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**THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY FOR SOCIETY  
AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

BY

**ANSUNETTE STARKE**

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of



Supervisor: Professor H. D. Herman

February 1996






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I declare that THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY FOR SOCIETY AND EDUCATION is my own work and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.



A. Starke




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- Ian for his valued assistance with editing.



THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO MY MOTHER.

*I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away the freedom of another man is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of humanity.*

Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (1994)



## ABSTRACT

Ideology reveals itself in the commonly shared ideas and ideals which act as the driving force responsible for group formation underlying nationalist aspirations in society. It reveals itself in various ways with politics as the most visible and education as the most powerful, yet unobtrusive, manifestation.

In South Africa Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Nationalism have been involved in a titanic battle for the last fifty years. The ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism developed as a striving for political, cultural and educational freedom from British imperialist domination. An important part of this struggle was waged in the field of education, leading to the development of the sub-ideology of Christian National Education. The tenacity with which the Afrikaner pursued his nationalist aspirations was rewarded with the recognition of Afrikaans as official language in 1925, the National Party gaining political power in 1948 and the establishment of the Afrikaner educational ideology, Christian National Education, as state education policy in 1967.

The Afrikaner Broederbond, under the cover of an Afrikaner cultural society, exercised a tremendously strong influence in the political, economic and social spheres. With the support of the extremely influential Dutch Reformed Church hegemonic rule was further consolidated. In order to attain its ideals and maintain its position of power, Afrikanerdom engaged in suppressing the Black sector of the population. This manifested in the denial of political and human rights to Blacks, and was reinforced by an education system which offered Blacks inferior education to that of Whites to ensure that they would not become a threat to Afrikaner power.

The yoke of Afrikaner oppression united Blacks from different tribal affiliations and stimulated the awakening of the ideology of Black Nationalism. Initially Black nationalist aspirations were limited, but under the influence of the Black Consciousness Movement their demands were adapted to that of full citizenship and equality with Whites. The

tendency towards communalism in Black society resulted in Black Nationalism adopting the ideology of Black Liberation Socialism, under whose banner many former colonies had attained independence from their European mother countries. The educational sub-ideology of People's Education served the Black Nationalist ideal by adopting in its curricula, syllabi and organisational structure an approach which supported Black liberation from the *apartheid* regime.

The South African state (government, the police, the legal system, *etc.*) acted in a repressive manner under the influence of the Afrikaner ideology. The oppression Afrikaners suffered at the hand of British imperialism was repeated when Afrikaner Nationalism assumed power under the Nationalist government. It subjected Blacks to oppression and totally negated Black nationalist aspirations.

Education always serves the dominant ideology - a concept clearly manifested in Christian National Education as it served the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. In the same manner People's Education proved to be an extension of the Black Liberation Struggle. Ideology is thus in the service of power. Ample evidence exists that Afrikaner Nationalism and Christian National Education served to entrench Afrikanerdom in a position of seemingly unassailable power for an extended period of time after it had discarded the British imperialist yoke. This dominant position was maintained despite being a minority group. Should the same pattern prevail one would expect the African National Congress to abuse its present position of power to oppress the White minority and take revenge for the suffering that the latter had inflicted on Blacks for so many years.

Both the Oppressed and the Oppressor are dehumanised in the process of oppression. Although the Afrikaner was in a dominant, powerful position and seemingly free, he became enslaved to his own ideology. He was deprived of independent opinion and thought by the prescriptive ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism and its educational ideology of Christian National Education. Non-compliance was frowned upon and deviants ostracised. It is ironic that, by ousting the Afrikaner nationalist regime, the African



National Congress actually became the agent which liberated the Afrikaner from his self-inflicted ideological oppression.

Oppression thus seems to follow a vicious circle with both the Oppressor and the Oppressed suffering dehumanisation. Unless the Oppressed is rehumanised the oppressive role model presented by the Oppressor is emulated and the former Oppressed become the new Oppressor. The necessity for the process of rehumanisation to occur in the post-*apartheid* South African society can not be over-emphasised and thus various steps that can be taken to effect rehumanisation are suggested.



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## UITTREKSEL

Ideologie manifesteer in gemeenskaplike idees en ideale. Dit dien as dryfveer vir groeppvorming wat die grondslag vorm waarop nasionale aspirasies gebaseer is. Dit vergestalt op verskeie maniere waarvan die politiek die mees opvallende, en die onderwys die onopvallendste, maar dié met die grootste impak is.

In Suid-Afrika is Afrikaner-Nasionalisme en Swart Nasionalisme reeds die afgelope vyftig jaar in 'n titaniese stryd gewikkel. Afrikaner-Nasionalisme as ideologie het ontwikkel uit die strewe van die Afrikaner om sy politiek, kultuur en die onderwys te bevry van die juk van Britse imperiale dominansie. Die onderwys het by uitstek 'n prominente rol in hierdie stryd gespeel en die ontwikkeling van die sub-ideologie Christelike Nasionale Onderwys tot gevolg gehad. Die hardnekkigheid waarmee die Afrikaner sy nasionale aspirasies nagestreef het, is beloon met die erkenning van Afrikaans as amptelike taal in 1925, die oornam van politieke mag deur die Nasionale Party in 1948, en die vestiging van die Afrikaner onderwysideologie, Christelike Nasionale Onderwys, as staatsonderwysbeleid in 1967.

Die Broederbond het, onder die dekmantel van Afrikaner-kultuurorganisasie, 'n geweldige sterk invloed uitgeoefen op politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale gebied. Met die uiters invloedryke Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk as bondvenoot is Afrikaner-oorheersing verder bevestig. Om sy ideale te verwesenlik en die voortbestaan van sy magsposisie te verseker, het Afrikanerdom die Swart sektor van die bevolking onderdruk. Die strategie wat toegepas is, het Swartes hul politieke en menseregte ontnem en is verder versterk deur minderwaardige onderwys. Op hierdie wyse kon Blankes verseker dat Swartes nie 'n bedryging vir hulle sou inhou nie.

Die swaar las van Afrikaner-onderdrukking het Swartes van verskillende stamverbande saamgesnoer en die ontwaking van die ideologie, Swart Nasionalisme, tot gevolg gehad.

Swart nasionalistiese aspirasies was aanvanklik beperk, maar onder die invloed van die Swart Bewussynsbeweging het hulle eise gegroei tot dié van volle burgerskap en gelykheid met Blankes. Die neiging tot kommunalisme in die Swart gemeenskap het gelei tot die aanvaarding van die ideologie van Swart Bevrydingsosialisme wat die onafhanklikheid van talle voormalige kolonies van hul Europese moederlande geïnspireer het. Die Swart sub-ideologie vir onderwys, *People's Education*, het die ideaal van Swart Nasionalisme ondersteun deur Swart bevryding van die apartheid-bewind in kurrikula, sillabusse en die organisasiestruktuur te inkorporeer.


Die Suid-Afrikaanse staat (die regering, polisie, regstelsel, ens.) het onderdrukkend opgetree onder die invloed van die Afrikaner-ideologie. Die onderdrukking wat Afrikaners aan die hand van Britse imperialisme ervaar het, is herhaal toe Afrikaner-Nasionalisme die mag oorgeneem het onder die vaandel van die Nasionale Party. Swartes is onderwerp aan onderdrukking en algehele ontkenning van Swart nasionale aspirasies.

Die onderwys staan altyd in diens van die dominante ideologie - 'n konsep wat duidelik na vore tree in die wyse waarop Christelike Nasionale Onderwys die Afrikaner-Nasionalistiese ideologie gedien het. *People's Education* het op soortgelyke wyse die Swart Bevrydingstryd ondersteun. Ideologie staan dus in diens van mag. Daar bestaan genoegsame bewyse dat Afrikaner-Nasionalisme en Christelike Nasionale Onderwys grootliks bygedra het tot die bevestiging van Afrikanerdom in 'n posisie van oënskynlik onaanvegbare mag wat, nadat die juk van Britse imperialisme afgeskud is, oor 'n lang tydperk standgehou het. Ten spyte daarvan dat die Afrikaner 'n minderheidsgroep was, is hierdie dominante posisie volgehou. Indien hierdie patroon homself sou herhaal, kan verwag word dat die African National Congress ook sy huidige magposisie sal misbruik om die Blanke minderheid te onderdruk en wraak te neem vir die lyding wat Swartes soveel jare lank aan die hand van die Afrikaner verduur het.

Beide die Onderdrukte en die Onderdrukkers word van hul menslikheid beroof in die onderdrukkingsproses. Alhoewel die Afrikaner hom in 'n magposisie van oënskynlike

vryheid bevind het, is hy deur sy eie ideologie verslaaf. Hy is 'n onafhanklike opinie ontnem en voorgeskryf wat hy moet dink deur die ideologie van Afrikaner-Nasionalisme en die onderwys-ideologie, Christelike Nasionale Onderwys. Diegene wat nie hierdie denkrigting ondersteun het nie, is verkwalik en deur die gemeenskap verwerp. Dit is ironies dat die African National Congress inderdaad die Afrikaner van sy selfopgelegde ideoloïese verslawing bevry het deur die Afrikaner Nasionalistiese regering uit sy magsposisie te onthef.

Onderdrukking blyk dus 'n bouse kringloop te volg deurdat beide die Onderdrukker en die Onderdrukte van sy menswaardigheid ontnem word. Tensy die menswaardigheid van die Onderdrukte herstel word, volg hy die rolmodel wat die Onderdrukker daargestel het na, en die voormalige Onderdrukte word die nuwe Onderdrukker. Die noodsaaklikheid van die herstel van menswaardigheid in Suid-Afrika na die beëndiging van apartheid kan nie genoegsaam beklemtoon word nie. Verskeie stappe wat gevolg kan word om die herwinning van menswaardigheid te bewerkstellig, word voorgestel.



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
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# CHAPTER 1

## AIMS AND OBJECTIVES, STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

*There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes the practice of freedom, the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. The development of an educational methodology that facilitates this process will inevitably lead to tension and conflict within our society. But it could also contribute to the formation of a new era in Western history.*

(Shaul in Freire 1992:15.)

This is as true for South Africa as it is true for Western history.

Apple (1979:1) argues that education is not “a neutral enterprise” and that the very nature of the institution implicates the educator, consciously or subconsciously, in a “political act”. Educators are unable to separate their educational task from “the unequally responsive institutional arrangements and the forms of consciousness that dominate advanced economies”. To add to this contention Thembela (in Ashley 1985:101) states that education faithfully reflects the *status quo* in society. The turbulence in South African education, particularly since the Soweto riots of 1976 (Frankel *et al.* 1988:4), reflects the

instability in the country's social and political spheres. Black education in particular has been pinpointed as a major cause for dissatisfaction and heated political debate as minority power has for years dominated and suppressed majority aspirations. The ideology that has underpinned South African society and education, particularly since 1948 when the National Party (NP) assumed political control, was termed by Schoeman (1993:29) an "ideology of national survival". This complements John B. Thompson's conception of ideology as "the complex ways in which meaning is mobilised for the maintenance of relations of domination" (1990:8).

White educational ideology was aimed at maintaining White political power and control by indoctrinating Whites into believing that they had a God-given right to dominate and a duty to control Blacks (Du Preez 1983:73-75, 85). Those in power needed to firmly establish and maintain White Afrikanerdom in a position of power and control by using education as a platform for the indoctrination of the young (*cf.* Apple 1979:87). Even White adults were brainwashed into believing that the government was better qualified to determine what was in their best interest. They allowed themselves to unthinkingly accept whatever the powers that be deemed fit and necessary (Du Preez 1983:72-78, 85).

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As a multi-cultural society South Africa inevitably accommodates a variety of ideological groupings, each with its own set of values, principles, corresponding world and life view and, importantly, aspirations to power (Thompson, John B. 1990:6, 7). These ideologies have had a very definite impact on education as it exists in South Africa even today. While the Christian National Educational (CNE) ideology, representing the Afrikaner Nationalist grouping, dominated the education policy, philosophy, structure and process in South Africa up to the democratic elections of 1994 (and in many ways effectively still dominates), it represents only a small proportion of the country's population. Other ideological approaches to education were not granted legitimacy. Because of the exclusive nature of CNE other ideologies were suppressed (Du Preez 1983:14), resulting

in destabilisation of South African educational and societal structures by proponents of the other ideologies.

The shift in political direction that is in process at the moment under the new African National Congress (ANC)-led government of national unity is not likely to occur without a great deal of turbulence for all ideological groupings in South Africa. It is evident from the historico-political process of which education in South Africa has been part, that the effect of the political changes will fundamentally affect education and the ideology/ideologies which may in future underpin it. In a new education structure for South Africa each group is likely to aspire to having its educational ideology accommodated and incorporated in the education of its children - unless ideology can be dispensed with altogether.

The main problem for this study can thus be formulated as follows:

*What have the implications of the two main ideologies been for society and education in the pre-apartheid South Africa, and what might they be for the post-apartheid South Africa?*

### 1.3 ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

The political order arranges social relationships (and thus education as well) according to their philosophical (ideological) beliefs (Ashley 1985:101). This is evident from the tenacity with which the NP introduced, implemented and maintained its educational ideology of CNE - unobtrusively, *e.g.* in text books, once it came to power in 1948 (Du Preez 1983:14), and overtly as official policy since 1967 (Christie 1985:93). Education policy, content and structure were prescribed by the Nationalist government. It also determined the *per capita* educational expenditure, as well as the quality and type of education offered to Whites and Blacks respectively. The much quoted pronouncement by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, one of the architects of the *apartheid* concept, can justifiably be

repeated in the context of the foregoing: “The native must not be subject to a school system which draws him away from his own community, and misleads him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze” (Rose & Tunmer in Christie 1985:93). Although this ideology underwent adaptations over the years due to pressure from Blacks themselves, some Whites and foreign interest groups, the writer suggests that they did not occur because of White generosity, but rather through necessity. They were reactive, rather than proactive responses.

As has been stated earlier, the type of education that is selected to serve a country is determined by its political system. The political system, in turn, conforms to broad sociological models and educational theories which will be discussed in Chapter 3. The interlacement of ideological, historical and educational issues in South Africa will be examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, establishing the existence of various, and inherently conflicting, ideological groupings. Each of these has its own value system, principles, views and aspirations to power that are inevitably carried through to education by means of its educational ideology, derived from the overarching political ideology. (Ashley 1989:27; Du Preez 1983:14.)

Education in South Africa has up to recently (1994), regardless of what the different ideological groupings might have preferred, been based on the CNE ideology proposed, instituted and maintained by the Afrikaner Nationalist government which held power from 1948 (Ashley 1989:21) to 1994. The educational ideologies of other ideological groupings were not recognised or granted legitimacy. The NP had no intention of sharing or relinquishing its hard-earned power over education, because it enabled them to secure the youth and the future for the Afrikaner cause (Ashley 1989:27). This caused tremendous frustration to many educational communities in South Africa which had to accept being educated under an ideology with which they could not identify, and to which they bore no allegiance. The 1976 Soweto uprisings, which developed into a national rebellion and had serious international implications (trade embargoes, boycotts, *etc.*), was triggered by “the mandatory introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in the

[Black] schools” (Frankel *et al.* 1988:4). Since then Black education has not yet normalised. It is therefore of little wonder that there is such widespread turmoil in every sphere of South African education.

The conflict and functional theories (cf. Chapter 3) explain many aspects of the socio-political history of South Africa which runs along Black-White, African-Western, and First-Third World divides. After examining South African society and its education in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Chapter 7 will explore how these theories can enhance understanding of this situation. It will be argued that the conflict model, the consensus model and the structural model may hold the possibility for reconciliation between the opposing ideological groupings.

#### 1.4 THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

It is the intention of this study to examine the implications of ideology for South African education. This implies a thorough examination of :

- the main ideological groupings;
- various sociological theories underpinning these ideologies;
- the educational theories which correspond with the political structures;
- the power struggle in which these ideological groupings are involved;
- the way in which education is used in the power struggle;
- the feasibility of a societal model that could reconcile the conflicting views in a multi-cultural South Africa.

In his opening address in parliament on 1 February 1991 former president F.W. de Klerk expressed the necessity for building a unified nation out of the diversity that exists in South African society. To overcome such diversity emphasis would have to be placed on



common values and ideals. He identified these common values and ideals as the desire of all South Africans for peace, prosperity, progress and participation in democratic institutions. (SA Address by the State President ... 1991a:2, 3.)

It is necessary to examine the impact the main ideologies have had on society and education, and to evaluate the implications for the future. The objectives to be attained in this study can be summarised as an examination of:

- the socio-political evolution of South African society and education;
- the two dominant ideological groupings and the power struggle between them;
- the societal and educational ideologies broadly representative of the identified groupings;
- the societal and educational theories which best explain these ideological groupings;
- a reconciliatory and reconstructive plan of action for society and education in the post-*apartheid* South Africa.



## 1.5 SOURCES AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

Due to the nature of the topic, quantitative research methods are not feasible. A literature study will therefore be employed. A number of sources consulted are not recent, as research into the political and historical background requires older material. Laws, White Papers, reports of commissions appointed by the government, journals and books on education, sociology and politics regarding both South Africa and other parts of the world have been examined.

Ideologists, according to Van der Merwe & Murphy (in Ashley 1985:110), tend towards “excessive intolerance, over-simplification, polarisation and a refusal to compromise or reconcile”. This attitude is inclined to deepen and intensify conflicts between differing ideologies. Ideological issues are sensitive items to their adherents and closely linked to political and cultural heritage. Logic and factual evidence opposing, or in favour of, certain strategies are frequently defied by emotional responses or “false consciousness” (cf. 2.6.1). For this reason an attempt will be made to present objectively the viewpoints of the predominant ideological groupings in South Africa by examining their cultural, social and historico-political background and the influence exerted by proponents and opponents of the identified ideologies.

After investigation according to the above strategy the feasibility of separate nationalist and educational ideologies in a new political dispensation will be examined. Finally, a reconciliatory plan of action will be proposed, as well as suggestions for future research and implementation.

## 1.6 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

The strategy to be followed in the investigation of the various aspects of this study is as follows (cf. Figure 1.1):

Chapter 2 analyses the term *ideology*, and related concepts, as well as the concept *nationalism*. It also examines the evolution of the concept ideology from its beginnings to the Marxist and Neo-Marxist interpretations. Contemporary theorists and a typology of South African ideologies are further studied.

Chapter 3 deals with an investigation into models of development, sociological paradigms and theories of schooling.

Chapter 4 investigates the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism as an ideology.

Chapter 5 studies the evolution of Black Nationalism, in particular Black Liberation Socialism.

Chapter 6 examines the implications of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism for education, and their respective educational ideologies, viz. Christian National Education and People's Education.

Chapter 7 summarises the major findings of the research and examines the relevancy of models of development, sociological paradigms and educational theories. It also evaluates the feasibility of a unifying ideology for South African society and education, and recommends a course of action to break down divisions and establish unity.

Chapter 8 offers the conclusions that have been reached, as well as recommendations for research and implementation.






Figure 1.1: Structural outline of this dissertation

## CHAPTER 2

### THE CONCEPTS IDEOLOGY, MARXISM AND NATIONALISM

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

As this dissertation intends dealing with the ideologies of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Nationalism, the latter particularly in the development of Black Liberation Socialism, it is essential that the concepts ideology, Marxism and nationalism be thoroughly examined before an attempt is made to study the main nationalist ideologies that are at work in South African society.

To clarify the relationship between ideology and nationalism Degenaar (1982b:8) explains that nationalism is an ideology that gives priority to the nation. The term *ideology* had its inception towards the end of the 18th century when the French philosopher, Antoine Destutt de Tracy, coined the term to express “the science of ideas” or the “philosophy of the mind”. This sober, pragmatic, non-dogmatic view of “ideology” acquired its pejorative connotation when Napoleon, after initially supporting their views, withdrew his support of Tracy and his fellow philosophers when they criticised his policies which they regarded as detrimental to France. (Dant 1991:57; Eagleton 1991:66, 67; Thompson, John B. 1984:1; Van Straaten 1987:5, 13.) Although the term *nationalism* lends itself to a variety of analytical approaches this study will concentrate on “the philosophical roots of nationalism”, which are imbedded in its “historical roots” in Western culture and political ideology (Degenaar 1982b:7). It is thus evident that both these aspects are relevant to this study as the historical background to the development of the South African peoples and their ideologies are inextricably interwoven.

## 2.2 THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

The Soviet philosopher, V.N. Voloshinov (in Eagleton 1991:48-49), saw the formation of the beginnings of ideological thought as newly emerging social forces, which he termed *behavioural* ideology, that start from “the lowest, most fluid stratum of ... consciousness”, progressing to the upper levels of consciousness. The latter stage he refers to as “established” ideology. This links up with Williams’ contention (in Eagleton 1991:47) that every social formation consists of “a complex amalgam of what [he] terms ‘dominant’, ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ forms of consciousness”.

Raymond Geus (in Eagleton 1991:43) distinguishes between *descriptive*, *pejorative* and *positive* definitions of the term, ideology. The *descriptive* (or *anthropological*) approach regards an ideology as a system of beliefs held by a specific social group or class and is then referred to as their *world view* which determines their conduct. The second and *pejorative* view of the term refers to a critical, negative interpretation of a set of values, meanings and beliefs which are based on oppressive power, held consciously or unconsciously, and may represent true, false or distorted reality. This view is supported by Marx and Engels and seen as ideas produced by the ruling class (Eagleton 1991:44). Lenin’s “socialist ideology” has a more positive tone in that it refers to “a set of beliefs which coheres and inspires a specific group or class in the pursuit of political interests judged to be desirable”, often synonymous with the positive view of class consciousness. This pragmatic, non-judgmental approach is supported by Sorel and Althusser. (*ibid.*:44.)

Degenaar (1982b:8) provides a categorisation similar to that of Geus. He sees ideology as a system of ideas or values used to (i) *evaluate* theories and actions; (ii) *change* or *defend* an existing social order; (iii) *challenge* a totalitarian structure linked to a corresponding state of mind; and (iv) *conceal* the political, social and economic interests of the group’s views (writer’s italics). Degenaar (*ibid.*:7) agrees with other philosophers that ideology originally meant *science of ideas*, and adds that it was used to unmask political prejudice. Only later did it assume the meaning of the ideas pertaining to a specific social group, and

eventually “Marxism added the qualification that ideology is in reality a *false consciousness* or a *collective illusion* which veils the true nature of a given society” (writer’s italics). According to Corbett (in Degenaar 1982b:27) ideology means “any intellectual structure consisting of: a set of beliefs about man’s nature and the world in which he lives, a claim that the two sets are interdependent, and a demand that those beliefs should be professed and that claim conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member of a certain society.” It thus involves a theoretical and a practical side.

### 2.3 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEOLOGY

Ideologies are often referred to as unifying, action-orientated, rationalising, legitimating, naturalising, and lending coherence to the groups that hold them, and are equally important to dominant and dominated groups (Eagleton 1991:45). MacIntyre (paraphrased in Van Straaten 1987:5-6) describes ideology as “a system of beliefs which confer a shared identity on members of a society by locating them as characters in a story or actors in a drama ... and it supplies them with both a history and a destiny, a past and a future”. Anthony Kenny (paraphrased in Van Straaten 1987:6) stresses that the system of ideas must be simple enough to be understood without special training. He contends further that it affects political behaviour.

According to Pratte (in Pretorius 1986:20) ideologies are “more than fundamental beliefs”. He sees an ideology as “a generic term applied to beliefs in conjunction with highly emotive and persuasive ‘directions’ to practical concerns”. Pretorius (1986:23) adds to this by pointing out that ideologies are strongly action orientated. Degenaar (in Ashley 1989:2) fully supports this view and regards ideology as being “held by a group of people, for whom it explains the nature of the reality they experience, and it also has the power to commit them to action. They act because they believe.” He quotes Bell who describes ideology as “the conversion of ideas into social levers”. Eagleton (1991:47) contends that, however metaphysical the ideas may be, “they must be translatable by the ideological

discourse into a 'practical' state, capable of furnishing their adherents with goals, motivations, prescriptions, imperatives and so on".

The evaluative quality of ideologies results in the passing of moral judgements on social institutions and processes, justifying itself above other perceptions (Pratte in Pretorius 1986:48; Pretorius 1986:2, 3). This view is supported by Sargent (in Pretorius 1986:22) who describes ideologies as "composed sets of attitudes ... accepted as fact or truth". By implication non-adherents to a specific ideology are likely to question the validity of the said "facts", resulting in clashes between supporters of such different ideologies.

For the purposes of this study ideology is not defined as exclusively either prescriptive, pejorative or positive. The writer suggests that ideology starts off as ideas at the subconscious level, progressing to the conscious level. When the awareness of others with similar ideas occurs, ideology proceeds to the stage where it assumes a unifying dimension. Then it acts as the metaphoric "social cement" or "social glue" described in 2.7.2. While this unifying ideal is in the process of being realised, individual differences are being de-emphasised and, in the fervour for the attainment of the goal, this usually leads firstly to a distortion of relationships, the justification of these apparently incongruous relationships and then, once the ideal has been reached, the abuse of power to retain the acquired position.

## 2.4 CONCEPTS RELATED TO IDEOLOGY

The terms *ideology* and *culture* are frequently used interchangeably, especially at Afrikaans language universities (Ashley 1987:20), due to the strong ethnic orientation. Concepts such as *life world*, *ethnicity*, *own culture* and *national consciousness* are closely associated with ideology (*ibid.*:17).

The fundamental pedagogics perspective, to which Afrikaner Nationalism is linked, uses the concept, *ground motive*, which is defined by Stone (in Van Schalkwyk 1988:240) as



an unseen driving force, the *spiritual root* of community life, moral standards, the economic system and juridical and community norms. Van Schalkwyk describes a ground motive as a community motive which directs the community culture and determines the general life view (philosophy of life) and community ethos. According to Van Til (cited by Badenhorst 1985:10-11) a ground motive leads to the formation of a specific culture and “does not only steer a society in a particular direction, but also gives its culture an identifiable appearance”.

Bierstedt (quoted in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:199) describes culture as the “complex whole that consists of everything we think and do and have as members of a society”. Group culture refers to the particular ideals, goals, activities, interests and patterns of behaviour of a specific group under the driving force of a specific life view, as evident in the origin, religion, history, art, science, technology, language, politics, industrial life, *etc.* (Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:199).

Significant to this study is Badenhorst’s contention (1985:11): “In a homogeneous society with a stable culture the behaviour of its members will to a large extent agree with the norms that are held.” It is therefore of little wonder that diverse ideological groupings have evolved from the heterogeneous South African society with its divergent cultures.

## 2.5 THE CONCEPT NATIONALISM

Nationalism lends itself to a variety of analytical approaches. This study will concentrate on “the philosophical roots of nationalism”, which are imbedded in its “historical roots” in Western culture and political ideology (Degenaar 1982b:7). Both these aspects are relevant to this study. The historical background to the development of the South African peoples and their ideologies are inextricable.

For the sake of clarity a distinction is made between the following aspects related to nationalism: *Race* is interpreted as a biological (referring to Caucasian or White, Negroid

or Black, and Mongolian or Yellow); *people*, as a cultural; and *nation* as a political concept. Another facet of nationalism is that it can be interpreted in the narrow sense, meaning nation as comprising a homogeneous group of people, or in the wider, organic interpretation which includes different peoples. (Degenaar 1982b:8-9.) *Black* and *White* will be written with their first letters in capitals to denote racial groups, as distinct from the colours, black and white. For the purposes of this study the term, *Black* will include Negroid and all *other than White* or *non-White* racial groups, as was the tradition during the *apartheid* era.

In the history of mankind consciousness of *nationalism* developed only as recently as the Renaissance and the Reformation (*ibid.*). Authority originally resided in God, or the rulers who acted as his representatives (the monarchs). This was followed by the nation-state, which in turn made place for the sovereignty of the people. Society in general currently ascribes to the latter interpretation where “[t]he ruler becomes a representative of the people rather than a representative of God”. (*ibid.*:9, 16-17.) The Declaration of Human Rights formulated the principles on which the present-day interpretation of nationalism is based as follows: “The principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation: no body of men, no individual can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it” (The Nations, Time Magazine, 7/12/1962:22). It follows that the relationship between the individual and the group plays an important role in analysis of the concept *nationalism*. Degenaar (1982b:12) identifies the following aspects of their structural relationship:

- (i) *a dialectical relationship holds between them: the individual becomes conscious of himself through identification and distinction from the group;*
- (ii) *belonging to a group creates a feeling of security in a threatening world; and*
- (iii) *homogeneity and conformity are pursued.*

From Renan's interpretation of a *nation* (in Degenaar 1982b:12-13) as "a soul, a spiritual principle ... a great solidarity, created by the sentiment of ... sacrifice" it follows that a nation cannot be destroyed by an external force, "but only by the people themselves, in so far as they lack the will to continue life in common" (Degenaar 1982b:13).

Kant's concept (*ibid.*) of self-determination had a significant impact on nationalism. He believed man should have the freedom of self-determination; therefore he believed in the republic as constitutional form which allows for the expression of the autonomous will of the people.

Kohn (in Degenaar 1982b:20) distinguishes eight kinds of *nationalism*:

- (i) *Constitutional nationalism (Locke in England and America);*
- (ii) *Nationalism of the will (Rousseau in France);*
- (iii) *Nationalism of the people (Herder);*
- (iv) *Revolutionary nationalism (Post-Napoleonic awakening in 1815 and the revolutions dating from 1848);*
- (v) *Power-political nationalism (Prussia, and Hegel's theory of the state);*
- (vi) *Pan-nationalism (the imperialism of pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism and Pan-Asianism);*
- (vii) *Racial nationalism (Gobineau and Anti-Semitism)*
- (viii) *Totalitarian nationalism (Communism, Fascism and National Socialism).*

The above categories cannot be applied rigidly and a variety of combinations exist. In Chapters 4 and 5 the writer will discuss *Afrikaner Nationalism* and *Black Nationalism* and refer to these categories. The ideology of *nationalism* uses metaphysics to justify its national behaviour. Examples are theologism (the myth of the chosen people) and racism.

These manifestations of the ideology of *nationalism* are very relevant to the South African nationalist ideologies and will be discussed when the relevant ideologies are being examined (Degenaar 1982b:30). The highest value of *nationalism*, though, remains national self-determination which refers to the right to independence with respect to other groups of people (*ibid.*:41).

## 2.6 IDEOLOGY, MARXISM AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

Gramsci (in Van Straaten 1987:6) identifies two interpretations of ideology in the *Marxist* tradition. One regards ideology as *false consciousness* (supported by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*), and the other sees ideology as *a necessary part of all social formations*.

To understand the origins of Black Liberation Socialism it is essential to have an understanding of *Marxism* (as distinct from *Marxist-Leninism*). Degenaar (1982a:11) defines *Marxism* as follows: "Marxism is a theory based on the views of Karl Marx according to which society is structured according to the basic relationships towards the means of production dividing society into two classes, the owners and the workers, and resulting in an exploitative and alienated situation which can only be overcome by a revolution in which the state as the coercive instrument of the propertied class is overthrown by the proletariat." The humanistic *Marxist* approach favours an evolutionary, dialectical process to conscientise the proletariat and dislodge bourgeois economic and political control without resorting to violence. Its aim is to establish a classless society so that the means of production will no longer be totally in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which causes the worker to become alienated from himself, his work and the products of his labour. (*ibid.*:10-11). *Marxism* is atheistic and believes that man is solely responsible for defeating injustices in the social, economic and political system. The *Marxist* ideology thus rationalises class interest (*ibid.*:11-12).

*Marxist-Leninism* on the other hand supports the same end-result but regards violent revolution as the only means to overcome exploitation. It differs from *Marxism* in the sense that it believes that the exploitative government must not only be overthrown, but that the master-slave relationship must be totally destroyed. Lenin also “introduced the concept of the Party, a small, dedicated élite which had to lead the revolution”. (*ibid.*:12-13.) *Marxist-Leninism* finds political expression in communism which Plano & Olton (1969:82) define as “[a]n ideology fostered by a revolutionary movement that calls for the elimination of capitalist institutions and the establishment of a collectivist society in which land and capital are socially owned and in which class conflict and the coercive power of the state no longer exist.”

Thus Marx’s view of revolution as a “dialectical process” was modified by Lenin to revolution as a linear, inevitably violent, process (Degenaar 1982a:12).

### 2.6.1 FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

The term *false consciousness* was coined by Marx. In the Marxist-Leninist conception ideology is also seen as an action-orientated system of ideas, with the concept of *false consciousness* referring to the values of an interest-group becoming instrumental in furthering its political ideal. Thus “moral values become mere instruments being made subservient to an all-inclusive idea”. It must be noted that *false consciousness* pertains to all ideologies, and not exclusively to Marxism. (Degenaar 1982a:16-17.) *False consciousness* links ideology to social classes and the material relations and forces of production (Van Straaten 1987:13). Marx stated that, “[m]orality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness”, are not independent of the history of material relations (Dant 1991:58). Referring to the workers’ class Engels (quoted in Van Straaten 1987:15) explains *false consciousness* as follows:

*The material life-conditions of the persons, inside whose heads this thought process [ideology] goes on in the last resort determines the*

*course of the process [but] remains of necessity unknown to those persons, for otherwise there would be an end of all ideology.*

This *false consciousness* lies in the ignorance of the economic class of its “own material origins” (Van Straaten 1987:15). Marx distinguished between ideology as *false knowledge* and science as *true knowledge* (Dant 1991:57). Bacon (in Dant:*ibid.*) studied how social and psychological features of knowledge introduced falsification and described the influence of the production of false or distorted ideas in his theory of *idols*. He stated that “all perceptions ... of sense of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.” He contended that superstition, human passion and religious representations also interfered with reason (in Dant 1991:56, 57), hence the often quoted phrase denoting religion as “the opium of the people” (Lenin 1905 in Vladimir Lenin: Religion 1933:7).

### 2.6.2 IDEOLOGY AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF SOCIAL FORMATIONS

The second approach in the Marxist tradition, namely that ideology is an essential part of all social formations, was put forward by Marx in the “Preface” to the *Critique of political economy* (1859) (in Van Straaten 1987:15-16):

*In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will: these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.*

The history of the theory of ideology within the Marxist tradition eventually veered away from materialist reduction which differentiated between ideology and science as distinct modes of knowing, but retained the conception of ideology as a structural feature of society (Dant 1991:57). Mannheim also distinguished between a total and a particular conception of ideology. His “total conception of ideology’ incorporated the recognition that all perspectives were ideological and socially situated”. This he used as basis for analysing “the social situatedness of all worldviews” and saw the “particular conception of ideology” as an effective political strategy because “it pointed to the social situatedness of opponents’ views” revealing their basis as class or self-interest, not truth. (Dant 1991:5, 57.)

## 2.7 CONTEMPORARY THEORISTS

Thus far the development of theories on ideology has been examined. Tim Dant (1991:5) states that “[the] contemporary theory of ideology describes a process of socially contingent values, interpretations and taken-for-granted knowledge that is necessary for the operation of society.” It is not concerned with false consciousness or truth as such, but rather with the process which is intertwined with all the other social processes. Dant (*ibid.*) defines ideology as “the general determinative relationship between the social processes and material conditions of existence and the abstract relations construed in knowledge”.

Contemporary studies of ideology would be incomplete without taking specific note of the views of Louis Althusser, John B. Thompson and Paulo Freire. Althusser examines how societal structures, which he terms State Apparatuses, are influenced by ideology. He regards education as the most influential Ideological State Apparatus. John B. Thompson, on the other hand, sees ideology as having no redeeming features, with the assumption of power as its sole aim. Freire agrees with the two previous theorists that manipulation and power struggle lie at the heart of ideology, but goes a step further. He not only explains

how the process of dominating and being dominated occurs, what harm it inflicts and how it impacts on education, but also offers a method to effect restitution. It is the opinion of the writer that, by studying the arguments of these three writers, the various dimensions of ideology and its impact on society and education can be examined in depth.

### 2.7.1 ALTHUSSER'S IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES

Althusser (1971:137) contends that the Marxist tradition regards the state as “a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes ... to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion, (*i.e.* to capitalist exploitation)”. Marx regarded the struggle of the workers’ class as rooted in the infrastructure set by the exploitative ruling class, and saw ideology as the means by which indoctrination occurs or by which an awareness of exploitation is created, resulting in a struggle against hegemony (Marx in Althusser 1971:139, 147).

