THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

TOPIC

WHEN SOLDIERS BECOME REFUGEES: SURVEILLANCE AND FEAR AMONG RWANDAN FORMER SOLDIERS LIVING IN CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA.

A MINI THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY / SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MA DEGREE IN ANTHROPOLOGY (STRUCTURED).

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DECEMBER 2017

ABSTRACT

This study examines the fears of Rwandan army deserters who oppose President Kagame, of being found by the External Security Organisation (ESO), a Rwandan spy organisation meant to sniff them out wherever they are in exile: in this case Cape Town, South Africa. The army deserters are perceived as both a political and military threat to the survival of President Kagame. I argue that the fear of being hunted is a real threat which (re)produces 'militarised identities' as these former soldiers employ their military training skills to hide from the ESO in South Africa. In this I employ Foucault's (1977) concept of 'panopticism' to examine these army deserters' experiences of surveillance by the ESO and also Vigh's (2006) concept of 'social navigation' to understand how the army deserters 'scan' and manoeuvre the exile terrain. In substantiating the thesis argument, my study draws from six in-depth interviews and conversations with Rwandan army deserters living in Cape Town. It also made use of thematic analysis, drawing themes from the data on which it is based.

Key Words: Army deserters, exile, surveillance, violence, Refugee

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
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother, Norah Chigwa-Francis ('Madam Francis') who died in 2008 and to my uncle, Enoch Masimba Dirawo ('Shylock') who died in 2012.

DECLARATION

I declare that this mini thesis; *When soldiers become refugees: Surveillance and fear among Rwandan former soldiers living in Cape Town South Africa,* is my own work. It is submitted to the University of the Western Cape in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Anthropology. At no other University or institution has it been submitted as a requirement for a degree or any other qualification.

Signature…………………………………………

Date………………………………………………..

LIST OF ACRONYMS

RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RDF	Rwandan Defence Force
ESO	External Security Organization
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
SAPS	South African Police Service
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
FNJS	Fahamu Network for Social Justice
DFID	Department for International Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

While studies on Rwanda's military pay attention to genocidal violence, (Uvin 2001; Prunier 2006; Reyntjens 2006; Stanton 2012;) and how military involvement in political violence pervades contemporary Rwandan society (Purdekova et al 2017; Sidiropolous 2002), few studies have focused on Rwandan army deserters who served in the post-genocide Rwandan military, or the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and are currently living in self-imposed exile in South Africa. This study focuses on Rwandan army deserters living in self-imposed exile in Cape Town, South Africa, in particular their everyday fears of discovery by the Rwandan military intelligence wing, the External Services Operation (ESO). The study examines the ways in which the Rwandan army deserters navigate, read and 'scan' the exile terrain, as a way of dealing with their situation of being hunted by the ESO. The study raises the following questions: What risks do they encounter in their daily lives? How do they deal with their situation of being hunted? These questions, help us to explain the fear of being hunted among army deserters in the context of exile. While deserting the army is a punishable offence across the globe, I argue that these army deserters are continuously being hunted well after exiting the military service. Even though the intention of Rwandan army deserters was to lead normal civilian lives in exile, this has not been the case for them because of the ESO's vigilance and the exile environment in which these former military men find themselves. They have banded together to (re)produce 'militarized refugees' who live in fear of being caught, but their military identity has been strengthened rather than diminished by this experience of being hunted in their everyday life. The social implication of being hunted is that in a way it creates hyper vigilance, which is militarised and has the capacity to reproduce military identities. Thus, the study draws on Foucault's (1977) concept of 'panopticism' (self-surveillance) to examine the surveillance and presumed 'omnipresence' of ESO spies in the daily lives of army deserters in their host society. The concept of panopticism is an important frame of this study because it helps to understand the Rwandan army deserters' daily fears of being caught. The study also draws on Vigh's (2006) notion of 'social navigation' to understand the ways in which these army deserters employ their past military tactics to read and navigate the exile terrain, infested with Rwandan government spies. The six army deserters who participated in this study served in the RDF between 2000 to the present, a period during which the RPF was experiencing

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heightened internal clefts because of the alleged 'commercialization' of the Rwandan military for personal gain (Baaz and Verweijen 2013) partisan and de-professionalization of the military (Sidiropolous 2002; Reyntjens 2013) hence they deserted from the army and fled to self-imposed exile. The study does not reveal what happened in the Rwandan army, it focuses on the army deserters' fears of being caught in an exile context.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

Rwandan former soldiers living in self-imposed exile have become targets for sporadic attacks. Over the past three years, there have been reports of Rwandan former soldiers killed in gun violence in South Africa (*news24.com 2014*). These attacks have occurred against the background of the purported existence of Rwandan spies who are out to thwart potential threats to the existing political order in Rwanda. Attacks of senior former Rwandan soldiers who have become vocal critics of the Kagame administration receive significant media and scholarly attention, yet no studies or media attention have been devoted to capturing the experiences of junior former soldiers who are in the same predicament and live in even more dangerous terrains in the host society. Consequently, their experiences in exile have remained silenced. In official parlance, Rwandan ex-soldiers are represented as fugitives who have fled genocide retribution and it is in the public domain that they are being hunted (York and Rever 2014; Hintjens 2008; Reyntjens 2006). Having been labelled fugitives and enemies of the Rwandan state, they have to contend with clandestine activities against them such as abductions, killing, and persecution committed by the ESO or their government's security agents, because they are regarded as a future threat to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) administration. Their government does not distinguish between army deserters, dissidents, and fugitives, or '*genoceidaire,*' in its bid to arrest suspects in the diaspora. They are tracked and attacked with the same amount of vigour as that applied to Kagame's high profile critics. Therefore, they live with the fear of being caught by the ESO, and find themselves in a deadly hide and seek 'dilemma' (Maringira 2015) which weakens their ability to lead normal civilian lives in exile.

1.2. Justification for this Study

Studies on former soldiers mainly focus on soldiers who exit the military and live in their home countries, but this study focuses on soldiers who deserted from the army and are now refugees in Cape Town, because it is impossible to stay in Rwanda after 'skiving[1]' from the military, given the prevailing animosity between the RPF government and former soldiers. Maringira's (2014) study of Zimbabwean soldiers living in self-imposed exile is the only one so far that pays attention to the lived experiences of former soldiers living in South Africa: however, his study focused on how and why Zimbabwean former military men cling to their military identities in post-combat life. In the process, researchers have neglected Rwandan former soldiers and the political violence perpetrated against them by Rwandan spies in the host society. This study explores the lived experiences or Rwandan former soldiers in self-imposed exile and their efforts to stay alive and make a living in Cape Town. The stories of their attacks by government spies have been overlooked and their accounts have not yet been written. This research gives information about how Rwandan army deserters have been persecuted, and how they dodge their pursuers and manoeuvre in the dangerously unpredictable exile environment. From an anthropological perspective the research contributes to the broad literature on military studies as it focuses on the phenomenological experiences of ex-soldiers living in self-imposed exile. Outside the discipline of Anthropology, the value of my research lies in its ability to influence policy makers so that their interventions pertaining to ex-soldiers living in exile are informed by the refugees' lived experiences, in order to improve rather than worsen their situation. I find Turton's (1996:96) argument convincing: "one cannot justify conducting research into situations of extreme human suffering if one does not have the alleviation of suffering as an explicit objective of one's research".

1.3 Background of the study: Rwandan Army

The RPF started off as a guerrilla movement in Uganda around 1987, and in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide it formed two 'distinct' institutions, a political party the RPF and the RPA which regularized and became the country's national army. Under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, the RPA embarked on a professionalization project which incorporated and also

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[1] Skiving is a term used in the military when soldiers escape from the watchful eyes of their commanders

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demobilized some members of Habyarimana's Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR). Hence the current RDF comprises the High Command council, General Staff, Rwandan Land Force, Rwandan Air Force and Specialized units[2]. Even though the RDF has been highly regarded as one of the most disciplined and well led armies in Africa (Rehder 2008) the military institution has not been immune to internal friction, resignations and desertions throughout its structures (Gettlemen 2013). The RDF has been accused of conducting its business in a highly unprofessional manner, insofar as recruitment, placement and overall administration is concerned. Brock (2016) found that though recruitment advertisements are placed in national media, usually placement is made on the basis of ethnicity and origin. In most cases, young men of Tutsi ethnicity whose parents were refugees in Uganda, were offered cadet positions ahead of other Tutsi and Hutu descendants (Hintjens 2008). In cases where there was dire need for recruits, men and children were forcibly recruited into the army. The author further found that until 2012, soldiers had no employment contracts. When the military decided to issue contracts, it did not consider employees' duration of service. This resulted in many soldiers losing benefits and rank, and many left acrimoniously. Also, there were no set procedures for exiting the military and commanding officers had the authority to decide who left and who stayed. Another issue within the army was that soldiers had no rights, especially not the right of conscientious objection to military service. There is no clear separation between the ruling party and the military institution, and as such the national army is used in fighting proxy wars or for the benefit of their high command. Even though military training is known to be physically taxing, the RDF's training which was based in vindictiveness and punishment is unbelievably harsh. All offences are wrapped into one, that of insubordination, which warrants gross inhuman treatment. These and other reasons have seen many members of the RDF deserting. Those military members who left the army in acrimony fled Rwanda and went into self-imposed exile because the Kagame administration perceived them as potential threats to its reign (Brock 2016).

It is important to distinguish the categories of Rwandan soldiers that I came across in my research. Rwandan ex-soldiers fall within two major categories; there are those who served in the Rwandan Armed Forces during the Juvenal Habyarimana regime, who exited military service because their army had been defeated by the RPA. Presumably this category could

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[2]https://www.mod.gov.rw

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include those who allegedly worked with the *Impuzamugambi* and *interahamwe* during the genocide and these could be the ones that President Kagame initially labelled 'genocidaires' before extending the scope of this word to include all ex-soldiers (Uvin 2001). There are also those who served under Kagame, who deserted the military because of its ethno-political polarization (O'Connor 2013; Purdekova 2008; Hovil 2010) and maladministration, amongst other reasons. My study focused on the second category of ex-soldiers; army deserters who were disenfranchised while serving in the RDF, but find themselves in the same situation as those "genocidaires" who are on the government's 'wanted' list because it does not tolerate army deserters.

This study is based on the fieldwork with six army deserters, three of whom escaped from the army while on duty and three who did not report for duty after completing a very tough pre-deployment training during which they were told that they were going to be redeployed along the dangerous Kamanyola - Bugarama border with Democratic Republic of Congo. Though these army deserters left the army at different times and followed different escape routes, they had a common destination, Johannesburg. For one reason or another, their stay in Johannesburg was short and they proceeded to Cape Town. Given Cape Town's reputation, it was assumed that these former military men were safe and possibly even overindulged in the host society. But this has not been the case for my participants who have had to contend with that face of Cape Town which manifests itself in the form of violence (Parnell and Pieterse 1999; Uwimpuhwe 2015) on one hand, and surveillance, abductions, killings and disappearances allegedly perpetrated against the army deserters by the RPF's military intelligence wing, on the other. Based on this knowledge or perception, Rwandan former soldiers find themselves in a precarious hide-and- seek 'dilemma' (Maringira 2015). Owing to this, they fall within the category of vulnerable refugees. The context of my study group, former soldiers of the Republic of Rwanda who deserted between 2000 and 2014, seemed puzzling:

In one respect, as Rwandans, they were regarded as being 'imprisoned' and vulnerable (Kavuro 2015) - yet in another they were indiscriminately bundled amongst all ex-soldier criminals by their own government and media in the host county (Uvin 2001; Peters 2015). The South African Police Service (SAPS) has indicated that there have been steady increases in criminal

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activities and along with the host country's media they have attributed these increases to the substantial presence of former soldiers from all over Africa in their host country, South Africa (Peters 2015). My basic research question is; what challenges do Rwandan former soldiers have to contend with in exile.

1.3.Chapter Outline

The thesis outlines these ideas over the course of five chapters.

