Service Delivery Protests and the struggle for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town.

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ABSTRACT

This study assesses the role of service delivery protests (SDPs) in promoting access to services such as water, electricity, and housing in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town. The study was conceptualised within the context of escalating frequency and scale of SDPs in South Africa. Although the first decade of democracy saw a decline in protests, some groups and movements protested. However, since 2005, when SDPs took national prominence, South Africa has experienced soaring levels of dramatic protests. This frequency of SDPs invites research. Why have SDPs (e.g., for housing, water, and electricity) increased despite the government promising a 'Better life for all' for nearly three decades, and how have they unfolded?

I investigate 3 specific research questions: (i) What are the reasons for participating in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha?, (ii) What are the repertoires of SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha and how have they been used to achieve urban development? and (iii) What is the character of SDPs' organisation in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha? The study presents a three-pronged argument but with more focus on the 3rd research question because while research on SDPs in South Africa is popular with researchers and students – with general consensus on the reasons for protests and the repertoires deployed in these protests – there are no agreements on how SDPs are organised. Scholars often describe SDPs as localised 'popcorn' contestations which flare up and immediately subside, lack an ideological driving force and coordination between and among protest action. While the characterisations of SDPs as popcorn are well-founded, my field research in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha unearthed layered characteristics of SDPs which include organisation, planning, consciousness-raising, and elements of longevity. These findings suggest that it is important not to characterise all SDPs as being the same: some SDPs last longer than others, have some organisational form, develop strategies and tactics that shape how repertoires of collective action are carried out, some act in spontaneous and organised ways etc. Indeed, my research findings show this to be the case in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, thus giving credence to my argument that some SDPs represent a hybrid of spontaneous and organised activity.

I employ three sub-theories of Social Movement Theory (SMT), namely, Resource Mobilisation Theory, Political Opportunity Structure approach, and Framing Processes Theory to assess the resources needed for mobilisation, the contexts which influence SDPs, the protesters' view of their world, and their reasons for protests. However, SMT is limited in explaining the modus operandi of 'unorganised' protests. As such, I also draw ideas from horizontalism, autonomous movements and spontaneity to illuminate the organised versus unorganised dichotomy. A lack of vertical leadership where decision-making revolves around a few can be misconstrued as spontaneous. I also draw on Gramscian analysis to analyse how organising, strategy, and consciousness-raising plays itself out in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

I used qualitative and quantitative methodologies but relied heavy on the former. I excavated rich information using in-depth and focus group interviews and solicited demographic and service delivery data using questionnaires in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Regarding Gugulethu, I conducted my Masters research in this area so I have a somewhat longitudinal data of SDPs.The findings show that SDPs seek to fast-track service delivery. While some protest tactics convey a message to the government, bystanders and other stakeholders, other tactics (e.g., land occupation and electricity reconnections) satisfy basic services needs. Many tactics require an important level of planning, organisation and consciousness. The intent of this thesis is not to contest the popcorn frame but to argue that although SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are not organised as social movement organisations, they are not fully popcorn protests. Rather, they occupy a middle ground – a hybrid (spontaneous-organised movement).

(610 words)

KEY WORDS

Service delivery protests

Popcorn

Spontaneous protests

Urban development

Social Movement Theory

Gugulethu

Khayelitsha

Cape Town

South Africa

DECLARATION

I declare that *Service Delivery Protests and the struggle for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Kenny Chiwarawara 27 October 2021

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my wife, Tariro Chiwarawara and our first-born child, Wenyasha uFavor Chiwarawara, my parents, siblings and their families. I love you all.

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Vertically, I thank God, the Father of my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ who through His Holy Spirit strengthened me to embark, persevere and finish this academic feat. Horizontally, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to countless people who contributed towards my academic life. This journey would not have been possible without God's grace and favor working through the concerted support of the following people.

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Azvichaperi ere zvechikora? Zvakaita ekudini? Mwari ngaazvipedze uchimbodzorora – weiti pfuu kuata hope - chinguri wakatanga zviya kuita chikora weichemera kuenda kucreche unemakore 5!

Mai, chazopera! Mwari wakazwa minamato yenyu yemwairamba mweiposhera! Ndinobonga yaemho!

When will it end? May God bring it to an end so that you can rest. You haven't rested since you started creche at 5 years!

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To God be the glory; great things He has done!

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AbM	Abahlali baseMjondolo
ANC	African National Congress
APF	Anti-Privatisation Forum
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
CCF	Concerned Citizens Forum
FPT	Framing Processes Theory
GAA	Group Areas Act
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution
HRC	Human Rights Commission
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
LPM	Landless People's Movement
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MSDF	Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework
MST	Brazilian Landless Movement
NHBRC	National Home Builders Registration Council
NSM	New Social Movement
OSM	Old Social Movements
OWS	Occupy Wall Street
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PRA	Population Registration Act
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RMT	Resource Mobilisation Theory
SAMWU	South African Municipal Workers Union
SDF	Spatial Development Framework
SDPs	Service Delivery Protests
SECC	Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee
SJC	Social Justice Coalition
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SMT	Social Movement Theory
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
WCAEC	Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign
WPTPS	White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This study assesses the use of Service Delivery Protests (SDPs) in the struggle for urban development in two low-income areas in Cape Town, namely, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. It underlines the importance of grassroots activism and argues that SDPs are used to achieve development in these communities. In this study, I regard contestations for service delivery, namely, housing, electricity, sanitation, and water – which aim to improve people's quality of life in impoverished and marginalised communities – as struggles for urban development.

This study is three-pronged: it speaks to three interconnected issues namely (i) the reasons people participate in protests, (ii) the repertoires activists employ in their struggles and how such repertoires are geared to achieve urban development, and (iii) the character of SDPs' organisation in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Of these three objectives, it is often 'how' these protests are organised that is questioned in the media and by some academics, and as such, I give greater attention to it. Yet because these objectives overlap and feed into each other, I study them together. As I will show, protesters fight for more and better services, employ an array of tactics from their bag of repertoires meant to get the government's attention and secure services, and engage in hybrid processes which help them push for urban development.

SDPs have become ubiquitous over the last decade or so, emerging and ebbing in SA's rural towns and metropolitan centres with regularity (Martin, 2021; Chikulo, 2016; Alexander, 2012). While the increasing number of spontaneous SDPs have become a feature of SA's grassroots collective action scene, they have also been critiqued for their seemingly ephemeral and unorganised nature. In fact, these so called 'unorganised' service delivery protests have often been pejoratively referred to as popcorn, spontaneous, and mushroom. Popcorn protests are regarded as localised, separate incidents of contestations which spontaneously erupt; tend to flare up and immediately fall back (Bond and Galvin, 2018; Bond, 2017; Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Bond, 2011). Patrick Bond (2011:118), who is credited for coining the popcorn term, argues that "seemingly ubiquitous 'service delivery protests' … have been called 'popcorn protests' because with the application of

intense heat, the leading grains explode into thin air." He suggests that because these protests lack an 'overarching political strategy', and pop up and quickly subside, they deserve "the curse-words 'popcorn protests' – as they run out of steam, or worse, get channelled by opportunists into a new round of xenophobic attacks" (Bond, 2012:np). Similarly, Ngwane (2010:np) describes the first wave of post-1994 protests as "the much ridiculed 'popcorn protests' that dotted the political scene for a short while." Most academic studies which focus on SDPs argue that the struggles for a wide array of grievances in low-income communities tend to be violent, nameless, without organisation, popcorn protests which come and go (Wasserman, Chuma and Bosch, 2018; Chikulo, 2016; Langa and Kiguwa, 2013; Bond, 2012). Similarly, popular media (television, radio and newspapers) habitually refer to these contestations as spontaneous protests which lack order and clear-cut grievances and demands (Zeurn, 2011). In these formulations, the ephemeral, popcorn nature of widespread spontaneous or unorganised service delivery protests are contrasted with those of organised protests.

Although both 'organised' and 'unorganised' protests promote more and better services, the contribution of 'unorganised' protests has largely been understudied. Given this, my study focuses on so-called 'unorganised' SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The intent of this thesis is not to refute the popcorn frame but to argue that there is need to unpack the characterisations of SDPs and what they do in specific localities. While there is a large measure of truth in characterising SDPs as popcorn protests, my empirical data in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha (in the case of Gugulethu, I conducted my Masters research in this area in 2013 and 2014 and my PhD in 2016 and 2017 so I have a longitudinal data of sorts to speak to these issues) show that characterising SDPs as popcorn, leaderless and unorganised formations which lack specific grievances and demands is not borne out in reality. The findings of this study show that SDPs have a level of organisation and strategy that has been poorly reported on in the popular media and under researched in academia. A nuanced rereading of the dynamics of protests particularly the reasons for protests, the repertoires they employ, and the organisation of these protests reveals a level of organisation that is different from the purely popcorn protest. Having excavated the lived experiences, knowledge and organisation of the marginalised voices in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, I uncovered layered characteristics of SDPs which include organisation, planning, consciousness-raising, and elements of longevity. The findings suggest that it is important to avoid

characterising all SDPs as being the same. Some SDPs change over time, last longer than others, have some organisational form, develop strategies and tactics that shape how repertoires of collective action are carried out, some act in spontaneous and organised ways etc. Indeed, my research findings show this to be the case in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This gives credence to my argument that some SDPs represent a hybrid of spontaneous and organised activity what I have called a spontaneous-organised movement.

The findings of the study fall under three broad objectives, namely (i) the reasons for protests – which I loosely define as service delivery protests (SDPs), (ii) the repertoires employed in SDPs – which I argue are tailored to achieve urban development and many require some level of planning and organisation prior to the protest event, and (iii) the character of SDPs organisation – which I contend involves processes, planning, deliberations which are uncharacteristic of 'popcorn' protests. This three-pronged argument is guided by a qualitative excavation of marginalised voices which allows me to give voice to my participants instead of voicing over their reasons, repertoires, and organisations. In other words, having unearthed local realities, I present these realities from participants' own contexts and point of views.

1.1.1. Conceptualisation of the Study

The study was conceptualised within the context of the escalating frequency and scale of dramatic service delivery protests in South Africa (Alexander et al., 2018; Chigwata, Donavan and Powell, 2017; Municipal IQ, 2017; 2014; Booysen, 2009; Allan and Heese, 2011). The protests have included boycotts, marches, submission of memoranda of grievances, mass community meetings, barricading roads, burning tyres, *toyi-toying*, street fights with the police, burning of municipal buildings and councillors' houses, and land occupations (Tshishonga, 2015; von Holdt et al., 2012; Alexander, 2010). In 2016, the University of Johannesburg's Social Change Unit released data which estimates that there were 67 750 police recorded protests between 1997 and 2013 (Runciman et al., 2016). The Civic Protest Barometer noted that the number of civic protests was 204 in 2009 and 176 in 2015 (Chigwata et al., 2017). Media reported service delivery protests in 2016 and 2017 were 377 and 375, respectively (Alexander et al., 2018). The most protest-prone municipalities in South Africa between 2012 and 2016 were Cape Town (17%), Johannesburg

(14%), eThekwini (8%), Tshwane (7%) and Ekurhuleni (4%) municipalities; non-metropolitan municipalities which recorded the most protests were the Breede Valley in the Western Cape and Madibeng in the North West province (Chigwata et al., 2017). These statistics show the extent of South Africa's protests, prompting Alexander (2012) to label South Africa as the protest capital of the world.

Mainstream media (newspapers, television and radio news) often refer to the rising tendency of SDPs becoming violent, although the accuracy of such reports is questionable. The mainstream media cover stories based on the size of the protest, the dramatic nature of protests, including novelty of tactics, geographical location (main towns are prioritised over local protests) and the presence of 'violence' in the protests (Zeurn, 2011; Koopman, 2004; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith, 1999). This selectivity imbued in media reporting affects the number and nature of protests that are reported. With respect to the number of the protests, it is probable that more protests go unreported. Equally, the resulting effect of media's selectivity on the nature of protests is that the public often views protests in a negative light. As Malcom X (n.d) has famously said "[t]he media's the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that's power. Because they control the minds of the masses." Similarly, Noam Chomsky (n.d) has said, "[h]e who controls the media controls the minds of the public." Indeed, the public usually views protesters as violent beings with no justifiable reasons who present a threat to stability and democracy (Gould, 2013; Zeurn, 2011; Pithouse, 2011). While mainstream media's hype with violence is understandable, given the desire to sell newsworthy stories, this is often misleading because 'peaceful' protests do not receive the same coverage as 'violent' protests. Crucially, the unbridled focus on 'violence' tends to conceal the justifiable grievances people protest for (Suffla, Seedat, and Karriem, 2010). I argue that commentators of protests should analyse the repertoires employed in protests within the contexts of the reasons people protest for rather than merely focus on the so-called 'violent' protests.

Even scholars have stressed the rising tendency of violence in protests (Chigwata, et al., 2017; Municipal IQ, 2014; Jain, 2010). For example, the Municipal IQ (2014) notes that since 2004, municipalities have been targets of violent protests in South Africa, with a 77% peak in 2012 and 67% lowest in 2011. The Civic Protest Barometer notes that since 2013, 90% of protests involved

some element of violence or intimidation from the authorities or protesters (where violence means protests where at least some of the participants engaged in activities that posed a threat and or harmed property or people) (Chigwata et al., 2017). Scholars have loosely defined violence to include the destruction of buildings or the blockage of roads, looting, intimidation, personal attack, and arson. This definition of violent protests is too broad; it fails to paint a correct picture of the 'violence' (Paret, 2015).

This study does not focus on 'violent' protests but on the *reasons* that residents engage in protests, the *repertoires* they employ in dramatising their protests and the degree of *organisation* in the protests. As such, I consider so-called violent protests in discussions around the diverse repertoires deployed in pushing for basic service delivery. As I will show, protest tactics should not be viewed in isolation, rather they must be seen in light of the reasons people protest for – which I argue pertain to more and better service delivery.

1.1.2. Defining Service Delivery Protests

Another point of contention relates to the characterisation of these protests as 'service delivery protests.' Some scholars have used the term 'community protest' instead of 'service delivery protest' arguing that the term 'service delivery protest' "tends to conceal the complexity of issues that communities raise, which often include criticism of South Africa's democracy" (Alexander, 2018:28). Others have found fault with the 'service delivery' characterisation, preferring instead to call it protests for 'public service' (Friedman, 2009). Likewise, in his article titled "The Service Delivery Myth", Pithouse (2011) launched a scathing attack on the term. Indeed, protests are complex and nuanced; contestations in communities often go beyond mere service delivery issues to include a demand for jobs, safety, a new kind of relations with the government, and other issues that affect communities. Labelling all protests in communities as service delivery is wrong but so is regarding the service delivery protests as a myth. There are, certainly, demands for the delivery of constitutionally sanctioned services. This does not mean activists are passive recipients as Pithouse (2011) puts it; rather, activists show that they will not passively accept the status quo in their communities. In this thesis, I use the term SDPs to provide focus to my study and emphasise the need for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Broad terms like 'community

protests' are vague and conceal the 'service-related' challenges that this study centres on. This stance finds support with the Municipal IQ, for example, which uses the phrase and maintains that:

> [T]he term "service delivery protest" if not always absolutely accurate is wholly adequate – it describes a protest which is galvanised by inadequate local services or tardy service delivery, the responsibility for which lies with a municipality. The term is also useful in that it makes clear that there are similar protests occurring across the country – to re-define such protests in different ways confuses the issue and draws attention away from the fact that this is a national phenomenon with some pressing causes (Allan and Heese, 2011:np).

A continual re-defining of the term confuses the issue. For example, in 2010 Alexander (2010) defined these protests as 'local political protests' or 'local protests', only to redefine the protests as 'community protests' in 2018 (Alexander et al., 2018). While characterisations of these protests as 'local protests' or 'community protests' are useful in capturing the diverse reasons for protests in communities, they are too broad and conceal the service delivery dimension that is distinct to low-income communities like Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Such categorisation confuses protests in impoverished/marginalised communities and other communities as both would carry the name 'community protests.' This does not mean impoverished communities are uniform, but it helps spotlight service delivery problems which feature prominently in low-income struggles. I define SDPs loosely to address any contestations relating to lack of access to and/or the poor quality of basic services such as housing, water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal as well as the cost and accessibility of services, the way services are delivered such as transparency, and anything that impinges on the delivery of basic services.

Some scholars embrace the 'service delivery' characterisation but question whether citizens protest because the service delivery is poor or because the government is in fact delivering so well. The government sometimes deploys this 'rising expectation' explanation to argue that protests occur because the government is delivering well (Zuma, 2014; Cronin, 2014). Former President Jacob Zuma (2014) vividly captured the essence of this stance in his State of the Nation Address:

> The dominant narrative in the case of the protests in South Africa has been to attribute them to alleged failures of government. However the protests are not simply the result of "failures" of government but also of the success in delivering basic services. When 95% of

> households have access to water, the 5% who still need to be provided for, feel they cannot wait a moment longer. Success is also the breeding ground of rising expectations.

The 'rising expectation' explanation finds support with the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) and the Municipal IQ; the latter is more critical of the explanation though (Duncan, 2016; SAIRR, 2012). The argument, as articulated by the CEO of the SAIRR, Frans Cronje, is that communities are protesting because the government has delivered so well in one section of the community and other communities protest to compel the government to equally dispense the same 'largesse' to them (Cronje, 2014). The SAIRR supports the rising expectation argument because it serves it politically, given its support of neoliberal policies (e.g., deregulating the economy and consolidating property rights) to the problems South Africa faces (Duncan, 2016; Cronje, 2014). This allows the SAIRR to argue that the government has raised people's expectations for services to be free and suggest that the government should privatise to lower impractical and unsustainable demands which it cannot match (Cronje, 2017; 2014; Duncan, 2016; SAIRR; 2015). Proponents of the rising expectation explanation are blind to the fact that the availability of services does not mean accessibility and affordability for everyone; also, a failure to maintain the infrastructures have led to service delivery disruptions (Duncan, 2016; Runciman, 2015; Mottiar, 2013; Dawson, 2010; Oldfield and Stokke, 2006). Suggesting that the 'service delivery protests' show the government's impressive service delivery record turns a bad story into a good one.

While the government's provision is commendable, and activists recognise the development in other parts of the country, it is quite a stretch to argue that rising expectation are driving the protests. I argue that at the heart of the problem are defensible service delivery problems which infringe on people's quality of life. Invoking the rising expectation argument only serves to further marginalise and trivialise poor people's lived experiences because it detracts attention from the inadequate, shoddy service delivery and other tendencies that compromise how services are delivered.

The question of protests related to service delivery in South Africa is not new. It is one of the most researched areas and is subject to many students' theses. In that light, this study provides a nuanced re-reading of the protest phenomenon, including the organisational character of SDPs in Gugulethu

and Khayelitsha, Cape Town. This study goes beyond reasons and repertoires of SDPs to consider the reasons activists choose certain repertoires. I argue that a relook at the activists' processes 'before,' 'during' and 'after' protests shows a level of organisation, analysis, and consciousness which does not fit the widely-held popcorn categorisation of SDPs. This does not mean SDPs do not include spontaneous actions from their bag of repertoires. Rather, activists' inclusion of spontaneous actions does not make them lack a level of organisation. After all, even established movements employ both 'organised' and 'spontaneous' actions in their fight for urban development. I argue that even though SDPs are not as organised as social movement organisations, they are not so unorganised as to call them spontaneous protests. Instead, these protests occupy a middle ground, a hybrid (spontaneous-organised movement) which marries some level of organisation and spontaneity in the fight for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town.

My argument finds support from a strand of literature which challenges the dominant popcorn categorisation of SDPs (Duncan, 2016; Runciman, 2016; 2011; Mottiar, 2013). However, most of the articles do not take spontaneity in SDPs as the main focus of their investigations and as such, they discuss the popcorn descriptor in passing. The exception here is Mottiar (2013:617) who in her article titled "From 'Popcorn' to 'Occupy': Protest in Durban, South Africa" directly addressed the popcorn description of these protests. Her study revealed that Occupy Umlazi was a clear break from 'popcorn' protests to a more 'sustained' feat. While her research is crucial, it focused on one occupation, Umlazi Occupy in Durban and as such, I consider whether the organisational forms present in the Occupy Umlazi are present in SDPs in two communities in Cape Town – Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

1.1.3. Locating Service Delivery Protests in unequal Cape Town

South Africa continues to show signs of a dual economy marked by one of the highest rates of inequality in the world (World Bank, 2021). The City of Cape Town, where my case study areas are located, has stark inequalities characterised by world class infrastructure and services in some areas, and poor infrastructure and limited access to basic services in the peripheral areas. The Western Cape government considers Cape Town to be a 'world city' due in part to the City's outward-focused service economy, tightly networked business hubs connected to other world cities

by high tech telecommunication and transportation systems and the development of world-class facilities to cater to a transnational elite (Wainwright, 2014; McDonald, 2008). Cape Town has state-of-the-art infrastructure owing to massive infrastructure upgrading. However, upgrading has not reduced socioeconomic inequality in world cities (Tiboris, 2016; Tyner, 2006; Sassen, 2002). While transnational elites enjoy state of the art services, poor people often endure inadequate and substandard services. Unsurprisingly, Cape Town is "one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world" (McDonald, 2008:42). Cape Town's disparities are still largely defined by pre-1994 arrangements; McDonald (2008:31) aptly captures this reality:

> The spatial legacy of apartheid has … meant that the city core, and virtually all of the upper-income housing in the city (situated in the city centre and along the mountain spine and coastline that run southward from the city centre), are separated from the vast, sprawling low-income townships on the Cape Flats by rail and road corridors, commercial and industrial space and/or parkland.

Post-1994, the privatisation of water and refuse collection has worsened socio-economic and spatial inequities. Exorbitant rentals in the city centres have pushed unemployed families and the working class to peripheral areas, leading to a new form of geographically peripheralised ghettoisation where poor households occupy Cape Town's periphery townships (Wainwright, 2014; Smith et al., 2001). That said, there were not many working-class communities in Cape Town's city centre owing to the apartheid policies which forcibly removed people of colour from District Six which is smack bang in the city centre and dumped them in the periphery. Put together, three centuries of colonialism, four decades of apartheid and Cape Town's neoliberal stance have created unparalleled forms of inequality (McDonald, 2008). Given these realities, Cape Town needs urban development because the urban poor who are concentrated in the peripheral areas experience poor, inadequate or non-existent services.