Marx conceived the topographical structure of society as consisting of an infrastructure or base, and a superstructure containing two levels. The base is represented by the economic infrastructure, and supports and carries the two levels of the superstructure. The first level of the superstructure is formed by the State and the law, and the second, by ideology. The superstructure or ideology is determined by the base and cannot exist without it, although it can function relatively autonomously as long as the base is in place. The effectiveness of the economic base determines the whole edifice. It is evident that reciprocal action occurs between the infrastructure and superstructure. (Althusser 1971:134-136.) Althusser distinguishes between the narrow view of the state as a legal institution, which he terms State Power, and that of the State Apparatus (*ibid.*:137, 141-142), which includes the government, administration, army, police, prisons, *etc.* These same institutions are referred to as Repressive State Apparatuses if they function by means of repression and/or violence (*ibid.*:142-143).



Of cardinal importance to this study is the concept, Ideological State Apparatuses (abbreviated as ISAs), which refers to specialised institutions such as the educational ISA (public and private schools system), the religious ISA (different Churches), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (political system and parties), the trade union ISA and communications ISA (press, radio, television, *etc.*) (*ibid.*:143). The distinction between the (Repressive) State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatus is that the former functions primarily by repression and secondarily by ideology, and the latter predominantly by ideology and secondarily by repression (*ibid.*:144-145). Althusser (1971:145-146) further contends that “very subtle explicit or tacit combinations may be interwoven from the interplay of the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses”, the reason being that both fall “*beneath the ruling ideology*, which is the ideology of ‘the ruling class’”. Because the State Apparatus is able to exercise repression by means of physical force, administrative directives, censorship, *etc.*, it also determines the political conditions under which the ISA operates (*ibid.*:150). Althusser is emphatic that, for the maintenance of state power over a long period of time it must simultaneously exercise hegemony over and in the ISA (*ibid.*:146). It is behind the shield provided by the Repressive State Apparatus “that the role of the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated, the ideology of the ruling class, which holds State power” (*ibid.*:150).

Although it is generally accepted that the political ISA is the dominant ISA Althusser (*ibid.*:153) disagrees. He believes that “the ideological State apparatus which has been installed in the *dominant* position in mature capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle against the old dominant ideological State apparatus, is the *educational ideological apparatus*” (*ibid.*:152). Although the political ISA enjoys prominence of place, the educational ISA dominates. It has also ousted the Church from its former position as dominant ISA (*cf.* 2.5). According to Althusser the reason for the dominance of the educational ISA is because it unobtrusively influences young children at the age when they are most susceptible and vulnerable to influences. “[N]o other ideological State apparatus has the obligatory (and not least, free) audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist formation, eight hours a day for five or six days

out of seven". (*ibid.*:156). This is, of course, equally applicable when an approach other than capitalism is dominant, *e.g.* socialism. Effectively the school has free reign to promote the ruling ideology under cover of the universally reigning ideology of the school "which represents the school as a neutral environment purged of ideology ... where teachers respectful of the 'conscience' and 'freedom' of the children who are entrusted to them ... open up the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, by knowledge, literature and their 'liberating' virtues" (*ibid.*:56-157).

One wonders how many teachers in South Africa (especially from White Afrikaner backgrounds), having been victims of the educational ISA themselves, were oblivious of the indoctrination they had been exposed to, and were perpetuating in their teaching. The writer contends that the Afrikaner family structure, school, society and church were usurped by the goals of CNE and Afrikaner Nationalism and that the indoctrination started in childhood and was, unbeknown to the persons themselves, carried through to adulthood and into their careers. Teachers were the particular focus of Afrikaner ideology as their position as educators of the upcoming generation put them in a powerful position to instil the ideology. The patriarchal Afrikaner family and rigid Calvinistic church structure served to reinforce unquestioning acceptance.

The teachers from Black and liberal White backgrounds who taught against the oppressive ideology, were jeopardising their position of employment. They were obliged to work from biased textbooks and expected to teach from the Afrikaner ideological perspective, and branded subversive if these prescriptions were not accepted and executed with the docility expected from their Afrikaner counterparts.

Again it has to be stated that the same State Apparatuses were used by proponents of Black Liberation Socialism, although without state sanction. Black education suffered severely in academic terms while the schools were being used as organs to express Black frustration with their inferior education and inability to attain civil and human rights, but they were forced into thinking versus mere acceptance; they learnt to question, to look

for hidden agendas, to stand up for a different point of view. The skills acquired in the process were lacking in White education and have left many Afrikaners afloat in the new dispensation. They are no longer subtly instructed what to think and never learnt the skill to develop an independent opinion. The writer sees this as the main reason for the present apparent lack of purpose amongst Afrikaners and their fear of the future.

### 2.7.2 THOMPSON'S VIEW OF IDEOLOGY AND POWER

It is evident from the foregoing that tremendous ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of the term *ideology*. John B. Thompson (1990:3) states that the term is sometimes used descriptively, sometimes prescriptively, "or perhaps even primarily to evaluate a state of affairs". He rejects the idea of it being a form of "social cement". He states that "to characterise a view as 'ideological' is, it seems, already implicitly to criticise," conveying a negative, critical sense. This has given rise to attempts to establish a "neutral conception" of ideology referred to earlier, namely, seeing it as a "system of thoughts", "system of beliefs" or "symbolic system". (*ibid.*:5.)

John B. Thompson disagrees with the view of ideology as a stabilising force that unites members of a society that share the same values and norms. He contends that modern, complex, industrial societies are characterised by diversity of values and norms, rather than conformity. He suggests that the use of symbolic forms and systems must be evaluated within the specific social context where it only earns the term, ideology, if it serves to attain and maintain positions of power. (*ibid.*:8.)

Ideology manifests itself in every political programme, movement and action (*ibid.*:1990:5). Thus the "-isms", nationalism, communism, socialism, conservatism, *etc.* are usually classified as ideologies. John B. Thompson (1990:6) disagrees that this can be neutral and without pejorative judgement: "The concept is simply too ambiguous, too deeply marred by a history in which it has been hurled back and forth as a term of abuse, to be salvaged today for the purposes of social and political analysis".

He also stresses that ideology is concerned with much more than categorising, analysing and evaluating systems of thought and belief. More important is the use of these symbolic forms “to establish and sustain relations of domination in the social contexts within which they are produced, transmitted and received.” It is concerned with the interrelations of meaning and power. He states that the concept of ideology refers “to the way in which meaning serves, in practical circumstances to establish and sustain relations of domination”, and therefore, ideology is “*meaning in the service of power*”. (*ibid.*:6-7.) John B. Thompson is supported by Degenaar (1982b:60) in his emphasis on the importance of power with regard to nationalist ideologies. He defines power as “the ability to act and direct behaviour”. Manifestations of power are evident in situations such as political domination, social privilege and economic interest. Ideology can thus be judged as being either subversive or supportive of the *status quo*, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed.

According to John B. Thompson (1990:8) “[t]he analysis of symbolic forms as ideological requires that these forms be analysed in relation to the particular socio-historical contexts within which they operate”. Thus ideology forms an integral part of social actions and interactions, power and structure, reproduction and change, and symbolic forms and their social functions (*ibid.*:7). John B. Thompson (*ibid.*) states that as language is a social phenomenon it is “enmeshed in relations of power, in situations of conflict, in processes of social change”. The interrelations of language and ideology is further discussed in 4.4.2, 6.2 and 6.4.3.

John B. Thompson (*ibid.*:9) states: “For most people the relations of power and domination which affect them most directly are those characteristics of the context within which they live out their everyday lives: the home, the workplace, the classroom, the peer group”. Symbolic forms are constantly “employed and deployed” in the structured social contexts, which include education. John B. Thompson also refutes the Marxist contention that ideology is an illusion (the idea of *false consciousness*) and regards the power

magnates as under no “illusion” with regard to the aims they wish to attain and to which end they employ ideology subtly, and even not so subtly. (*ibid.*) He states that “[i]deology is not a pale image of the social world but is part of that world, a creative and constitutive part of our social lives” (*ibid.*:5-6).

A further aspect of John B. Thompson’s theory on ideology that requires discussion is his contention that power relations are “systematically asymmetrical” (1990:7). This can be explained in terms of the inequalities that exist between men and women, Black and White, rich and poor (*ibid.*:9). Underlying this study is the power struggle between Black and White nationalist ideologies in South Africa which have also powerfully impacted on education. Many of these inequalities will be examined in the forthcoming chapters of this dissertation.

### 2.7.3 FREIRE’S PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED

Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, who had lived and worked among the poor, based his pedagogical argumentation on the assumption “that man’s ontological vocation is to be a *Subject* who acts upon and transforms his world, and in so doing moves towards ever new possibilities of fuller and richer life individually and collectively” (Shaul in Freire 1992:12-13). By developing a critical consciousness and evaluating social, political and economic contradictions man experiences a freedom that instils fear, because civilised society regards *conscientização* (critical consciousness) as leading to fanaticism and disorder. Freire equates being a *Subject* (one who knows and acts) with experiencing freedom, and being an *Object* with suffering oppression (Freire 1992:20).

The Oppressors regard themselves as custodians of freedom by maintaining the *status quo* which is threatened by *conscientização*. The Oppressor’s dialectic is “domesticated” and avoids what it regards as fanaticism; they enclose themselves in their “circles of certainty” and create their own truth. (*ibid.*:22-23.) This links up with ideological thinking that transforms opinion into fact (*cf.* 2.3).

“Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift”, and requires autonomy and responsibility. “It is the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion (Freire 1992:31). Thus, false generosity dispensed by the oppressor is juxtaposed with “[t]rue generosity [which] lies in striving so that these hands - whether of individual or entire peoples - need be extended less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working transform the world” (*ibid.*:29). Both the Oppressor and the Oppressed suffer dehumanisation - the Oppressed the more obvious loss of freedom, and the Oppressor the “unfreedom” produced by the security of conformity (*ibid.*:32).

“The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization” (*ibid.*:33). Freire criticises the *banking* concept of education and its accompanying teacher-student contradiction as oppressive. He favours problem-solving education and a dialogical relationship between student and teacher. (*ibid.*:57-74.) The main thrust of his pedagogy is that education is the practice of freedom which goes hand in hand with the dialogical relationship between student and teacher (*ibid.*: 75-118). The dialogical action required to effect his pedagogy rests on co-operation, unity, organisation and cultural synthesis (*ibid.*:119-186).

It is the contention of the writer that the Afrikaner in particular needs to consider Freire’s descriptions of the Oppressed. She is convinced that, if this is undertaken in a spirit of self-examination and soul-searching, instead of falling in the all too familiar trap of having to defend the Afrikaner ideology, tremendous insight can be gained and much-needed healing will take place. Then an internal revolution is likely to occur against the oppression suffered under their own ideology, hopefully with a cathartic effect.

#### **2.7.4 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION**

The three theorists that have been discussed above will be referred to in discussions of the nationalist and educational ideologies in the ensuing chapters. Although they view

ideology from totally different perspectives, the relevancy of each of their theoretical argumentations will become clear as the discussion proceeds. In Chapter 7 the writer will explain how these theorists provide complementary interpretations to the topic from perspectives which may seem contradictory at first glance. Althusser's *Repressive State Apparatus* and *Ideological State Apparatuses* very aptly explain the methods used by the Afrikaner Nationalist movement to establish itself in a position of power and to maintain that position despite being a small minority group. John B. Thompson's conception of ideology as *meaning in the service of power* is equally appropriate in describing how Afrikaner Nationalism managed to attain and retain power over a vast majority of Blacks and in the face of world criticism and opposition. Freire's *pedagogy of the oppressed* recounts the struggle of the oppressed in Brazil against their oppressors, which provides an appropriate parallel to the oppression suffered by Blacks in South Africa at the hand of Afrikaner Nationalism, and to a lesser extent, the domination of the Afrikaner by the British. The philosophy that he develops served as basis for the Black educational ideology of People's Education. But Freire goes further than that: he comments on the psychological impact that an oppressive regime has on both the Oppressed and the Oppressor. These insights are of great value for the restoration that needs to take place in South Africa.

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## 2.8 A TYPOLOGY OF IDEOLOGIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

### 2.8.1 ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Up to the end of the 1980's *ethnic nationalism* was spearheaded by academics at the Afrikaans language universities. They linked ideology to group consciousness and a non-pejorative approach to the belief system of each community, nation or *volk*. This group included Afrikaner nationalists, as well as the tribal Blacks of the (then) homelands of KwaZulu, Bophutatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda. (Ashley 1987:7; Ashley 1989:5-6.) With the political shifts that have taken place since 1990, dramatic ideological shifts have taken place as well, and the label of *ethnic nationalism* is now associated

predominantly with conservative Afrikaner nationalists (*viz.* the Freedom Front alliances), and the Inkatha Freedom Party and Zulu kingship, both fighting to maintain their own ethnic identities.

The *ethnic nationalist* interpretation of ideology is associated with related concepts (see 2.4) such as *life world*, *ethnicity*, *own culture*, and *national consciousness* (Ashley 1987:17). Each community/nation/*volk* is regarded “as having its own unique ‘ideology’ (life world), valid in its own right, but different from other communities. These ‘life worlds’ have tended to be considerably reified and treated in an a-historical, idealistic manner, and with ‘God-given, *volk*-national ethnic vocations’, with the view to safeguarding their nationality”. (*ibid.*:18.) This unique identity is based on, for example, language, skin pigmentation, religion, manner of dress, eating, and quasi-religious events (such as the Great Trek and the Covenant) for the Afrikaner *volk* (*ibid.*:19).

### 2.8.2 LIBERALISM

In the *liberal*, predominantly English-language communities (academic and beyond) the term ideology, is used in a distinctly pejorative and a-theoretical manner. For this group, culture has a more neutral connotation. (Ashley 1987:7, 20.) In this tradition a strong tendency exists to use the term ideology pejoratively to refer to Afrikaner Nationalism, *apartheid* and racism, to the *other than themselves*, and to regard themselves as “universal” and less “ideological”, acting as mediators between the embattled Afrikaner and African Nationalist ideologies (Ashley 1987:22; Thompson, John B. 1990:5). For the purposes of this study the *liberal* tradition is merely mentioned, but will not be examined in detail.

### 2.8.3 LIBERATION SOCIALISM

The Marxist framework started gaining support in the English communities (in the mid-1970's), as well as amongst the Black trade unions, and, community and political



organisations (Ashley 1987:23; Ashley 1989:5-6). Althusser's ISA (discussed in 2.7.1) has had a tempering effect on the overly reductionist, economic approach to Marxism which contends that "(t)he mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of life" (Van Straaten 1987:15). Some academics, though, regard Althusser as excessively structuralist. Gramsci's conception of *hegemony* and the *ruling block* has been applied to what is seen as cross-class ideologies such as Afrikaner and African Nationalism, mobilising several classes under the *hegemony* of the dominant class (Ashley 1987:23).

The Marxists lay emphasis on the relationship between racial oppression and ideology on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation on the other. They also stress the ideological character of the supposedly *non-ideological* liberalism at English language universities in South Africa. (*ibid.*:23-24.)

## 2.9 CONCLUSION

The interpretations of the concept *ideology* seem to be inexhaustible. Althusser (1971:186) contends that "ideologies are not 'born' in the ISAs but [emanate] from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experiences of the struggle, etc." and that the term *nationalism* allows for a variety of analytical approaches. For the purpose of this study the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism will be examined, as these ideologies have had the most impact on the socio-political evolution in South African society.

The English liberal tradition, which is recognised as having attempted to play a mellowing role with regard to the rigid, hegemonic rule of Afrikaner Nationalism, and Black Ethnic Nationalism, which has been accused of 'corroborating' with Afrikaner Nationalism to establish Black ethnically based homelands, will not be dealt with in this study. The research will focus mainly on the pre-1990 history that shaped the ideological thinking that dominated South African politics, and by implication, its education. An attempt will be

made to sketch possible ideological scenarios for the future of the rapidly changing South Africa, and a plan of action to effect re-humanisation.

The next chapter will explain the sociological and educational theories which explain various aspects of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism, *viz.* the functional model, and the conflict model.



## CHAPTER 3

### SOCIETAL MODELS AND THEORIES OF SCHOOLING

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The field of Sociology provides an appropriate framework to place the ideologies functioning in the South African society on a theoretical basis. Weber (quoted by Collins 1986:4) issued a warning though, that “theories can only take the form of ideal types with which to chart the particulars of that endless flow that makes up history”. Models of development are defined in ideological terms and respond to historical conditions. They are predominantly either capitalist or socialist in orientation (Collins 1986:29, 30) and correspond broadly with the two main models of society, *viz.* the *functional* or *consensus model* and the *conflict model* (Kuper in Kinloch 1972:25, 26). In a complex society with hierarchical labour divisions it is important to establish whose values determine the societal, and therefore also educational, systems. Insight into models of development shed light on the historical routes ideologies have followed in South Africa. They also facilitate understanding of the antagonistic attitudes that prevail between the various ideological groupings and explain their preferences with regard to educational philosophies.

Where a great deal of diversity exists in a society, custom and tradition do not provide a common framework of meaning and authority against which educational values can be measured. In such societies education frequently becomes a major focal point of social as well as political change, in fact “an ideological battleground”. (Williamson 1979:5.) Kuper (in Kinloch 1972:108) contends that the diversity in South African society manifests in the racial, cultural and social spheres, and are “heavily ideologically bound”.

### 3.2 THE LINK BETWEEN MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

Education systems shape, and are shaped, by models of development, and education can play a very important role in promoting or hindering economic development (Simmons 1980:1; Williamson 1979:25). Williamson (1979:5) contends that “[t]he way through education lends *structure* and power to the world thereby determining how the world is perceived and known and is the mechanism through which structures of power relations are either consolidated or transformed”. Bowles & Gintis (1976:129) argue that “the main function of education is to prepare pupils for their economic fate in capitalist production”, either to be exploiters or to be exploited, and that the individual is shaped to the requirements of the social divisions of labour. Berger & Luckmann (1966) and Bourdieu & Passeron (1991) support this concern for the connection between education and social production.

A specific model of development is used by the ruling group to manage and direct economic change based on the dominant social values of society (Apple 1979:2; Williamson 1979:29). Earl Hopper (1971:99) contends that “ideologies of legitimation ... translate questions concerning the distribution of power into questions concerning the distribution of educational suitability”. Williamson (1979:33) goes beyond the mere selection for education to include the choice of values, the knowledge that will form the core curriculum, *i.e.* the range from individualism and particularism to universalism and collectivism. Thus “ideological differences suffuse educational politics, penetrating directly into the daily practices of schools themselves”. These differences are historically rooted and schools, “being essentially conservative institutions, carry the values of earlier periods while responding to new situations”. This is clearly a problem South African education experiences: Political change has been brought about quite rapidly, whereas educational change is a much slower process. This explains the frustration experienced in the South African education system which lags far behind the political system in implementing change.

### 3.3 MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT

Williamson (1979:34) identifies four models of development, each with a corresponding type of economic system: They are the *capitalist*, *developed socialist*, *dependent* and *underdeveloped socialist models*. It is the contention of the writer that the South African society has been dominated by the *capitalist model* of development, specifically *racial capitalism*, driven by the White sector which, according to Williamson (1979:36), purposely suppressed the other racial groups and moulded them into a dependent society. With the ANC in power since 1994 the writer regards it as likely that the development model for the post-*apartheid* South Africa will be a combination of *capitalism*, to provide a structure within which the Whites and the majority of middle class Blacks can operate, and *underdeveloped socialism*. The latter is necessary to accommodate the societal groups emerging from a situation best described by *dependency theory* where *communalism* played an important role (*cf.* Adam & Moodley 1986:47; Motlhabi 1987:135).

White capitalism, which historically has been linked to colonialism, is referred to by Hudson (in Frankel *et al.* 1988:270-271) as “colonialism-of-a-special-type”. He further contends that the Black national-democratic movement opposed foreign political and economic domination, and was more anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist than anti-capitalist. This is evident from the Freedom Charter which does not call for the destruction of capitalism and does not even implicitly refer to socialism.

The modernisation theory (an extension of the capitalist model) states that, “with the correct economic policies, societies which are currently poor can, following a well-known trajectory, pass through the stage of development to become fully modern industrial societies” (Williamson 1979:39, 40; *cf.* Seers in Lehmann 1979:25). Many argue, though, that modern capitalism’s need for profit inevitably results in inegalitarian exploitation (Williamson 1979:38).

Williamson (1979:39, 40) contends: "Economic backwardness is an historically based phenomenon, the outcome of poor societies having had their economies and social systems distorted and conditioned by the ... expansion of capitalist enterprise". This view is supported by Dore (1976:1). In South Africa the traditional rural Black economies could not effectively compete with the western-type White economy and aggravated Black economic dependence (*cf.* Williamson 1979:40). This view therefore suggests that economic backwardness is not intrinsic in pre-modern society (Black rural society in the South African context), but "an historically, externally imposed condition which is reinforced internally" - in the South African situation by the White South Africans. (*cf.* Williamson 1979:4; Seers in Lehmann 1979:26, 27).

The ex-homeland economies and rural Black economies in South Africa were established in accordance with the dependency strategy of development, with inferior education provided to these people, thus supporting this outlook. This resulted in historical constraints reinforced by ideological constraints. Inequalities between Black and White education, as well as Black education having a western orientation, confirmed to Blacks that, as the undeveloped sector of the population, they needed to accept the economic model of the dominant, developed European sector to facilitate their own development (Altbach in Arnove *et al.* 1992:469-471, 475-477; Williamson 1979:41). Even now, with a government dominated by the ANC, the historical and economic constraints, and the attitudes and beliefs among the peasants and workers, are slow to change.

### **3.4 MODELS REGARDING THE NATURE OF SOCIETY**

To understand why education assumed a specific form in a country it is essential to gain insight into how the particular society functions. Kinloch identifies four models to describe the nature of society (1977:25-26, 107-110), all of which are relevant to the South African situation either with regard to the past and present, or the future. They are the *consensus* or *functional*, the *conflict*, the *conflict-consensus* and the *structural models*.

The *consensus* or *functional model* views society as a cohesive, integrated “organism” consisting of functionally related sub-parts. “The social system rests on consensus of the participants and acts to constrain deviance from central norms and values”. Societal change is thus minimised to maintain social equilibrium or homeostasis. This is an ideologically conservative social theory, emphasising conformity and control of deviance. (Kinloch 1977:25-26.) In the South African society the *apartheid* ideology conformed to the functional or consensus model. According to this model South Africa under the *apartheid* system was regarded as totally stable, functioning effectively and socially integrated. In essence the functional theorists saw the consensus model as functional, promoting the well-being of the Blacks and Whites, racial purity and peaceful race relations (*cf.* Kinloch 1977:108, 109). It will become evident in ensuing chapters that this was a distorted view of the South African reality.

In direct opposition to the *consensus model* is the more liberal *conflict model*. The conflict model regards the state of continuous social equilibrium proclaimed by the consensus model as an illusion, and sees social life as an “endless struggle over social and natural resources”. (*ibid.*:26.) Kuper supports the contention that conflict formed the basis of social structure in the *apartheid* era in South Africa and stresses “structural discontinuities” in society. He identifies three levels of pluralism in the social organisation, *viz.* “units of cleavage, cultural diversity and separation in social organisations”. This non-alignment of racial, cultural and social elements is a major source of conflict and “heavily ideologically bound”. (*ibid.*:108.) One of the major tasks in the post-1994 South Africa is to minimise these divisive aspects and try to identify and establish common ground.

Gluckman contends that society is interrelated, without implying that underlying societal consensus exists. According to Gluckman’s theory of counter-balancing cleavages a “measure of social cohesion through inter-dependence and cross-cutting ties exist, without assuming a totally integrated society based on consensus”. (In Kinloch 1977:109, 110). Cross-cutting bonds (*e.g.* loyalty, custom, common interest) inhibit open quarrelling and

provide a measure of structural cohesion. An example is the need for Black workers to find work in South Africa, and the White South African economic sector requiring the Black labour force. Such reciprocal needs provide the basis of consensus between conflicting groups and ideologies, hence the conflict-consensus model. The post-*apartheid* South Africa needs to emphasise meeting these reciprocal needs. The *structural model* exhibits an objective approach to aspects of pluralism. Smith (in Kinloch 1977:110) assumes an institutional approach to pluralism. He defines society as those politically united under a single government but forming different groups with regard to the main, "core" institutions. This model corresponds well with the South African society in that the Government of National Unity coheres groups of people who are firstly South African, and secondly Xhosas, Zulus, Afrikaners, *etc.*

It is the contention of the writer, that for the plural society of South Africa, the conflict-consensus and structural models have a great deal of merit. Despite lack of agreement on various issues regarding political, economic, education policy, *etc.* neither the predominantly White supporters of the consensus model, nor the predominantly Black supporters of the conflict model are able to function independently. This reciprocal interdependence as well as cross-cutting bonds such as shared interests, values, custom, loyalty, *etc.* promote co-operation and a measure of structural cohesion that should limit conflict. CODESA I and II, the Transitional Executive Council and the Government of National Unity which came about after the non-racial, democratic election of April 1994 are examples of these (Keesing's ... Annual Reference Supplement 1993:R25; Keesing's Record of World Events ... 40(5) 1994:39990). Gluckman's theory of counter-balancing cleavages (in Kinloch 1972:109-110) are decidedly relevant to the South African situation.

The great variety of ethnic groups, cultures, languages, political affiliations, economic and educational preferences, demographics, religions, sectionalism, *etc.* render South Africa ideally suited to Smith's structural model (in Kinloch 1972:110). This model presents an objective approach which operates by means of co-operation with regard to the functioning of the "core" structures or institutions. Examples cited in the previous



paragraph with regard to the conflict-consensus model are equally valid here. De Klerk and Mandela have on various occasions stressed the necessity to focus on common values and ideals. The conflict-consensus model seems to lean more towards the building of a unified nation, whereas the structural model is more geared to the practical, functional running of the country and society. The latter model does not intend to purposely foster one nationhood. It concerns a working relationship, and whatever bonds flow from that are bonuses. The writer contends that the extremists to both the left and right will probably find the structural model the most acceptable, whereas those who want to work towards a unified nationhood are likely to accept the conflict-consensus model as their point of departure. It is thus evident that these two models are complementary, and do not exclude each other.

### 3.5 THEORIES OF SCHOOLING

Ideology and theories of schooling are inextricably intertwined. Failure of a student from a lower socio-economic class may, for instance, be interpreted as discrimination at school or cultural deprivation and lack of ability, depending on the ideological preconceptions that exist (Hurn 1985:38). In the 1960's the *functional theory* predominated. It represented an optimistic, liberal view of schools as agencies to create a more meritocratic society where progress is based on competence and expertise. By the beginning of the 1970's there was a great deal of disillusionment with this view of schooling. This resulted in the functional paradigm being seriously challenged by a more radical, pessimistic approach which became known as the *conflict theory*, as it contradicted virtually every claim made by the functional theory. (Hurn 1985:47, 36-37; Simmons 1980:1.) As a societal product, it is inevitable that the theories of schooling will correspond to theories on society in general. It must be noted that the *consensus/functional paradigm of society* links up with the *functional model of schooling*, and the *conflict paradigm of society* with the *conflict model of schooling*.

### 3.5.1 THE FUNCTIONAL PARADIGM

The *functional paradigm* consists of the views of several theorists, not all of whom were sociologists. It is based on the assumption that schooling in modern western societies had become increasingly important as it had to provide an efficient, rational way of sorting and selecting talented people so that the most able, motivated candidates would attain the highest positions. By providing equal opportunities everyone could compete on the basis of effort and ability, and not family background, for high-status positions. Schools were also credited with the ability to teach the kind of knowledge required for the post-industrial society. The above constitutes the core of liberal orthodoxy in educational thought. Education thus needed to be expanded in order to establish a more *meritocratic, expert, democratic* society. (Altbach 1992:472-473; Hurn 1985:46, 48; Simmons 1980:1.)

The first argument in support of the *functional paradigm* states that in modern Western society occupational roles and status are achieved and earned on *merit*, in contrast with pre-modern societies where positions were inherited or ascribed. With the expansion in educational availability barriers to upward mobility of talented but disadvantaged lower-class students were erased. Rather than redistributing wealth, equal opportunities were made available. These developments were seen as humane, functional, morally justified, efficient and rational - an improvement on the former situation which provided only the wealthy upper class with education. This was to ensure that the most talented people, regardless of social class, could be recruited for the most demanding occupations. (Dore 1976:6; Hurn 1985:37, 48-50, 52; Kinloch 1977:108; Simmons 1980:9.) In South Africa Whites are regarded as the advantaged, and Blacks the disadvantaged sectors of society, hence the motivation for examining these paradigms.

According to the *functional paradigm*, modern society demanded *expert*, rational knowledge to cope with the fast pace of economic growth. To achieve this, extensive schooling was required to provide a sound foundation for adequate cognitive development

to keep abreast of rapidly changing technology. Schools were required to devise new pedagogical techniques and curricula; they had to teach students *how* to learn, rather than concentrate on facts that become outdated. Rote memorisation and moral indoctrination needed to be replaced with more sophisticated skills, *viz.* cognitive development, intellectual flexibility and adaptability. Educational institutions were responsible for providing a more reliable basis than social status, religion or race for selecting and sorting talented people. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will explain how these intentions were sent off course by political manipulation of education in South Africa. The contention was that even middle- and lower-status occupations demanded more sophisticated skills, flexibility and adaptability. Therefore only “experts” with the ability to apply advanced cognitive skills would be able to deal with the technological advancement required for high-status positions in modern society. (Hurn 1985:50-52, 57, 58.)

Implicit in the *functional paradigm* is the striving towards achieving democracy and social justice. This ensues from the liberal political movement and its belief that society must work towards the eradication of evils and inequalities. The emergence of an educated, informed citizenry bears evidence of progress in this domain. An increase in education also tends to reduce intolerance and prejudice, which, in turn, leads to greater freedom and justice. The redeeming feature then is that modern society does not only pursue wealth and profit, but that it earnestly seeks social justice, quality of life and fulfilment for every member of society. (Hurn 1985:50; Simmons 1980:1.) The writer contends that South African education exhibited selective compliance with only those aspects of the functional paradigm which correlated with the dominant educational ideology, *viz.* CNE.

Economists within the functional paradigm developed the *human capital theory*. They argue that an investment in education will provide future pay-offs in terms of an increase in knowledge and expertise. This, in turn, will enable the better qualified workers to have better employment with better salaries. Educational institutions are then bound to attract more students, thus increasing the numbers of educated people. The influence of this theory is evident in the sacrifices made by both Afrikaner and Black parents to provide the

best education they could at the stage when they were beginning to rise from their oppressed status. The human capital theorists further contend that employers prefer to pay more for educated employees, as they prove to be more productive, having attained certain skills and abilities through advanced education. It has been proven that illiteracy does have a detrimental effect on performance. Some sociologists have identified another reason for employers preferring college graduates - prestige! (Dore 1976:1,2; Hurn 1985:52-54.)

### 3.5.2 THE CONFLICT PARADIGM

In the early 1970's the *functional paradigm* came under fire from several theorists who had been disillusioned by the claims that better education produced a better society. This pessimistic, sceptical, and in some cases even cynical, approach blamed schools for doing exactly the opposite to what the functionalists had claimed. In their view schools did not create a more meritocratic society, but rather reinforced inequalities - tests were biased towards the middle-class with the result that poor and disadvantaged students were labelled less intelligent, lacking the skills required for high-status positions, and therefore having only themselves to blame for failure. (Dore 1976:2; Hurn 1985:37, 47.) Contrary to functionalist expectations, education pandered to the demands of the elite, teaching docility and compliance, reinforcing inequalities and fostering acceptance of the *status quo* rather than the acquisition of cognitive skills (Hurn 1985:61). The relevancy of this contention is evident in Black education in South Africa (*cf.* Chapter 6).

The optimistic, liberal vision of modern society was replaced by one of greedy business corporations destroying the environment, corrupt politicians concerned with their own power and privilege, racism, sexism and manipulation (Hurn 1985:62). This new era of contradiction also saw many un- or under-employed educated, indicating society being over-educated, with insufficient positions to absorb the highly educated. The liberal optimism implicit in the functional paradigm was being eroded by disillusionment with its inability to unambiguously demonstrate improvement in learning outcomes, to eradicate

the discrepancy in achievement between students from different backgrounds (such as between Black and White students in South Africa), and to stay declines in educational standards, especially in high school. (Dore 1976:4; Hurn 1985:47, 63; Simmons 1980:1, 16.) This disenchantment with the functional paradigm led to the formulation of what they regarded as a more realistic substitute paradigm, *viz.* the *conflict paradigm*.

Hurn states emphatically that “we can in no sense solve the problem of the unequal school achievement of different groups of students by equalizing school resources” (1985:60). Quality of schooling is only weakly associated with student achievement, but socio-economic background and IQ are powerfully associated with achievement. It is also evident that privileged parents do pass on their advantages to their children. (Hurn 1985:59-60.)

School integration is another aspect that exhibits a mildly positive effect on the performance of Black students, but the inability of Black students to match the achievement of White students can also have a detrimental effect on the self-esteem of the former (Hurn 1985:60). This should be kept in mind in post-*apartheid* education to avoid unrealistic expectations by Black students. The conflict paradigm also rejects the supposed correlation between positions held and cognitive skills taught at school. These theorists do not accept that most jobs require a high level of cognitive sophistication. They contend that employers are more concerned with attitudes and values such as loyalty, compliance and docility, than with high intellectual ability. (Hurn 1985:63-64; Simmons 1980:7-8.)

Despite disputes within the conflict paradigm between Marxists and non-Marxists, and even amongst rival Marxists, a set of broad assumptions have emerged to which most conflict theorists ascribe: They agree that society is conflict-ridden, with groups competing for control, putting their own interests first while pretending to care for society, and that an unequal struggle exists between societal groups with the elite always having the upper hand because of access to superior resources (Hurn 1985:63; Simmons

1980:7-8.) The above contentions reveal a marked similarity with the conflict-ridden South African society, as will be evident from Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Randall Collins (in Hurn 1985:68), a non-Marxist conflict theorist, maintains that, during this century, education has expanded faster than highly skilled and professional occupations, and that it was wasteful acquiring credentials and sophisticated cognitive skills that jobs did not warrant. The high unemployment rate of academically qualified persons in South Africa at present confirms Collins' point of view. Except in highly technical fields meagre evidence exists that formal education supersedes skills acquired "on the job". Furthermore, he regards schools as decidedly inefficient at producing cognitive skills and much more concerned with teaching the values, ideals and standards of the dominant elite. Chapter 6 bears proof of this contention in the South Africa context. Collins (in Hurn 1985:68, 71) is emphatic that the struggle between the various groups for dominance and prestige is a permanent feature of society. (Also *cf.* Collins 1979; Dore 1976:4, 5.)

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (Bowles & Gintis 1976), both neo-Marxist theorists, based their *correspondence theory* on the premise that schools serve the interests of the capitalist order in modern society. Schools are required to repress and coerce students to create a compliant and efficient labour force representative of the different classes in society and their correspondent occupations: Low-status occupations require workers to learn punctuality, following instructions and rules, obedience to authority, respect for superiors and exercising minimal discretion. Executives need to acquire flexibility, tolerance of ambiguities, the capacity for sustained independent work, choosing between alternatives, adapting to change and innovation, and internalising norms. In South Africa the White sector of the population claimed the high-status occupations, and the Blacks were relegated by law to low status positions (*cf.* Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Curricula, instruction and evaluation are geared towards attaining these diverse objectives. It is thus evident that the social organisation of the classroom mirrors the social

organisation of work and that the education system reinforces class inequalities in contemporary society. (Bowles & Gintis in Hurn 1985:64-65, 212; Dore 1976:11-12; Simmons 1980:8-9, 10.) It will become evident in Chapter 6 that this contention is clearly reflected in South African education. The fear exists that “the ideology of educational liberation can become a tool of domination” (Hurn 1985:91), a possibility against which the post-*apartheid* educational system will have to guard.

Radical theorists such as Ivan Illich, Michael Apple, Pierre Bourdieu and J.C. Passeron contend that schools convey a particular kind of consciousness that legitimates the “structures of domination” in capitalist societies (Altbach in Arnove *et al.* 1992:481 refers to this as “servitude of the mind”). CNE is certainly guilty of this accusation. The above theorists contend that terms such as expertise and objective knowledge are used to camouflage domination. Bourdieu coined the phrase, “cultural capital”, to describe this superior, particular form of high culture that the elite employ to “buy” status and position in society. Collins supports this view by stating that education provides the “cultural currency” to purchase adult status (Hurn 1985:213-214; *cf.* Altbach in Arnove *et al.* 1992:479-480). Compliance with this form of consciousness is dependent on one’s inherent ideology.