In the first, I introduce the thesis argument that even though exiled Rwandan army deserters aspired to lead normal civilian lives in exile, the violent conditions obtaining in the exile terrain, surveillance and attacks orchestrated by Rwanda's spies, and the generally violent environment in parts of Cape Town, as well as limited economic opportunities, worked to strengthen rather than diminish their military disposition. In other words, they became tougher soldiers here because they constantly relied on military tactics to navigate through and survive in exile. I further give a background of the study and highlight the constraints within the RPA structures which led to my respondents deserting the army.

Chapter 2 expounds on my methodological reflections about the research journey. I reflect on how I connected with my research participants and the challenges that I encountered given that Rwandan ex-soldiers in exile are a closed community, and are quite suspicious of people who talk to them about their military past. This is linked to the Rwandan genocide in which soldiers were perceived as perpetrators. In this chapter, reveal how I moved from being perceived as a 'President Kagame spy', as someone who was sent by President Kagame to penetrate Rwandan army deserters in exile, to being accepted as a researcher, and how these military men came to perceive me as a researcher. Importantly, this chapter explores the fears that I had during my fieldwork and how the violent incidents that coincided with my study not only wrecked my emotions but inspired me to stay the course in order to write about these prejudices.

Chapter 3: Literature review

I examine the existing scholarship on military identity, importantly on how it has been theorized in military studies and introduce literature on the construction of a soldier through military training. The exploration of the ways in which soldiers are trained helps us to

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understand the actions of soldiers in post-army life, and how they constantly employ their military skills in exile, in navigating the exile terrain.

Chapter 4: Findings and discussion

This chapter presents the findings and analyses the respondents' stories about their fear of being hunted in exile. The chapter draws on Foucault's (1977), concept of surveillance and 'panopticism', to understand the ways in which the Rwandan spies watch over the ex-soldiers' every moment, in exile and how these army deserters in turn exercise self-surveillance.

In Chapter 5 I present my conclusion, which uses the strings of fear, surveillance and social navigation that I have raised throughout the thesis. In this chapter, I also reveal how the thesis contributes to a broad understanding of critical military studies and the anthropology of the military in the aftermath of 'the military life'.

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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGICAL JOURNEY

In doing this research, I found myself in conversation and constant interaction with men who have been trained for combat and who later deserted the military, men who are being hunted by the Rwandan Army. Doing research among these men has been challenging but I managed to overcome my own fear of them and of the circumstances under which they live. This chapter reveals the methodological journey: how I met these former Rwandan soldiers, how I was perceived at the beginning of the research and how I managed to begin conversing with them. The chapter thus describes my sampling method and shows my motivation for using ethnographic data collection techniques. This study reveals the army deserters' challenges and fears of being tracked down.

I found qualitative research methods to be well suited for this. I used the snowball sampling method because my research participants were "hidden from and hard to reach for the outsider researcher" (Cohen and Arieli 2011:426; Petersen and Valdez 2005). Before embarking on my fieldwork, a researcher who is familiar with the Rwandan research climate advised me to prepare myself for the difficulty of accessing the exile network, particularly my target population, former soldiers. I was warned that my type of analysis was generally unwelcome in a 'closed community' because of the perceived threat that they could be found, prosecuted or otherwise harmed by the Rwandan Army. My first attempts to make contact with this category of Rwandan refugees in Cape Town were difficult. However, in August 2016, a colleague who was acquainted with my research topic facilitated a meeting with an army deserter who was excited about this study and promised to bring his compatriots. Around the beginning of September 2016, I received sad news that this man had been found shot dead at his home. His assailants were unknown, but his colleagues believed that his death was the work of Rwandan spies. I was terrified by this yet it also gave me a sense of what I was about to get myself into; a dangerous terrain.

My second attempt to meet with them in October 2016 was frustrating. A colleague gave me email addresses and cell phone numbers of some Rwandan academics who he was confident would help me with identifying participants for my study but we were wrong in assuming that finding Rwandan ex-soldiers would be easy if we approached academics. I sent emails and

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text messages to some Rwandan academics situated in Cape Town. Most did not respond to my emails and text messages, but one of them, who I will name Rubwire, phoned me a week after I sent an email his message was as follows:

> Miss Florence, I demand that you leave me out of your spying mission, whoever you are working for. While I understand researches, I really do not believe that anyone can conduct a study like that innocently. I really I am not interested in 'politics' and I have a young family that still needs me.

At the time, all the people I asked for help did not want to be associated with this study for 'security reasons'. I had assumed that this study would not be so sensitive because it was being conducted outside and far away from Rwanda. I began to question the feasibility of my study because of matters related to the Rwandan political climate. I put the respondents search on hold and resumed it in March 2017. The experience was not very different from the previous one. On the verge of despair, I finally got some positive responses from non-academics; "I know them but I can't guarantee you their participation for obvious reasons."[3] "These people are there, but bringing them to the party is going to be very difficult because of the mistrust amongst us but we will find a way."[4] These statements were made before I asked whether or not it was possible to speak to these ex-soldiers. People generally understood the difficulty associated with convincing army deserters to participate in research. Nonetheless, I continued my search for participants and for the third time a colleague who was acquainted with my research interests facilitated another meeting with a cheerful Rwandan former soldier who took it upon himself to assist me to organise participants from his own network. This research breakthrough relieved me greatly but about one month after our meeting I received the news that this participant had also been found dead at his home. His assailants were not known and his colleagues alleged he had made a sizeable number of enemies outside their network. I was afraid, devastated and emotionally wrecked. I remember rushing to my supervisors with the news and telling them that I felt emotionally too weak to carry out this kind of study. I began to understand the sense of menace that my respondents experienced in their daily lives, and the ex-combatant's death scattered the research network he had established.

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[3] Personal communication with a Rwandan national who said he knew Rwandan former soldiers but would not dare to identify them for fear of being used as a proxy

[4] Personal communication with a second Rwandan national who offered to help in my search for research participants

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The period of identifying research participants was for me the most frustrating and cyclical in that I kept going back to the same position of having to look for participants. I was informed that my search for participants coincided with security agents' operations and it so happened that those army deserters who had offered to assist me were 'on the list'. After the second death I resumed the search for participants again- and this time it was even more challenging. Working together with two Rwandan nationals and my friend who lived in the townships, I was turned down on several occasions. I was finally linked to a contact who 'interviewed' me before allowing me to meet other ex-soldiers. He asked me questions such as - are you a soldier? To which politician are you related? Who I was working for, how did I know of the existence of Rwandan ex-soldiers in South Africa and what was my motivation for studying this category of refugees? Who was funding my research? How were participants going to benefit from this study, immediately and in the long term? What I was going to do with the research findings? They also asked me personal questions about my family background, educational background and future aspirations. I explained my research topic, thoroughly to this man, I answered all his questions and I assured him that my research was being carried out for academic purposes only. My statements were verified and he made sure that my words were backed by official university documentation, which I produced. Former soldiers made copies of my student ID card, proof of registration and ethical clearance. I was also told to present them with an interview guide because they were not going to entertain any political questions related to their lives in Rwanda. This vetting, authentication and planning process lasted two weeks, from 30 May 2017 to 13 June 2017. We had to plan on how to introduce the topic to the army deserters because "as you are aware, this is a very sensitive topic for us". In thinking through this vetting experience, I was reminded of de Castro's (2013) instructive notion of the *'relative native'* which demands researchers to conduct themselves in an ethical manner because the researcher and research participants interchange the 'native' position. Having been satisfied that I was not on a prying mission for Kagame, my contact introduced me and the research topic individually to his compatriots because we had agreed that the participants should not meet each other because "these men may have been sworn enemies back home, even though they now share vulnerabilities in South Africa". This is the most profound benefit of using snowball sampling method. It landed me in a network which I would not have accessed had I used other sampling techniques.

Despite having been introduced to these former military men I still encountered logistical challenges in terms of these former soldiers making it to appointments on scheduled dates and times, meeting with or spending time with them. The men were sceptical of me as an outsider who wished to gain insight into their experiences. All of them at some point told me that I was a spy but I explained to them that this study was for academic purposes only and that I was not a spy. Working with these army deserters demanded a high degree of flexibility because they constantly changed dates and times for meetings not because of tight schedules but because they at times anticipated what they referred to as "swarming"[5]. This concept was used each time the army deserters felt that military intelligence agents were in close range. The fear of danger was a shared notion and it influenced their patterns of behaviour and perceptions. Chronicling their methodological challenges in their study of marginalized groups in South Africa, Jacobsen and Landau (2003) noted that fear and distrust toward researchers limited responses from potential participants, and I shared this experience. I can say that my research was conducted in a rather closed context. For Koch (2013) the term 'closed context' reveals methodological concerns which focus on research about spaces or topics that are not easily accessible or have the character of closure, intimidation and incarceration.

Even though I had initially planned to interview many Rwandan ex-soldiers, I ended up working with six men because of the difficulty of convincing members of this closed community that my study was purely an academic exercise. What was interesting was that the participating men talked not only about themselves, but also about other former soldiers living in South Africa. Writing about soldiers in the war context, Hynes (2001) talked about the 'collective experience' of combat life. This is what my participants did, they talked more about their former commanders, their compatriots and the ways in which they banded together in South Africa. The powerful nature of qualitative research is that it also tells a deep story of other people. I made use of pseudonyms, in this study.

My research participants were particular about leaving tracks behind them in their engagements with me because of 'security reasons', so rather than sending them messages on *WhatsApp*, I

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[5] Swarming is a military strategy which involves the use of highly coordinated, decentralized and highly mobile force against an enemy.

was told to call them if I wanted to meet. They refused to be recorded. I found calling quite frustrating at times because it was expensive, but I persisted and we would meet at odd places such as at a stadium, a car park, in one of the townships and a taxi rank or bus terminus. One of these army deserters insisted that I meet him at a *shebeen* in the townships. However, I insisted that it was quite dangerous for me to do so. We then met at a safer place, the taxi rank. We discussed my research topic over some alcoholic drinks and *urumogi* weed. 'Pulling' *urumogi* was for me the craziest part of this study, even though it was quite soothing. Drinking and pulling together gave my participants a sense that I was on their side and that was the point when I achieved 'intersubjectivity' (Tankink and Vysma 2006). Being a civilian researcher enabled me to understand the former soldiers' stories as an outsider and be able to analyse these stories with a critical eye.

In answering the question of what kind of information will help me give an account of the ways in which these former military men lived, I made use of successive in-depth interviews and the life history approach. Although I spent a great deal of time with them, we did not move around when we were together because they did not want others to recognise them with me or vice versa. I managed to gather extensive information about the research participants' experiences, opinions and motives. All interactions were confidential and happened in settings where the participants (and I) felt secure. (Gill et al., 2008). I at times got the feeling that some of the army deserters appeared to be "actively engaged in withholding information to protect themselves" (Chakravarty 2012:252), refusing plainly to answer some questions. There were times when I felt intimidated by some of the research participants and I sometimes found myself engaging in 'self-editing' (Purdekova 2011) and being extremely circumspect. Yet I neither lost my focus nor gave an inaccurate version of the ex-soldiers' accounts. I found the life history approach to be the most fruitful and interesting data collection tool. With it I was able to get an appreciation, through their thick narratives, of how the former soldiers became soldiers, about their training and combat experiences, their motivations behind exiting military service and their post war experiences.

I admit that I sometimes felt terrified and distressed by the accounts. The life history approach further enabled me to discover their survival or coping strategies as 'militarised refugees' –

ready to defend themselves at any time in the host society. I was told in graphic detail about their lived experiences in South Africa. Chakravarty (2012) highlights the need for people doing research on Rwandans to be careful of stage setting because Rwandans are perceived as being generally guarded and actively seeking sympathy. She therefore urges researchers to go a step further and seek the reality behind 'stage set' versions. The word of caution by Chakravarty (2012) was persuasive but I was reluctant to venture into the politics of the dichotomies between reality and stage setting, given that I preferred Clifford and Marcus' (1986) characterisation of accounts and partial truths. Honest accounts of the physical and mental hardships experienced by Rwandan ex-soldiers are narratives and my understanding of those accounts is yet another form of knowledge.

