerability through various forms of mutual aid may be one of the few survival strategies available to them.

The differences in network and associational activity among the African/Black community in Cederberg compared to the African/Black community in Matzikama are striking. In the sections that follow I investigate the factors which drive the rich and vibrant culture of civic organisation in Cederberg but are visibly absent in Matzikama despite their similar socioeconomic characteristics—that is, they are economic migrants, have low incomes, are marginalised and culturally displaced.

The augmented analytical framework, repeated below, discussed the different types of characteristics of networks. It distinguished between horizontal and vertical features, active versus passive, heterogeneous versus homogeneous, public good versus private good-producing, and political versus non-political characteristics. Using primarily qualitative data, I examine how the networks and associations differ between Cederberg and Matzikama in terms of the type of characteristics with which they are imbued and how this impacts on the vibrancy of public life and ultimately on development outcomes in the two municipalities concerned.

Figure 7-1: Analytical Framework Incorporating a Typology of Networks/Associations



7.2.1 Horizontal Versus Hierarchical Networks

Table 7-3 showed a proliferation of formal social groups in the African/Black community of Cederberg, the most prominent form being that of Sports Groups. According to the Sports Coordinator interviewed in Cederberg

> Khayelitsha has many sport groups. One of them Khayelitsha Sport was introduced in 1999. Here the youth was organised into soccer clubs like the Young Pirates, Yizo Yizo, Blue Line United, Boesmanskloof, Brazilian chiefs, Oceans Swallows (Lamberts Baai) Bob Rangers Elands Baai, Citrusdal United. There are a total of nine soccer teams.[22]

Sports clubs appear to be spread throughout the Cederberg Municipality including Boesmanskloof, Lamberts Bay, Elands Baai and Citrusdal, indicating that they are not confined to one area in the municipality. Observation confirmed that a large number of African/Black

[22] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

youth are involved in these groups. It is likely that such sports groups provide a good opportunity for the youth to develop civic competences including leadership capabilities.

According to one community development worker in Cederberg

> The sports clubs provide the youth with opportunities for skills development and leadership. The leaders of the sports clubs have petitioned the municipality to train its members in various aspects of management and administration like financial management and the writing of reports. [23]

Apart from facilitating the formation and development of leadership skills, a community with a diverse social network structure also facilitates the flow of information on socioeconomic and developmental issues facing them. In small communities with dense horizontal social networks, such as that found in the African/Black community in Cederberg, the flow of information about community needs is much more diffuse. As a result, communities can be informed relatively quickly about events that affect them. With good leadership, they are in a position to respond to these events more effectively. As we shall see later in the chapter, their response to events can be further improved if the relationship between social groups and state organs (municipal departments) is carried over to the institutional structures that are mandated principally to deal with service delivery.

The dissemination of information by effective leaders about community needs in sports groups can reinforce a sense of collective identity and generate social and political mobilisation. This is the view of Donovan et al. (2004, p. 407) who used New Zealand as a case study and found that membership in sport clubs promotes political engagement. According to Donovan et al., sport groups were "also associated with higher dimensions of engagement that included voting and discussing politics" (Donovan et al., 2004, p. 415). Similarly, Stevens and Adams (2013, p. 661) argued that sports groups impact on collective action and community change.

In contrast, those informants interviewed in the African/Black community of Matzikama identified a few social groups to which locals are affiliated such as the soup kitchen, the soccer club, the African National Congress (ANC) branch, the ANC Women's League and the

[23] Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured

Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The informants also disclosed that most of the organisations were political or were funded and operated by government or political organisations. This may explain the hierarchical nature of networks and associations in Matzikama because they function according to modes of centralised authority. According to the municipal manager of Matzikama, the social group structures are funded by the local office of Social Services which he said was highly politicised. As such, he said, these structures were badly managed and had difficulty working together.

From this short profile it would appear that Putnam's (1993, p. 116) so-called "dense social networks" are more prevalent in Cederberg's African/Black community than among its counterpart in Matzikama.

The interviews held with the African/Black community in Matzikama revealed that hierarchical organisations reflect the classical features of dependence (rather than mutuality) that are characteristic of such vertically structured entities and as such, are limited in their ability to generate norms of reciprocity, social trust or a sense of responsibility for collective endeavours (see Boix & Posner, 1996, p. 3). It is useful to recall here Boix and Posner's description in the literature review of vertical associations as

> contain(ing) built-in hierarchies which facilitate decision-making and eliminate the collective action dilemmas which confront members of horizontally structured groups. Since the experience of arriving at mutually acceptable decisions and overcoming dilemmas of mutual cooperation is at the heart of what makes participation in civic associations so beneficial for facilitating wider social cooperation, this feature of vertically structured organizations robs them of much of their social capital-building power (Boix & Posner, 1996, p. 4).

The social network structure in the African/Black community in Cederberg is more horizontal, numerous and diverse than that found in the African/Black community in Matzikama, and as such lends itself to the flow of information within the community and the development of civic competencies and leadership capabilities. The practical manifestations of these networks in Cederberg bear a resemblance to Putnam's description of social networks in Northern Italy. We recall that he characterised them as "social networks" because they are not hierarchical. In his opinion, communities with social networks often value social solidarity, civic engagement, cooperation and honesty more than they do in hierarchical ones (Putnam, 1993, p. 116). He does not, however, say anything about the development of leadership competencies as a spin-

off of membership in these social networks, which we observe to have occurred in Cederberg. This point is discussed in more detail below in the section on active and passive membership.

In the previous section the emergence of leadership, the flow of information and modes of communication were identified as spin-offs that emanate from social group membership. Community leadership, as we will see, is a central factor explaining participation and ultimately, development outcomes.

7.2.2 Active Versus Passive Membership

The quantitative data exercise did not gather information on the activity of membership but some insightful information nevertheless emerged from the interviews. Active and passive social group membership varied depending on the nature of the social groups as well as the calibre of leadership they had.

According to several key informants who were both internal and external to the community, such as the community development worker, the municipal manager of Cederberg Municipality and the Sports Group Coordinator suggested that membership in these social groups are very active. For example

> The networks and associations are very strong. They have regular meetings and are funded. They also hold AGMs.[24]

> They are strong and meet bi-monthly, or at least monthly.[25]

> They are very strong and active.[26]

That networks or associations are reported to have regular meetings, are funded and have regular AGMs suggests the presence of active and effective leadership. This in turn provides a

[24] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

[25] Municipal Manager, Cederberg Municipality, Male, Coloured

[26] Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured

basis for leadership development among the younger members of the associations who are likely to take up meaningful social and political roles later in their lives. I propose that this informal "leadership academy" in itself is a form of social capital.

In contrast, responses from "insiders and outsiders" of the African/Black community in Matzikama such as the Municipal Manager of Matzikama, the leader of the Women's League in Matzikama and several other stakeholders from the community indicated that the networks and associations are not very strong, as evidenced from the excerpts below:

> The networks and associations are not very strong. People wait for the seasonal work, other than that they sit at home.[27]

> I think that some of these structures are badly managed and they have difficulties with working together. Politics also plays a major role as the local office of Social Services, which funds most of them, is highly politicised.[28]

In cases where networks are hierarchical (as indicated in the previous section) they stifle broader participation and also reduce the probability of active membership and the development of leadership competencies.

7.2.3 Heterogeneous Versus Homogeneous

Formal associational life in both Cederberg and Matzikama is primarily concentrated among homogeneous groups that is groups where people are similar to each other in terms of culture, language, income, race, history and socioeconomic status. These similarities make it relatively easy to establish the social trust necessary for civic engagement and socioeconomic advancement, whereas in heterogeneous groups it has to be built gradually. Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005, p. 235) argue this point cogently saying that associational involvement in

[27] Senior Representative of the ANC's Women's League, Female, African/Black

[28] Municipal Manager: Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured

heterogeneous groups is necessary so that people can interact with others who hold opinions different from their own for social trust to take root.

In Matzikama, as in Cederberg, groups are homogeneous in terms of race and/or class. This homogeneity is reinforced by the spatial division of groups that was enforced through the panoply of planning strategies under Apartheid which effectively prevented heterogeneous social group membership from being formed.

Although there was no significant heterogeneity in terms of group membership, the heterogeneity of social group structures was present, as evidenced in Table 6-3 and from the interviews with informants in Cederberg. This increases the opportunity for bridging and linking social capital which connects groups and individuals to others as well as with those who occupy different social positions (e.g. the more powerful or socially advantaged).

Woolcock (2001, pp. 11-17) and Mani (2001, p. 3) are of the view that linking social capital is characterised by the connections between those with differential levels of power or social status, for example links between the political elite and the general public or between individuals from different social classes. The leaders of associations and networks in Cederberg were seen to open up opportunities for bridging and linking social capital between different associations, particularly in the context of heterogeneous social group structures and, through these groups, creating the opportunity for linking between the political elite and different social classes. For example, one of the community leaders in Khayelitsha (Cederberg) is a past chairperson of the local ANC branch. He has been involved in several social groups in the African/Black community but also has strong links with the municipality and councillors. He is responsible for facilitating meetings with the local authority as well as other groups outside the community.

7.2.4 Political Versus Non-Political

Association type is another lens through which associations are viewed in the diagram in Figure 7-2. In Wollebæk and Selle (2002) and Putnam (1993), non-political associations had different impacts on trust and participation and hence, socioeconomic outcomes, when compared to political associations. This was confirmed by Stolle and Rochon (2001, pp. 154–155) who

showed that political organisations have the least levels of public and political trust and efficacy.

Research on the African/Black community in Matzikama revealed that political networks/associations that received their funds from government departments were considered to be highly politicised and tended to crowd out participation and a sense of collective identity. In Cederberg, by contrast, non-political associations were seen as promoting community cohesion and participation in community development. The sample of responses listed below to questions in the interviews provide some evidence of this (respondents were asked which cultural, social, or community traditions affect the way in which people in the community help each other and stand together).

> In Khayelitsha they have stokvels and the imbizo where people talk and communicate among each other.[29]

> In the African community people have shebeens for music, dancing and traditional dancing. Choirs and sport also help people stand together. Coloured people participate in these activities, especially in the sport and music. [30]

Non-political associations like stokvels, choirs and sport groups in Cederberg would appear then to not only enable people to bond and stand together but also offer an opportunity for them to engage with other racial groups (especially Coloureds) and thereby build trust and cohesion between them. This clearly facilitates the flow of information and enhances communication between and within these groups.

One of the other findings from the research in this thesis is that non-political associations affect the ways in which political participation occurs. Here we see the impact that these associations have on the type of political participation that occurs. Although we will deal with a more detailed analysis of political participation later in this chapter, the thesis shows how non-political networks disseminate important information about community needs and issues. This

[29] Community Representative, Male, African/Black

[30] Senior Community Representative, Female, African/Black

is taken up by community leaders who are active within and outside these structures which, in turn, disseminate this information to the relevant local authority officials. In the context of rural South Africa, where participation is often confrontational and antagonistic in nature, it changes the way in which people participate and respond to problems in the community. Social group membership in non-political groups provides the type of institutional infrastructure which may seem to be pertinent for more engaging and less violent types of political participation. Leaders in these non-political organisations act as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand and the community on the other. They appear to assume this role regardless of political affiliation though it was found that leaders in the African/Black community in Cederberg do have links with the ANC which provide a mechanism through which dialogue takes place between the community and the municipality. This does not appear to have occurred in Matzikama among the African/Black community.

A feature of the political culture of the local African/Black population is its readiness to organise protests and marches to express dissatisfaction over government policy or other social and economic issues. Such mass action has become a particularly strong feature of the response to service delivery issues. Respondents in Cederberg and Matzikama indicated that such oppositional and antagonistic behaviour has become part of the arsenal of actions available to their community to protest poor service delivery. I argue, however, that the probability of marches and violent protest over service delivery issues is diminished due to the existence of numerous non-political associations[31]. These non-political organisations, supported by their leaders, act as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand and the community on the other. The mediation efforts of community leaders within these structures often play a decisive role in non-violent outcomes. In Cederberg, the more subtle form of participation (engagement through interlocutors) might turn out to be more enduring over time. Over time, conflict is bound to ensue in communities that feel their efforts to channel their grievances are frustrated. That Cederberg has not had violent outbreaks could well be attributable to the role that the array of non-political associations has played until now. Were

[31] Informal discussion with Cederberg Municipality indicated that there have been no violent protests in the African/Black community in Cedeberg since the research was undertaken in 2007.

these non-political associations not to exist, the political climate in Cederberg might well be more volatile[32].

Seen in this context, the cohesion of political associations (as opposed to non-political associations) is more likely to be short-lived especially if it is formed around a particular issue (as was found to be the case in Matzikama), because it does not possess the social glue required for a more organic solidarity capable of sustaining the resolution of broader community issues.

7.2.5 Private and Public Good-Producing

The next lens through which we examine social group membership is through "type" and "scope" of activities. By type of association we refer to whether an association provides public or private goods. Boix and Posner (1996, p. 5) succinctly describe a public good as that which

> can be enjoyed by everyone in the community irrespective of whether or not they participate in the association that provides it. . . . the social capital formed in a . . . public goods-producing organization is likely to be far stronger than that formed in the provision of private goods. . . . . It lay(s) the basis for very strong norms of reciprocity and trust and to forge an especially sturdy template for future cooperation.

The Cederberg community is predominantly engaged in issues around the provision of public-type goods which has given rise to a dynamic that facilitates cooperation and reduces free riding.

The key informants were questioned regarding the type and scope of activities of the social groups of which they were members of. In both Cederberg and Matzikama the activities identified by the informants were predominantly public-good type goods and services like sports groups, church choirs, etc.