Inequality is not unique to Cape Town. Around the world, inequality has remained a persistent problem in urban areas; inequality can fuel social unrest (UN Habitat, 2020). In South Africa, poor, peripheral communities like Gugulethu and Khayelitsha have staged numerous dramatic SDPs to fight for urban development. These protests should be understood within their contexts. Sections of these communities are characterised by poor and inadequate housing, water and electricity disconnections, leaking sewage pipes, and air filled with stench from rubbish dumped in open

spaces due to inconsistent or non-existent refuse removal. In response, activists have employed several dramatic tactics from their bag of repertoires in the struggle for better services.

1.2. Rationale and significance of the study

South Africa has earned the descriptor, the protest capital of the world, due to the unparalleled frequency of protests in the country (Alexander, 2012). Protests have characterised the pre-1994 and post-1994 era. In the post-1994 era, 'organised' movements and so-called 'popcorn' protesters have staged numerous protests in the struggle to promote the quality of life. Post-94, social movements rose that challenged the ANC's policies especially after the government adopted a neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework. The government censured and expelled its members who publicly criticised its policy framework (von Holdt and Naidoo, 2019). These former members and other activists who felt the brunt of the policy shift banded together and formed new social movements. The new social movements included the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC) in Cape Town, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in Johannesburg, and the Concerned Citizens' Forum (CCF) in Durban which struggled for the provision of free basic services. Nationally, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) steered struggles pertaining to land and farm work, and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) fought for the provision of free anti-retroviral and other resources to people living with HIV/AIDS (Mottiar and Lodge, 2017; Friedman and Mottiar, 2005).

Due to a host of reasons, many of the new social movements declined or were defunct around 2004. Interestingly, around this time, so-called 'popcorn' service delivery protests erupted outside the new social movements which demanded similar things that the new social movements before them fought for. Such protests dotted the socio-political sphere since the 1990s though. However, from 2005 there was a steady increase of such protests. Indeed, scholars generally agree that dissatisfaction in service delivery prompted post-apartheid protests that rose to national prominence in 2005 (Alexander, 2010; Habib, 2010; Booysen, 2009; Pithouse, 2007). SDPs over housing, water, sanitation and electricity are expressions of feelings of betrayal (Hart, 2008). Protests have predominantly emanated from poor resourced areas including shack communities and formal communities which have backyard shacks (Alexander, 2010). In Khayelitsha, protests

declined when there was improvement in the perceptions of service delivery and conditions of life (Nleya, 2011). Well-to-do communities usually use the legal system/courts, but poor communities take to the streets to protest and make their voices heard (Tapscott, 2010; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). Although protests are usually concentrated in urban and metropolitan areas, semi-urban and rural towns have also been affected. Clearly, the extent of SDPs deserves attention.

Even though numerous studies have investigated SDPs, there is limited information on the organisation of service delivery protests in two of the protest hotspots in Cape Town, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This is important in a context where these SDPs have generally been regarded as popcorn which suddenly erupt and subside and lack proper planning, structure, and clear demands. Interestingly, even organised social movements strategically include spontaneous actions in their struggles. Should we categorise SDPs as 'popcorn' merely because they marry both spontaneous actions and organised actions? In other words, if SDPs deploy both spontaneous and organised actions from their arsenal of repertoires just like organised social movements do, though to different degrees, would the popcorn metaphor apply to them?

Classifying SDPs as popcorn which burst forth and rapidly subside and characterised by sporadic protests which lack strategy raises questions of their endurance and contribution. I argue that so-called 'spontaneous' or 'popcorn' protests have a certain degree of organisation, continuity and common belief which allows them to give shared meanings to protests. In that light, I ask whether 'popcorn' protests can be regarded a social movement. After all, social movements are diverse and usually take on dissimilar forms which often makes it difficult to define them. Social movements do not always have to be formal, organised institutions, rather, they constitute broad informal groups which pursue a shared goal or ideology in society (Zald and McCarthy, 2002). Given this, SDPs can be regarded as a form of a social movement.

Globally, social movements play a significant role in pressuring the government to deliver services (Bebbington, 2007; Perreault, 2006; Mitlin, 2006). Interestingly, social movements relate with the state differently depending on the need as aptly captured in an article titled "Together with the state, despite the state, against the state: Social movements as 'critical planning' agents" (de Souza, 2006). This means social movements sometimes (i) co-operate with the state, (ii) at other times

they carry out their activities without the blessing of the state, and (iii) sometimes they act against the state in its activities and endeavors. Similarly, SDPs relate with the state in the three different ways described above.

Social movements' diverse relationship with the government is premised on movement views that the state is the source and solution of exclusion, poverty and inequality (Bebbington, 2007). I analyse the ways in which activists in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha have worked with the state, despite the state and against the state to bring about better service delivery. The varied relationships protesters and the government forge in the processes 'before', 'during' and 'after' protests illuminate activists' demands, the diverse repertoires they deploy and the level of organisation or lack thereof in SDPs.

The findings from this study can help shape the government's view of protests and protesters. At times, government officials have argued that the high level of protests in South Africa are concocted by the 'Third Force' which seeks to undermine the democracy of South Africa. Pre-1994, ANC leaders used the term 'Third Force' to refer to a group of undercover apartheid forces who were, allegedly, behind a spate of violence in townships. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) later confirmed the group as a loose network of right-wing groups and security operatives (TRC, 2003). Post-1994, the ANC has redeployed the term to attribute protests to the interference by foreign intelligence agencies working in cahoots with White intellectuals and opposition parties (wa Azania, 2014; Butler, 2013; Pithouse, 2012). It is reported that SDPs of 2005 were scrutinised by the intelligence services (ISS, 2007). Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), an organised movement which fights for shack dwellers, has turned the original meaning of the 'Third Force' on its head and appropriated the term to give it a new meaning. AbM has defined the 'Third Force' as struggles by the organised poor (Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2006). S'bu Zikode, the Chairperson of the Abahlali baseMjondolo (Shack dwellers) movement has defined the 'Third Force' as the poor people's pain and suffering; the 'Second Force' as the poor people's betrayers and the 'First Force' as the anti-apartheid struggle. He adds that the 'Third Force' will end when the 'Fourth Force,' described as "land, housing, water, electricity, health care, education and work," comes (Zikode, 2006:np). If protests are for urban development (land, housing, water, and

electricity) and not acts by hooligans or influences by the 'Third Force' then this could lead to more negotiations and trust between government and communities.

Insights from this study can also lead to less suspicion and heavy handedness that the state sometimes uses in dealing with the protests. This might lead to an appreciation of the agency of communities in actively shaping the course of development between elections. After all, along with elections, protests have become a new form of engagement with the government (Booysen, 2007; Oldfield, 2002). Activists often decry the labeling of their activities as influences by foreign intelligence agencies, White intellectuals and oppositional parties. Such descriptions are an attack on poor people's agency as the assumption in the 'Third Force' is that the poor cannot organise on their own. Poor people can mount dramatic protest on their own to fight for basic services. If this is the case, the government should encourage and enhance poorer and more vulnerable sections of society's capacity in order to influence those that make policies and make them accountable (Kabeer, 2005). In this sense, protesters are necessary because they help hold the government to account and prove that they are one of the key urban development players which must be involved in planning, implementing, monitoring and the evaluating of development trajectories and projects. The findings from this study could help the local government that, in the main, SDPs are not meant to proffer criminal activities but to actively participate in bringing about urban development on Cape Town's periphery. The government can learn from this study that protesters are not against the political parties per se but are against a lack of development in their communities. Such a view might help mend the acrimonious relationship between municipalities and the communities.

Further, there is limited scholarly work on SDPs in Gugulethu as researchers usually concentrate on Khayelitsha – one of the protest hotspots in South Africa in general and the Western Cape in particular. This study builds on my Masters thesis research which investigated the role of networks in initiating and maintaining SDPs in Gugulethu (Chiwarawara, 2014). While community protests are usually considered to be spontaneous with loosely organised activists, my study found that in Gugulethu, residents were fairly organised and met regularly. The study found that activists with anti-apartheid activism experience played a key role in mobilisation.

In the present study, I research both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The study has uncovered rich data on SDPs' gains in Gugulethu, an older township, and Khayelitsha, a newer township with a record number of protests. The study explains how SDPs in both case study areas seek to promote service delivery/urban development. This three-pronged study explains (i) 'why' residents engage in protest, (ii) 'how' they go about the protest, including 'why' they choose the repertoires they deploy and (iii) 'how' they organise themselves to push for urban development.

1.3. Problem Statement

The advent of democracy brought new hopes of progress. However, such prospects have not been adequately met, resulting in what are called post-apartheid service delivery protests (Booysen, 2007). Since then, there has been an increase in protests activity in South Africa, prompting some scholars to regard South Africa as the protest capital of the world (Alexander, 2012). Academic researchers and students have often focused on the reasons behind the continuance of service delivery protests. Research shows that protests against lack of housing, sanitation, water, electricity and infrastructure are usually catalysed by lack or poor response from local authorities, problems with billing of services, high crime rates and lack of business and employment opportunities (Mottiar and Bond, 2012). While research confirms the causes of these protests, less attention has been placed on how so-called spontaneous service delivery protests are organised in the fight for urban development. This calls for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of protests to determine whether labeling such as popcorn protests is correct. To fully understand the dynamics of the protests, I consider the reasons residents get involved in the protests, the ways in which they dramatise their protests and the organisational processes they engage in prior to a protest event. These will be the focus of the current study.

1.4. Aim of the Study

To assess how SDPs are used to achieve urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

1.5. Research Objectives

To explain the reasons for participating in service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

To assess the repertoires used in service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha with a view of understanding how they are tailored to achieve urban development.

To explain the character of service delivery protests' organisation in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

1.6. Research Questions

What are the reasons for participating in service delivery protests Gugulethu and Khayelitsha?

What are the repertoires of service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha and how have they been used to achieve urban development?

How are Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protests organised?

1.7. Research Methodology

This inquiry's research questions necessitated a mixed methods study which involved a blend of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. That said, I placed a heavy reliance on qualitative methodology because the primary concern was on the 'depth' of understanding rather than the 'breath' thereof (Blaxter, 2001). The qualitative research enabled participants to give subjective responses and provided me with a deeper understanding of people's experiences (Silverman, 2010). The qualitative analysis helped me to excavate the dynamics and nuances of protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This helped me to better appreciate the reasons residents participate in protests, the repertoires they employ in the protests and the organisational character of the so-called popcorn SDPs in the two research sites. The purpose of the statistical analysis was not to

generalise the findings. Instead, I administered questionnaires to solicit information on basic demographic and service delivery data to complement the qualitative data.

I collected data from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data involved in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires and secondary data involved reviewing documents and studies on service delivery protest. The triangulation of different data sources helped capture a rich contextual picture of protests. Such triangulation helped boost my confidence in the results; basic geometry suggests that several viewpoints of an object provide greater accuracy (Jick, 1979).

The study used the intrinsic case study approach to focus on service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The demarcation narrowed my inquiry to boundaries of place (Gugulethu and Khayelitsha), activity (protests) and definition (service delivery protests). I strictly adhered to laid out research ethics in order to avoid harming my participants before, during and after the research. Notwithstanding the challenges I faced in the field, I adapted and worked around the challenges. I provide a detailed description of the methodology and methods in chapter 5.

1.8. Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 has provided the reader with the context of service delivery protests in South Africa within which this study was conceptualised. The study was conceptualised within the context of escalating frequency and scale of SDPs in South Africa. In this chapter, I described the research problem, aim and objectives of the study. I introduced the popcorn description that characterise SDPs and argued that such a phrase is a misnomer. I argued for a nuanced re-reading of the protest phenomenon in order to excavate the dynamics of SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Chapter 2 provides a brief context of the legal frameworks, inequality in South Africa, Cape Town and underdevelopment in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. I argue that despite impressive legal frameworks, South Africa and Cape Town are characterised by high rates of inequality, hypersegregation and class-based segregation with huge investments in formerly 'White' areas and meagre development in formerly 'Black' designated areas. The chapter discusses the state of

service delivery in poor parts of Cape Town and highlights the need for urban development in peripheral areas. Basically, chapter 2 paints a picture of the contexts within which protests emerge.

Chapter 3 presents a review of literatures. The review focuses on the reasons for protests, the repertoires of protests and the ways the protests are organised. I begin by discussing protests for urban development around the world, what they fought (or fight) for and how they dramatise their protests and the ways in which they come together to mount the protests. I also show that some protests which are often considered spontaneous have merely adopted horizontal ways of organisation as exemplified in autonomous movements. Following this discussion, I zero in on SDPs in South Africa. I trace the history of protests in South Africa and underline debates around the often dichotomised 'organised' and 'unorganised' struggles for urban development. I show that both 'organised' and so-called 'unorganised' protests fight for the same things (basic services/urban development) and deploy somewhat similar repertoires to express their grievances. The chapter also briefly considers some of the service delivery protests that have occurred in the case study areas – Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Generally, there is general consensus among scholars on (i) the reasons people fight for and (ii) the repertoires people deploy. There is, however, contestation on (iii) how people organise themselves in these protests; this is the gap the thesis seeks to fill. I note that social movement scholarship has placed too much focus on 'organised' protests and paid little attention to the so-called 'unorganised' protests. I call for a rethink of the oft-held spontaneity narratives that characterise some protests. I show that often, underneath what is regarded as spontaneous protests 'globally' and 'nationally' has a level of organisation that is unapparent to everyone. A close examination of the so-called 'spontaneous protests' shows that these protests are often steered underground by seasoned activists. Also, 'popcorn protests' have vestiges of formal organisations somewhat similar to the way formal movements deploy spontaneous action to their advantage. Overall, I show that although so-called spontaneous protests may not have a name, they have demands which are often similar to those of 'organised' movements and have a degree of planning which does not wholly fit the popcorn descriptor.

Chapter 4 provides the conceptual framework that serves as a base for the research. I first discuss the Social Movement Theory's 3 inter-related approaches namely the Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) and Framing Processes Theory (FPT). I complement the RMT, POS and FPT by drawing on the theory and practice of horizontalism, autonomous movements and spontaneity to better understand the so-called popcorn service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. I use these ideas to argue that a lack of vertical leadership where decision-making revolves around a select few can be easily misconstrued as spontaneous actions. Understanding this helps in analysing the unorthodox ways of organising that Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists engage in which I argue do not warrant the 'popcorn' descriptor. I also draw on a Gramscian analysis to understand notions of power, strategy, and consciousness. Crucially, the chapter captures the three interrelated objectives by considering the ways in which activists frame their demands for urban development, the repertoires they employ in their contestations and the processes they engage which help them mount dramatic protests.

Chapter 5 presents the research design and methodology employed in the study. I trace the processes I engaged in 'before', 'during' and 'after' my excavation of rich data in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. I report that I only went to the field after receiving permission from the University of the Western Cape's Ethics Committee. After securing the permission, I engaged in in-depth and focus group discussions in order to unearth the reasons, feelings, thoughts, rationale behind the protests and choice of repertoires. I complemented the qualitative data with basic quantitative analysis in order to comprehend the basic demographic and service delivery realities of the protesters. The chapter underlines the reasons for the choice of the research methods, highlighting the importance of between and within methods of triangulation. Having described the sampling, data presentation and analysis, I end the chapter with ethical considerations that guided the study 'during' and 'after' the research, and challenges I encountered in the research and the ways I navigated the obstacles in the quest for truth.

Chapter 6 presents results, analysis, and discussions of the research findings. I consider the results in light of the 3 inter-related approaches of the Social Movement Theory and ideas from horizontalism, autonomous movements and the logic of spontaneity. I also compare and contrast the findings with other scholarly literature. To provide a logical flow to the discussion, the chapter

is organised into four inter-related sections. The first section provides context to the discussion by introducing the protesters. I drew on both qualitative and quantitative data to introduce the activists. Having laid this foundation, each of the 3 remaining sections answers a research question which deals with the (i) reasons for SDPs (ii) repertoires deployed in SDPs and (iii) organisation of SDPs. Due to the symbiotic relationship between the research questions, some ideas permeate the 3 sections. The overarching findings reveal a fusion of organisation and spontaneity in the struggle for urban development. Contrary to the oft-held popcorn protests, people take time to think about the reasons for the protests; the reasons they protest determine the kinds of repertoires they utilise and the kinds of organisation, flexibility, and improvisation necessary to bring about urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Chapter 7 concludes the study by offering a comprehensive summary of the study. The chapter looks back at the journey I strode starting with the context that necessitated the study, the aims and objectives of the thesis, the background of the study, the gaps I found in the literature and sort to fill, the theory I utilised, the ways I gathered data and the findings that emerged from my excavation. This synopsis underlines my deliberate efforts to triangulate different data sources to enrich the insights of the study. Next, I provide a summary of the key findings in relation to each of the three research questions. Finally, I close the discussion with a brief consideration of the implications the findings have on literature, theory, research, policy and practice.

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides a context of the socio-economic inequalities in South Africa, Cape Town, as well as Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. To do this, I first discuss the legislative framework which dictates 'what' and 'how' public services should be delivered by the government. I briefly discuss the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service (the Batho Pele White Paper) and the Integrated Development Plan. The three pieces of legislation I discuss aim to transform the public service by encouraging values for example community participation and transparency in decision making, fairness, treating citizens as customers thereby putting them first in service delivery.

Yet despite these impressive principles, the government has faced challenges in delivering services. I argue that the presence of good policies does not guarantee good and efficient service delivery; what guarantees good service delivery is the proper implementation coupled with rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the policies. Additionally, although the City of Cape Town has an impressive vision for the City, the reality on the ground shows a divided city, one with excellent service delivery and infrastructure in some parts of the city and appalling services in low-income communities. I show that the history of racial segregation and current class-based segregation and hyper-segregation have resulted in unequal service provision in Cape Town. I contrast the service delivery realities in the greater Cape Town with that in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha to show that there are two Cape Towns – one which is well serviced and rich and another which is poorly serviced and requires urban development. The chapter paints a picture of the context within which service delivery protests occur in the two case studies and underlines the need for urban development in peripheral areas.

2.2. Legislative Framework

2.2.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

In South Africa, the Constitution was enacted in 1996 as the supreme law of the country. The Preamble of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996) captures the heart and soul of what the Constitution seeks to achieve. The Preamble acknowledges the injustices and divisions of the past and seeks, through the Constitution, to heal from them. The aim is to create a society that is founded on democratic values, and which upholds basic human rights and social justice. The preamble affirms the need to establish a society in which the government does the will of the people and improves all citizens' quality of life.

The Constitution of South Africa stresses citizens' rights to basic services such as housing, water, food, health care, social security, education and information in an equitable manner; this is aptly stated in Sections 26 and 27 of the Act. The Constitution of South Africa and international human rights instruments recognise adequate housing as an important basic human right (South African Human Right Commission, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 1948). The right to adequate housing is crucial because it is intricately linked to other rights and services such as water, sanitation and electricity. The peculiar history of apartheid in South Africa which subjected many Black people to inhuman living conditions makes the rights to housing as spelt out in Section 26 of the Constitution crucial:

1. Everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing.
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
3. No one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.

Additionally, Section 195 (clauses d and e) state that "services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias" and that "people's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making." Further, clause 32.1 states that it is the duty of the government to avail information to citizens on services they are supposed to be receiving.

To establish values of democracy, Section 17 emphatically states that "everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions" if they believe their rights are being violated or their needs are not met (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996). Below I highlight two court judgments that have upheld the right to protest.

In a landmark ruling, Acting Judge Petse wrote in the Western Cape High Court in Mlungwana v The State (2018:30) that:

> People who lack political and economic power have only protests as a tool to communicate their legitimate concerns. To take away that tool would undermine the promise in the Constitution's preamble that South Africa belongs to *all* who live in it, and not only a powerful elite. It would also frustrate a stanchion of our democracy: public participation.

Acting Judge Petse's ruling was in line with the Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng's judgment in the Garvas case (SATAWU v Garvas, 2012) where he stressed the right to demonstrate especially for the vulnerable and powerless in society:

> The right to freedom of assembly is central to our constitutional democracy. It exists primarily to give a voice to the powerless. This includes groups that do not have political or economic power, and other vulnerable persons. It provides an outlet for their frustrations. This right will, in many cases, be the only mechanism available to them to express their legitimate concerns. Indeed, it is one of the principal means by which ordinary people can meaningfully contribute to the constitutional objective of advancing human right and freedoms. This is only too evident from the brutal denial of this right and all the consequences flowing therefrom under apartheid. In assessing the nature and importance of the right, we cannot therefore ignore its foundational relevance to the exercise and achievement of all other rights.

Importantly, Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng stressed the importance of 'spontaneous' and 'organised' protest in the Garvas case (SATAWU v Garvas, 2012). He noted that the apartheid state enacted several pieces of legislation to strictly regulate and ban protests. Notwithstanding, the excluded Black people of South Africa continued to mount both organised and spontaneous protests. The chief justice stated that protests were one of the ways the marginalised majority aspired and struggled for in a future participatory democracy.

The excerpts above show the determination to provide a platform for the poor, vulnerable and voiceless to participate in South Africa's democracy. The Constitution and the subsequent court rulings are informed by the harsh realities of the apartheid policies which prevented other racial groups from meaningfully participating in decision making. Another piece of legislation which emphasises transforming the public service is the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service.

2.2.2. The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (the Batho Pele White Paper)

The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) came into force in 1995. The WPTS emphasises transforming the public service; it seeks to addresses issues that were identified as lacking, namely, administrative capacity, notably management, transparency, accountability, efficient service delivery attributed in part to officials' lack of motivation, and salaries that are not market-related (WPTPS, 1995). The WPTPS identifies eight transformation priorities, which include transforming service delivery. The Paper identified improving service delivery as its ultimate goal. The White Paper focuses on 'how' services are provided not merely the quantity, quality and level. Decisions on 'what' services would be delivered are based on the *Batho Pele* approach.

The *Batho Pele* Paper emphasises a people-centred public service. *Batho Pele* is a Sotho word for 'people first.' The Paper seeks to (i) put people first and (ii) view recipients of services as customers. This policy framework consists of service delivery principles that are regarded as an appropriate approach to addressing service delivery challenges. The principles: frequent consultation with customers, setting and communicating service standards, customers to be treated with a high level of courtesy and consideration; providing accurate and up-to-date information about services, enhancing openness and transparency about services; increasing access to services, giving the best possible value for money and remedying failures and mistakes (WPTPS: The *Batho Pele* White Paper, 1997).

The White Paper (RSA, 1998) advances several reasons for integrated development planning in South Africa. The Municipal Act, 32 of 2000, Sections 29 (1) and 42 clearly stipulate that local

residents must be actively involved in drafting the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Performance Management System. Also, the IDP aims to achieve the Constitutional obligation of improving South Africans' quality of life.