As highlighted above, this task was not for the faint hearted. My involvement put me on the spotlight and it endangered me. But I found that I was celebrated by hard core soldiers who thought me brave for carrying out a study of this kind. On the inside, I was dying of fear and anxiety, and because of the words of caution I received from my participants and Rwandan friends, I feared that my name might be added to some 'list'. I was afraid everywhere, I stopped walking alone and I was troubled every night during the data collection phase of my study. I began to hear things, had problems sleeping at night and a fear of being watched by the Rwandan External Security Operation (ESO) also gripped me. I ended up taking sleeping tablets to sleep. I also wrote in my researcher's journal how I so much wanted to abandon this study because it was so emotionally taxing. Speaking to my co-supervisor about my fears was helpful, even though I sometimes felt that he was not really understanding the danger I was in, because he always appeared to be so calm about it and he encouraged me to 'soldier on'. Having conducted studies on soldiers himself, he told me that soldiers were like that, they always gave terrifying narratives about their experiences and this could be quite difficult for civilians who had not received military training to fathom. However, with the help of Soda, a participant in my study, who became my aide during the period of data collection, I learned how to navigate this dangerous terrain and I began to enjoy the study. Thinking of the former soldiers' lived experiences in exile just ravaged my emotions and debriefing to supervisors did not put my mind to rest. On 13 August 2017 I made the decision to cease communicating with the army deserters when I received a call that one of the army deserters had been shot and the participant who called asked whether I had presented my report to the authorities, because this

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problem (of persecution of soldiers who had gone absent without leave) was persisting. It is after receiving that call on the 13th August 2017 that I realized how urgently these former military men wanted this problem of violence against them to be addressed. I can only hope that this study will influence policy interventions when addressing issues of violence against former soldiers living in exile.

For reasons of ethics and safety I gave participants synonyms (as indicated above). I do not give any description of the research site or of any particular features or recognisable aspects of the former soldiers or their lives. During research my field notes, interviews and any research material was carefully locked away and kept confidential.

2.1. Conclusion

This chapter has revealed the intricacies of doing fieldwork in an uncertain space characterised by men living in fear of being hunted or even killed. Even though I faced challenges of gaining access to the ex-military men and my research participants were guarded and sometimes secretive about whether or not they in turn also hunted Rwanda's security agents, I managed to get an understanding of how these former military men went about surviving in their host society. I managed to get adequate data for this study because in some cases respondents were willing to share a lot. They were sharing their stories with an outsider for the first time and they saw the study as a vehicle through which their problem of violence would probably attract attention.

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CHAPTER 3:
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter I examine the military practices of 'making' the soldier (Gibson, 2010; Hockey, 2002) which produces the 'warrior hero' (Woodward, 2000). I focused on the literature, which concerns itself with the construction of soldiers who are physically fit, aggressive, self-reliant and effective warriors. Given the fact that the military institution's ideals are consistent with those of the hegemonic masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), I found it inconceivable to separate the two, as they played a huge role in the army deserters' post combat life in exile. Studies often centre on the functionality of military institution in the making of a soldier, but this thesis reveals the ways in which the exile context reproduces the soldierness. Those that focus on micro-level military identities do so with the aim of understanding soldiers' actions within the context of various structures of power in the military institution (Woodward and Jenkings 2011). It is rare for attention to be paid to the soldier at a micro-level (Haltimer and Kummel 2009). Studies on ex-soldiers have generally focused on efforts to reintegrate them in their home countries (Kingma 1997) with limited scholarly work on those who exit the military through desertion and find themselves in exile.

3.1. Theorizing the Military identity

Military scholars do not agree on the conceptualization of a unitary military identity and the debate is both interesting and illuminating, especially when focusing on their post military lives. Although exiting military service removes the soldiers from the material resources availed to members by military institutions, exiting does not strip ex-soldiers of their military identity or military disposition. For Locke (2013), Hinojosa (2010) and Woodward (1998) transforming from soldier-hood to civilian-hood is difficult because soldiers' military identity is embedded in what they *do*. This perspective emphasizes only the soldiers' actions or performance. Such analyses usually present soldier-hood as a temporary, sometimes poorly choreographed role, which fails to end when the 'social drama' –the war- comes to an end. Schechner (1987: xix) highlights that such performance is "subjunctive and liminal" in regard to soldiering, an occupation that is real and intense. To think of soldier-hood, as mainly performative, is short sighted. In support of the action / performance view, Woodward and Jenkings (2011) suggest that where the ex-soldiers still perceive themselves to be soldiers, there

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is a suggestion that it is only the fields in which soldierly *roles* are being carried out, that have changed.   Kovitz (2003; 5) puts forward the idea that the military identity is exhibited in the soldiers' *'social practices'*, which include their patterns of behaviour, habits, language, assumptions and perceptions. Some scholars have adopted Berger and Luckman's (1967) 'social constructionism' to naturalize the relationship between military identity and masculinity and thus ascribe hegemony to the military identity, suggesting that soldiers are generally at the top of the 'masculinity hierarchy' (Connell 2005). Lomsky and Rapoport (2003) and Karner (1998) therefore regard soldier-hood to be ingrained in *traits* such as aggression, physical strength, impulsivity, insensitivity and lack of expression or emotion, homophobia and minimum complaint.   Committed to clarifying the difference between 'doing' and 'being' Higate (2000) Lande (2007), Hockey (2002) and Maringira (2015) argue for the appreciation of the nature, intensity and role of military training in terms of ritual and initiation rites, (Turner 1987; Van Genepp 2011) as these processes enable one to see how the training constitutes the soldiers' *being*. It is understood that *being* transcends mere *performance*. An ethnographic analysis of violent initiation rituals – of which military training is one – suggests that "the violence of initiation rituals remains in the body of the initiated even as they leave the ritual space" (Bloch 1992).   It is this perspective which has had the deepest influence on my study.

3.2. Constructing a soldier

In order to understand the strategies employed by former military men to cope in their post military lives, an investigation into the process of constructing a soldier was critical for this study.   But first, it is important to point out that the process of constructing a soldier is embedded in theories that view the body as being docile and malleable (Foucault 1975 in Tremain 2015), also as being a representation of society and power (Scheper- Hughes and Lock 1987). According to these ideas, the body has the capacity to be re-moulded. Military training entails the gaining and improvement of physical and mental attributes that are necessary for war related tasks (Beevor 1991 cited in Woodward 2000). It is essentially embedded in principles of warrior-hood and masculinity (Hinojosa 2010; Kovitz 2003; Woodward and Jenkins 2011). In military studies literature, these ideas have been used as lenses to look into the rigour, brutality and effectiveness of the process of making a soldier. Van Gennep's (2011) concept of 'rite of passage' was particularly helpful in showing how the civilian body is crushed and re-moulded into a soldier.

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The author outlined three phases of the transition path; separation, marginal and aggregation: which also resemble the stages involved in the process of making a soldier from the time of enlistment, training and then 'passing out'. In explaining the importance of the separation phase of the process of making a soldier, Woodward (2000:640 - 643) argues that the space in which military training is conducted is important insofar as it contributes to the production of a "specific model of military masculinity 'warrior hero', for a specific end" – 'close-quarters combat' on the battleground, that is why such training is conducted in "inhospitable rural environments… in places of potential danger and hazard" (ibid). It is established that military training "is not a picnic" (Hockey 2002:158) but a period and space in which the recruits' bodies are expected "to master fatigue, suffer, adapt to military discipline and exhibit physical dexterity" (Lande 2007). Therefore, as a 'total institution' (Goffman 1961), the military institution focuses on the suppleness of the body in stripping it of civilian-hood in order to create a soldier subjectivity that is very much an "agent of institutional will" (Foucault 1975 cited in Tremain 2015), regimented and prepared to kill or protect depending on the circumstances. In his ethnography of infantrymen construction in the British Army in 1986, Hockey (2002: 149-150) argues that the infantry is the toughest trained military company because it conducts its activities in highly dangerous spaces. The author highlights that the recruits' "time, space and body are ordered by a training programme which is minutely detailed for 24 hours a day and whose sequence of events is akin to a perpetual conveyor belt preceding at a hectic pace" (ibid). The infantry recruits' bodies are expected to exhibit military discipline in that, in addition to the forced marches, long road runs with a heavy load on their backs, drills, assault training, exposure to harsh climatic conditions; the way they brush teeth, shave, shower, have a hair-cut and how they move and purport themselves should be 'soldierly'. Hockey further says in the cook-house, the way these bodies ingest food is dependent on the Non-Commissioned Officers' whims in that the moment he finishes his food, everyone else finishes eating immediately and recruits' body waste disposal system is also regulated in that if a Commander walks into the barrack urinal everyone must immediately finish what they are doing, otherwise they will be dragged to the parade point half naked. Smiling inappropriately was also a punishable offence, according to the author. The account given by Hockey shows that military training is brutal and that it can, occasionally be fatal.

Thinking about how army recruits make it through military training leaves one with nothing but admiration especially when considering that even breathing is regulated in the military and these bodies are expected to 'breathe like a soldier' (Lande 2007) while running up the mountain with heavy loads on their backs in a simulation of war. For Lande, breathing like a civilian was said to have dire consequences on the individual and entire platoon in times of conflict: so as a Reserve Officer Training Corp at Fort Knox in North Carolina, Lande was taught to synchronize his breathing with this sensorimotor function in order to be an effective leader and marksman in the US Army. Writing about his experiences of the process of his construction into an arms-corps soldier at Camp Kapooka, Wedham (2004) recalled its intensity and ruthlessness saying the conditions of military training were both "degrading and disorienting, all-consuming and akin to self-mortification" (ibid). Physical exertion, assault training, bayonet training, drills, forced marches; thorough beatings by commanders and colleagues; road runs and exposure to harsh climatic conditions were all part of this process of volunteering oneself to suffering and becoming a soldier.

The literature reviewed above which details the lived experiences of army recruits during training, confirms claims by several scholars that "soldiers are not born but made" (See Woodward 2000: 640; Hockey 2003:16; Higate 2000:332). Things that soldiers experience as serving members play a major role in determining how these people exit the military. So having been taken through the severity of military training, it becomes a bit easier for us to understand why soldiers behave in the manner that they do, even in post military life. It has been argued that initiates tend to embody the violence of initiation rites even after they have left the ritual space (See Bloch 1992; Wedham 2004; Locke 2013; Hinojosa 2010; Gear 2002; Nesbit and Reingold 2011; Strachan 2006). In his study on exiled soldiers from Zimbabwe Maringira (2015) reveals that the military has the capacity to ingrain a military identity in an individual hence their identity encompasses both actions and being. Higate (2000) further argues that the military ethos is usually carried into post military life.

3.3. Leaving the Military

While the ideas of the passive body and the power of the total institution have been central in the construction of soldiers, it should be borne in mind that as individuals, they have 'agency'

(Latour 1996). Despite having volunteered to be enlisted, to be 'national property', (Wedham 2004) and in spite of having gone through severe military training, some soldiers do leave the military institution. In fact, many exit military service because of the monster that lies beneath the veneer of the "professional military" institution (Belkin 2012). Military institutions in the global north, especially in the United States of America, Australia and Canada have over the past years been accused of retaining abusive and discriminatory structures (ibid). In most African countries, reasons for leaving the military have ranged from disenchantment as a result of maladministration, impunity, abuse, politicization, socio-economic factors and discrimination (Prunier 2006; Maringira 2014; Sidiropolous 2012; Purdekova 2012; Reyntjens 2006). These authors show the potency of individual agency especially when the relationship between the individual and institution ceases being mutually beneficial. This is in some way related to the training that soldiers are given in the military as it seeks to create 'stereomatic'-strong and self-reliant-warriors (Wedham 2004). Interestingly, this agency is displayed even as army recruits are being trained; when they engage in skiving (evading the watchful eye of the commander) because they do not want to be given 'unnecessary' tasks (Hockey 2002). This also extends into post-military life. Analysing how soldiers in Guinea Bissau seemed to be at liberty to choose which armed group to join during the wars that ravaged the West African country, Vigh (2006) contends that there is a dialectical relationship between member agency and structure. Agency amongst members of the military has also been confirmed by President Paul Kagame, who pointed out that militaries, and especially the Rwandan army, were not immune to losing members through resignations, going AWOL or even desertions because sometimes soldiers do leave the military, "they just go" (Gettlemen 2013). Even though it may be difficult to imagine someone walking away from their sacrifices and sometimes their only source of livelihood, they leave when they feel that the institutions aim have ceased coinciding with their personal interests. In analysing the problems facing institutions in Africa, Mamdani (2002) alluded to the contribution of member agency to these problems, even though he called upon institutions to address their structural problems first. The various acrimonious routes used by soldiers to exit the military show the refusal by soldiers to be 'contained' and their desire to be 'free from being institutionalized squaddies in the military' (Higate 2000:330-333).