From Woolcock and Narayan's (2000, p. 229) "communitarian perspective" it can also be argued that poor communities are more adept at providing public rather than private goods. It would be more plausible, however, to say that poor communities are likely to place more

[32] See previous footnote.

emphasis on providing basic infrastructural services to meet the socioeconomic challenges that they face. As they move up the needs hierarchy, though, the nature and type of goods required change–which might cause a switch from more public-type goods to private goods. Argued differently, different classes use networks for different purposes. If a household has access to basic services then there is no need to mobilise around it. But where the state (national or local) does not provide an essential need such as security and protection against crime and where the individual household cannot do this on its own, networks are activated to achieve specific ends. It would appear then, that the response of the community to government failure is to mobilise their social and other resources to make their demands heard especially with regard to the provision of basic services. However the mobilisation of cooperative behaviour is not automatic. It requires a certain set of common beliefs and norms which include a strong sense of collective cooperative identity and good leadership. If any of this is not present in the community, impersonal social group formation will not take place. This will be further discussed in the chapter.

Having evaluated the different types of characteristics of networks and associations, I proceed to assess their manifestations in the two municipalities. Table 7-1 below describes each type of characteristic and compares the presence/absence of each in Cederberg and Matzikama. The table assigns a scale where *** reflects a strong presence of a characteristic and * reflects a weak one. Three stars reflect the presence of more than two thirds of the variables concerned, compared to one star where less than one third is observed.

Table 7-4: Characteristics of Networks, Comparing Cederberg and Matzikama

CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORKS	DESCRIPTION	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA
Horizontal	• Mutuality and equality of participation • Densely populated • Enhances communication and cooperation • Facilitates generalised reciprocity • Equal division of power	***	*
Hierarchical	• Dependence rather than mutuality • Characterised with coercion and compliance • Unequal division of power	*	***
Active	• Characterised by active engagement and involvement	***	*
Passive	• Passive participation in a network involves not participating actively, and usually letting others make decisions	*	***
Homogeneous	• Networks/associations that have the same kind of constituents • Generally racially and culturally-based networks	***	***
Heterogeneous	• Networks/associations that have unrelated constituents • e.g. Racially and culturally diverse	*	*
Public Good-Producing	• Public good-producing networks/associations are set up to supply a universally consumable product like better schools • Public good-producing networks/associations' existence depends on the ability of their members to overcome built-in incentives for free riding	***	***
Private Good-Producing	• Private good-producing networks/associations depends on convergent interests	***	***
Non-Political	• Examples of non-political networks/associations includes sport groups, cultural groups etc.	***	*
Political	• Unions, government agencies	*	***

Table 7-4 shows that more positive characteristics for effective networks are present in Cederberg when compared with Matzikama, indicating that these features might have a more enduring effect on the formation of trust, participation and ultimately socioeconomic outcomes.

This occurred despite the general expectation that the process of in-migration and the accompanying cultural displacement that arises from rapid urbanisation are supposed to lead to a breakdown of the norms that engender cooperative behaviour. The evidence gathered points to a confluence of factors which provides the context for the development of a vibrant civic culture.

7.3 TRUST

The previous discussion highlighted the powerful role of networks and associations and how this strengthens and is strengthened by the presence of leadership and communication. In the analytical framework, networks and associations impact on trust and participation as is shown in Figure 7–2. It is with this in mind that I now proceed with the findings on trust in Cederberg and Matzikama.

Figure 7-2: Analytical Framework – Trust



As noted in the literature review, a large part of the literature on social capital involves the notion of trust. Uslaner (2006, p. 3) sees trust as allowing us to

> put greater confidence in other people's promises that they mean what they say when they promise to cooperate. The "standard" account of trust presumes that trust depends on information and experience.

In short, the concept of trust refers to the understanding that individuals or members of social groups will operate in a manner that is equally advantageous and that the norms established through that relationship will ensure that they adhere to shared values.

The augmented analytical framework distinguishes between personal (family and friends) and impersonal trust (government and social). The quantitative findings report on both, with an emphasis on the latter, while the qualitative findings attempt to explain the difference in levels of trust between the two African/Black communities.

The findings show that impersonal trust in government—or "political trust"—was higher in Cederberg among African/Blacks than for other race groups and higher than the levels found in the African/Black community in Matzikama. This was seen primarily as the result of the difference in the types of characteristics of networks and associations in the two municipalities. This section seeks to provide answers to questions that shed more light on the factors that influence trust. More specifically, the questions revolve around the following: (i) how trust manifests itself in the ability of community members to collaborate and help one another in order to solve problems, (ii) why the African/Black community in Cederberg is more likely to work together than in Matzikama (iii) why some households are likely to be excluded from collective activity, (iv) how the lack of trust acts as a constraint that limits peoples' ability or willingness to work together, and lastly, (v) whether it is trust in local politicians and councillors that facilitates participation as the analytical framework indicates.

7.3.1 Personal and Impersonal Trust

This study examined trust at various levels including the family, neighbours and the public sector, including representatives of public institutions. The institutions that were examined were mainly political and party leaders, local government officials (the tier closest to communities) and central government. The following tables present the findings on trust at these various levels.

Table 7-5: Trust in the Family by Municipality

	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA	TOTAL
Yes	95.7%	93.2%	94.6%
No	2.5%	3.4%	2.9%
Other	1.8%	3.4%	2.5%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Table 7-6: Trust in the Neighbours by Municipality

	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA	TOTAL
Yes	91.5%	90.1%	90.9%
No	5.6%	4.6%	5.2%
Other	2.9%	5.3%	3.9%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

In Cederberg trust in family and neighbours is high at 95.7% and 91.5% respectively compared to Matzikama where trust in family and neighbours is slightly lower at 93.2% and 90.1% respectively. The p-values suggest that there is no significant difference between the two municipalities.

A political trust variable consisting of trust in political leadership (local) and local government was constructed for both Cederberg and Matzikama. The comparison revealed that there are lower levels of political trust in Matzikama compared to Cederberg at 60.5% for the latter and 50.2% for the former.

Table 7–7: Political Trust by Municipality

	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA
Yes	60.5%	50.2%
No	25.0%	36.4%
Other	14.5%	13.4%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

The low level of political trust in Matzikama does not seem unusual when compared to international trends. According to Shakaryan (2007), the USA, Japan and developed countries in Europe are concerned with declining levels of trust in institutions. He also found that the situation is worse for countries that have recently democratised like those in the former Soviet

bloc. These countries face a lack of confidence in all institutions but particularly in political institutions. In Poland, for example, he reports that confidence in parliament and the government decreased from 85% in 1989 to a current level of 20%.

Figure 7-3 shows that people with low income have high levels of trust in both Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities. As income increases political trust decreases. According to the Chi-square test for both municipalities, the results are statistically significant. Roughly translated, this means that the poor have more faith in government than the non-poor. One possible explanation is that they are much more dependent on the state than the rich, that is, their need for basic services from the state such as water, sanitation and electricity is much greater than that of higher income groups.

Figure 7–3: Political Trust by Income in Cederberg and Matzikama



When political trust is examined on the basis of race the following results were obtained:

Table 7–8: Political Trust by Race in Cederberg and Matzikama

	CEDERBERG			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE	MATZIKAMA			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE
	YES	NO	OTHER		YES	NO	OTHER	
African/Black	95,3%	2,6%	2.1%	χ^2 – value = 157,625 p-value = 0.000	45,7%	27,6%	26.7%	χ^2 – value = 10.658 p-value = 100
Coloured	56,8%	22,4%	20.8%		53,5%	24,6%	21.9%	
White	33,8%	39,1%	27.1%		41,2%	31,1%	27.7%	
Total	61,8%	20,8%	17.4%		49,8%	26,3%	23.9%	

The Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a significant association between race and political trust for Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values are less than 0.05 for Cederberg suggesting that there is an association between political trust and race in both municipalities. In Cederberg, African/Blacks (95.3%) have higher trust compared to Coloureds (56.8%) and Whites (33.8%). Whites in Cederberg have the lowest recorded levels of political trust. In Cederberg and Matzikama political trust among Coloured communities is roughly the same, 56.8% and 53.5% respectively, and are also in the same range for White communities. However, a big difference is apparent between the African/Black communities of Cederberg and Matzikama with political trust at 95.3% in the former and 45.7% in the latter. The causes of this huge differential in political trust require further investigation. Could the high levels of trust among the African/Black community in Cederberg be the result of the high prevalence of networks and associations in this area, or is it purely a result of a better relationship that exists between the community and the municipality in its provision of basic services?

The high level of political trust that exists in the African/Black community in Cederberg could be a result of the high presence of particular types of networks and associations in this community coupled with the roles that effective leadership and communication play as enablers of trust and participation. These networks thus warrant further investigation using qualitative methods.

7.3.1.1 Associations and Networks as Enablers of Political Trust

In the previous section on networks and associations we discussed the numerous cross-cutting horizontal, active, non-political, public-type good-producing networks that enable information (on community needs) to flow through these community structures. With the help of their leaders, these structures often engage the state about a particular issue at hand that affects the community, such as the provision of housing. That many associations and networks have been set up to deal with the delivery of public goods and services suggests that an alternative channel or modus operandi has emerged to augment the operations of the local government. The municipality liaises with the community to seek solutions to the provision of goods and services—and this is mediated through the leadership found in these networks and associations. This raises trust in political leaders like councillors because they are seen to be assisting in the provision of basic services. The failures of government (local and provincial) thus appear less glaring. An observation that can be made here is that the more numerous the networks and

associations with capable community leaders are, the stronger the likelihood that trust will be sustained in the local authority. Furthermore, as these associations set up their own services and work with public institutions they are less likely to depend solely on the state for services to be provided.

In contrast to the situation in Cederberg, the African/Black community in Matzikama appears to have little faith in the ability of politicians or public officials to deliver on promises made. Barely 46% indicated that they have trust in politicians and public officials. To reiterate, the explanation I offer in this study is that lower levels of trust can be attributed to the different types of networks and associations that are present in Matzikama. These were observed to be generally hierarchical and political in nature and were less numerous than the ones found in Cederberg. An analysis of the differences in characteristics of networks and associations between the two municipalities purport to show that hierarchical types offer less opportunity to work through structures to secure better outcomes for the community, particularly in the provision of basic services. Information flows in a hierarchical network are also less fluid than that of a horizontal network, which could frustrate the process of articulating the community's needs to the leaders of these associations. The fact that such networks do not encourage the development of leadership in the community further inhibits the ability of sustained engagement with the municipality. One probable explanation for this is the centralised nature of leadership in a hierarchical structure or association which discourages broad participation and, in so doing, limits a more extensive engagement with the municipality. This lends itself to fewer platforms for engagement and a heightened sense of marginalisation. These factors undermine political trust (in public institutions and politicians) and increase the opportunities for more violent protest/participation from the community.

7.3.1.2 Other Factors Impacting on Political Trust

In Cederberg, associations and networks appear to influence political trust in the African/Black community by reinforcing trust in local politicians. For example, if the leadership in horizontal, non-political, active, public good-producing social networks can communicate and share information with their councillors (as we shall see in the next section on political participation) then these councillors are likely to make decisions based on the most pertinent needs identified by the community.

A cursory review of the responses by community leaders and representatives of Cederberg to the question, 'why do you trust local politicians?', supports this point:

> Because the councillor cares about my interest.[33]
>
> They have the interest of the people at heart.[34]
>
> They work for us.[35]
>
> Because I assume they will do their best.[36]

The nature of the trust that has been engendered in Cederberg is such that it is able to sustain communication with the local authority aided by the latter's political links with the ruling party. This could be interpreted as a variation of the classical western model of representative government where direct access to political elites affords a degree of influence over policies and/or delivery of services.

From a peripheral standpoint, one can see another dimension to political trust in Cederberg, namely, that it appears to be influenced by the local political situation. Community leaders enjoyed close links with the ANC, the party in power at the time the research was undertaken. The ANC held six of the 12 seats on the local municipal council. Fifty percent of respondents interviewed indicated that they had political trust because the local politicians/officials/councillors were from the national ruling party, the ANC. In practical terms this meant that they would go to local politicians/officials/councillors for help or to convey their concerns about conditions in the community.

[33] Community Representative, Male, African/Black

[34] Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[35] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

[36] Senior Community Representative, Female, African/Black

This was, however, not always the case in Cederberg. Respondents indicated that under the previous (non-ANC) local government, the African/Black community of Khayelitsha was neglected where service delivery was concerned. This was the initial catalytic event that mobilised people to establish associations for the provision of public-type goods and services. This community was also mobilised by the leaders of these associations, who were ANC members, to engage with the local authority to provide better services. Under the previous local government there was a sense of marginalisation among the African/Black population because some of the needs of the African/Black community such as provision of soccer fields were ignored. According to one respondent

> Most of the people felt that they would not go to White people to assist them.[37]

With the change in political office holders, the African/Black community started to enjoy a more hospitable relationship with the local authority because its main community leaders were also ANC members. This made for effective communication between the community, the councillors and the local municipality.

In contrast, Matzikama had a local authority run by the Democratic Alliance (DA) which held seven out of the total of 13 available seats in the municipality. The ANC held the remaining 6 seats so they had considerable influence. Yet as far as political engagement was concerned, ANC councillors were perceived as being less than helpful by their own constituents. This is evident in the community's responses when questioned about their trust in local politicians/officials/councillors.