2.2.3. The Integrated Development Plan (IDP)

Upon entering its elected term of office (which spans 5 years), each municipality must develop and implement an IDP (Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000). An IDP is a statutory requirement of the Municipal Systems Acts and serves as the key planning instrument for local governments in South Africa. The IDP is an umbrella plan that guides municipalities' budgeting and decision-making processes aimed at improving the quality of life. In addition to the IDP, municipalities prepare a Spatial Development Framework (SDF) which serves as its policy to inform and guide land related development issues for example, township establishment and rezoning (Gueli, van Huyssteen and Liebenberg, 2007). Municipalities utilise IDPs and SDFs to encourage the participation of communities in deciding what they want.

The IDP was launched after 1994 to, among other things, provide service delivery planning, provide infrastructure, promote socio-economic development as well as long-term sustainability. Three key principles guide the IDP process (Cape Town, 2017; Minnaar, 2010). First, the approach emphasises the consultative process, where appropriate fora are put in place to allow local residents, government representatives, civil society, NGOs, external sector specialists deliberate on service delivery problems, priority needs, draft a common vision, develop project proposals, evaluate, align, and authorise an IDP plan. Second, the approach stresses a strategic process where knowledge by local residents is joined with technical expert knowledge, service delivery obstacles are overcome by consensus building within specified time frames, underlying causes and symptoms of service delivery problems are dealt with, scarce resources are used efficiently and effectively and IDPs are planned, budgeted for in connection with other sectors. Third, the implementation-orientated process seeks to be an instrument that ensures faster and better service delivery by designing technically-sound, planning and budget are developed mindful of the feasibility and that enough consensus is sought among key stakeholders on the planned projects.

Despite their laudable aims, IDPs have not fully realised their objectives due to weak strategic content particularly vague objectives, blurred lines of responsibility between local government and the central government (Urban Sustainable Exchange, 2021). This is compounded by lack of support from high-tier government especially when different political parties run different spheres of government (local, provincial and national). Additionally, IDPs failed when public support was ignored or minimal and in cases where consultation was more of a rubber-stamping exercise.

2.3. Introducing Cape Town: A divided city

The City of Cape Town's vision is to: (i) "be an opportunity city that creates an enabling environment for economic growth and job creation, and to provide assistance to those who need it most;" (ii) "deliver quality services to all residents;" and (iii) "serve the citizens of Cape Town as a well-governed and corruption-free administration" (CoCT, 2017:4). In order to achieve its vision, the City of Cape Town's mission is to (i) "contribute actively to the development of its environment, human and social capital;" (ii) "offer high-quality services to all who live in, do business in or visit Cape Town;" and (iii) "be known for its efficient, effective and caring government" (CoCT, 2017:4). The City of Cape Town's vision and mission should be understood in the context of urban areas. According to the South African Cities Network (SACN) (2006:2):

> Urban areas are the keys to a country's success in the global marketplace … [however] cities can be problematic: they have the capacity to exclude, to marginalise, to reinforce patterns of inequality, and to create insiders and outsiders.

Given that urban areas have a capacity to exclude, marginalise and reinforce inequality, I consider whether Cape Town is realising its vision and mission. To do this, I briefly discuss how the history of segregation, class-based segregation and hypersegregation continue to deepen patterns of inequality in Cape Town. Following this I consider service delivery in the greater Cape Town, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Cape Town, the oldest city in South Africa, was established by the Dutch East India Company in 1652 to serve as a trading post. It has beautiful scenery, and one of the 7 world wonders, Table Mountain, makes it a popular tourist destination. The 2004 British Telegraph Travel Awards voted Cape Town the "best foreign city in the world." At the same time, Cape Town has sprawling informal settlements, poverty, and high levels of inequality (SACN, 2006). In 1999, the

government established the Cape Town Partnership (CTP) to regenerate the city's central space and promote it as a suitable city for global investment, business, leisure and entertainment. One of CTP's key projects, the Central City Improvement District (CCID), was established in 2000. Since CCID's establishment, Cape Town's central district has been significantly transformed and upgraded, which has led businesses to return to the city centre (Lemanski, 2007). In the late-1990s, businesses fled the city's central places which had high crime levels, vagrants and street-hawkers (Dewar, 2004; Nahnsen, 2003).

In 2000, the government established Cape Town as a single 'unicity' which saw the amalgamation of seven metropolitan areas namely City of Cape Town, City of Tygerberg, Blaauwberg Municipality, Helderberg Municipality, South Peninsula Municipality, Oostenberg Municipality and the Cape Metropolitan Council. This transformation aimed at redistributing resources and taxes throughout the metropolitan area and avoid enclaves of resources and wealth; it had an interesting slogan, 'one city one tax base.' In the 1980s, anti-apartheid civics demanded 'one city, one tax base' to enable equal distribution of resources in an urban space (Swilling, Humphries and Shubane, 1991). Levies which residents add are directed exclusively to the development of their residential areas. Lemanski (2007:455) argues that "[a]lthough entirely justifiable that residents' top-up levies are channelled exclusively into their residential area (while their 'normal' tax remains part of the wider 'one city' redistribution system), the potential consequences for spatial polarisation and exclusivity are very real." Additionally, pouring extra proceeds from investment into developing an upmarket core with a global competitive edge which occupies less than one percent of Cape Town and caters for a tiny segment of the population and rather than channel this money to the townships languishing in poverty on the city's periphery defeats the purpose of the redistribution goal (Lemanski, 2007). Even the investments done outside the CBD are clustered in former White areas such as Century City, Cape Gate, and Tygervalley in the northern suburbs while the Westlake development and Claremont redevelopment are in the southern suburbs, areas that benefited immensely from apartheid's skewed resource distribution agenda (Watson, 2003). In other words, such investments have focused on already affluent areas and neglected impoverished Black African and Coloured spaces.

In 2003, Cape Town's CBD was designated as an Urban Development Zone (UDZ) with the introduction of generous tax incentives meant to encourage private sector property renovation and

construction (Amirtahmasebi et al., 2016). This development resulted in stiff competition for both residential and commercial space in the CBD and an increase in retail rental costs by 350% (Property Magazine, 2005). Consequently, there is over-investment in one centrally located formerly White area and a neglect of the rest of the largely Black areas of the city and increasing polarisation between wealthy professionals and poor urbanites; these two augment apartheid legacies and make Cape Town a divided city (Lemanski, 2007).

Indeed, Cape Town is a "starkly polarised city" with affluent suburbs at the core of the city and in economic centres and overcrowded poverty-stricken settlements at the fringes of the city (Turok, 2001). Cape Town is "one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world" (McDonald, 2008:42). In fact:

> The spatial legacy of apartheid has … meant that the city core, and virtually all of the upper-income housing in the city (situated in the city centre and along the mountain spine and coastline that run southward from the city centre), are separated from the vast, sprawling low-income townships on the Cape Flats by rail and road corridors, commercial and industrial space and/or parkland (McDonald, 2008:31).

This polarisation is not unique to South Africa. As in the divided cities in the USA and Latin America, Cape Town is divided between the middle-classes that are concentrated in beautiful and heavily protected areas of residence, work and leisure while poor Black urbanites are crammed in formal and informal neighbourhoods where services are inadequate and violent crimes are high (Lemanski, 2006). In South Africa, the state has tried to develop the Black African townships such as when in 1996, the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) attempted to create an economic node in Philippi, Cape Town, aimed at linking pre-existing economic nodes in both southern and northern suburbs; business owners and investors were wary to access such townships leading to continued deterioration and lack of development (Turok, 2001). Although there are some investments such as Khayelitsha Retail Centre and Vangate Mall in Athlone, these are "negligible compared to the proliferation of upmarket business, commercial and residential development in Cape Town's northern and central-southern areas" (Lemanski, 2007: 456). This is not to say the state should not seek ways to attract investment but proceeds from such ventures should not only profit the CBD and the formerly White areas but should be spread to the rest of Cape Town where unemployment, poverty and crime in Black communities are high.

2.3.1. History of Segregation in Cape Town

Three centuries of colonialism, four decades of apartheid and Cape Town's neoliberal stance have created unparalleled forms of inequality (McDonald, 2008). In 1950, South Africa passed the Population Registration Act (PRA) which grouped people into three racial types (Posel, 2001). This was meant to ensure that distinct racial groups lived, worked and played separately. Informed by the PRA, the Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950 aimed to segment cities and towns into racially exclusive suburbs and thereby eliminate racial residential mixing (Parry and van Eeden, 2015). Indeed, by 1991, towns were 'hypersegregated' – a condition where there was high racial residential segregation (Christopher, 2001).

After the fall of apartheid, the government has sought to redress social imbalances entrenched by the apartheid regime. For example, in 1997 the Department of Housing developed the Urban Development Framework which envisions urban settlements which are "spatially and socio-economically integrated, free of racial and gender discrimination and segregation" (Republic of South Africa, 1997:7). Parry and van Eeden (2015:31) measured racial residential segregation in Cape Town and Johannesburg using censuses of 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2011 to determine how residential segregation has changed over time. Although they found that "from 1991 to 2011, segregation levels decreased at all geographic scales in both cities" they also noted that "both cities remain highly segregated" (Parry and van Eeden, 2015:31).

Racial residential segregation can be defined as "the separation of racial groups in urban space" (Boustan, 2012:319), and can also be defined as "the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another, in different parts of the urban environment" (Massey and Denton, 1988:282). Segregation, especially for non-whites, hampers and reduces access to services and employment opportunities (Donaldson and Kotze, 2006). In fact, non-whites who reside in highly segregated communities generally earn lower incomes and have lower educational qualifications compared to non-whites who live in more integrated neighbourhoods (Boustan, 2012). Unsurprisingly, urban geographers usually regard segregation as the main cause of political, economic, institutional and social exclusion.

Drawing from several literatures on segregation in South Africa, Donaldson and Kotze (2006) concluded that not a lot of integration has taken place since the collapse of apartheid. However, five factors that are likely at the heart of the slow pace of residential integration are: (i) the majority of population – particularly Blacks – have major economic barriers and lack resources to relocate from the places they currently reside, (ii) integration efforts have been frustrated by Whites who relocate from integrating neighbourhoods, (iii) conservative Whites in small towns have managed to derail integration in their neighbourhoods, (iv) Black townships continue to have high segregation levels because other races choose not to live there, and (v) gated neighbourhoods and estates contribute towards segregation (Irvine, 2012). In fact, Christopher (2005:2305) argues that "[t]he post-*apartheid* city continues to look remarkably like its predecessor, the *apartheid* city" (emphasis in the original).

As cities restructure to compete globally, they produce and strengthen social and spatial segregation (Sassen, 2018). In the city of Los Angeles, USA, expansion has engendered a dual city in which highly developed areas do not intersect with underdeveloped and neglected areas used by the urban poor (Davis, 2006). Cities which seek to be key global players often do whatever it takes to attract investment even if it means other aspects of the city's problems are neglected. To show global strength, cities often invest in core already-affluent areas to encourage investment from internal and external elites, however such investments often deepen segregation. Given the scarcity of resources, investing in already affluent areas happens at the expense of impoverished areas, which deepens poverty and separates the attractive core spaces and the unattractive peripheral areas (Lemanski, 2007). Even pro-poor strategies that South African cities seek to promote are inhibited by efforts meant to achieve global competitiveness.

South Africa has glaring inequalities prompting former President Thabo Mbeki to describe it as 'two nations' – where one is wealthy and one poor. Although Mbeki's idea has been criticised as simplistic, "South Africa's cities strongly demonstrate this dichotomy between the first world and third world, where people and spaces from two worlds are juxtapositioned in close proximity, and many inner-city spaces have shifted back and forth between the two worlds" (Lemanski, 2007:451). Also, South Africa's legacy of apartheid serves as the spatial and social infrastructure

of division and inequality (Saul and Bond, 2014; McDonald, 2008). Class-based segregation has replaced racial segregation.

2.3.2. Class-based segregation and hypersegregation

South Africa is also associated with hypersegregation where poor communities become more and more economically homogenous owing to outmigration of residents who can afford to live in better places which leads to more racially homogenous poor neighbourhoods made up of those who do not have the means to leave these communities (Massey and Denton, 1993). Similarly, Geyer and Mohammed (2016) argue that wealthy neighbourhoods become economically homogenous and racially heterogeneous owing to selective in-migration of well-to-do residents from poor neighbourhoods. While it is true that in post-94 South Africa anyone who affords can stay in areas they so wish, thereby creating the racial heterogeneity, such heterogeneity should not be overemphasised because few people from different races have managed to be economically secure post-1994. Geyer and Mohammed (2016: 36) offer a helpful distinction between hypersegregation and class-based segregation:

> Hypersegregation is characterised as poor neighbourhoods that experience both class-based segregation, being differentiated on the basis of income, racial segregation, being differentiated on the basis of race, and spatial segregation through the increasing spatial concentration of poverty. Class-based segregation, on the other hand, experiences economic homogeneity, racial heterogeneity and spatial segregation … from impoverished areas.

To determine whether hypersegregation and class-based segregation exist, Geyer and Mohammed's (2016) study identified neighbourhoods with conditions which fit the aforementioned segregation between 2001 and 2011 in the Cape Town municipal area. They found that hypersegregation and class-based segregation exist in different communities. Indeed, a significant number of South Africans stay in highly impoverished communities which are racially homogenous (Beavon, 2004). Despite city-wide efforts for racial desegregation and an increase in previously disadvantaged middle class' economic and spatial mobility, there is now a growing new underclass which is increasingly racially distinct, economically deprived and spatially concentrated and segregated from the rest of Cape Town (Geyer and Mohammed, 2016).

Importantly, their study found that although racial segregation in Cape Town is lower than it was in the pre-1994 period, compared to international rates, it is still highly segregated.

Gentrification has cemented the shift from race-based segregation to class-based segregation (Beavon, 2005; Visser, 2002). Urban poverty is largely concentrated in former townships. Certain factors continue to marginalise residents; these include unaffordable municipal services, poor housing provision and the unfavourable location of townships (Rogerson, 1999). Segregation is not merely spatial, it is also evident in income and public service provision levels (Beavon, 2005; Aliber, 2003; Rogerson, 1999). Hypersegregation and class-based segregation do not ensue from an intentional process to marginalise certain people but it is "an indirect externality of filtering process and locational obsolescence" (Geyer and Mohammed, 2016:39). Evidently, South Africa's post-apartheid restructuring of cities has resulted in "a remanifestation of the divided city, though not as overtly racial, but rather class-based" (Geyer and Mohammed, 2016:41). Although South Africa's hypersegregation and class-based segregation is economic, not racial, the processes discussed above have led to "the formation of a sociospatially fragmented city that is as segregated and exclusive as during the apartheid era" (Geyer and Mohammed, 2016:37). Thus, hypersegregation, involving indirect racial and economic segregation of poor communities resultant from selective outward migration is taking place in Cape Town. Two of the communities where this hypersegregation is evident is in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Below I compare service provision in the greater Cape Town with service delivery in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

2.3.3. Unequal service delivery in Cape Town, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha

Governments have the responsibility to provide basic services to their citizens and such services are to be provided "at the highest level of responsiveness and efficiency" (Johnson, 2004:77). Globally, the UN General Assembly established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000. All 191 UN Member States, and 22 international organisations supported the global effort to achieve the eight international development goals. Goal number 1 which aimed to "eradicate extreme poverty and hunger" speaks to my research topic. MDG interventions sought to halve the proportion of people without access to portable water by 2015, to halve the proportion of persons without adequate sanitation by 2015, increase access to water and sanitation to all peoples, and provide regulated piped water supply in house and sewage connection with partial sewerage for

everyone (World Bank, 2015). The MDGs came to an end in 2015 and were succeeded by the Sustainable Development Goals.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) were adopted by all UN Member States in 2015 and should be achieved by 2030. The SDGs are 17 closely related goals which serve as the "blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all" (United Nations, 2017). Five of the seventeen SDGs directly speak to service delivery related needs. The relevant goals are goal 1 (end poverty in all its forms everywhere), goal 6 (ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all), goal 7 (ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all), goal 10 (reduce inequality within and among countries), goal 11 (make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable).

Nationally, since 1994 South Africa has put in place legal frameworks aimed at improving the lives of its people. The South African government, like other governments around the world, struggles to provide services efficiently and effectively. Indeed, "delivery troubles are not unique to South Africa. They occur worldwide, in both business and the public sector" (Manning, 2006:23). One of the factors that hinders the smooth provision of services is population growth. According to Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) (2012), the 2011 census showed that South Africa's population had increased by 46% (11. 2 million) since the 1996 census. The statistics also show that Western Cape's overall population increased by 1.9 million since census 1996; it increased from 3 956 875 to 5 822 734 and that of Cape Town alone increased by 29% (StatsSA, 2011). In South Africa, Black Africans are the largest group but Cape Town is predominantly Coloured (42%), followed by Black Africans (39%), Whites (15.7%), other groups (1.9%) and then Asians (1.4%) (StatsSA, 2011). The census statistics also show that generally, these different populations are still living in formerly designated areas that were based on race (Group Areas Act). Most Black Africans live in townships that are predominantly Black. For example, 99% of the population in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is Black (StatsSA, 2011). These townships are also indicated in the 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses as key areas with limited access to services in the city of Cape Town.

Races that were disadvantaged before apartheid are still, by and large, affected in the post-apartheid era. Official statistics reveal that 77.6% of households in South Africa live in formal

dwellings and the remainder live in informal dwellings that are usually shacks in backyards and squatter settlements (StatsSA, 2011). The Western Cape has the second highest proportions of informal dwellings in South Africa after the Gauteng Province; most of these informal dwellings are occupied by Black Africans. The percentage of formal dwellings in Cape Town largely remained the same from census 2001 (79%) and census 2011 (78%) but that of informal dwellings grew by 3% and still continues to grow with Black Africans occupying 87% of these informal dwellings (StatsSA, 2011). Most of these informal dwellings are found in areas like Gugulethu and Khayelitsha; in Gugulethu 29% of households live in informal settlements (StatsSA, 2011). In Khayelitsha only 45% of households live in formal dwellings whilst the other 55% lives in informal dwellings (StatsSA, 2011). However, there has been a 5% increase in the numbers of Black Africans living in owned and fully paid dwellings from the 30% in 2001 to 35% in 2011 and a 4% increase for Coloured people, from 29% in 2001 to 33% in 2011 (StatsSA, 2011).

While there has been an improvement in service delivery in the Western Cape and in Cape Town between 2001 and 2011, there has not been a significant change in service delivery for 'Black African communities' like Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Statistics from both the 2001 and 2011 censuses show that the Western Cape ranks second after Gauteng in the number of households with flush toilets that are connected to sewerage systems but also has the second highest percentage of households that use bucket toilets in South Africa. At least 2% of South Africa's total population use bucket toilets and Black Africans have the highest percentage of households that use these bucket toilets and pit toilets without ventilation (StatsSA, 2011). Between 2001 and 2011, households in Cape Town that used flush toilets connected to a sewerage system increased from 85% to 88% but the number of households that use bucket toilets also increased from 34 200 in 2001 to 48 500 in 2011 and these households were largely Black African (StatsSA, 2011).

Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's 2011 census statistics contrasted with statistics for White South Africans show stark inequalities that mark the delivery of services in Cape Town. In Gugulethu, official statistics show that 63% of households have access to flush toilets, 30% still use bucket toilets and 3% of all households do not have access to toilet facilities (StatsSA, 2011). In Khayelitsha, 72% of the households have access to flush toilets, 6.7% use bucket toilets and 10.1% of all households do not have access to toilet facilities (StatsSA, 2011). On the other hand, 99% of White households have access to flush toilets that are connected to sewerage systems, only 0.1%

households use bucket toilets, and 0.2% of White households that have no access to toilet facilities (StatsSA, 2011). Such differences in service delivery are enough to show that there are stark inequalities in Cape Town.

In terms of piped (tap) water, census 2011 showed that there has been an overall increase in the number of households that have access to piped water in Cape Town, from 62% in 2001 to 72% in 2011. Statistics show that White households' access to piped water inside their dwellings increased from 96.8% (2001) to 99.6% (2011); 94% (2001) to 97% (2011) for Coloured households; and 62% (2001) to 72% (2011) for Black African households, a significantly lower percentage when compared with other population groups in Cape Town (StatsSA, 2011). In fact, 1% of the total Black African households have no access to piped water especially those living in informal dwellings (StatsSA, 2011).

Census 2011 showed that 6 in every 10 households in the whole of South Africa use electricity as their main source of energy but 15% still use wood to heat up their homes, 15% use paraffin for lighting, cooking and heating whilst 12% actually have no means of heating their homes (StatsSA, 2011). Again, Black Africans constitute the highest number of households that do not have or use any energy source for lighting or heating (StatsSA, 2011).

The percentage of households that use communal dumps to dispose of their refuse increased from 1% (10 000 households) in 2001 to 3% (30 000 households) in 2011 (StatsSA, 2011). This increase was mainly recorded in informal settlements where the majority are Black African. Whereas only 4.7% of White households in Cape Town do not have their refuse removed, 26% of households in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha do not have their refuse removed by the local authorities (StatsSA, 2011).

While there has been economic transformation post-1994, economic empowerment has chiefly benefited a select few; the majority of Blacks are still living in abject poverty (Langa and Kugiwa, 2013). In the next section, I discuss the two cases of this study – Gugulethu and Khayelitsha – which are situated in Cape Town, one of the wealthiest cities in South Africa and Africa. Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are a testimony of the legacies of apartheid and the post-apartheid's failure to promote inclusive development in Cape Town.

2.4. Gugulethu and Khayelitsha

Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are good examples of segregation. These two communities experience inadequate service delivery compared to the rest of the city. Below I present the circumstances in the two case study areas to show the contexts within which protests occur and buttress the argument that Cape Town is divided into two, one which is developed and well-serviced and another which is poor and poorly serviced and in need of urban development.

2.4.1. Gugulethu

Gugulethu, isiXhosa for our pride, is approximately 15km away from the Cape Town city centre. Gugulethu was established in 1960 to address overcrowding in Langa, the first Black residential township in the Western Cape (Saho, 2013). In 2011, Gugulethu had a population of 98 468 people and 29 577 households (CoCT, 2011). This population was predominantly made up of Black Africans (99%). Slightly more than half the population lived in formal households while approximately 47.8% of the households lived in informal settlements, including shacks in backyards. Less than half (47.6%) of households had piped water inside their dwellings. Almost 30.6% of households had access to piped water more than 200m away from their yards while 0.7% of households do not have access to piped water whatsoever. Although more than half (62.6%) of Gugulethu's households had a flush toilet connected to sewerage system, a large number of households use unsanitary toilet systems. Thirty percent still use bucket toilets and 2.8% have no form of toilet whatsoever (CoCT, 2011). Like Cape Town, Gugulethu can be divided into two: formal and informal areas. While service provision is relatively better in formal dwellings, it is worse in informal settlements. That said, there is an intersection of the formal and informal due to the presence of backyard shacks behind formal houses. The City acknowledged that "Gugulethu remains one of the City of Cape Town's priority development areas" and noted the need for intervention to provide basic services to backyard dwellers (CoCT, 2014). Figure 1 below shows a map of Gugulethu in relation to Cape Town.