3.4. Migrating Soldiers

For most military men in Africa, 'escape and migrate' seems to be the most reasonable course to 'freedom from the military' (Higate 2000) because of the impunity of these institutions. The decision to desert from the army and flee the country is reflective of the limited options available to soldiers in the post colony arrangement, insofar as grievance resolution is concerned (Maringira 2017; Brock 2016). While exiting the military acrimoniously has grave consequences, the punishment for this offence in Rwanda is possibly more severe than elsewhere; therefore, soldiers guilty of this often flee the central East African country. The flight of members of the military also reflects the political climate prevailing in Rwanda, which is characterised as a dangerous case of tyranny (Longman 1997; Prunier 2008: Reyntjens 2006; Lovegren 2015). Literature on the Rwandan military has largely focused on the soldiers' participation in the genocide, the manner in which it has buttressed Kagame rule inside the Central East African country and the reach of the military ethos in Rwandan society (See also Prunier 2006; Hintjens 2008; Purdekova 2002; Uvin 2001; Sidiropoulos 2012; Purdekova et al 2017), but other scholars have focused on the soldiers' participation in peacekeeping and their involvement in rebuilding the previously shell shocked country (Redher 2008). In contrast, this study sought to understand how Rwandan former soldiers living in self-imposed exile eke out a living. It is common knowledge that soldiers who leave the military remove themselves from the material privileges and resources extended to members by the military institution. Nominally, they become civilians. As migrants, they usually contend with all the challenges that the ordinary civilians face, plus more. Several works on the integration, assimilation and incorporation of migrants in industrialized countries show that life is generally not easy for migrants who have to satisfy various requirements for them to 'settle' in foreign countries (see also Portes 1997; Crul and Schneider 2010). It is generally held that male migrants are subordinate to local masculinities, and they usually struggle to pave a way in the new society's economic sphere (Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport 2003). Armed with survival skills acquired during military training, which according to Woodward (2000:646) is "training for life", former military men usually rely on these tactics in post military life (Higate 2000). So, former soldiers negotiate their subsistence from the limited opportunity structures availed by the host society and economy.

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Most former military men now living in South Africa find themselves in a highly competitive lower economic stratum whose environment is swamped by many other immigrants. Surviving in the lower economic stratum thus requires innovation and aggression (Neeves and du Toit 2012), traits that were ingrained in the former soldiers during training. The peripheral economic strata in which most migrants are found, is sometimes compared to a jungle where survival is not simplistic but stressful and only the strong survive. It has been argued that influxes of immigrants tend to increase 'subsistence crime' rates amongst the migrant population compared to indigenous populations because they are largely excluded from public services and the labour market (Engbersen 2007). Referring to Liberian former child soldiers living as refugees at Buduburam refugee camp in Ghana, Woodward and Galvin (2000) argue that sometimes former soldiers find themselves in a state of "placelessness" because of the challenges they face in their attempts to (re) integrate into society. Maringira (2014) points out that army deserters in self-exile in South Africa find themselves in a similar dilemma. He acknowledges the potential of former soldiers becoming violent given their military training but analyses their soldierly-ness from the point of victims and survivors of violence, rather than as perpetrators. Woodward and Galvin (2000:1009) argue that when the soldiers' attempts to (re) integrate into society prove futile "they are forced to return to soldiering, the only occupation they have known because more often than not, totting a gun is known to 'bring power, if not peace" (ibid). Failure to find sustaining work tends to place former soldiers in distressing limbo (Mountz et al (2002). When these former soldiers have to contend with a lack of economic opportunities and joblessness their long-term stability is threatened (Williamson 2006). Rwandan former soldiers living in Cape Town are unique in that in addition to hunting for opportunities for survival in the host society, they are hunted by the Rwandan government spies, leaving them in a double dilemma.

3.5. Surveillance

During training, soldiers pledge allegiance to the state and by virtue of taking this oath, they become the property of the state (Wedham 2004). Just like any responsible property owner, military institutions have an obligation to vigorously pursue soldiers who exit the military unceremoniously, inter alia because of the possibility of these military personnel being involved in criminal activities. This pursuit of army deserters is inscribed in the understanding

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that soldiers have only one skill – soldiering (Woodward and Galvin 2000:1009) so this is likely to increase their propensity to engage in criminal activities (Mountz et al 2002; Williamson 2006). However, in the context of African countries, this tracking is compounded by the politicization of the military institution and it results in overzealous surveillance of former soldiers. This is because they are perceived as possible future 'national threats'. This overzealousness, I argue, is embedded in Foucault's (1977) concept of panopticism, where the governing authorities are in full view of the citizens. This further results in self-surveillance by the people who have ingrained in them, the idea of being watched (ibid). Commenting on the zeal with which security institutions and their respective government departments, particularly those in the post colony, carry out their duties, Mbembe (2000) argued that they are hyper vigilant. To prepare for this 'potentiality' (Ambagen 1998), militaries and government departments responsible for security focus their energies on surveillance, using both sophisticated and traditional technologies since these institutions are in a "state of war preparedness" (Wilson 2012).   Some scholars have shown how framing security in terms of national protection has had instant and enduring implications on entire communities (Bajc 2013; Ochs 2013; Betts 2010). These justifications for security are said to shrink the social fabric. Because of the heightened need for security, most communities are engulfed by an 'emotional climate' (De Riveira 1992 cited in Maroney 2006, Barbalet 1992) of fear and suspicion. In her book *Security and Suspicion* (2013) Ochs shows how fear, suspicion, surveillance and security have been the most prominent principles ordering the daily lives of Palestinians in Israel. Pasquetti (2013) explains how rampant distrust of family and friends characterized the social relations of people living in the Arab district of Lod in Israel. Trioullot et al (2001) emphasized the notion that security is a 'meta-framed' phenomenon; therefore, the fear of danger is a 'state- effect' that is reproduced through non-state actions. In Africa, reasons for heightened security range from national defence in the DRC and the Great Lakes region; religious extremism in Nigeria and Kenya; high crime rates in South Africa; politics in Zimbabwe, and many others. Whereas national defence has been highlighted as the major reason for heightened security in the global north, countries in the south have, to a great extent, used these ideas for purely partisan political reasons such as fortifying and sustaining dictatorial regimes. In the case of Rwanda, the military has a long history of being enmeshed in national politics: therefore, despite its high-sounding reputation, it has not succeeded in disentangling itself from national politics.   Some scholars have argued that the RDF has the rare capacity of

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being 'omnipresent' (Uvin 2001) because it has a well -resourced external security unit (Prunier 2006) which, through 'lateral surveillance' – citizen-to-citizen / peer-to-peer monitoring (Chan 2008), has divided the Rwandan community in the diaspora. The objective of such surveillance has been to deal with enemies of the state and *genocdaires* "who live freely abroad" (Uvin 2001). So the political climate that exists in Rwanda is being played out well beyond its geographical borders (York and Rever 2014).

Even though virtually everyone is a potential victim of violence in South Africa, immigrants seem to experience 'intermittent, anomic and spontaneous' violence on multiple fronts. The notions of belonging and indigeneity are important in examining the reasons for, nature and extent of violence perpetrated against foreign nationals. For Narogin (1995) indigeneity refers to people originating from the same land while Dei (2000) argues that the term refers to people sharing the same world view. Mamdani (2005) contends that this is a racial stereotype which has unfortunately been used to perpetuate colonial exclusionary policies in post-colonial Africa. In South Africa, the violence that migrants contend with are informed by colonial categories of exclusion which according to Jones (2011:35) are exclusive xenophobia, possessive xenophobia and toxic xenophobia which state that "you are fundamentally different from us, therefore you exist outside of our imagined community and you want to take our jobs, education, tax dollars, medical care, husbands, wives and our freedom". These exclusionary ideas become easy justifications by the locals for being violent against migrants. The violent environment in South Africa also makes it possible for other intruders to use the host society as a 'springboard' from which to perpetrate violence against migrants (Masutha[6]). As highlighted, migrants contend with multiple layers of violence in the host society; xenophobic violence, violence perpetrated by fellow migrants as well as political violence. Commenting on the reach of political violence beyond geographical borders, Prunier (2006) highlights that, in the case of Rwanda, the government has an effective military intelligence wing which has the capacity to trace and perpetrate violence against those nationals that the government sees as threats to the Kagame administration. Reports of political violence against critics of Kagame have also arisen in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium, while several assassination

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[6] Mr Michael Masutha is South Africa's Minister of Justice. He made this comment in following the assassination of Patrick Karegeya in Johannesburg in 2014, which the South African government believed was perpetrated by Rwandan security agents.

attacks have been made on such critics in Uganda, Kenya and Mozambique (York and Rever 2014). In Cape Town, this trailing makes it very difficult for former soldiers to lead normal civilian lives.

3.6. Conclusion

The existing literature places much emphasis on identities of soldiers who retire from military service, therefore army deserters continue to be on high alert in a context of being hunted by government spies. The review pursued this trailing of military identities into post combat life to see written accounts of how ex-soldiers made use of their military dispositions in post military lives, while also navigating dangerous terrains to eke out a living. This study focuses on former soldiers in an exile context and the ways in which their military identities are reproduced by the exile context of the fear of being hunted.

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CHAPTER 4
EXILE, FEAR AND SURVEILLANCE

4.1. Introduction

This chapter reveals the ways in which former Rwandan soldiers continue to live in fear of their lives because of the External Services Organization (ESO) and the ways in which they navigate this fear. The chapter employs Foucault's idea of 'panopticism' which helps us to examine the ways in which the military organization creates self-surveillant subjects amongst former Rwandan soldiers living in exile as refugees. In substantiating this, the chapter draws on former soldiers' narratives of fear and the ways in which they deal with it. However, the chapter also argues that former soldiers should not only be perceived as criminals, but they have the initiatives to lead a stable life by employing livelihood strategies such as car guarding, *'ubering'* or driving metered taxis, *'tuk-tuking'* (offering transport over short distances on scooters), doing food delivery or serving as security guards etc.