### 3.5.3 THE FUNCTIONAL AND CONFLICT MODELS OF SCHOOLING COMPARED

The following table summarises the main differences between the functional and conflict theories of schooling. In Chapter 7 suggestions will be put forward to find common ground from which proponents of these two opposing paradigms could co-operate to offer appropriate education to the people of South Africa.

FUNCTIONAL MODEL	CONFLICT MODEL
<p><b>Educational output:</b> Emphasis on cognitive skills provided by schools for complex jobs.</p>	<p><b>Educational output:</b> Compliance and discipline taught for capitalist workplace.</p>
<p><b>Equity of opportunity:</b> Schools transmit common values in ethnically diverse societies.</p>	<p><b>Equity of opportunity:</b> Capitalist values are imposed on the mass of the population.</p>
<p><b>Role of school:</b> Schools are vehicles for equal opportunities for all social classes.</p>	<p><b>Role of school:</b> Provision of equal opportunities is a smoke screen camouflaging perpetuation of inequalities.</p>
<p><b>Role of school in society:</b> Schools meet society's need for cognitive skills and core values.</p>	<p><b>Role of school in society:</b> Capitalist need for profit shapes type and character of school.</p>
<p><b>Effect of schooling:</b> Schools efficiently prepare students for life in a complex society providing liberal, humane values (rationality, tolerance, <i>etc.</i>).</p>	<p><b>Effect of schooling:</b> Education has liberating potential, but exhibit a repressive character.</p>

Table 3.1: A comparison of the functional and conflict models based Hurn's (1985:92-93) analysis.



### 3.6 CONCLUSION

Despite the many conflicting interpretations of the functionalist and conflict models common ground does exist: Both regard the school as having the potential of socialising and unifying heterogeneous population groups, thus reducing class conflict. Both demand equality of opportunity and stress a close relationship between societal changes and the development of schooling. (Hurn 1985:4.) In their desire to celebrate or condemn schooling the theorists tend to exaggerate. The input of both models is necessary, and indeed complementary, to effect worthwhile change as much of the history of schooling can be seen as the outcome of conflicts and struggles between groups for control of what was taught and how it was taught. (*ibid.* 1985:104.) “[T]hese differences in interpretation reflect differences in ideology that cannot be resolved by any empirical evidence” (*ibid.* 1985:101).

The models that have been examined in this chapter will be applied to the South African context in Chapter 7, after the societal and educational ideologies have been studied in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The next chapter will embark on this task by examining the development of the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism which gave birth to CNE. Althusser (1971:86) contends “that ideologies are not ‘born’ in the ISAs [*cf.* 2.7.1] but from the social classes in the class struggle: from the conditions of existence, their practices, their experiences of the struggle, *etc.*” A socio-politico-historical approach will thus be adopted in the following two chapters, tracing the ideologies of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism, with Chapter 6 looking at the respective educational ideologies to which they subscribe.

## CHAPTER 4

### AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Ideologies cannot be examined out of the “specific socio-historical contexts within which they are employed or take hold” (Thompson, John B. 1990:8). For this reason the socio-historical as well as the political backdrop against which the formation of Afrikaner Nationalism (Chapter 4) and Black Liberation Socialism (Chapter 5) occurred, will be sketched. The development of these ideologies went hand in hand with the struggle of both these nationalist movements to attain political power. Afrikaner Nationalism has its origin in the Afrikaner striving for political, cultural and economic independence. In this chapter the development of this ideology, which is referred to in Ashley’s typology as ethnic nationalism (*cf.* 2.8.1), will be examined. This endeavour will be traced from the first historically identifiable stirrings of ideological thought in Afrikaner minds at “the lowest, most fluid stratum of ... consciousness” through the establishment of an identifiable ideology in the upper levels of consciousness (*cf.* Voloshinov in 2.2), to the formation of the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses (*cf.* Althusser in 2.7.1) and the maintenance of “relations of domination” (*cf.* John B. Thompson in 2.7.2). It is the contention of the writer that the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology rests on three pillars, *viz.*: the political ascent of the Afrikaner, the establishment of the Afrikaans language and the strong influence of the Dutch Reformed Church. Du Toit (in Thompson & Butler 1975:27) expresses a similar view.

To ensure that the Afrikaner youth would develop the same fervour as their forebears for the Afrikaner Nationalist movement a strong involvement in, and eventually control over, the education of the Afrikaner youth was necessary. (*cf.* Althusser’s educational ISA in

2.7.1.) Early *Voortrekker* education centred around the ability to read the Scriptures, but the Afrikaner that had emerged from those pioneer days required more from education (Christie 1985:41) when the Industrial Revolution reached South Africa. Apart from academic advancement, education for the Afrikaner child was to provide a Christian upbringing, but in addition had to establish and nurture the ideals of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. It is the opinion of the writer that these motivations were instrumental in the eventual establishment of CNE. This educational ideology was so closely linked to the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology that, especially on issues of Afrikaner culture, such as the Afrikaans language, there was barely a distinction. The ensuing chapter will therefore first deal with the development of Afrikaner Nationalism, on which CNE was, to a great extent, based.

## 4.2 THE POSITION OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM

Kohn identified eight categories of nationalism (listed in 2.5). Degenaar (1982b:20-22) emphasises that these categories are not rigid, but that various combinations evolve as a result of combinations with other primary political concepts. He sees Afrikaner Nationalism as a combination of *liberal* or *constitutional nationalism*, *nationalism of the will*, and *Volk-nationalism* or *nationalism of the people*. *Constitutional nationalism* refers to “the freedom of the individual, the people’s exercising of their political power and the authority of the government (which) are all bound by the constitution”.

*Nationalism of the will* is more complex. It stems from the time of the French Revolution when the absolute sovereignty of the people (their general will or *volonté générale*) replaced the absolute sovereignty of the king. Thus “[t]he will of the people became the will of the nation”. What has to be acknowledged, though, is that “this mystical, unverifiable and absolute authority ... could not guarantee the freedom of the individual”. (Degenaar 1982b:21.) The truth of the latter statement with regard to Afrikaner Nationalism will become evident in the course of the dissertation.

Herder, a German follower of Rousseau, was responsible for the inception of *Volk-nationalism*. He replaced the mystical concept of *volonté générale* with *Volksgeist* or spirit of the people, which he regarded as a manifestation of God. It refers to the mystical identity between the individual and the *Volk* with the creative powers of the people operating as a collective personality, thus effectively negating the individual. *Volk-nationalism* is responsible for the phenomenon of mythologising of the *Volk*. (Degenaar 1982b:22.) This aspect of nationalism will emerge as the study proceeds.

When Dr. D.F. Malan introduced the South African Nationality and Flag Bill in 1926 (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:489) he stated that it concerned “the soul of our nation ... with the establishment of an outward and visible symbol of our nationhood, and our national status”. This confirms Carl Friedrich’s contention that “Nationalism is typically devoid of any specific notions concerning the political and social order as such, except to insist that the order be in keeping with ‘national traditions’”, but combines with other political forms of which socialism is an example (Du Toit in Thompson & Butler 1975:33).

Manifestation of combinations of the three nationalisms that make up Afrikaner Nationalism will be evident in the ensuing sections of this chapter.

### **4.3 BACKGROUND TO THE AFRIKANER NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY**

The *Trekboere* were the first settlers at the Cape to object to the Dutch East India Company rule at the Cape (Louw & Kendall 1986:19). The persistent striving of these Dutch farmers to put physical distance between themselves and the controlling authorities at the Cape is, in the opinion of the writer, a manifestation at the subconscious level (*cf.* Voloshinov in 2.2) of the striving for independence that, much later, formed part of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology (Thompson & Butler 1975:28).

Historians offer many diverse explanations for the mass exodus of farmers from the Cape into the interior from 1834, which became known as the Great Trek. Some of the views are: They could not accept the Anglicisation policies implemented during the British occupation of the Cape in 1806; it was a protest against the idea of equality between Black and White; they wanted to escape from the frontier wars. It was a manifestation of their sense of nationhood which Dr. D.F. Malan later contended left Afrikaners the heritage of a larger South Africa. (Louw & Kendall 1986:19, 21-23; Muller *et al.* 1980:120, 151.) The various “*Trekker*” groups were divided, though, and did not all leave for the same reasons (Muller *et al.* 1980:158). They were staunch Calvinists who saw their determination to develop separately from the non-White races as scriptural (Louw & Kendall 1986:89) and regarded themselves as a “chosen people” who undertook their “exodus” through the “wilderness” and suffered many “trials and tribulations” for the preservation of a pure White nation (Du Preez 1983:92). They were “the Israel of Africa” being led to the “promised land” (Degenaar 1982b:24). On the basis of these pronouncements their mission into the unknown could, in some respects, be seen as an example of *nationalism of the people* or *Volk-nationalism* (cf. 2.5).

According to Voloshinov’s exposition, the Afrikaner ideology had, at this stage, progressed beyond the sub-conscious level to the upper levels of consciousness and thus qualified as an “established ideology” (cf. 2.2). At this point it is necessary to state that the writer disagrees with John B. Thompson’s total rejection of the conception of an ideology as a type of “social cement” (cf. 2.7.2). On reviewing the development of Afrikaner Nationalism thus far, the metaphor seems appropriate. As this emerging ideology certainly lent coherence to the various groups of *Trekkers* in that the ideal of political (and thus also cultural) independence was realised for the *Trekkers* (although independently for the various groups) with the establishment of the two Boer republics (the Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek and the Orange Free State) although their independence was short-lived. The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand provided the necessary incentive for Britain to annex the two *Trekker* republics. The Boers resisted with a tenacity that the British had not anticipated. Independence was restored to the Suid-

Afrikaanse Republiek at the Sandrivier Convention in 1852, and to the Orange Free State at the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854 (Van Schoor in Muller *et al.* 1980:237; Du Plessis in Muller *et al.* 1980:260).

The British imperialist and expansionist ideal of Cecil John Rhodes to incorporate the Boer Republics under the British flag led to the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in which both Boer Republics were defeated (Van Zyl in Muller *et al.* 1980:328-388). The prisoner of war camps in which not only men, but also women, children and the elderly, were kept under such atrocious conditions that 27 927 of them died, as well as the devastation of Afrikaner farms by the British soldiers caused an outcry in the British parliament against the “methods of barbarism” that had been employed (Muller *et al.* 1980:357-360).

Needless to say, the war left the Afrikaners with feelings of intense bitterness towards the British. Milner’s Anglicisation policy directly after the Anglo-Boer War met with fierce opposition from Afrikaners. In fact, it had anything but the desired effect: “[I]ncreasingly education and language were perceived as instruments for creating and preserving a separate social and cultural identity”. (Du Toit in Thompson and Butler 1975:29.) British imperialist expansionist ideology had clashed with emerging Afrikaner nationalism, and although it had seemingly quelled the Afrikaner cause it had actually served to revitalise it.

In 1910 the Union of South Africa was established under the slogan, *Unity is Strength*, uniting the two ex-Boer republics and the British colonies of the Cape and Natal under the leadership of General Louis Botha’s South African Party. His pro-British sentiment and support of big business and capitalism irked his political opponent, General Hertzog, who formed the National Party in 1913. The slogan he promoted was: *South Africa First*. He emphasised the need to protect Afrikaner culture and traditions from “being swamped by the international culture of the English language”. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:429-433; Malherbe 1977:18.) In 1923 the Labour Party (LP) and the NP joined forces to form the Pact government that defeated the South African Party (SAP) in 1924. They had agreed to abide by Hertzog’s idea of Afrikaner and English culture and social life running

parallel to each other rather than integrating, a clear indication that the ideology of a separate Afrikanerdom was reviving. In 1934 Generals Hertzog and Smuts joined forces, and the UP was formed with Smuts as Prime Minister and Hertzog as his deputy (Liebenberg in Muller *et al.* 1980:437). At this stage *constitutional nationalism* was the order of the day (*cf.* 2.5 and 4.2).

The different ideologies to which the English and Afrikaans speakers in South Africa adhered, prevented them from forming one nation. The English bore loyalty to the British Empire, and the Afrikaners desired the establishment of their own, independent state where their own culture could be nurtured. The underlying enmity and distrust between these two ideological groupings still lurked beneath the facade of a joint political affiliation. (Hertzog's insistence on equal rights for English- and Afrikaans-speakers eventually cost him his political career.) Anti-English sentiments were strong enough for Dr. D.F. Malan to muster sufficient support to break away and form as official opposition party, the Purified National Party, based on the ideology of an exclusive, self-sufficient, independent Afrikanerdom. To realise this ideal, the Afrikaner had to attain a position of power. This was realised when Malan triumphed in the 1948 election. (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:465, 476-478; Malherbe 1977:19.)

In the opinion of the writer it is at this point in history that the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology changed from the metaphoric "social cement" to John B. Thompson's view of ideology as "meaning in the service of power" (*cf.* 2.7.2). It should be noted that Blacks did not enter into the political equation at this stage of South African history. The ideological battle being waged here was between English Imperialists and Afrikaner Nationalists.

#### **4.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM**

For an exclusive Afrikaner ideology to come to fruition the establishment of a firm political powerbase was essential. The political strides made by Afrikaner Nationalism in

the first half of the 20th century can be attributed mainly to the undercover activities of the Broederbond, the unifying effect of the advent of Afrikaans to official language status, and the strong supportive role of the Dutch Reformed Church. There is clear evidence of this ideology becoming strongly action- and goal-orientated, and providing its adherents with “motivations, prescriptions [and] imperatives” (*cf.* 2.3).

#### 4.4.1 THE AFRIKANER BROEDERBOND

The Broederbond (the name by which the Afrikaner Broederbond is more commonly known) started as an innocuous, semi-religious, cultural society known as Jong Suid-Afrika, with the aim of providing a cultural haven for young Afrikaners on the Reef (Malherbe 1977:668). As an exclusive Afrikaner cultural organisation it provided Afrikaner youth with an ideological safehouse for the cultural activities that were peculiar to them as a like-minded group. In 1918 its name changed to the Afrikaner Broederbond with the aim of promoting Afrikaner interests and the Afrikaans language. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:247; Malherbe 1977:668.) “The stated aim was the creation of a consciousness among Afrikaners concerning their language, religion, traditions, country, and *volk*, and the promotion of the Afrikaner nation” (Adam & Giliomee 1979:246). The unsuspecting cultural society was secretly being infiltrated by members of the Purified Nationalists who advocated an ideology of exclusive Afrikanerdom and an independent republic for the *Boerenasie* (Malherbe 1977:19).

Less obtrusive were the strong ideological undertones related to hegemonic power that started taking root in the organisation. “Desired recruits were described as those who ... would give preference to Afrikaners and other sympathetic persons and firms in economic, public and professional life, who were of sound financial standing, and who were in every respect trustworthy”. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:247.) As their name indicated, the Broederbond instituted a system whereby Afrikaners were to look after one another’s interests like brothers. In 1928 it became a secret organisation. (*ibid.*:247.) Many characteristics of the Broederbond are reminiscent of the Freemasons. In his book,



“Inside the Brotherhood” (1989), Martin Short describes how Freemasons are selected and invited to become members if they meet certain criteria, they are sworn to secrecy about the society’s activities, they are instructed to favour their fellow-brothers in business, *etc.*, they have unobtrusive political and economic links, *etc.* The advantage of secret membership was obviously to prevent detection of favouritism and manipulation. Members manoeuvred their way into positions of authority so that they could draw in more “brothers” to use the organisations and institutions to support the Afrikaner cause. (Moodie 1975:101.) Their motivation was to use the movement as a steppingstone towards the attainment of power, whether for political or economic reasons. Again the progression from ideology as a unifying “social cement” to ideology in service of power (*cf.* John B. Thompson in 2.7.2), is evident.

During the 1930’s and 1940’s the Afrikaner elite in the political, cultural and economic fields were enlisted as members with particular emphasis on recruitment from the Dutch Reformed ministry, the teaching profession and educational administration (Malherbe 1977:668). The Broederbond wanted to stem the socialistically inclined trade unions and promote Afrikaner private capital. Culturally it campaigned for single medium schools, and politically it campaigned for Afrikaner unity and against British imperialism. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:247.)

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By means of the cell system, so successfully used by Nazi and Communist organisations, the Broederbond gradually extended its influence until it controlled virtually every sphere of South African life (Malherbe 1977:668). In the political arena it exercised control by means of the Purified National Party. In the economic field it strongly opposed the socialist trade unions, and by the institution of the Reddingsdaadbond it assisted Afrikaners impoverished by the economic depression of 1929-1933. In education it acted under cover of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) (which advocated separate Afrikaans and English medium schools) and the Nasionale Instituut vir Opvoeding en Onderwys. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:249; Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:491-492; Malherbe 1977:669-670; Serfontein 1979:39.)

When Hertzog exposed the true activities of the Broederbond in 1935 he described it as an insidious political “network for the purpose of active propaganda” (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:491). At that stage half of its members were teachers, in an ideal situation to further the Broederbond ideology amongst the youth (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:491-492; Malherbe 1977:23; Serfontein 1979:39). They had a captive, impressionable audience, a generation of Afrikaner school children who were being indoctrinated into total commitment to the Broederbond interpretation of the Afrikaner cause (Serfontein 1979:39). The UP, which represented the government of the day, prohibited the subversive activities of the Broederbond, thus forcing the organisation to continue its activities underground (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:491-492; Malherbe 1977:28-29), but the Broederbond was unperturbed, and rationalised and legitimated its actions in the name of the Afrikaner cause.

The under-cover efforts of the Broederbond were primarily responsible for the rapid growth of Afrikaner Nationalism. In 1938 the centenary of the Great Trek was commemorated with a symbolic “*Ossewatrek*” culminating in the laying of the foundation-stone of the Voortrekker Monument. During the celebrations the sufferings and victories of the struggle of the Afrikaner *volk* for freedom from *die Engelse* and their battles against the native tribes were recounted. (Du Preez 1983:76, 84; Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:495-496; Malherbe 1977:28-29; Serfontein 1979:42.) Most Afrikaners were by then so convinced that God’s plan for them was to be his “chosen people” and to remain separate from other population groups (Du Preez 1983:92, 76; Moodie 1975:103-104), that General Smuts lost the 1948 election because he was insistent on equal rights for Afrikaans and English speakers and dual medium schools. Dr. D.F. Malan, leader of the (Purified) National Party, became prime minister on the strength of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology (Christie 1985:55; Malherbe 1977:29; Serfontein 1979:43) which “supplied them with both a history and a destiny, a past and a future” (*cf.* 2.3). The doctrines adhered to by the “Malanites” were characterised by “recourse to past and intense emotionalism ... and a dislike for the English-speaking South Africans ... ascribed

to the scars of the Anglo-Boer War” (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:490). Emotional responses characterise ideologies (*cf.* 2.3) and are particularly effective to muster political support.

The Broederbond had provided a highly effective structure to orchestrate and promote the Afrikaner cause (Degenaar 1982b:67) and had close ties with the NP (Serfontein 1979:39). Strijdom, Malan’s successor, was against political interference of the Broederbond, and saw its task as that of expanding the Afrikaner’s share in commerce and the professions. During the prime ministership of Dr. Verwoerd there was a distinct convergence between the Broederbond and the NP. The Broederbond served as the main disseminator of the ideology of separate development and became less involved with economic issues as the Afrikaner’s economic status improved. Its main concern became politics and ideological coherence. It was also the force behind realising the ultimate ideal of Afrikaner Nationalism: the establishment of an independent Republic (Adam & Giliomee 1979:248). The NP and Broederbond regarded themselves as the custodians of the freedom of the Afrikaner people. This freedom that had been gained with republican status came at a cost - the cost of not allowing *conscientização* to expose the qualities of real freedom, and of avoiding the fear of the responsibilities that accompany freedom and in the end suffering “unfreedom”. (Freire 1992:14, 32.)

As Broederbond membership increased over the years educators always constituted the highest percentage: Teachers represented 2 039 out of 3 500 members in 1952, and 20,4% in 1978. They ranged from virtually all rectors of Afrikaans universities and teacher training colleges, provincial directors of education to school teachers and heads of related institutions such as the Educational Advisory Council. Almost 40% of all White Dutch Reformed Ministers were estimated to be members. The FAK represented the “public arm” of the Broederbond and controlled more than 200 cultural, religious and youth organisations. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:250.) The Broederbond provided the impetus and structure which propelled Afrikaner Nationalism to a position of a relatively small minority group powerfully controlling the rest of the South African population. This

manifests how ideology, as John B. Thompson (1990:7) expressed it, is “meaning in the service of power”.

Afrikaner political opinion became more diverse after they had established themselves as the dominant political party in the government. As a gradual loss of political coherence occurred amongst Afrikaners “the Bond [was] finding it increasingly difficult to establish a national consensus, composed as it [was] of Verwoerdian ideologues, ‘pragmatic realists’, and ‘radical’ *verligtes*”. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:250.) It is this lack of coherence that induces John B. Thompson (1984:5) to reject the view of ideology as “a sort of social cement”. The writer is of the opinion that the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology did “cement” Afrikaners together so effectively that they managed to attain a position of political dominance. As soon as the goal towards which they had collectively striven, was attained, the urgency of standing united subsided and their diverse views enjoyed more prominence. This explanation puts forward the writer’s contention that the view of ideology as “social cement” is not irreconcilable with John B. Thompson’s exposition. It is simply applicable to the earlier stages of ideological formation.

Freire’s term for the formation of these sub-groups is *sectarianism*: “The rightist sectarian ... wants to slow down the historical process to ‘domesticate’ time and thus to domesticate man ... so that the future will reproduce this domesticated present.” The leftist, on the other hand, regards the future as pre-ordained. Thus they create their own truth and imprison themselves in “circles of certainty”. (Freire 1992:22-23.) It is the opinion of the writer that, as soon as an ideology is threatened, *sectarianism* will fall away and ideology will once again become a unifying force.

#### **4.4.2 THE ADVENT OF THE AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE**

“To explore the interrelations between language and ideology is to turn away from the analysis of well-formed sentences or systems of signs, focusing instead on the ways in which expression serves as a means of action and interaction”. It is informative to note

“the multifarious uses of language intersect with power, nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it”. (Thompson, John B. 1984:2.) John B. Thompson (1984:7) sees language as “enmeshed in relations of power, in situations of conflict, in processes of social change”. The interaction between language and ideology focuses on language as a socio-historical phenomenon embroiled in human conflict - a far cry from a structure, a system of signs employed to communicate and entertain (*ibid.*:2).

Language is one of the aspects that provides a cultural group with a separate and specific identity (Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:199). It appears to the writer that where there is more than one cultural group in a society the dominant group inevitably uses its position of power to foist its own language on all other groups, so as to prevent a subordinate group from benefiting from the unifying effect of their language. This is particularly evident in South African history. The advent of the Afrikaans language became “the outward symbol of their exclusiveness and separateness” and created “a ‘national’ consciousness” (Thompson & Butler 1975:29; Malherbe 1977:19).

#### 4.4.2.1 THE DUTCH HERITAGE OF AFRIKAANS

In the last quarter of the 19th century the Dutch-speakers in the Cape Colony campaigned for equal recognition of Dutch alongside English in schools, courts of law and government offices. During the early colonial period Dutch and English were the official languages (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:488.) They were also used by the Boer Republics as media of instruction in their schools (Louw and Kendall 1986:3-5). Milner’s insensitive Anglicisation policy after the British annexation of the Boer Republics led former Orange Free State president M.T. Steyn to express Afrikaner language sentiments as follows: “The language of the conqueror in the mouth of the conquered is the language of slaves.” (*cf.* 6.4.3 for similar sentiments expressed by Blacks with regard to Afrikaans.) Afrikaner children were subjected to English as the only medium of instruction until financial support from Holland helped to establish private CNE schools where both Dutch and English were employed as media of instruction (Malherbe 1977:4-7). By the non-recognition of the

Afrikaans language a strategy of British domination had emerged which Freire (1992:150-151) terms “cultural invasion”, the purpose of which is to convince the subjected culture of its intrinsic inferiority. “Cultural invasion is on the one hand an *instrument* of domination, and on the other, the *result* of domination” (Freire 1992:151-152).

As the Afrikaners gained more language and cultural recognition the need for CNE schools to keep their language alive diminished. These schools were neither compulsory nor free (Christie 1985:50), and when the Transvaal and Orange Free State were granted responsible government in 1907 and 1908 respectively, the Boer leaders opted for the amalgamation of CNE schools with government schools. The position of English and Dutch as media of instruction was laid down by the Smuts Education Act of 1907 in the Transvaal, and the Hertzog Education Act of 1908 in the Orange Free State. (Malherbe 1977:6.) When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910 both Dutch and English were recognised as official languages, although English remained the language of business

#### 4.4.2.2 AFRIKAANS ATTAINS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE STATUS

“Education in the mother-tongue and the replacement of Dutch by the erstwhile socially inferior patois of Afrikaans in school, church, press and university, as much as the creation of an original Afrikaans literature” (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:488) by poets such as Jan Cilliers, Louis Leipoldt and Eugene Marais strengthened the Afrikaans language movement. “The movement gained a strong following amongst teachers and provided a key dimension to the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism at the time. In the process Afrikaans came to be defined as the language of a specific group - **white** Afrikaners”. (*ibid.*) The efforts of Hertzog and the NP led to the recognition of Afrikaans as an official language in 1925 (Thompson & Butler 1975:30; Kallaway & Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:435, 488; Serfontein 1979:38).

The recognition of the Afrikaans language symbolised breaking out of the cultural inferiority mould and defying British domination. According to Freire (1992:150-151) creativity and expression are restored in this manner. It is evident that the struggle for political recognition of the Afrikaner was underpinned by the struggle for the recognition of the Afrikaans language (Malherbe 1977:16). The unifying effect of a mother tongue serves as the “cultural cement” that provides a sturdy foundation on which to build a powerful political structure. At *volksfeeste* usage of Afrikaans (the official recognition of which formed part of their struggle for ideological identity) added special meaning as tales were told “that recapitulate[d] the past and anticipate[d] the future”. These accounts were employed to legitimate and justify the political actions of the leaders. (Thompson & Butler 1975:30; Thompson, John B. 1984:11.) Such actions support John B. Thompson’s (1984:6) contention that language is used, knowingly or unknowingly, to alter, undermine or reinforce “social relations which are asymmetrical with regard to the organisation of power”. Because one assumes that “the statement made is *true* and that the speech-act is *correct*” language is open to abuse for purposes of indoctrination and falsification to serve an end (Thompson, John B. 1984:7, 8, 13). Slogan-like terms such as *die Swart gevaar*, *die Rooi gevaar* and *die totale aanslag* serve as examples (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:476; Du Preez 1983:80).

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The 1943 election was fought around the issue of language medium in South African schools, with the UP supporting dual medium schools to foster a common loyalty between English- and Afrikaans-speakers, and the Purified Nationalists favouring language segregation in schools. At a *Moedertaalkongres* held that same year dual-medium schools were condemned, and the Afrikaner striving for an own language, own culture and own political identity further fuelled. (Malherbe 1977:39-40; Serfontein 1979:39.) Degenaar (1982b:32) agrees that language plays an important role in establishing identity.

It is interesting to note how both the UP and the NP used the education system, specifically the language issue, to further their different political objectives - one to unite, and the other to divide and separate (Malherbe 1977:39-40). The language issue played

an immensely important role in the Black liberation struggle as well (*cf.* 6.4.3). Degenaar (1982b:32) warns that the “misuse of language ... leads to and accompanies a misuse of people”. In the next chapter the validity of this contention will become evident, and the significant role that language played in the rise of Black Nationalism as an ideology will be traced.

#### 4.4.3 THE IDEOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH

Afrikaner Nationalism has strong ties with the fundamental pedagogics approach and the concept, ground motive (*cf.* 2.4). Part of the definition of what a ground motive encompasses refers to “the spiritual root” of a community which, in turn, links up with how its religious expression is manifested. The Dutch Reformed Church with its rigid Calvinistic approach exercised an immensely strong influence on its members and served as a powerful ideological incentive. The *Voortrekkers* regarded themselves as having an exclusive relationship with God, and a God-ordained task of proselytising the heathen Blacks. This special relationship was confirmed by victory of the *Voortrekkers* over the numerically stronger Zulus at the battle of Blood River and nurtured by the annual religious celebration of the occasion. These *Volksfeeste* took place at *Volksmonumente* heralded as holy places. These activities formed a crucial part of CNE and school children played an active part. (Thompson & Butler 1975:30; Du Preez 1983:65, 85.) Moodie (1975:1) refers to the “sacred history” of the Afrikaners, which Dr. Malan described as “not the work of men but the creation of God”, as “civil religion”.

##### 4.4.3.1 THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH AND EDUCATION

The Dutch Reformed Church extended its influence beyond strictly religious confines. Its involvement in education can be traced back to the days of the *Voortrekkers* when education was mainly the concern of the parents and the church, with the Bible as the only textbook. The few state schools that sprung up also followed a syllabus with a heavy



religious content. (Christie 1985:40.) State schools instituted after the Second Anglo-Boer War to counteract Boer nationalism and promote British values, toned down the church involvement considerably. This led to the inception in 1904 of the Commission for Christian National Education by Afrikaner military, political and educational leaders and resulted in the institution of private CNE schools run with financial support from Holland. (Christie 1985:159; Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:438.)

Many Dutch Reformed ministers became members of the Broederbond. The Reverend William Nicol had, for instance, been moderator of the Transvaal Dutch Reformed Church as well as leader of the Broederbond. No wonder Rene de Villiers (quoted in Malherbe 1977:46) described the Dutch Reformed Church as “the National Party at prayer”. The Broederbond as well as the Dutch Reformed Church actively supported unilingualism in schools. In 1944 the Reverend Nicol issued the following statement which was circulated to all church members: “Our aim with the Afrikaans language, which is also the language of the Church, is to preserve and develop it, thus making sure of promoting the future interests of the Church, since the mother tongue school serves to preserve future members and their descendants for the Church”. (Malherbe 1977:43, 46.) The revival of CNE (with the advantage of state financing) after the NP had assumed political power ensured the Dutch Reformed Church of a denominational hold on the Afrikaner (Malherbe 1977:40). It is thus evident that the Broederbond-Dutch Reformed Church connection was mutually beneficial. John B. Thompson (1984:4) commented on the intertwining of ideology and social structures, and the above proves him correct.

The world-wide economic depression between 1929 and 1933 also took its toll on South African society. An inadequate education system was identified by the Carnegie Commission as the root of the Poor White problem which had affected Afrikaners particularly adversely. Other reasons offered were the devastation of farms, crops and stock by the British army during the Anglo-Boer War, the uneconomic subdivision of land amongst members of large families, the inability to cope with the industrial revolution, and, indolence and irresponsibility. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:425.) The Dutch

Reformed ministry, in conjunction with the NP, became involved in the social and educational upliftment of the Afrikaner. Traditional Afrikaner farmers, unable to cope with an industrialising South Africa, flocked to the cities where they lived in abject poverty under slum conditions. The Reverend J.D. Kestell established the *Reddingsdaadbond* to address these problems and, in particular, to assist promising but poor Afrikaner students. Soon the Broederbond had infiltrated the leadership of this charitable society to ensure that it would serve as a forum to promote the Afrikaner cause and ideology amongst the destitute. (Malherbe 1977:20-21.)

#### 4.4.3.2 THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH AND POLITICS

It should be evident from the previous section that the divide between the Dutch Reformed Church and the Broederbond had become increasingly blurred. Afrikaner Nationalist ideology, and specifically *apartheid*, was being presented as scriptural by many Dutch Reformed Church ministers. (Adam & Giliomee 1979:240; Malherbe 1977:663.) Describing the reason for the inception of the Broederbond Professor Van Rooy referred to it as “being born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner nation was planted in this country by the hand of God and is destined to continue to exist as a nation with its own character and own calling” (Malherbe 1977:663).

The writer contends that the church-dominated Afrikaner accepted whatever was preached from the pulpit as the truth and would not have dared to question such pronouncements. Thus the church provided the ideal forum for dissemination of indoctrination. The Reverend Dr. E. Greyling justified the NP and Broederbond insistence on Afrikaans unilingual schools as follows: “God had willed it that there shall be separate nations, each with its own language, and that mother tongue education is accordingly the will of God. The parent should have no choice” (Koers 12/12/1944). This is a prime example of the loss of freedom, or “unfreedom” as Freire (1992:32) calls it, on the part of the *oppressive* group as their leaders act as the custodians of their freedom, offering “false generosity” (because of their ulterior motives) while actually robbing their own people of

their freedom of thought and decision. This, according to Freire (1992:28-29, 32), occurs because those previously oppressed (the Afrikaner by the British) dehumanise others in an attempt to restore their own humanity. The “oppressor himself [becomes] dehumanised because he dehumanises others”.

After General Hertzog’s exposure of the Broederbond, the Dutch Reformed Church launched an inquiry into the activities of the Broederbond. The report of the board of inquiry stated that the aim of the organisation was merely to cultivate unanimity among Afrikaners and a love for the Afrikaans language, religion, traditions, country and people (all ideological goods), thus promoting Afrikaner interests. (Malherbe 1977:664.) It is the contention of the writer that, due to the intertwining of the Broederbond and many members of parliament, the Broederbond was actually investigating itself. It was unlikely that they would reveal information they wanted kept secret. They would have reported what they wanted to be known.

When Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Nationalist Prime Minister and prominent Broederbonder, put forward the doctrine of separate development, the Dutch Reformed Church compromised their Christianity even further by endorsing the *apartheid* policy as scriptural (Louw & Kendall 1986:89; Malherbe 1977:12). It seemed as if the leadership of the Dutch Reformed Church had become an ideological tool wielded by the Broederbond, instead of serving as the conscience of the nation. Munger (quoted in Adam & Giliomee 1979:241) stated in 1957: “The Dutch Reformed Churches are in no position to oppose the National Party - and the National Party is in no position to oppose the *Kerk*” - another example of “unfreedom” (Freire 1992:32).

Afrikaner Nationalist ideology had now proceeded to rationalising and legitimating its actions, passing moral judgement on social institutions, and justifying itself above other perceptions. Its own ideas were put forward as “facts” and converted into social levers (*cf.* 2.3), as has been described above in the case of education, social welfare and religion. There is clear evidence that Dant was correct in his “total conception of ideology” as

socially situated and based on self-interest rather than truth (*cf.* 2.6.2). Marx's exposition of "false consciousness" can also be identified in the study of Afrikaner ideology: If professed Christians can be indoctrinated to the point of adapting Scripture to suit their ideological purposes their "consciousness" is no longer true to themselves (*cf.* 2.5).

Further manifestations of these characteristics of ideology are abundantly evident as Afrikaner ideology gained ground and extended its power base. "[A]most always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors" (Freire 1992:29-30). This sad truth also applied to the Afrikaners.

#### 4.4.3.3 THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

The Sharpeville shootings in 1960 and the subsequent state of emergency focused the attention of the world, and the World Council of Churches (WCC), on South Africa. The WCC stated that, with the rise of Black nationalism world-wide since the Second World War, it has had to adjust its "theological thinking" and undertake "a new search of the Scriptures for its message concerning race relations". The WCC regarded race relations as the over-arching problem in South Africa. (Cottesloe Consultation 1960:5-9.) This resulted in the Cottesloe Consultation taking place in December 1960 in Johannesburg (Adam & Giliomee 1979:240; Cottesloe Consultation 1960:9, 15). Although agreement could not be reached on the definition of "*apartheid*" as a theory of race relations (Cottesloe Consultation 1960:20), it was decided that "any form of segregation based on race, colour or ethnic origin is contrary to the Gospel, and is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of man and with the nature of the Church of Christ" (*ibid.*:26). Eighty percent of the participants of the Consultation found the ideology of "*apartheid*" incompatible with Christian norms (*ibid.*:26, 29-34). The Dutch Reformed Churches of the Cape and the Transvaal (who were members of the WCC) did not regard the resolution adopted by the Consultation as incompatible with their point of view that "a

policy of differentiation can be defended from the Christian point of view, that it provides the only realistic solution to the problems of race relations and is therefore in the best interest of the various population groups" (*ibid.*:34-35). The Nederduits Hervormde Kerk van Afrika expressed their full support of the South African government's policies and rejected the declarations of the Consultation (*ibid.*:26, 29-34). This resulted in the Afrikaans churches of South Africa being expelled from the WCC (*ibid.*:35).