Figure 1: Map of Gugulethu **Source: Google maps (2014).**

2.4.2. Khayelitsha

Khayelitsha, isiXhosa for our new home, is situated about 35 km away from city center – making it a typical apartheid area located away from affluent Cape Town areas. Indeed, in 1983 the apartheid government announced a plan for a new town – now Khayelitsha – to accommodate about 250 000 Black people (Donaldson and Du Plessis, 2012). The services provided were poor and inadequate and have since been strained by a population increase. Stats SA data show that in 2011 Khayelitsha had a population of 391 749 people, an increase from the 329 002 in 2001. Even conservative reports show an increase in population growth which has not been matched with an increase in services.

Khayelitsha falls under the Tygerberg substructure which is under the Cape Town Metropolitan Council. Like Gugulethu, Khayelitsha can be divided into two. One category has decent housing and basic services and the other has informal dwellings and poor services. The majority of

households live in informal dwellings. The City of Cape Town (2016) admits that the "demand and need for housing in Khayelitsha is still a daunting challenge as approximately 51% of houses in the area are pre-dominantly informal settlements." In 2001, 57.4% lived in shacks and in 2011, 55.4% lived in informal housing and shacks (StatsSA, 2011). Informal housing and shacks come with related problems such as water, toilet facilities and waste disposal. Only 34.6% of households had piped water inside their dwelling and only 27.3% had piped water inside yard and the rest had piped water within 200m outside their yard and 9.2% had water 200m outside their yard (StatsSA, 2011). Clearly, the majority of people do not have water inside their yard – posing a lot of dangers to residents who have to fetch water from distant places.

Although the percentage of households with flush toilets (connected to sewerage system) in Khayelitsha is high, a number of households used poor toilet systems. In 2011, 4% used flush toilets with septic tank and 3.4% used chemical toilets. Further, 0.6% used pit toilets with ventilation and another 0.6% used pit toilet without ventilation. A high percentage of 6.6% used bucket toilets and 3.0% used other forms of toilet systems. What is worse is that 10% of households in Khayelitsha had no access to a toilet facility (CoCT, 2011).

Clearly, Cape Town is characterised by high levels of inequality and poverty. While the advent of democracy brought with it new hopes and a certain level of transformation in townships (which had been deliberately designed to be labour dormitories), transformation has been slow and has been met with by new challenges such as an influx of migrants into Khayelitsha. The government's attempts to develop/transform historically disadvantaged locations have fallen short of addressing all the key problems that bedevil such communities. Figure 2 shows a visual representation of Khayelitsha, the second research site I conducted my research, in relation to other areas in Cape Town.

Figure 2: Map of Khayelitsha **Source: Google maps (2016)**

The frequency of service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha invites research. Also, in view of the media bias, it is fitting to conduct an in-depth study in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha to understand the reasons protesters proffer for the protests, the repertoires they employ and the rationale behind the choice of the repertoires and the degree of organisation that characterises these protests.

2.5. Conclusion

South Africa has a long history of colonialism and apartheid which shapes today's realities. While there has been economic transformation post-1994, economic empowerment has chiefly benefited a select few; the majority of Blacks are still living in poverty. The Constitution of South Africa recognises the injustices of the past and aims to create a society based on basic human rights and social justice. To this end, it underlines citizens' right to basic services such as housing, and water. Although South Africa has impressive Legal Frameworks, the implementation of these laws and policies has been ineffective. Additionally, while citizens participate in developing integrated

development plans (IDP) and in processes of service prioritisation and delivery, the effectiveness of such processes have been questioned. Consequently, Cape Town, where my two case studies fall, is still marked by high rates of inequality, hypersegregation, class-based segregation with huge investments in the core and formerly White areas and less development in the periphery. Cape Town is marked by two extremes – wealth concentrated in the CBD and clustered in formerly White areas under the Group Areas Act of 1950. Formerly Black designed areas are still largely poverty stricken. Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are situated in Cape Town – one of the wealthiest cities in South Africa and Africa. Gugulethu and Khayelitsha have unimpressive service delivery records in a city where other communities have impressive service delivery. It is in these contexts of glaring inequalities of extreme riches and service delivery in one section of the city and service delivery inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that service delivery protests have occurred.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Introduction

Social movements across the world have engaged in protests that seek to improve or increase access to basic services and enhance the standard of living for their members and communities. Many of the protests fight against uneven development that characterise the world system. Poor or nonexistent service delivery of housing, water, electricity, and sanitation inconvenience and endanger people. The lack, or the poor quality, of these services deprives people of a safe and dignified place to relax, sleep and build a family; this can affect people's mental and physical health (South African Human Right Commission, 2016). In this thesis, I consider the fight for public services (e.g., housing, electricity, sanitation, and water) which seek to improve the quality of life as struggles for urban development. While my study focuses on South Africa, similar struggles for access to services or urban development take place in other parts of the world.

In South Africa, the post-apartheid era has witnessed the emergence of both organised and unorganised or the so-called 'spontaneous' protests which fight for more and better service delivery or urban development. In the early years of the new democracy, social movement protests for basic services were largely waged by organised movements such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC), the Concerned Citizen Forum (CCF), the Landless People's Movement (LPM), and the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM). After the demise or weakening of these organised movements, protests were driven by so-called 'spontaneous' or unorganised groups – also more popularly referred to as service delivery protests (SDPs) – that have mounted dramatic mobilisations in localities/neighbourhoods across South Africa's rural towns and cities. Despite differences in the form – whether organised or unorganised/spontaneous – of these protests, they are united in fighting for urban development.

Categorising protests for urban development as either organised or unorganised/spontaneous has obvious benefits; for example, the dualism makes it easy to compare the advantages of one over the other. Yet contestations are rarely exclusively organised or exclusively

unorganised/spontaneous; rather, they are complex and nuanced and often include elements of both. Notwithstanding, movement scholarship has largely focused on formally organised social movements and placed less attention on the role of spontaneity in social movements. This is understandable given that it is easier to study a visibly organised formation than one whose strategy, leaders, and composition are not easy to pinpoint. Given the limited research on spontaneous forms of protests, such as service delivery protests, my study sheds more light on 'why' so-called spontaneous SDPs occur, 'what' repertoires they deploy and the reasons for deploying these repertoires, and 'how' the SDPs are organised in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Basically, this three-pronged study considers the reasons for protests, the repertoires employed in protests, and the organisational processes undertaken in SDPs in the two research sites.

The chapter is organised as follows; I first discuss protests around the world, what they fight for, the repertoires they deploy, and their level of organisation. I consider the horizontal form of organisation and the debate on spontaneity. I show that the so-called 'spontaneous protests' are often steered underground by seasoned activists and have vestiges of formal organisations just as the more formal movements also employ spontaneous actions. Following this, I discuss South Africa's struggle for urban development. I show that both organised and unorganised/so-called spontaneous protests fight for service delivery or urban development in South Africa. Crucially, I question the 'popcorn' descriptor that characterises South Africa's service delivery protests as contestations which lack organisation, analysis, strategy, alliance between protesters; essentially protests which simply pop up on to the scene and rapidly subside.

3.2. Global protests for urban development

The world system is characterised by uneven development where "extremities in both the level of economic development and in the state of human condition" are rampant (Panayitopoulos and Capps 2001:213). In this context, organised and unorganised movements have engaged in collective action for urban development across the world. Although there is general consensus on what these movements fight for, there are disagreements on how these movements are organised. This is partly because a crucial feature of some of the so-called unorganised protests is that they are organised differently, quite unlike the traditional hierarchically structured movements.

In 2011, the world witnessed a surge in uprisings, revolutions and social movement activities against unjust political systems and economic crises. Movements rose in Egypt, Spain and the United States of America that were based on democratic decision-making practices and 'horizontalism' – where participants discussed things that were important to them and chose the agenda together (Sitrin, 2011). It is to these global protests that I now turn. I seek to show that some of the protests regarded as unorganised, are merely organised differently, for example those which use horizontalism. Thus, the key difference between hierarchical, top-down organisations and horizontal forms of organisation is more on the nature of organisation not on the content they seek to achieve.

3.2.1. Horizontalism in global protests

The term 'horizontalism' (*horizontalidad* in Spanish) was first used in Argentina following the popular rebellion that rocked the nation in 2001 (Sitrin, 2012). Protesters banged pans and pots and demanded all politicians to leave office; their activism removed five successive governments. In these contestations, protesters formed neighbourhood assemblies that were rooted in *horizontalidad,* a term they coined to describe the natural way they connected and listened to each other. Activists advocated for a participatory space where individuals freely expressed themselves. Protesters jettisoned representative democracy which, they argued, empowered delegated leaders. They castigated representative democracy for creating the crisis they were fighting against. The logic of horizontalism is still prevalent in Argentina with some working-class people taking over factories and managing them collectively; the unemployed, who have few prospects of finding work, collectively finding ways to be self-sufficient using mutual aid and love; and autonomous indigenous communities fighting to recover stolen land (Sitrin, 2006).

Basically, horizontalism is a form of organising that assumes that all human beings are equal and should be actively involved in fundamental decisions that affect their lives (Rowe and Carroll, 2015). It is a critique of hierarchy and authority which seeks to create new relationships and a process which presents an alternative way of relating and being (Sitrin, 2011). The philosophy of horizontalism advances a leaderless movement, arguing that everyone is a leader. Essentially, horizontal relationships do not subscribe to the logic and practice of representation and vertical organisation (Sitrin and Azzellini, 2012). Horizontalism has gained international recognition and

is used to describe social movements with an affinity for direct democracy, self-management and autonomy (Sitrin, 2012).

Horizontalism is important to this study because it reveals contestations elsewhere in the world which use non-hierarchical forms of organisation instead of the well-known vertical, hierarchical top-down levels of organisation. It is easy to misconstrue these forms of organisation as 'spontaneous' because they do not follow the bureaucratic, vertical leadership style where power and decision making is concentrated in the hands of a few. Ideas from horizontalism provide an important analytical lens to thinking about the so-called 'spontaneous' protests. Using ideas from horizontalism I consider the extent to which activists have adopted horizontalism, where there is popular mobilisation, leaderless style of leadership, autonomy, and direct action. While activists may not always practice the logic of horizontalism, they may aspire to implement ideas from the horizontalism framework that are germane to their own struggles and contexts. The most vivid examples of horizontal forms of organisation occurred in Occupy Wall Street's (OWS) nightly general assemblies in Zuccotti Park in New York City (and other cities in the USA) where more than 1000 people engaged in consensus decision-making.

Occupy Wall Street (OWS) emerged in New York City in 2011 as a fight against a rise in income inequality, an increase of corporations' political power especially those tied to finance capital on Wall Street, mortgage defaults and unemployment (Cohen, 2011). The movement attacked a system of economic relations which failed to serve the needs of the majority (Tarrow, 2012). This movement's demonstrations received wide support from many people because it expressed the aspirations of the masses and exposed corporate greed and economic injustice (Hart and Negri, 2011). The protesters felt that there was a lack of political representation, and that politics did not serve them. This was aptly captured in their slogan "we are the 99%. They are the 1%" which highlighted the income and wealth disparity in the country where wealth was concentrated among a tiny minority (1%) while the rest (99%) of the households earned less income. Some of their novel tactics included occupying homes to stop evictions (Sitrin, 2012).

The OWS did not have a formal leadership with rigid formal structures, rules and hierarchical organisation. Such a structure was appealing to people who preferred a participatory platform which avoided a bureaucratic, top-down organisation where power was concentrated in the hands

of the few (Moore, 2012). OWS comprised of mostly young adults who effectively used social media platforms such as Facebook, emails, Twitter to create the necessary networks; media and press working groups horizontally decided most messages sent using media sites (Tremayne, 2014; Sitrin, 2011).

One of the key organisers of these protests, Marisa Holmes, stated that the "assembly was about levelling the playing field. It didn't matter where you came from, how well known you were, or how much money you had. Everyone was equal in the assembly" (Holmes, 2012:154). The General Assembly as the collective decision-making body of OWS employed modified consensus which involved participants working through every objection to proposals until the whole group agreed. Yet although there was no majority rule in the General Assemblies, in cases where a member resolutely withstood a decision, such a proposal required 90 percent support from the collective to pass (Sitrin, 2011). Positively, this process accommodated diverse views from different people but negatively, the process required a lot of time.

Horizontal democracy did not start at OWS though. For example, at OWS, activists used a "circle justice" procedure to settle conflicts, which involved community participants deciding the best resolution (Sitrin, 2011). This process is rooted in Native American systems of justice specially the Tlingit and some tribes in Canada (Mirsky, 2004). Elsewhere in Greece, participants in assemblies borrowed their Athenian ancestors' methods and used a process of lottery to choose speakers at mass assemblies (Sitrin, 2012). The Zapatista rebellion of 1994 in Chiapas, Mexico also had its roots in autonomous democratic participation and inspired several movements around the world (Chiapas Support Committee, 2013; Holloway, 2011).

The Zapatista introduced a new language and ideas that were radically different from the ideas of the revolutionary tradition with their emphasis on the dignity of ordinary people (Holloway, 2011). The recognition of dignity meant a rejection of the humiliation that marked the way the ordinary people lived. Interestingly, they noted that although their dignity had been trampled upon for a long time, they had enough dignity to rebel against such a repudiation. The fight of and for dignity, as they saw it, included a contestation for indigenous rights and a larger struggle for a world that embraces a mutual recognition of dignities (Holloway, 2011). In the Zapatista communities of Chiapas, indigenous communities use consensus-based decision-making progresses to organise

themselves autonomously from the state to meet their basic needs. Evidently, the Zapatista concept of politics seeks to capture people's views instead of dictating a line and is thus essentially anti-hierarchical.

In rural Brazil, the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST) utilises some elements of the horizontal logic of organisation. The MST was formed in 1984 and reclaims land and fosters the future in their daily activities and interactions. MST promotes grassroots participation and a horizontal structure in small groups (nucleos) as opposed to the top-down hierarchical structure (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016). Remarkably, although the MST is organised, it uses both organised and spontaneous/unorganised practices in its struggles. The MST's grassroots struggles have led to land acquisition and improvement of livelihoods for people (Karriem, 2016; 2009). MST's grassroot struggles should be praised for pressuring the government to implement policies. Karriem (2016:185) aptly captures the interplay between state policies and the agency of grassroots struggles, noting that "while state policies or 'politics from above' in Brazil can promote development in rural areas, social movement 'politics from below' can pressure the state to implement policies." The MST has managed to successfully utilise the horizontalist logic of organisation and creatively employ both organised and spontaneous practices in their struggles.

What is apparent in the global struggles I have discussed so far is that people from different walks of life are adopting the horizontal logic of organisation in their demand for better living standards and the upholding of their dignity. Interestingly, the organisation prevalent in some of these struggles has an antecedent, such as the use of a 'circle of justice' in the OWS organisation, which has roots in Native American systems of justice (Mirsky, 2004). Similarly, in Greece activists borrowed their Athenian ancestors' methods of organising (Sitrin, 2012). In Chiapas Mexico, the Zapatista rebellion of 1994 also had its roots in autonomous democratic participation (Chiapas Support Committee, 2013; Holloway, 2011). To move the discussion forward, I continue with the discussion on global contestations but shift my focus to a discussion on spontaneity narratives that permeate many of the global struggles. My aim is to show that the so-called spontaneous protests have antecedents that influence them.

3.2.2. Spontaneity narratives in global protests

Spontaneity can be defined as "events, happenings, and lines of action, both verbal and non-verbal, which were not planned, intended, prearranged, or organised in advance of their occurrence" (Snow and Moss, 2014:1123). The Lexico dictionary (2020) defines spontaneity "as a condition of being spontaneous" where "spontaneous" means "performed or occurring because of sudden inner impulse or inclination and without pre-meditation or external stimulus." The central theme about spontaneous events and actions is that they are not deliberately thought through or decided prior to their occurrence. Stories that describe certain protests as unplanned and unorganised ahead of their occurrence are called spontaneity narratives.

Movement scholarship has placed little attention on spontaneity in social movements (Snow and Moss, 2014). This has happened in a context where many scholarly writings have categorised protests as either organised or spontaneous. Indeed, binary juxtapositions are characteristic of sociological analysis and movement theorising and analysis (Zerubavel, 1996). While such binary classifications are useful in painting a picture of the dynamics in each of the extremes, the reality on the ground is often not as clear cut as these dichotomies show.

For example, while reporting on the accounts of student leaders involved in the Beijing student movement of 1989, Zhao, 2001:147 (cited in Snow and Moss, 2014:1122) found that many participants stated that "I walked down the road and saw X (or, I woke up in the morning and thought of Y), and then I decided to do Z." He concluded that "many of their activities represented *spontaneous* and individualistic responses to events rather than conscious decisions arrived at collectively by their organisations" (Zhao, 2001:147, emphasis added). This is a similar sentiment expressed in the protests that follow. Below, I show how describing these protests as spontaneous is problematic.

Spontaneity narratives were prevalent in the student sit-ins in the United States of America in the 1960s, this notwithstanding the planning, coordination and links to prior sit-ins and pre-existing networks (Polletta, 1998). For example, Morris (1984:202) rejected the idea that what happened was a college phenomenon, arguing rather that the "sit-ins spread across the South in a short period because [adult] activists, working through local movement centres, planned, coordinated, and sustained them." However, Polletta (1998) argues that spontaneity in the student sit-ins did not

mean a lack of prior planning and coordination but referred to local initiative and action that ensued from moral imperative not bureaucratic planning; spontaneity also meant the absence of adult leadership. Such labelling of local people's deliberate efforts at planning, initiation and staging protests without established bureaucratic planning as 'spontaneous' is prevalent in service delivery protests. This means that even with clear planning in advance of a protest action, local efforts are relegated to 'spontaneous' protests.

Essentially, the line of argument advanced by Polleta (1998) holds that what was at play in the student sit-ins was the work of autonomous movements. In other words, people moved away from centralised decisions and vertical leadership structures and directly engaged in decisions that affected their lives. In this sense, so-called 'unorganised' protests where people are intentionally fighting for things that directly affect their everyday lives can be regarded as autonomous movements.

Activities by autonomous movements can be misconstrued as 'spontaneous' because autonomous movements sometimes 'auto-invisibilise' their activism due to a refusal to identify their group by recognisable names; a growing logic of autonomous movement practice makes it more difficult for observers to see the "unidentified assemblies behind autonomous collective action" (Flesher Fominaya, 2015:143; 2007). In fact, part of the reason 'spontaneity' explanations has remained is because autonomous movements lack a recognisable or visible organisational framework. The refusal to identify their group with recognisable names sometimes makes it hard for people to get a handle on what the people will be fighting for and the ways in which they organise themselves.

Autonomous movements sometimes employ spontaneity narratives to strategically benefit themselves. For example, spontaneity narratives can be used by extremists (e.g., religious extremists) who present their actions as acts by outraged citizens and in the process conceal their connections with certain players. Similarly, social movement actors can employ spontaneity explanations to portray their claims and grievances as a popular will of the people. Such a move helps to integrate new members. Activists also use spontaneity narratives when they seek to avoid victimisation from the state. Yet evoking spontaneity narratives can also help deny social movement actors and networks agency. While spontaneity narratives are sometimes used strategically, they are not always 'consciously strategic' (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). For instance,

in the USA's student sit-ins in the 1960s, activists used spontaneity narratives to explain occurrences in their movement to outsiders, but such explanations also formed the narratives activists told each other in their private spaces (Polleta, 1998).

Activists are not alone in describing their activities as spontaneous. Journalists, scholars, and observers often characterise periods of intense protest as "spontaneous, unprecedented and unexpected" (Flesher Fominaya, 2015:142). This usually happens when there is no clear known network between protesters and established social and political organisations. For example, some scholars characterise the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet republics in the 1990s and 2000s as spontaneous.

The phrase 'colour revolutions' is used to refer to contestations where ordinary people and opposition parties chose a colour as a symbol of their anti-government demonstrations. Other scholars prefer the term 'electoral revolutions' because elections triggered these protests (Bunce and Wolchik, 2007; 1999). While some scholars characterise colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet republics in the 1990s and 2000s as those which sprung up spontaneously overnight, O Beachain and Polese (2010) debunk the view that colour protests were created overnight. Instead, they argue that a number of associative movements which were not registered before the colour revolutions played an important role in the revolutions. Although external financial support helped the colour movement, activists relied on pre-existing structures and ideas. Colour revolutions helped formalise the groups and publicise them to a wider global audience. Thus, a close scrutiny of what transpired shows a symbiotic relationship between pre-existing structures and colour revolutions.

Another example of what is often described as spontaneous is the 13-M (after 13 March) following the Madrid train bombings of 2004. For example, Blakeley (2006:342) argues that evidence suggests that the 13-M "were entirely spontaneous and were organised through mobile phones." This was not the case though. The protest was organised by a handful of seasoned activists who utilised the extensive networks they had built in prior mobilisations (Flesher Fominaya, 2011; Sampedro, 2006). Although people who were not initially connected to the instigators joined the movement when it was already underway, this does not fit the 'entirely spontaneous' description advanced by Blakeley (2006).

Following the bombings, the ruling party, the Popular Party (PP), called for an official demonstration against what it regarded as an attack by the 'terror group' ETA. After the official demonstrations, there was "a wave of spontaneous, unofficial demonstrations in which people" demanded the truth about the groups behind the bombings before they could go to the polls with slogans such as "We want the truth before we vote" (Blakeley, 2006:341). The demonstrations which were targeted against PP's party headquarters were also supported in Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia "by spontaneous saucepan banging," a tactic which protesters used in the anti-Iraq War demonstrations (Blakeley, 2006:342). While these tactics are considered spontaneous, several prior developments led to the adoption and the eruption of the demonstrations; the bombings only acted as catalysts. For example, a group of people responded to the ruling party's moves to manipulate information after the Madrid bombings and traced this new move to previous attempts to manipulate public opinion (Gonzalez, 2004 cited in Olmeda, 2005). Evidently, these protests were not purely spontaneous.