4.2. Non-tolerance of threatening elements

While the consequences for deserting the military are usually severe, breaching the military oath in Rwanda has grave consequences because irrespective of the reasons, one is labelled an enemy of the state and *'genocidaire'* i.e. one who has been involved in perpetrating genocide. The government demonstrates a zero tolerance of army deserters and if caught, such persons, "with bad and unclean attitudes" (Purdekova 2013) will be candidates for "mind-set correction and rehabilitation" (Lovegren 2014) at Iwawa Rehabilitation Island on Lake Kivu. The Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational Skills Development Centre commonly known as Iwawa Island has been the government's response to the problem of 'delinquent young men', often army deserters, who are threats to national security (ibid). This extreme emphasis on security is endemic to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, formerly the military wing of exiled Rwandans in the 1990 conflict, which eventually took power in 1994. Army deserters from Rwandan army are perceived *en masse* by the RPF as serious threats to national stability or security. As noted by Rwandan President Kagame "ex-soldiers are amongst the thousands of guilty persons who remain free abroad" (Uvin 2001:182). President Kagame said that these deserters should not be permitted to compromise national security. He is determined to enforce the country's declared policy against genocide and cleanse the Rwandan state both at home

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and abroad. President Kagame is alleged to have added "we will continue to arrest suspects and when needed, kill in broad daylight those threatening to destabilize the country" *(New York Times* 2014). Even though this statement was made in response to questions about the arrest and disappearance of political opponents within Rwanda, this thesis posits that distance and the sovereignty of other African states did not act as a hindrance to this policy. For him the RPF will not compromise national security and the persecution of ex-soldiers in self-imposed exile falls under this category. It is important to note that the securitization agenda in Rwanda stems from a legitimate need to prevent national instability (Fisher and Anderson 2015; Sundberg 2016) because the Great lakes region has a recurrent tradition of refugees engaging in armed repatriation, which threatens state and regime security. However, the securitization has legitimized harsh repression outside acceptable sphere of political activity (Ibid). It is against such ideas of securitization that Longman (2011) argues that Rwanda has, in the post genocide era, transitioned from "one authoritarian regime to another", while for Sidiropoulos (2002) the country is presented as a 'strong case for hegemonic authoritarianism'. In the same vein, some scholars argue that Rwanda has developed into the most 'straitjacketed' country in Africa. (Reyntjens 2006, 2009; Hintjens 2008; Prunier 2006; Uvin 2007; Kimonyo et al 2004; Kavuro 2015; Gettleman 2013). While national security has been the justification for 'panopticism' in Rwanda, the government's framing of exiled ex-soldiers is embedded in the government's need to maintain political power through the 'production of political subjectivities' (Pylypa 1998). This has little, if anything at all, to do with national security. In order to scrutinize former soldiers and other anti-President Kagame citizens, Rwanda relies on its effective military intelligence wing, the ESO, referred to by some as the 'omnipresent eye' of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Hintjens 2008). The ESO allegedly has the capacity to physically control exiled Rwandans (Prunier 2006; Uvin 2007) thus making it very difficult for army deserters to lead normal lives in South Africa. Evidence of the current animosity between the government and exiled army deserters abounds and it is against this background that most of the deserters' social and political problems remain silenced. In his analysis of the character of security institutions in the post-colonial state, Archile Mbembe observed the general visibility of the state (1992). Focusing on Rwanda, Lovegren (2014) argues that government departments responsible for security are 'hyper vigilant' (see also Katz 2001).

4.3. External Security Organization

Re-established around 1998 with the objective of informing national policy on external security threats the ESO is a discreet branch within the Rwandan military (Prunier 2006; Reyntjens 2013), whose initial responsibility was to collect and analyse such information.   But in line with the RPF's authoritarian aspirations, the ESO has since 2002 expanded its activities to include strengthening and ensuring President Kagame's rule against the backdrop of increased defections from the ruling party. This has effectively turned the country into a 'securocracy' (Sidiropoulos 2002).   Therefore, its undertakings have come to encompass monitoring and gathering intelligence on persons involved in any activities that would seek to subvert this regime *(refworld 2014).*   The organization also allegedly plans, coordinates and executes clandestine operations such as kidnapping and presumably killing those labelled as *'genocidaires'*, as well as taking action against any other dissidents perceived as threats to the government. This organization employs professionals who carry out paramilitary operations outside Rwanda's borders (Prunier 2006; York and Rever 2014).   Rwanda's ESO has its equivalents in the USA's CIA, UK's M16, France's DGSE, Uganda's ESO and Zimbabwe's CIO, among others. The ESO is however not immune to scandals, factions and desertions. Information about its operations are not in the public domain but its presence is heavily felt amongst Rwandan army deserters:

> The ESO is 'omnipresent', my sister

As the metaphor of being 'omnipresent' indicates, the organization is seen as being embedded in the former soldiers' social environment. It is not just a 'potentiality' (Agamben and Heller - Roazen1999): the "possible actualization of hidden capacity" it is an 'existential constant' (Vigh 2008), an element which pervades the army deserters' everyday lives. This leaves them in a state of 'chronic uncertainty' (Scheper-Hughes 2008). The existence of this security organization informs or explains their insecurity and patterns of social navigation (Vigh 2011).

4.4. Understanding army deserters

Rwandan ex-soldiers fall into two major categories; there are those who served in the Rwandan Armed Forces during the Juvenal Habyrimana regime (and who left the military because their army had been defeated by the RPA) and those who have served in the RDF under Kagame. This study focuses on those ex-soldiers that have served in the RDF from 2002 to the present,

and deserted the military because of its maladministration and ethno-political polarization (O'Connor 2013; Purdekova 2008b; Hovil 2010) but find themselves in the same situation as those dissidents and or *"genocidaires"* who are on the government's wanted list because of its intolerance of army deserters. Given Cape Town's reputation of world-class educational institutions, health facilities, higher formal employment opportunities and tourist attractions, the general assumption would be that these men have fled to a safe haven. Some scholars however argue that Cape Town's "beauty is flawed" because of racism and discrimination, as well as the violence against *kwere kweres* (foreign Africans), which lurks beneath its surface. Migrants from the African continent bear the brunt of the city's xenophobic flaws (Parnell and Pieterse 1999; Uwimpuhwe 2015). Rwandan ex-soldiers find themselves in a hide-and-seek 'dilemma' (Maringira 2015). Rwanda has assigned the military's external services organization to track down ex-soldiers living in exile because they are regarded as a future threat to the Kagame regime. So, based on the knowledge or perception that they are being tracked, Rwandan former soldiers find themselves actively engaged in scanning their social environments for suspicious objects, vehicles and persons in dangerous townships. Owing to the perceived threat posed by the ESO these former military men thus fall within the category of vulnerable refugees.

4.5. Mistrust and embodied insecurity

The Rwandans in Cape Town are a complicated group with subtle and multi-layered divisions. These include the Rwandan Community in Cape Town (anti – government), Rwandan Diaspora in South Africa (pro-government), political parties of which the Rwandan National Congress is one and Rwandese churches. Within these broad categories I found further clusters along ethnic, professional, familial and regional lines. People of Hutu ethnicity had their own polar divisions (north and south). While most refugees are not homogenous, the dense history of distrust that characterises Rwandans can add further dangers or perceived threats. In this community, mistrust, violence and fear of danger compete over how Rwanda is represented in the diaspora. As noted by Sirikare, one of the army deserters,

> The community can easily be infiltrated because it has too many divisions
> which also make the community fertile breeding ground for suspicion, fear
> and surveillance.

The quote above not only reveals the social incoherence and chronic mistrust but also the deep-seated volatility of the Rwandan exile community in Cape Town. The idea of infiltration echoed by army deserters and the wide distrust understandably reflect a long term crisis in this society. When crisis becomes endemic rather than episodic in society, people develop the skill of 'smelling the rotten' (Vigh 2008), making use of their senses to proactively scan their social environment for invisible intruders, and negative potentialities (Ambagen 2000; Vigh 2011). This sensual detection of trouble depends on citizen-to-citizen monitoring or 'lateral surveillance' (Chan 2008). It is believed that the RPF has utilized this method to catch its rivals (perceived or real) in the past. As noted by Soda, an army deserter,

> Kigali seems to have accurate, (up) to the minute information about those
> being sought and such accuracy is obtainable only when they are working
> with insiders.

The idea that Kigali (i.e ESO) might be using state of the art surveillance technology was dismissed: instead the blame was shifted to "sell-outs" - individuals who were committed to the Rwandan state. In other words, 'people were the technology'. For Mataka, an army deserter

> That is why it is difficult to trust anyone here. One cannot entrust their safety
> to anyone. Safety is an individual responsibility.

While citizen-to-citizen surveillance is part of global ways to protect national security, Pasquetti (2013) maintains that this type of surveillance destroys the social fabric. From the discussion with army deserters, even at happy spaces like weddings it is difficult to trust people. Thus, some people do not eat food at weddings or funerals, others generally avoid such gatherings for fear of being spotted. It is in such instances that the assertion that citizen-to-citizen surveillance attacks the social fabric (Purdekova 2016). Those Rwandans who are affiliated to the Rwandan diaspora in South Africa are the most mistrusted because of their (possible) close connections with the Kagame government. Close association with these pro-government people can cause one to be mistrusted or even ex-communicated by his group members. Non-aligned persons and new arrivals were also said to be equally mistrusted by both factions (Uwimpuhwe 2015). Given such high levels of mistrust, most of my research participants lived in fear of the known and unknown, and in most instances they relied heavily

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on their own soldiering techniques of soliciting information to make decisions about their daily movements and times.

In her book *Security and Suspicion*, Ochs (2013) reveals how fear, suspicion, surveillance and security can be prominent principles in ordering people's lives. Foucault's (1977) concept of 'bio-power' is appropriate when it comes to explaining 'self-surveillance' behaviours amongst my participants, for example uneasiness during interviews, being constantly on the phone receiving updates (according to them), cancellation of meetings, the kind of hyper alertness that Vigh (2011) referred to as 'talking with one eye and looking out with the other', being overly suspicious etc. When I met with participants, these ex-soldiers were restless and tense during most of the conversations. The one that appeared most uneasy was Soda: square-jawed and stern looking, he hardly smiled and continuously took deep breaths. He also looked around and sometimes stood up to pace up and down, rubbed his palms. He was always on the phone and at the end of each call he would say to me

> It is my colleagues; they are worried that they have not seen me since morning.

While the explanation above reassured Soda and made him smile a little, I found him constantly uneasy when talking about the army deserters' experience of life in exile. It was confounding and risky, and the multiple calls during interview showed me just how much my respondents predicted and ordered their movements in relation to perceived and experienced threats. Even though they feared their 'hunters', they always seemed to be prepared for what they imagined could happen. Such preparedness for danger rather resonates with Bourdieu's concept of *illusio*, wherein "one always positions oneself not where the ball is, but where it will be" (Bourdieu 1998). So when Soda excused himself to go to the bathroom, I did not think that he would come back to continue the interview. I was surprised when he did. Another participant, Gitare about 10 minutes into the conversation, abruptly indicated that he could not continue, because he was afraid and then hurriedly left me. With Soda, I found that his updates from his compatriots regarding the safety of his environment were useful but they also limited his movements. A deserter who cancelled our discussion shortly after we started really scared me. He seemed hyper agitated and worried. I did not know then and still do not know where to place him in the Rwandan maze of exiles. He said:

>   I am sorry I cannot continue with the interview because I do not feel safe
>
>   since you are only a student and not an organization. I would have continued
>
>   if you were coming from a Human Rights organization, at least I would know
>
>   that I would be more protected.

This seemed to resonate with Foucault's notion about the ways in which power is played out in self-regulating, daily routines wherein the individual is implicated in their oppression as a result of self-surveillance and self-discipline (Trioullot 2001; Pylypa 1998). On two occasions, I had to cancel appointments after Mwaka phoned saying;

>   I am sorry but I have to cancel this meeting because as I am driving I
>
>   have realized that there is a vehicle that has been following me for a long
>
>   distance now and I am just suspicious, I trust my instinct. I will be in
>
>   touch.

The extract above brings our attention to the interesting facet of instinct in surveillance studies. According to Vigh (2011) the notion of instinct or sixth sense, entails a holistic combination of one's senses and experience. It is that lens focused on possible danger, which moves us out of harm's way or prepares us for it. One army deserter in my study reiterated the importance of paying attention to one's hunches. He maintained that the military training that soldiers undergo harnessed this sixth sense and it became a useful characteristic in life. For my research participants, everyone was treated as suspect. In my case, despite my having gone through their 'vetting' process, they still wanted to know a lot of things about me. One of the army deserters, Fuyama, said directly "Who are you working for? Because the information we give might end up in the wrong hands, you might be a spy." This was echoed by, Rubwesi, an army deserter, who stated that the RPF was the deadliest 'animal': therefore, they were wary and inquisitive

>   If there was anything to be afraid of in this world, the RPF was one such
>
>   thing. But tell me, how sure are you that you also are not being watched or
>
>   followed, since you are not working for them? Talking to us can really put
>
>   you on the spotlight you know.