> They are not here, they never come.[38]

> The local (ANC) councillor will not do anything.[39]

[37] Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured

[38] Youth, Male, African/Black

[39] Youth, Female, African/Black

> No, they are from the Democratic Alliance (DA), Independent Democrats (ID), the Mayor is from the DA.[40]

> No, people don't have experience of what happens at a national level. They do watch TV but it leaves them confused. People are not interested because the politicians only come during elections.[41]

When asked whether they trusted councillors and how much they thought people in their neighbourhood trusted them they gave the following responses:

> No, because trust must be earned and cannot be bought.[42]

> Actions speak louder than words.[43]

> Like who, we can't go to politicians because they do nothing, they just want votes.[44]

An important observation here is the remarkable difference between the responses and data from Matzikama and Cederberg, underscoring the role social group membership plays in political trust. Social group membership is the conduit through which a community's priorities are filtered through to the municipality, via the councillor. As observed earlier, social group membership of the horizontal kind is low in Matzikama which means that the issues raised with the local councillor do not necessarily reflect the full spectrum or even the most important concerns of the community. It is also an indication of the low correlation between party political affiliation and political trust. A DA administration in Matzikama and an ANC administration in Cederberg would appear to make little difference in political trust. Rather, it is the behaviour

[40] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[41] Senior Representative Of The ANC Women's League, Female, African/Black

[42] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[43] Youth, Male, African/Black

[44] Youth, Female, African/Black

of councillors, which is partly influenced by the associations and networks with whom they engage, that seems to be more of a determining factor in this regard.

From the interviews conducted it emerged that perceived racism from the local authority toward the African/Black community was cited as a factor impacting on political trust. The African/Black community in Matzikama indicated that they felt more acutely discriminated against in the provision of basic services, citing the support given to the Coloured and White communities as justification for this. I argue that even though discrimination may well play a role in their situation, it is more likely that the absence of social networks and its bridging and linking attributes of the horizontal and vertical kind heightens their sense of alienation and exclusion. This is borne out by the following statement:

> Yes even the Coloureds look only after Coloureds; they come to us when they need a Black face. We end up being used. [45]

Furthermore, there is a sense that politicians make promises and then leave, never to be heard from again.

> Dyanti was here in 2007 and made promises and we never heard from him again. The imbizo was here when the Premier came and then left and then nothing.[46]

Another factor that has contributed to the sense of marginalisation is language. With Afrikaans as the working and business language, the local authority is perceived to be racist by the African/Black community because their home language is not accorded the same status. This is borne out by the following excerpts:

> It is racism that prevents development, racism by Coloureds against Blacks which happened even when the ANC was in power.[47]

---

[45] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[46] Senior Representative of the ANC's Women's League

[47] Senior Representative of the ANC's Women's League

> Language and communication is a big problem, this Afrikaans thing is a big problem.[48]

> The newspapers are in Afrikaans so if the jobs are advertised in Afrikaans we don't know about it. The big problem is that family and friends work in the municipality, so there is lots of nepotism. Social services have a youth forum but no Africans are on it, yet they get their money from the state.[49]

The role that social groups play in communicating their members' needs to the council is a vital part of the relationship between a local government and its residents, as has been demonstrated with the statements quoted above. Clearly this does not happen in Matzikama where there is mistrust between African/Blacks and other racial groups as well as between the municipality and the black community. Language as we have seen, is a major factor in the gulf that separates the authorities from sections of the local population. The lack of networks, organisations and good leadership that can act as interlocutors between the community and the municipality heightens their sense of exclusion and further contributes to the erosion of trust in municipal officials.

In the course of this study it became increasingly clear that networks with the positive attributes indicated in Figure 7-1 reinforce accountability and improve the way in which political officials behave toward their constituents. Where these networks are active and communicate with one another, as is the case in Cederberg, they are in a position to vote inefficient councillors out of power even when the representative is of the same race. In a racially divided society like South Africa, this is a particularly poignant observation. The spate of service delivery protests in other parts of the country that have taken place since data was collected would appear to support this contention.

7.4 CIVIC AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The analytical framework below shows the relationship between trust and participation. There are different types of trust articulated in the framework and the previous section indicated how these impact on civic engagement and political participation. In this section I investigate

[48] Municipal Manager, Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured

[49] Senior Representative of the ANC's Women's League

political participation in Cederberg and Matzikama and examine how the type of characteristics of networks has a direct effect on the type of participation that is found in the community. When this is mediated by community leadership, participation can take different forms and reduce the number of protest-type actions.

Figure 7-4: Analytical framework: Civic Engagement Participation



As noted in the literature review, there is much debate about the concept of "participation" in the literature on social capital. In general, there is consensus that participation is a form of active citizenship that enables people to develop responses to social and economic problems and disseminate them in different areas of public life and in a multiplicity of ways. Political participation is defined as taking part in the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies (Parry et al., 1992, cited in Lowndes, 2006, p. 542). Verba (1987, p. 2) defines political participation as "activities by private citizens that are aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take . . . in acts that influence government decisions."

For Jooste (2005, p. 2) the arguments underlying the theory is that social capital

> spurs on a host of behavioural and attitudinal mannerisms which contribute toward the strengthening of democracy, the development of cooperative culture and the establishment of harmonious social interaction. The more we trust and actively engage with one another, the more likely we are to cooperate, act tolerantly and embrace civic mindedness which helps democratic institutions to flourish

> and societies prosper. [She states that the] flow of information between citizens and state is vital in sustaining a cooperative relationship between these actors as well as ensuring that the actions of government fit the demands of the people (2005, p. 12).

In this section of the thesis I explore the degree of political participation or civic engagement in Cederberg and Matzikama. I also explore the relationship between trust and political participation with a view to finding out whether communities with higher levels of political trust will have higher levels of political participation. The aim here is to measure political participation in such a way that it is capable of capturing the active role that citizens play in their engagement with the state, including officials and institutions. In this study, the measures used to do this included the following: signing a petition, participating in an election campaign, attending a council meeting and voting in local elections. When participants indicated that they were not participating it meant that they were not involved in any of these activities.

A political participation variable was constructed for Matzikama and Cederberg. Political participation measured is indicated below in Cederberg (45.0%) and Matzikama (56.5%).

Table 7-9: Political Participation in Cederberg and Matzikama

	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA
Yes	45.0%	56.5%
No	46.7%	40.7%
Other	8.3%	2.8%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

In Table 7-10 the Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a significant association between race and political participation in Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values are less than 0.05 for Cederberg suggesting that there is an association between political participation and race in the municipality. In Cederberg, African/Blacks (96.3%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (57.8%) and Whites (17.8%). In Matzikama African/Blacks (87.0%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (35.6%) and Whites (14.3%).

Table 7-10: Political Participation by Race

	CEDERBERG			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE	MATZIKAMA			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE
	YES	NO	OTHER		YES	NO	OTHER	
African/Black	96.3%	2.6%	1.1%	χ^2 – value = 118,324 p-value = 0.000	87.0%	10,4%	2.6%	χ^2 – value = 5.097 p-value = 0.000
Coloured	57.8%	34.8%	7.3%		35.6%	61.8%	2.6%	
White	17.8%	61.8%	20.4%		14.3%	82.4%	3.4%	
Total	45.0%	46.7%	8.4%		56.5%	40.7%	2.8%	

African/Blacks (87.0%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (35.6%) and Whites (14.3%).

The table shows that in both Cederberg and Matzikama, African/Blacks display higher levels of civic engagement/political participation than other race groups. Levels of participation among Whites are lowest compared to other race groups in both areas. Coloureds record intermediate levels of participation in Cederberg and Matzikama.

In the following subsections, the nature and extent of civic engagement/political participation is discussed in the context of Cederberg and Matzikama Municipalities. Here examples of civic engagement/political participation is given before proceeding with a description of its dynamics in terms of the issues that triggered it, who organised and mobilised it, as well as those who participated in it.

The factors that impact on civic engagement/political participation (relationship with the local authority, political structures and institutions, etc.) as illustrated in Figure 7-4 will be used as the basis for comparing the African/Black populations in the two municipalities.

7.4.1 Relationship with the Local Authority

A community can have high levels of engagement/participation either because they are ignored or because they have highly complementary relations with the local authority (Rao and Woolcock, 2001, p. 72). Having highly complementary relations with the state does not always lead to more effective participation because there is a possibility that communal social groups are at risk of either being co-opted into accepting outcomes which do not maximise their social welfare or running the risk of having their leadership bought off in the process.

The qualitative findings seem to suggest that this has not been the case in Cederberg. From the qualitative interviews with the African/Black community in Cederberg it was found that they engaged with the state primarily on the basis of the provision of basic services, particularly housing. For example, houses were built for the community but this entailed moving to a new location. The community opposed the move and there were ongoing meetings to address the issues. In addition to this, the community used structured and formal processes to address the issues and had the opportunity to engage the local authority in more ways than it had in the past. This is because of the presence of "social networks" which managed to facilitate a good working relationship between the political party in power (ANC) and leadership in these community structures and institutions. The result is that when the ANC came to power, community leaders were better able to communicate with the local authority but this did not mean that the mode and form of engagement changed.

In Matzikama, key informants were asked about the history of the provision of services in the community. There were a number of striking features that stood out from the responses in Matzikama. The first was that the relationship between the community and the local authority was fraught with misunderstanding. This centred on the provision of basic services; that is, they did not fully understand issues relating to the indigent policy of the municipality which regulates special rebates on water, sanitation, electricity provision and refuse removal for poor households. Nor did they fully understand the level of service provision to which they were entitled. Those interviewed attributed this misunderstanding to the failure of the African National Congress (which most of them voted for) to come to power. The misunderstanding was further exacerbated by racial divisions: the community development workers (CDWs) who work with and in communities were Coloured rather than African/Black. As we shall see later, this was the cause of several problems. CDWs are an all-important link between communities and the local government's poverty alleviation programmes and efforts to improve access to essential social services. Members of the community also felt that the ward councillors who were African/Black and ANC-aligned did not accomplish much. The instruments of the state that would normally facilitate participation between the local authority and the municipality were hence rendered ineffective. I return to this point in the next section which deals with political structures and institutions.

The feelings of exclusion harboured by the African/Black community in Matzikama are a major factor contributing to their strained relationship with local government. The African/Black community has often resorted to mobilising through political or politically affiliated institutions (rather than civic ones), such as Cosatu, to bring attention to their demands. This form of protest has its roots in the liberation politics of the Apartheid era when marches were a popular form of demand for change.

The community's feelings of frustration over housing issues is but one example of the nature of the relationship between it and the municipality. Similar feelings were expressed over concerns about other social and economic issues such as crime, high food prices and drug and alcohol abuse. The protests mainly take the form of marches and are openly antagonistic as indicated in the following quotes:

> Yes, we go and fight with the municipality, but nothing changes. Like Dyanti [former MEC for Housing] who came here and spoke to the Municipality but not to the people.[50]

> The . . . march . . . that took place was against crime on the 24th of September 2007.[51]

> Yes we marched with Cosatu to protest the high food prices.[52]

There is also, however, a sense of disillusionment that these marches were ineffective and that nothing came of it as reflected in the following statements by informants:

> The march we had was against the food prices, but nothing happened—only a memorandum was given to the mayor. [53]

[50] Senior Representative Of The ANC's Women's League

[51] Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured

[52] Senior Representative Of The ANC's Women's League

[53] Youth, Male, African/Black

March against crime didn't really have an impact. [54]

The march (was) against high prices but it had no effect whatsoever. [55]

Despite the fact that there have been marches where community members have been given an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions—there is a sense that the participation in these marches has been low, particularly in the African/Black community. This seems to confirm Putnam's idea that there is a link between social group membership and civic engagement.

7.4.2 Political Structures and Institutions

This section discusses the dynamics of collective action and political participation by looking at the platforms and structures available for engagement.

The quality of participation depends on the political structures and institutions that exist between the state and civil society groups and the extent to which these institutions are used for specific purposes. Related to this is the issue of how the state and civil society interprets their respective roles and how this is given effect in the policies of the state.

In the South African local government context, ward committees were created to facilitate meaningful participation of the community in local affairs. In most municipalities, though, the ward committees have not proved particularly effective and only in rare instances have they been commended for their role in addressing the concerns of local residents (Smith 2008, p. 4).

A ward committee consists of a ward councillor and representatives from different civic bodies and community groupings. There are also mandatory forums that exist to include communities in the planning processes of the municipality such as the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) and Local Economic Development (LED). Ward councillors are either elected in local government elections or get appointed via the proportional electoral lists of their respective

[54] Youth, Female, African/Black

[55] Senior Representative Of The Anc's Women's League

political parties. In both Matzikama and Cederberg the latter has been the preferred method but has been combined with community consultation.

In Cederberg there is a general sense among the African/Black population that councillors are actively engaged in matters affecting the community and that they have done so through the ward committees. The evidence from the interviews suggests that the councillor is proactive and gets things done for the community. The following statements are examples of how members of the community feel about their councillor:

> The crèche in Khayelitsha. . . will be upgraded through the councillor.[56]

> Yes, in June we had lots of rain and the councillor got relief, blankets and food and shelter. [57]

This is reinforced by a respondent in Cederberg who indicated that ward committees hold monthly meetings which help people to get to know one another and where

> People have an opportunity to complain.[58]

However, some noted that participation in statutory planning processes like the LED or IDP is not uniform across the communities of Cederberg.

There are also street committees which are informal platforms that have been set up in the African/Black community through which residents can lodge complaints. Respondents indicated that the street committees are strongest in Khayelitsha.

Community leaders in Cederberg indicated that collective action had been taken several times around housing issues and yielded results. According to respondents, the housing issue

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[56] Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured

[57] Youth, Male, African/Black

[58] Youth, Female, African/Black

is a hard one with lots of tension between the community and the council.[59]

Despite the intensity of the issue, the community, through its leaders, engaged the municipality in a series of meetings. A community leader indicated that there were no marches, only "hard" meetings with the council which lacked support on this particular issue. The mechanisms and platforms available for dealing with issues relating to basic services are effective because the meetings they hold include consensus building processes. According to those who were interviewed, no violent incidents took place while the issues of housing provision were being discussed. Here again we see an illustration of how horizontal networks that are active, public-type good-producing and non-political, enhance the process of political engagement when combined with political institutions that have clearly enunciated aims and objectives. The result is that the probability of violent protest is dramatically reduced.