Another movement, the 15M movement, came to be known by this name owing to its inception date, 15 May 2011, or the Spanish *indignados*, a name the mass media labelled its participants (Perugorria and Tejerina, 2013). The word indignados is Spanish for 'the indignant' – a name the media labelled the movement. The indignados demanded change in economic and social policies such as housing, debt, education and a wider citizen participation in formulating and implementing policies (Hart and Negri, 2011). Proposals by the indignados resonated "with (more traditional) participatory visions, but also with new deliberative conceptions that underline the importance of creating multiple public spaces, egalitarian but plural" (della Porta, 2011:np). These practices resonated with ideas and practices of horizontalism. Similar to other contestations discussed above, scholars, journalists, observers and even participants identified the 15-M as spontaneous.

While many scholars associate the 15-M mobilisations with spontaneity:

> [T]he ability of the 15-M/Indignados to sustain mobilisation based on deliberative democratic practices is not spontaneous, but the result of the evolution of an autonomous collective identity predicated on deliberative movement culture in Spain since the early 1980s (Flesher Fominaya, 2015:142).

The argument is that Spain's current movement cultures are nourished by former autonomous movement experiences in the country. Social movements do not emerge from nowhere; rather, established practices make routines and networks needed for converting anger into gatherings.

The 15-M is an heir of the 13M grassroots social movements which supported military disobedience, No to War [No a la Guerra] and others (Barba and Blanco, 2011). Additionally, Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without A Future), one of the organisations behind the 15-M movement should be understood within the context of predecessor movements such as the V for Vivienda movement (H for Housing movement) and the anti-Bolonia movement (Raboso and Merino, 2011). The Movement for the Right to Housing was also a crucial precursor movement; it started in 2003 and comprised collectives such as the PAH and 'H' for 'Housing' movement. Movement for the Right to Housing used to be a platform which included political parties and union; however, by 2006 it was making use of autonomous mobilising tools such as 'no acronyms, no flags' to bar unions or parties from 'advertising' at their events (Haro Barba and Sampedro, 2011).

In the 15-M, during times of abeyance, "activists continued to be actively integrated into groups and assemblies, engaging in protest and activism within the 'submerged' networks and laboratories around diverse issues, albeit with less intensity" (Flesher Fominaya, 2015:158). Activism was incorporated into the day-to-day business thereby reinforcing collective identity processes. This daily activism helped mobilise people who were not formerly politically active who later joined the 15-M movement. Deliberative practices of the 15-M should be understood in the context of their evolution in Madrid, all of Spain and the growth of an autonomous collective identity over the years (Bravo and Saez, 2016; Sampedro and Lobera, 2014).

There are, however, pros of associating the 15-M with spontaneous narratives. In fact, even when spontaneity discourses are not consciously used, they serve strategic purposes (Polletta, 1998). In the 15-M movement, they helped advance the narrative that the struggle was by the ordinary citizens not activists. Spontaneity narratives in the 15-M also sought to distance themselves from vertical, centrally organised mobilisations and associated with more horizontal and deliberative styles (Flesher Fominaya, 2015).

Spontaneity narratives are also often used to describe the Arab Spring or Arab uprising of a wave of demonstrations and protests that rocked the Arab world in 2010. These protests started in Tunisia following Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest against police ill-treatment and corruption (Howard, et al, 2011; Ismael, 2013). There is a general consensus among analysts that economic deterioration due to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), corruption in state apparatus and heavy-handedness of Arab regimes led to the Arab uprisings (Salih and Eldin, 2013; Ismael, 2013).

Scholars and journalists have tended to see the Arab Spring as having "sprung out of nowhere" with an over emphasis on the new use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as Facebook and Twitter, almost as if social media single-handedly made revolution possible (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Salih and Eldin, 2013; Howard et al., 2011). Although novel media had a significant role in the Arab Spring, activists had networks that existed prior to the uprisings; such protests thus did not "spring from the ether" rather they had social movement actors' intervention and organising structures (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). Contrary to the widely held view that the Arab Spring protests in Egypt and Tunisia in 2010 and 2011, respectively, were spontaneous, there is evidence that these mobilisations were neither spontaneous nor fully organised. This evidence suggests that these struggles were a result of the interconnections between formal organisations and informal, spontaneous groups in sustaining the protests (Pilati et al., 2019).

Often, different contexts necessitate and favour the use of a particular kind of mobilisation. That said, there is a general belief that formal organisations which have membership criteria, vertical leadership, rule, monitoring of behaviour, and where there are sanctions and incentives are crucial in both democratic and repressive contexts (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2011; Trejo, 2012). In repressive contexts, informal groups play an important role in mobilisation. The informal groups often lack a stable structure and are characterised by no clearly defined roles, rules and behaviours of members; their actions usually encompass individual experiences and daily practices (Bayat, 2013). Commenting on the Arab Spring protests in Egypt and Tunisia, Pilati et al., (2019:463) concluded that "in repressive context, spontaneous groups and more established and formal organisations continuously switch from one form to another, overlap, and transform themselves faster than they would do in democratic contexts." While Pilati et al., (2019) were more concerned about the speed at which spontaneous groups and formal organisations switched, overlapped and

transformed themselves between repressive and democratic contexts, they took as a given that these occurrences happened in both contexts.

Indeed, in democratic contexts, protesters switch from one form of organisation to another and utilise repertoires used in both organised and spontaneous protests. Switching, however, may not always be a conscious effort but may be based on the need of each situation. At other times, such switching is based on the pros and cons of each mobilising repertoire. For example, informal networks and loosely organised social groups play an important role in mobilising resources for protests in repressive contexts (Pilati et al., 2019). Under authoritarian rule, individuals and informal groups find streets and squares to be conducive places where political information is disseminated, shared and collective feelings developed. The informal networks are adaptable, flexible and have a contingent structural nature which is helpful in repressive contexts (Duboc, 2020). Even in democratic contexts, some governments demonise protests and victimise activists as evidenced by police heavy-handedness during protests (Paret, 2015; Duncan, 2014). In South Africa, the police killed over 50 protesters between 2004 and 2014 (Alexander et al., 2014). Due to the sensitive nature of protest ideas in repressive contexts, informal groups of neighbours, friends and acquaintances disseminate political claims in private homes and on the streets among people they can trust. Given this discreet mobilisation, to the outside world unaware of the underground networks and mobilisations, protests appear to be spontaneous.

In South Africa's low-income areas such as Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, there is arguably a strained relationship between the police and protesters. While not at the same level as the repression in authoritarian contexts, there is a level of repression in low-income communities which is different from that experienced in wealthy suburbs in South Africa. In fact, some scholars see a link between the increasingly violent turn of protests with a rising police's propensity to use violence (Paret, 2015; Duncan, 2014; Alexander et al., 2014; Suffla, Seedat, and Karriem, 2010). The Marikana massacre best illustrates an extreme case of police heavy-handedness. In 2012, the South African Police Service killed 34 miners and injured 78 in a brutal use of force which some have compared to the 1960 Sharpeville massacre (Pijoos, 2017; Bond, 2014; Maromo, 2014). While initial camera footage appeared to show that mine workers attacked the police, it later became apparent that "rather than being motivated purely by self-defence, the police killings of

miners was more premeditated than initially thought" (Duncan, 2012:np). The Marikana massacre should be viewed in the context of poor service delivery and stark socioeconomic inequalities where Marikana miners came from these communities which engage in so-called spontaneous service delivery protests. A year before, in 2011, a police rubber bullet fired at close range killed a protester, Andries Tatane, at a service delivery protest in Ficksburg, a small town in Free State Province (Grobler, 2011).

Each of the global protests discussed above fought (and fight) for better services, dignity, fairness, and other factors which improve the quality of life. While there is general consensus on the reasons these movements protested, there is no agreement on how these movements are organised. In fact, there is a tendency to view these protests as spontaneous. Given this, I underlined the horizontal forms of organisation prevalent in these struggles and questioned the spontaneity narratives that often characterise these contestaionts. With this global perspective in mind, I now shift my focus to contestations for urban development in South Africa.

3.3. South Africa's protests for urban development

When the African National Congress (ANC) won office in 1994, it sought to address the historic marginalisation of Black communities and neighbourhoods throughout the country which had very little access to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, and housing. Indeed, the ANC came into office promising a 'Better life for all.' While the ANC has made progress in delivering services, many communities have persisted to protest the lack of access to services. Non-existent or poor delivery of these services inconvenience and endanger people. I consider the contestations for basic services such as housing, electricity, sanitation and water, what is commonly referred to as service delivery protests as struggles for urban development.

Overall, post-1994 protests in South Africa have predominantly emanated from Black and Coloured areas and communities, with rare protest action from better serviced and resourced suburbs (Alexander et al., 2018; Nleya, 2011; Alexander, 2010; Booysen, 2007). One of the principal reasons driving protests in South Africa is inadequate service delivery (Masiya et al., 2019; Alexander, 2010; Booysen 2007). Service delivery in local government refers to the provision of tangible or intangible public municipal goods, services, activities, and benefits which

enhance people's quality of life (Reddy, 2016). A municipal service regarded as basic is "necessary to ensure an acceptable and reasonable quality of life and, if not provided, would endanger public health, or safety or the environment" (Reddy and Naidu, 2012:94). Municipalities, as custodians of public funds, are mandated to utilise these funds to address basic service delivery needs of local communities such as water, electricity, infrastructure, refuse removal and spatial development of local communities.

A service delivery protest is "galvanised by inadequate local services or tardy service delivery, the responsibility for which lies with the municipality" (Allan and Hesse, 2011:np). Protests in low-income communities are chiefly poor people's expression of dissatisfaction with state inadequacies in the delivery of infrastructure, houses, municipal services such as electricity, water and sanitation etc, what is often called 'service delivery' (Mottiar and Bond, 2012; Marais et al., 2008). In his study on Gugulethu, Staniland (2008) noted that high levels of discontent, especially with housing delivery, led to protests. There is an intersection between the formal and informal settlements in Black low-income communities. That is, neighbourhoods with formal houses also often have informal dwellings such as a shack in the backyard. Backyard dwellers are either family members who do not have enough room in the formal houses or tenants whose rentals help supplement the income of the low-income families who stay in formal houses. In Khayelitsha, informal settlement dwellers attended protests more than formal settlement dwellers (Nleya, 2011); this is chiefly due to the poor services provided in informal settlements.

Grievances over land and housing feature prominently in these contestations (Moetsi, 2015). The fight for land must be understood within the context of a conflation of issues. For instance, the struggle for land, has within it the belief that with land, the people will build houses with access to services such as water, a toilet in the house, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal. These protests are sometimes punctuated by some level of militancy. For example, in Tembisa, Gauteng, residents came up with 'Operation Khanyisa' in which they reconnected themselves to electricity following cut offs due to non-payment (Ngwane, 2010). Researchers' focus is sometimes placed on the militant nature of the protests, not what the protests seek to achieve, namely service delivery or urban development.

Protests have mainly been from poor, less privileged and informal communities where there are high levels of unemployment and a lack of basic services (Paret, 2017; Akinboade et al., 2012). Given the intersection of formal and informal settlements, that I have alluded to above, in Black poor neighbours, protests emerge from both informal and formal communities, chiefly by backyarders who fight for land and or houses. Due to no sanitation in many of the backyard shacks (and where there are no facilities such as toilets and water in the yard), residents often have to use facilities in the formal houses which puts pressure on the services in the formal dwellings.

In Sedibeng district, in Gauteng, communities which protested had higher levels of unemployment compared to the rest of average residents in the Municipality (Akinboade et al., 2012). The unemployed live in communities which require urban development, and they often struggle to pay for the basic necessities of life including basic services such as water and electricity. As mentioned before, residents in low-income areas often supplement their incomes by renting out their backyard shacks which creates an intersection of the formal houses and informal backyard shacks together. While this somewhat increases their income, it further puts a strain on basic services such as water. StatsSA (2011) shows that formal and informal rental is rapidly increasing in South Africa with a quarter of all South African households renting their accommodation. Approximately 60% of all households who are unable to secure formal accommodation make a home through the informal rental market, while about 40% find shelter in informal settlements (StatsSA, 2011). The unemployed, underemployed, and low paid residents mobilise for development. Unemployment is not the only factor that leads to protests as evidenced by communities with somewhat similar circumstances but with differentiated responses.

Even where there is provision, there have been times when the poor quality of services has led to protests. Poor service delivery has in some cases been a direct result of lack of maintenance of available infrastructures and amenities (Masiya et al., 2019; Hawker, 2013; Funani, 2012; Anthony, 2011; Staniland, 2008). In other cases, poor quality was a direct result of poor workmanship in the building of RDP houses – a development that led to protests in Mitchells Plan in Cape Town (Atkinson, 2007). Booysen (2007) notes that the poor quality of service delivery was one of the reasons that led to two consecutive years of grassroots protests prior to the March 2006 local government elections in South Africa.

The government itself recognises the sub-standard quality of the RDP houses. For example, in 2009, the then minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale announced that the government would commit R1.3 billion to rectify RDP houses which were poorly built (South African Government Agency, 2009). His announcement came after his visit to Alphendale, East London where 339 RDP houses were poorly built. During his visit, Sexwale blamed the contractors responsible for the shoddy work. He said "[t]he money we should have used for another house has to be spent to rebuild this one. It is a shame. It is a shame that all that money we used to build these houses has gone down the drain just like the rain that is falling today" (South African Government Agency, 2009:np). A year later, minister Sexwale announced that the government had spent an additional amount of nearly R1 billion on repairing or rebuilding sub-standard RDP houses (DFA, 2010).

Chris Vick, the then special advisor to minister Sexwale stated that many of the houses which were under repair were either built before the National Home Builders' Registration Council (NHBRC) was fully operational and as such they were not properly inspected to ensure quality control, or they were built when the People's Housing Process was not under the quality process of NHBRC (DFA, 2010). NHBRC is the home building industry regulatory body. Yet even after the establishment of the NHBRC, the quality of RDP housing remained poor. For example, the then Democratic Alliance Member of Parliament Stevens Mokgalapa visited housing developments across South Africa and concluded that poor workmanship still characterised government-funded developments (Mokgalapa, 2012). He stated that all the developments he had visited had been approved by the NHBRC yet many of the houses had signs of sub-standard workmanship such as cracked structures, with people having to vacate the houses, leaky basins and toilets etc. In 2020, Snake Park residents in Soweto, Gauteng protested over their RDP houses that were built on wet land which, as a result, were cracking and crumbling due to water and floods (Toloane, 2020).

Activists' demands for state provision have often been coupled by complaints of maladministration and government's corruption (Paret, 2017). In response, communities have protested against nepotism, corruption, unsatisfactory levels of accountability, cadre deployment of unqualified and incompetent councillors (Langa and Kugiwa, 2013; Alexander, 2010; Booysen, 2009). These reasons hamper the smooth provision of basic services in low-income areas. Zeurn (2011) argues that the fight against apartheid was premised on a desire for social and economic rights. She further

notes that many poor communities expect improvement of their standard of living vis-à-vis income and services such as housing, health and education. Protests are not only to be understood as a result of the failure on the part of the government to adequately meet people's needs but as a failure to realise the democracy that South Africans envisaged pre-1994. Although the fight for people to vote touched on human rights and dignity, it needs to be understood as extending beyond political terms to include social and economic upliftment. Low-income communities are still fighting to realise urban development. In doing this, "protesting communities often contrast their plight with positive developments in nearby areas" (Paret, 2017:65). In some cases, urban townships and informal settlements are surrounded by leafy suburbs and shopping centres and other forms of wealth (Maringira and Masiya, 2018).

Some scholars, however, argue that the focus of protests is not on service delivery but establishing choices of citizens in a democratic way (Pithouse, 2011). Mottiar (2014:372) observes that protesters often frame their claims "as material demands for 'service delivery', but very often, claims refer to the lack of accountability and transparency of local authorities as well as the lack of genuine spaces for participative democracy for the urban poor." Similarly, other scholars (Pithouse, 2011; Friedman, 2009) argue that the service delivery protest (SDP) characterisation is not the most accurate way to describe protests in South Africa. Rather, when protesters are demanding service delivery, "they are also insisting on entrenching citizen choices in a democratic way" (Mottiar, 2014:382). While it is true that protests are complex and include criticisms of South Africa's democracy (Alexander et al., 2018), for the purposes of this thesis, I use the term service delivery protests to emphasise the need for urban development in the two case studies. Broad terms such as community protests do not explicitly capture the lack of or poor services that low-income communities face.

To be fair, since 1994, the government has made strides in service provision. While the government's provision needs to be appreciated, two factors have led to inadequate service delivery. Firstly, neoliberal cost-recovery policies which advocates fiscal restraint and a balanced budget have negatively impacted service provision. Even the provision of Free Basic Water "in the context of overall policies of cost-recovery creates a paradox in which low-income, poor households experience debilitating and insufficient access to water and increasing debts" (Peters and Oldfield, 2005:315). Secondly, an increase in population has not been matched with an

increase in service provision. This must be understood in the context of natural population growth and in-migration in metropolitan cities which grew by more than double the growth rate of South Africa as a whole (Pillay et al., 2006). Cost recovery policies and population growth particularly in cities have led to more service delivery inadequacies. This has compounded economic and social strain on poor households and an overstretching of already underserviced and inadequate services. In this context, different formations have mounted dramatic protests to fight for more and better services.

3.4. South Africa's 'organised' and 'unorganised' protests for urban development

Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, organisational forms and repertoires that were used in the anti-apartheid struggle continued to shape post-94 struggles in both 'organised protests' and 'unorganised protests.' In 1996, the ANC government adopted a neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework – the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) – it regarded as non-negotiable (von Holdt and Naidoo, 2019). The government censured and even expelled ANC members who publicly criticised its adoption of the framework. Some of these members and other dissatisfied activists who felt the brunt of the policy shift which resulted in privatisation and commodification of services, health spending cutbacks, trade liberalisation and the adoption of the willing buyer and willing seller to land redistribution, banded together. These activists included poor residents who were unable to pay for basic services and demanded the stop of house evictions, electricity and water cut offs, poor people who were unable to pay for anti-retrovirals for HIV/AIDS, precariously employed persons and workers whose jobs were affected by trade liberalisation and people affected by the new land redistribution approach.

These disgruntled members engaged in protests between 1997 and 2006 which with time became more formal and structured organisations which fought for a range of services. The Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC) in Cape Town, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in Johannesburg, and the Concerned Citizens' Forum (CCF) in Durban fought for the provision of free basic services. Nationally, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) was established to steer struggles pertaining to land and farm work, and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) fought for free anti-retrovirals and other resources to people living with HIV/AIDS (Mottiar and Lodge,

2017; Friedman and Mottiar, 2005). These post-1994 movements which emerged outside of the confines of the Congress were called the 'new social movements' (Ballard et al., 2006; Naidoo and Veriava, 2005). Many new social movements challenged the ANC government's adoption of neoliberal policies and a failure to deliver basic services (Mottiar and Lodge, 2017). Although some of the community formations that comprised these new social movements remained existent at the local level, by 2006 a majority of these movements were either in decline or defunct due to a host of reasons (Runciman, 2015; Naidoo and Veriava, 2013).

Interestingly, around 2004, community protests erupted outside the new social movements, many of which fought for similar issues raised by new social movements before them. While such protests dotted the socio-political sphere since the 1990s, from 2005 South Africa witnessed a steady increase of such, reaching sustained levels of protests in 2009 (Municipal IQ, 2017; Runciman et al., 2016). These protests were over housing, electricity, water, other municipal services, corruption in the allocation of houses and plots, and inactions of authorities. The protests involved marches, submission of memoranda of grievances, mass community meetings, road barricades, burning tyres, *toyi-toying*, street fights with the police, burning of municipal buildings or councillors' houses (Tshishonga, 2015; Alexander, 2012; Langa and von Holdt, 2012; Booysen, 2012).

While the mobilisation in the new social movements has been regarded as 'organised protests', the mobilisation in the so-called spontaneous protests that rose to prominence from the mid-2000s has been described as 'unorganised protests.' Interestingly, both 'organised protests' and so-called 'unorganised protests' fight for similar things. In fact, Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng stressed the importance of 'spontaneous' and 'organised' protest in the Garvas case (SATAWU v Garvas, 2012). To give context to his judgment, the Chief Justice referred to the legislative frameworks the apartheid government took. He stated:

> Under apartheid, the State took numerous legislative steps to regulate strictly and ban public assembly and protest. Despite these measures, total repression of freedom of expression through protest and demonstration was not achieved. Spontaneous and organised protest and demonstration were important ways in which the excluded and marginalised majority of this country expressed themselves against the apartheid system, and were part and parcel of the fabric of the participatory democracy to which they aspired and for which they fought.

Below, I first discuss the 'organised protests' before turning to a discussion of the so-called 'unorganised protests' in post-apartheid South Africa.

3.4.1. 'Organised' protests for urban development

South Africa has witnessed both organised and so-called 'spontaneous' protests in the struggle for urban development. Examples of the more organised forms of protests include the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC), the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC), the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF), the Landless People's Movement (LPM), Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC). I take each in turn.

The APF was formed in 2000 from a blend of contestations against the City of Johannesburg's privatisation of basic services and the University of the Witwatersrand's outsourcing of support services (McKinley, 2012; Dawson, 2010). Three key factors gave rise to the APF: (i) displeasure with the African National Congress' (ANC) adoption of Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, (ii) influences from anti-globalisation movement in other parts of the world, and (iii) a search for answers by the working class who had limited accesses to goods and services and whose livelihoods were under threat owing to retrenchment and cost recovery (Marais, 2011; Buhlungu, 2006).

The APF's initial affiliates were predominantly from vulnerable and marginalised communities, especially the precariously employed whose jobs were threatened by the City of Johannesburg's and the University of the Witwatersrand's outsourcing of support services, the unemployed and pensioners who could not afford to pay for privatised services and the middle class, largely Leftist White activists and students (Runciman, 2015; Dawson, 2010; Buhlungu, 2006). The APF's critical posture towards the ANC led to some of its initial affiliates, for example the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union, the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) and the South African Students Congress (Wits branch) to withdraw their support (McKinley, 2012). In the end, the APF was chiefly composed of community-based organisations from mostly African townships and informal settlements and some middle-class activists.

The APF fought against privatisation, evictions, pre-paid water (through Operation *Vulamanzi* which means let the water flow in isiZulu) and electricity meters (Operation *Khanyisa* which means to light up). In these operations, 'struggle' plumbers and electricians bypassed pre-paid water and electricity meters (Dawson, 2010; von Schnitlzer, 2008). The act of reconnecting sought to restore crucial necessities of life and highlight people's rights to constitutionally guaranteed access to housing and water.