The above justifications of *apartheid* by Afrikaans churches correspond with Bacon's "theory of idols" which states that social and psychological features of knowledge introduce falsification and distortion of reason. He compared human understanding to "a false mirror" (*cf.* 2.6.1). Whether the justification of the *apartheid* ideology is an example of "the workings of a *camera obscura*" (Marx's *false consciousness*, *cf.* 2.6.1) or whether the church leaders were just mobilising meaning for the maintenance of relations of domination (Thompson, John B. 1984:5), only their consciences will be able to tell. The Afrikaans churches rationalised and legitimated the *apartheid* policy to the point of putting their loyalty to the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology and the Nationalist government before loyalty to the other Christian churches of the world and, in fact, the doctrine preached by Christ. This is an example of the evaluative quality of an ideology which results in justification of itself above other perceptions and the passing of moral judgement (*cf.* 2.3). The Dutch Reformed Church had become totally intertwined with the Nationalist government and its ideology as a result of the large number of Broederbond members in both the Dutch Reformed ministry and the government. It is obvious that loyalty to Broederbond ideals enjoyed preference. They resorted to a state of "unfreedom" and refused "to listen to the appeal of others, or even the appeal of their own conscience" (Freire 1992:32).

#### **4.5 AFRIKANER NATIONALISM CONSOLIDATED**

Although racial segregation had formed part of South African society from the time of the first White settlers, in 1926 Hertzog appealed for a systematic, consistent policy to govern

race relations in South Africa. He saw *segregation* as a policy which would be in the best interest of both Black and White. Whites would act as guardians over Blacks, not because of colour prejudice, but because Blacks were culturally and politically too undeveloped. De Kiewiet objected to Hertzog's portrayal of Blacks as a "privileged class happily free from the burdens and demands of a complex culture". (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:479-480.) The writer is of the opinion that this paternalistic attitude was employed to camouflage the Afrikaner's aspirations for domination, which corresponds with John B. Thompson's (1990:6-7) contention that ideology serves relations of domination (*cf.* 2.7.2). Freire (1992:153,15) supports this view when he states that paternalism is an inherent part of hegemonic rule.

By 1948 Afrikaner Nationalism was well on its way towards establishing itself. Giliomee (in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:532) states that the "Nationalist winning formula was that it appealed both to the Afrikaner Nationalist sentiments and to the interests of specific Afrikaner class categories (workers, farmers, professionals), and wrapped it all up in a package called *apartheid* which meant different things to different people". Initially Afrikaners were not united in their support for *apartheid*, but once the NP had assumed power the divisions started to disappear. A broad spectrum of Afrikaners were united in support of the new government: workers, farmers, civil servants and also businessmen. As a minister of religion Malan was adept at reconciling the *apartheid* ideology with the Christian creed. As by far the majority of Afrikaners were devout members of the Dutch Reformed Church, Church support of the policy could be translated into Afrikaner support (with objection from only a few prominent Afrikaners, *e.g.* Prof. B.B. Keet and later, Beyers Naude). (*ibid.*:532-533, 539.)

The ideology of *apartheid* was more than an appeal to racism. It touched on the interests, ideas, fears and sentiments of the Afrikaner, and, according to Giliomee (in Kallaway *et al.* 1989:539), "[u]ntil the late sixties few Afrikaners were prepared to challenge the claim that an Afrikaner had to be a nationalist, otherwise he/she was not an Afrikaner." Afrikaner Nationalism was growing in solidarity. The Broederbond, of which Malan was

a prominent member, had a network permeating all institutions of importance: educational institutions, Spoorbond, the Dutch Reformed Church, the FAK, the Reddingsdaadbond, the Mine Workers' Union, Saambou Building Society, SANLAM, SANTAM, Volkskas, Nasionale Pers, *etc.* The Afrikaans language was established in the civil service, in schools and in all institutions where the Afrikaner held sway. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:442; Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:488; Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:490-494, 496.) The Afrikaner Nationalist ideology was extending its influence to every sphere of South African life. Although racial segregation had been evident in South Africa long before 1948, the NP passed a number of laws, of which the Land Act and the Immorality Act are examples, to enforce segregation more firmly (Christie 1985:52, 55-56). This was in line with their ideology of developing separately from other racial groups (*cf.* 4.4.3.2).

Advocate J.G. Strijdom who succeeded Malan in 1954 was equally committed to the *apartheid* ideology and republicanism, but his political career was cut short by his death after just more than three years in office (Liebenberg in Muller *et al.* 1980:479-480). Dr. H.F. Verwoerd (who took over as Prime Minister) led Afrikanerdom to its most secure position of supremacy: As architect of *apartheid*, homelands and tribal colleges for Blacks, he divided the oppressed and established "an ideology of oppression" (Freire 1992:174). The way had been paved for the establishment of a Republic in 1961 (Degenaar 1982b:34) - the ultimate goal of Afrikanerdom was then attained. After Verwoerd's assassination in 1966 (Liebenberg in Muller *et al.* 1980:523) he was succeeded by B.J. Vorster.

#### **4.6 1976: THE WATERSHED YEAR FOR SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES AND THE AFTERMATH**

The sixties saw a long period of apparent Black quiescence which was terminated by the 1976 Soweto Uprising. White Afrikaner Nationalist leaders then realised that they would have to accommodate the aspirations of the Black majority in some way. (Swilling in Frankel *et al.* 1988:1-2.) This resulted in the *verligte/verkramp* cleavage developing

amongst Afrikaners. Freire (1992:22-23) refers to this as *sectarianism to the Right and Left*. With B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister an era of *détente* dawned. The writer suggests that the contact with Black governments in the rest of Africa prevalent during this period served as a smoke screen to cover up his government's hard line tactics in dealing with insurrection against *apartheid* in South Africa, and to try and stem the support South African Blacks received from African states. Vorster's political career was sunk when the Department of Information scandal came into the open. (Swilling in Frankel *et al.* 1988:2, 4-5; McCaul in Frankel 1988:119.) He was succeeded by P.W. Botha under whose leadership the South African state increasingly employed the technocratic ideology to depoliticise and legitimate its practices (Mann in Frankel 1988:65).

*Total Strategy* was the name given to the reformist initiative instigated by the *verligte* element in Botha's cabinet and by the more liberal demands of the business community (McCaul in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:119). This adaptation of ideology to societal changes Swilling (in Frankel *et al.* 1988:5) interprets as "an attempt to reconstitute the means of domination on terms favourable to the ruling group". Freire (1992:16, 153) contends that this type of reformist solution does not resolve "the internal and external contradictions" because, in the first instance, it serves the objectives of the ruling class. During Botha's term of office *apartheid* assumed a new guise, the tricameral parliament, which incorporated the Coloureds and Indians "into a 'consociational' central government structure without threatening the autonomy of the white parliamentary system". An overarching 'confederal' structure would accommodate the homelands (De la Harpe & Manson 1983:61; Swilling in Frankel *et al.* 1988:6, 7.)

True to the paternalistic attitude characteristic of hegemonic rule (Freire 1992:15, 153), the White voters decided unilaterally about the future of the other population groups; Blacks were denied "the right to say their own word[s] ... [which were] stolen from them". "They [the Oppressors] see themselves as 'promotors' (*sic*) of the people. Their programs of action ... include their own objectives", and they are the "professionals" who are best qualified to take such decisions (*ibid.*:153), in this instance to stave off majority rule.



Some NP supporters strongly objected to these concessions as they posed a threat to the “maintenance of the relations of power” by Whites (Thompson, John B. 1984:5). They envisioned these changes as encroaching on traditional Afrikaner rights to be a separate people that God put in charge of the lesser races (Brynard 1987:44; Du Preez 1983:73-77). Threatened by the swerve towards the Left, many former NP supporters renounced their allegiance to the party and joined the Conservative Party (CP), strengthening its ranks to the point where it ousted the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as official opposition in 1989 (Frankel in Frankel *et al.* 1988:279). Resting on the attainment of the ideological ideal of an Afrikaner dominated independent state, the variances within sub-groups began surfacing. John B. Thompson’s (1990:8) objection to the “ideological cement” metaphor rests on these variances that had always been there, but (in the opinion of the writer) had been submerged by a common striving; the ideology they shared “cemented” them together, even if only until its attainment. Freire (1992:22) refers to this phenomenon as “sectarianism” of the Right and Left.

#### 4.7 THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH DOES AN ABOUT-TURN

The publication of the document, *Kerk en Samelewing* by the Algemene Sinodale Kommissie van die Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk in October 1986 was the result of intensive research regarding the task of the church in South African society. In this document the Dutch Reformed Church declared that it had come to the conclusion that “*apartheid* as a political and social system which deprived people of their rights and favoured one group above another was unacceptable on the grounds of Christian ethics, as it is contrary to the principle of neighbourly love and inevitably detracts from the human dignity of all those affected. Insofar as the church and its members had part in this system it confessed in repentance and humility”. (NG Kerk 1986:52-53, writer’s translation.) This is an about-turn from the position assumed at the time when the Broederbond virtually controlled the Dutch Reformed Church with an all-consuming ideological passion for Afrikaner power at any cost (*cf.* 4.4.3.2).

In November 1990 a National Conference of Churches in South Africa was held at Rustenburg to engage “in a process of soul-searching and wrestling with the theological and socio-political complexities of our country” (Rustenburg Declaration 1990: Preamble). The Declaration acknowledged that “some of us actively misused the Bible to justify *apartheid*, leading many to believe that it had the sanction from God” and that “its motives were good even though the effects were evil” (*ibid.*:2.5.1). The Declaration continued to state that *they had been influenced more by ideologies than by Christ’s Gospel* (*ibid.*:2.6, writer’s italics). Once again this is a total about-turn from the position the Church assumed at the Cottesloe Consultation (*cf.* 4.4.3.3). This serves as proof of how ideology can distort truth and create a “false consciousness” (*cf.* 2.6.1).

The churches in South Africa, including the Dutch Reformed Church, followed their confession by a plea for forgiveness: “With a broken and contrite spirit we ask the forgiveness of God and our fellow South Africans. We call upon the Government of South Africa to join us in public confession of their guilt and a statement of repentance of wrongs perpetrated over the years”. (Rustenburg Declaration 1990:2, 11.) Admission was made to complicity in racism (*ibid.* 1990:4.2.1).

#### 4.8 EN ROUTE TO DEMOCRACY

In 1989 President P.W. Botha suffered a stroke. It appeared as if he had reached the limits of his vision of reform. The NP used his imposition to request his reluctant resignation. F.W. de Klerk assumed the new leadership (Keesing’s Record of World Events ... 41(1) 1995:40342) and opened the way for what Freire (1992:22) termed the “sectarianism of the Left” to accelerate the pace of reform drastically (The Argus 14/8/1989:1). In his speech at the opening of parliament on 2 February 1990 De Klerk announced sweeping reform initiatives. He appealed to all South Africans “to set aside all ideological differences and draw up a joint programme of reconstruction (The Argus, City Late, 2/2/1990:1, 3.) He announced that the government would start negotiating with other ethnic groups to establish a dispensation to accommodate the ideological strivings of

all the population groups, and institute a democratic, open, non-racial society. The unbanning of previously illegal organisations (including the ANC), the release of Nelson Mandela (at that stage deputy president of the ANC) and subsequently many other political prisoners and detainees, opened the way for negotiations for a democratic, non-racial political dispensation, constitution and education system. (Address by the State President ... 1/2/1990.)

One year later, at the opening of the 1991 parliament, De Klerk spelled out “the removal of discrimination ... to give all South Africans full rights in every sphere of life” (Address by the State President ... 2/2/1991:1). A multi-party conference under the acronym, CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa), acted as a negotiating forum where *bona fide* leaders representing all the population groups met for the first time in South African history to take decisions about their collective future. From the CODESA I and II negotiations flowed the establishment of a Transitional Council, followed by the election of a Government of National Unity on 27 April 1994 (Keesing’s ... Annual Reference Supplement 1995:R25). What had occurred here is what Freire (1992:134) saw as the only way to rectify an Oppressor-Oppressed relationship: “Because liberating action is dialogical in nature, dialogue cannot be *a posteriori* to action, but becomes a *continuing* aspect of liberating action.”

#### 4.9 CONCLUSION

From the foregoing it is pertinently obvious that Afrikaner Nationalism as an ideology has its roots in the establishment of Afrikanerdom as a political force, an exclusive cultural and language group, and a religious group with a divine calling. Du Toit (in Thompson & Butler 1975:20) describes the hegemony of the Afrikaner as “a remarkable phenomenon” seen in the light of the White minority constituting such a small percentage of the population. Theories on the formation and manifestations of ideologies reveal an undeniable correspondence with the route followed in the formation of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. Afrikaner Nationalists very successfully orchestrated the various

ISAs which operated under the helm of the Repressive State Apparatus and used ideology to attain a position of domination thus giving effect to the theories of Althusser and John B. Thompson (*cf.* 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 respectively). When applying Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed (1992:29-31) to Afrikanerdom it is revealed as the former Oppressed who had assumed a position of power to become the new Oppressor, copying the role model of its former Oppressor.

The ensuing chapter will trace the establishment and development of the Black Nationalist ideology in South Africa and its titanic struggle against the domination of the powerful Afrikaner Nationalist ideology.



## CHAPTER 5

### BLACK NATIONALISM AS LIBERATION SOCIALISM

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In contrast with Afrikaner Nationalism, which united settlers from several European countries of origin under one ideology (the British were the exception as they remained imperialist at heart), Black Nationalism did not manifest in one unified ideology. The Black tribes were divided into several ethnic groups, each with its own leaders, sub-culture, language, traditions and territory, and were in competition with one another, if not in a state of inter-tribal war. Despite these divisive aspects, one powerful, unifying force emerged: the struggle for Black liberation from White hegemony. Freire (1992:140) confirms this tendency: “[T]he harmony of the oppressed is only possible when its members are engaged in the struggle for liberation.”

Ever since the *apartheid* regime of the NP tried to locate the Blacks in tribal homelands, previously referred to as reserves (Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:471, 561), there has been ongoing confrontation between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the two strongest contenders for Black political supremacy. In the opinion of the writer this is a battle between conflicting ideologies: Liberation Socialism in the case of the ANC (*cf.* 2.8.3), and Ethnic Nationalism in the case of the IFP (*cf.* 2.8.1). Kohn (in Degenaar 1982b:20; *cf.* 2.5) categorises the former under Totalitarian Nationalism and the latter under *Volk*-nationalism or Nationalism of the People. Although the Black nationalist struggle for political power has been rewarded with triumph over the NP in the 1994 election, the battle between the ANC and the IFP has intensified rather than abated. This serves as proof of the intensity that accompanies ideological variance, and the tendency for group differences to surface again once the common ideal, which for a period of time

united different groups, had been realised. This chapter will trace the development of Black Nationalism, and specifically Black Liberation Socialism, from its rather hesitant beginnings to its present position of power. Ethnic Nationalism as represented by the IFP will not be dealt with in any depth in this dissertation.

Black-on-Black violence is frequently put forward as justification for White hegemony in South Africa. Freire (1992:48) explains this phenomenon as follows: “[H]orizontal violence against their own comrades results for petty reasons” due to the “chafing” under the restrictions of the order imposed by the Oppressor. “The colonized man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones against his own people.” He explains that the Oppressed are defenceless against the onslaughts of the Oppressor, so that his pent-up aggression is vented against his fellow-Oppressed at the slightest provocation.

## 5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK NATIONALISM

During the early years of White colonisation at the Cape the indigenous people consisted of Khoi hunters and San herders. As colonisation progressed their numbers gradually dwindled as they were killed for resisting the take-over of their land or decimated by European diseases to which they had no natural resistance. A small number became labourers in the service of the White settlers. (Mbata in Thompson & Butler 1975:203; Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:13-14). The Xhosa lived in the Eastern Cape, and further north in the present-day Natal, the Nguni. These two groups were subsistence cattle and, to a lesser extent, crop farmers. A series of frontier wars erupted between the *Trekboere* and the Xhosas over grazing land. (Christie 1885:30-32; Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:13-14.) The Black tribes were finally defeated by the greater might of the Whites and the last Kaffir War took place in 1878 (Motlhabi 1987:1; Walshe 1973:4). The mere fact that the Blacks continued fighting against the much stronger White commandos of the

*Trekboere* is an indication of the beginnings of the formation of a Black Nationalist ideology at what Voloshinov terms “the sub-conscious level” (*cf.* 2.2; 4.2).

### 5.2.1 THE FIRST INDICATIONS OF RISING BLACK NATIONALISM

In 1882 the Black people responded to White supremacy with the formation of the first Black political movement. Two years later the first Black newspaper was published to put forward the Black point of view. (Mothlabi 1987:1.) These were the first indications of a Black Nationalist ideology taking shape and rising from the sub-conscious level to the conscious level which Voloshinov describes as an “established ideology” (*cf.* 2.2 and 4.2).

In these initial stages Black ideological thinking centred around seeking peace with the Whites and warding off total disinheritance by abandoning their sole claim to the land they were sharing with the more powerful White colonists (Mothlabi 1987:2). Their political immaturity made them easy victims of manipulation by the White colonists (*cf.* Freire 1992:144). As Blacks became progressively Westernised and attained greater economic mobility this strategy was gradually adapted to that of an ideology demanding equality and power-sharing with Whites on a democratic basis. The effect of a shared ideology (*cf.* 2.3) as a unifying, motivational, goal-orientating and action-inspiring tool became evident as Blacks rallied together to express their objection to the government’s ruling forcing them to carry passes to move around in their own country (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:436). In 1889 a Black delegation approached the government to address this issue, but to no avail. When a poll tax was imposed on Blacks in 1906 they expressed their discontent by launching the Bhambata Rebellion. Delegations were sent to England and Europe in 1909, 1913 and 1919 requesting political and civil rights. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:449; Mothlabi 1987:25; Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:14). In 1900 Black Nationalist awareness led to the formation of yet another politically orientated organisation, the Natal Native Congress, representing the Zulu Christians and demanding representation in the Natal parliament (Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:14).

It is evident that the awakening of Black Nationalism was accompanied by a strong emotive response and a sense of coherence amongst Blacks (*cf.* 2.3) which resulted in unified action driven by a common ideology, *viz.* Black liberation from White domination.

### 5.3 THE FORMATION OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

The refusal of South Africa's White population in the early 1900's to allow Blacks citizen rights resulted in polarisation between their respective nationalist ideologies: Black Nationalism stood in opposition to the White ideologies of British Imperialism and Afrikaner Nationalism (*cf.* 4.2). In 1912 the first real Black resistance movement was formed, *viz.* the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). (The name of this organisation changed to the African National Congress in 1952.) Its formation was instigated by a Black lawyer, Pixley ka Izaka Seme. Members consisted mostly of the "schooled elite", the professionals. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:450-451; Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:500; Laurence 1984:269; Motlhabi 1987:xix, 38, 39; Walshe 1973:9.) The Congress was established to bridge ethnic differences, to grant self-expression, dignity and justice, and to establish a united front in the fight against the institution of discriminatory legislation and for Black representation in the parliament of the Union of South Africa from which Blacks had been excluded (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:451). They did not have aspirations to overthrow White supremacy and, according to Walshe (1973:10), lacked the leadership to do so, but wanted acceptance by the Whites on the basis of civilised values. Petitions and deputations, and not violent means, were employed to present their grievances to the government. The objective of this movement was to unite all South African Blacks, regardless of tribal affiliations, under one ideological umbrella, and to establish an African self-help organisation as they had come to realise that they themselves would have to accept responsibility for reform. "The exclusive and introspective Afrikaner nationalism kept African nationalism outward-looking." (Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:14-15; Walshe 1973:9-11.)



The 1913 Land Act Bill which compressed the Blacks into 13% of the land resulted in yet another Black delegation to the Prime Minister, General Botha. When their proposal was summarily rejected Black women resorted to passive resistance in Bloemfontein and several other centres to express Black dissatisfaction. In 1936 the government instituted a Native Representative Council to provide Blacks with a platform to express their grievances, but at the same time removed them from the voter's role in the Cape. Black resistance was vigorous to the various restrictive acts that Hertzog's government passed between 1924 and 1936. They realised that, although two nations had effectively been created within one state, they were economically dependent on each other - Blacks required the White expertise and infra-structure, and the Whites needed Black labour. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:436, 351; Motlhabi 1987:25-26, 40; Walshe 1973:6, 13-15.)

These onslaughts on the position of Blacks and their disillusionment with the motives and nature of White authority strengthened Black Nationalism tremendously and effected a shift of the parameters within which they were previously content to operate. Before they had been prepared to accept a qualified franchise, hoping for the creation of a South African nation in which the various groups would develop along their own lines socially and culturally, but share common political objectives. A unified Black national identity was beginning to form and by 1941 the Congress had increased its demands to full franchise as well as representation in all government bodies. Inspired by the Black Nationalist ideology, a Bill of Rights was adopted by the Congress in 1943. (Motlhabi 1987:25-26, 40; Walshe 1973:14-17.) By unified action they were better able to counter manipulation and domination (Freire 1992:141).

After the Second World War, in which Blacks had fought side by side with White soldiers, a wave of nationalist sentiment swept the world. This resulted in strong nationalist feelings in the African colonies where Blacks demanded equal economic, political, religious and educational rights. South African Black nationalist aspirations were not left unaffected. (Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:9.) The SANNC maintained that their

struggle was not against Whites as such, but against White domination (Motlhabi 1987:42). Black Nationalism, strengthened by Christianity, had developed into an ideology that bridged the many ethnic differences so effectively that a coherent, unified front evolved, determined to fight for Black rights against White hegemony (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:451-452; Walshe 1973:6, 18).

It must be noted that, at this stage, the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology had just won its struggle against British domination (*cf.* 4.3). It was unlikely to be willing to share its new-found, hard-earned position of power with another nationalist movement. This proves Freire's (1992:29-31) contention that the Oppressed to whom the Oppressor is the model of "manhood" takes over the role of Oppressor. What Althusser termed the Repressive State Apparatuses were already in place (*cf.* 2.7.1), and there was much evidence to support John B. Thompson's emphatic view that ideology serves "to establish and sustain relations of domination" (*cf.* 2.7.2). Despite the fervour of Black Nationalism Afrikaner Nationalism was firmly established in its seat of power.

Nevertheless, Black Nationalism continued to grow, spurred on by the Pan-African movement. The pressures of inflation and rapid urbanisation encouraged the formation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICWU) in 1919 in Cape Town (country-wide from 1925). It also served as a political forum, due to the lack of another. Disastrous organisation and financial chaos led to its collapse in the late twenties. The ICWU had given the Blacks a taste of mass mobilisation, though, and in its footsteps followed the Joint Councils, headed by a group of White liberals who sympathised with the Black plight. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:452; Walshe 1973:19-21.) The influence of Black American successes, White liberal support and especially Christianity, contributed greatly to the growth of the Black Nationalist ideology (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:451-452; Walshe 1973:24-25).

Socialism started emerging increasingly in the South African Black Nationalist context due to its presence in the rest of Africa and under the influence of the South African

Communist Party. This effected an ideological evolution. The Communist Party advocated a classless, socialist Independent Native Republic, and the American, Marcus Garvey, propagated the slogan "Africa for the Africans" (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:543; Walshe 1973:20-23.) This led to the Black Nationalist ideals being pursued fervently, collectively and bridging tribal divides. It must be noted that at this stage socialism was adding another ideological facet to Black Nationalism, changing it to the ideology of Black Liberation Socialism. (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:543; Walshe 1973:35.) This ideology was moulding Blacks into a formidable force: they were action-orientated, goal-directed, emotionally inspired and united in respect of their political aspirations (*cf.* 2.3). This type of response Freire (1992:21) terms radicalisation (as the counter to sectarianism) which involved increased commitment, creativity and greater engagement in the process of transforming reality.

#### 5.4 THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK LIBERATION ESCALATES

During the forties and fifties the ANC started to develop mass support under the capable leadership of Dr. A.B. Xuma who set about establishing an organised branch and provincial structure. In the document, *African Claims*, the ANC demanded one man one vote, and legislative and executive powers for the Native Representative Council. This document indicated a diversion from the "somewhat naive politics of moral assertion" to acceptance that confrontation with the government was unavoidable. (Walshe 1973:26-28.)

In 1949, a year after the NP had come into power, the SANNC called for non-cooperation with government institutions, resulting in the Resistance Campaign which entailed boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience. These actions were followed by the Defiance Campaign, launched in 1952 "to relieve Africans of immediate burdens while they strove for larger, more inclusive goals". (Motlhabi 1987:42; Walshe 1972:30-31.) The Black Nationalist ideology had managed to unite, inspire, motivate and spur on its supporters to the extent that it had the courage to spar with the mighty Afrikaner

Nationalist ideology, a formidable opponent in the light of the fact that the Afrikaners could shake off the yoke of British Imperialism.

When the South African Communist Party was banned in 1950, its members formed the white South African Congress of Democrats (CoD) which supported the SANNC and, in fact, adopted membership. This caused controversy within the movement. Although they had their opposition to the Nationalist government in common, their points of departure were based on different ideologies - the South African CoD adhering to the Communist ideology, and the SANNC to Black Nationalism which encompassed Black liberation. Eventually their differences were set aside and Communist membership of the Black movement was allowed on condition that they adhere to the liberation struggle. The ANC (as the SANNC was now known), the CoD, the South African Indian Council (SAIC) and the South African Coloured Person's Organisation (SACPO) set their individual agendas aside and joined forces to form the Congress Alliance. This serves as another example of the coherence that can be created by a common ideology, that of Black Nationalism. In 1955 the Congress Alliance drafted the Freedom Charter. It stated that "[o]nly a democratic state based on the will of the people, can secure to all their birth right without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief". (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:545-546; Motlhabi 1987:16, 47, 58; Walshe 1973:32.)

The Freedom Charter put forward the following ten points:

- The people shall govern.
- All national groups shall have equal rights.
- The people shall share in the country's wealth.
- The land shall be shared among those who work it.
- All shall be equal before the law.
- All shall enjoy equal rights.
- There shall be work and security.
- The doors of learning and culture shall be opened.
- There shall be houses, security and comfort.

- There shall be peace and friendship.

(Motlhabi 1987:47.)

The above charter clearly reveals the strong socialistic leaning in Black Nationalism. In the opinion of the writer this is not surprising as the communalistic tendency in Black culture links up very well with socialism (*cf.* Motlhabi 1987:135). This serves to prove that Degenaar (1982b:20-22) was correct when he stated that nationalism frequently combines with other political forms (*cf.* 4.2).

## 5.5 THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS RESORTS TO POSITIVE ACTION

As has been seen before, ideology inspires action (Ashley 1989:2; *cf.* 2.3). In 1959 impatient members of the ANC Youth League broke away to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe. They felt that the ANC was not making sufficient progress towards Black political rights. Another matter of contention was their objection communists with a different ideology being allowed membership of the ANC. (Motlhabi 1987:xix, 2, 45, 51, 90; Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:15-16; Walshe 1973:32, 34; *cf.* 5.3.)

1960 saw a turning point in Black resistance. The PAC started “a new era in political awareness and response” and resorted to what they termed “positive action” (Motlhabi 1987:105). The emotive quality of ideological thinking (*cf.* 2.3) had caused members of the Youth League to become so agitated by the frustration of not making any progress towards their nationalist goals, that they broke away from the ANC with the view of implementing drastic measures to effect change. They deliberately contravened the pass laws and presented themselves for arrest. At a mass anti-pass campaign on 21 March 1960 at Sharpeville a huge crowd of about 20 000 Blacks gathered around the police station. In the subsequent police shooting 69 people died and 78 were injured. At Langa in the Cape a similar gathering had an equally tragic outcome. These actions certainly

evoked reaction: The rest of the world expressed strong disapproval of the police action and the *apartheid* policy; and, the ANC came out in support of the PAC. Both these organisations were banned on 8 April 1960. The police were granted wide powers under the Unlawful Organisations Bill and detention without trial became commonplace. (Motlhabi 1987:27, 94, 97, 100; Ubuntu-Butho 1990, Ibanga 8:15, 16; Walshe 1973:32-33.)

The PAC had certainly succeeded in getting the world and the South African government to take note of its demands. Having achieved its position of power because of the driving force of its Afrikaner Nationalist ideology, the government knew full well that the Black Nationalist ideology posed a serious threat to the Afrikaner cause if it was allowed to flourish. In 1961 South Africa was declared a republic, which put the government in a position to take whatever action it regarded necessary to suppress Black ideological ideals. Blacks were offered independence and self-government in their own homelands. This meant they would no longer be South Africans, but citizens of a specific homeland. (Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:527.) It also meant that the threat of the Black Nationalist ideology to Afrikaner supremacy had been warded off by what Freire (1992:137-143) describes as a strategy inseparable from domination, *viz.* the “divide and rule” tactics. By these pacts that were formed between Oppressor and Oppressed the impression was created that dialogue was taking place, but the true objectives unequivocally served the interests of the dominant elite (Freire 1992:144). “As the oppressor minority subordinates and dominates the majority, it must divide it and keep it divided in order to remain in power” (Freire 1992:137).

## 5.6 IDEOLOGICAL FRUSTRATION LEADS TO MILITANCY

After their banning the Black liberation organisations went underground (Motlhabi 1987:16). Their “positive action” had been frustrated, therefore tougher action had to be considered. Both the ANC and the PAC resorted to the formation of military wings. *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) was formed by the ANC (ironically on 16

December 1961, this being the Day of the Covenant when the victory God had granted the *Voortrekkers* against the Blacks at Blood River is commemorated), and Poqo, by the PAC (Motlhabi 1987:67-68). Desperate to realise their ideological strivings they resorted to violent actions such as sabotage. Within two years the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* leaders were captured by the South African police. At what became known as the Rivonia Trial one of the leaders, Nelson Mandela (currently President of South Africa), motivated their aggressive actions as follows: "Fifty years of non-violent struggle had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation". (Umkhonto we Sizwe in Motlhabi 1987:67-68.)

Mandela's statement brings to mind Lenin's contention (in Plano & Olton 1969:94) that "the bourgeoisie would never relinquish its dominant role until its power was smashed by a violent proletarian revolution." The movement identified four stages of violence to be employed to effect change: Sabotage, which did not involve loss of life, was to be exhausted first before resorting to progressive measures, viz. guerrilla warfare, terrorism and revolution. It was felt that only two alternatives had remained - submitting to White suppression, or fighting against it, as "peaceable demands by the people for rights and freedom" had been met with force on the part of the South African government. (Umkhonto we Sizwe in Motlhabi 1987:67-68.) Freire (1992:41) contends that "violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognise others as persons - not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognised."

Twenty seven years after being convicted of high treason for the above acts against the state, Nelson Mandela was released. It was clear that the ideological flame that had led him and his fellow-accused to those actions had maintained the hope for the realisation of the Black nationalist ideal.

## 5.7 THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT

The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) had its inception in December 1968, after Black students had become disenchanted with the multi-ethnic National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). They wished to establish a Black students' organisation which would unite all the other separate organisations. At its inaugural meeting at the University of the North in 1969 Steve Biko was elected as first president (Motlhabi 1987:109.) Black Consciousness became the ideology of this movement. Its intention was to awaken the "Black people of South Africa to their value as human beings and their dignity as God's children and creatures" (*ibid.*). They maintained that prolonged subjugation leads to acceptance and resignation (Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:560; Motlhabi 1987:11, 138) and "complicity in the crime of allowing [one]self to be misused" (Pityana quoted in Motlhabi 1987:112). In a very short time Black Consciousness became an immensely powerful sub-ideology of Black Nationalism. Within a year it had launched literacy campaigns, health services, home study assistance projects as well as various cultural and educational organisations. They furthered their ideology by rejecting White stereotypes of Blacks: The derogatory connotation of the term "black" was dispelled and favoured above "non-white" and "non-European". (Motlhabi 1987:111.) Freire (1992:41, 78) adds to these negative terms from his experience in Brazil: "savages", "natives", "subversives", "violent", "barbaric", "ferocious", "the great unwashed". Black history and Black culture, referred to as "barbarism", and Black religion, referred to as "superstition", were to be reinstated. Further undertakings were the revival of a community-centred approach, joint land ownership, neighbourliness and mutual help. The intention was to alleviate poverty and promote an holistic view of life.

Biko aimed "to establish an entirely new society in which all the citizens would participate equally, though, in the end the majority would have to be reflected" (Motlhabi 1987:111). The BCM favoured non-racialism, as opposed to multi-racialism, which effectively meant majority rule, due to the numerical superiority of the Blacks in South Africa. The movement also supported the African socialist approach of Black communalism, but



opposed Communism (Adam & Moodley 1986:47; Motlhabi 1987:135) - a distinction Whites seldom recognised (*cf.* 2.6). Biko stated that they favoured peaceful revolution to achieve their aims (Motlhabi 1987:135). Many student strikes, including the 1976 Soweto Riots, were organised by the movement.

Only in 1977 did the South African government fully realise that the BCM did not merely represent “tribal consciousness” (*ibid.*:146), an approach which corresponded with the government’s homeland policy. The fact of the matter was that ideologically the BCM was far more radical than the ANC, and was having a tremendous impact on the Black youth. When the government realised what a serious threat the movement posed, it was summarily banned. Steve Biko was jailed where he died under highly suspicious circumstances. (*ibid.*:149-151, 153.)

## 5.8 THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

From the late 1970’s the NP government sank into a legitimacy crisis. The *Total Strategy* reforms, referred to in 4.7 (*cf.* McCaul in Frankel *et al.* 1988:119), were preceded by the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions which respectively dealt with industrial relations and the urbanisation of Blacks. A wave of strikes had been organised by Black labour unions, which had, under socialist leadership, become highly effective structures providing organisational training for a new generation of community leaders (Swilling in Frankel *et al.* 1988:8). The 1983 constitutional changes made provision for the implementation of the tricameral parliament which “consisted of consociationalism for Whites, Coloureds and Indians within a tricameral parliament, and confederalism to facilitate political and economic independence of ‘separate’ states” (*ibid.* 1988:3-6). With the constitution came the Koornhof Bills which allowed Blacks rights in municipal government (Black Local Authorities) in their own urban group areas and relegated the rest to their homelands (*ibid.* 1988:9; Zille 1983:42). Freire (1992:155) explains that the Oppressor’s intended reforms (as discussed above) demand that they divest themselves of and renounce their “myths”, which is experienced as an act of self-violence: “The only way out ... is ...

[perceived to be] ... *steering, conquering, and invading.*" Each instance of reform instigated by the NP regime confirms Freire's theory. Swilling (in Frankel *et al.* 1988:16-17) comments on the "ingenuity of these reforms" which eventually reveal themselves as "the state's strategy of repressive reform."

In 1983 the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched under the slogan: "*Apartheid divides, UDF unites*". As a non-racial *front* the movement united over 400 organisations to oppose the Koornhof Bills and the new constitution that would institute the tricameral parliament. The long-term objective of the UDF was a democratic future for Blacks and Whites. (Bloch 1983:155; De la Harpe & Manson 1983:67-68; Lekota 1984:4; Nijkelana 1984:30.) Without a vote Blacks had no chance of preventing the tricameral parliament from entrenching yet another version of *apartheid*, but through widespread sustained rebellion civil government in the townships collapsed. Between 1984 and 1988 nearly 50 000 people had been detained, two states of emergency (in 1985 and 1986) had been imposed, and, disruption of meetings, shootings, bannings, curtailing of press freedom, jailing of political leaders, *etc.* were the order of the day. Repression had replaced reform, but the liberation movements nevertheless managed to survive. (Swilling in Frankel *et al.* 1988:11; Mann in Frankel *et al.* 1988:48.)

Mark Swilling (in Frankel *et al.* 1988:10-11) ventured the following prediction in 1988: "Although the South African conflict has always confounded predictions that the collapse of the regime is imminent, there may be some truth in the popular view that the conflict is going through its last violent convulsive cycle." He was correct in that hegemonic Nationalist rule did come to an end, but fortunately it occurred by means of negotiation. 4.8 describes how the changes instituted by the *verligte* element in the government took advantage of Botha's illness, ousted him and replaced him with F.W. de Klerk who immediately started instituting reforms where there seemed to be no (or fewer) hidden agendas aimed at covering up just another version of *apartheid*.