The extract reveals not only a profoundly perceived RPF presence in these army deserters' lives but also the meanings and importance they attached to treating strangers as possible enemies, or conduits for state surveillance. It also shows how determined these former military

men were to uncover the hidden aspects of people before they engaged, regardless who referred you to them. They do not seem to take anything for granted. Their belief that army deserters are being followed controls these men and who they associate with – thus, like the security organizations that they think is pursuing them, they are hyper vigilant.

4.6. Suspicion of the Other

Army deserters avoid predictable routines because they live in fear of the omnipresence of forces laying in ambush to catch them (Uvin 2001). They are extremely distrustful of everyone, especially outsiders. Fear and suspicion seem to have become existential realities ingrained in them to the point of being an "ontological insecurity" (Giddens 1991). While Rwandan ex-soldiers in exile have always been on the lookout for danger, their feelings of insecurity and subsequent self-surveillance actions were worsened by the assassination of Patrick Karegeya in Johannesburg in 2014, three failed attempts to assassinate General Kayumba Nyamwasa and the deaths of their compatriots "which occur regularly in SA" (GroundUp 2016) as reported earlier. Although their circumstances were unpleasant, they found ways to survive and even make a living in Cape Town. Rather than pretending that they were safe, they appeared to have normalized their predicament and had cautiously ordered their lives around it. Some of the narratives were quite compelling, like that of Soda:

> One of the army deserters got a call from a person whom he had been communicating with, regarding a better employment offer, when this "linker" visited him the next thing was that the army deserter was found dead in his house. In another incident the army deserter was abducted then kicked out of a speeding car. In another different incident an army deserter's house was broken into in broad daylight: none of their possessions were stolen but he was found dead with a shot in his chest. In yet other incidents some people just go missing and their bodies will be found in places which are well known for murder such as Nyanga, Langa or Khayelitsha townships, and in most occasions some get assaulted by unknown assailants. But we can tell that this person has fallen at the hands of the spies because of the nature of attack,

the signs of struggle on the dead person's body and the way a body is tied, if
they tie the person, we know.

The extract above reveals the narratives of real violence meted out against army deserters, men suspected of having a hidden agenda against President Kagame's government. These acts of violence are not openly spoken about within the Rwandan exile community and they are aimed at creating political subjectivities by instilling fear within those opposed to the Kagame administration. The on-going disappearances, assaults and killings is an issue which continues to worry these army deserters. Soda explained:

It feels like we are living in a war zone and the military has taken advantage of the violence that takes place in this city, the gangs and thugs etc., so sometimes they use the same tactics used by local thugs in attacking us so that the people are left guessing as to who the perpetrator is, but we know. They also sometimes use these guys to attack us, you know. These South African guys who do not want to work will be willing to do the job for small amounts so that they can buy 'tik'. What is disheartening being that the police attend to these scenes yet they do nothing about these cases until they become cold. They say that the killers and assailants cannot be traced. And it is also difficult for us to pursue the cases, we may expose ourselves in the process, you know how it is when you wish you could do something but are afraid of putting yourself in the limelight.

What the above extract is inviting us to unpack is that the 'unknown' assailants have capitalized on the high levels of crime in the city and they have gotten away with it on several occasions. Even though the police attend the crime scenes, the deserters feel vulnerable. The situation described above resembles that of Guinea Bissau in several wars. High levels of youth unemployment bring young men that engage in conflict and crime for small amounts of money. While the host society, i.e Cape Town, has a reputation of violence (Salo 2011; Uwimpuhwe 2015), the army deserters maintain that their compatriots have fallen victim to security agents whom their government has sent to attack them for political reasons. The RPF's espionage ring is said to continue to use South Africa as a "springboard to conduct illegal activities" (*Global*

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Post 2014; All Africa 2014) as highlighted by the South African Minister of Justice and Correctional Services Mr. Michael Masutha. The above incidents and the South African Government's own concern enhanced the 'emotional climate' (De Rivera 1992; Barbalet 1992) of fear and suspicion within which the Rwandan ex-soldiers lived and operated. According to De Rivera (1992) emotional climates comprise

> …sets of emotions or feelings which are significant in forming and
> maintaining identities and collective behaviour. Emotional climate thus
> constitutes emotional tones and behavioural patterns which differentiate
> social groups

 For these army deserters, fear created an exceptional state of alertness, a 'state of war preparedness' (Wilson 2012) which was the substance of their livelihoods.   Although I was aware of the RPFs hostile attitude towards ex-soldiers, I was initially oblivious to my study participants' unwillingness to be associated with the Rwandan government.   I noticed their discomfort in my use of the words 'community' and 'diaspora' when referring to the entirety of Rwandans in Cape Town. They themselves instead differentiated between 'community' and 'diaspora' when referring to those people who are anti-government. They used 'diaspora' to denote those who are pro-government. The army deserters thus felt themselves part-and-parcel of a long history of divisions within Rwandan society and perpetuated outside it by ex-patriots, refugees and even Rwandan spies. In trying to understand the army deserter's disinclination to be associated with the incumbent government, I refer to Lovegren's (2014) characterization of the kind of authoritarianism which the RPF represented. She argued that it pervaded even the intimate spaces of ordinary citizens living in the country, representing a sovereign power that decided who lived and who died. Reyntjens (2006) and Hintjens (2008) describe it as a ruthless kind of dictatorship that has not only inculcated fear within its nationals, but neglects and perpetrates violence against the people who defend its sovereignty, those whose lives are put on the line, in 'commercial wars' such as the DRC wars, for the selfish enrichment of a few.

 It is a political order that will not let even those of its nationals living beyond its geographical borders find and enjoy real peace (York and Rever 2014; Uvin 2001). My informants as former military men have mastered the art of 'reading' people as well as profiling, intelligence

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gathering and scanning the social environments for possible threats, with the hyper vigilance provided by their military training. As noted by Sirikare:

> As soldiers we are trained to move faster than the enemy otherwise that will be the end of me. For me, I work in this open space so I always look out for people who have an inquisitive eye when they look at me. When someone approaches me to ask for help I can detect whether they are genuinely in need of help or not from the way they carry themselves and from the way they talk and look. Even from a distance, I can smell danger.

This statement confirms the argument that the military characteristics learnt within the military context are transposed into post military life, and may become a useful resource (Higate 2000). Being responsive to the danger underlying the hyper vigilant behaviour of such research participants draws us to understand their vulnerabilities-their fears are very real- but fear is also subjective when it presents itself in 'invisible' ways; fear, insecurity and suspicion become chronic states of being that are depressing at least and incapacitating at most.

One of participants had with him a can of pepper spray, a stun gun (*taser*) and an okapi knife, for 'self-defence and not criminal activities'. This, he said, was nothing compared to the weapons of his 'enemy'. Thus these army deserters remained 'militarised refugees'. He pointed out that most of his compatriots had something to defend themselves. While the intention of deserting and fleeing to South Africa was to lead normal civilian lives, the threat and perceived danger they find themselves facing, reinforced rather than diminished their 'military habitus'. Although my research participants did their best to conceal their former military involvement their disposition tended to betray them, to the discerning eye. Most of the army deserters said that they only walked to the mall or the club when it felt safe to do so. Other than relying on information from all their compatriots, they were rather selective depending on an informant's credibility, and they also relied on faith and intuition for guidance. The self-defence skills they learned during military training were in many cases the reasons why some of my participants are alive today. My interpretation of their permission to briefly explain these circumstances is in order to make their plight known and show that their fears are real.

While the South African government is seen to be protective towards Rwandan refugees (Sokoloff 2014), the ex-soldiers feel that the police and population are hostile towards them. Some talked about being attacked by locals who saw them as proud and rather conspicuous in buying beer and enjoying life. The government of South Africa demonstrated its attitude towards Rwandan exiles when it expelled Rwandan diplomats in 2010 and in 2014, following the attempted assassination of General Kayumba Nyamwasa and after the murder of Patrick Karegeya. The police tend to capitalize on their vulnerability, Sirikare said:

> Sometimes the police purport to know people who are 'hunting' Rwandan refugees so we constantly negotiate with police and usually end up paying bribes in order not to be exposed to the 'hunters'. Seriously! Those gentlemen are cruel.

Army deserters are convinced that the ESO sometimes works with corrupt police officials in South Africa, whom they pay. Then the local police come to Rwandan army deserters and extort money from them, I was told. Thus ex-soldiers fend for themselves under very difficult conditions. While the ex-soldiers expressed fear of the ESO, they said they were in much the same situation with the people who are trailing them because:

> They cannot return to Kigali without having accomplished their mission, otherwise they will face the consequences of failing to execute their duties.
>
> It is not possible for those guys to go back to Kigali without having accomplished the task they have been sent to do. So in situations where they really fail, because sometimes the persons they seek are not so much of an easy target, they end up going for the easier targets- that is why we end up with casualties' even amongst ordinary civilians. You see, in the army, the commander's word is like rain, it does not go back up without having made the ground wet (Makwa).

Mere association with army deserters can be dangerous because people can be in trouble for allegedly harbouring army deserters, according to my participants. To me, the rain referred to above became a euphemism for shedding blood; the security agents are unleashed on the

entirety of the Rwandan community in exile (the soil) persecution of Rwandan civilians follows (wetting the soil) and then condensing (evaporating) and returning to the sky (Kigali).

4.7. Resistance and resilience

Even though the Rwandan government has called for Rwandans living abroad to return home, like most of their compatriots, former Rwandan soldiers living in Cape Town, South Africa remain unconvinced by promises to refugees to return home. They are reluctant to go back and they insist on staying in South Africa

> I tell you I am going to stay here in South Africa until the SA government
>
> naturalizes my residence.

Rwanda is perceived as an unsafe place for them to return to (Hovil 2010, FNJS 2014; Kavuro 2015), and it long will be.

> We can continue this hide and seek with whoever is assigned to catch me
>
> until forever, it is okay, but I will never return to that country.

These statements can be understood as an appeal to policy makers - the government of South Africa and the UNHCR - to look into the plight of Rwandan ex-soldiers whose repatriation has such dire consequences. Despite having witnessed, experienced or heard about their pursuers, Rwandan ex-soldiers seem to be resilient in dodging them. They explained that security is a domain of experience and that one may never appreciate unless you have been there.

> We are not joking here; it is a matter of life and death every day.

The ex-soldiers have become skilful in navigating the South African civilian terrain. In trying to understand how my participants navigate the social spaces, I used the concept of 'social reflexivity' (Vigh 2008), i.e. being aware of the unpredictability of the terrain and assessing the spaces they move in. I found that this is one trait that sets the rest of migrants apart from army deserters. They constantly reflected upon their ways of anticipating and predicting possible and impending dangers. In this reflexivity, I am further drawn to understanding the actions of my participants (self-surveillance, self-regulation, fear, suspicion and resilience) as

a result of continuous 'reflexive normalization' (Berger and Luckman 1967; Giddens 1991) of their circumstances in the host society. Such normalization does not mean that the circumstances of being followed or watched have been resolved; rather it means that they have managed to organize their lives around those circumstances. In (re)conceptualizing navigation within crisis situations, Jackson (1998), Vigh (2006a) and Vigh et al (2006) point to the existing dialogue between people's actions and the environment. Rather than thinking about how they move in their environment, we see the environment also as having the capacity to move army deserters. Sirikare added:

> Ex-Rwandan soldiers are a special case and the host government should at least prioritize us when it comes to documentation, such as giving us refugee status at least, because honestly we are endangered. And this is not a joke. We are not '*genocidaires*' as they portray us to be, we are those people who could not stand the rot that currently characterizes the military, seriously. Kagame sees us as a future threat to his government. We need some form of protection, every one of us; not just those who have been vocal critics of Kagame, such as General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. Without that, we will spend the rest of our lives running and being vigilant in ensuring our safety. Some have been dying, some people are being killed, and the problem is we don't know who is on the list.