Luke Sinwell and Carin Runciman used the APF to debate the revolutionary potential of protest action. In his article titled "Is 'another world' really possible? Re-examining counter-hegemonic forces in post-apartheid South Africa", Sinwell (2011) critiques scholarly literature on social movements for uncritical optimism of another world. He points to the disconnect between "ideologies manufactured by academics, and the worldviews that the working class and poor possess" (Sinwell, 2011:61). He criticises scholars for simplifying and homogenising movements with little attention to the particularities of movement's internal dynamics, their relation to the state and the alternatives they give to neoliberalism. Based on his analysis of two affiliates of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) in Alexandra township, Sinwell (2011:62) argues that South Africa's movements are more interested in a "piece of the pie on offer by the state rather than challenging it altogether." In other worlds, movements are primarily concerned with accessing basic services not transforming the status quo. He invokes a Gramcian conception of hegemony and points to the African National Congress' (ANC) liberal stance and hegemony. Sinwell (2011) argues that the ANC has entrenched its hegemony by co-opting civil society and labeling the opposition 'ultra-left.' He notes the prevalence of the 'common sense' of development that the elites envision and that the masses accept. He argues that although the protests are sometimes militant and violent, these protests do not attack the ANC's neoliberal policy framework; in fact, sometimes upon accessing the basic services, these movements support the ANC.

Runciman (2011) critiques Sinwell in her article titled "Questioning resistance in post-apartheid South Africa: a response to Luke Sinwell." Runciman's (2011) critique draws on her ethnographic fieldwork with the APF. She implores analysts to pay particular attention to the ways in which organisational forms shape a movement's identity and politics. She points to a disjuncture between academics' understanding of resistance with meanings activists themselves have of their struggles

and calls analysts to pay "greater attention to the messy and often contradictory realities of social movement activism" (Runciman, 2011:607). She calls for a methodological approach that triangulates movement documents, accounts of movement leaders and data drawn from ethnography. Runciman shows that APF's affiliates have varying sizes, strengths, organisation and political orientations. She also shows that APF activists are divided into leaders (who are highly political) and grassroots members (who have varying degrees of political consciousness). The core activists – what she calls – 'bridge leaders' are crucial in politicising (through workshops and other fora) what is considered private issues of the community, thereby linking the APF's message with the daily realities of its members. Part of the APF's message involves challenging capitalism, privatisation and the neoliberal stance of the ANC. The leaders of the organisation are crucial in building a counterhegemonic challenge' by building ideologies, piercing the 'common sense' that keeps many people passive regardless of the injustice they face. In this case, APF's activism can be regarded as efforts to build 'good sense' in the movement. However, counter-hegemonic consciousness develops over a long period of time and is not always linear and logical. Runciman (2011:612) argues that although the APF affiliates may engage in issue-based struggles, they are also involved in "a broader struggle about the content and quality of post-apartheid democracy." Thus, although the APF is not politically uniform, political education within the movement has helped to wage both struggles for material struggles to access the necessities of life as and other challenges that go beyond these. Both Sinwell and Runciman call for the need to have a nuanced understanding of the APF. This is also important for understanding service delivery protests in different communities and at different times. As I will argue, service delivery protests are made up of seasoned activists and grassroots protesters with varying levels of consciousnesses. I will show that although there is no open challenge to the status quo, protesters have a rising social consciousness which points to a movement dynamic. One of the active member organisations of the APF was the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC).

The SECC was a relatively small social movement organisation which mobilised for the provision of affordable and, in some cases, free electricity to poor residents of Soweto (Egan and Wafer, 2006; Ngwane and Veriava, 2004). The SECC was not one organisation but a complex and heterogenous movement with episodes of strong cohesion and solidarity as well as cleavages and tensions (Egan and Wafer, 2006). It had over 20 branches in Soweto and comprised of anarchists,

pensioners, *gogos* (grandmothers) church-goers and ANC supporters. The SECC combined peaceful protest events with illegal reconnections under Operation Khanyisa (Mottiar, 2013). The SECC's illegal reconnections were in response to ESKOM's aggressive cost recovery in Soweto. A survey carried out by the Municipal Services Project and the SECC in 2001 revealed that about 20 000 households in Soweto were being cut off for non-payment of services each month (Fiil-Flynn, 2001). Research revealed that defaulters could not afford to pay for electricity and water thus debunking the oft-held view of a culture of non-payment (McDonald and Pape, 2002, Bond, 2002). In response to the cut offs, the SECC reconnected more than 3000 households within 6 months (Ngwane, 2003). The illegal connections were rampant as detailed by a scholar-activist Trevor Ngwane (cited in Naidoo and Veriava 2005:50):

> I remember a time in the SECC meetings people who were illegally connected would be asked to raise their hands, and almost everyone's hands would go up. There'd be this sense of relief as almost everyone would be illegally connected. The only thing was that they were doing it as a criminal act individually. So, it was a question of turning what was a criminal act into a collective act of defiance.

Interestingly, activists reconnected both SECC members and non-members, with one re-connector claiming to have reconnected the Moroka Police Station (Egan and Wafer, 2006). At one point, 87 of the 100 activists who had descended on the home of the then mayor of Johannesburg, Amos Masondo, to present a petition titled "Fire the Mayor, fire the Councillors" were arrested, many of them pensioners, when they attempted to disconnect the mayor's electricity and became prisoners of neoliberalism in the international resistance movement to globalisation's eyes (Resist, 2002). Upon his release, Trevor Ngwane the then figurehead of the SECC reiterated the SECC's unwavering commitment to press the ANC to fulfil its 2000 election promise of providing free electricity and water to the poor. Ngwane emphasised that 'the rich' should pay for utilities not 'the poor' people, especially pensioners (SAPA, 2002). Trevor Ngwane is a scholar-activist who joined the ANC in 1990. He was elected councillor for Pimville ward in Soweto. He later became critical of the tripartite alliance's neoliberal stance, a move that led to his expulsion from the ANC.

In the Western Cape, where my two case studies are located, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC) emerged in 2001 and composed of diverse organisations grounded in grassroots struggles from Cape Town's marginalised and poor areas to fight evictions and water

cuts (Oldfield and Stokke, 2004). The City of Cape Town Council-led evictions of families which hailed from state-owned flats in former Coloured group areas gave rise to the initial need for the WCAEC. This resonated with activists across the movement who faced threats and realities of evictions and water cut-offs as well as frustration with local political representation (Leitch, 2003). Generally, a shift in local government's provision of water and electricity to cost recovery policy – coupled with threats of disconnection to defaulters played a key role in the formation of the WCAEC.

Given that the state does not act as a 'service provider' but a 'service ensurer' whereby it has adopted a public-private partnership model, cost recovery becomes an important factor (Oldfield and Stokke, 2006). Families that cannot afford to pay for housing, electricity and water have faced evictions and cut-offs. Within this context, the WCAEC created a space for the poor and average citizens to defend and extend their livelihoods. The majority of the movement's members had experience in community activism having participated in the struggle against apartheid and had themselves been victims of evictions and service cuts (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). The activists used a wide range of strategies and tactics including sit-ins, peaceful protests, occupying land, repossessing houses and reconnecting basic services (Oldfield, 2003). Before legal procedures and court hearings took place, the WCAEC moved evicted families back into their dwellings and reconnected their water (WCAEC, 2002).

Remarkably, the WCAEC members described their struggles as a spontaneous response to the poor people's basic problems and immediate problems (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Indeed, the WCAEC had innovative and flexible tactics germane to each situation. A Valhalla Park Civic member and WCAEC activist Getrude Square, interview 2002 (quoted in Miraftab and Wills, 2005:208), praised her community's ability to display power through spontaneous, cooperative action, persuasion, negotiation, and force:

> If someone saw a white man or somebody just hanging around a letterbox or by the water meter, then they [would] just call the people. A lot of people are out of work here and that is what makes us so strong. If something happens during the day, then we get all of the people together and we hop in our cars and we chase them right out. And we warned them, if ever you come in here again, there is going to be trouble ... [But in one case] we talked [to them], and they said: "No, we don't want to come here to cut people's water off, but

> we are the contractors. The contract is a piece of bread." [We said to them:] "It's a shame...you leave me without water, you leave me thirsty with children, yet it's your piece of bread." [Then] they made an agreement with us. [They said:] "So, that my children can eat, we will come in here and we will issue the water cutoff papers." So they asked us nicely, can they come in here and issue the papers to the people, but if it comes to the point when the people don't pay, then they won't cut the water off. So we said fine (Gertrude Square, interview, 2002).

In Durban, a social movement called the Concerned Citizens Forum (CCF) was established in July 2001. The CCF largely concerns itself with urban working people in the eThekweni Metropolitan municipality (formerly Durban). It particularly focuses on two poor areas in the 'Indian' township of Chatsworth, namely, Bayview and Westcliff. This movement reveals these two communities' struggle to defend themselves against the negative impacts of the government's neo-liberal policies espoused in the GEAR macroeconomic framework (Desai, 2002). Its initial actions aimed to alleviate impacts brought upon by the government's policy shift (e.g., reactions to housing evictions and water and electricity cut offs). The CCF's struggle electricians and plumbers illegally reconnected people whose basic services had been disconnected. Interestingly, the government temporarily halted mass evictions where CCF operated and many of its activists lived (Dwyer, 2004). Over time, the CCF evolved into a coordinating body which organised and supported protest actions, rallies and connected groups with common experiences across Durban. CCF is not a membership-based organisation and its participants were never referred to as 'members'; participants characterised the organisation as comprised of "a 'loose coalition', 'a network' and 'a network of organisations'" (Dwyer, 2004:12).

The CCF participated in marches to demand the jettisoning of neoliberal policies in South Africa, which activists argued hampered sustainable development and continued racism, during the two United Nations conferences hosted by the government of South Africa (von Holdt and Naidoo, 2019; Desai, 2002). In August 2001, the CCF played a pivotal role in organising the Durban Social Forum to contest the ANC government at the World Conference Against Racism. Then in September 2002, the CCF took part in protests outside the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and the Social Movements United march which had about 30 000 activists. CCF organised solidarity marches with other social movements around the country such as the APF and the Landless People's Movement (LPM).

The LPM was formed in 2001 following a meeting of landless formations' representatives in South Africa; it had a wide array of local branches around South Africa. The LPM was inspired by international movements like the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST). The LPM arose against the backdrop of the "negative effects of years of belt-tightening fiscal policies on the poor and marginalised majority of the country, following the adoption of the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic strategy in 1996" (Greenberg, 2004:1). It was founded in a context of South Africa's housing evictions and Zimbabwe's forced removal of White farmers (Mngxitama, 2005; Xezwi, 2005). It was also established as a response to the municipality's attempt to evict residents. The LPM runs with the slogan 'No land! No house! No vote!', a campaign it initiated around the 2004 national elections to underline the ANC's failure to redistribute land to the Black majority (Sinwell, 2015). Maureen Mnisi, the then Protea South LPM Gauteng provincial chair (2003) aptly captured the spirit and soul of the campaign:

> [W]e did not struggle for the vote so that we may be treated worse than dogs. It is the landless who voted for our government since 1994 in every election, but we have to ask this, why are we still landless and homeless ten years into our democracy? Is this the democracy we suffered so many years for? As if that is not enough, we are being told to "register where we live,' but we are facing forced removals…. We demand respect and our full citizenship rights (Mnisi, 2003 cited in Alexander, 2006:17).

The LPM provides a sharp separation between 'political parties' which are repressive and do not consult the community and 'social movements' which represent the community and are victims of government repression and state power (Sinwell, 2015). It primarily demands a rapid redistribution of land to the landless, secure tenure for everyone, discarding of the willing buyer and willing seller to land reform and an adoption of a new effective way of redistribution. The LPM also calls for an immediate stop of evictions on farms, informal and other settlements, and fights for the transference of land to those who reside on it. It has used a range of strategies and tactics in a bid to access state resources. It employed land occupations as a self-activity method of redistributing land to the landless, identified unused, underused, and unproductive land and land belonging to abusive farmers as the initial focus of redistribution (Greenberg, 2004). In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the LPM along with other movements such as the Abahlali baseMjondolo have called for a moratorium on land, housing, and farm evictions (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 2020; Manyane, 2020; Sokutu, 2020).

Another organised movement, the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) is a shack dwellers movement which was founded in Kennedy Road shack settlement in Durban in 2005 which campaigns against evictions and for public housing and has since expanded to other cities, namely, Cape Town and Pietermarizburg. AbM is a shack dwellers movement that mobilises people who stay in shacks and temporary shelters with no basic services (Mottiar, 2013; Pithouse, 2007). It has adopted the LPM's 'No Land, No house, No vote' slogan. Like the LPM, the AbM is critical of political parties. An article by Abahlali baseMjondolo (2011) titled "By Voting We Are Only Choosing Our Oppressors" highlighted this critical stance stating that with the 2011:

> Local government elections approaching, politicians (whether from the DA, ANC, COPE or PAC) are once again crawling out, like cockroaches, to ask for our votes. As part of this, they are once again promising us houses, jobs and service delivery – the usual old recycled lies. The reality, however, is that we don't have houses and proper service delivery because we live in a system of total inequality – a system of capitalism and the state. The councillors lying to us know this, but they want our votes so that they too can become comfortable and rich.

Many organised movements such as the APF, SECC and WCAEC are now defunct and new ones, including trade unions and organised movements like the Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) have emerged. SJC, which operates in Khayelitsha, was formed in 2008 and concerns itself with safety, sanitation, and justice. With the demise of many New Social Movements, there has been an emergence of the so-called 'spontaneous protests' that fight for similar concerns which the more organised movements were (and some are) fighting for. These urban development concerns include water, electricity, land and housing. Paradoxically, the new social movements collapsed at a time when protests for service delivery, such as housing, exactly what they were fighting for, were growing (Paret, 2017; Runciman, 2015; Naidoo and Veriava, 2013; Alexander, 2010). A host of reasons led to the demise of many of the new social movements. In the case of the APF, elite divisions in the ANC negatively impacted the movement, political heterogeneity made it difficult to forge a coherent collective identity and the movement's inability to maintain a leadership from the APF's grassroots constituency adversely impacted the movement organisationally and politically (Runciman, 2015). In the next section, I discuss the many protests that have appeared on the South African scene as unorganised, i.e., not under the umbrella of any organisation, the ones often called spontaneous protests.

3.4.2. 'Unorganised' protests for urban development

So-called unorganised protests have occurred in many cities and have largely been reported in popular media. Scholars have also analysed these protests, but mostly base their analysis on accounts and statistics drawn from the media and the police. As alluded to in the discussion above, even during Mandela government's 'honeymoon' after 1994, pockets of strong movements demanded change in a number of areas (Ballard et al., 2006; Bond, 2000). Paradoxically, around the time organised movements declined, unorganised or spontaneous service delivery sprang onto the national agenda, many of which protested for similar issues demanded by the new social movements before them. Unlike the organised movements such as the APF, SECC, WCAEC, CCF in the pre-2005 period, service delivery protests emerged as a form of popcorn or spontaneous protests (often with no name). Before 2005, so-called 'violent' protests were below 10% but after 2005 'violent' or unrest incidents rose consistently (Mottiar and Bond, 2012). Indeed, South Africa experienced a steady increase of service delivery protests and reached sustained levels in 2009 (Municipal IQ, 2017; Runciman et al., 2016). The South African Police Service figures show that 3000 service delivery related protests were recorded between 2009 and 2012, meaning almost 3 protest incidents each day (Saba and van der Merwe, 2013). Figure 3 shows media reported service delivery protests as reported by the Centre for Social Change – which regards the protests as media reported community protests (MRCPS) (Runciman et al., 2019). The figure shows a rising trend in service delivery protests since 2005.



Figure 3: Media reported service delivery protests Source: Runciman et al., (2019).

Evidence from communities in different provinces over the years reveals the scale of the protests. For example, in December 2007, residents of Delft in the Western Cape occupied large numbers of government-built houses (Cape Argus, 2008). In 2009, Siyathemba residents in Gauteng protested for the provision of electricity and water (Bearak, 2009). In 2011 protesters in Danielskuil, Northern Cape province promised to make the municipality 'ungovernable' until their demands were met (Mokoena, 2011). Calls to make the municipality 'ungovernable' harks back memories of an anti-apartheid struggle slogan to make apartheid ungovernable, which suggest some level of continuity between pre-94 and post-94 protests (Paret, 2015; Mottiar, 2014). In 2013, Protea South, Soweto residents in Gauteng province demanded electricity and other basic services (Simelane, 2013). In 2016, Zandspruit residents in Gauteng blocked roads and burnt tyres as they protested over electricity connections and other service delivery concerns (Whittles, 2016).

In the North West province, a wave of service delivery protests against intermittent water supply and run-down roads in villages surrounding Mahikeng led to a week-long closure of a border post into Botswana (Tau, 2017). On the 3rd of April 2019, residents of Alexandra township in Gauteng protested against the lack of service delivery in their area (Mjo, 2019). Protesters blocked the road leading to Marlboro train station, a development that led Gautrain users to be sneaked out of the

station. In the Western Cape, Sir Lowry's Pass Village closed a portion of the N2 road, a major national highway road, in protest against poor service delivery, particularly housing delivery (Felem, 2019). On the 19th of November 2020, a group of shack dwellers whose homes had been destroyed during floods demanded to be moved into flats and threatened to occupy a neighbouring housing project in Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal (Ntuli, 2020). Threats of occupation initially started when 300 shacks were gutted by fire in September 2020. In Barberton, Mpumalanga province four weeks of protests over massive water shortages led to a 'lockdown' of the town (Viljoen, 2020). Evidence from these provinces shows that communities are protesting unsatisfactory service delivery in South Africa.

Figure 4 below shows the grievances protesters cited in the period 2004 to 2013. It is interesting to note that the top five reasons for protests comprise of the services I have regarded as service delivery protest in this thesis, namely, housing, water and sanitation and electricity. While land is in the bottom 3 of the reasons for protests in Figure 4, it is covered in the 'housing' reasons which is the first specified reason for protests, after the general 'service delivery protests' which tops the list.



Figure 4: Grievances cited by protesters **Source: Alexander et al., (2014).**

Another feature of these so-called spontaneous protests is that they are often localised in nature. Bayat (2013:201 cited in Paret, 2018:339) argues that the "urban dispossessed" focus on "localised struggles" because they must emphasise "strategies, organisations, and associations that respond directly to their immediate concerns." Given this, he argues that poor people are not in a position to be ideological as they view local protests to be more meaningful and manageable compared to struggles with a broad transformative agenda because the urban poor understand them, their consequences, and have control of their outcomes. Bayat (2013) makes a distinction between the urban poor's localised struggles of the 2009 Green Revolt in Iran from the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. The urban poor's emphasis was on 'quiet encroachments' of, for example, illegal electricity connections and squatting. 'Quiet encroachments' here refers to "the discreet and prolonged ways in which the poor struggle to survive and to better their lives by quietly impinging on the propertied and powerful, and on society at large" (Bayat, 2013:15). For Paret (2018; 2015), South Africa's local protests fell in-between these ideal types, noting that they were more 'audible' than 'quiet' with clear demands on the state and disruptive tactics such as barricading roads and a focus on immediate needs.

In Durban, Mottiar (2019) contrasted street traders from Warwick Junction and shack dwellers from Kennedy Road and noted that street traders engaged in more 'invisible' 'everyday acts of resistance' as they avoided engaging with authorities but preferred to undermine power structures by employing repertoires where they traded everyday (e.g., ignoring trading laws by trading without permits, 'subletting' stands from people with permits – which is illegal). Shack dwellers' everyday acts of resistance included refusing to be displaced from the settlement by simply rebuilding a new shack after the Land Invasion Unit destroyed the old one. Shack dwellers also defied attempts to be excluded from basic service delivery by the local municipality through illegally connecting water and electricity. Mottiar (2019) concluded that the street traders in her study represented the 'invisible' power engaged in 'quiet' encroachment and the shack dwellers represented the 'visible' power and practiced 'everyday acts of resistance' along with the more 'spectacular' types of resistance.

Generally, South Africa's protests between 2009 and 2014 were highly localised and did not challenge the broad political and economic order (Paret, 2018). Protesters consistently engaged with the ruling party and the government (Paret and Runciman, 2016; von Holdt, 2014). Protesters'

engagement with the government is present in both social movement organisations and so-called spontaneous protests. As mentioned, de Souza (2006) captures the varied relationships which exists between the government and the protesters which involves working with the state, working without the blessing of the state and even working against the state to achieve their goals. The engagement between the protesters and the government calls for a level of organisation and coordination from both parties, which throws into question the overly romanticised popcorn protests.

In analysing why South Africa's protests were localised and did not challenge the broad political and economic order, Paret (2018:338) drew from "three ethnographic and interview-based case studies of local protests and organising within informal settlements in and around Johannesburg," stating that "in all three cases, residents responded to market insecurity by demanding collective consumption for place-based communities, and they responded to state betrayal by demanding fulfilment of a national liberation social contract through administrative fixes." These strategies confined activism to the local level and did not lead to broad economic and political challenges.

The circumstances of the urban shack dwellers make them prioritise local level protests (Pithouse, 2013). Persistent lack of access to formal work, communication and transport hampers their participation in transnational politics – which sometimes makes it difficult for them to organise across even one city. The spatial exclusion that the urban poor confront make them mount struggle over territory which often takes a local form (Pithouse, 2013). A lack of mobility calls for a greater bond and reliance on neighbours and support from neighbours; such support helps build a strong sense of place which is not present in the affluent areas who are highly mobile and have access to services that extend beyond their community. Below I consider the localised struggles for service delivery in the research sites – Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

3.5. Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's protests for urban development

My two case study areas – Gugulethu and Khayelitsha – have been rocked with dramatic service delivery protests. In Gugulethu, the poor level of service provision has generated widespread service delivery protests. Media publications reveal that there has been a high number of protests in Gugulethu. In August 2012, Gugulethu residents protested against inadequate housing during a

handover of 300 housing units to Joe Slovo residents in Langa (Pollack, 2012). In another contestation, shack dwellers in Gugulethu closed the N2 freeway in protest against poor service delivery (Sacks, 2012).

Activists from different political and religious formations, social movements and other concerned stakeholders motivated by justice have taken to the streets during Easter holidays to highlight what they describe as an "evil intent in the design of South African townships" (Ngovi, 2014:np). The activists have staged marches to highlight the appalling living conditions faced by people who live in townships. The marches are meant to publicise the abnormality of township life by interrupting "the ongoing hypnosis that makes us accept such abhorrent living conditions" (Way of Life Church, 2013:np). Over the years, pastor Xola Skosana of the Way of Life Church and other groups have marched against poor living conditions.