Even though the same formal structures and platforms for participation exist in Matzikama, they are not used in the same way as in Cederberg. Among the African/Black population of Matzikama, councillors are not seen as mobilising their communities and are thought of as being limited in what they can achieve. Many felt that nothing much was being achieved as evidenced by the statement:

Not much except some tree planting. [60]

In Matzikama, participation in civic projects varied for different reasons. For example, marches and activities related to food price increases were supported by some people but were not connected with the provision of services, particularly basic services, which is the responsibility of the local authority. There was also little awareness of the relationship between state structures and civic capacity, and a limited understanding of the role of community development workers (CDWs) and their relationship with the community.

From this description of ward councillors and community organisations, meaningful participation in Matzikama can be assessed as being low. A few questions arise from this. Are

[59] Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured

[60] Youth, Male, African/Black

marches an indicator that the existing platforms are not working? If the platforms for engagement between the local authority and the community are effective, would there still be a need to march? Could marching be seen as a sign that the community has disengaged from the local municipality?

The answers could very well point to the relationship between the methods of engagement used and the state/political structures and institutions that do not function optimally. When a community's needs and expectations are not dealt with by a local authority, is the only alternative then to resort to extreme measures such as marching and boycotting or non-payment of services? That two very similar institutional orders should have such differential outcomes leads me to conclude that it is the social formations in Cederberg and their modus operandi that allow for more consensual engagement than is the case in Matzikama.

7.4.3 Formal and Informal Rules, Customs and Conventions

Formal and informal rules, customs and conventions affect participation (Lowndes et al., 2006, p. 540). Here it is important to remember the work of Douglas North as cited in Lowndes et al., (2006, p. 540) who emphasised "rules of the game" and correct incentives which structure participation. This includes institutional and policy design as a factor (that influences participation) including responsiveness of decision making by local authorities but also encompassing the social, cultural and legal constraints to participation.

It can be argued that political associations with their inbuilt hierarchies do not always allow for the correct incentives for all to participate. This is in contrast to the more horizontal types of structures in which a very different set of incentives are at play.

7.4.4 Social, Cultural, Legal Constraints to Participation

In the interviews conducted among African/Black communities in Cederberg, social and cultural constraints were not considered impediments to civic engagement and political participation but rather as barriers to interaction between the different race groups. The history of Apartheid and its spatial segregation of different racial groups have meant that the Coloured community, which has numerical strength in Cederberg and Matzikama, has limited contact with the African/Black community.

A common view expressed in the interviews with the African community is that "there's nothing preventing Black people from participating but Coloured people have different ways of participating than [African/Blacks]—they don't march, it's not their culture."

Social causes for the lack of participation particularly among the youth are drugs and alcohol. Another respondent indicated that in general, people are not interested in participating—they are apathetic.

In both Cederberg and Matzikama, those who did not participate in civic action were identified as farm workers from the surrounding areas who were unable to attend meetings because of the long hours they worked. Others who tended not to participate were identified as those engaged in criminal activity. A minority of Sotho-speaking people also avoided participation in Cederberg as there was tension between them and the non-Sotho speaking African population. Illegal immigrants that were not in possession of identity documents were also reluctant to get involved in civic engagement.

In Matzikama, the interviews indicated that since African/Blacks were a minority, they did not have a numerical critical mass for effective political participation. In their view they are excluded because they are not from the same cultural and social group as Coloureds and are therefore disadvantaged.

> Even the newspapers are in Afrikaans so if jobs are advertised in Afrikaans we don't know about it. The big problem is also that family and friends work in the municipality, lots of nepotism. Social services have a youth forum but no Africans and they get money from the state.[61]

There is also a keen awareness that "politicians will always be biased towards the people that supported their party in an election." [62]

In both Matzikama and Cederberg customary laws do not seem to constrain the community from exerting influence over public institutions. There is, however, acknowledgement that

[61] Youth, Male, African/Black

[62] Youth, Female, African/Black

Coloureds and Africans have their own culture and language and that each will use them to their own advantage. In the case of the Coloured community, who make up the majority, the perception is that they will use their influence to the extent allowed within the power structure. For example, when the new fire brigade was formed only Coloureds were appointed or were admitted in learnerships.

7.4.5 Community Leadership as a Factor

The dense networks and associations in Cederberg are an outcome of the coordination activities of numerous leaders in the African/Black community of Cederberg, particularly in the informal settlement of Khayelitsha. The leaders of this dynamic community are highly connected to one another, collaborate and maintain close contact with one another. They nurture broad-based ties making it easier to mobilise community members for collective action purposes.

The leaders in the Cederberg community have, in the Purdue (2001) sense, the ability to connect various sub-groups determining the relative efficacy of the group. As noted earlier in the literature review, the greater the number of sub-group connections there are, the greater the leaders' access to a diversity of information and social support from which leaders can draw since "groups that communicate more frequently with other groups have greater access and more potential resources to draw from (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006, p. 575). The leadership of Cederberg have more sub-group connections meaning that leaders are able to draw from a greater pool of resources.

These leaders operate in both the private and public domain and comprise both males and females. The leadership activities of females and males differ in that females operate more in the private, social, religious and cultural domains compared to males who operate predominately in the political and economic domain. According to Warren et al. (2001), it is women who primarily bring together neighbours and relatives to support issues of daily life which are not met through the economic and political system. The authors highlight that women tend to have a comprehensive approach to community development which is based on human and needs-centred programmes and an open style of leadership. The authors also state that women develop strategies that are diverse but emphasise the integration of public and private spheres—"with a key focus on strengthening family and friends." This is also reflected in the Cederberg experience.

Female leaders operate predominantly in the social, educational, cultural and religious sphere. Females are involved in stokvels, cultural and church activities, and support one another in these domains. Even though there is strong female leadership, male leaders still have more sway in the community because of the patriarchal system of African/Black communities. For example, male leaders in the community engaged with females and asked the women to form a committee to meet with Social Services and request financial support for a new crèche, which they subsequently did. Here we have females mobilising themselves to petition Social Services for a crèche—but largely as a result of their consultation with the male leadership.

According to Purdue (2001, p. 2221), community leaders act as key points of contact between the state and local communities, putting them at the interface between internal "communal" and external "collaborative" social capital. This role, which is in the political domain, is largely spearheaded by male members of the community of Cederberg, particularly by Mr Welcome Manka, who holds considerable influence as the former chairperson of the ANC. This former position means that Mr Manka has strong links with the political leadership— making the interface between the community and state easier. This can be seen from the following excerpts:

> The leadership of the community is strong, everybody knows Welcome Manka. He meets with the people and discusses service delivery in Hopland and Khayelitsha.[63]

> The Khayelitsha communities participate in those meetings that are organised by him [Welcome Manka].[64]

> He has the support in the Khayelitsha community, and if he says people must move they will move.[65]

When the informants were questioned about who organised engagement between the state and civil society the following responses were recorded:

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[63] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

[64] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[65] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

> Welcome organised an imbizo. Welcome Manka is the main leader and a past chairperson of the ANC in the community.[66]

> Community leaders like John Mountain and others organises it.[67]

Leadership has emerged as a key reason for the proliferation of social networks and associations in Cederberg. Community leadership also emerged as an important factor in the organisation of collective action. An example of how the leadership organises collective action is illustrated through a comment from one of the key community leaders:

> We had a problem last year with electricity, the municipality cut the wires. We called a meeting in the community. People were made to understand that they were using electricity illegally. The councillor was told that the people were forced because they waited long for electricity.[68]

In Matzikama, political mobilisation happens primarily through state organs, trade unions and other political formations. Some respondents, however, indicated that these instruments of mobilisation had limited community support in so far as the issues they raised were not deemed important by the larger community.

Here the extent to which the state forges dynamic alliances and partnerships between and within state institutions and civil society is emphasised. The augmented analytical framework indicates that the issue of leadership from the perspective of the state as well as the community is an important factor facilitating engagement with the state.

7.4.6 Networks and Associations as an Explanation for Participation

Social networks facilitate the flow of information through structured and unstructured engagement. Informants in Cederberg talked about their historical ties with one another and their personal interactions. Therefore the flow of information is both structured and

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[66] Community Development Worker, Male, Coloured

[67] Senior Community Leader, Female, African/Black

[68] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

unstructured or, as one respondent put it, "people interact informally as well as in formal structures." This link between informal and formal engagement was found to be important because it allowed all the pertinent issues to percolate to a structured discussion of how they should be tackled. One example of how this happens can be seen in issue-driven discussions in church. A respondent indicated that the informal interaction through church attendance is harnessed by community leaders. Engagement thus takes on a more formal character as groups of people are mobilised through the church by community leaders to tackle community-specific problems which generally involve the production of public goods through the establishment of associations.

The process of how this happens in practical terms is outlined below:

- In Cederberg the flow of information and personal interaction takes place through civic structures and informally—"people interact informally and in (civic) structures." This information is then disseminated through structured engagement which takes various forms in the different sectors in the society; through NGOs, the Community Police Forum, political parties, church events, etc.
- The churches play an especially important role in the personal contact that people have and in terms of awareness creation and information sharing. The belief system (church values) serves as an anchor for the community.
- The sense of cohesion is reinforced by the presence of other structures such as street committees, and other forms of civic structures.
- The presence of ward committees creates a platform where the concerns of the community (through structures like street committees) can be aired and the political engagement with the local authority initiated.
- The presence of community agency/leadership is a decisive driving force in the mobilisation of the community's ambitions.

Here the role of agency in the mediation between politics and the needs of the community is demonstrated—an important cog in the process of dealing with the pressing issues of service delivery. It is also useful to note the importance of community leadership in forging collective identity which was an essential aspect in the formation of networks for Campbell and McLean (2002, p. 550).

The following excerpt from a community leader in Cederberg captures this succinctly:

> The leadership of the community is strong, everybody knows Welcome Manka, I meet with the people and discuss service delivery in Hopland and Khayelitsha. Like our crèche is far but I asked the women to form a committee and to meet with Social Services to get money for a new crèche. Also we had a problem with the police because the community did not understand the work of the police. A drug merchant was selling drugs in the community but the people met and decided to get rid of the seller. Nonsokolo Phama is also a community leader and a strong woman leader and lives in Khayelitsha.[69]

The research on networks and associations in Matzikama reveal a different set of circumstances at play. In the African/Black community in Matzikama the link between informal and formal engagement was found to be more tenuous than in Cederberg. To start with, people get to know each other informally through meeting and talking on the streets or in the shebeens but this does not translate into a collective voice on common community concerns. This is captured and confirmed in the following statement by one of the interviewees:

> "we get to know each other informally through just talking but there's no structures except those who drink and go to the tavern–they have a structure." [70]

Because of the lack of dense social networks, respondents from Matzikama feel that they do not have a particularly vibrant community given the problems that they are facing:

> I do not think that the community is particularly vibrant. There is a distinct disinterest from the youth to participate and mobilise themselves into structures that may be of use to them and to contribute positively to their communities. Alcohol and drug abuse, teenage pregnancies, early school drop-outs are the order of the day. Matzikama has a young population and something needs to be done to get them to a point where they can become responsible members of society. [71]

[69] Senior Community Leader, Male, African/Black

[70] Youth, Female, African/Black

[71] Community Development Worker, Female, Coloured

The lack of diverse social networks also meant that new migrants to Matzikama felt a strong sense of exclusion. According to one respondent

> there is a sense though that Matzikama used to be quite a closed community before the development of the mines at Brand-se-Baai when there was in-migration of skilled people from the Northern Cape, Cape Town and the Eastern Cape. The Vredendal community, before the influx, knew each other quite well, and people that moved here from outside Vredendal are still considered "inkommers" (outsiders) no matter how long you have lived here.[72]

When compared to Cederberg, there seems to be less integration of "outsiders" into the community of Matzikama.

Reasons for the low level of participation of African/Blacks in Matzikama in various networks and associations can be gleaned from Campbell and McLean (2002) who studied residents from an immigrant background in a small town. Their participation levels in beneficial community networks were also low. In the literature they found that a precondition for participation in community-level networks was a sense of collective identity which was relatively absent in the immigrant community. The community was small, dispersed and lacked economic and political influence and psychological confidence (2002, p. 643–657). The "inkommers" label attributed to migrants in Matzikama would appear to apply equally well here.

In summary, associational activity appears to vary between races living in the same municipality but also within the same racial groups living in different municipalities. In the African/Black community in Cederberg, associational activity in general seems to be more pronounced than is found in the Coloured and White communities. This is not the case in Matzikama. Diverse, horizontal, active, public-type good-producing networks are found to have numerous spin-offs. Not only does it affect political engagement and participation but it also has broader social effects that is if done properly, it reduces the incidence of violent protest and improves socioeconomic outcomes.

[72] Municipal Manager: Matzikama Municipality, Male, Coloured

7.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES

This section examines the performance of the two local authorities and the impact they have had on social and economic outcomes. I also consider the extent to which performance can be related to social capital in the two areas.

The relationship between social networks and government effectiveness may not always be evident and it is perhaps helpful here to indicate how the former may influence the latter. In the early stages of parliamentary democracy, representative government was seen to rule on behalf of the governed. Legislation would be formulated, the government's role in it defined and executive orders would be issued to the relevant government departments. With the development of democratic systems in the twentieth century, representative government in this form was seen as inadequate, and civil society, through various organisational forms, increasingly became an important appendage to the original governance models. In established democracies, such socio-political formations are viewed as "pressure groups," but they are not necessarily deemed to promote government effectiveness. The same cannot be said of lobby groups who use their considerable resources to sway government policy to advance their interests and thereby influence both the structure and functions of the bureaucracy to ensure that it will duly perform its duties once the political decisions have been made.