The extract above dismisses the idea that the army deserters' fears are just perceptions. The RPF's hatred towards exiled army deserters is based on the history of the party's rise to power. Given the current failure in statecraft in Rwanda, the RPF probably anticipates a possible armed invasion of Rwanda, which is why the government's security organs are desperate to find and punish army deserters and political opponents outside Rwanda.

During the course of this study, two participants were found dead: one at his home and two months later, the second one was gunned down in an informal settlement in one township, where he was visiting his friend. The assailants of both men were unknown but their colleagues are convinced that they had been on the 'list'. Their knowledge of the existence of a 'list' of people being pursued, while not knowing whether they are on it themselves, presents a

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continuous sense of threat. The actual violence experienced or witnessed by army deserters also reveals the reality of their fears.

Inasmuch as the ESO agents are committed to ensuring the RPFs security, they remain insecure and dispensable to the Rwandan authorities, according to Sirikare. He explained:

> We are in much the same predicament with these people who are seeking us, if you look at it closely. While they are busy securing the president and the government, they are also very insecure. Because the moment they fail to accomplish the task they are in hot soup, the military cannot tolerate such 'incompetence'.

To ensure their success the Rwandan security squads operating in South Africa have reportedly incorporated various groups of people to assist them:

> They know that some of the army deserters love their drink so they go to clubs in town and *shebeens* in townships to look for them. If you look at it, most of the guys that have been attacked in townships would have been drinking earlier on. That is why I say drinking is not bad but being drunk is deadly. They know that some of the army deserters love women so much and that they cannot keep their belts on their waists.

Thus being drunk can be perilous, but is also a way to escape from constant worries and fear. While prostitutes can possibly inform on Rwandan ex-soldiers the latter nonetheless try to have a 'good time' with women in the host society in Cape Town, newcomer involved in love and sexual relationships in the midst of difficult situations (Gray 1958; Rennell and Hall 2015).   In spite of the risks associated with such engagements, being trailed was not enough to deter some of my research participants. As noted by Soda, military security personnel sometimes used children or unsuspecting citizens to gather information about certain people

> Once they know the possible whereabouts, they will just produce your photo to people and pretend to be your long lost friends and they will ask all the information they can get, for children, they can give them small

change five rand for example, and then they will follow up on that information and the next thing we hear is so-and-so is missing or dead.

It is small wonder these supposedly ubiquitous death squads are called the 'omnipresent eye'. The concept of the 'omnipresent eye' is also embedded in the Rwandan government's perceived ability to make use of lateral surveillance through other people in almost all the circles that e.g. a Rwandan deserter might orbit. This makes the ESO 'present even in its absence' (Agamben 1999; Chang 2013; Ochs 2013). The latter's commitment to duty is seen as sometimes stretched to unacceptable, unethical levels. E.g. using children to provide information. But that was not surprising to Sirikare:

They have no scruples, they used child soldiers in 1990: it is not news to me, that is how desperately they want to catch army deserters.

My study participants alleged that ESO agents in South Africa work with local gangs, and thugs, in their bid to catch army deserters:

One evening I was walking with my neighbour and as we were approaching a group of young men who were standing in the street, there was commotion amongst these guys, like a fight just broke out and a car just sped past us but there was a shot that was fired from the car, I saw it. None of the guys took out a gun. Moments later, I received information that the security agents were in my area. That is when I started to join the pieces of what had happened. So it is true, they also take advantage of these poor thugs also.

Even though the net of informers has broadened, it is important to note that the army deserters remained convinced that their fellow countrymen played a pivotal role in leaking information about their lives and whereabouts to the ESO. An irate Sirikare said:

'Our brothers betray us!'

While the Rwandan military's security agents are purported to be busy gathering information about their targets, the army deserters gathered information about the agents in turn and seemed to be well informed about the ESO agents' whereabouts and impending moves. Security thus

becomes a porous and problematic issue and the army deserters feel as though they are in a war zone. Their general conviction is that the military agents are fierce. One of my respondents said they (security personnel) first tended to go for those people who were in the political limelight and then for those who may have had access to classified information. Finally, such agents focus on those who 'exuded confusion', i.e. those who did not know who their true allies are. In this situation neutrality was seen as deadly:

> Remember that this is a game of wits, if they approach wrongly they might be overpowered and the rest I will leave to your imagination but the consequences on their part for such a miss are grave as well.

Mamdani (2002) points out that we need to understand the nature of power in order for us to understand the nature of the struggles that people go through. The extract above reveals the battles that occur on the surface, as army deserters contend with the effects of the political climate of their home country each time they encounter attacks in the host society. Bourdieu's (1990) toolkits of habitus, capital and field are appropriate in analysing the utilization of military training by army deserters in defending themselves from attacks. These narratives also confirm Higate's (2000) argument that military skills can become a useful resource in times of difficulty in post-military life.

4.8. Camouflage and Concealment

Camouflage is a military term used by my participants to protect themselves from being identified by the military intelligence agents. This concept is supported by the findings that some Rwandans identify themselves as Somalis because they look like them and they now live amongst them. It is important to note that the RPF's political enemies cut across the ethnic divide unlike in the past where animosity between the government and citizens was almost entirely ethnically based. As such, I was not surprised to find army deserters of Tutsi ethnicity. The army deserter of Tutsi origin disguised himself in a manner that intrigued me. Indeed, he mastered the art of personal identity concealment. It emerged that because of fear; some ex-soldiers of Tutsi origins, whose looks resemble Ethiopians and Somalis, situated themselves amongst Somalis and have formed their livelihoods within the Somali communities. As I was

sitting at the bus terminus waiting for my research participant, I saw a lanky gentlemen donning a grey *thawb* walk straight to me, extending a handshake to me he said, "Florence, I am the gentlemen you are meeting today".

After looking at him closely, I realized that I had met him about a month earlier when I was with Soda, but that day he had been in completely different attire.   I did not expect him to be the person I was waiting for because to me, he was a 'Somali' nonetheless, we proceeded to the stadium   where we could talk safely and privately. When I commented on his completely different appearance, he explained to me that he and some of his compatriots had "implanted" themselves into "Somali-ness" as part of their disguise strategy. Camouflage and concealment presented both opportunity and risk for these army deserters. Like their colleagues, these ex-soldiers have also internalized the sense of being watched so they have created mental schemas to regulate their movement in the city delineating where they are safe and where they are not, and they do not, as a matter of principle, use secluded paths and they always take different routes.   My research participants appeared to feel safe in odd spaces. They tended to pay particular attention to their "hunches" and seemed to display capabilities to 'smell the rotten': just like Vigh's (2011) participants in Bissau who scanned the environment for the potential conflict of threat or danger (Vigh 2011).   On two occasions I had to reschedule my meetings with research participants who failed to make it to the meeting places. They said afterwards that they realized some suspicious vehicle had been following them for a long distance. Thus they decided to evade their potential followers, both for their own as well as my safety.

To understand my research participants' hyper-vigilance, one has to appreciate the fact that security is a sphere of experience in which past experiences and present circumstances shape one's sentiments about and logic of security (Bajc 2013).   Fear and suspicion are not new to Rwandan history, Rwandan experiences or the ex-soldiers. These emotions are also common to communities or people that have experienced heightened conflict and or criminality. Ochs (2013) observed that in Israel fear and suspicion conditioned how people see, live, move around the city and relate with each other.   For Trouillot (1996), the fear of danger is a "state effect" which is reproduced through non-state actions.   In my study, it can be said that the political climate prevailing in Rwanda is a felt reality amongst the ex-soldiers because of their perceptions of the Rwandan military's 'panoptic' capabilities to track down people even in far

off lands. The concept of panopticism (Foucault 1977) has thus been central in the creation of the 'emotional climates' of fear and suspicion that exists amongst my research participants. However, it is important to highlight that even though security emerged as the most important principle ordering their daily lives, in their most private spaces (with family and reliable compatriots), threat and suspicion are not necessarily prominent motifs.

4.9. Initiatives for Survival

There is a dialectical relationship between security and the quality of life that one leads (see also Ochs 2013; Chang 2008). The cases presented by the former soldiers whom I interviewed showed that, being trailed, fear and suspicion impacted negatively on their capacities to be economically productive, given the fact that most of them are not formally employed. This view is supported by Vigh (2008:15) who suggests that deterioration in one aspect of existence will, almost by definition, affect other areas of our lives'. What Vigh then calls us to do, is to examine the impact of trailing, fear and suspicion, on the army deserters' livelihood strategies in relation to the macro-environmental factors obtaining in the host society. It also calls us to analyse the agency of army deserters and the extent to which the host environment allows them to act towards livelihood in the circumstances they find themselves in.

South Africa's asylum law is basically concentrated on self-settlement or self-integration and self-sufficiency (Kavuro 2015). Refugees do not get material support and or humanitarian relief that "would help them to adapt to the average South African lifestyle" (ibid: 4). Globally, refugees and asylum seekers are largely excluded from the labour market because the refugee status 'was never meant to be permanent' (Sluzki 2006). Several works on the integration, assimilation and incorporation of migrants in industrialised countries show that life is generally not easy for migrants (Portes 1995; Crul and Schneider 2010; Massey and Par 2012). The situation for Rwandan army deserters is not any better in Cape Town. The Department for International Development DFID (2000:1) suggests that "a livelihood comprises the capabilities and assets (both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living". My research participants entered the country as refugees however, none of them were in possession of the refugee status, and all have asylum permits but would not disclose the validity of their permits. Nonetheless, their current livelihood situation is delicate because

ESO allegedly 'hunts' them. At the same time the UNHCR 2011 edict which revokes the refugee status of some Rwandans seems to have plunged them into a state of limbo, since they do not know whether they will be allowed to remain in South Africa or not after 31 December 2017. Contrastingly, commenting on Congolese and Zimbabwean migrant integration strategies, Tati (2014) and Maringira (2015) observed that migrants usually integrated into the host society, from below, through migrant-led effort.

Like many migrants in the country, most of the army deserters are found within the lower economic stratum which requires a lot of innovation and aggression for one to survive. They are mostly engaged in insecure unregulated trades such as the 'customer care" industry which encompasses car guarding, 'ubering' (or driving non-metered taxis) some are security guards, gardeners and shop assistants. Others are into the business of food deliveries and some are into 'tuk tuking' (offering short distance transport to locals, using scooters). Analysing the livelihood strategies amongst the urban poor in Cape Town, Neves and Du Toit (2012) said the jobs that the urban poor do, simply enable them to 'get by' the day. Even though they can work in formal employment most of the army deserters said such employment is scarce, hence they innovate. Soda had this to say:

> Here people can work, but the problem is that without other skills it can
> be difficult that is why you are seeing us trying to enrol for short courses.
> Another thing is that of documentation. That is the major challenge. And
> lastly, connections. For example, myself, most of the people who would
> be in a position to help me are car guards and some drive ubers, they will
> not be able to find me proper employment, which they could not find for
> themselves so we create our own work.

While the host environment has provided limited 'affordances' (Gibson 1986) to my research participants they mostly relied on their military disposition to identify and optimally utilize the few available opportunities in order to survive. In responding to the question of how long it took ex-soldiers to find jobs in Cape Town, one of my participants said:

> Never mind about us getting jobs here, rather ask about us finding something to eat and
> I can assure you that none of us goes to bed on a hungry stomach, we are soldiers, we
> scavenge…

According to the above quote ex-soldiers are used to this jungle-like scenario because of their military training. It is important to note that my research participants are certainly not subjects of aid, they have capital (skills and capabilities) that they use to support themselves. This confirms Hovil's (2004) argument that refugees have 'self-reliance strategies'.