## 5.9 Conclusion

The regime did not collapse, but terminated its hegemony by engaging in a process of rapid and genuine reform towards democracy (7.4 discusses various interpretations of the concept), in the full knowledge that there would never again be a White dominated government in the light of the vast Black majority. De Klerk, and those who supported him, managed the difficult act of facing up to “the violence of their own act of invasion” which entailed “abandoning all the myths which nourish invasion, and starting to incarnate dialogical action” (Freire 1992:154). It meant abandoning the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology, knowingly giving up their position of political independence and control for what could be termed being “swamped” by a vast Black majority. After so many years of oppression Blacks probably approached the reforms with guarded optimism. It must have been exceedingly difficult to have faith in the former Oppressors, but trust, according to Freire (1992:80), can only be established through dialogue, and that “[t]rust is contingent on the evidence which one party provides the others of his true, concrete intentions”.

It is the contention of the writer that Black Nationalism only became a force to be reckoned with when an ideological shift took place towards Liberation Socialism. It is evident that the ideological evolution had been inseparable from the socio-political occurrences, as the latter provided the impetus that directed ideology. Many factors can be sighted as instrumental in the eventual abandonment of oppression: the economic pressure which bore down heavily on Whites who had to carry the high cost of *apartheid*; the relentless and sustained struggle by Black liberation movements; pressure from the rest of the world; the global trend towards recognition of individual and group freedom which manifested in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent “liberation” of its republics; the break away armies fighting for ethnic group rights in Eastern Europe; the ousting of dictatorships such as the Marcos regime in the Philippines; the cessation of civil war in Angola; establishment of independence in Namibia; *etc.* Finally, and hopefully, the main reason is the revivification of the consciences of White South Africans who, having suffered the dehumanisation of oppression themselves, had realised that they

had been blinded by their own ideology and subsequently started the process of reclaiming humanity for themselves and those they had oppressed.

The following chapter will examine the effect ideology had exercised on education in South Africa over the years: The effect of CNE on White education will be traced first, and then the development of People's Education as an alternative educational ideology to Bantu Education will be studied.



## CHAPTER 6

### THE IMPLICATIONS OF IDEOLOGY FOR EDUCATION

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The two previous chapters demonstrated the tremendously powerful driving force exercised by ideology on the nationalist aspirations of the sub-groups that make up South African society. Ideology is inculcated in the minds of children within their family circle and thus passed on from one generation to the other. Commitment to a particular ideology is strongly influenced by the history, religion, language, political orientation, social alliance, *etc.* (*cf.* 2.4) of a family. Althusser (1971:150-157) refers to the family in this capacity of instilling ideology, as the family ISA. (*cf.* 2.7.1.)

From school-going age children spend progressively more time at school or being involved in education-related activities. At this stage children establish their identities, value systems and norms, and are particularly susceptible to influences. For this reason each ideological grouping tries its utmost to use education as a tool to imprint its beliefs on its children. When education performs this ideological function Althusser describes it as the school ISA. (Althusser 1971:155-157; *cf.* 2.7.1 for a discussion of Althusser's ISAs and related concepts.) The child is "squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational State apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in the ruling ideology" (Althusser 1971:155). Schools thus end up preparing pupils to perpetuate the type of society and economic system their parents had inherited from their forefathers. This is an example of "the production of relations of production", *i.e.* the state ideology (*ibid.*:156-157). This phenomenon led Bowles and Gintis to formulate their "correspondence theory" (*cf.* 3.5.3).

In the ensuing chapter the manifestations of ideology in South African education will be traced.

## 6.2 EARLY EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

When colonisation started at the Cape in 1652 education for White children was left in the hands of the church which adhered to a strong religious ideology. The content of schooling was religious by nature and aimed at enabling the pupils to read the Bible (Christie 1985:32). The strong religious emphasis creates the impression that their temporal, earthly lives were not regarded as justifying much more than basic reading, writing and arithmetic skills. This powerful religious ideology formed part of the European heritage brought to Africa by the European colonists. It permeated education at that time and was subsequently carried over to White education, in particular by CNE, and to Black education via the mission schools. (Cosser 1991:49.) This will become evident as the chapter proceeds.

Apart from its religious functions the Church in the Middle Ages played a powerful political and educational role (Althusser 1971:151). The Reformation brought many European settlers who wanted to escape from the despotic rule of the Church there to religious freedom in South Africa. It is interesting to note that, despite fleeing from the oppression of the Church, Calvinism had produced its own brand of oppression via the Dutch Reformed Church and CNE (*cf.* 4.4.3).

The annexation of the Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek by Great Britain in 1877 gave rise to a protest movement by the Boers which culminated in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in which the British were victorious (Muller *et al.* 1980:334; *cf.* 4.3). This war not only brought about political domination of the Boer Republics, but also educational domination. Whereas the Republics had previously provided and controlled their own education they were now subjected to a dominant Anglophile approach to education. (Christie 1985:46-50; Coetzee 1963:296-330; *cf.* 4.4.2.1.) Freire (1992:151) states

“[t]hat for cultural invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become convinced of their intrinsic inferiority”. From the discussion of CNE it will become evident that the Afrikaners took firm action to preserve their culture.

The annexation of Afrikaner land by British imperialists without regard for the plight of the Afrikaner people represents the Repressive State Apparatus in action - functioning primarily by repression. (Refer to the annexation of the Boer republics, the Anglo-Boer War, the concentration camps where prisoners of war suffered greatly, *etc. cf. Muller et al. 1980:237, 260, 279, 192-195; cf. 4.3.*) On the secondary level it functions by ideology (*e.g.* expanding the British empire to include the Witwatersrand goldfields - in Muller *et al.* 1980:328-333). With the Repressive State Apparatus in place, the ISAs, such as the educational ISA, could start operating. Functioning primarily by ideology, the English attempted to convert the Boers from speaking Dutch to speaking English by making English a compulsory medium of instruction in the schools (Du Toit in Thompson & Butler 1975:29; *cf. 4.3.*) Resistance was dealt with (on the secondary level) by repression, calling on the Repressive State Apparatus (Althusser 1971:134-135, 137; *cf. 2.7.1.*) The British domination of the Afrikaners links up with John B. Thompson's (1990:6, 7) contention that ideology serves power (*cf. 2.7.2.*)

Educational change continued in the wake of sweeping economic, political and social change resulting from the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand (Christie 1985:43-45). After the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 education for Whites functioned under the auspices of the provinces, while the Ministry of Native Education took charge of African education (Christie 1985:48-50; Cosser 1991:49).

### **6.3 CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

“There is a much older ideological debate [than the present liberal-radical debate] between liberals and nationalists in South Africa, which was particularly prominent after the

accession to power of the Afrikaner nationalists in 1948” (Ashley 1989:ix). This debate stems from the struggle for Afrikaner independence from British domination and instilled a strong feeling of nationalism amongst Afrikaners. The sense of group solidarity that emerged gave birth to the Christian Nationalist ideology. The adoption of the policies of separate development and *apartheid* also meant totally separate education, which had far-reaching political, social and educational implications for South Africa and further strengthened the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. (Christie 1985:52; Cosser 1991:50.) Both the educational and political ideologies served what the Afrikaners saw as “the practice of freedom” (Freire 1992:151; *cf.* 1.1) - although the other side of the coin was oppression of the Black people. Schoeman (1993:31) contends that national, cultural and educational modalities are all on the same level, superseded only by the relationship with the Creator. He states that Christian Nationalism absolutised the national to the extent that it superseded the Creator-creature relationship as well as all the modalities, including education. The Afrikaner Nationalist ideology became the regulative norm for education.

### 6.3.1 THE INCEPTION OF CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION

The philosophy of CNE is based on the view that human nature has a tendency towards sin and that the child is a deficient non-adult who requires Christian education to ensure proper development (Landman 1982:3, 8; Van Schalkwyk 1988:13, 16-17; Gunter 1961:453-454). The Calvinistic approach which had guided the education of the *Voortrekkers* found expression in the establishment of CNE schools after the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). These schools also expressed the Afrikaner’s anti-liberal and anti-imperialist sentiments. (Christie 1985:50-51.)

As mentioned before, Milner’s Anglicisation policy following the Anglo-Boer War threatened Afrikaners, especially in the northern provinces. “The Dutch/Afrikaans language became a symbol of the emergent nationalism and provided a rallying point for otherwise divided Afrikaners” (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:438), an example of the unifying effect of ideology (Eagleton 1991:45; *cf.* 2.3). The Afrikaner could not identify



with the British model of education, and objected to the dual medium schools which were aimed at uniting the Afrikaner and the English into one South African nation (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:438). They wanted to be a separate people as their underlying ideology differed vastly from the British Imperialist approach. In an attempt to force the government to incorporate a CNE ideology in the schooling of the Afrikaner child the Afrikaanse Kultuurraad and the Pretoriase Onderwysraad organised a strike by pupils, students and teachers in 1943 to demand education based on ten principles put forward in a memorandum (*cf.* Appendix D). These included a demand for their own schools with a definite Christian National basis (Malherbe 1977:691). This serves as an example of how the Afrikaner cultural and school ISAs clashed with the Union State Apparatus which did not represent their ideological views. Cosser (1991:49) contends that “[t]he politicization of White education was focused around the launching of CNE”.

The name, Christian National Education, presents “Christian” and “National” as the two central features upon which the Afrikaner educational ideology rests, “the first being that all education should be based on the Christian Gospel, and the second, that mankind was divided into nations and that education should reflect these natural differences (Ashley 1989:7). (*Cf.* 6.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the definitions of these two concepts.)

When the NP came into power in 1948 CNE could no longer be stemmed. The first formal modern codification of CNE took the form of a Policy Statement by the Institute for Christian National Education in Potchefstroom, which represented an historical shift from private CNE education to a state education system based on the principles of the Christian Nationalist ideology. (Ashley 1989:7-8; Christie 1985:50). The Policy Document set out how the CNE principles would apply to the role of the state, parents, syllabi, curriculum content and relations with other population groups. It prohibited mixing with regard to language, culture, religion or race and was basically aimed at establishing Afrikaner hegemony. The theoretical basis of CNE, Fundamental Pedagogics, stems from the phenomenological mode of analysis, and has a strong conservative, religious and nationalist bias. (Ashley 1989:7-8.)

In 1967 the National Education Policy Act introduced another shift in CNE. From the rigid Calvinistic and Afrikaner Nationalist orientation its policy was adapted to incorporate all Whites and engender a broadly Christian, patriotic stance. (Ashley 1989:9.) Although the intention was to make CNE more inclusive, it is the contention of the writer that the notion of Afrikaner exclusivity had been inculcated to such an extent in the Afrikaner psyche that mere policy adaptation was not sufficient to effect any real change in the Afrikaner's experience and interpretation.

### 6.3.2 DEFINING "CHRISTIAN" AND "NATIONAL" IN THE TERM CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION

The National Education Policy Act no. 39 of 1967 declared Christian National Education the official educational ideology for the Republic of South Africa. It laid down ten principles of which the first stated that education shall have a Christian character, but shall respect differing religious convictions with regard to religious instruction and religious ceremonies. The second principle catered for a "broad national character". (Behr 1978:42; Malherbe 1977:676.) Due to the broad spectrum of possible interpretations of the terms "Christian" and "National", the Minister of Education was requested to define these in a parliamentary debate in 1971. The "Christian" principle was explained as follows:

*Christian Education in school shall have a Christian character founded on the Bible and imprinted (a) through religious instruction as a compulsory non-examination subject, and (b) through the spirit and manner in which all education as well as administration, are conducted.*

(Malherbe 1977:147.)

Christie (1985:163) points out that, although those who disagreed with the Nationalist government's interpretation of "Christian" could attain exemption from religious

instruction and ceremonies, they were still subjected to other school subjects being offered in the Christian “spirit and manner” as prescribed by the Education Act of 1967. It is evident that the Afrikaner ideology predominated with disregard for any other point of view (*cf.* 2.3). The state used its position of power - which Althusser (1971:143) terms the Repressive State Apparatus - to enforce its Afrikaner ideology (although slightly adapted as explained above) on education in South Africa (*cf.* 2.7.1).

The definition of the term, “National” as used in the 1967 Education Act, was explained by the Minister of Education as follows:

*National Education in schools shall have a broad national character which shall be imprinted (a) through the conscious expansion of every pupil's knowledge of the fatherland, embracing language and cultural heritage, history and traditions, national symbols, the diversity of the population, social and economic conditions, geographical diversity and national achievements; and (b) by developing this knowledge in each pupil into understanding and appreciation by presenting it in a meaningful way where appropriate, in the teaching of the two official languages, national history of the fatherland, civics and geography in school teaching and further through the participation of pupils in national festivals, and their regular honouring of the national symbols, so as to*

- (i) inculcate a spirit of patriotism, founded on loyalty and responsibility towards the fatherland, its soil and its natural resources;*
- (ii) enable every pupil to gain a balanced perspective; and*
- (iii) achieve a sense of unity and a spirit of co-operation.*

(Malherbe 1977:147-148.)

Malherbe (1977:141) maintains that, despite the above explanation, the term remains coterminous with regard to usage, interpretation and connotation. *National*, referring to a

policy for the whole South African nation at central level, distinct from provincial or regional level, is the presumed connotation for a policy governing education in South Africa, rather than *national* in the ideological sense connoting a particular interpretation of nationhood held by a specific ideological group. According to Malherbe (1977:14) the 1967 Act would have been more appropriately named “The *White Person’s* Education Act”, rather than *National*. It is the opinion of the writer that the Act embraces the Afrikaner ideological connotation attached to the word, *national*, rather than that of the whole of the South African population. This exclusive ideological approach by the government caused great dissatisfaction amongst the other ideological groupings (Schoeman 1993:32). (Refer to the detailed discussion of the concept, nationalism, in 2.5.)

### 6.3.3 THE AFRIKANER INTERPRETATION OF NATIONHOOD

Another important aspect underpinning CNE was the Afrikaner notion of its nationhood which put it apart from, and elevated it above, other nations. Morrow (1982:32-33) states that, in what he terms the CNE *grammar*, “‘the nation’ is seen as something like an organism the parts of which cannot live once they have been severed from it”, and that the Afrikaners regard themselves as fulfilling a moral obligation by offering other ethnic groups “the opportunity to develop their own ‘nationhood’, pursue their own ‘education policy’, and articulate their own ‘philosophy of education’”. This method of rationalising the paternalistic treatment of Blacks is referred to by Freire (1992:34, 135) as “the myth of a free society” that is indispensable to the oppressors for the preservation of the *status quo*. It must be added that these separate pursuits of nationhood took place within the parameters laid down by the NP. This policy links up with the *divide and rule* phenomenon which forms part of the theory of oppressive action (Freire 1992:137-143; cf. 7.7.2).

Nationhood was determined by people sharing the same language, religion, history, culture, philosophy of life, customs, political traditions and legal system (Ashley 1989:9).

According to this interpretation the Zulu, Xhosa, Indian, Coloured, *etc.* ethnic groups all qualified for distinct and separate nationhoods which meant they also required an education system corresponding with their peculiar nationhood. In the CNE tradition Afrikaner nationhood was extraordinary, a cut above the other nationhoods, and “not the work of men but the creation of God” (Pienaar quoted in Moodie 1975:1).

Schoeman (1993:31) finds the Christian National combination with regard to ideology untenable, as it absolutises nationalism, and puts it in a position superseding what should be the primary relationship, *viz.* that between Creator and creature. He states that “to suggest that the ‘national’ can be regulative for the development of culture, society, morality, education and the like is a serious misinterpretation of the Christian doctrine”.

#### 6.3.4 THE INTERLACEMENT BETWEEN SCHOOL, FAMILY, STATE AND CHURCH

Another vital aspect of CNE is the strong sense of interlacement that exists between the school, the family, the state and the church (Gunter 1961:449; Stone 1972:84-91; Van Schalkwyk 1988:172-186). These four societal structures collectively carried the responsibility for the education of White children according to the ideology underlying their educational philosophy, with the school taking care of the academic, the church of the spiritual, the family of the emotional moulding of the child, and the state fulfilling the organisational function. Althusser refers to these structures as the educational, family and religious ISAs in service of the (Repressive) State Apparatus which wields power over the other ISAs (Althusser 1971:142-145; *cf.* 2.7.1).

Although the *democratic* state is accepted as the provider of freedom, it infiltrates ISAs such as the school, family and the church to ensure reproduction of the State ideology so that its dominant position can be maintained - thus the interlacement between school, family, state and church. As the Afrikaner Nationalist movement gained ground in the 1940's it became progressively bolder until it had enough power to enforce its political

and educational ideology. (Christie 1985:50). Althusser (1971:139) contends that, under cover of “political democracy”, there often lurks “subtle everyday domination”.

### 6.3.5 MANIFESTATIONS OF CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION IN THE CURRICULUM

The inculcation of the norms and values of CNE occurred by means of the curriculum which was “heavily influenced by ideological factors” (Ashley 1989:21). The state-prescribed curricula have been vehemently criticised as racist and discriminatory by Black and liberal White South Africans, but, until recently, few Afrikaner academics were prepared to offer more than mild criticism (Schoeman 1993:32). Ideology can misapply education by distorting the facts and situations (*ibid.*). Examples of how the CNE ideology was incorporated in the curriculum include the following:

- Afrikaans, in the opinion of the writer, is one of the most ideologically loaded subjects in the curriculum, as it had played a major role in the political ascent of the Afrikaner people (*cf.* 4.4.2), and was used to maintain the notion of a threatened nation that needed to draw *laager* to protect itself against the eroding influences of other ideological groupings in South Africa. With regard to Black education Afrikaans attained a very negative ideological connotation of suppression (*cf.* Althusser 1971:144-145 and 2.7.1) when it was made a compulsory instruction medium in Black schools in 1976, leading to the Soweto Riots (Christie 1985:238-239; *cf.* 6.4.3). Schoeman (1993:33) suggests that the imposition of Afrikaans as medium of instruction to replace English as *lingua franca* was aimed at preventing the possibility of “the ‘linguistic imperialism’ of the English among Blacks”. This has resulted in students at non-racial, bilingual universities (*e.g.* the University of the Western Cape) demanding to be instructed in English, generating what Brown (in Schoeman 1993:33) describes as “linguistic chauvinism”.

In network books the Afrikaner's legitimate authority and superiority over Blacks was lauded. His role as God's chosen people, his pioneering spirit which enabled him to tame this "afflicted" country, the tough Afrikaner male and subservient female role, *etc.* are prominent features (Du Preez 1983:72-73). Esterhuysen (in Ashley 1989:27) contends that Afrikaner children have been deprived of being taught their best literature as most of the prominent authors were liberal thinkers and did not subscribe to the hegemonic Afrikaner ideology.

- Geography portrayed South Africa as a vast land, rich in minerals and lending itself to the noble task of farming which kept man dependent on God, who sent or withheld the gifts of nature (Du Preez 1983:26, 78-79). Geography lends itself to masking "the spatial strategies of the possessors of power" as well as the *apartheid* world view of "territorial separation ... and justification of the bantustan complex". Textbooks offer a paternalistic coverage of Black rural agriculture. (Schoeman 1993:33.)
- History, another very contentious subject, propagated the idea of the Afrikaner performing the God-given task as guardian of the Black heathens, finding freedom for Afrikaners away from British domination and having a covenant relationship with God (Du Preez 1983:25, 78, 85). History was used to justify *apartheid* and Afrikaner domination by presenting it in ideological context (Naidoo in Schoeman 1993:33). Wright *et al.* (in Schoeman 1993:33) agree that "[i]deologues neither 'invent' new historical facts, nor do they disregard old ones. They merely interpret them in a way that will best serve their ultimate objectives".
- Religious Instruction based on the rigid Calvinistic code formed an all-important part of the curriculum and permeated all other subjects. Religion

and the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology had become so intertwined that they could hardly be separated (Du Preez 1983:43, 75, 92).

- Youth Preparedness and Veld Schools were introduced in 1972 to inculcate moral and military preparedness to ensure the survival of the norms and values underpinning CNE (Christie 1985:165).

(Cf. Ashley 1989:21-27.)

These few examples serve to demonstrate how education is used to promote a specific ideology.

## 6.4 BLACK EDUCATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

### 6.4.1 EARLY BLACK EDUCATION

Traditional Black education occurred informally. Children learnt, mostly through observation (Mandela 1994:13) what they required to know to function effectively in their society. They learnt from their day to day experiences in the work, play, ceremonies and rituals of their society. (Christie 1985:30.) It would seem that, if one should try to identify an educational ideology for the tribal Blacks in those early days it would not be linked to political activity but rather centre around everyday functionality and practicalities.

With White colonisation, education for Blacks underwent a metamorphosis. From the White perspective the following are some of the motivations: The Whites felt it their Christian duty to proselytise the heathen Blacks and equip them with the skills required to participate in church activities; the colonists needed the services of some literate and



numerate slaves and labourers; if they were taught the Western way of life, social discipline and Western work values could be cultivated.

The mission schools assumed responsibility for inculcating these norms and values. (Christie 1985:34-36.) It is evident that the ideology underlying the education presented to Blacks by the colonists differed vastly from that of their traditional education: Apart from converting Blacks to Christianity, it was solely aimed at meeting the needs of Whites and extending their power base. Freire's (1992:154, 129) contention (based on similar experiences in Brazil) is that these actions stem from the assumption that the indigenous people were too ignorant to be consulted about their own educational needs. Education was used as a "social lever" (*cf.* Bell quoted in 2.3). It also clearly demonstrates how Althusser's Educational ISA functions (*cf.* 2.7.1) and affirms John B. Thompson's conception of ideology as "meaning in the service of power" (*cf.* 2.7.2).

As the colony grew its needs changed and expanded. In 1841 the Cape government started contributing financially to mission schools, as industrial and agricultural education needed to be instituted to provide in the manpower requirements. It was also hoped that, by educating Black people on the frontiers, trade between Blacks and Whites would be promoted, leading to the cessation of border hostilities. (Christie 1985:36-38.) Once again it is evident that the education offered was geared to meeting the needs of Whites and not Blacks. Freire (1992:144, 39) agrees that the Oppressor's true objectives are determined by the unequivocal egotistic interest of the dominant elites. He calls this "false generosity". It revolved around establishing White supremacy in Southern Africa.

In the 1800s Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal Black education was deployed along similar lines as in the Cape, with the emphasis on training Black people for manual labour. Then already education was segregated along the divides of colour and social class (Christie 1985:40-43.) Black education was at the bottom of the priority list when funding allocations were made. From 1910 it fell under the Ministry of Native Affairs of the Union of South Africa, and in 1922 funding was fixed at the current rate, with Black

taxes having to cover any excess expenditure (*ibid.*:49, 50; Cosser 1991:49.) Severe financial shortages resulted in an investigation into Black education in 1936, but only in 1945 were more funds allocated by the UP government (Christie 1985:50; Cosser 1991:49). The Repressive State Apparatus operated through the educational ISA to keep Blacks in a subordinate position (Althusser 1971:143; *cf.* 2.7.1).

Blacks had suffered discrimination in every sphere, and education was no exception. It would seem that White ideological thinking justified curbing Black development to maintain Whites in their superior position. The writer contends that the oppressive attitude intensified when the NP came into power in 1948. Its Repressive State Apparatus (Althusser 1971:144-145; *cf.* 2.7.1) employed its dominant position to safeguard its abusive power. The Afrikaner Nationalist ideology had emerged from British domination to become the new oppressive force in South Africa. Afrikaner hegemony set about gradually and progressively marginalising Blacks, ensuring that their nationalist aspirations could not flourish to become a threat to Afrikaner Nationalism. Those who were formerly the Oppressed (White Afrikaners) had now become the Oppressors (Freire 1992:29-30).

An eminent Afrikaner journalist (quoted in Welsh 1975:69) stated: “We rejected domination of ourselves but we have not equally rejected the domination of other people by ourselves.”

#### 6.4.2 THE INCEPTION OF BANTU EDUCATION

Upon coming to power the NP government immediately set about restructuring Black education. In 1949 the Eiselen Commission reported that “the inherent racial qualities, the distinctive characteristics and aptitude of ‘Natives’ required an education system very different from that of Whites”. (Cosser 1991:49-50; Christie 1985:54-55.) This pejorative attitude is characteristic of a dominant ideology imposing its ideas on a non-adherent group to eliminate any possible threat to its position (*cf.* 2.2). The government’s

acceptance of the Commission's recommendations had detrimental implications for Black education:

- The 1953 the Bantu Education Act placed Black education under a separate department, the Department of Bantu Education;
- State expenditure was fixed at R13 per head per annum with the rest to be covered by Black taxes;
- Black parents were responsible for the provision of uniforms, textbooks and stationery whereas White children received textbooks and stationery from the government;
- Schooling was not compulsory for Black children, but it was compulsory for White children.

Afrikaner Nationalism was using its position of political power, or its Repressive Political State Apparatus (Althusser 1971:144-145; *cf.* 2.7.1), to impose restraints on the development of Blacks by restraining and limiting their access to education. The writer is of the opinion that Whites felt that, by oppressing their intellectual development, Blacks would be less likely to establish a powerful Black nationalist ideology which could pose a threat to the dominant position of Whites. By employing the Educational ISA Afrikaner Nationalism had begun a highly effective onslaught on Blacks via education. A titanic battle ensued between Blacks trying to obtain equality with White education and Afrikaner Nationalists continuously downgrading Black education to prevent them from reaching a level of development comparable with that of Whites. Freire (1992:146) explains that the Oppressor had to "keep the people from thinking" to maintain hegemony. This view is supported by Mkatshwa (1985:9) when he says that "[t]he ruling social classes know that by maintaining a tight grip on education, they can control the minds and indeed the destiny

of the oppressed people. To fully understand the present system of black education, one must be aware of the history and ideological underpinnings of that notorious system.”

To enable the government to control all Black education, mission schools were pressurised to register with the government and become state schools (Christie 1985:55, 93; Cosser 1991:50). Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, then Minister of Bantu Education, wanted to ensure that education would not raise the expectations of Blacks beyond the position the government had envisaged that they would fill, namely that of unskilled labourers, as white-collar jobs were reserved for Whites (Cosser 1991:50-51; Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:420-422). His mission statement that the native must not be subject to a schooling system which “draws him away from his own community, and misleads him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was (*sic.*) not allowed to graze” (Christie 1985:93; Cosser 1991:50-51), contributed greatly to the polarisation between Black and White groups, especially on educational issues.

Systematically Black education was marginalised: The Extension of University Act of 1959 removed the need for Black students to attend White universities by instituting tribal colleges where the level of education was not on a par with that of the White universities. In 1963 the Coloured Person's Education Act placed education for “Coloured” people under the control of the Department of Coloured Affairs and forced Coloured schools to register with the government. This was followed by the Indian Education Act in 1965, relegating Indian education to the Department of Indian Affairs. (Christie 1985:55.) The motivation behind these two acts was the same as for the Bantu Education Act. To offset these Acts the ironically named “National” Education Policy Act 39 of 1967 (*cf.* 6.3.1) declared CNE mandatory in White schools (Christie 1985:93) - despite objections from the liberal (predominantly English) Whites.

Thus the advancement of White education was ensured without having to extend it to the other population groups. By segregating the education of the various ethnic groups under different departments inequality in education was further incurred and differentiation

between racial groups increased (Christie 1985:55). Freire (1992:93) contends that by division and isolation “the oppressor minority subordinates and dominates the majority” (cf. 7.5.2). It is clear that, once the NP government had assumed power, it took the necessary steps to ensure that it remained in power and that its educational ideology was institutionalised. The education policy in particular was aimed at keeping Blacks in a subordinate position where they posed no threat to the Afrikaner structures. Blacks were subjected to a system which, in Freire’s (1992:146) words, attempted to “anaesthetise the people so they will not think”. This strongly supports John B. Thompson’s contention that ideology serves relations of power (cf. 2.7.2). To ensure the reproduction of their domination the government used what Althusser calls “double ‘functioning’: by repression and by ideology ... very subtle explicit or tacit combinations [were] woven from the interplay of the (Repressive) State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses” (Althusser 1971:145-146).

#### 6.4.3 BLACK EDUCATION STRIKES BACK

Tutu (1985:20) contends that Verwoerd was the first to legalise depriving Blacks of proper education and reduce them to a position of subservience and docility. Over the years Blacks had internalised a lack of self-confidence, which Freire (1992:151) describes as part of the oppressor’s strategy of dehumanisation. 1976 became a watershed year in South African history. A dramatic upsurge in resistance to Bantu Education resulted from the Minister of Bantu Education announcing that from Standard 5, half of the school subjects had to be taught through the medium of Afrikaans (Christie 1985:238). This serves as an example of what Freire (1992:152-153) terms “cultural invasion”, and is both an *instrument* and *result* of domination. In the opinion of the writer *cultural invasion* was the underlying motivation for the imposition of Afrikaans as medium of instruction in Black education: It extended the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology by using the Afrikaans language, a powerful ideological tool, to neutralise opposing Black ideological formations from coming into their own, and perhaps even prevent them from forming alliances with the liberal White (mostly English) group.



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Orchestrated by the BCM 20 000 students marched through Soweto to the police station in objection to this imposition. In the ensuing police shooting many people were killed and wounded, including the young Hector Petersen, whose death raised his status instantly to that of international martyr. (This serves as an example of the Police as a Repressive State Apparatus, and of the relationship between power and ideology. *cf.* 2.7.1 & 2.7.2.) Steve Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, was arrested and the movement banned. The following year Biko's death in detention under suspicious circumstances caught world attention yet again. (Christie 1985:238-239.) The actions of the NP government to protect and extend the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology gained South Africa the disdain of the world, but proves that a minority can sustain an ideology despite being outnumbered and facing world opposition, on condition that it has power at its disposal. To achieve this, the Repressive State Apparatus must have close ties with the ISAs and be able to rely on their undivided loyalty. This was the case with the South African government, hence its successful hegemony (*cf.* Althusser 1971:137, 142-145 and 2.7.1).

Despite the bannings of all the Black resistance movements and their leaders, dissatisfaction with Black education was by no means stemmed. Intermittent eruptions continued. Freire (1992:41) contends that, "with the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has *already* begun." He regards the Oppressors as the initiators of violence, and not the Oppressed. In 1979 the Education and Training Act replaced the much hated Bantu Education Act, but Blacks considered it a mere cosmetic change that made no impact on the contentious issues. Unabated school boycotts during 1980 proved that Black education was not prepared to function according to the dictates of Afrikaner Nationalism. (Christie 1985:56-57.) Before its banning the BCM had done much to encourage Blacks not to identify with the Afrikaner Nationalist portrayal of Blacks as inferior (*cf.* 5.7) to justify White hegemony. An ideology of Black Liberation Socialism was rapidly gaining ground, as it had done in the rest of Africa (Hudson in Frankel *et al.* 1988:269). It will be noted that Black liberation and Black nationalist aspirations

followed a similar pattern to that of the Afrikaner struggle (*cf.* Chapter 4). Both fought against being dominated.

Continued unrest in Black educational institutions led to the appointment of the De Lange Commission in 1980. It was given one year in which to conduct its investigation into education in South Africa - an indication of how untenable the situation had become, though it may have been a hastily required cover to provide academic legitimacy to preordained political strategies with regard to education. In 1983 a White Paper was issued accepting the Commission's eleven guiding principles (listed in Appendix A) but not its recommendation of a single department of education (Christie 1985:56-57; SA White Paper 1983:3). Instead a Department of National Education was created to exercise control over the other fourteen regionally and ethnically based departments (SA White Paper 1983:16-17). This strategy was regarded as merely "modernising" race domination and removing "blatant *apartheid*", but leaving the ideology of White hegemony intact. Blacks still had no say in their own education (Alexander 1985:34-35). The NP effectively maintained all the power they had previously in order to guard against having to compromise their ideology. Freire (1992:161) has the following to say about this type of *reform*: "Almost always the metropolitan society induces these reformist solutions in response to the demands of the historical process, as a new way of preserving its hegemony. ... 'Let us carry out reforms before people carry out revolution.'" The homeland policy and the tricameral parliament are South African examples of this phenomenon (*cf.* Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:561; Grest in Frankel *et al.* 1988:101-102).

Althusser (1971:137) contends: "The State apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention 'in the interest of the ruling classes' in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic 'function'".



#### 6.4.4 REASONS FOR DISCONTENT WITH BLACK EDUCATION

It is evident from the discussions thus far that Black education was geared to the production of a certain level of labourer that would not threaten White occupations. Kros (in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:66) contends that education had to produce a Black working class for secondary industry. It appears to the writer that Black education was thus not organised with the view of serving the best interests of Blacks, but as a tool of manipulation by which White privilege could be protected (*cf.* Freire 1992:144-149).

Reasons for the discontent that had built up in Black education at that stage can be summarised as follows:

- The per capita expenditure on a Black pupil was considerably less than that spent on a White pupil.
- Black teachers were un- or under-qualified.
- The pupil-teacher ratio was much higher than in White education;
- Schools were under-equipped and lacked facilities taken for granted in White schools.
- Poor Black parents had to provide school books, whereas White pupils received their books from the State. (During the 1960s White pupils did pay for their books.)
- As most Black parents were themselves ill- or uneducated, they were unable to assist and stimulate their children. A vicious circle had thus been created.

- Inequality in the standard of education existed amongst the various education departments.
- Schooling was compulsory for Whites, but not for Blacks.
- Age restrictions limited the age up to which Blacks could attend ordinary schools (18 for Standard 8, and 20 for Standard 10).
- Unrest and the Defence Force presence at schools to maintain order and protect state property were blamed for the high drop-out rate and for destroying the culture of learning.
- Poverty and the high cost of education to Black parents (school fees, books, bus fare) resulted in pupils dropping out of school early.
- The government refused to recognise the Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs). In the patriarchal White education system pupils could make no input into their own education, and only Parent Teacher Associations were allowed.
- The content of education also caused great dissatisfaction: It was regarded as removed from the experience of the Black child, irrelevant, capitalistic, racialistic, Western and White in orientation, suppressing and dominating Black culture, preparing pupils for subordination, work discipline and identification with the homelands policy.
- The Department of Education and Training (DET) was accused of having a hidden curriculum and not teaching the Black child critical thinking so that he/she would accept the *status quo*. It was also criticised for being

paternalistic and autocratic, for barring Blacks from high-level posts in the DET, for lack of insight into the real needs of Black education, and for lack of Black representation on decision-making bodies.

The above list was compiled from objections put forward by a number of interviewees, several of whom could not be identified because of fear of persecution by the Security Police at the time (as recorded in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:68-74). It must be noted that some changes did take place on an ongoing basis but, it seems, only when pressure was put on the government to do so.

It is obvious from the reasons provided for the dissatisfaction with Black education that the NP government was more intent on serving their own ideology than accommodating Black preferences. Freire (1992:39) expresses his opinion on this as follows: "Pedagogy which begins with egotistic interests of the oppressors (an egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism) and makes of the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression." It seemed as if Black education was provided for the purpose of preparing Blacks to be of better service to the aspirations of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology and prevent them from establishing their own Black Nationalist ideology in competition with that of the Afrikaner. The writer perceives the Afrikaner ideology as so consuming that it superseded the Christian principles of brotherly love, all people being equal in the eyes of God and caring for one's fellow-man. Once again one is confronted with John B. Thompson's conviction that ideology is "meaning in the service of power" (*cf.* 2.7.2).

## 6.5 A DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION ARISES

The idea of alternative education for Blacks started as early as the 1920's when Elias Wellington Buthelezi set up alternative schools in the Eastern Cape which promoted Black religion, values and culture (Mkatshwa 1985:10-11). After the introduction of Bantu Education in 1953 the African Education Movement (AEM) was formed in 1954/55 to

express dissatisfaction with Black education. It started cultural clubs to provide informal schooling with a Black ideological basis (Unterhalter in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:28; Mkatshwa 1985:12). According to Althusser (1971:143) these would be classified as cultural and educational ISAs. These cultural clubs were started for the same reasons as the early, privately run CNE schools referred to in 6.3.1. These clubs functioned until 1960 when high costs forced them to close down (Christie 1985:55).

The Welsh Commission reported in 1936 that there was “opposition to the education of the native on the grounds that it made him lazy and unfit for manual work.” A similar sentiment was expressed by Giddy (quoted by Freire 1992:126) with reference to the working class in England: “However specious in theory the project might be of giving education to the labouring classes of the poor, it would be prejudicial to their morals and happiness; it would teach them to despise their lot in life instead of making them good servants.” The Welsh Commission Report proceeded to say that two separate social orders existed for Black and White and that the “education of the White child prepares him for a life in a dominant society and the education of the black child prepares him for a subordinate society” (quoted by Mkatshwa 1985:7.) Black education provided by the White regime was further stigmatised by Dr. Verwoerd’s contention that the Black child does not have the same educational needs, and was not entitled to the same educational provision as the White child (Christie 1985:12).