In young democracies, social movements and civic organisations are able to achieve similar results albeit through the "sound and fury" of their demands at the local level. Their impact can be attributable to the resource constraints from which this tier of government suffers. The example of South Africa is instructive. With the advent of political democracy in 1994, the promise of a better life for all after decades of exclusion and discrimination led to strong demands for basic services. The demands are often voiced by grassroots community organisations which then become the main transmission mechanism between political office holders and municipal officials. That this has become more pronounced here than in most other societies can in large measure be attributed to the limited capacity of local authorities to execute their mandate. By the same token, the acceptance of the role of civic groups that are often associated with these demands should be seen as an acknowledgement that a maturing democratic order requires such an extra tier of government for its full functioning. This is also

an example of linking social capital at work where sections of the government elite form partnerships with broad-based community organisations.

The dynamics of the transmission of civil society's demands to local government are not dealt with in the literature yet forms an essential part of the consequences of "social capital in action." The primary role of local government in South Africa is to attend to living conditions and promote the economic development of the area/region. The assessment of needs has, generally speaking, been carried out with acceptable levels of competence, in most cases through consultants. The technical skills, however, relating to town planning, building plans, road construction, water reticulation and sewerage, and so on, are not always readily available which, when combined with relatively low levels of administrative competence, leads to lags in delivery. The formation of social networks introduces a consultation process that gradually induces accountability and efficiency on the part of administrative staff.

Studies that have examined the effects of social capital on government effectiveness have used a host of administrative and technical indicators as measures of government performance/efficiency. In the literature review, a number of these studies were covered. For example, the study by Knack (2000, p. 22) measured government performance across five areas, including financial and capital management, human resources, information technology and what he refers to as "managing for results". Within the five performance areas a total of thirty-five criteria were used to determine government efficiency, including adequacy of financial auditing, effective procurement management and involvement of stakeholders in developing strategic plans. While using financial, HR and other technical indicators of government performance Knack's work does not relate well to municipalities that have capacity constraints such as Cederberg and Matzikama. This study augments Knack's approach to measuring government effectiveness by using a "welfarist approach" which I show to be more suitable in such circumstances.

In Chapter Four, where the analytical framework was introduced, government effectiveness was defined in both technical as well as in welfarist terms (the extent to which government maximises the social welfare function of the poor). The welfarist approach looks at a more subjective measure of performance—particularly from the perspective of the poor. It focuses on government effectiveness as experienced by citizens in so far as their social and economic welfare are concerned.

There are a few things that should be said about the more subjective measure. Firstly, it captures that which is not apparent in the more technical definition. Citizens are best placed to judge a government's efforts to improve the welfare of its constituents—*their* welfare.

Secondly, there are other ways to achieve social progress even if the local authority has capacity constraints. It is particularly in these circumstances that networks present another alternative, one that is more effective in ensuring positive outcomes by bringing pressure to bear on the local authorities through regular engagement, as in the case of Cederberg. The more responsive local authorities are to the needs of their communities the greater the prospect of improving the social and economic welfare of the poor.

Both these approaches are captured in the diagram below. The diagram also illustrates the way in which social group membership affects trust and participation and ultimately government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes.

Figure 7-5: Augmented Analytical Framework



There is a two-dimensional approach to this analysis: the subjective dimension captures the perspective of constituents on how government is impacting on their lives and the objective measure examines independent criteria on efficiency and effectiveness. Both are discussed in the section that follows.

7.5.1 Perceptions of Government Performance

In the survey, residents were questioned about their perceptions of government effectiveness. On the whole, favourable perceptions of government performance were similar for Cederberg and Matzikama.

Table 7–11: Perceptions of Government Performance by Municipality

	CEDERBERG	MATZIKAMA
Yes, government is efficient	50,2%	52,6%
No, government is not efficient	33,3%	37,9%
Other	16.5%	9.5%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

In Table 7-12 the Chi-square test of association was used to test whether there is a significant association between race and perceptions of government performance in Cederberg and Matzikama. The p-values are less than 0.05 for Cederberg suggesting that there is an association between government performance and race. In Cederberg, African/Blacks (87, 4%) have higher participation compared to Coloureds (42, 0%) and Whites (26, 5%).

In Matzikama there is no statistically significant difference between race and perceptions of government performance.

Perceptions of government effectiveness differ significantly between the two African/Black communities of Matzikama and Cederberg. Most of those surveyed in Cederberg (87.4%) agree with the perception that their municipality is performing well compared to 60.3% in Matzikama.

Table 7–12: Perceptions of Government Performance by Municipality and Race

	CEDERBERG			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE	MATZIKAMA			CHI-SQUARE P-VALUE
	YES	NO	OTHER		YES	NO	OTHER	
African/Black	87,4%	9,5%	3.1	χ^2 – value = 194,486 p-value = 0.000	60,3%	30,2%	9.5	χ^2 – value = 5.995 p-value = 0.424
Coloured	42,0%	41,5%	16.5		52,3%	38,2%	9.5	
White	26,5%	40,4%	33.1		46,2%	44,5%	9.3	
Total	50,2%	33,3%	16.5		52,6%	37,9%	9.5	

7.5.1.1 Objective Measures of Government Performance

Previous studies have found that the quality of government was positively associated with levels of social capital at the national and local tiers. In the literature review we saw how various indicators were used to assess the quality of government and then correlated with social capital indicators.

When these scores for the various key performance areas (KPAs) were aggregated into a total score the following emerged from the analysis[73].

Table 7–13: Local Government Effectiveness Scores

CATEGORY	MATZIKAMA	CEDERBERG
Municipal transformation and OD	75%	83%
Basic service delivery	42%	50%
Good governance	72%	85%
Financial viability	89%	74%
Public participation processes	83%	67%
LED strategies	67%	67%

[73] The KPA scores were obtained from the Western Cape Provincial Government and not from the survey data gathered for the thesis. See page 96.

Cederberg (83%) scored higher than Matzikama (75%) in the area of municipal transformation and organisational development (OD), the provision of basic services and good governance. Matzikama performed better in the area of financial viability and public participation processes. Further research into the results will focus on whether the better marginal performance in the first three KPAs is the result of the level of social capital in Cederberg.

While the differences between the two municipalities appear to be marginal the impact is nevertheless important in so far as welfare outcomes are concerned. Measurable differences in the performance of government thus have less to do with size and capacity and more to do with how resources are allocated and to whom. The research results indicate that allocation is largely a response to the way in which communities bring pressure to bear on authorities, especially with regard to delivery of basic services. I argue that the reason why Cederberg scores better on performance is that its civil society organisations were able to influence resource allocation. It is possible that municipalities with such capacity constraints can be more receptive to fulfilling the welfare needs of the poor. With regard to municipalities with considerable resource and capacity constraints, the role of social networks and associations becomes even more critical since their absence increases the possibility of funds being easily mismanaged or misappropriated. The watchdog role they play over the local authority acts as a bulwark against profligate or wasteful expenditure.

The local government effectiveness scores indicate that the Cederberg municipality scored better than Matzikama municipality in the areas of Municipal Transformation and Organisational Development, Basic Service Delivery and Good Governance. On the other hand, Matzikama municipality performed better than Cederberg municipality in the areas of Financial Viability and Public Participation Processes.

A more detailed analysis of the performance criteria reveals some interesting insights. In the area of Municipal Transformation and Organisational Development, Cederberg did better than Matzikama. This means that Cederberg municipality, although understaffed, had the necessary policies and systems in place to guide the management of human

resources in the municipality. Matzikama, on the other hand, was found lacking in this regard. The importance of this area of performance has to be emphasised since it informs how effective and efficient municipalities should be in responding to the needs of their communities. The strength of an organisation/institution depends largely on the hiring of competent staff, maintaining adequate staffing levels and having an effective HR system.

The municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama are graded below according to their performance indicated by High (H), Medium (M) and Low (L)[74].

Table 7-14: Municipal Transformation and Organisational Development

	NUMBER OF VACANT POSTS		TRANSFORMATION	HR POLICIES AND SYSTEMS	OVERALL SCORE
	MM AND S57	OTHER			
MATZIKAMA	H	H	M	L	75%
CEDERBERG	H	M	M	H	83%

In the performance area of Basic Service Delivery Cederberg performed better than Matzikama even though both municipalities faced several constraints on their ability to deliver. One of the key roles of local government is to provide the local population with adequate access to basic services. Unfortunately, both municipalities had severe backlogs in basic service delivery and both municipalities spent only a fraction of their capital budget—an indication of how effective they are at supplying basic services.

[74] The grading was developed by the Western Cape Provincial Department of Housing and local Government.

Table 7–15: Access to Basic Services

	HOUSEHOLDS WITHOUT ACCESS TO BASIC SERVICES	BACKLOGS	SPENDING OF CAPITAL BUDGET	PROVISION OF FREE BASIC SERVICES	OVERALL SCORE
MATZIKAMA	L	L	L	M	42%
CEDERBERG	L	L	L	H	50%

Cederberg was more successful in providing basic services even though it had under-spent on its capital budget in the period under investigation.

In the performance area of Good Governance, the indicators used include Performance Management and Other Indicators of Good Governance. It is worth noting here that the categories of Performance Management and Other Indicators of Good Governance directly relate to the performance of officials. For example, Cederberg has implemented an anti-corruption policy while Matzikama has not. It might be that the effects of these policies permeate the lives of the different communities in Cederberg which would explain why Cederberg has enjoyed such high subjective ratings of government performance.

Table 7–16: Performance Management

	POLICY AND FRAMEWORK	PMS IMPLEM. ON ALL LEVELS	PMS LINKED TO IDP TARGETS
MATZIKAMA	L	L	L
CEDERBERG	H	M	M

Table 7–17: Other Indicators of Good Governance

	DELEGATIONS (ADMIN AND S59 MSA)	REGULAR COUNCIL AND MAYORAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS	QUORUM AT MEETINGS	CHANGES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY IMPLEM.	OVERALL SCORE
MATZIKAMA	H	H	H	H	L	72%
CEDERBERG	H	H	H	H	H	85%

An emphasis on good governance generally comes from political will. This could come from political and community pressure in the form of demands for accountability. Also, good governance benefits all communities as government effectiveness is not intended to be exclusive to one constituency. This is one example of the link between policies and their impact on the performance of officials and, in turn, the impact on communities.

It is interesting to note that even though Cederberg is less financially viable than Matzikama, Cederberg has managed to put various mechanisms and systems in place to manage (through its HR policies and systems), monitor and evaluate the performance of staff, making the municipality more accountable in the eyes of the communities it represents.

Matzikama municipality scored more than Cederberg in the area of "Public Participation Processes." On the face of it, this seems to challenge the earlier finding that Cederberg has higher political participation than Matzikama. The municipality, it seems, has a public participation strategy that is supposed to inform the processes of engaging the public.

Table 7–18: Public Participation Processes

	PUBLIC PARTICIPATION STRATEGY	COMM. STRATEGY	WARD COMS EST	FUNCTIONING OF WARD COMS	TOTAL
MATZIKAMA	H	L	H	H	**83%**
CEDERBERG	L	L	H	H	**67%**

The public participation strategy adopted in Matzikama appears to be a contradiction: one would have expected more participation because the strategy has been developed. Very little is said about how the strategy will be implemented. It is possible that the strategies were drafted by consultants but the implementation thereof does not appear to be fully outlined. With less community participation, the strategy would appear to be defeating its own objectives. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from this is that participation is rarely driven from the top down. When participation is effected from the bottom up, social group membership and strong leadership from the community informs and shapes its outcomes.

7.6 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES

A central theme of this study was to investigate whether a variation of the Putnam thesis holds in the context of marginalised African/Black communities in the rural municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama. In the analysis of the research I sought to question whether social group membership can affect developmental outcomes if the municipalities concerned suffer from capacity and resource constraints. Up to this point various constructs in the analytical framework were examined without establishing whether there is a statistically significant relationship between them. In order to establish this, path analysis was used to estimate whether social group membership impacts on development outcomes as illustrated in Chapter Four. Unfortunately path analysis could not be used as an analytical tool to test the full augmented analytical framework because of the complexity of the data and modelling requirements.

As explained in Chapter 5, path analysis is an extension of regression analysis which aims to provide estimates of the scale and importance of presumed causal relationships between sets of variables. According to the theory “a regression is done for each concept or construct in the model as a dependent on others which the model indicates are causes.”

Figure 7-5 postulated a number of paths starting with social networks and ending with socioeconomic outcomes. In this section, a path coefficient will be estimated for each path

in the analytical model for Cederberg and Matzikama. A sequential step in this process is to do the same for African/Black communities and for the municipalities as a whole.

7.6.1 Estimating the Effect of Social Capital on Socioeconomic Outcomes: Cederberg

The path analysis in Table 7-20 gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the path model for the African/Black population group.

The definitions and compositions of the actual variables included for each of the items presented in the path analysis is described in the table below:

Table 7-19: Definition and Composition of Variables

VARIABLE	DEFINITION	COMPOSITION OF INDICATORS
SGM	Membership in formal social groups	Number of individuals who indicated that they or/and members of their family were members of a formal social group.
POL TRUST	Trust in government and political leaders.	Trust in political leaders, local government and central government. Average of the three variables.
POLITICP	Political participation is the active role that citizens play in their engagement with the state, through government officials and institutions.	Signing a petition, participating in an election campaign, attending a council meeting and voting in local elections. Average of the four variables.
GOV EFF	Effectiveness of government	Perception of government's effectiveness
OUTCOMES	The socioeconomic outcomes variable is operationalised as people's perceptions of government's impact on their socioeconomic conditions.	Perceptions of government's action positively impacting on socioeconomic status?