Though connected to 'secure networks', most Rwandan soldiers are individually settled amongst the urban poor in townships which have a reputation of being unpredictably dangerous and where economic livelihood contests are underpinned by tense relations between locals and migrants. The 'social drama' (Turner 1980) of migrant - local hostilities were played out in xenophobic attacks on the former in 2008, in 2015, and to a limited extent in 2017 (Crush et al 2013; Uwimpuhwe 2015; *news24,* 2017). The context for hostilities was that migrants were willing to work in precarious conditions, and work harder, for longer hours and for paltry pay, hence for oppressive employers they became employees of choice at the expense of locals. Most of my respondents highlighted that in the areas where they stayed, locals disliked foreigners and all of them had been attacked at least three times each while going about their businesses. Looking at me sternly, Soda who now referred to me as his sister instead of spy, asked me:

> Do you think anyone in this country should really claim to be purely South
>
> African, given the colonial history and attendant intermarriages?

While I was still thinking of how to respond to this rather ideological question, he laughed out loud and continued that:

> This country is a conglomeration of migrants so the 'so-called' locals must
>
> just shut up and enjoy the benefits of the 'so-called' migrant's sweat.

He attributed his survival during the 2015 xenophobic attacks which occurred while he was living in Johannesburg, to the self-defence skills acquired during his military training. Hearing these sad stories of being followed, harassment by police and xenophobic attacks I raised the question why South Africa remains the destination of choice for most of my research participants? I was told that while economic factors are important in making such a decision it is not the predominant issue. South Africa was deemed to be safer than any other place in

Africa because the South African government abides by international laws, it has an effective and functional justice delivery system and it upholds human rights. The government is not easily swayed into abusing the human rights of refugees by the authoritarian governments from which refugees fled. These comments were made by participants who once sought refuge in Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia but were forcibly repatriated. Because of this, my research participants regarded the South African government highly.

4.10. Not all ex-soldiers are criminals

As the problem of limited employment opportunities persists, the media has reported increases in criminality in the host society. Concerning ex-soldiers' involvement in crime, Rwanguri says there seems to be over-sensationalizing of crime when it is committed by soldiers. In this regard gun violence, armed robberies as well as 'subsistence crimes', were reportedly committed by the migrant population, particularly ex-soldiers from African countries (Peters 2015). Some scholars have noted that the lack of marketable skills of ex-soldiers renders them vulnerable to crime (Gear 2002; Nesbit and Reingold 2011; Strachan 2006). In Zimbabwe, a British ex-soldier was arrested for drug dealing[7] (*newzimbabwevision 2017*): Zimbabwean ex-soldiers were arrested for armed robbery in South Africa (*news24 .com 2017*), while ex SANDF members broke into the military armoury in Khayelitsha, "in order to put bread on the table" (*Voice Western Cape News 2017*): According to Woodward and Galvin (2000:1009) when the soldiers' attempts to (re)integrate into society prove futile "they are forced to return to soldiering, the only occupation they have known." In 2003, members of "Executive Outcomes" which comprises South African former soldiers were arrested in Harare following a failed coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea[8]. "Executive Outcomes" has allegedly, also been involved in Nigeria, Libya and Sudan as mercenaries (Smith 2015). Thus, my respondents said statements by South African Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula "that army deserters from other countries were committing crimes in South Africa", was "inflammatory nonsense". They challenged him to substantiate his claims with "statistics that are representative of all ex-soldiers in this country". Rwanguri emphasized that:

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[7] http://newzimbabwevision.com/

[8] The Herald, 18 March 2004. Zimbabwe government arrests Equatorial Guinea coup plotters who are all former members of the South African National Defence Forces

Rwandan ex-soldiers were not engaged in criminal activities and that it was

a risk they were not prepared to take because once caught they are 'finished'

because of the consequences they would face back home. If any Rwandans

are involved in such activities "it can only be those sent by the RPF to look

for refugees.

While 'soldierhood' (Maringira 2015) is associated with masculinity traits such as aggression, physical strength, impulsivity, insensitivity and lack of expression of emotion and minimum complaint (Connell 1995; Karner 1998; Woodward 1998; Woodward and Jenkings 2011) I argue that being an army deserter does not warrant the wholesale criminalisation of the ex-soldiers exiled in South Africa. I found that my research participants made every effort to lead normal civilian lives through honest means, doing the odd jobs alluded to earlier on. But circumstances demanded that they "cling onto their military identities" (Maringira 2015) in order to survive.

4.11. We live 'normal' lives in our terms

I wondered whether my research participants led 'normal' lives. Soda said his entire biological family had been killed in Rwanda, his father and brothers died during the genocide while his sister and mother died after the genocide:

> After deserting the army my journey to this present day has been a sad one.
> I am married and I have one daughter who is aged four. My wife and
> daughter are all I have, so I sweat and bleed to provide for them. My wife is
> a domestic worker and I know that life without me would be very difficult
> for them.

This participant was in distress when he thought about his past life and the future of his family in the event that he dies or is deported. I could hear his pain, he looked at me with tears in his eyes. After he regained his composure he said in a rather harsh voice

> When anyone comes to attack me, either to rob me or whatever the case,
> when I envision my wife and child, I fight like a tiger, it is for my family that
> I now stand in strong defence. Not for stupid politicians to put bread on their

tables while I don't have crumbs for my family. (But) I do lead a normal live

within certain parameters.

That last remark drew my attention to the concept of relativity, indeed normal is a relative term also denoting both "quantitative and qualitative aspects - as in the predominant state of affairs and or how things should be" (Vigh 2006a). I learned that normality is socially constructed. As indicated earlier no one can fully comprehend the situation or actions of Rwandan ex-soldiers because it is a phenomenological experience. Also their compatriots' perceptions towards these people seem to complicate their being in exile. Other non-soldiers regarded them as:

> …a danger to the community: because of the violent history of combat
>
> hence they should be treated as a special case. Second, their presence
>
> amongst us has endangered even non - soldiers because the people
>
> looking for them can attack even those suspected to be harbouring them.
>
> They need to be given some special protection. All of them, not only
>
> the politically vocal like General Kayumba Nyamwasa.

Responding to the question of whether they would still want to be employed as soldiers, the younger man said they obviously would return to soldiering in any army except the military back home.

4.12. Facilitators of Escape

According to Nzabamwita (2015) South Africa plays a key role in African migration as it serves as both a destination for immigrants and a source of maintenance of migrants' social ties, through remittances. Finding out that my research participants sent some of their income back home was not surprising since remittances have become a survival strategy sustaining livelihoods in the global south (Bakewell et al 2012). Nonetheless, what I found astonishing amongst my research participants was the reason for sending money to their families. Rather than wanting to ensure the well-being of family members in Rwanda, they mainly did so in order to facilitate their relatives' escape from human rights violations that could be perpetrated against army deserters' families by the country's internal security units, said Sirikare:

> To be honest with you, the income that I get per month ranges from R2000 to R5000 since I am not formally employed and this amount is not sufficient for me to adequately provide for my family in Rwanda. So what I have done in the past is to facilitate their escape from persecution in Rwanda because up to now, my brothers and parents sometimes get visits from the security agents who are still troubling them about my whereabouts. Nonetheless, my inability to remit meaningfully to my family makes me realize that I have failed in my role as a provider and as a man.

Sirikare's extract reveals the brutality of Rwanda's security organizations in that simply being related to an army deserter presents good justification for the government to perpetrate violence against you. The country has failed to arrest citizen flight which results from repression and human rights violations, despite the 'reputable developments' the country has achieved. In addition to all this, the extract shows the affective aspect of army deserters who then facilitate the relatives' escape from the regime despite the fact that they do not have adequate resources. Disappointment in one's failure to provide for his family, as above, shows the desire by army deserters to provide for their families. This desire is however throttled by the limited opportunities made available by the host society, which further rendered them incompetent in this regard.

4.13. Concluding thoughts on surveillance

This chapter has shown how Rwandan ex-soldiers experience being in Cape Town. Following their governments' non-tolerance of refugees in general and exiled ex-soldiers in particular as well as the hostile nature of the society they find themselves in, I have shown how these men's military identity has been bolstered rather than diminished. The discussion about the disunity amongst Rwandans in Cape Town has revealed that both the society and individuals contribute to the oppression of ex-soldiers through lateral surveillance and self-surveillance. Rwandan ex-soldiers represent militarised refugees, hence it can be concluded that there has been a perpetuation of the military identity. I have also shown their resilience in difficult situations and how they have innovated and managed to secure a niche in the hostile lower economic

stratum where most of them are found. The next chapter concludes the thesis, presenting the ways in which this research has contributed to existing scholarly arguments on and about former soldiers.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The study has revealed that even though the Rwandan army deserters' intentions were to lead normal civilian lives in exile, they have continued to live as targets of the Rwandan military intelligence wing, the External Services Organization. They found themselves bundled in the same category with former soldiers of the first and second republics who perpetrated genocide hence they do not live freely in Cape Town as they are constantly being hunted by the ESO which is mandated to root out possible external threats to Rwanda "in the interests of national security" (Prunier 2006; Reyntjens 2006). Thus persecuting former soldiers living in exile would extinguish potential threats of an armed invasion and enable the Kagame administration to proceed freely on its authoritarian path (Sidiropoulos 2012; Purdekova 2016). Contrary to the official Rwandan perspective that ex-soldiers living in exile are amongst the thousands of "fugitives and genocide hard liners who remain free abroad" (Uvin 2001:182) my participants revealed that they did not flee genocide retribution in their home country, rather they fled the cruelty and unprofessionalism of the Rwandan Defence Force (Kimonyo et al 2004; Silva-Leander 2008, Al 201; Hovil 2010; Sommers 2006; Brock 2016).

Having witnessed the manner in which the Rwandan Patriotic Army ended the genocide, my participants were initially proud to be members of the military but changed their minds when they found themselves victims of ethnic, political and class discrimination as well as brutal punishment within the military. It emerged that the RPF's extreme care for national security simply veiled the ruling party's intention to maintain political power by being hyper vigilant (Mamdani 2002; Mbembe 1992). My participants revealed that they were living very difficult lives in exile and that some of their colleagues have been abducted, physically attacked, killed or just disappeared. Because of this, the army deserters lived in fear of being caught and had acquired vigilance and skills, constantly reading and scanning the exile terrain for potential danger (Ambagen 1998; Vigh 2011)-and they had mastered the art of navigating it (Vigh 2008). It also was revealed that the government spies tended to capitalize on the host society's violent environment to conduct their activities so that people were left guessing who the perpetrators were. So I have argued that for my participants, the host environment works to strengthen their military dispositions and thus (re)produces 'militarized refugees' who, though vulnerable, are prepared to defend themselves. This study further shows that the situation that my participants

find themselves in, undercuts their capability to lead proper and predictable civilian lives because they spend most of their time scheming where possible next moves.

While many studies on ex-soldiers have presented the military-to-civilian transition as an easy one (Gear 2002; Woodward and Jenkins 2000), especially when the former military men find sustaining work (Woodward and Galvin 2000), only a few acknowledge that the environments that these former military men find themselves in can actually strengthen their military dispositions (Maringira 2014). The case study of Rwandan army deserters is one in which the former soldiers' military identities have been strengthened because combat followed them into civilian life. Even though the ESO has utilized the concept of panopticism (Foucault 1977) through its surveillance tactics we see the ex-soldiers employing social navigation tactics (Vigh 2008): they also dip back into their military habitus as they look out for danger and try also to protect themselves from the enemy, in the exile terrain. They are however constantly outsmarted by their well-resourced hunters, hence the fatalities and casualties on their part. So taking my research participants as a point of departure could be useful when making decisions such as the issuance of residence permits or when deciding on interventions aimed at protecting the human rights of former soldiers living in exile.

Even though my participants find it difficult to lead normal civilian lives in exile because of the surveillance by the Rwandan spies, they have managed to establish a niche in the lower economic stratum where they are engaged in what they term the 'care industry' where they are car guards, they do *'ubering'* and *'tuk-tuking'* as a means of survival in Cape Town. This study has also shown that not all ex-soldiers from the African continent are engaged in criminal activities, disproving the sensationalizing of crimes committed by ex-soldiers in South Africa. In the case of my participants, it was revealed that they did not engage in criminal activities for fear of the consequences that they may face in their home country, if they were caught and deported.

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