In the light of these historical motivations it is understandable that Blacks remained suspicious of the influence of the White ideology with regard to change implemented in Black education. They were convinced that it was aimed at maintaining Black servanthood to Whites by subjecting them to inferior “gutter education” (Sisulu 1985:96, 107). Christie (1985:12-14) quotes the official statements made by several politicians at the time Bantu Education was instituted to confirm the truth of the accusations made by Blacks. Freire (1992:65) describes this kind of education as an “exercise of domination” ... “indoctrinating [students] to adapt to the world of oppression.” Blacks had no desire to attempt to enter into dialogue with, or try to understand the point of view of, the DET

(Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:31, 65-66, 74). Tremendous antagonism had been built up against the system responsible for the provision of Black education.

### 6.5.1 PRESSURE FOR CHANGE IN BLACK EDUCATION

Mkatshwa (1985:10) contends that “[e]ducation and the other structures of society whether economic, political or social structures as a whole are completely intertwined and therefore it is almost ridiculous to wage a struggle for democratic education and ignore the forces that are at work in the society.” Although the struggle against inferior education was initiated by adults (*ibid.*), from 1976 their role was taken over by the pupils and students from 1976. They wanted the “doors of learning and culture” opened to all, as stated in the Freedom Charter in 1955 (Motlhabi 1987:47; *cf.* 5.3).

By 1985 education had virtually come to a standstill in the townships. Lulu Johnson (1985:17, 18) comments that, as there was no response to the demand for better education, they resorted to drastic measures such as school and examination boycotts. Where attendance and discipline had collapsed this was answered by the government with the closure of educational institutions, teargassing, detentions, shootings and even killings. A state of emergency was declared in all these areas, and the South African Defence Force (SADF) was deployed in townships to restrain pupils from damaging school buildings. (Molobi 1986:3; Muller *et al.* 1980:108-109). Johnson (1985:18) justifies the destructive behaviour of students as the result of their frustration and desperation with the government for not responding to their pleas. (Refer to the Regional Reports at the National Consultative Conference ... 1985:22-27 for statistics on school and examination boycotts.)

Mkatshwa (1985:12-13) stated that Blacks must, by their own efforts, prepare themselves educationally for the future, when they gain control. For this reason alternative educational programmes (People’s Education) had been instituted on an experimental basis as political power was required to substitute the education system. These

programmes served as preparation for when Blacks would assume political and educational control. This view was supported by Z. Sisulu (1985:96) when he said that *apartheid* education could not be separated from *apartheid* in general.

People's Education (PE) reintroduced the parents and community into positions of leadership in the struggle for education. This led to the slogan, *Liberation now, education later*, being replaced by slogans favouring the resumption of schooling with PE programmes being introduced in addition to the regular education syllabi. Examples of the new slogans are: *Forward to People's Power*, and, *Forward with People's Education, Education for Liberation*, as well as *Away with apartheid, gutter education*. (Sisulu 1985:104-107; Rensburg 1986:8.) In October 1985 the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee arranged a meeting to find a solution to the education crisis, which was followed by a futile deputation to Minister Sam de Beer of the DET. In December 1985 the first National Consultative Conference tabled the concept of PE as an alternative form of education in an attempt to try and get schooling to resume (Brief background ... National Consultative Conference ... 1985:2-4).

### 6.5.2 THE INCEPTION OF PEOPLE'S EDUCATION AS A BLACK EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY

People's Education is defined by its *ad hoc* commission as education "of the people, by the people and for the people" (Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:89) and can be categorised as an educational ISA (Althusser 1971:143). Its ideological basis emanates from the philosophical views of the South American Roman Catholic bishop and educationist, Paulo Freire, who proposed free, democratising, dialogical, humanising education in the early 1960's (Freire 1992). PE has been described as an African variant of humanism influenced by Marxism and socialism (an anonymous interviewee in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:89). Van der Walt *et al.* (*ibid.*:81-82) define PE as an unrefined educational philosophy which exhibits a closer resemblance to an educational theory than a

philosophy, as it deals predominantly with teaching rather than with a broad educational programme.

Kruss (1988:4, 19-20) sees PE as a changing, fluid, dynamic process, open to contestation, rather than as a final product. She also accused it of “intellectual dishonesty” for “promising to deliver educational material before they could possibly have reflected sufficiently on the philosophical basis of an alternative education system”. Van der Berg (in Kruss 1988:4) states that the definition of PE had been left open intentionally so that it could be debated. This approach led to the lack of a systematic programme which critics renounced as a strategy for political mobilisation to promote political propaganda and indoctrination, and not solely education. This application of education had much in common with CNE which, despite its noble-sounding title, was used for exactly the same purpose, although unobtrusively. It is therefore understandable that some people feared that PE would operate in a similar manner to CNE (Kruss 1988:4), but only from another ideological perspective.

The launching of PE in schools in 1986, the Year of Remembrance, ten years after the Soweto Riots, is significant. With Blacks having made no substantial progress towards liberation in those years, PE represented a shift in the struggle from “protest to challenge”, from “*Liberation now, education later*” towards “*Education for liberation*” in the widest sense (Muller *s.a.*:10; Rensburg 1986:8).

### **6.5.3 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT - OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE AND FOR THE PEOPLE**

PE is a much wider concept than traditional European-Western education. It is a “process rather than a rigid written doctrine” (Rensburg 1986:9). In addition to formal education (at schools and tertiary institutions) it included informal education such as adult literacy and political awareness programmes. It also provided alternative educational programmes for those who had been unable to complete their schooling for socio-political reasons.

(Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:91, 126; Kruss 1988:27, 37.) PE attempted to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and emphasised production (Molobi in Kruss 1988:37). It aimed at educating over a broad spectrum, involving the entire community, from scholars and students to teachers, parents and community leaders in establishing programmes, curricula, content, *etc.* The PE philosophy of consultation, negotiation, democracy and community involvement points to a model of community responsibility and a bottom-up approach (in contrast to the authoritarian, top-down approach of CNE). Freire (1992:67) commends the dialogical, problem-posing educational approach (as in PE) and criticises the banking concept applied (as in CNE) where the teacher's relationship with the pupil is one of domination and not partnership.

Vusi Khanyile, national chairman of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), recommended that the community should draw up syllabi (a view supported by Freire 1992:57-65, 154), but Luthuli cautioned that educationists should rather conduct that task with input from, and in consultation with, the community (in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:91, 121, 131). The writer is of the opinion that the latter strategy combined the benefits of both approaches and held out prospects of success: It recognised community needs and involvement as well as input from experts in the education field. After the People's Education Conference of March 1985 regional and rural offices were established providing the entire community with the opportunity of contributing to the curricula content of PE. Street and area committees tried to raise parents out of their generally apathetic acceptance of the *status quo* to involvement in the educational and political struggle that was being waged by the pupils and adult activists (Loewe 1986). By establishing PTSA structures were put in place for a consultative, dialogical relationship between the parties involved. (Freire 1992:67, 152-154; Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:12, 152-153.) In this way Blacks were establishing their own educational, family and community ISAs.

The primary concern of PE was to effect the transfer of control and responsibility to the people themselves; educational models and a system of education could be attended to at a later stage. Van der Walt *et al.* (1987:151) are dubious about an education system



without a sound philosophical basis and the relevant structures in place. They also feel that PE over-emphasised the community at the expense of the individual.

#### **6.5.4 THE POSITION OF PUPILS, TEACHERS AND PARENTS**

Freire's view (1992:152-156) of the pupil-teacher-parent relationship forms the basis of the position of PE in this regard. PE was decidedly pupil-centred, in the respect that a non-prescriptive attitude was to be adopted - a far cry from the rigid confines of CNE. In addition a great deal of authority would be vested in the Student Representative Councils. The political role played by the pupil would remain one of the pillars of the struggle for freedom. Corporal punishment, liberally used in CNE, would be abolished as it was regarded as dehumanising, and the dominant role of the teacher - as the adult responsible for leading the non-adult to adulthood according to the Fundamental Pedagogics perspective on which CNE is based - would be toned down considerably. (Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:118, 168; NECC May 1987; Hartshorne 1986:8.) Instead teachers were expected to identify and emphasise the ideology of PE when teaching all subjects (Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:165, Kruss 1988:29). It should be noted that CNE also furthered its ideology by a teaching approach which correlated with its educational ideology.

#### **6.5.5 PEOPLE'S EDUCATION AND CURRICULUM CONTENT**

It is evident that PE was by no means a variant of White education (Pleming & Motanyane 1986:11), neither did it find "equal" education within the separate development structures acceptable (Alexander 1985:161). It did not aspire to educational equality with Whites in a single education department. PE aimed at a totally different type of education, *viz.* emancipatory, participatory education for a transformed, democratic society based on different values and social objectives (Khanyile at ASP Conference 1986:2; Muller *s.a.*:10). Curriculum content, as prescribed by the DET, was White-centric, irrelevant to Blacks and not in touch with the needs of the community it was supposed to serve. In fact, it was seen as rather meeting the needs of the Whites by offering Blacks education

that would prepare them for a role of subservience to White domination. (Rensburg 1986:9; Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:91, 142.) Freire (1992:29) warned against this kind of “false generosity” which the oppressor extends to the oppressed. Syllabi were therefore to be reconceptualised as well, based on completely different principles (Gardiner 1987:6).

After the December 1985 People’s Education Conference regional officers gathered input with regard to curriculum content from “the people” in an attempt to ensure that it would be relevant to each area. Everyone involved in education at whatever level was to have a say in curriculum content (Rensburg 1986:8; Carstens in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:106.) At the same time a commission was instituted to start work on actual material for the new curriculum (Kruss 1988:24, 25). Great care was taken to avoid material that could imply prejudice, antagonism or offence to any group (Mpkakele in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:106).

History and language, two very contentious issues, were to be dealt with first. White-centred history portraying Blacks as inferior would be replaced by People’s History, which was to look at South African history from a totally different perspective, rejecting the justification of unequal division of wealth and power. This daunting task was to be performed by multi-cultural, multi-ethnic committees. (Kruss 1988:28; Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:108-109; Kros 1987:5-23.) English was expected to become the *lingua franca* and medium of instruction (Meerkotter in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:110), as well as the official language in a post-*apartheid* society. Afrikaans, the language of the oppressive regime, was to remain an official language with all the other languages in the post-*apartheid* society (Alexander 1985:89). Black English, the “township” variant of English, was to be used for language and literature studies as it gave better expression to the feelings and aspirations of Blacks. Texts could for instance come from speeches, newsletters, sermons, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, *etc.* (Gardiner 1987:4-7). The teaching of English was to be integrated with the teaching of other subjects and used to develop critical thinking (Kruss 1988:27-28).

Other subjects worth mentioning with regard to content change were the following:

- Religious Instruction would be based on the theology of liberation (an anonymous interviewee in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:107);
- Music was to stress the role of traditional music and liberation songs of the struggle against *apartheid* (Meerkotter in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:107);
- Political Studies, which was not taught in schools under the NP government, would certainly deal with the liberation struggle (Gardiner in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:107).

According to Kruss (1988:29) there was little evidence of People's Mathematics.

#### 6.5.6 PEOPLE'S EDUCATION AS AN IDEOLOGY

The primary aim of PE was to "equip and train all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain People's Power in order to establish a non-racial South Africa". This took PE far beyond mere education. It dealt with the interrelatedness between education and politics, the economy and culture. PE had as one of its aims the removal of the capitalist values of "competition, individualism and stunted intellectual development" in favour of what was regarded as the "democratic" norms of "collective input and active participation by all" and the "stimulation of critical thinking". To attain these ideals PE would have to take over education completely. (Kruss 1988:11-13.)

It is interesting to note the coterminous nature of the word, democratic. In the opinion of the writer the meaning attached to the term by supporters of PE relates to freedom from White domination and the capitalist system, and fostering of a socialist approach. To White Afrikaner Nationalists democracy referred to being able to choose to pursue their

nationalist ideals in a capitalist, certainly not socialist, economic system. It is evident that in PE (as in CNE) the educational, economic, social and cultural ISAs come into play in service of the over-arching Repressive State Apparatus (*cf.* Althusser 1971:142-145 and 2.7.1).

Alexander (1985:88) confirms the ideological status of PE when he refers to it as the “ideological cement” with which to build an ideologically unified people in an “Azanian/South African nation in which oppression and exploitation shall have been eliminated”. Gerwel (in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:96) agrees that PE is part of an ideological, political struggle. Kruss (1988:19) states that “[t]hrough People’s Education, people will be mobilised and organised towards the goal of a non-racial democratic South Africa; but at the same time, through People’s Education people are beginning to develop a future education system”. This system would aim to eliminate illiteracy, ignorance and exploitation (Kruss 1988:15). It is evident that in the case of PE the educational struggle was secondary to the political struggle. Sisulu (in Van der Walt *et al.* 1987:2) sees PE as having a post-*apartheid* character with a Black perspective, but offering no concrete model of education.

According to Van der Walt *et al.* (1987:95) the long-term goal was the transfer of power from Whites to Blacks, with the “people eventually taking over control of schools”. Van der Walt *et al.* (1987:155) credit PE with certain merits but accuse it of being over-politicised, and of abusing the child and education to effect political change.

### 6.5.7 THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES OF PEOPLE’S EDUCATION

PE was an attempt to offer a constructive alternative to the militant struggle that had become part of education. The NECC, the ANC and the DET wanted education to be restored, but the government responded with suppression, confiscation and arrests. PE intended offering quality education with which the poor could also identify, but would also respond to the political crisis. PE was to strive for peace, non-prejudice, economic

development and the upliftment of the poor. The lack of trust in education, the restlessness of the pupils and the depressed spirits of the teachers were to be addressed (Kros 1987:7, 8; Hartshorne 1986:2, 3).

The educational objectives PE aimed to attain by critical and creative methods, analysis and thinking were summarised as follows by Hartshorne (1986:18):

- *to eliminate illiteracy, ignorance, capitalistic norms of competition, individualism, stunted intellectual development and exploitation;*
- *to enable “the oppressed to understand the evil of the apartheid system” and to prepare them for “participation in a non-racial, democratic system”;*
- *to equip and train “all sectors of our people to participate actively in the struggle to attain people’s power in order to establish a non-racial, democratic South Africa”.*



## 6.6 COMPARING CHRISTIAN NATIONAL EDUCATION AND PEOPLE'S EDUCATION

Christian National Education	People's Education
<p><b>Inception:</b> as alternative to Anglophile education during British colonial period; became state education during National Party rule; objections to English as compulsory medium of instruction</p>	<p><b>Inception:</b> as alternative to Bantu education during period of Afrikaner Nationalist domination; never became state education; part of Black liberation struggle; objection to Afrikaans as compulsory medium of instruction</p>
<p><b>Aim:</b> to educate Afrikaner children according to the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology</p>	<p><b>Aim:</b> to attain People's power to establish a non-racial South Africa - education secondary</p>
<p><b>Ideological status:</b> Fully developed educational ideology; broad educational programmes in place</p>	<p><b>Ideological status:</b> Closer to educational theory than educational ideology; has to do with teaching rather than broad programme</p>
<p><b>Structure:</b> Final, fixed format</p>	<p><b>Structure:</b> changing, fluid, dynamic, open-ended, not final product</p>
<p><b>Responsibility:</b> State responsibility and control; prescriptive, authoritarian, rigid; community (parents, teachers) have little or no say, obey prescriptions, pupils have no say; top-down strategy</p>	<p><b>Responsibility:</b> Community (pupils, parents, teachers, community leaders, <i>etc.</i>) responsible and involved; consultative, dialogical, democratic, negotiation; bottom-up strategy; education of the people, for the people and by the people</p>

<b>Curriculum:</b> decided by education department	<b>Curriculum:</b> decided by all members of community, including pupils
<b>Activism:</b> Drastic action employed to establish CNE: strikes by students and teachers, memorandum with 10 principles for education	<b>Activism:</b> School boycotts (e.g. Soweto Uprising), pupil and teacher strikes; arson; Education Charter
<b>System:</b> Separate schools for ethnic groups each with own brand of education	<b>System:</b> Education to emphasise commonality rather than diversity
<b>Capitalist</b> , individualistic approach	<b>Socialist</b> , humanistic, communalistic approach
<b>Political bias:</b> Offered exclusive education for Whites so that Whites could maintain position of power; Western orientation	<b>Political bias:</b> Objected to inferior Black education subject to White domination; to meet educational needs of all, but strong Black orientation
<b>Schooling compulsory</b> , books free	<b>Schooling not compulsory</b> , books free

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<b>Curriculum content:</b>	<b>Curriculum content:</b>
<i>History:</i> White orientation, Blacks seen as barbaric and inferior, concentrates on Afrikaner Nationalist struggle	<i>History:</i> including Black liberation struggle, balanced view, to rectify view of Blacks as inferior
<i>Language:</i> English and Afrikaans official languages and media of instruction	<i>Language:</i> English <i>lingua franca</i> , all languages official, Black (township) English
<i>Religious instruction:</i> Christian, tolerant of other religions	<i>Religious instruction:</i> Theology of liberation

<i>Music:</i> Afrikaans folk music from <i>FAK Sangbundel</i>	<i>Music:</i> Black music and liberation songs
<i>Political education:</i> never overtly allowed amongst teachers or pupils; unobtrusively present in approach to subject matter - hidden curriculum	<i>Political education:</i> Black liberation struggle to feature prominently; teachers to adopt perspective of Black liberation struggle
<b>Individualistic:</b> Emphasises academic differentiation and individualisation	<b>Communalistic:</b> Emphasises community and communalistic approach
<b>Economic bias:</b> Stresses advantages of capitalism; justifies unequal distribution of power and wealth	<b>Economic bias:</b> Rejects capitalism, favours equal distribution of wealth and power
<b>Teacher-pupil relationship:</b> Teachers in dominant and pupils in subordinate role	<b>Teacher-pupil relationship:</b> Teachers not in dominant position, serve as helpers alongside pupil
<b>Corporal punishment:</b> still operative - correlates with dominant, authoritarian role of teacher	<b>Corporal punishment:</b> forbidden
<b>Slogans:</b> total onslaught, " <i>Engelse gevaar</i> ", " <i>Swart gevaar</i> ", " <i>Rooi gevaar</i> ".	<b>Slogans:</b> People's education for people's power; Education of the people, by the people and for the people; Education before liberation

Table 6.1: A comparison of characteristics of CNE and PE.

When juxtaposing the above table (6.1) and Table 3.1, comparing the functional and conflict models of schooling, it is evident that CNE exhibits a measure of correspondence with the former, and PE with the latter.



## 6.7 CONCLUSION

CNE and PE have almost as much in common as what they are different. From this chapter it has become evident that both educational ideologies (although PE is not a fully fledged ideology) have their origin in, and are sub-ideologies of, the nationalist ideologies of the groups they served.

CNE sprung from the Afrikaner Nationalist movement and provided education in accordance with it. Its structures served the *apartheid* ideology and ethnic divisions and prepared its young to continue in the same vein. Althusser (1971:133) refers to this as “*the production of the relations of production*”. Once Afrikaner political power had been attained, it had to be consolidated and maintained. To ensure that the Afrikaner ideology would be kept alive and exclusive, the traditions, notions of superiority, opposition to anything foreign that might endanger or contaminate, were nurtured in the young through education. Thus the “maintenance and nourishment of this ideological representation of the School” is ensured (*ibid.*:157.)

PE formed part of the Black liberation struggle. It was aimed more at fostering political awareness and activism than education although it operated through the medium of education. By its socialist, communalistic approach it united Blacks of all age groups and ethnic origins, stressing the group above individual aspirations. Once again the young had to be captured for the cause as they had to take up the mantle and continue the liberation struggle. As the liberation movement started to gain ground PE started disappearing (like the early CNE schools). A new power structure was in sight, and a new education system and educational ideology to accommodate all South Africans.

Although PE did not oust CNE, it left an indelible mark on South African education. It is the contention of the writer that a new education system can derive great benefit from combining the already established organisation structure, services, academic excellence and many other aspects of the outgoing CNE system with the creativity, striving for

relevancy and inclusive approach of PE to provide the learners in the post-*apartheid* South Africa with education that will prepare them for their future.

In the next chapter South African society and education will be evaluated against societal models and theories of schooling in order to determine the feasibility of a South African ideology for society and education. This will be followed by an analysis and application of Freire's conception of dialogical and antialogical cultural action to bring about restoration of the fractured South African society.



## CHAPTER 7

### MAJOR FINDINGS AND THE PROCESS OF RESTORATION

#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

Having examined the two main nationalist ideologies that have been governing South African society, as well as the correspondent educational ideologies, it is appropriate to revisit the models of development discussed in 3.3. It is necessary to assess where society finds itself at present before a route to the future is envisaged. In 3.3 the writer suggests that the *capitalist model* of development, and specifically *racial capitalism*, dominated in South Africa, the benefits of which were unequal, with Blacks being disadvantaged. Objection to this model formed part of Black Liberation Socialism.

Various sociological models were examined in 3.4. The friction between the adherents of the functional/consensus model and those favouring the conflict model (generally Blacks who had been forced into a situation of dependency) became evident in the struggle by Blacks for liberation from White oppression. The historical paths traversed by the two major ideologies were traced in Chapters 4 and 5. Two reconciliatory approaches reflected in the conflict-consensus and structural models examined in 3.4 suggest a course for reconciliation in the post-*apartheid* South African society fractured by years of oppression and resistance to the oppression.

The functional and conflict models of society manifest in the functional and conflict models of schooling, and the strife in society carried over to schooling, as was evident from Chapter 6. It is now necessary to find a way of reconciling these divergent approaches in a unified South African society and single system of education.

## 7.2 MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

### 7.2.1 WHITES AND RACIAL CAPITALISM

The expertise of the White sector of society put them in a position where they, in accordance with the practice of *racial capitalism*, controlled the country politically, conducted state planning of the economy, and dominated corporate industry (*cf.* Frankel in Frankel *et al.* 1988:270). It is the opinion of the writer that the class divisions that form part of the capitalist economy have always been evident amongst White South Africans, but *apartheid* relegated Blacks in South Africa to a class of their own, below any White person. Thus even the lower echelons in White society were artificially raised above Blacks who, had they been White, might have assumed a higher class position. It follows that working class Whites who have been accustomed to an artificially inflated status, feel severely threatened at this stage of transition to a unitary, non-racial society. Like the Afrikaner movement established in 1939, the Ossewa Brandwag, with its Nazi-modelled stormtroopers (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:498), the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) reveals strong neo-Nazi characteristics. The AWB leader, Eugene Terreblanche, called on his followers to arm themselves and their women for the inevitable civil war (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 39(11) 1993:39723). In an attempt to protect their privileges and interests some of them have become obsessive in their outdated interpretation of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology. They have not kept up with the ideological shifts that Afrikaner Nationalism had undergone since its inception, and feel betrayed by the reforms.

Right-wing extremists have been linked to the following incidents which reflect their response to reforms granting Blacks civil rights: bombings in Bethal in 1986; Barend Strydom, a member of the White extremist Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging (White Freedom Movement), Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging and a group calling themselves the Wit

Wolwe, killed seven Black people in Pretoria on 15 November 1988; David Webster, a White anti-*apartheid* activist and lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand was shot dead in front of his house on 1 May 1989; bombings caused damage to post offices, police stations and multi-racial schools in the Transvaal; Chris Hani, an important former *Umkhonto we Siswe* leader, general secretary of the South African Communist Party and member of the National Executive of the ANC, was assassinated in April 1993 by Janus Walus - also involved were Clive and Gaye Derby-Lewis, prominent Conservative Party members; Prof. Johan Heyns, a reformist vice-president of the Broederbond, the driving force behind the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk's decision to abandon support of *apartheid* and brand it sin, was shot dead in his home, allegedly by extreme right-wing activists. (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 35(1) 1989:36387, 35(5) 1989:36647, 35(5) 1989:36647, 38(1) 1992:38705, 39(3) 1993:39398, 40(9) 1994:40264.)

Added to the disillusionment with the *verligte* Afrikaners were the effects of "low growth, poverty, uncompetitiveness, massive internal debt, huge socio-economic backlogs, crime, skill shortages," *etc.* (Financial Mail 17/11/1995:25) which tend to be blamed solely on the new political dispensation (just as *apartheid* was blamed for all the ills that befell Blacks). Equal opportunities for all races, at this stage subject to affirmative action as well, have certainly shattered White complacency, especially in the case of the working class Whites. They should not lose sight of the fact that their forebears were on the receiving end of affirmative action (although the term had not yet been coined) at the time of the Poor White problem amongst Afrikaners in the late 1920's (Christie 1985:46). Since then, until the 1994 election, they enjoyed White privilege. During the Great Depression of 1929 to 1933 (Kallaway *et al.* 1987:573) the Afrikaner working class was opposed to the rich industrialist capitalists exploiting them. To retain their support for Afrikaner Nationalism the Broederbond stepped in to arrange employment for the impoverished Afrikaners (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:492-493).

### 7.2.2 BLACKS AND THE DEPENDENCY MODEL

Blacks have, ever since the arrival of the White settlers, been relegated to a position of inferiority to, and dependence on, the Whites of South Africa. Their situation reveals close correspondence with the *dependency model* (cf. 3.3). The removal of all but Whites from the voters' role excluded Blacks from having a say in their own affairs. They could no longer subsist on the land of their choice, live where they could eke out an existence, or take decisions about their own political, economic, social and educational activities. A series of laws were passed that relegated them to a position of dependency, where decisions were taken for them. They were compelled to accept how others interpreted their needs, and were dehumanised and reduced to a position of inferiority (Christie 1985:46-47, 55; Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:482-483, 498, 500).

Various derogatory labels were attached to Blacks and used liberally in speeches by various politicians (Christie 1985:12-13; Mkatshwa 1985:9, 10; cf. 5.6). According to Freire (1992:60) the Oppressors regard their own actions as "humanitarianism" to preserve a profitable situation" for themselves. It is the contention of the writer that many of the accusations levelled against Blacks are probably valid when interpreted from a *capitalistic* point of view. Freire (1992:93) holds *dehumanisation* by the Oppressed responsible for the attributes of the Oppressed that frustrate and anger the Oppressor. What must be taken into account, though, is that the *rehumanising* process that needs to be embarked upon in post-*apartheid* South African society, is likely to take much longer than the *dehumanising process* (cf. Freire 1992:119-186). It took Afrikaners many years to recover from the inferiority ingrained in them as a result of the *dehumanisation* inflicted by English domination (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:490; Muller *et al.* 1980:357-360, 365-366). The writer contends that breaking down self-worth is the surest way to subject a people.

The oppression that Blacks suffered at the hands of White South Africans was, in the opinion of the writer, much harsher than which the Afrikaner had experienced under the

English, its duration much longer, and suppression of insurrection more severe. It is thus to be expected that Black resentment will be much greater and take considerably longer to dissipate than it took Afrikaners to accept the English on an equal footing as fellow-South Africans - if that has yet completely happened. Afrikaner and English were forced together only when politicians started using the scare tactics of the *Swart gevaar* which, because of Black numerical superiority, posed a major threat to White privilege (Du Preez 1983:82). Freire's (1992:119-186) suggestions as to how the process of reconciliation and rehumanisation can be initiated and conducted is discussed with reference to the South African context in 7.5.

As explained in Chapter 5, frustration with the government ignoring the appeals from Blacks for human and civil rights led to acts of aggression and terrorism. As with the extremists who feel that the post-*apartheid* South African democracy is a betrayal of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology (*cf.* 7.2.1), the Black Liberation Socialist ideology also has its extremists who do not see a place for Whites in the new dispensation. Examples of acts of terrorism are rife in the history of the Struggle (Adam & Moodley 1986:121), but more disconcerting are those who have been swept up in the culture of violence that has followed in the wake of the Struggle. Examples of such acts against the South African society (Black and White) follow: White teachers in Kathlehong were attacked by an extremist PAC youth group calling themselves the "Revolutionary Watchdogs"; a violent clash between ANC and IFP supporters resulted in what became known as the Boipatong massacre; the Bisho massacre occurred when an IFP rally at the Bisho stadium was interrupted by an ANC march; in a PAC attack at a King William's Town golf course several golfers were shot; on 25 July 1993 a multi-racial congregation was attacked during an evening service at St James' Church, Kenilworth where twelve people were killed and several injured by Black and White gunmen, allegedly PAC members; an attack on the Heidelberg Tavern in Observatory, Cape Town left several of the multi-racial patrons dead; armed AWB members stormed and caused chaos at the World Trade Centre while the CODESA negotiations were in progress. (Keesing's Record of World

Events ... 38(2) 1992:38751, 38(6) 1992:38948, 39(9) 1992:39078, 38(12) 1992:39177, 39(7/8) 1993:39542.)

### 7.2.3 MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT FOR THE POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

While the ANC was still in exile their economic approach/model of development favoured nationalisation as put forward in the Freedom Charter. It was committed to worker participation in industry, but not worker control. Simkins (1988:31) states that the ANC had then already indicated "willingness to deal with international capitalism and the most powerful section of domestic capitalism on terms that capitalists can comprehend, even at the risk of alienating the more radical section of the ANC's constituency". In February 1992, while the CODESA negotiations were in progress, Mandela indicated a shift from large-scale nationalisation to a "mixed economy" and a European-type private sector to generate wealth for South Africa (Simkins 1988:31). In June 1994, after the ANC had come to power, Trade, Industry and Tourism minister, Trevor Manuel, stated that the nationalisation-privatisation debate needed to be stripped of its ideological connotations, as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) could only be funded by privatisation and the reduction of government spending. Jay Naidoo, Minister without Portfolio, in charge of the RDP, agreed that privatisation was "the only way". Mandela added that a move away from their former policy of nationalisation will allay the fears of the business community (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 40(9) 1994:40264).

It is the opinion of the writer that the *capitalist model* will remain in force with regard to the first world sector of South African society, at this stage predominantly White, but is likely to gain popularity amongst members of the growing Black middle class, thus maintaining an economy that can participate in trade with the Western world. Innes (1984:15) says about the Black Nationalist Liberation movement and the Freedom Charter that Black "nationalism is not necessarily a socialist demand ... and is quite compatible with capitalism". The writer suggests that, as Blacks become increasingly Westernised,



they are likely to experience class division resembling that of the White capitalist class structure. Foster, General Secretary of the Federation of South African Unions (FOSATU) (paraphrased by Hudson in Frankel *et al.* 1988:271) expressed the necessity for the inception of a working class movement as the “working class in South Africa runs the risk of eventually merely serving the ends of non-proletariat Black classes who desire the destruction of *apartheid* and the deracialisation of capitalism in South Africa, but who have no interest whatsoever in the specific problems of the working class, and who in fact are opposed to seeing the construction in South Africa of a society in which workers ... control their own destiny”.

The failure of *communism* and *socialism* to replace *capitalism* in modern world history has removed the sense of threat it held previously. It is the opinion of the writer that the idea of a classless society is a Marxist illusion. Morrow (1990:7) expresses a similar view. The Third World sector of the population, which represents the workers' class, stands to gain from a socialist dispensation, but is unlikely to be able to boost and maintain an economy to support the development that is required. For this reason the writer anticipates the societal model of *undeveloped socialism* to replace the present model of *underdevelopment* and run parallel with *capitalism* in a dual economic and societal structure. It is possible that Whites from the lower socio-economic classes will find the benefits of the model of *undeveloped socialism* attractive. As stated in 7.2.1 some Afrikaners exhibited pro-Nazi sentiments during World War II, and the AWB shows strong neo-Nazi tendencies in their rejection of a democratic, non-racial society in South Africa. While they may not find it too difficult to adapt to this model, tremendous inertia will have to be overcome to dispense with the negative connotations of the *Rooi gevaar* aspect of the term *socialism*.

It would be a triumph for democracy and non-racialism in South Africa if value systems that underpin the preference for specific models of development and class divisions could determine group formation rather than the Black-White dichotomy and the corresponding ideologies. Due to the inherent tendency towards communalism amongst Blacks (Adam &

Moodley 1986:47; Motlhabi 1987:135), their position of economic depravity and their vast numerical superiority to Whites, the model of *liberation socialism* is, in the opinion of the writer, expected to play a major role in South African society, especially with regard to the underdeveloped section of the population, and at least until the poverty level has been raised.

Difficulties experienced during the CODESA I and II negotiations, (Keesing's ... Annual Reference Supplement 1995:R30) and the acts of violence that have since arisen between Black-and-White and Black-and-Black bear witness to the fact that "Apartheid has prevented the emergence of a shared moral discourse, and produced a morally fractured society" (Morrow 1990:2). Morrow (1990:1) states that democracy is not something that is signed and sealed by contracts, agreements or rules (such as the Interim Constitution), but that it requires the existence of a "deeper agreement". He describes South Africans as "politically adrift, deprived of their anchors in the traditions of either protest or reactionary politics" and, in many instances, revealing their inability to come to terms with the drastic political changes by maintaining the rhetoric of protest or conservative reaction (1990:2). It is evident that the "deeper agreement" still eludes South African society and that the paradigmatic and ideological shift required for the establishment of a political community capable of "intelligible political disagreements, agreements and discussion between and among themselves" (Morrow 1990:1) has not yet occurred.

### **7.3 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF SCHOOLING AND IDEOLOGY IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY**

As education is inextricably intertwined with every other aspect of society the models to which each group in society ascribes will be reflected in their models for education. Chapter 6 deals with the educational ideologies and their manifestations in educational practice (or, in the case of PE, how they wished it to manifest). In 6.6 a comparative table summarises and compares the various aspects of *Christian National Education* and *People's Education*. This offers an interesting similarity with the comparative table of the

*functionalist* and *conflict models of schooling* in 3.5.3, and will be referred to in the following paragraphs.

Subscription to the principles of the *functional model* is very noticeable with regard to CNE: Equilibrium was maintained by rigid prescription from the Departments of Education regarding the ideological approach to curriculum, subject content, manner of presentation and examination, *etc.* The authority structure in schools followed the same pattern of authoritarianism as in the societal model: A tremendous amount of virtually unchallengeable authority is vested in the position of the principal, pupil input is minimal in most schools, parent authority is limited to financial issues, *etc.* Although the undemocratic, rigid approach of traditional CNE has mellowed considerably in recent years, and has technically been removed from the statute books by the Interim Constitution (Keesing's Record of World News ... 39(11) 1993:39722-39733), it cannot merely be erased by a cognitive decision, as an ideology is ingrained in people's psyches. In 7.5 Freire's suggestions for embarking on the process of re-humanising is described as a long process demanding sustained dedication.

PE petered out only a few years after it had been proposed as an alternative to CNE, but it has left an indelible mark on educational thinking which will be well worth considering in a new educational dispensation. Contrary to CNE (*cf.* 6.3), PE (*cf.* 6.5) caters for involvement of educational leaders, teachers, parents, community leaders and students in discussion and decision-making. This would occur through the PTSAs. Involvement of the latter has been unacceptable to the proponents of the authoritarian CNE. The principle behind the consultative, dialogical, democratising approach is that all agents affected by a decision should be involved in the decision-making (*cf.* 6.5.3 and 6.5.4). Karabel & Halsey (1992:16) concisely describe the aim of PE as geared to "a unitary, non-racial, democratic South Africa and an education relevant to this ideal. It has produced a counter definition of education based on a strong socialistic ethic."

It must be noted that some White schools known to the writer have embarked on an experiment whereby pupils at the end of their Standard 9 year were involved in group discussions to give their input regarding the exercising of discipline and other issues relating directly to the pupils. It remains to be seen to what extent their input will be taken into account. Education that has relevancy to its consumers, and curricula that are not biased in favour of, or against, sections of the student population (*e.g.* History, *cf.* 6.5.5), are some of the issues that are at present being addressed by educational authorities. Afrikaans and English as only media of instruction from Standard 2 will make place for the implementation of all the languages of South Africa as announced in November 1995.