The estimates are for the relationship between social group membership (SGM) and socioeconomic outcomes (OUTCOMES). Social group membership and political trust (POL TRUST) are positively related and are statistically significant for the African/Black population in Cederberg Municipality. Being a member of a formal social group increases political trust by 0.16 compared to those who are not members of a formal social group. The path coefficients for all other concepts in the model are insignificant since all other p-values are greater than 0.05 which suggests that the link from political trust and political

participation (POLITICP) and from participation to government effectiveness (GOV EFF) and/or socioeconomic outcomes does not hold for African/Blacks in Cederberg. What is interesting is that social group membership is directly and strongly related to socioeconomic outcomes in Cederberg municipality. In fact, being a member of a social group increases positive socioeconomic outcomes by 0.33 in the municipality concerned.

Table 7–20: Standardised Regression Weights for the African/Black Population Group in Cederberg

		ESTIMATE	P-VALUE
SGM	POL TRUST	0.160	0.028
POL TRUST	POLITICP	-0.019	0.795
POLITICP	GOV EFF	0.123	0.094
POLITICP	OUTCOMES	-0.039	0.601
GOV EFF	OUTCOMES	-0.098	0.186
SGM	OUTCOMES	0.33	<0.01

One possible explanation for the link between social group membership and trust and between social group membership and socioeconomic outcomes is that political culture varies across the marginalised, migrant African/Black community in Cederberg. This was also observed in our earlier discussion on the individual component parts of the analysis.

Social group membership was positively related to trust in political leadership in Cederberg. We should recall that political leaders are closely aligned to the community whose leaders have close relationships with the ANC structures. These community leaders also mobilise communities and act as interlocutors between the local authority and the municipality. However, the path analysis did not confirm a statistically significant relationship between political trust and political participation. This suggests that it was the leadership of Cederberg's African/Black community which played an instrumental role in political participation. The interviews highlighted this with the following response to the question posed about who organises political participation in the African/Black community in Cederberg:

> Welcome has the support of the Khayelitsha community, and if he says people must move they will move.[75]

This confirms that political participation is driven by trust in community leaders and is, in turn, sustained by the almost zealous following they have in their communities. Their role as interlocutors between the municipality and community is what establishes the platform for negotiation and mediation on development issues. This is based on a type of direct democracy which is typical of traditional African/Black culture where community members go directly to the chief to solve their problems. This is also symptomatic of the paternalistic relationships that exist in a newly urbanised community where traditional patterns of behaviour find their own expression. This does not conform to the kind of political behaviour that is found in older democracies such as in Putnam's account of Italy.

The explication of the statistical relationship between various forms of social capital and socioeconomic outcomes allows us to now compare the African/Black communities in Matzikama and Cederberg.

The table below gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the path model for the African/Black population group in Matzikama.

Table 7–21: Standardised Regression Weights for the African/Black Population Group in Matzikama

		ESTIMATE	P-VALUE
SGM	POL TRUST	-0.016	0.871
POL TRUST	POLITICP	0.049	0.609
POLITICP	GOV EFF	-0.076	0.432
POLITICP	OUTCOMES	0.517	<0.01
GOV EFF	OUTCOMES	0.117	0.157

[75] Sports Coordinator, Male, African/Black

The only variable in the path model that is statistically significant is the path from political participation to socioeconomic outcomes. All other variables are insignificant. What this means is that those who participate politically are estimated to increase socioeconomic outcomes by 0.52.

This has very important implications for Matzikama. If they were to engineer better social group membership, the prospect of better socioeconomic outcomes would improve, as it has in Cederberg.

7.6.1.1 Estimating the effect of social capital on socioeconomic outcomes by Municipality

Upon examination of the path model for Cederberg as a whole, however, a very different picture emerges as indicated in Table 7-22.

Table 7–22: Standardised Regression Weights for All Population Groups in Cederberg

		ESTIMATE	P-VALUE
SGM	POL TRUST	0.158	<0.01
POL TRUST	POLITICP	0.234	<0.01
SGM	POLITICP	0.241	<0.01
POLITICP	GOV EFF	-0.047	0.249
POLITICP	OUTCOMES	0.416	<0.01
GOV EFF	OUTCOMES	-0.025	0.492

Figure 7-6: Path Coefficients for All Race Groups, Cederberg



It is interesting to note that formal social group membership and political trust is positively related and statistically significant (p-value = 0.01) for Cederberg as a whole. What this means is that in Cederberg, being a member of a social group increases political trust by 0.16 compared to those people who are not members of a formal social group. There is also a positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.01) relationship between political trust and political participation and between political participation and socioeconomic outcomes. The path coefficient for the former is estimated at 0.23 and the latter is estimated at 0.42. In essence, this means that having political trust increases political participation by 0.23. Citizens in Cederberg who politically participate experience a 0.42 increase in (better) socioeconomic outcomes than those who do not.

It is interesting to note that there is also a direct link between formal social group membership and political participation. Formal social group membership increases

political participation directly by 0.24 (irrespective of whether they have trust in the public sector). The behaviour of the population as a whole seems to confirm the Putnam thesis, namely, that better socioeconomic outcomes are ultimately the result of one's membership in social groups which influences trust and participation (see the diagram above). The red dots indicate the paths that are statistically significant.

The behaviour of the population as a whole is similar to the one identified in the northern parts of Italy and very different to what we observe in Matzikama as we shall see. However it also differs from the behaviour of African/Black communities in Cederberg which is probably attributable to residents being relative newcomers within a paternalistic culture.

The table below gives a breakdown of the estimates and p-values for the path model for all population groups in Matzikama.

Table 7–23: Standardised Regression Weights for All Population Groups in Matzikama

		ESTIMATE	P
SGM	POL TRUST	0.022	0.606
POL TRUST	POLITICP	0.143	<0.01
POLITICP	GOV EFF	-0.048	0.269
POLITICP	OUTCOMES	0.535	<0.01
GOV EFF	OUTCOMES	0.023	0.531

It is interesting to note that unlike Cederberg, there is no statistically significant (p-value = 0.606) relationship between formal social group membership and political trust for Matzikama as a whole. However, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between political trust and political participation and between political participation and socioeconomic outcomes. The path coefficient for the former is estimated at 0.14 and the latter is estimated at 0.54. In essence, this means that having political trust increases political participation by 0.14 in Matzikama compared to 0.23 in Cederberg. Citizens in Matzikama who participate politically have a 0.54 increase in experiencing better socioeconomic outcomes than those who do not. A diagrammatic representation of the model with the estimates is given in the figure below.

Figure 7-7: Path Coefficient for All Race Groups, Matzikama



If Matzikama had the same density and characteristics of networks as Cederberg, it would be able to improve socioeconomic outcomes through improved trust and political participation.

7.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter compared Social Group membership among the various race groups in the municipalities of Cederberg and Matzikama and showed that African/Blacks had a vibrant culture of formal social networks and associations. These formal social groups were horizontal, active, non-political, and public-type good-producing which accounted for the differences in the socioeconomic outcomes among the African/Black communities in Cederberg which were not present in Matzikama.

The chapter highlighted the fact that informal associations and networks (like congregating in shebeens) are not as viable as formal networks and associations in impacting on development outcomes. Formal networks and associations are more beneficial since they provide the necessary structures for direct engagement with officials and decision makers and are better predictors of positive socioeconomic outcomes. Informal associations lack rules and procedures and accountability and are unable to exert the kind of pressure required for effective service delivery.

The research findings and analysis thereof also show that the transmission mechanism from networks to socioeconomic outcomes is complex. While several factors appear to influence outcomes, no definitive conclusion can be drawn about which one has captive power over those outcomes. Some factors clearly have stronger correlations than others. Among these is the quality of leadership present in communities. This was shown to be decisive in the case of Cederberg and was visibly absent in Matzikama. If the level of social capital is high as in the Cederberg case, there is a strong probability that leaders emerge as interlocutors to negotiate the roll-out of services. The interlocutor role of leadership is instrumental in stimulating public participation and if well organised and managed, can significantly contribute to socioeconomic outcomes by virtue of the way it galvanises communities and local officials. In such cases government effectiveness is likely to improve in the areas of financial and capital management, procurement and general technical competence. An associated aspect of government effectiveness is the welfare function that a government performs (maximising social welfare benefits to the poor). Where networks and associations, however, prompt local authorities to be more responsive to demands for welfare programmes, the effect on socioeconomic outcomes is certain to be positive. Depending on the level of formal organisational structure and the scope they articulate, the networks and associations are an important community resource for development.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter summarises the findings of the thesis by considering the theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions made to the study of social capital and the key findings and conclusions that can be drawn from the research. Two municipalities were used as case studies to determine whether social capital is a significant contributor to better socioeconomic outcomes. Using Putnam's framework as a point of departure, the study compared the experiences of two rural municipalities with severe capacity constraints that were similar in terms of their economic and social structure, and were located in the same geographic region[76]. The study found that the African/Black residents of Cederberg managed to establish a vibrant culture of social group membership and that their socioeconomic outcomes were considerably enhanced as a result of this. This was absent among the African/Black residents of Matzikama. These finding presented an opportunity to investigate which factors might be responsible for such social incongruity in the two municipalities concerned.

8.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS

8.2.1 Theoretical Contribution of the Thesis

Putnam's framework was used as a point of departure to develop a comprehensive model that depicts how associations/networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. Putnam's social capital thesis showed that social capital in the form of associations and networks has an impact on socioeconomic outcomes even if these associations have no connection to politics or the economy. Putnam hypothesised that this was because civic participation instils skills of cooperation and a sense of shared responsibility in individuals. This, in turn,

[76] See Annexure A for a detailed socioeconomic profile of the two areas by race.

results in a better quality of government and better economic (and social) outcomes for communities. He elaborated on this by observing that citizens in civic communities demand more effective government and are prepared to act cooperatively to achieve their shared goals. But, the Putnam thesis left unexplored many underlying dynamics of social group membership, trust, participation, government effectiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. This opened up the opportunity to develop a more nuanced perspective of the theory.

His theoretical framework (represented in Figure 8-1) was reviewed and augmented to develop a framework that was appropriate to rural, capacity constrained municipalities in South Africa. In turn, the new analytical framework was used to analyse the different outcomes among the African/Black communities in Cederberg and Matzikama. Theoretically the thesis built on Putnam's existing social capital theory and expanded it to describe the transmission mechanism from social group membership to socioeconomic outcomes. This exploration of transmission mechanisms is one of the unique theoretical contributions of the thesis.

The graphical representations of the static interpretation of the Putnam thesis and the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four are reproduced below in Figure 7-1 and Figure 8-2 respectively.

Figure 8-1: A Graphical Illustration of an Interpretation of the Putnam Model



Figure 8-2: Analytical Framework Developed



Figure 8-2 delineated the numerous characteristics of networks which impact on socioeconomic outcomes. The thesis found that the extent of improved socioeconomic outcomes in impoverished rural communities is critically dependent on the characteristics of networks, particularly the ones highlighted under networks and associations (light green enclosed within the dashed red line) in Figure 8-2. Factors such as formal and informal rules, state agency, leadership, political structures and institutions and the relationship with the state (all highlighted under civic engagement/participation) in Figure 8-2 details the interpenetration of state and civil society in the development and promotion of civic engagement/participation. This challenges Putnam's (1993, 1995) "society centred approach" which undervalues state agency, leadership, political structures and institutions, and so on, all of which are important variables that are not considered in Putnam's framework. For example, if state agencies promote and respond to the needs articulated by communities through their representatives, a virtuous cycle of cooperation and dialogue is created which is one of the key mechanisms to reduce violent protests presently affecting the Western Cape province of South Africa.

The role of leadership in the promotion of social capital cannot be underestimated. Leaders play a key role in transmitting social capital into better socioeconomic outcomes for communities. This was evident among the African/Black residents of Cederberg where the quality of leadership was instrumental in securing better socioeconomic outcomes and was visibly absent in Matzikama. In the Cederberg case, the interlocutor role of leadership was instrumental in stimulating public participation and, if well organised and managed, can significantly contribute to socioeconomic outcomes by virtue of the way it galvanises communities and local officials.

Another contribution made by this thesis to the theory of social capital is the idea that formal social group membership is of greater significance than informal networks in impoverished, marginalised rural communities located in areas governed by resource-constrained local government institutions. This is because formal social groups instil in their members the structures and processes necessary for coordinated collective action in a sustained and effective manner.

Marginalised communities that have (i) diverse formal social groups (cultural groups, sport groups, etc.) with (ii) cross-cutting membership that (iii) span across different age groups, are more likely to have improved socioeconomic outcomes since these equip members with skills which may be used in different settings, that is, their own private contexts. These skills and competencies are particularly relevant in the context of sports groups which have significant youth membership in the case of Cederberg, where leadership development takes place, acting as we have seen in Chapter Six as de facto leadership academies.

I also argue that the probability of marches and violent protest over service delivery issues is diminished due to the existence of numerous non-political associations[77] which we see in Cederberg. This is because of the mediation efforts of community leaders within these structures who play a decisive role in non-violent outcomes because they act as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand and the community on the other hand.

In the analytical framework government effectiveness is more broadly defined than in the Putnam model. In areas where governments are ineffective in terms of technical criteria, such as is found in Cederberg and Matzikama, it was established that the pressure exerted on the local authority by poor communities, organised in networks and associations, actually impacted on their wellbeing. Given the developing country context of our case studies, the augmented framework differs from Putnam's original framework in that it allows for both technical efficiency criteria as well as social and economic welfare criteria. The augmented analytical framework implicitly argues that in (poor, marginalised) communities where there are numerous networks and associations of the kind that engender positive outcomes, the welfare function of such communities is by and large formulated and established through the ebb and flow of information in such structures. The social

[77] Discussion with Cederberg Municipality indicated that there have been no violent protests in the African/Black community since the research was undertaken in the mid-2000s. This is in contrast to many other parts of the Western Cape which have been prone to protests.

welfare function of communities then gets determined by what communities need/prefer. Thus social networks influence the formation and constitution of the social welfare function of poor communities. This can then be communicated to the local municipality through political engagement.