In 2011, this formation brandished a placard which read "Welcome to hell; SA townships" in a march to highlight the need for more and improved service delivery at a march from Gugulethu to Site B in Khayelitsha during the Easter period (Meyer, 2011). The march celebrated its seventh anniversary in 2017. The 2013 march was interesting though. The activists organised a march from Gugulethu to Mandela Park, Khayelitsha, to register their displeasure at the separate development in the country, which they argued amounted to a perpetuation of the group areas act. They concluded that apartheid continues. The protest was announced seven days before (on the 23rd of March 2013) the planned day (30 March 2013). Their press release stated the time for the protest (from 9:00am), the place the march would start (Uluntu Centre, Klipfontein Rd in Gugulethu) and where it would end (Way of Life Church, 1 Joe Modise St in Mandela Park, Khayelitsha) (Way of Life Church, 2013). The organisers invited the wife of the late activist Andries Tatane who was killed by a police rubber bullet during a service delivery protest in the Free State (Grobler, 2011). Although these protests started spontaneously by a pastor who had supposedly seen a vision or an epiphany, they have metamorphosed into a relatively organised formation.

Another protest worth mentioning involved land occupation. In 2018, some Gugulethu residents erected shacks on vacant land in protest against inadequate housing (Ngalo and Dyantyi, 2018). Activists barricaded Klipfontein Road and some protesters looted a supermarket and burnt a car that was parked outside the famous Mzoli's Place, a bustling butchery where people buy grilled

meat (or as it is popularly known – *Tshisa Nyama*). The backyard dwellers said they attacked Mzoli's because they heard that Mzoli planned to open a shopping center in Gugulethu. Although the City of Cape Town's anti-land invasion unit demolished the shacks, it is clear that backyard dwellers are exercising their agency.

Protests by backyard dwellers and informal settlements residents should be understood within the context of the often appalling living conditions they reside in. For example, after inspecting toilets in Gugulethu's Kanana, Europe and Barcelona informal settlements, the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) found that toilets in some informal settlements were a health risk and needed urgent attention (Koyana, 2013). The HRC spokesperson, Isaac Mangena, found that sanitation in the three areas was in "crisis." Residents informed HRC officials that the City of Cape Town had not collected waste in two months due to a strike by Sannicare, a city contractor (Koyana, 2013).

In 2009, residents in Lotus River informal settlement in Gugulethu had dirty water filled with rubbish and excrement outside their dwellings for two years (Kalipa, 2009). This was a dire health hazard but also a testimony to the slow pace of responsiveness on the part of the municipality. The then Ward 42 councillor Mandisa Matshoba admitted that she was aware of the situation and even the then City of Cape Town informal settlements manager, Mzwandile Sokupa said there had been water in that area for years. Asked to comment on the waste in the area, Sokupa said the question should be directed to the City's Solid Waste Management Department (Kalipa, 2009). The lack of proper coordination between different departments in the municipality continues to affect service delivery in Gugulethu.

Lastly, consistent with media's preoccupation with newsworthy protests, all the protests I mention below made mention of either violence or disruption. Yet all but one of the reports elaborated the service delivery protests the residents were fighting for. On Monday the 23rd of May 2005, residents protested over housing, water, and electricity in Gugulethu (Scoop, 2005). Residents blocked the NY1 road, every 100 metres with burning tyres. Media reports show that on the 6th of March 2018, protesters disrupted services at the Gugulethu Local Office of the Western Cape Department of Social Development (DSD) and burned four staff vehicles (Western Cape Government, 2018). Also, around 40 people staged service delivery protest in Gugulethu on

Monday the 26th of January 2015 (Sapa, 2015). They burned tyres on the NY108 road around 6am in the morning and dispersed after a few hours; no damage to property or injuries were reported. Clearly, media reporting is marked by bias and often fails to uncover the varied reasons of protests, the reasons behind the repertoires and the organisation or lack thereof of these protests. Correspondingly, researchers and academics have written less on service delivery protests in Gugulethu as they tend to focus on Khayelitsha protests – one of the protest hotspots in South Africa in general and the Western Cape in particular.

Khayelitsha residents have challenged the slow pace of development in their community by engaging in protests. Khayelitsha's population is made up of predominantly young people of less than 30 years (QSJ Consultants & Unit for Religion and Development Research, 2006). Age cohort of 20 to 24 makes the largest part of this population. This young population has high hopes for a democratic South Africa and also provides a large pool of human resources who mount dramatic protests. While there are no official number of protests in this area media publications record numerous protest activity in this hotspot – making it an area worth researching.

On the 23rd of May 2005, Khayelitsha residents protested over water, electricity and housing (Scoop, 2005). The protesters burned tyres on Landsdowne Road. Town 2 residents registered their displeasure at their lack of toilets by dumping excrement from their buckets at the then Ward Councillor, Phakamile Kula's house. In 2013, Khayelitsha residents marched in the Cape Town CBD in protest over, among other reasons, land for housing, and decent sanitation (Underhill, 2013). A group of Khayelitsha residents demanded to see the then premier of the Western Cape, Hellen Zille, but she did not present herself; the protesters gave her seven days to respond to their memorandum. Activists stated that the protest was not political but was based on a decision taken by the street committees to protest for housing and service delivery. Stembele Majova, one of the suspended ANC members at the time for alleged participation in the poo-throwing protests, was in attendance and conveyed the message of the group.

Further, in 2013 a group of people dumped human excrements on the Western Cape's provincial legislature and the Cape Town International Airport in protest over inadequate sanitation in Khayelitsha, in what is now dubbed the 'poo protests.' The poo protests made news all over the world. The BBC (2013) reported the arrest of 180 people, some of whom carrying bags of faeces,

ahead of a planned protest against poor sanitation in Cape Town. Residents managed to dump bags of human waste in some local government offices. Likewise, on the 4th of June 2013, Khayelitsha residents emptied buckets of raw sewage at the then DA premier of the Western Cape, Hellen Zille's convoy as she was leaving an official event in Harare, Khayelitsha (Mposo, 2013). In 2020, a service delivery protest led to the torching of three buses and a private car in Makhaza, Khayelitsha (Mlamla, 2020). Several roads were barricaded with burning tyres which caused heavy congestion on the N2 road.

Given the localised nature of service delivery protests in low-income areas (e.g., Gugulethu and Khayelitsha), contestations for urban development occur in the same places with more or less the same people who participate in these struggles and employ familiar repertoires. Can the repeated localised engagements of the activists lead to a mobilisation that is somewhat organised, particularly in a context where some of the activists in these communities once participated in the struggle against apartheid and in the new social movements? Understanding these questions is important because service delivery protests have been dubbed 'popcorn' protests in popular media and even by academic researchers to denote the lack of organisation of these protests (Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Bond, 2011, Ngwane, 2010).

3.6. Gaps in Literature

South Africa's contemporary service delivery protests have been described as 'popcorn' which pop up and burst onto the scene and rapidly subside (Bond, 2012; 2011; Ngwane, 2010). Following the phrase 'popcorn civics', Patrick Bond coined the term 'popcorn protest' to describe South Africa's 'service delivery' protest (Mottiar, 2013). Bond (2011:118) argues that "seemingly ubiquitous 'service delivery protests'" are "'popcorn protests' because with the application of intense heat, the leading grains explode into thin air." He asks rhetorically:

> [I]f activists fall before a new hail of police bullets, or if they lack an overarching political strategy, won't the demonstrations simply pop up and quickly fall back down again deserving the curse-words 'popcorn protests' – as they run out of steam, or worse, get channelled by opportunists into a new round of xenobhobic attacks? (Bond, 2012:np)

Given this, Bond (2011) argues that the SDPs are not worthy to be classified as 'urban social movement.' Likewise, Ngwane (2010:np) describes the first wave of protests after the liberation

as “the much-ridiculed ‘popcorn protests’ that dotted the political scene for a short while.” He adds that “[a]s the pejorative term ‘popcorn’ suggests, the protests were trivialised, marginalised and demonised” (Ngwane, 2010:np). This is despite the recognition that “[b]oth social movements and popcorn protests have had an impact” (Bond and Mottiar, 2012:290). Trivialising of so-called ‘popcorn’ protest is understandable given that globally, more-organised organisations are considered more successful (Gamson, 2009). Are these SDPs popcorn though?

As I have shown in the discussion on spontaneity in protests around the world, the so-called spontaneous protests often have a precedence and are often steered by seasoned activists. While the general consensus among scholars and in popular media is to regard these protests as popcorn or spontaneous, there is a strand of literature that questions this categorisation. For example, in her insightful article titled “From ‘Popcorn’ to ‘Occupy’: Protest in Durban, South Africa”, Mottiar (2013) draws on evidence from the Umlazi Occupy where 300 residents from Umlazi township in Durban ‘occupied’ a piece of land outside the office of the municipal councillor for one month. She notes that the Umlazi Occupy drew inspiration from Occupy Wall Street and argues that the Umlazi:

> Occupy began as a series of ‘popcorn’ protests but then began to show signs of movement building; the physical Occupy camp presented an opportunity for community bonding and the forging of a common identity (Mottiar, 2013:614).

Certainly, it would be too much of a stretch to dismiss the lengths Umlazi Occupiers went in the struggle for urban development as popcorn. In fact, based on the evidence Mottiar (2013:614) excavated, she astutely argues:

> The Occupy protest was clearly a break from the more common ‘popcorn’ protests; by clearing the bush on the field outside the councillor’s office and erecting a tent there, the ward 88 protesters made it clear that they were not popping up simply to fall back down again (Mottiar, 2013:614).

As other scholars have noted in their own analyses of protests in South Africa, the term ‘popcorn’ is faulty in that it “belies the complex dynamics of protests, which are mostly hidden from public view: the numerous attempts to engage the authorities and the rounds of community meetings which usually proceed a protest” (Runciman, 2016:432). Similarly, the use of the phrase ‘popcorn protests’ “to describe seemingly sporadic, spontaneous protests – ignores the extent of organisation

that actually exists" (Duncan, 2016:168). My study joins this lean body of literature that questions the popcorn categorisation.

While this strand of literature is helpful, it needs more research to better understand the dynamics in the so-called 'popcorn' SDPs. Mottiar's (2013) study focused on one occupation 'Umlazi Occupy' where their activism was a departure from the popcorn categorisation. Is the level of organisation and coordination exemplified in the Occupy Umlazi characteristic of other SDPs, e.g., in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha? Runciman (2016) who also finds fault with the popcorn protests did not focus on spontaneity. She focused on questioning Booysen's (2007) 'dual repertoire' thesis which sees protests not as a lack of support for the ANC, because the ANC has continued to receive electoral support, but a tool to pressure the government to deliver.

Earlier in 2011, Runciman (2011) argued that researchers need to pay careful attention to organisational forms in localised community-based organisations. She noted for example the crucial role 'bridge leaders' play in "politicising the seemingly private issues of the community and linking" a movement's message to the everyday experiences of potential recruits (Runciman, 2011:608). While her study is helpful in that it unearthed rich information from ethnographic fieldwork, it focused on an organised new social movement, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF). The downside to the study of a social movement organisation is that it is well received that these movements engage(d) in 'organised' struggles not popcorn protests (although, as I have shown, they also employ spontaneous actions). For the purposes of this study, there is an upside to her study of the APF though; given that APF's members live in communities which engage in service delivery protests I show that these activists bring in their organisational and tactical lore. Of course, in keeping with autonomous movement principles such activists cannot wear their social movement organisation's regalia and wave their flags and banners. These tendencies further conceal the actors and the organisations involved in so-called popcorn protests. Further, Duncan (2016) who also critiques the popcorn metaphor in her book, "Protest Nation: The Right to Protest in South Africa" did not dwell on the popcorn categorisation because her focus was on the right to protest in South Africa and evaluating the degree to which such a crucial right is being respected.

My research builds on the work of these few scholars but puts a stronger emphasis on the organisation or lack thereof in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This, I think, is important

because although proponents of the popcorn metaphor do not dismiss some processes in what they call the popcorn protests, they maintain that these protests are 'popcorn.' For example, in his review of Duncan's (2016) book, Bond (2017:107) concedes that "courageous and often sustained community organising is often undertaken prior to these service delivery protests" but argues that because the protests have "no analysis, strategy and intra-protester alliance, then popcorn is still an appropriate concept." Similarly, Ngwane acknowledges that before people protest, they often exhaust peaceful channels, and only resort to 'disruptive' and 'violent' protests when these processes fail; he remarked that as such, when protesters hit the streets, they should brandish a banner inscribed "all protocol observed" (van Schie, 2014:np).

Using chiefly the qualitative methods, I seek to understand three inter-related research questions. This three-pronged study: (i) considers the reasons Gugulethu and Khayelitsha residents participate in SDPs, (ii) seeks to understand the repertoires residents employ in the SDPs and the rationale for using these repertoires, and (iii) analyses the processes observed before protest events in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. In the third research question, I consider the 'popcorn' descriptor in light of empirical evidence drawn from Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

3.7. Conclusion

Social movements play an important role in the struggle for service delivery or urban development. Crucial in the debate of collective action is the ways in which people organise and co-ordinate human and material resources to protest against and for certain ideas and practices. There has been a general tendency to dichotomise 'organised' protests where social movement organisations plan and organise ahead of protests and 'unorganised' protests where groups of individuals engage in unplanned and unorganised 'spontaneous' actions. To better understand service delivery in South Africa, I first considered protests for urban development around the world before discussing the so-called organised and 'unorganised' protests in South Africa. I showed that some mobilisations which are regarded as 'spontaneous' merely mobilise differently. To do this, I considered the horizontal logic of organising prevalent in the Occupy Wall Street, the Zapatista and the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST). Interestingly, even the organised movement, the MST, deployed both organised and spontaneous practices in its struggles.

Further, I noted that several scholars regard global protests such as the student sit-ins in USA in the 1960s, colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet republics in the 1990s and 2000s, the 13M and 15M in Spain and the Arab uprising as involving spontaneous actions similar to the characterisation of South Africa's community protests as popcorn/spontaneous. There is however a strand of literature that shows that the protests which are considered as involving spontaneous action involved complex networks which drew from experiences from previous mobilisation, suggesting that the protests were not purely spontaneous.

In South Africa, the social movement organisations' names, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Landless People's Movement and Abahlali baseMjondolo make it easy to understand what activists are fighting for. For example, the Anti-Privatisation Forum was against the move towards privatisation of basic services; the Soweto Electricity Crisis Commission focused on the delivery of electricity in Soweto and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign focused on fighting evictions. While it is apparent from the names of the organised movements what activists fight for, it is not always as easy to pinpoint what activists in the 'unorganised' and often 'nameless' service delivery contestations fight against or for. Yet as I have shown, both 'organised' and so-called 'unorganised' protests fight for the same services. Equally, because it is difficult to get a handle on the organisation in SDPs, they have earned the descriptor – 'spontaneous' SDPs. Given that SDPs are often localised, could it be that similar people who engage in these protests several times have built a somewhat 'organised' although somewhat different way of mobilising? These considerations are important because some of the activists in these protests participated in anti-apartheid struggles and the new social movements of the 2000s and bring their learned organisational and tactical lore to SDPs.

My study joins a lean and emerging body of literature that challenges the dominant popcorn protests that describe SDPs. I re-examine the dominant popcorn/spontaneous protest view that describe South Africa's SDPs by examining the dynamics of protest in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The dichotomising of protests particularly the so-called spontaneous protest is the gap in the literature that I seek to fill. As I have shown, the term 'spontaneous protests' is a misnomer because it does not fully capture the dynamics of organisation in many of the struggles. Rather, what exists

in collective action for urban development is a marrying of formalised practices and spontaneous actions to form a hybrid (spontaneous-organised movement). To fully understand the gaps in literature, I present a three-pronged argument which considers the reasons for participating in SDPs, the repertoires employed in these protests and the organisational processes that characterise SDPs.

CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1. Introduction

Theories help in laying a foundation for the social research sciences. This makes theories a key ally of the researcher because they explain how the social world that the researcher seeks to understand operates (Neuman, 2007). Researchers should strive to close the gulf between theory and practice by ensuring that conceptual frames are informed by a systematic observation of the social world (empirical data) (Buchanan, 1994). Thus, on the one hand, a scientific study of the social world requires guidance from theoretical questions and, on the other hand, realities from data may require an adjustment or winnowing out of the theory. Given this symbiotic relationship between theory and practice, I employ theory to analyse data, but remain alert to contradictions between theory and findings. Against this backdrop, the chapter discusses scholars' theorisation of collective action, particularly why people engage in service delivery protests (SDPs), what repertoires they use, and how theorists juxtapose so-called 'popcorn' or 'unorganised' SDPs with 'organised protests' that are facilitated by social movements.

As I have shown in the Literature Review chapter, so-called 'unorganised' protests fight for similar things 'organised' social movements fight for. Many SDPs that erupted outside of the new social movements (NSMs) around 2005 fought for similar issues the NSMs before them raised, such as housing, water and electricity. Interestingly, 'unorganised' movements deploy repertoires that are also utilised in 'organised' social movements such as illegally reconnecting electricity and occupying vacant land and houses. While there is often not much disagreement on the reasons for the protests and the repertoires employed in these protests, there is an emerging strand of literature that questions the popcorn metaphor that most scholars use to describe SDPs. This strand of literature argues that so-called spontaneous or 'popcorn' protests have a certain degree of organisation, continuity and shared belief which allows them to assign a common meaning to given collective events. Given this, can the so-called spontaneous protests be regarded as a social movement? After all, social movements are diverse and often take on many different forms, which sometimes makes them difficult to define. Social movements are not always formal, organised institutions; rather they are often constituted as broad informal groups which pursue a shared

ideology or goal in society (Zald and McCarthy, 2002). The SDPs that I investigate in this thesis are made up of informal networks of persons either on the same side or different sides of conflicts.

I employ different strands in Social Movement Theory, horizontalism, the logic of autonomous movements and spontaneity to understand why people participate in collective action (SDPs), what repertoires they enact to realise their goals for urban development, and how they go about doing this organisationally. Social Movement Theory (SMT) provides a relatively strong rationale for (i) why people participate in protests, (ii) what repertoires they use to realise their urban development objectives in the case studies, but (iii) SMT's are found wanting in explaining/understanding the role of spontaneity in collective action or how so-called spontaneously protests mobilise. Given this, horizontalism, autonomism and spontaneity illuminate the organised versus unorganised dichotomy.

These complementary ideas reveal that groups of people can organise without centralised leadership. This is crucial because social movement scholarship places a lot of value on leadership, and often regards actions by a group of individuals without a clear recognisable leadership as spontaneous. However, lack of leadership may be a deliberate organisational strategy espoused in the logic of horizontalism and practiced by autonomous movements. I use ideas from horizontalism to analyse protesters' demands, ways they initiate, dramatise and maintain their protests as well as the different ways they organise, which involves direct democracy, forging horizontal, nonhierarchical relationships that open up space for free, open and candid engagements with one another. The practice of autonomous movements brings interesting ideas such as a refusal to align to the vertical institutional left, a ban on party and union regalia, flags and banners – practices which are prevalent in SDPs.

The chapter is organised into three broad sections. The first section provides brief background information on collective action, collective identity, and social movements. The second section discusses the Social Movements Theory that guide the study, namely, Resource Mobilisation Theory, the Political Opportunity Structure approach, and Framing Processes Theory. The third section focuses on ideas from horizontalism, autonomous movements, spontaneity, and Gramscian's notions of power.

4.2. The struggle for urban development

Before turning to the discussion of Social Movement Theory, I briefly first locate SDPs in relation to collective action, collective identity and social movements. I seek to explain the ways in which service delivery protesters voice, dramatise and advance their concerns to demand urban development in their communities. I also explain that some form of collective identity is necessary for collective action. Next, I consider the activities and organisation of social movements and the social organisation movements. This discussion helps to set a basis for understanding so-called popcorn protests in South Africa particularly the reasons for protests, repertoires and organisational structure utilised in SDPs. I argue that so-called spontaneous service delivery protests are not organised into formal social movement organisations, but they have a certain level of organisation which fits the 'social movement' classification. This will become clearer later on in the chapter.

4.2.1. Collective action and Collective identity

Service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha engage in varying types of collective action to demand for more and better service delivery. Collective action refers to the ways social movements voice their concerns and grievances by engaging in protests to dramatise their concerns and demand or resist a course of action (Snow, Soule and Kriese, 2004). Collective action draws and depends on consequences from interactions and choices of an individual along with the others (Heckathorn, 1996). Collective action has diverse taxonomies ranging from confrontational versus persuasive, normative versus non-normative, conversionary versus competitive, high cost versus low cost and online versus offline action (Odag, Ulug and Solak, 2016; Morgan and Chan, 2016; Becker and Tausch, 2015; Wright, 2009; Postmes and Brunsting, 2002). The logic of collective action is defined by strong commitment, formal organisational control, and collective identity framing (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). Collective action may even require selective incentives such as laws and norms which reward collaborators and discipline defectors (Heckathorn, 1996). This is useful in service delivery protests where people who do not participate may be punished or victimised while those who participate are respected and supported. Clearly, some form of collective identity is necessary for collective action.

Collective identity ensues from a process of moulding identities through the interaction of participants (Tarrow, 2011; Cohen, 1985). This process involves actors weighing the costs and benefits of collective action through interaction, negotiation and forging social cohesion (Melucci, 1988). For collection action to happen, there should be a group of people who commit to absorbing the costs of collective action. A group achieves collective identity when its members share at least one common goal, common convictions/beliefs and are connected by emotional bonds and social relationships (Opp, 2009). Collective identity enables members to identify each other, maintain solidarity, build cultural and symbolic practices that encourage communication of members and help mark out a group's social norms and boundaries (Dumoulin, 2018).

A measure of identity helps convert individual interests to group interests and individual action to collective action (Goodwin and Jasper, 2015). Collective identity helps to disrupt the status quo; usually elites "try to legitimise inequalities of power and wealth by disseminating ideas about the advantages of the status quo, and about the dangers of alternatives" (Zirakzadeh, 2006:14). Notwithstanding the attempts from the elites, non-elites mount dramatic struggles to change the status quo or an aspect of the social world they abhor. This is important in the study of SDPs where some narratives and responses from the government apparatus seek to vilify, demonise, and thwart activism.

4.2.3. Defining Social Movements

In this study, I regard ordinary people's contestations for service delivery in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha as part of social movements. Social movements are diverse, which makes them difficult to define. Tilly (2004), for example, admitted that for many years he avoided the term 'social movement' because it brought about different meanings, leading to more obscurity than clarification. He later defined a social movement as involving ordinary people's collective claims on authorities, elites, and other groups by means of campaigns and performances. Similarly, Tarrow (2011:9) defines social movements as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opposition and authorities." Certainly, SDPs fit these definitions, although of course, questions may be raised on how 'sustained' these collective claims and challenges are.