Buckland & Hofmeyer (Annual Conference of the Southern African Comparative and History of Education Society 1992:13) stress the powerful role ideologies have played in education in the South African context and succinctly summarise the shift that has taken place in CNE:

*The conflict of Christian National Education (CNE) and its offspring, Fundamental Pedagogics, with liberalism, Black consciousness, Marxism and People's Education has produced a struggle in the realm of ideas. At different times these ideologies have served to mobilise groups across differences of interest, and to divide interest groups. Christian Nationalism is a good example of an ideology which served to unite and mobilise Afrikaners of different class interests in the 1940s and 50s, and yet currently acts as a strong divisive force among Afrikaners.*

The post-*apartheid* South Africa has discarded the functionalist concept of advancement merely on the basis of achievement or merit (*cf.* 3.5) due to the inequalities and backlog Blacks had suffered during the *apartheid* era. Equal opportunities will not eradicate this backlog, therefore affirmative action is being employed. The *conflict theory's* criticism of the *functional paradigm* lies in the detrimental influence of a lower socio-economic background accompanied by a lack of self-esteem (*cf.* 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). This links up with

the theory of the *reproduction of consciousness* which contends that the elite classes (Whites in the South African scenario) possess “cultural capital” that gives them a social advantage over the deprived classes (Blacks) (*cf.* 3.5). Blacks will therefore not be able to compete with Whites by merely having the same educational opportunities, as their socio-economic background, social exposure and the degradation of self-esteem they have suffered under the *apartheid* structures have put them at a disadvantage. The neo-Marxist *correspondence theory* (*cf.* 3.5) holds the capitalist society and its class structure responsible for the inequalities in society and education. South African Blacks have had their schooling experience correspond with the low-level jobs for which it was preparing them (*cf.* 6.4.2), while White education matched the demands of high-level positions.

Another contentious issue is the *functional model's* support for advanced expertise to cope with the requirements of a technically advanced society. It has come under fire from the worker sector that wants a more equal distribution of training to counter class formation. The *conflict paradigm* also questions the necessity for high level cognitive skills for most jobs. It regards their supposed necessity for the technocratic modern society as a myth that serves the purposes of the dominant elite (*cf.* 3.5). It has been made clear by the present government that funds for basic and primary education will enjoy preference above that for tertiary education, and that parents will have to contribute considerably to higher education. The labour market seems to be saturated with job seekers with high-level qualifications, and the state is unwilling to spend the meagre finances at its disposal to add to the educated unemployed. The *human capital theory* (*cf.* 3.5) which falls within the parameters of the *functionalist theory* of schooling, offers educational advancement as an investment in people that will always pay off. Unfortunately its advantages are not always evident in the South African labour market which is at present flooded with unemployed educated job seekers. Economic growth is hampered by social instability manifesting in violence, crime and strikes. These will first have to abate if foreign investments are to be forthcoming. (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 37(2) 1991:37992, 37(4) 1991:38131, 37(9) 1991:38422, 38(4) 1992:38850.)

Both the *functional* and *conflict theories of schooling* favour a democratic approach, but their interpretations of the concept differ (*cf.* 3.5). In the post-*apartheid* South Africa the *functionalists* (generally representative of White South Africans) support the eradication of social injustices by making equal opportunities available to all, but the *conflict theorists* (generally representing the Blacks in South Africa) regard mere opportunities to give everyone a fair chance as inadequate, as the elite already have an unfair advantage (*cf.* 3.5). The latter group regards the *functionalist* idea of a democratic, fair society is an illusion. They see society as conflict-ridden with various groups (Whites and middle-class Blacks in particular) competing for control (*cf.* 3.5), unconcerned about the plight of the worker class and the very poor. This is what Foster, General Secretary of FOSATU (quoted in 7.2), warned against.

#### 7.4 THE FEASIBILITY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

With reference to present-day nationalisms Degenaar draws a distinction between nationalism that achieves freedom and accepts the full range of value variances that is represented in a society, and nationalism that does not. Nationalism should never force one kind of identification on an individual. This aspect is emphasised by pluralism. (Degenaar 1982b:29, 32). Tagore (in Degenaar 1982b:34) states: "The idea of the Nation is one of the most powerful anaesthetics that man has invented. Under the influence of its fumes the whole people can carry out a systematic programme of the most virulent of self-seeking without being in the least aware of its moral perversion - in fact, feeling dangerously resentful if it is pointed out." This statement rings true if one looks back at what has been committed in the name of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism: detentions without trial, assaults, incarcerations, killings in the name of the former; acts of terrorism, burning of schools and government related buildings, general vandalism and crime in the name of the latter (*cf.* Chapters 4 and 5, 7.2.1 and 7.2.2). These politically and ideologically motivated crimes will be dealt with by the

Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 40(6) 1994:40039).

Kohn (in Degenaar 1982b:31) expresses a radical view when he states that the value of humanity should replace the "outdated" concept of nationalism which demands total allegiance to the nation-state. Silvert (in Degenaar 1982b:30) is more optimistic and distinguishes between ideology as an aspect of nationalism, and nationalism devoid of ideology. He warns that the distortion implicit in ideology should be avoided by adhering to nationalism "as a way of working towards a rational society, as well as towards a global interdependence, in which a plurality of cultures can co-exist in a brotherhood of nations". The writer contends that this de-ideologised approach to nationalism could accommodate the diversity of South African society. The idea of a nationalist ideology does not appear to be a feasible option, as there is not sufficient common ground for one unifying ideology, and even more important, ideology seems to inevitably lead to power-seeking and domination of the weaker groups. John B. Thompson's contention that ideology serves power has fitted the South African situation too well to be ignored, and Althusser's ISAs are all too familiar. Common nationhood based on similar values, aspirations and desires offers a much better basis for national unity.

Simkins (1988:Preface) states that prior to negotiations the country was in a state of "violent equilibrium". A period of competing nationalisms/ideologies followed which greatly complicated the task of building a single nation (*ibid.*:3). He predicted that the open political competition which is now possible will result in new political alignments which will bring together those who really belong together (*ibid.*:2). Simkins (*ibid.*:1) states that "political, economic and special interest groups struggle to renovate and update their traditional formulations" because they are "prisoners of tradition", in other words, the hold that ideology has on these groups is very resistant to change.

Degenaar (1982b:27-28, 31) insists that nationalism has value if ideological distortion can be avoided, and proposes a method to do so which should include:

(a) *giving a philosophical analysis of the ideology and the issues at stake:*

It would be necessary that reasons for the inception of the ideologies of both Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism are explained. The many similarities could facilitate mutual understanding: Both started as liberation movements and eventually attained political power (*cf.* Chapters 4 and 5); the methods used to achieve their aims included starting schools that fostered their respective ideologies of schooling represented by CNE and PE (*cf.* Chapter 6). The appointment of the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation can be seen as an attempt to analyse acts committed in the name of ideology (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 40(6) 1994:40039).

(b) *demythologising and revitalising ideology to a limited human frame of reference:*

The myth of the chosen people manifest in both White and Black ideologies - the former has been discussed in 4.4.3.2, and the latter is evident from Luthuli's (1962) book, "Let my people go", and the Indigenous Church Movement which rejected the White nature of Christianity and saw themselves as black "Israelites" (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:451-452). An ideology of common nationhood that will de-emphasise destructive differentiation has to be cultivated without suppressing individuality, as put forward by De Klerk in his address at the opening of parliament on 1 February 1991 in which he pleads that nation-building should be founded on common values and ideals (SA 1991a:1-4).

(c) *exposing ideology in so far as it is a mask which veils group interest:*

The past is riddled with examples of hidden agendas (*cf.* Chapters 4, 5 and 6), *e.g.* the tricameral parliament which, camouflaged as an opportunity to break with exclusive White rule, actually entrenched separate development (*cf.* 4.7). This interpretation by the disenfranchised sector of the population differed vastly from that put forward by the NP government. The ANC government



will have to take care that they do not fall into the same traps. In the opinion of the writer Affirmative Action and the RDP could lend themselves to this kind of ideological abuse. It is necessary for each South African to consciously put national interest before group interest and not be seduced by former prejudice or antagonism. The writer is well aware that this will not be a natural action, but the future prosperity and contentment of all South Africans depend on the commitment to the best interest of all its citizens.

*(d) if ideology as [a] system of values is decided to be inevitable, taking part in the game by giving appropriate arguments and by guarding against the temptation of exclusive dogmatism; in other words: seeing ideology as exploration:*

Care should be taken to abandon approaching ideology as dogma that dictates action and thinking and leads to radicalisation to the “left” or “right”. A regard for the humanity of all fellow-South Africans and respect for one another’s differences should prevail. Freire’s conception of dialogical versus antidialogical cultural action discussed in 7.5 suggests an appropriate approach.

*e) working towards communicative action:*

The writer contends that *apartheid* has separated Black and White for so long that they generally do not know one another except in the *baas-kneg* context - a concept supported by Du Toit (in Thompson & Butler 1995:19). By making contact (Freire calls this dialogical action; *cf.* 7.5) they will come to recognise their common humanity. The writer suggests that once Black and White have broken through the historical and ideological constraints of their past relationships they may be surprised by how much they have in common as human beings and what values they actually share.

*(f) realising that a political situation is not unilinearly determined by one phenomenon, e.g. an ideology, but that it is a complex phenomenon involving*

*industrialisation, modernisation, classes, groups, interests, values, economic, social and political organisation, bureaucracy, ideologies, international relations, and diplomacy:*

A common South African nationalism has to be built on more concrete foundations than the distortions of ideology. The common enthusiasm of all South Africans for events such as the Springboks' victory at the Rugby World Cup, international cricket tours, the Olympic bid, *Bafana Bafana's* Football Africa Cup victory and the shared pain when disasters such as mining accidents, floods or droughts strike, are proof that there are many who are prepared to set aside group ideologies and be counted as South Africans. Mary Metcalfe, MEC for Education in Gauteng, captured the spirit required to transcend the past when she commented with regard to totally overcrowded schools that no pupil will be turned away because of the shortage of funds to provide more facilities, but that they will receive education *despite* the shortages (SABC TV 1 News 20h 00, 15/01/1996). Working towards the prosperity of a post-*apartheid* South Africa in which all its people have freedom and to which all South Africans bear the same allegiance, transcends party political differences. Many more aspects, such as those listed in point (f), come into play, of which several have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.

## **7.5 REHUMANISATION BASED ON FREIRE'S ANALYSIS OF DIALOGICAL AND ANTIDIALOGICAL CULTURAL ACTION**

Having established where South African society finds itself at present and having examined the probable economic, societal and educational models that may operate in the future, the problem of *rehumanising*, as Freire puts it, requires attention. Of the three theorists, Althusser, John B. Thompson and Freire, against whose theories the two major South African ideologies were evaluated, Freire is the only one who also examines the aftermath of an oppressive ideology and its effect on society and education. His observations of oppression in the Third World countries of South America offer many

parallels for South Africa, and his suggestions for reconstruction of a “whole”, *rehumanised* society are worthy of consideration. Freire’s (1992:20) conception of *humanisation* and *dehumanisation* is equated to the *Subject-Object* dichotomy explained in 2.7.3. A humanised person or Subject is in charge of his own life, whereas a dehumanised person or Object is being dominated by an Oppressor, who in turn is dehumanised by his own oppressive acts (Freire 1992:27-29, 33).

Freire (*ibid.*:119-120) contends that “men’s activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of the world”. The revolution which he propounds “is born as a social entity within the oppressor society ... it is cultural action”. In a dynamic, rather than static view of revolution, there is no absolute “before” or “after”, with the taking of power as the dividing line. This view is supported by Morrow (1990:3) and confirmed by the manner in which transfer of power in South Africa occurred without any immediate dramatic effect. “Originating in objective conditions, revolution seeks to supersede the situation of oppression by inaugurating a society of men in the process of continuing liberation” (Freire 1992:132). This revolution, as in South Africa as well, will not be achieved by mere verbalism or activism, but by praxis, that is, by reflection and action. The Oppressor can only dominate if he acts antidialogically and denies the Oppressed true praxis, but the revolutionary must act dialogically and be involved with the Oppressed in praxis and not merely have them follow his decisions. The negotiations between the various political groupings in South Africa have followed the method suggested by Freire. The Oppressed must themselves be involved in the process of transforming their Object status to that of Subject (*ibid.*:120-121). This, he contends, is dependent on dialogical interaction: “Dialogue, as the encounter among men to ‘name’ the world, is a fundamental precondition for their true humanisation” (*ibid.*:133). Blacks have become involved in all aspects of South African society and are actively transforming themselves from Objects to Subjects. Freire (*ibid.*:133) puts forward two theories regarding the Oppressor and the Oppressed: the dialogical theory of revolutionary action, and the antidialogical theory of oppressive action, aspects of which will be discussed and applied to the revolution taking place in South African society at present. The

characteristics of the theories of dialogical and antidialogical action will be juxtaposed and dealt with simultaneously.

### 7.5.1 CONQUEST VERSUS CO-OPERATION

Ideology based on antidialogical action requires *conquest* of men by whatever means necessary, ranging from repression to paternalism (*ibid.*:133-134). This characteristic manifests in the dehumanisation process carried out against the Afrikaner by the imperialist, expansionist and Anglicisation policies of the British, and against the Blacks of South Africa by the *apartheid* policy. The Afrikaner republics were conquered by British military force causing men, women and children to suffer or die in atrocious conditions in concentration camps. Their farms were destroyed and burnt to ensure that they would not be able to remobilise and challenge their British oppressors. They did not suffer only military defeat, but their morale and humanity were destroyed. The situation was aggravated when the world-wide economic crisis precipitated by the Great Depression reached South Africa and submerged the Afrikaner, who had not yet recovered from the devastation of the Anglo-Boer War, into such poverty that the Poor White Afrikaner resulted. As described in Chapter 4 the Reddingsdaadbond and the Afrikaner Broederbond were formed to uplift the devastated and dehumanised Afrikaner. The oppressed Afrikaner was reduced to the status of Object by the oppressive British.

Freire contends that conquest is facilitated by the creation of derogatory myths about the Oppressed (*ibid.*:135). Thus a sense of inferiority is created in the Oppressed, he is treated like an unworthy object or “thing”. The Afrikaners were looked down upon by the more sophisticated English, they were termed “boorish”, insinuating that they were unrefined, they did not have the British heritage to back them culturally, they lacked experience in an industrial economy, and they were regarded as capable of little more than farming. With regard to education, the British conqueror also imposed on the vanquished Afrikaner his conception of education in the form of the educational model current in

England at that time, which the English regarded as “the epitome of universal civilization and rationality” (Morrow 1990:5). (For more detail *cf.* Chapters 4 and 6.)

This situation was reversed when the Afrikaner political leaders managed to uplift, unite and guide their people under the motivating force of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology to a position of power. Freire (1992:43) warned that “the authentic solution of the Oppressor-Oppressed contradiction does not lie in a mere reversal of position”, but that there is ample evidence (also in Africa) that this tends to occur. He explains this as the result of having “internalised” (grown so accustomed to) being the vanquished they become “ambiguous beings ‘housing’ another” (internalising the Oppressor’s value system) (*ibid.*:134). This serves as an indication that their (the Afrikaner’s) own humanity had not yet been restored and they were imitating the role model of “manhood” provided by their Oppressors, the British (*ibid.*:31).

On the receiving end of the revenge of the Afrikaner’s dehumanisation were the Black people of South Africa who were in turn relegated to the position of Objects and second rate citizens: They were disenfranchised, dumped in overcrowded reserves, forced to serve the White economy as migrant labourers separated from their families, restricted by laws such as the Immorality Act, pass laws, job reservation, *etc.* (Christie 1986:46, 50, 55-56). Non-compliance was dealt with in a dehumanising manner such as shootings, jailings and detention without trial. Black education was used to keep the Blacks in a subordinate position by offering inferior education which would prevent them from rising above the situation of the vanquished. Thus the Blacks remained the vanquished and the Whites the conquerors. These events were dealt with more fully in Chapters 5 and 6.

The myths that the Oppressor dispenses about the Oppressed (*ibid.*:135-136) in Latin America apply equally well to those attributed to the Blacks in South Africa:


- “the myth that the oppressive order is a ‘free society’” - *Apartheid* was interpreted as “separate freedoms”;

- *“the myth that all men are free to work where they wish, that if they don’t like their boss they can leave him and look for another job”* - Job reservation, meagre wages, the migrant labour policy, the prohibition of Black trade unions, *etc.* greatly strained the labour situation in which Blacks found themselves;
- *“the myth that this order respects human rights and is therefore worthy of esteem”* - Whites decided what Blacks needed, as Whites were better qualified to do so. Freire (1992:153) refers to them as the “professionals”;
- *“the myth of the universal right to education”* - Black children were not subject to compulsory education, and what education they were offered, was inferior and irrelevant;
- *“the myth of the equality of all men”* - Blacks could only be “equal” in their own homelands. Whites saw themselves as the “masters”. (Du Toit in Thompson & Butler 1975:19);
- *“the myth of the heroism of the oppressor classes as defenders of ‘Western Christian civilization’ against ‘materialist barbarism’”* - Blacks were regarded as uncivilised;
- *“the myth of the charity and generosity of the elites ... who foster selective ‘good deeds’” and “the myth that the dominant elites ... promote the advancement of the people and that the people should be grateful”* - Whites were giving the Blacks houses, schools, education, medical services, *etc.* free of charge or at very low cost (but they were denied the

opportunity and dignity to earn these for themselves) despite Blacks being regarded as untrustworthy, dangerous and lazy;

- “*the myth of the inferiority of the oppressed and the superiority of the oppressor*” - Whites regarded themselves as of superior intelligence and ability and Blacks as inherently stupid. (Freire 1992:135-136.)

Now that the ANC has taken over as rulers from the Afrikaner Nationalists, time will tell whether the Blacks will be able to manage their *dehumanisation* and be *rehumanised* without reverting to Oppressor status. It is the opinion of the writer that, in the persons of F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela, South Africa has a most fortunate combination of leaders to guide all the people of this country to democracy. In the face of severe criticism and accusations of betrayal from his own people, De Klerk led the way to *rehumanise* the Afrikaner. To take over from him there was Nelson Mandela who is hailed as “the deliverer of SA democracy and guarantor of its stability and integrity”. (Financial Mail 17/11/1995:20.) Mandela, unrealistically credited with messianic qualities (*ibid.*), sets a fine example of how to effect rehumanisation, but the ultimate responsibility rests with each individual.



To counter conquest Freire (1992:167) suggests co-operation. “In the dialogical theory of action, Subjects meet in co-operation in order to change the world.” It must be noted that Freire uses the term, Subjects, and not Subject-Object, or the singular form, Subject, which implies that the two parties commence negotiations on equal footing. CODESA I and II bear evidence to the fact that negotiations of this kind are possible, although fraught with problems (Keesing’s ... Annual reference supplement 1993:R25) that arise due to remnants of dehumanisation stemming from the former Oppressor-Oppressed situation surfacing continuously. (Freire issues a warning against this “*ambiguity* of oppressed men” and the Oppressor still “housed” in them.) The tenacity with which these problems were tackled, the determination with which the process was repeatedly salvaged from breakdown, the successful progression to a democratic election and the institution of a

Government of National Unity (Keesing's Record of World Events ... 40(5) 1994:39990) forged an example of authentic co-operation that gave hope to many strife-torn communities over the world.

It must be noted that Freire (1992:167-168) emphasises that the leaders "do not own the people and have no right to steer the people blindly towards their salvation," the people must remain co-authors. In contrast to the *mythicisation* as part of domination, each Subject must unveil his world and himself. One Subject, *e.g.* a leader (such as Mandela or De Klerk), may initiate the unveiling on behalf of others, but they must then in their own right become Subjects in authentic praxis. It strikes the writer that the present government has made a valiant attempt to maintain communication with the people, risking slowing down the process rather than opting for snap, unilateral decisions on behalf of the people. The November 1995 local government election is yet another step towards full democratisation.

At present the ANC government is fraught with demands for instant delivery on (possibly unrealistic) pre-election promises. Unrealistic expectations have led to disillusionment and comments such as: "It was better in the days of the National Party". This bears evidence to Freire's contention that "the oppressor 'within' the oppressed is stronger than they themselves are, their natural fear of freedom may lead them to denounce the revolutionary leaders instead!" (*ibid.*:169.) The solution to this problem lies in communion with the people which, in turn, elicits co-operation. Fusion between the leaders and the people occurs only if revolutionary action is truly "*human*, empathetic, loving, communicative, and humble, in order to be liberating". Only then can the Oppressed escape from their deprived lives and enter into a situation where fullness of life can be enjoyed. (*ibid.*:171.)

Sadly, the Afrikaner (in the opinion of the writer) did not complete the full *rehumanising* process as his ascent to power was too rapid; he clung to his dominant position fiercely and did whatever was required to maintain it. It was more a reaction of fear of being oppressed again than a desire to oppress. This opinion is supported by Degenaar



(1982b:35) when he contends that the Afrikaner's fear of domination was greater than his need to dominate, but it led him to becoming an Oppressor in an attempt to safeguard his superior position.

### 7.5.2 DIVISION VERSUS UNITY

During the time of the separate, independent Boer republics Afrikaner Nationalism had not yet emerged as a unifying force. Internal *divisions* between leaders from the respective republics prevented them from presenting a united front to the oppressive British (Muller *et al.* 1980:303-304). After both republics had been subjected to British rule and were eventually united with Natal and the Cape Province to form the Union of South Africa in 1910, Malan emerged as the messianic leader that would liberate Afrikanerdom from British oppression (*ibid.* 1980:445-448; Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:532-533). Division renders a nation an easy target for an Oppressor. The strategy of *divide and rule* (Freire 1992:137) is a highly effective method for a minority to dominate a majority and safeguard their hegemony. Dr. H.F. Verwoerd devised the *apartheid* policy to separate Blacks and Whites so that the Afrikaners would not have to compete against a Black majority. To ensure that Blacks could not mobilise against White domination Verwoerd's homeland policy ensured fragmentation of the Black population. Unity, organisation and struggle are dangerous to Oppressors.

*Division* is instituted and maintained by emphasising "a *focalized* view of problems, rather than seeing them as a dimensions of a *totality*" (*ibid.*:138). It is the opinion of the writer that half-truths are used subtly to camouflage reality and can easily be sold to the gullible, unsuspecting, ideologically blinded and naively trusting, especially if it is to their advantage to believe. Examples abound: Black poverty is totally their own fault; they are lazy, have more children than what they can afford, *etc.* - instead of recognising the destruction of the pre-colonial economy, subsequent deprivation of opportunity, inferior education, job reservation, *etc.* as part of the problem. Further entrenchment of division occurs by stressing local, area and regional divisions - Blacks were separated into their

respective ethnic homelands scattered all over South Africa (emphasising that they do not belong together but require *separate nationalisms* and *separate freedoms*), in urban townships to service industries, in group areas to maintain separate development. Class conflict was instigated (*ibid.*:141) - Coloureds and Indians were offered participation in the tricameral parliament; they had their own education systems with better funding and a better standard of education than Blacks. Solidarity with Blacks might have threatened their privileged position. Black education was a particularly effective tool of domination in that Blacks were to be trained to the level at which they served the purposes of the White Oppressors, but not so that they could threaten White hegemony (Christie 1986:12; Mkatshwa 1985:11; *cf.* 6.4).

Another way of bringing about *division* is by providing leadership training and support to leaders selected by the Oppressor. They are provided with resources to “control the submerged and dominated consciousness of their comrades, or they become strangers in their own communities” (Freire 1992:139). Homeland leaders opted for co-operation with their Oppressors, some with the intention to use their positions to fight *apartheid* from the inside (Chief Buthelezi stated that he would use the *apartheid* structures as “chariots of liberation” (Laurence 1984:271), others to enrich themselves (rumours and/or investigations regarding financial corruption are at present surrounding leaders such as Mangope, Matanzima and other former homeland leaders). The writer suspects that part of the present dissension between KwaZulu Natal leaders, Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill Zwelethini, and the ANC relates to an unwillingness of the former to part with the power that had been accumulated under the wing of the NP government during the *apartheid* era.

The above acts of “false generosity” (Freire (1992) describes this concept in detail in the first chapter of *Pedagogy of the oppressed*.) served as an effective camouflage for the depersonalisation, dehumanisation, manipulation and domination of the Oppressed. It does not only enable the Oppressor to “preserve an unjust and necrophylic order, but to ‘buy’ peace for himself”. How often did one not hear White South Africans say in self-

justification: “But look what all we give to the Blacks!”. The question that arises is whether these “gifts” are not perhaps issued to appease the White conscience.

To counter division *unity* is required among the Oppressed. It “can enable them to change their weakness into a transforming force with which they can re-create the world and make it more human” (*ibid.*:141-142). Freire (*ibid.*:172-173) emphasises that, in the dialogical theory of unity for liberation the leaders must devote themselves to unity among the Oppressed, and unity of the leaders *with* the Oppressed. Once again it cannot occur without praxis. The revolutionary leaders have a difficult task to carry out a liberating praxis as they have the instruments of power directed against them. The Afrikaners struggled to attain political freedom, have their language (Afrikaans) and educational ideology (CNE) recognised and were at the mercy of the British rulers (Krus 1987:498; Muller *et al.* 1980:367-371). Blacks had a much greater struggle to put into motion the mechanism required to establish unity as they were oppressed on every level of society. They were disenfranchised, removed from their land and relocated under the Group Areas Act, relegated to inferior education, suffered job reservation, had their leaders jailed, their political movements banned, *etc.*

Unity amongst the Oppressors is derived from their unified antagonism towards those they oppress. This is particularly evident in the unifying effect anti-British sentiments had on Afrikaners bridging class differences. The “Poor Whites” were uplifted by the Reddingsdaadbond and the Broederbond which promoted Afrikaner Nationalism, and drew the votes needed to gain political power (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:490-491). The measure of co-operation that was forged between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans had, in the opinion of the writer, more to do with the maintenance of the privileges afforded by *apartheid* than with identification with the Afrikaner cause. Most of the English liberals were just liberal enough not to support the *apartheid* ideology, but also not so liberal that they would unconditionally side with the Oppressed against the Oppressor. Freire (1992:173) affirms that, in the face of any threat to their fundamental interests, the dominant elite fortuitously and rapidly unite.

Oppression creates an ambiguity and emotional instability in the Oppressed. He is at the same time desirous and fearful of freedom, because his present, past and future are equally without hope (*ibid.*:173-174). This explains the fatalistic acceptance which characterised the attitude of many Blacks who saw no way out of their oppressed situation. It emphasises the necessity for rehumanisation to move from Object to Subject status. In contrast with the ideology of oppression, re-ideologising entails perceiving their adherence to an unjust reality and transforming it. That means the Oppressed must recognise himself firstly as an oppressed individual who, secondly, belongs to an oppressed class. They need to “first cut the umbilical cord of magic and myth which binds them to the world of oppression” and then establish a different, liberating unity. (*ibid.*:174-175.) In this respect the nurturing role performed by the Afrikaner Broederbond did much to establish the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology which raised the Afrikaner from his oppressed state to one of political power (*cf.* 4.4.1). The BCM, in turn, was mainly responsible for actively embarking on the eradication of the negative connotations attached to being Black by replacing it with a positive conception (*cf.* 5.7). By re-establishing their identity as Blacks, unity for liberation started gaining ground.

### 7.5.3 MANIPULATION VERSUS ORGANISATION

Manipulation, a third dimension of the theory of antidialogical action, is used “by the dominant elites [to] try to conform the masses to their objectives” (Freire 1992:144). Along with the myths explained in 4.2 another myth is employed to increase the Oppressor’s power over the Oppressed by convincing them that they should enter into dialogue with the dominant elites so that they can be assisted towards their own ascent. The less mature the Oppressed are politically, the greater their gullibility with regard to such subtle manipulation. (*ibid.*) Promises of their own independent homeland with their own cabinet sounded like a pact offering Blacks independence, but due to their total financial dependence on the South African government, the homeland was little more than a dumping ground for superfluous Black labour, women, children and the old and sickly

(Giliomee in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:527). The tricameral parliament offered Coloureds and Indians a similar deal of an own parliament with limited control over their own affairs, as *general affairs* still left them dependent on the Nationalist government for the execution of their decisions (Grest in Frankel *et al.* 1988:101-102). Instead of offering increased freedom “these pacts always increase the subjugation of the people” (Freire 1992:144). Freire (1992:146) warns that this form of “quick return to power” eliminates the ability of the Oppressed to organise for true freedom.

Manipulation manifests in “an unauthentic type of ‘organisation’” which safeguards the interests of the dominant elites by preventing the emergence of true organisation (*ibid.*:145). This was evident from the way in which Black quasi-politicians feathered their own nests and the upper middle class Black businessman attained special deals for acting as go-between for trade between White business and the Black workers and peasants. Their financial success depended on the manipulation which they carried out in cahoots with the elite and which they, in fact, suffered themselves. These intermediaries Freire (1992:147) describes as “amphibians” who live in two elements, shuttling between the Oppressor and the Oppressed. Populist leaders who live this dual life do not have authentic communication with their people and are mere pawns in a game of manipulation the Oppressors orchestrate. They distributed in a paternalistic fashion “act[s] as an anesthetic (*sic*), distracting the oppressed from the true causes of their problems and from the concrete solution of these problems”. (*ibid.*:149.)

The writer suggests that the furore in Black education centres around young people refusing to be manipulated by education structured to prevent them from rising out of their subordinate position to become competitors with Whites. In Chapter 6 there is ample evidence of politicians (of which Verwoerd is probably the best known) stating openly and emphatically that Black education must be structured to meet the needs that White society has for Black labour (*cf.* Christie 1986:12; Mkatshwa 1985:1-2), but at the same time ensure that they do not intrude on the White labour market. To this end job reservation was entrenched in law as a precautionary measure (Grest in Frankel *et al.* 1988:59).

“The antidote to manipulation lies in critically conscious revolutionary organisation, which will pose to the people as problems their position in the historical process, the national reality, and manipulation itself” (Freire 1992:146). *Organisation* goes hand in hand with *unity, co-operation* and *witness* to the fact that the struggle for liberation is a common, shared task. Witness is characterised by consistency between words and action, radicalisation leading to increasing action, courage to love in order to transform the world for the liberation of men, and faith in the people. It involves confrontation with the world and with men. Thus witness contributes to organisation. In antialogical terms organisation implies the structuring of power to manipulate more effectively, whereas in dialogical terms it refers to leadership, discipline, determination and setting of objectives to work with the people towards *conscientização* and, ultimately, liberation. (*ibid.*:177-178.)

When Afrikaner Nationalism was *organising* to liberate the Afrikaner people from the English yoke, the essential elements of witness were present: There was *consistency* between their call for the upliftment of the Afrikaner devastated by the Anglo-Boer War, recognition of the Afrikaans culture, language, religion (*cf.* Chapter 4) and their demand for CNE (*cf.* Chapter 6). It was reinforced by *bold* political action, cultural practice, *radicalisation* in their witness regarding their struggle for freedom, *courage to care* for the Poor White Afrikaners and *faith* in the support of their people for their cause (Kallaway in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:425; Malherbe 1977:20-21).

When they attained power the Afrikaners *organised* to retain and build out their position by subjugating and manipulating Blacks and imposing their decisions on Black people without dialogical action taking place. Freire (1992:179) states that this kind of authoritarianism and license represents the antithesis of authority coupled to freedom. Authentic authority depends on delegation and sympathetic adherence, and not mere transfer of power as occurred with the Black leaders who were appointed by the White government to exercise authority on their behalf.

*Organisation* for the Black liberation struggle occurred *with* the people and also complied with the essential elements of *witness* (*ibid.*:177) mentioned earlier: They were *consistent* in their demands for franchise rights, the abolition of *apartheid* laws such as the pass laws, *etc.*; they followed on with *boldness* by taking part in protest action such as the Defiance Campaign; they were *radical* in opposing the White hegemonic regime head-on, demanding what it purposely withheld; they *courageously* fought for justice undeterred by any form of repression; and exhibited *faith* in the support of the people in their fight for freedom (*cf.* 5.3).

In the educational field *organisation* played a particularly important role in the Afrikaner Nationalist struggle: Major organisation lay behind the strategies employed to have Afrikaans instituted with English as a medium of instruction in schools. This was followed by lobbying for single medium schools which eventually contributed to the Purified Nationalist Party gaining control in the government. (Malherbe 1977:39-40; Serfontein 1979:39.) To maintain their dominant position the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology required that Blacks be suppressed before they could pose a threat to Afrikaner power. This was done by organising education that would be inferior to that of Whites. In the case of both the Afrikaners and the Blacks the language of the Oppressor was a source of repulsion and great contention, with a strong ideological impact. The Soweto Uprising was organised around the issue of Afrikaans having been made a compulsory medium of instruction with English and led to a tremendous escalation in the Struggle. (Christie 1986:238-239.) A prime example of *organisation* is the establishment of PE, although with limited success.

#### 7.5.4 CULTURAL INVASION VERSUS CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

*Cultural action* has as its objective either the preservation or the transformation of culture, and serves either to dominate or liberate. Dialogical cultural action aims “at surmounting the antagonistic contradictions of the social structure”, thereby achieving the liberation of men. (Freire 1992:180.) Antidialogical action, on the other hand, serves self-interest and

“the *conquest* of people, their *division*, their *manipulation*, and *cultural invasion*”. It is an *induced* action as it serves domination. Like divisive and manipulative tactics, *cultural invasion* also contributes to conquest. Freire describes *cultural invasion* as an act of violence against the owners of the invaded culture and manifests in the following manner: The invaders are the authors, and the invaded the objects of invasion; the invaders do the moulding, and the invaded are moulded; the invaders make the choices, and the invaded have to follow the choices; the invaders act, and the invaded experience only the illusion of acting. Thus invasion is camouflaged as generous assistance. The invaded culture loses its authenticity as it mimics the invaders, because the latter’s culture is presented as superior. This leads to cultural duality and dehumanisation. (*ibid.*:150-151.)

The development of the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology occurred to a great extent in defence of the Afrikaner culture which was being forged from the Dutch and, to a lesser extent, the German and French cultures. Milner’s Anglicisation policy was aimed at invading the Afrikaner culture to minimise the threat of the strongly emerging Afrikaner ideology (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:498; Spies in Muller *et al.* 1980:367-368). English as compulsory medium of school instruction, the ridicule Afrikaans pupils were subjected to because they could not speak English, and the use of the derogatory term, “kitchen Dutch”, for Afrikaans riled the Afrikaner. But instead of their culture being swamped, it inspired them to fight for their cultural rights. The language issue led to a split between Smuts and Hertzog, and partially as a result of the single and dual medium school arguments after Afrikaans was allowed as medium of instruction, the Purified Nationalist Party gained power (Krus in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:488-490). It is the opinion of the writer that cultural invasion by the English did leave a scar on the Afrikaner psyche in that a sense of cultural, political and economic inferiority had been deposited, from which they have, for the most part, recovered. The political, economic and cultural success of the Afrikaner, despite having to contend with both the English minority and Black majority, was no mean feat, but the superior attitude of a small number of the English-speaking South Africans who pride themselves still on their ties “back home” irritate occasionally.



Black South Africans have suffered many more years of cultural invasion than Whites. The ethnic differences and inter-tribal rivalry have, of course, rendered them even more susceptible to cultural invasion. Over the years Whites have constantly reminded them that, because they neither spoke a European language nor had a Western culture and economic system, they were inferior, primitive, stupid, lazy, uncivilised, ineducable, dirty, *etc.* They were ridiculed for the way they spoke the Western languages (not that many South Africans could speak any of their languages), took to wearing cast off clothes of their White bosses, laboured in an economy for which they received meagre reward, while their music, dance, art and history were regarded as primitive. To reinforce this vision of cultural inferiority Bantu Education was structured by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, Minister of Bantu Education, in 1953 so “that natives will be taught from childhood that equality with Europeans is not for them”. (Christie 1986:12.) Freire (1992:183) warns that the invaded seldom venture beyond the models imposed on them by the invaders, hence the tremendous struggle to break out of inferior education, which has not yet happened, despite dramatic political changes. Structures can be changed with laws and agreements, but the ideology that has been internalised and which determines the educational philosophy, is intangible and extremely resistant to change.

In *cultural synthesis* “actors” (not “invaders”), come from their culture not to teach, transmit or give, but to learn with the people about their world. This can only occur effectively if they become integrated with the people (*ibid.*:181-182). “Cultural synthesis is thus a mode of action for confronting culture itself, as the preserver of the very structures by which it was formed. Cultural action ... is an instrument for superseding the dominant alienated and alienating culture ... [thus ] every authentic revolution is a cultural revolution”. (*ibid.*:182.)