8.2.2 Methodological Contribution of the Thesis

The literature highlighted the different methodological approaches used to measure social capital. No particular methodology, on its own, could be used to analyse the findings of the research—and the need for an innovative approach capable of capturing the complexity of the analytical framework developed in Chapter Four was required.

A mixed-method approach was used to analyse the findings of the research, since to merely quantify social group membership and other variables in the analytical framework through the use of descriptive and inferential statistics was not enough to obtain a deeper understanding of how social capital is formed. This compelled the need for qualitative research.

A methodological innovation in this study was the application of "path analysis" to capture the "interactional" relationships that existed in the analytical framework. The use of path analysis to test the "interactional" relationships between social networks and socioeconomic outcomes at the local government level is an original contribution of the thesis.

8.2.3 Empirical Contribution of the Thesis

The study also made an empirical contribution since it measured a representative sample of the Cederberg and Matzikama populations, asking them detailed questions regarding their membership in formal social groups, the trust they have in political leadership as well as the political engagements they have with the state. This is a unique contribution since this is the first time that such comparisons have been made at a local government level in the context of marginalised rural communities.

Empirically it was demonstrated by Jooste (2005) that poor communities in the Western Cape had low levels of formal social group membership, because the opportunity cost of their time counted against such pursuits. This study however proves otherwise. The Cederberg experience show that poor communities use their membership in formal social groups as one of the few survival strategies available to them and that they achieve better socioeconomic opportunities precisely because these social groups are formal. Evidence of high levels of formal social group membership in an impoverished area is therefore another empirical contribution of the thesis.

The empirical evidence also shows that there is no correlation of income levels and social group membership. For example in Matzikama membership across the different race groups were low, irrespective of whether some race groups were poorer than others.

However the evidence does suggest that there are differences in the types of social groups to which different race groups belong to with Whites more likely to belong to Volunteer Groups and African/Blacks more likely to belong to Cultural and Sports Groups. Although no research has been done on why this might be the case, it is likely that it is as a result of the distinct demographic profile of the communities concerned - a more youthful African/Black population and an older White population.

8.3 KEY INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Putnam thesis argued that social networks impact on socioeconomic outcomes. The original contribution of this thesis as presented in the augmented analytical framework demonstrates that the relationship between social networks and socioeconomic outcomes is complex and contingent upon several factors that are themselves the product of multifaceted social and institutional conditions. For social networks and associations to impact on socioeconomic outcomes a considerable confluence is required between a number of variables as the augmented analytical framework illustrates.

The framework shows that not all networks and associations have the same impact on developmental outcomes. Rather, it is the characteristics of networks that are important

determinants of development outcomes. Networks and associations that are horizontal, active, heterogeneous, non-political and public good-producing maximise the impact on developmental outcomes as we see in the case of Cederberg.

The presence of multiple networks that have the positive characteristics mentioned above facilitates the development of political trust in two ways. Firstly, it facilitates the flow of information, particularly in small communities (about their needs) through the structures of local government. With the help of their leaders, the communities are able to engage the state about issues they see as critical, such as the provision of housing and basic services. The existence of such networks/associations facilitates dialogue between the state and civil society.

Secondly, horizontal networks that are heterogeneous, active and have been set up to deliver public goods and services facilitate the development of an alternative channel or mode in dealing with the provision of public goods and services. The activities of these networks and associations may at times augment current activities of the local authority. This sustains trust in the political leadership because their performance as interlocutors is valued for the way in which they attend to problems with regard to service delivery. This compensates for the failings of the state in such areas. The networks and associations coupled with strong community leadership thus engender trust in the local authority and its political actors. The organised activities of these associations around service provision lessens their dependence on the state for these services. The result is higher levels of political trust by residents as was found in Cederberg.

The thesis conversely argues that associations and networks that are hierarchical, passive, political in nature and limited in the activities that they undertake are more likely to generate political mistrust even if they are involved in producing public-type goods and services. Information flows in a hierarchical network are less fluid than in a horizontal network which could frustrate the process of articulating and communicating information about the needs of a community to the leaders of these associations (as in the case of Matzikama). The lack of good, effective leadership in the community further inhibits the

possibility of sustained engagement with the municipality. This lends itself to fewer platforms for engagement and a heightened sense of marginalisation follows. All of this undermines political trust (in the public institutions and politicians since many of these networks have been initiated by political entities) and increases the prospect of violent protest/participation. The conceptualisation of networks and associations which imbue certain characteristics as an enabler of political trust is an original contribution of this thesis.

The greater the number and more diverse the networks and associations involved in providing public-type goods and services, the more likely is their engagement with the state. In the case of Cederberg it has also meant that a larger segment of the African/Black population participates with local government in issues that concern them. Inevitably, this is tantamount to "pressure" being applied on local government officials to prioritise these issues. Thus, in spite of capacity and resource constraints in the municipality, networks and associations can be seen to have an impact on government effectiveness by helping to focus resource allocation.

One of the most interesting outcomes in communities that have dense, integrated networks, such as in Cederberg, and where this is accompanied by sustained engagement with the state, is that they tend to assume a larger role in the social welfare function of the poor. This was particularly evident in the way housing provision was negotiated in Cederberg, where dissatisfaction with an allocated site led to some hard bargaining and the granting of an alternative, more acceptable location.

A question that needs to be posed is why Cederberg has such vibrant associational activity compared to Matzikama. The answer, it seems, lies in the confluence of factors that precipitated the outcome. These factors are discussed below.

The formation of networks and associations was established as a response to government failure and the perception that the community was marginalised—politically, socially and culturally—as was the case initially in Cederberg before the ANC came to power in the

local government. Under these conditions community leaders mobilised themselves to facilitate the production of basic public goods and services. This, however, cannot be the only factor as Matzikama, despite the fact that the African/Black community there faced the same challenges and experienced the same degree of marginalisation as the community in Cederberg, did not develop similar vibrant associations/networks. This suggests that other factors were co-responsible.

In Cederberg, the presence of leadership was a decisive driving force in articulating the aspirations of their constituency and mobilising their participation in the process. The role of leaders as interlocutors between government and the ruling political party on the one hand and the community on the other should be seen as an important milestone. A unique feature of the leadership in the African/Black community in Cederberg is that it enjoyed links to the ANC and hence an automatic mechanism existed through which dialogue could take place between the community and the municipality. From the findings it appears that this has not happened in the African/Black community in Matzikama.

In Cederberg, there is a sense of collective identity that facilitates the formation of networks/associations. This, too, is absent in Matzikama. In Cederberg the flow of information takes place through both structured engagement through civic structures as well as informally. Information is then disseminated through established channels in the different sectors in the society—through NGOs, Community Police Forums, political parties, church events, and so on. The churches indeed play an especially important role in fostering this sense of collective identity because it is through the church that relationships are established, awareness is raised and information shared. The belief system of the church (the values it espouses) serves as an anchor for the community. The sense of collective identity is reinforced by good leadership and the presence of other structures such as street committees.

The presence and activities of such networks encourages a virtuous cycle of bridging and linking. Numerous horizontal networks are likely to have more channels established with

other communities and organisations, expanding the contacts and resources available to that community, as is the case in Cederberg.

The research also showed dramatic variations in social capital by apartheid-designated racial groups which were more or less still inhabiting separate spaces. Significantly in Cederberg and Matzikama, African/Black residents displayed higher levels of civic engagement/political participation than other racial groups. However, participation was higher in Cederberg when compared to Matzikama. The augmented analytical framework unpacked the variables (other than demographic and socioeconomic) that are essential for participation. These included the relationships that communities have with the state, political structures and institutions that are in place that impact on participation, leadership, formal and informal rules and state agency.

The findings showed that the African/Black residents in Cederberg had a better relationship with the state when compared to their counterparts in Matzikama. While the political institutions and structures that exist at a local authority level in South Africa are operationally the same, it is the way in which they give expression to their constitutional mandate that appears to determine their effectiveness. In Cederberg there is a sense of regular, structured engagement between the council/municipality and the community. This takes the form of regular meetings with the councillor and ward committee members, housing officials, municipal manager and the mayor. The findings show that the ward committee structure and community development workers in Cederberg worked hand in hand with the African/Black community, which was not the case for Matzikama.

While the findings in Cederberg and Matzikama cannot be generalised for other places, it is hoped that the dissemination of this thesis will stimulate research in other locations where the characteristics of networks and associations can be assayed and their behaviour studied. This could serve a much larger purpose—that of enhancing developmental outcomes—which is of critical importance in South Africa at this stage of its development, when innovative approaches are desperately needed if government is to satisfy the aspirations of the poorest sections of the population.

Unfortunately the research has also shown that social capital in the Cederberg context in the mid-2000s could not break through Apartheid's spatial legacy. Communities are still separated on the basis of race and geography, with Whites for the most part occupying spaces of privilege and African/Blacks relegated to second-class spaces and informal settlements. Spatial Apartheid continues to divide communities despite the vibrancy of associational activity in Cederberg among African/Blacks.

It is interesting to note that the networks and associations primarily manifested themselves among members of the African/Black community and to a lesser extent, the Coloured and White communities. However this can be seen as an outcome of the historical separation required by the Apartheid state which led to structural barriers between White and African/Black groups. Hence social capital in Cederberg has demonstrated that it could not fundamentally recast relationships, especially those between the predominantly White landlord classes and the African/Black farm workers. Its applicability seems to be limited to the social, municipal and cultural domains, with no immediate demonstration of challenging existing class structures. There is also no demonstration that the vibrant social capital in Cederberg is used to significantly challenge White landholders' unequal access to and control of assets and land.

The localised manifestation of social capital in the African/Black community shows that it has limited application at the macroeconomic level and as such cannot be seen as an alternative to a strong developmental state. It seems to be more meaningful at the micro-level since it can improve the livelihoods of poor households through the effect that it has on nurturing, supporting and coordinating initiatives for socioeconomic development in these communities. Unfortunately, without the re-engineering of Apartheid's perverse economic, spatial and social legacy by a strong state, social capital cannot begin to alter years of historical discrimination and inequality in the short run.

Social capital is therefore an important part of the livelihood strategies adopted by poor households who, it could be argued, cultivate it to ensure better socioeconomic outcomes and protection against external shocks (stokvels are a good example of such networks). It

is more likely to be cultivated as a mechanism to aid the socioeconomic and psychological wellbeing of poor communities that would otherwise be worse off and isolated.

Social capital is unlikely to result in considerable changes in income levels of poor households and a reduction in inequality in the short-term without massive investments into public infrastructure and local economies. This is unlikely to happen through the constrained local authority alone, whose revenue base is ironically limited by the very poverty it needs resources to redress.

8.4 FUTURE AVENUES FOR RESEARCH

The theoretical framework developed on the back of Putnam's thesis explaining the transmission mechanism from social capital to socioeconomic outcomes, can be tested to ascertain whether it has broader applicability and is robust in its explanation of how social capital impact on socioeconomic outcomes.

There are also opportunities to build on this study in a longitudinal manner, particularly in Cederberg Municipality to see the long-term impact of social group membership on youth development, particularly what such membership has done to counter the dominant culture of violence and risk behaviour so prevalent among marginalised youth in Black communities.

The study has shown that associational life develops certain capabilities like leadership, particularly amongst the youth. There are thus opportunities to ascertain if this is prevalent elsewhere and how leadership development takes place in the context of social group membership, particularly sports groups.

There are opportunities to investigate the nature of social group membership in South Africa (and not merely the number of people in social groups) so as to ascertain whether they are imbued with the characteristics necessary for better socioeconomic outcomes.

Another area of further investigation is the interface between social groups and the state and how dynamic virtuous relationships are formed, i.e., the types of relationships which mitigate against violent protests against the state, promoting co-operation and negotiations particularly with a view to improving state/society relations.

8.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The research provides insights into what capacity constrained local governments can do to enhance the welfare of their communities. In this regard, Figure 7–2 has particular resonance, particularly the factors that impact on civic participation and engagement.

The findings of the research highlighted the fact that social capital is an important alternative resource that can be harnessed by the state for better socioeconomic outcomes in the face of dwindling financial resources and/or a weak local authority. The local authority can play an active role in the identification and development of social capital in poor communities through the forging of dynamic alliances and partnerships between and within government institutions and civil society, particularly with those groups who vocalise their unhappiness with service deliver issues, thereby reducing violent-type protests. However, this requires meaningful engagement with communities that takes the perspectives of communities as the starting point.

Another policy implication is that there should be more support for sports and cultural groups, or any non-political institution which has broad-based participation or the opportunity for broad participation in impoverished communities.

There is also sufficient opportunity for the establishment of complementary relationships between government and civil society, so that the synergies between state and citizen action ameliorate resource access problems and creates a virtuous cycle of social, institutional and economic improvement.

From a national point of view, it would be prudent to foster better understandings of social capital in terms of how to grow it to foster civic engagement and participation in and

ownership of decision making, thereby directly contributing to the deepening of the national democratic project.

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ANNEXURE A: DEVELOPMENTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

1. INTRODUCTION

A system of local government in rural areas was practically non-existent under Apartheid (Davids, I., n.d., p. 32). A large part of South Africa's rural areas at that time were concentrated in the former homelands ("self-governing" ethnic enclaves). The provision of services usually associated with local government was devolved to traditional authorities. In rural areas which were predominantly under the control of white commercial farmers, these services were performed by provincial administrations or national departments (Pycroft, 2002, as cited in Davids, I., n.d., p. 32). In the view of Davids (n.d., p. 33), a workable system of local government for rural people was formalised during the transition period in the form of Transitional Rural Councils and Transitional Representative Councils. The former had more power than the latter—where it had both legislative and executive authority to carry out programmes whereas the latter had fewer less responsibilities and minimal capacity.

According to Davids (n.d., p. 33) the first few years of the newly elected government saw a move "towards the establishment of a nation-wide developmental government system" starting in 1996 with the new Constitution of South Africa. The Constitution provided the framework for three spheres of government— a central, provincial and local sphere. Given its proximity to the local population, this third tier was required by the Constitution to:

> "(a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;
>
> (b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;
>
> (c) promote social and economic development;
>
> (d) promote a safe and healthy environment; and

(e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government." (Chapter 7, South African Constitution)

The South African Constitution provided for the establishment of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) whose mandate was and still is to transform, develop and capacitate local governments to execute the constitutional mandate of providing for the development needs of communities.

The various mandates of local government are rooted in this legislative mandate and government sees it as the main interface between citizens and the state, securing their basic services and promoting social and economic development in a participatory manner. The Constitution therefore confers on local government responsibilities relating to the social and economic development and of deepening democratic practices and norms.

The White Paper on Local Government issued in 1998 further crystalised the notion of "developmental local government" by defining it as 'local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality of lives.' The notion of citizen participation was cemented by Section 19 of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) which states that municipalities are required to consult the communities and civil society organisations to perform their functions. Hence, as part of its developmental role, local government is required to take a "leadership role, involving and empowering citizens and stakeholder groups in the development process, in order to build social capital and generate a sense of common purpose in finding local solutions for sustainability" (Binns & Nel, 2002).

After years of primarily centralised decision making under the Apartheid state, the formulation of *developmental local government* was a deliberate step toward decentralised service delivery and enhanced participation—making local governments (on paper) more responsive to the needs of citizens. This increase in powers and functions has not been commensurate with increases in the necessary financial and human resources to realise

these new mandates. This has led to serious problems in areas with smaller populations (generally this means rural municipalities), which do not have the capacity to fulfil all their functions.

According to Davids (n.d., p. 37) "following the adoption of the white Paper, a series of acts and bills were enacted to give effect to the provisions of the white Paper and provide a legislative reform framework for developmental local government. The Municipal Structures Act (1998), the Municipal Demarcations Act (1998), the Municipal Systems Act (2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Bill (2002) form the foundations of the future local government system. Taken together, these pieces of legislation establish municipal types and their governance structure, pronounce the powers and functions of local government, provide for the rationalisation of local government through the demarcation process and restructure local government systems, procedures and processes."

2. CURRENT CONFIGURATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A brief overview of local government is presented here to indicate the extent of its powers and functions and the institutional arrangements that exist particularly with regards to state-civil society participation.

The Municipal Demarcation Act provided for the establishment of the Municipal Demarcation Board. One of the tasks of the Board was to reduce the number of local municipalities in South Africa from 843 to 284 (6 metropolitan, 231 local, and 47 district municipalities). According to Kallis and Fast (n.d., p. 15) many municipal authorities were merged (on average, between 3-5 municipalities), "and urban boundaries were expanded to include their rural hinterland." The demarcation process and the concomitant amalgamation of municipalities has had a profound effect on participation and consequently on state-civil society interactions.

It is the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 that provided for the different types of local government and their respective powers and functions. Briefly, there are different types of municipalities:

- Metropolitan Municipalities [Category A]: In South Africa there are six Metropolitan municipalities with each of them having more than 500 000 voters. The cities with metropolitan municipalities are: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and the East Rand. These metros are made up of different wards and the residents of each ward are represented by a ward councillor.
- Local Municipalities [Category B]: The areas that are outside the six metropolitan municipal areas are divided into 231 local municipalities. There are also District Management Areas (DMAs) that generally have very small populations and fall directly under the District Municipality. Local municipalities are also made up of different wards with the residents of each ward represented by a ward councillor.
- District Municipalities [Category C]: District municipalities generally consist of 4-6 local municipalities in one district some of which also have district management areas that typically comprise nature reserves and have low population density. The district municipality has its own administration and coordinates development and service delivery in the district.

The two municipalities under discussion are characterised as Category B municipalities.

The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 provided for the different types of local government and their respective powers and functions.

Local government is generally made up of the following:

- Elected members – they represent the local community and are responsible for approving policies and laws.
- Executive committee – exercises oversight and is responsible for coordinating the making of policies and bylaws and see to it that implementation by the different local government directorates takes place.
- Local government directorates and municipal officials who do the actual work.

The municipality is made up of a Council that makes decisions and municipal officials and staff who are responsible for implementation. The Council, which is made up of the elected

members, passes a municipal budget, approves policies and bylaws for the municipal area and decides on development plans and municipal service delivery for the area.

The councils' work is convened and coordinated by a mayor, who is elected by the council and who is assisted by an executive or mayoral committee made up of councillors. The mayor and the executive committee oversee the municipal manager and departmental heads that are responsible for the implementation and administration of council decisions.

The actual work of the municipality is done by the municipal administration that is run by the municipal manager with appointed senior managers. The municipal manager is responsible for appointing staff and coordinating them to execute and implement the councils programmes and initiatives.

A council typically has the following structures:

- A mayor – who is the head of the council.
- An executive or mayoral committee – that meets frequently to coordinate the work of the council and make recommendations to council.
- A speaker, except where there are very small councils, who chairs council meetings.
- Council meetings – where the full council takes decisions.
- Committees – various committees are constituted and comprise few councillors who meet to discuss specific issues.

Ward Committees

Ward committees are elected by the communities they serve and consist of local community organisations, residents' associations, CBOs, NGOs and other civil society structures. A ward committee generally does not have more than 10 members and the ward councillor typically acts as the chairperson. Ward committees have no formal powers but they advise the ward councillor or make submissions directly to council. Ward committees typically are involved in the range of statutory development planning activities of the local area such as the drafting of Integrated Development Plans.

The objectives of ward committees are:

- To facilitate more meaningful participation from the community to inform council decisions.
- To effect more effective communication between the council and the community.
- To assist the ward councillor with consultation and report-backs to the community.

Ward committees are supposed to present the material concerns of a community such as service delivery and may therefore offer the opportunity for citizens to raise broader concerns regarding how the system functions.

Responsibilities of Local Government

The municipality is responsible for the following functions:



- Water for household use
- Sewage and sanitation
- Storm water systems
- Refuse removal (household and business)
- Electricity provision
- Fire-fighting services
- Municipal health services
- Decisions around land use
- Municipal roads
- Municipal public transport
- Street trading
- Abattoirs and fresh food markets
- Parks and recreational areas
- Libraries and other facilities
- Local tourism.

National and provincial governments also delegate other responsibilities to municipalities. When this occurs, it means that the local municipality is asked to perform the role of another sphere of government, as in the case of housing which is not a local government responsibility. If the municipality is not provided with a budget by the other sphere of government then this is considered an "un-funded mandate".

Municipal councils have the power to:

- Pass by-laws
- Approve budgets and development plans as is the case with IDPs (Integrated Development Plans)
- Impose rates and other taxes—such as property rates which are an important source of revenue.
- Charge service fees—for municipal services such as water.
- Impose fines—for breaking municipal by-laws or regulations. For example, traffic fines.
- Borrow money—where the council may take a loan to finance development and use municipal assets as surety.

ANNEXURE B: MAPS OF CEDERBERG AND MATZIKAMA MUNICIPALITIES


MATZIKAMMA MUNICIPALITY
This overview of the municipal area shows basic infrastructure on top of land ownership and usage.
ROAD NETWORK
TRANSFORMATION
ECOSYSTEM

ANNEXURE C: SOCIOECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CAPITAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

	In clear	ID Number				
Region						
Municipality						
District area						
Survey area						
Household						

Table 1 : Table Household																				
Id #	Name	Gender M F	Date of birth MM/YY	Marital status	Relation with the head of household	Family number	Family status	Work status	Education level	Mother tongue	Belong to social group	Amount spend on social group	Belong to political party	Amount spend on political party	Belong to religious org	Amount spend on religous group	Monthly net income	Pop. group	TB status	HIV status	Date of arrival in the area
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*14*	*15*	*16*	*17*	*18*	*19*	*20*	*21*	*22*
1																					
2																					
3																					
4																					
5																					
6																					
7																					
8																					
9																					
10																					

Table 2. Events in the household happening during the last 12 months (from 1st December 2005 to 30th November 2006)																							
	Name	Relationship to Ref person	Marriage	Divorce	Left household	Victim of crime	Sickness	Death (reasons)	Live birth				Month of the event		Date of Birth DD/MM/YY								
									M			F											
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*			*10*	*11*		*12*								
1																							
2																							
3																							
4																							
5																							
6																							
7	Total																						

Q3. Type of housing :	
Q4. Number of rooms :	
Q5. Tenure status:	

Q6. Access to piped water		
1	Inside house	
2	Inside yard	
3	Community stand less than 200m	
4	Community stand further than 200m	
5	No access	

Q7. Source of water		
1	Local water scheme	
2	Borehole	
3	Spring	
4	Rain water tank	
5	Dam/ pool/ stagnant water	
6	River / stream	
7	Water vendor	
8	Other	

Q8. Toilet facility		
1	Flush toilet (connected to system)	
2	Flush toilet (septic tank)	
3	Chemical toilet	
4	Pit latrine (ventilation)	
5	Pit latrine (no ventilation)	
6	Bucket latrine	
7	None	

Main Energy		Cooking	Heating	Lighting
		Q9	Q10	Q11
1	Electricity			
2	Gas			
3	Paraffin			
4	Wood			
5	Coal			
6	Candles			
7	Animal dung			
8	Solar			
9	None			

Q12. Main system of refuse disposal		
1	Local authority at least once a week	
2	Local authority less than once a week	
3	Communal refuse dump	
4	Own refuse dump	
5	No disposal	
6	Other	

Q13. Is your dwelling equipped with?				
Appliances:		Y	N	Distance
1	Electricity			
2	Piped water			
3	Toilet inside			
4	Bathroom inside			
5	Kitchen			
6	Refuge removal			
7	Used water evacuation			

Q14. Is the household equipped with:		Number
1	Fridge	
2	Cooker	
3	Phone ground line	
4	Cell phone	
5	TV	
6	VCR / DVD player	
7	Satellite dish	
8	Hi-Fi	
9	Car	
10	Bicycle	
11	Motorcycle	
12	Truck	

Q15. During October 2006, state the different type of incomes in Rands, net of taxes		In rand Net
1	Salary	
2	Investment	
3	Rent	
4	Pension	
5	Grant	
6	Familial aid	
7	Community aid	
8	Total	

Q16. During October 2006, state the different type of expenditure in Rands			
		In rand Net	Place of expenditure
1	Home loan		
2	Rent		
3	Car mortgage		
4	Food		
5	Clothing		
6	Health		
7	School fees		
8	Transport		
9	Leisure		
10	Other		
11	Total		

Q17. Financial assets		Do not know	Know but have not	Have some
1	Saving account with banks			
2	Stokvel			
3	Unit trust			
4	Shares			
5	Policy			
6	Work savings			
7	Others			

Q20. From 1st December 2005 to 30th November 2006, please state all your visits to anyone in your community							
	Person or Institution	Date	Reason	Help receive?	Date of solution	Cost related	External expenses
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							

Q21. Access to services		Y	N	Distance
1	Municipal offices			
2	Public Transport			
3	Public Primary school			
4	Public high School			
5	Public phone			
6	Medical doctor			
7	Nurse			
8	Public hospital			
9	Private clinic			
10	Bank			
11	Supermarket			
12	Lawyer			
13	Clothing			
14	Sport facilities			

Q22. Table migration (from 1st January 2002)				
	Date	Place of departure	Place of arrival	Reason
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

Q23. Table health (from 1st January 2002)						
	Date	Symptoms	Medical visit	Diagnosis	Distance	Expenses
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						

Q24. Table employment (from 1st January 2002)									
	Position	Sector	Type of Company	Date of entry	Date of exit	Reason	Distance from home	Net month salary	Publicity of position
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

Q25. Do you trust:		Y	N	DK
1	Neighbours			
2	Family			
3	Political leaders			
4	Local government			
5	Central government			

Q26. Can you get help from		Y	N	DK
1	Neighbours			
2	Family			
3	Political leaders			
4	Local government			
5	Central government			

Q27. Do you get information from:		Y	N	DK
1	Neighbours			
2	Community board			
3	Community agents			
4	Local newspapers			
5	National newspaper			
6	Radio			
7	TV			
8	Groups / associations			
9	Business			
10	Internet			

Q28. Social cohesion and differences		Divide community	Provoke violence	Have no impact
1	Education			
2	Age			
3	Wealth			
4	Landholding			
5	Social status			
6	Gender			
7	Religion			
8	politics			
9	Ethnicity			
10	Duration of stay			

Q29. Safety		Y	N	DK
1	Area safe			
2	Feel safe alone at home			

Q30. Political action in 2006		Y	N	DK
1	Feel you have control			
2	Has positively impacted on living conditions			
3	Feel you are heard			
4	Have signed petition			
5	Have attended council meeting			
6	Met politician			
7	Demonstrate			
8	Part in election campaign			
9	Alerted media			
10	Notified police or court			
11	Vote last local election			
12	Vote last national election			
13	Would you vote for candidate from other pop group			
14	Vote last local election			
15	Vote last local election			

Q31. Honesty		Y	N	DK
1	Local gvt officials			
2	Traditional village leaders			
3	Medical workers			
4	Teachers			
5	Staff of post office			
6	Police			
7	Judges and court staff			
8	NGO's			

Q32. Main household economic activity		
1	Shop	
2	Shebeens	
3	Crafts	
4	Laundry services	
5	Food	
6	Transport	
7	Agriculture	
8	Other	
9	None	