*Cultural synthesis* attempted by a thematic, objective study, investigation and analysis of people and their culture as passive objects produce naive, antidialogical, invasive results (*ibid.*:182). The education models that were proposed included suggestions for this type

of “cultural synthesis” to familiarise the various population groups with one another’s cultures. As Freire had predicted, these attempts did not succeed.

Effective *cultural synthesis* bridges the difference between the world views of the leaders and of the people by integrating the sophisticated knowledge of the leaders with the empirical knowledge of the people, resulting in mutual support. Leaders and their followers must together determine their strategies for cultural action and not follow predetermined guidelines. Leaders are warned to guard against invading or adapting their people’s world view although they might possess insights of which the people are incapable. They should deal with such dilemmas by identifying and explaining to the people why adaptations to their demands are necessary in certain instances. (*ibid.*:183-185.) The manner in which the Afrikaner leadership, via the Broederbond and Reddingsdaadbond, dealt with the Poor White Afrikaner (Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:490-491) brought about cultural synthesis, and had a unifying effect on the Afrikaners. The ANC leadership which, until the 1940s, consisted of mostly middle class Blacks who promoted their middle class interests, changed their strategy towards looking after the interests of uneducated and rural Blacks as well (*ibid.*:500). Although they were much better educated than the Black peasants, they identified with them in the struggle for liberation.

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CNE effected *cultural synthesis* with regard to education amongst Afrikaners by emphasising Afrikaner symbols, religion and language, *i.e.* ideology. The philosophy of PE is an example of cultural synthesis as is evident from the motto, “Education of the people, by the people and for the people” (*cf.* 6.5). Although PE did not really take off as an educational ideology it offers valuable suggestions for bringing about cultural synthesis in the fractured educational situation in South Africa. For the multi-cultural South African society it is essential that liberating, dialogical action takes place when educational theory is constructed. Blacks may no longer be relegated to inferior education and backlogs will have to be addressed, but care should be taken that the Oppressor does not become the Oppressed by breaking down what White education has attained. It would be much more

beneficial to all educational consumers and the country as a whole if Blacks could share in White expertise. As has been reflected in the numerous reports regarding a future education system, communities will have considerable say in local content of the syllabi. In November 1995 a White Paper appeared announcing multi-lingual instruction in schools, instead of only English and Afrikaans. The language medium of school instruction will be determined by the parents, and will not be dictated by the government. (Compare the quotation in 4.4.3.2 regarding parents having no choice in medium of instruction.) The views and needs of parents and the expertise of the leaders are united in dialogical action. "Only in the encounter of the people with the revolutionary leaders - in their communion, in their praxis - can this theory be built". (Freire 1992:186.)

## 7.6 PLAN OF ACTION FOR REHUMANISING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

The political democracy established in South Africa after the election of 27 April 1994 represents the beginning of the difficult process of rehumanisation. Freire refers to this process as *dialogical cultural action*, under which he categorises *co-operation*, *unity*, *organisation* and *cultural synthesis*. What Freire means by these terms has been discussed in 7.5 and its applicability to the South African situation pointed out. The critical aspect is how these suggestions can be implemented.

The writer agrees with Freire that the leaders have greater insight than the majority of their followers and they realise what major ideological shifts will have to occur to effect co-operation, unity, organisation and cultural synthesis. To avoid polarisation the leaders will have to gently and patiently guide their followers. If change takes place too fast some get left behind. On the other hand, the leaders cannot be held to ransom by followers unwilling to make the necessary shifts. The disconcertingly high crime rate in South Africa at present is an example of an issue that requires firm and drastic action as the stability of society is threatened and the climate conducive to effective dialogical cultural action destroyed. The example of effective co-operation set by prominent figures from

traditionally opposing camps in the political sphere and the community serves as a suitable starting point for public action.

The media should accept the challenge to foster co-operation. This does not prohibit them from putting forward diverse points of view, but they should be cautious not to fan conflict. Instead they need to be acutely aware of their impact on the population, handle it with great responsibility and in the spirit of the new dispensation by consciously focusing on points of agreement and common ground from where solutions can be found for problems. It is comforting to note that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and several magazines have accepted this challenge. Unfortunately this is not the case with most of the newspapers. The writer suggests that a written communiqué be issued weekly to report on progress with regard to forming a common South African nationhood. This can then be distributed as supplements to existing newspapers.

With regard to education few White South Africans can or will argue against equal allocation of funds and initial additional expenditure to address backlogs. Such rational adjustments should not cause more than grumbling about increase in school fees for White South Africans, as they intrinsically know that they have enjoyed privilege for a very long time and that it has simply come to an end. The writer contends that the process of school integration should not be forced to the point where bussing occurs to create a "melting pot" situation which had a detrimental effect in the United States of America. Schools have been opened to all races and pupils who feel able and comfortable to be part of a minority group in a school now have the freedom to exercise that choice. Adjustments with regard to structure, content, *etc.* have been discussed at various instances in the dissertation.

Society will take time to adapt to non-racialism as attitudes that have taken shape over many decades cannot simply change on instruction. The writer suggests that the school-going youth will effect the transition with much greater ease than the rest of society as the young have fewer prejudices and these have not been nurtured for as many years as those

of adults. Furthermore, the young are much more adaptable than older people and are still in the process of forming their views. Here parents and teachers should act with responsibility and make a concerted effort not to transfer their prejudices to the children who will have to live in the post-*apartheid* society after the adult generation has passed on.

In conclusion the writer wishes to emphasise that the greatest hurdle to re-humanisation lies within each person. As has been explained previously, virtually all South Africans have suffered oppression, the Blacks under *apartheid*, and the Afrikaners under the British regime which deprived them of the opportunity to “name their world” (Freire 1992:13). Freeing the mind of the imposed mind sets of the past is the ultimate challenge, and not one that can be placed solely at the door of politicians, teachers, community leaders or others. That is the task and responsibility of each individual - a task that demands dedication.

## 7.7 CONCLUSION

On examining the various models and theories that are, in the opinion of the writer, likely to impact on society and education in the future South Africa, it is evident that a tremendous amount of adaptation will be required. White South Africans will have to learn to share what they have claimed as theirs since colonisation: the land, power, decision-making, privilege, wealth, *etc.* Blacks, in turn, will have to learn to accept and handle the responsibilities that come with their newly acquired status. Freire (1992:179) regards freedom and authority as co-ordinates: “The dialogical theory of action opposes both authoritarianism and license, and thereby affirms authority and freedom. There is no freedom without authority, but there is no authority without freedom” These words are reminiscent of the “unfreedom” of the *apartheid* era, but issues a warning for the post-*apartheid* South Africa not to revert to merely a different version of oppression.

Many changes have already occurred in the political sphere, and these have proceeded remarkably smoothly, taking into account the starting positions of the various groupings. Education has been in a very uncomfortable state of limbo, with a few minor, mostly financial, changes having taken place. The separate education departments have, in theory, ceased to exist. Major changes are scheduled for 1996 when the matriculation examination will no longer have any form of racial division. The writer sees as the greatest challenge the task of rehumanisation which was discussed according to Freire's suggested approach. A united South Africa will remain a clause on the statute books unless all members of the nation commit themselves to this arduous process.

Chapter 8 will conclude this study with a brief summary of the major findings and conclusions, and make recommendations for implementation and research in the future.



## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

From the research presented in this dissertation it is evident that “[t]here is no such thing as a neutral education system” (Shaul in Freire 1992:15, quoted in 1.1). It has also become abundantly clear that education serves to pass on “the logic” (*ibid.*), and thus also ideology, from one generation to the next. Forcing the younger generation to conform to the ideas of the previous generation results in the new generation being ill-prepared to face the realities of its own situation and times. Society has the responsibility of allowing its youth to be educated for the society in which they will have to function, *i.e.* in Freire’s words, “the practice of freedom” (*ibid.*). To do otherwise amounts to using landmarks from the past to indicate the route into the future - the directions simply do not apply, and can only serve to mislead. Inevitably education was a pawn in the competing nationalisms, used to further the respective ideological objectives (*cf.* Chapter 6). In this chapter the writer intends to summarise the main conclusions that have been reached, and on the basis of these findings venture suggestions about the future.

#### 8.2 SUMMARY

In the past seven chapters the ideologies of Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism have been traced from their beginnings as liberation movements to the present. The Afrikaner-dominated government which came to power in 1948 embarked on an “ideology of national survival” embodied in the *apartheid* system “with its concomitant suppressive and selective legislation, also regarding educational matters” (Schoeman 1993:29). Afrikaner Nationalism culminated in the attainment of republican status on 31

May 1961, whereas Black Liberation Socialism reached its ultimate goal when the ANC came to power in the multi-racial, national, democratic elections on 27 April 1994, thus gaining majority rule.

Degenaar (1982b:34) contends that the Coloured, Indian and English-speaking White South Africans did not bond themselves to any particular kind of nationalism, but this was not the case with Afrikaner and Black Nationalism. He (*ibid.*) quotes Deutsch & Folts (in Munger) who stated that, of these, Afrikaner Nationalism was “the most intense and coherent nationalism on the continent”, hence its ability to maintain dominance over a numerically much stronger contender in the form of Black Nationalism. When the methods employed by the ANC had not managed to attain equal rights for Blacks with Whites by 1959, the PAC split from this movement (*cf.* 5.5) and contact with, and support from, socialist countries increased. This gave a Black Liberation Socialist leaning to the Black Nationalist ideology (Adam & Moodley 1986:100).

The two mainstream ideologies exhibit a great deal of commonality. It is the contention of the writer that, in the same way as Afrikaner Nationalism imitated many strategies used by British Imperialism, Black Nationalism followed the example of Afrikaner Nationalism. Both fought for political freedom and control of education which underpin their political ideologies. On many occasions similar strategies were employed by these two ideological groupings to attain their goals of freedom. Their people were united by striving singularly towards freedom and temporarily setting aside group and class differences.

The middle-class Afrikaner who instigated the nationalist movement channelled the displaced and impoverished urban (White) peasant away from socialism (to which they were drawn via the trade unions; *cf.* Kros in Kallaway *et al.* 1987:494) into the ethnic fold by providing protective employment and status in a racial caste system (Adam & Moodley 1986:44). The *bywoners* who had been forced off their own land because they could not cope with industrial farming worked for wealthy Afrikaans farmers who included them in the nationalist struggle (Adams & Moodley 1986:47). “Middle-class



Afrikaner ideologues were able to channel the economic frustrations of poor Whites into a cultural movement" (*ibid.*:50). This method of *caring* (Freire 1992:177; *cf.* 7.5.3) united Afrikaners of different social strata under a single nationalist ideology.

Black nationalism manifested itself in the ethnic mobilisation of the Inkatha movement of the Zulus, the trade unions which were used as a political forum and the BCM (*ibid.*:46), and eventually united the Black peasants, labourers and middle-class under an ideology striving for Black liberation, especially in the form of Black Liberation Socialism. When the Afrikaners could not attain their nationalist objectives by peaceable means they ended up in a war with Britain (Adam & Moodley 1986:47). This was followed by the formation of the Union of South Africa, which the Afrikaners eventually converted into an independent republic in which they were the ruling group (*cf.* 4.4 and 4.5). Blacks attempted to attain civil and political rights by non-violent means, but when these efforts proved futile after many years, they resorted to aggressive, and later violent methods (5.3-5.6; *cf.* Adam & Moodley 1986:45-46). Their cultural ethnic ties, which had been severed by urbanisation, were replaced by economic solidarity amongst the urban Blacks (Adam & Moodley 1986:50-51). Adam & Moodley (*ibid.*:50) regard their common economic deprivation as the strongest motivation for unified action.

Despite the many similarities between the Afrikaner and Black nationalist ideological struggles, differences also exist: Adam & Moodley (1986:49) state emphatically that "[w]ithout the predicants of the Calvinistic churches to give impetus to the ethnic movement, Afrikaner nationalism would be inconceivable". Blacks, on the other hand, do not embrace a single religion, but have many different religious affiliations, such as virtually all Christian denominations, Islam, Hinduism, and indigenous offspring of Christian and native fundamentalism, *e.g.* Zionism. Another tool employed by "ethnic entrepreneurs" (*ibid.*) is language. The fact that Afrikaners had to struggle against the English for the recognition and survival of their language had a unifying ideological effect, whereas the numerous Black languages were not threatened with extinction. As a matter

of fact, they were united in their opposition to Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor, preferring to be taught in English (*ibid.*:48).


Parallel to these political ideologies that function in society are the sub-ideologies impacting on education. In the case of both ideologies education played a powerful role in their nationalist struggle. CNE exhibited similar characteristics to the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology, and PE to the Black Nationalist/Socialist Liberation ideology. The two educational ideologies, compared in 6.6, both served to support the political ideologies. Disunity hampered both Afrikaner and Black nationalism: The wealthier, more liberal Cape Afrikaners had benefited from the English culture and business expertise (Adam & Moodley 1986:47) and were less willing to sever their ties with the English, whereas the poorer Transvaal Afrikaners had not yet recovered from the effect of the atrocities inflicted on them during the Anglo-Boer War (*ibid.*:45-46); the power struggle between the ANC and IFP resulted in Black-on-Black violence such as at Boipatong, Bisho and Shell House.

Apart from the similarities between the two nationalist ideologies and their supporting educational ideologies, there are major differences in their models regarding the type of society, economic and education system envisaged. This will have become evident in this dissertation. To forge unity where there is so much diversity lies beyond ideological adaptation and unification, hence the rejection of the possibility of one South African ideology. The writer agrees with Degenaar's (*cf.* 7.4) repudiation of ideology in favour of non-ideological nationalism based on a pluralistic approach. A South African nationalism will have to be built on common ground, such as shared values, the desire for peace and prosperity, *etc.* (*cf.* De Klerk's speech in 8.3).

As has been evident from this dissertation, education finds itself at the centre of ideological, political and all other societal issues. Whereas education has been an inseparable part of the struggle for liberation and the establishment of ideology in both Afrikaner and Black Nationalism, it needs to become part of the post-struggle and post-

ideology strategies and solutions. The younger generation has an advantage over the older generation in that they do not carry so much ideological baggage. They are more able to adapt, concede and compromise, as their futures are at stake. It would be a crime against the next generation if the older generation allows its prejudices to hamper the chances of the young to foster a spirit of reconciliation and strive for the creation of a unified South African nationalism and nationhood.

In practical terms the education authorities bear the responsibility to present to the young the best academic, cultural and social instruction and opportunities they can afford. The economic situation is such that at best compromises will have to be made. White South Africans will have to contribute financially to pay back for the many years of privilege at the expense and deprivation of Blacks. The time has come for the syllabi, curricula and textbooks to reflect the full spectrum of South African society. Students must be granted the opportunity to conduct constructive arguments and discussions on topics that the present adult generation may find controversial, but those realities form part of the future society and can best be thrashed out in the relatively protective educational environment where teachers are present to ask leading questions, offer counter arguments and alternative perspectives.



PE may not have been able to produce a fully-fledged educational ideology, complete with syllabi and curricula, but it certainly focused on aspects of CNE that need to be discarded and offered some viable alternatives. PE should be seen as an experimental workshop where various alternatives to the rigid, racially and culturally biased CNE were tested - some experiments were successful, some partially successful, and others proved to be dismal failures. The high level of academic excellence that can be drawn from CNE, the existing structures that are flexible enough to accommodate the new dispensation and a tempered measure of discipline (the latter lacking in Black education), combined with the creativity, consultative approach and willingness to experiment and deviate from established practice in search of better alternatives characteristic of PE, paint a much less gloomy picture of future education in South Africa. In the same way as society cannot

instantly adopt a new mind set, education will not be transformed over-night. Apart from financial restraints, teachers practising in the CNE mode have much to unlearn. On condition that “quick fixes” are not demanded South African education can, in the long term, look forward to a much improved system for all.

### 8.3 THEORISTS

The implications of ideology for society and education in South Africa in terms of the theoretical viewpoints of Althusser, John B. Thompson and Freire can be summarised as follows:

The implementation of what Althusser terms the *Repressive State Apparatus* has been evident in the manner in which the British regime at the Cape suppressed the Afrikaners during the time of colonial rule. The various *Ideological State Apparatuses* such as the *cultural* and *educational ISAs* were also used to maintain domination over the Afrikaners (e.g. Milner’s Anglicisation policy and their campaign against Dutch/Afrikaans). When the Afrikaner Nationalist regime came to power it employed the *Repressive State Apparatus* in an extremely vehement manner against rising Black Nationalism and continued to do so over an extended period of time. Disenfranchisement, restrictive laws, jailings, detentions, various forms of degradation and prejudice, *etc.* were the order of the day (*cf.* Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

Working hand in glove with the *Repressive State Apparatus* were the *Ideological State Apparatuses* which were extremely effectively employed in the service of oppression. The *educational ISA* which subtly permeates most aspects of society, is regarded by Althusser (a view with which the writer agrees) as the dominant ISA. It is linked to the *Repressive State Apparatus* in the sense that education policy is determined by the state; the laws made by the state give effect to what the state demands from education (*legal ISA*); the *police ISA* ensures that the laws are enforced; the *cultural ISA* determines the cultural goods that will be presented to students (e.g. the imposition of Afrikaans as medium of

instruction at Black schools which resulted in the Soweto riots), *etc.* (*cf.* the discussion of Althusser's theory in 2.7.1.)

John B. Thompson (*cf.* 2.7.2) supports Althusser's contention that power plays a dominant role in ideology and its manifestations in society, but criticises the generally held view of ideology as "a kind of social cement". The writer regards this criticism as feasible, but only under certain circumstances, and is of the opinion that ideology does act as a social cement uniting people who share an ideal that can only be accomplished by means of unified action. John B. Thompson argues that ideology cannot unite groups as there are more differences than similarities (*cf.* 8.2 for a discussion on the differences and similarities between Afrikaner Nationalism and Black Liberation Socialism.), and that the pursuit of power is the only motivation: He sees ideology as "meaning in the service of power" (Thompson, John B. 1990:6,7). The writer agrees that the differences that concern John B. Thompson certainly exist, but contends that they are de-emphasised while the unifying mission is yet unaccomplished. The diverse parties are united by a common ideology, but as soon as the ultimate aim has been attained these differences surface again.

Looking at Afrikaner and Black Nationalism in the politico-historical perspective, abundant evidence has been cited in the course of the study to support the writer's view. This will be summarised briefly. In Chapter 4 the Afrikaner ideology was traced from when the ideal of an independent Afrikaner *volk* united Dutch, French and German settlers (with the English remaining separate and retaining ties with Imperial Britain). Many disagreements between the leaders of the *Voortrekkers*, the two Boer republics, and the Union government were overcome by this unifying ideal. After the attainment of an Afrikaner-dominated government under the NP in 1948, the ultimate goal of an independent Republic of South Africa was striven for and realised in 1961. It is the opinion of the writer that from that point in time the Afrikaner ideology started assuming a new dimension, namely that of "meaning in the service of power" (Thompson, John B. 1990:6,7). The Afrikaner leaders deluded their followers by exaggerated threats of the

*Swart gevaar* and the *Rooi gevaar*, in order to justify the extremely harsh restrictions placed on Blacks (*cf.* Chapters 4 and 5).

The writer suggests that at this stage the antagonism between Afrikaner and English seemed to dissipate. They joined forces, firstly because both groups felt threatened by the Blacks who greatly outnumbered the Whites, and secondly, because the English were reluctant to part with the privileges than accompanied *apartheid*. Few were "liberal" enough to do more than criticise the NP government. The diversity that John B. Thompson stresses, is thus not being questioned, only qualified: it existed at the time Afrikaner Nationalism took shape, and still exists (*cf.* Adam & Moodley 1986:48-50; Chapter 4).

Black Nationalism followed a similar pattern: The various tribes were historically always battling for superiority. Despite having their own tribes, land, leaders, customs, traditions and languages their striving for freedom from White domination shaped a Black Nationalism that de-emphasised the many differences (*cf.* 8.2): The ANC, PAC and IFP stood together despite their differences, while they were struggling for the removal of *apartheid*, but now that the ANC is leading the Government of National Unity, their differences are coming to the fore again and a power struggle is being waged. This serves to support the writer's contention that Althusser and John B. Thompson's theories are compatible, but that they merely look at the situation from differing perspectives.

Freire's *pedagogy of the oppressed* as applied to the South African situation was discussed in detail in 7.4 and will not be repeated here. It suffices to say that, whereas Althusser and John B. Thompson describe the *problems* each from their respective points of view, Freire analyses the *reasons* for and offers his suggestions for a *solution* to the problems. The writer selected these three theorists as it is her opinion that they offer an illuminating view on the implications of ideology for South African society and education.

## 8.4 CONCLUSION

The future in the post-*apartheid* South Africa is an untrodden path and ideologies from the *apartheid* era in South Africa have become totally inappropriate. This journey into a completely different future will be fraught with obstacles. In his speech at the opening of Parliament on 1 February 1991 F.W. de Klerk (SA 1991a:2) offered the following guidelines:

*In South Africa the task of nation-building is formidable because of the diversity of our population. We lack the natural cohesion of a single culture and language that frequently forms the cornerstone of nationhood. Consequently we shall have to rely heavily on the other cornerstone - that of common values and ideals.*

## 8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Currently South African society is in a state of flux, which inevitably brings with it uncertainty and fear with regard to an unpredictable future. Adaptation is in itself problematic, but at present few South Africans know what they must prepare to adapt to with regard to society in general, and education in particular. There will be no blanket solution, though. Different age groups amongst both the White and Black communities have different fears and expectations of the future, based on their personal exposure to the overarching ideologies with which they had identified and which shaped their individual life views.

### 8.5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH

Research into the following aspects could assist understanding of where groupings in society find themselves at present. If categorised according to age and ideological affiliation, the information gained could serve to ease the transition towards a democratic,

non-racial society and education system as well as indicate what the expectations are of the different groupings in society. Thus topics recommended for research include the following:

- The present manifestations of the impact of CNE on the psyche of the White school-going youth during various periods, *e.g.*: (a) between 1948, when the Afrikaner Nationalist ideology became the state ideology with the NP coming to power, and 1961, when the Afrikaner Nationalist ideal of an independent republic was realised, and (b) from 1967, when CNE became the official educational ideology, until the 1994 election and the educational changes it precipitated;
- The present manifestations of the impact of Bantu Education on the psyche of the Black school-going youth from the time of the inception of Bantu Education until the Soweto uprisings in 1976. This needs to be followed by a comparative study of the manifestations of the impact of the political and educational struggle on the psyche of the school-going youth from 1976 to 1994 when a democratic, non-racial government was elected and the process of educational change started;
- Aspects of PE that can be useful for: (a) breaking the authoritarian mould in which CNE had cast the products of its ideology, and (b) freeing the minds of pupils who had been victims of the mental constraints of the ideology of CNE;
- An empirical study of the application of the rehumanisation process required by both Oppressor and Oppressed as proposed by Paulo Freire.



### 8.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

After examining the impact of the ideologies of Afrikaner Nationalism and CNE, and Black Liberation Socialism and PE, on society and education it appears necessary to implement the following strategies:

- Programmes should be developed and implemented to de-ideologise education and communities;
- Opportunities should be created for members of the various population groups (adults and students) with similar value systems to make contact with the view of forming societal groupings based on shared values, rather than race;
- The value of a common South African Nationalism devoid of the distortions of ideology should be fostered so that all South African citizens will be subsumed under the country's motto, *Unity is Strength*;
- Paulo Freire's suggestions for rehumanisation should be applied over as broad a spectrum as possible.



## APPENDIX A

### TIMELINE (1806-1995)

- 1806 Second British occupation of Cape
- 1834 Groot Trek started
- 1852 Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek independence - Sandrivier Convention
- 1854 Orange Free State independence - Bloemfontein Convention
- 1877 Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek annexed
- 1882 First Black political movement formed
- 1884 First Black newspaper published
- 1889 Black delegation to Parliament to object to pass laws
- 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War
- 1907 Transvaal granted responsible government
- 1908 Orange Free State granted responsible government
- 1910 Union of South Africa formed
- White education under provincial auspices
- Black education under Ministry of Bantu Education
- 1912 South African National Native Congress (later ANC) established
- 1913 National Party established
- Natives' Land Act
- Black delegation to England to request political and civil rights
- 1914-1918 First World War
- 1919 Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICWU) formed in Cape Town
- Strikes and unrest
- Smuts' first ministry
- Black delegation to England to again request political and civil rights
- 1918-1921 Post-war boom
- 1921 Communist Party of South Africa formed

- 1923 Natives' Urban Areas Act  
National Party and Labour Party form electoral pact  
SA Indian Congress formed
- 1924 Pact (NP & LP) win election  
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICWU) expands nation-wide
- 1925 Afrikaans becomes an official language
- 1926 SA Nationality and Flag Bill  
Hertzog appeals for policy of racial segregation
- 1928 Broederbond becomes a secret organisation
- 1929 NP wins *Swart gevaar* election - Hertzog becomes Prime Minister  
FAK established
- 1929-1933 Great depression
- 1930 Land Act Bill
- 1932 Carnegie report on Poor Whites
- 1933 Fusion between NP and SAP
- 1934 NP and SAP join forces to form United Party  
D.F. Malan leaves NP to form Purified National Party
- 1935 Hertzog exposes true activities of Broederbond
- 1936 Native Representative Council instituted  
Welsh Commission
- 1938 Centenary of Great Trek
- 1939-1945 Second World War
- 1939 Establishment of Ossewa Brandwag  
Hertzog leaves UP; Smuts becomes Prime Minister for second time
- 1941 ANC increases demand for full franchise and representation

- 1943 Death of Hertzog  
 United Party wins election fought around dual language medium issue  
 Malan reunites National Party  
 ANC Youth League established  
 Bill of Rights adopted by ANC  
 Afrikaanse Kultuurraad and Pretoriase Onderwysraad organise strike by teachers and pupils
- 1946 ANC sends its President, Dr. Xuma, to UN to object to South Africa's separate development policy
- 1948 Fagan Commission Report accepted - African townships in cities accepted, migrant labour to be maintained on limited scale only  
 NP, joined by Afrikaner Party, wins election - *apartheid* formally adopted
- 1949 SANNC (later ANC) starts Resistance Campaign - boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience  
 Eiselen Commission investigates Black education  
 Suppression of Communism Act passed - SACP banned  
 Group Areas Act passed
- 1951 Legislation to remove Coloureds from voters' role
- 1952 SANNC changes name to ANC  
 Defiance Campaign launched by ANC - passive resistance directed at passes and railway *apartheid*  
 Legislation passed enforcing *apartheid* in public amenities
- 1953 Bantu Education Act passed resulting in Ministry of Bantu Education
- 1954 J.G. Strijdom succeeds D.F. Malan as Prime Minister  
 African Education Movement (AEM) formed
- 1955 Congress Alliance adopts Freedom Charter
- 1956 Parliament removes Coloured voters from the common electoral roll  
 Rivonia Treason Trial begins
- 1958 National Party wins with enlarged majority  
 Dr. Verwoerd becomes Prime Minister

- 1959 Extension of Universities Act resulting in tribal colleges  
PAC formed
- 1960 PAC starts positive action  
Sharpeville shootings  
ANC and PAC banned  
Cottesloe Consultation
- 1961 South Africa becomes a republic  
*Umkhonto we Siswe* (Spear of the Nation) formed on 16 December
- 1963 Coloured Persons' Education Act
- 1964 Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other ANC leaders sentenced to life imprisonment on conclusion of Rivonia Treason Trial
- 1965 Indian Education Act
- 1966 Dr. Verwoerd assassinated  
B.J. Vorster becomes Prime Minister
- 1968 Inception of Black Consciousness Movement
- 1967 CNE becomes official education policy for White schools
- 1972 Youth Preparedness and Veld schools introduced
- 1976 Soweto uprisings
- 1979 Education and Training Act replaces Bantu Education Act  
UDF launched
- 1980 School boycotts  
De Lange Commission appointed
- 1983 New Constitution instituting Tricameral Parliament  
White Paper published accepting eleven guiding principles of De Lange Report
- 1985 Wide-spread boycotts in townships  
State of Emergency declared

- 1986 PE launched - Year of Remembrance  
State of Emergency  
Bombings in Bethal by White right-wing activists  
NGK recants on statement that *apartheid* is biblical
- 1988 Wit Wolwe kills seven people in Pretoria
- 1989 CP ousts PFP as official opposition  
David Webster, University lecturer and ANC activist killed
- 1989 Prime Minister P.W. Botha suffers a stroke  
F.W. de Klerk becomes Prime Minister
- 1990 Rustenburg Declaration  
Nelson Mandela released
- 1991 De Klerk announces sweeping reforms *e.g.* release of political prisoners,  
unbanning of Black political organisations  
Chris Hani assassinated
- 1991-1992 CODESA I
- 1993 CODESA II  
Interim Constitution adopted
- 1994 Nelson Mandela inaugurated as president, with Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de  
Klerk as vice-presidents



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## APPENDIX B

A list of abbreviations used in the text which are of a local nature. See Appendix C for translations.

AEM	African Education Movement
ANC	African National Congress
AWB	Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
BC	Black Consciousness
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
CNE	Christian National Education
CoD	Congress of Democrats
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CP	Conservative Party
DET	Department of Education and Training
FAK	Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge
FOSATU	Federation of South African Teachers' Unions
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
ICWU	Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
ISA	Ideological State Apparatus
LP	Labour Party
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
NECC	National Education Crisis committee
NGK	Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk
NP	National Party
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PE	People's Education
PFP	Progressive Federal Party
PTA	Parent Teacher Association

PTSA	Parent Teacher Student Association
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RGN	Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing
RSA	Repressive State Apparatus
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACPO	South African Coloured People's Organisation
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAIC	South African Indian Council
SANLAM	Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewensassuransie-Maatskappy
SANNC	South African Native National Congress (changed name to ANC)
SANTAM	Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust Assuransie-Maatskappy
SAP	South African Party
SAP	South African Police
UDF	United Democratic Front
UP	United Party
WCC	World Council of Churches





## APPENDIX C

List of non-English terms used by the writer.

*Afrikaanse Kultuurraad* - Afrikaans Cultural Council

*Afrikaner* - White South African of French, German or Dutch origin who speaks the Afrikaans language

*Afrikanerdom* - Afrikaner nationhood

*Algemene Sinodale Kommissie* - General Synod Commission

*apartheid* - policy of separate development which segregated White and Black in South Africa

*baas-kneg* - master-slave

*Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging* - White Freedom Movement

*Boer/boer* - traditional Afrikaner farmer

*Boerenasie* - Afrikaner nation

*Bond* - abbreviated form of Afrikaner Broederbond

*(Afrikaner) Broederbond* - secret organisation which promoted the interests of the Afrikaner; literally Band of Brothers

*bywoners* - Poor White Afrikaners who worked for the wealthy Afrikaner farmers particularly during the 1929-1933 depression

*conscientização* - critical consciousness

*Engelse* - English/British

*Engelse gevaar* - the English threat


*FAK-sangbundel* - volume of traditional Afrikaans folk music published under the auspices of the Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies

*Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* - Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies

*Kerk* - Church, specifically the Dutch Reformed Church

*Kerk en Samelewing* - Church and Society

*kraal* - enclosure for farm animals



*laager* - camp in the open country protected by a circle of wagons (lit.); *draw laager* - closing ranks for self-protection (fig.)

*Moedertaalkongres* - Mother Tongue Congress

*Nasionale Instituut vir Opvoeding en Onderwys* - National Institute for Education and Training

*Nasionale Pers* - National Press (mouthpiece of National Party)

*Ossewa Brandwag* - Nazi-modelled cultural organisation promoting and actively protecting Afrikaner interests

*Ossewatrek* - Great Trek re-enacted to celebrate its centenary

*Poor White Afrikaners* - Afrikaners impoverished by the Great Depression of 1929-1933 and the after-effects of the Anglo-Boer War

*Pogo* - military wing of the Pan Africanist Congress

*Pretoriase Onderwysraad* - Pretoria Education Council

*Reddingsdaadbond* - organisation formed to uplift the Poor White Afrikaners

*Rooi gevaar* - red threat (lit.); threat of Communism (fig.)

*Saambou* - Building society started for and by Afrikaners

*stormtroopers* - attack force

*Swart gevaar* - Black threat, referring to the numerical superiority of Blacks over Whites

*totale aanslag* - total onslaught; term used to denote the Black, red and English threat against Afrikanerdom

*Trekboere* - frontier stock farmers who ventured into the untamed South African interior in search of grazing

*Trekkers* - abbreviated form of Voortrekkers

*Umkhonto we Siswe* - military wing of the African National Congress

*veld schools* - training of scholars in survival tactics in the bush

*verkrampes* - conservatives

*verligtes* - liberals

*volk* - nation

*volksfeeste* - national festivals

*Volkskas* - a bank formed for and by Afrikaners

*volksmonumente* - national monuments

*Voortrekkers* - group of Dutch farmers who left the Cape travelling northwards by ox wagon to seek independence from Britain; Afrikaner youth organisation similar to the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides

*Wit Wolwe* - White Wolves; name of a group of militant Afrikaner right-wing activists



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## APPENDIX D

Translation into English of the Memorandum drawn up by Die Afrikaanse Kultuurraad and Die Pretoriase Onderwysraad when calling for a strike by pupils, students and teachers in 1943 to persuade the government to take note of the Afrikaner plight for Afrikaans as medium of instruction.

### *BASIC PRINCIPLES*

*With regard to the question of the medium of instruction, Die Afrikaanse Kultuurraad believes:*

1. *that the single medium school represents the healthiest pedagogical and psychological policy;*
2. *that the government with its propagation of the dual-medium school or the introduction of the second language of tuition in certain subjects simply intends to introduce the old political dictate of Milner in order to Anglicize and denationalize the Afrikaner;*
3. *that the Government is presently dragging educational issues into political affairs or politics into education, but that the Afrikaans churches and educational bodies should, as a consequence, not fail to take a stand on this issue;*
4. *that this policy of the Government is simply the thin edge of the wedge and that it will take the first available opportunity to lump Afrikaans and English children together in one kraal once again;*

5. *that the true objectives are simply the sacrificing of Afrikanerdom on the altar of British-Jewish Imperialism;*
6. *that Afrikanerdom in the last century experienced more than enough injustice under the yoke of the British;*
7. *that it is not the Afrikaner but rather the English who is unilingual;*
8. *that the introduction of so-called dual-medium schools does not affect thousands of English children in private schools on the Rand, in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, etc., and that it is only the Afrikaner child who will suffer;*
9. *that the Afrikaner definitely believes in thorough bilingualism, but that it should be consistently applied in all the branches of society and in the civil service by means of directing the same requirements at both sections of the nation;*
10. *that Afrikanerdom solemnly wishes to undertake, through its churches, school committees, school commissions, etc., to fight actively this new attempt at Anglicanization, and in so doing to avoid a complete mutual estrangement of the two population groups, through*
  - (a) *encouraging the parents of Afrikaans schools to adopt passive resistance (a principle which has a Christian-historical basis in our history) by refusing to send their children to such schools; and*
  - (b) *only as a last resort, to take recourse in the establishment of their own schools with a definite Christian-National basis, but for which they as taxpayers will demand their justifiable share of contributions from the state.*

Malherbe 1977:691.

## APPENDIX E

Principles for the Provision of Education in the RSA on which the De Lange Commission had Reached Consensus.

### Principle 1

Equal opportunities for education, including equal standards in education, for every inhabitant, irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex, shall be the purposeful endeavour of the State.

### Principle 2

Education shall afford positive recognition of what is common as well as what is diverse in the religious and cultural way of life and the languages of the inhabitants.

### Principle 3


Education shall give positive recognition to the freedom of choice of the individual, parents and organisations in society.

### Principle 4

The provision of education shall be directed in an educationally responsible manner to meet the needs of the individual as well as those of society and economic development, and shall, *inter alia*, take into consideration the manpower needs of the country.

### Principle 5

Education shall endeavour to achieve a positive relationship between the formal, non-formal and informal aspects of education in the school, society and family.



**Principle 6**

The provision of formal education shall be a responsibility of the State provided that the individual, parents and organized society shall have a shared responsibility, choice and voice in this matter.

**Principle 7**

The private sector and the state shall have a shared responsibility for the provision of non-formal education.

**Principle 8**

Provision shall be made for the establishment and state subsidisation of private education within the system of providing education.

**Principle 9**

In the provision of education the processes of centralization and decentralization shall be reconciled organizationally(*sic*) and functionally.

**Principle 10**

The professional status of the teacher and lecturer shall be recognized.

**Principle 11**

Effective provision of education shall be based on continuing research.

(HSRC 1981:14-16.)

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