Social movements are not necessarily formal organised institutions but are often broad informal groups which pursue a shared ideology or goal in society (Zald and McCarthy, 2002). della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that a social movement is not a single organisation but a network of informal or formal organisation depending on different circumstances. Thus, a social movement is made up of informal networks of persons or organisations with a collective identity who are on the same side in political or cultural conflicts which work to promote and facilitate social change (Tarrow, 2011; Diani, 1992). In other words, informal and formal organisations which work separately but for a common cause can be regarded as a social movement.

Social movements can be divided into old social movements (OSM) and new social movements (NSM) – not to be confused with South Africa's new social movements which emerged in the post-1994 era that I discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas OSMs focus on materialistic goals such as improving the standard of living of a given social class, NSMs concentrate on non-materialistic goals like identity, women's rights, environmental rights, pacifism culture, lifestyle, animal liberation and consumer protection and are chiefly of Western origin but the topics they advance resonate around the world though (Feixa, Pereira and Juris, 2009; Pichardo 1997; Scott, 1990). Melucci (1996) and Touraine (1981) argue that everything is new in these NSM which emerged in the post-industrial period. Whereas OSMs arose in Europe in the 19th century Europe and the early 20th century, NSMs emerged in the 1960s following the west's post-industrial economy (Feixa et al., 2009). SDPs have their feet in both OSMs and NSMs in that they fight for material gains such as houses, electricity, water, and non-materialistic goals e.g., dignity and respect in government's interactions with them.

Importantly, a social movement is a collectivity outside institutional channels with some degree of organisation and continuity which resist and promote change in a group, community, or world order it is also part of (McAdam and Snow, 1997). Social movements play a pivotal role in allowing ordinary people to participate in public politics (Tilly, 2004). Social movements involve shared beliefs and a sense of belonging (Nash, 2000). They can also be regarded as a mobilised demand for change in a society which involves "a set of opinions and beliefs which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:217-218). So crucial are beliefs that Nash (2000) argues that belief and solidarities afford actors and observers the opportunity of assigning a shared meaning to certain

collective events which ordinarily would not have been regarded part of a common event. Drawing from the above definitions, I adopt the view that service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are a social movement particularly because they have enabled ordinary people to collectively participate in public politics through their campaigns and performances over the years. However, although service delivery protesters engage, to a certain level, in activities that social movement organisations conduct, I do not regard their protests to have developed into a social movement organisation.

When a specific movement phenomenon becomes prolonged, it may institutionalise and lead to a social movement organisation (SMO). Zald and Ash (1966) coined the term Social Movement Organisations, arguing that social movements often manifest themselves in diverse social movement organisations. SMOs differ from social movements in that the former is a more formally organised version of social movement and constitutes a part of specific social movement (Zald and McCarthy, 2002). A more or less formal organisation tends to occur if a movement's mobilisation efforts outlast a single event and connects multiple networks of activists and adherents (McCarthy and Zald, 2001). In this case, SMOs help manage the interdependence between a movement's activists and adherents. SMOs are formally organised and mobilise more consolidated struggles towards their clear-cut goals. Armstrong and Bartley (2013) note that:

> Social movements organise people, resources, and ideas for social change. Many do this through formal organisations, and most sociologists recognise the social movement organisation (SMO) as a key factor in the study of movements. SMOs can be defined as formal organisations that take the collective pursuit of social change as a primary goal.

In this regard, della Porta and Diani (2006:145) highlight the important role of SMOs as:

> [I]nducing participants to offer their services; defining organisational aims; managing and coordinating contributions; collecting resources from their environment; selecting, training, and replacing members … act as powerful sources of identity for a movement's own constituency, its opponents, and bystander publics.

In distinguishing social movements and Social Movement Organisations (SMOs), McCarthy and Zald (1977) view the latter like a firm which accumulates resources, employ staff and 'sell' their ideas to potential targets, and the former like the industry to which the firms belong. While this is a purely market-centric/economistic formulation that applies to rich NGOs, which most

movements in the global South do not represent, 'selling' ideas to potential recruits is applicable to my case study areas. Using these ideas, I analyse the ways in which leaders 'sell' protest ideas to potential protesters, that is, the manner in which leaders mobilise residents to join the protest network.

SMOs also play a role in challenging ideas, practices, and the status quo. Social Movements and SMOs can address broad issues of politics in a way that can be transformative (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Advocacy has the potential of making claims for the marginalised in a manner that increases the capacity to demand citizenship rights and bring them into wider spheres of decision making (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Social movements thus extend the boundaries of citizenship to excluded groups and oppose a development project while at the same time opposing the ideology behind that development. The emphasis is on "challenging existing power relations" instead of "working around them for piece meal gains, e.g. better service delivery" (Mottiar, 2014:374). Although so-called spontaneous service delivery protests are not organised into formal social movement organisations, they have a certain degree of organisation which fits the 'social movement' classification. With this background in mind, I now turn to a discussion of Social Movement Theory.

4.3. Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory (SMT) attempts to explain the reasons for social mobilisation, the forms it takes, and the results and consequences it brings. SMT draws from diverse disciplines within the social sciences and has changed tremendously over the years. In the 1900s, sociologists thought movements ensued from random incidents of people who reacted emotionally to occurrences beyond their control. Gustave Le Bon, in his book, "The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind" studied collective behaviour and concluded that when an individual submerged in a crowd, his behaviour became primitive, irrational, and capable of 'spontaneous' violence (Le Bon, 2002).

The dominant belief was that social movements were a form of collective behaviour. Flowing from this, scholars regarded Social Movements as "*spontaneous,* unorganised and unstructured phenomena" quite unlike the institutional and organisational behaviour (Morris, 2000:445, emphasis added). Collective behaviour and related theories underplayed human agency and related

mechanisms such as social organisation, strategising, rationality, reason, and analysis. Although not explicitly stated, some scholars' characterisation of so-called popcorn SDPs resemble the description of irrational crowds espoused in collective behaviour formulations.

In 1965, Mancur Olson, an economist, wrote a book titled 'The Logic of Collective Action' wherein he asked why and when individuals would protest if they were purely rational and carefully weighed the costs and benefits of their choices (Olson, 1965). While this was an overly economistic and individualistic approach where costs and benefits were considered for an individual not for a group(s), Olson showed that rational people could participate in protests unlike Le Bon's stance. Following this, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977) developed another economistic version of protest which argued that formal organisations are the core of social movements and likened social movement organisations (SMOs) to firms which gather resources, hire staff and sell their ideas to potential stakeholders. Like firms, SMOs competed against each other for resources and taken together the SMOs made a social movement industry. This approach, with its different shades, is called 'Resource Mobilisation Theory' (RMT).

Around the time the RMT was developed, some scholars saw the political dimension of social movements. Scholars noted that social movements such as the civil rights and labour movements made demands to the state particularly voting rights. The state was now seen as both the target as well as the adjudicator of grievances (Goodwin and Jasper, 2015). As in the case with resource mobilisation theory, social movements were regarded as rational beings whose activities were like normal politics which used extra-institutional means. These theories emphasised social movements' relationship with the state, particularly conflict and external environments of social movements. Scholars explained that social movements are a result of 'opportunities' created by the state (e.g., reduced repression or division among political and economic elites). The 'Political Opportunity Structure (POS)' approach explains that top-down opening in the political structure influences the process and outcome of movements (Tarrow, 1996).

Further, in the late 1980s, scholars recognised the significance of the cultural side of social movements. Scholars highlighted the importance of creating symbols, convincing people about their grievances and forging solidarity among activists. One of the cultural approaches is the 'Framing Processes Theory' where organisers 'frame' issues in a manner that makes sense to

potential recruits and the broader public. Having briefly traced the history of Social Movements, I now take each of these Social Movement Theory approaches in turn.

4.3.1. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT)

I use the Resource Mobilisation Theory to analyse how Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protesters generate, aggregate, and spend resources. I analyse the ways they mobilise resources and the type of resources (material and non-material) they accumulate including the organisational and leadership structure they embrace.

Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) explains the process in which a group collectively gains control of resources necessary for collective action, networks of social movements with other groups, the importance of external support, and the tactics authorities use to incorporate or control movements (McCarthy and Zald, 2001). RMT explains what protesters do and how they do it (repertoires) and with what they do it (resources). What is key in mobilisation are the resources controlled by a group prior to mobilisation, and the processes employed in pooling resources and directing them towards social change and outsiders' contribution in increasing the resource pool (Jenkins, 1983). For movements to survive, they need 4 broad resources namely, human, informational, moral and material (Ballard et al., 2006; Cress and Snow, 1996). While no consensus exists on the type of resources that are significant, frequently used assets include facilities, legitimacy, money, labour, technical expertise and capital (McCarthy and Zald; 1977; Tilly, 1978). Material and non-material resources include friendship, moral engagement, faith, authority, services, money, work, labour, technical expertise, and legitimacy (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978). There are consequences for mobilising one set of resources over another – e.g., money versus labour; the resources prioritised have a bearing on tactical action (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). Oliver and Marwell (1992) identify what they call action technologies. These are comprised of production technologies which seek to achieve goals and mobilisation technologies which aim to mobilise resources.

Resources can either be tangible or intangible. Interestingly, intangible assets encompass specialised (e.g., organising and legal skills) and the unspecialised labour of supporters (Jenkins, 1983). An example of an intangible resource is networks. In considering how social movements

are formed, scholars explore the networks that organisations build upon (Ballard et al., 2006). Such networks – which can either be formal or informal develop along, inter alia, class, gender, racial, ethnic and religious lines (Ballard et al., 2006) – are mobilised differently depending on the structure of the organisation. This is especially significant in analysing the networks that protesters in my two case studies draw upon. For Jenkins (1983), formal, organised and centralised social movements mobilise resources better than informal and decentralised social movements. Given the importance of mobilisation in community struggles, comparisons about which structure is more effective should not crowd our thinking to an extent that scholars forget that even the so-called spontaneous protests mobilise resources. This is important in my case studies where the protests are generally identified as spontaneous or popcorn.

Networks are used to mobilise people within and outside the affected community and to this end different strategies and tactics are used. For some, the most valuable contribution of this theory is its emphasis on the importance of outside contributions and the assimilation of institutional resources (Jenkins, 1983). Also, key in this theory is the need to aggregate resources for collective purposes; such resource aggregation calls for some level of organisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Activists should employ different tactics and strategies to mobilise supporters and garner support from the masses and elite publics by neutralising and, in some cases, transforming these groups into sympathisers (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Some scholars downplay the importance of resources in protest though. For example, Piven and Cloward (1992) argue that what is necessary for a protest are common grievances and targets. In this thesis, I hold the view by McCarthy and Wolfson (1996) that labour by volunteers is a key resource at the grassroots level. Further, I draw on the RMT to analyse the level of organisation used to aggregate internal and external resources and the different tactics employed in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Additionally, social movements have a relationship with the larger society within which they operate. They utilise infrastructure that society provides such as communication media, preexisting networks, influence levels and institutional centres (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). RMT underlines the importance of these structural factors and argues that participation in social movements is based on rationality which is opposed to what traditional theories argue. RMT can be used to analyse the use of certain symbols and gadgets to determine whether such use is based on

rationality and meant to push for better services in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Using RMT, I analyse the ambivalent relationship SDPs have with the media; for example, on the one hand, protesters seek to publicise their contestations, but on the other hand, they bemoan negative reporting from the media outlets.

RMT examines the "dynamics and tactics of social movement growth, decline, and change" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1213). What works to achieve one aim may be in direct conflict with the kind of behaviour required to achieve another (Goodwin and Jasper, 2015). This paradox is quite important as it best explains how confrontational protest tactics may work to pressure the government to deliver but can serve to undermine other tactics that seek to appeal to the conscience of the government and other stakeholders. RMT also deals with the tactics employed by authorities to influence movements (by incorporating or controlling them).

Additionally, Resource Mobilisation theorists regard social movements as extensions of institutionalised actions and restrict focus to institutional change movements which seek to change social structure aspects and the "reward distribution of society" (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218). Social movements advance the interests of excluded groups from the polity and organise unorganised communities against institutional elites (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1978). Although SDPs are not primarily concerned about institutional change, they advance the interests of marginalised low-income individuals.

A key contribution of RMT is its emphasis on the importance of outside contributions and contemporary social movement's co-optation of institutional resources (Jenkins, 1983). The traditional assumption has been that resources only come from the direct beneficiaries of social change; that social movements do not acquire resources from institutional sources. The movements of the 1960s and 1970s mobilised a 'conscience constituency' comprised of the wealthy and affluent middle class and co-opted institutional resources from social welfare institutions, universities, private foundations, the mass media, government agencies, and business corporations (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). This suggests a shift away from the classical movement organisations made up of indigenous leadership, and where resources came from direct beneficiaries to embrace resources contributed by individuals who are not direct beneficiaries. In this case, resources can come from conscience constituencies whose actions 'speak for' rather than involve an aggrieved

group (Jenkins, 1983). That said, to mobilise successfully, a movement should not only rely on external structures but its own ability to pull diverse resources together (Edwards and Gillham, 2013). I assess the dynamics of leadership and resources that SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha pull together.

One of the general criticisms levelled against RMT is its underestimation of grievances and ideology as crucial determinants of participation in social movements (Useem, 1980: Carden, 1978). Klanderman (1984) argues that although grievances and ideology fail to explain the rise of social movements, they affect why members decide to participate in a movement. Such participation in a movement is regarded as a by-product of rational decisions where people assess costs and benefits of involvement in a social movement (Klandermans, 1984). More contemporary analyses critique these economic interpretations of the 1980s. In their desire to avoid the "pschopathological models, which characterised collective behaviour as irrational, resource mobilisation theorists recast movement participants as ultrarationalistic actors devoid of feeling": movement participants are "neither psychotics nor computers" though (Benford and Hunt, 1992:50). This means that in order for participants to act, they should not merely be mobilised but they should also be inspired.

Although RMT does not necessarily deny the presence of grievances, it focuses on the structural conditions that enable such grievances to be expressed (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Previously, American conservatives in their quest to delegitimise the radical left and reform social movements underlined the significance of 'outside' resources. These political analysts deemphasised grievances as propellers of social movements and placed focus on 'communist conspiracy', 'outside agitators' and outside funding meant to create an appearance of widespread grievances (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). This is important in the study of service delivery protests in South Africa where the government and police sometimes see the contestations as attempts by outside elements – the 'Third Force' – that are bent on destabilising South Africa's democracy.

While traditional explanations of social movement formation stressed a sudden increase in short term grievances caused by rapid social change's structural strains (Gusfield, 1968), RMT regard grievances as secondary. RMT views grievances, in and of themselves, as insufficient to steer collective action; for grievances to matter, organisations and issue entrepreneurs should ensure

that grievances are "defined, created, and manipulated" in a manner that engenders collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1215). While I draw on aspects of the RMT, I find its economistic outlook problematic as it does not reflect the praxis of SDP protesters. For instance, although I do not characterise SDP protesters and leaders as issue entrepreneurs, I acknowledge that activists engage in producing and interpreting grievances differently depending on strategies they seek to deploy (Martinez Lucio et al., 2017). This is helpful in discussing whether SDPs are popcorn or relatively organised because service delivery grievances need to be clearly defined and utilised in a manner that encourages collective action. Using RMT, I explain the activists who have the capacity to frame grievances in a manner that encourages people to protest. This offers some explanations on why some communities protest more than other communities which have somewhat similar grievances.

Additionally, RMT sees grievances as relatively constant and movements form due to long-term changes in the resources a group possesses, its organisation, and collective action opportunities (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Oberschall, 1978). Some analysts argue for an entrepreneurial theory of movement formation where the resources available, particularly cadres and organising facilities are the main factor (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Clearly, movements form through various means hence the need to adopt a multifactored approach. In this regard, Gamson, Fireman and Rytina (1982) argue for what they call a "threshold" model of resources which arguably applies to grievances as well. This means that before a movement emerges, each individual factor should be present at its threshold level, e.g., group organisation and experienced organisers; additional resources after the threshold engender little differences.

While resource mobilisation theory makes significant contributions in understanding how resources are used in mobilisation it has its limitations such as its focus on centralised social movement organisations. Indeed, Flynn (2011:119) has criticised the RMT for focusing "almost exclusively on centralised social movement organisations" and ignoring "decentralised social movement communities." Service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha strive for decentralised or horizontal leadership structures where the focus is not on an individual leader but on the community. Also, RMT fails to provide reasons that social movements' participants cite for mobilisation (Opp; 2009; Ballard et al., 2006). Framing Processes theory provides the reasons

participants give for participating in mobilisation. However, before turning to Framing Process, I first discuss the political opportunity structure approach.

4.3.2. Political Opportunity Structure (POS) Approach

I use the Political Opportunity Structure approach to analyse the contexts which allow protesters to stage protests such as the right to protest enshrined in the Constitution (Constitution of South Africa, Section 17). I also use the POS to analyse strategies that protesters use, noting when protesters utilise elite conforming and elite challenging repertoires. Further, I analyse the land occupations, electricity, and water reconnections in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha and argue that such confrontational repertoires satisfy a need for land to build houses with water, electricity and sanitation, and reconnections help access services.

The POS approach concerns itself with the context within which movements may or may not emerge (Opp, 2009; Ballard et al., 2006). Eisinger (1973) laid the foundation for the POS theory in his analysis of the structure of opportunities, that is, the political environment context within which politics occur. Undoubtedly, social movements affect the course of history, yet they do so within the circumstances they find themselves in, that is, they do not choose the contexts (Meyer, 2004). That is why Chloe and Kim (2012) regard this approach as a political condition outside the social movement which affects the movement's mobilisation. Political opportunity structures are "consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent-dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994:85). POS are political mechanisms "available (for example, constitutions, policies, institutions, legislation) as well as historical opportunities or moments at which coalitions are challenged" such as "before or after elections" (Mohanty et al., 2010:6). Basically, these structures are external to the movement itself but affect what a movement does.

POS theorists argue that protests should not be understood by merely focusing on internal structures, capacities, interests and resources of activists because actors' methods do not occur in a political and social vacuum; they are influenced by several contextual forces including the closedness or openness of political institutions, disunity of political elites, changes in elites, presence of allies and the government's tendency towards repression, changes in regime, political

instability, and the weakening of states (della Porta, 2008; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1996; Tilly, 1978). These opportunities may offer leeway which allows social movements to mobilise. Thus, a change in hindering and favouring factors enable mobilisation, by creating an opportunity whereby protesters and activists strategically use a certain protest.

The political opportunity structure are dimensions of political environments that offer incentives for people to engage in collective action through affecting projected chances for either success or failure, but they are not necessarily permanent, national, and formal (Tarrow, 1998). These dimensions can be temporary such as when particular events open 'windows of opportunity' which oppositional actors can capitalise on to advance claim-making and mobilisation. I consider the 'windows of opportunity' Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protesters utilise in their struggles.

POS theorists argue that grievances in and of themselves do not necessarily lead to protests, but the context and timing of such grievances can determine whether or not protests will emerge. Indeed, della Porta (2008) opines that social movements emerge and succeed not necessarily because they seek to address new grievances, but because changes in the broader political environment allow already existing grievances to be heard. Here, it would be important to see how grievances affect protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, particularly when such grievances for service delivery have lingered and intensified.

Using the POS approach, I interpret successes or failures of activism. This is because the POS explains protest cycles, arguing that such cycles begin when there is an increase of "structurally created political opportunities" and expand as a result of a movement's activities such as a movement's ability to mobilise and rapid innovation (Ballard et al., 2006:5). Factors such as the state's increased repression, an increased acceptance of activists' claims by the group, tiredness (protest fatigue), boredom, frustration and disillusionment by movement's participants may lead to the ebbing of protests (Ballard et al., 2006; Zeurn, 2001; Tarrow, 1994).

Both internal and external conditions influence the strategies actors will employ. The use of radical forms of protests often starts due to their resonance with at least some of the movement's actors and at the same time the political opportunity structure such as the type of regime and the state's ability to repress make such radical forms to be used (della Porta, 1995). A blend of democratic

institutions and considerable prosperity are likely to allow elite conforming protests (protests that obey existing institutions such as approved demonstrations) while a combination of a more closed political system and relative poverty call for elite challenging or more confrontational and non-institutionalised repertoires (Bourdreau, 1996). The POS helps in analysing when elite conforming and elite challenging protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are used. The transition from elite confirming repertoires to elite challenging repertoires is key in uncovering the processes involved in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests and helps analyse the appropriateness of the popcorn descriptor.

More confrontational repertoires may be an entirely reasonable way of satisfying needs and creating resource. In this way, land occupations can be seen as a resource acquisition strategy which brings with it housing, water, electricity, and sanitation. These tactics are crucial in understanding my second research question which considers the repertoires protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha deploy and why they deploy such in their contestations. In rural Brazil, the Brazilian Landless Movement has conducted more than 250 000 land occupations and improved the general livelihoods of land reform settlers (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016; Wolford, 2003). In South Africa, the Landless People's Movement has occupied land as a self-activity of land redistribution to the landless people (Greenberg, 2004). Thus, at times direct action serves as a protest alternative even when there are strong opportunities because the very process of struggle addresses the needs of members (Bourdreau, 1996). A distinction is made between 'greed' and 'grievances'; here insurgencies are propelled by either political demands or economic aspirations (Korf, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). In this regard, I use the POS to explain widespread land occupations, particularly in Khayelitsha and show that land occupations are addressing the needs of the occupiers which is to build houses with water, electricity, and proper sanitation. Intriguingly, protesters shape political opportunity structures and improve conditions of their protest via collective action. Could the ANC's adoption of the land expropriation without compensation stance be, in some way, one of the gains of community land invasion and occupation? Chapter 6 grapples with this question.

Yet despite the contributions of the POS approach, it fails to place due emphasis on activists' role; this could be a result of a lack of a clear analytical framework which aids it to explain the interplay

of actors and the opportunity structure (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). The POS underlines the political weakness of contending groups arguing that political systems/structures determine whether or not movements will emerge. This formulation places too much social movement agency in the hands of external actors (Morris, 2000). As Karriem (2009a:263) has contended, the POS, is "too formulaic in that movements *require* an opportunity to act" (emphasis in the original). He uses the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST) struggles to illustrate that bottom-up mobilisations can use ideology and human agency to create space in the political system. Karriem (2009a:277) shows that the "MST's organisational capacity, it's ideological outlook, and the agency of its members are crucial in driving its struggles across local-global scales." As such, I rope in the Framing Processes Theory to complement the POS' contributions.

4.3.3. Framing Processes Theory (FPT)

I use the Framing Processes theory (FPT) to complement the RMT and POS approaches. The FPT provides an insider perspective through explaining the reasons why social movements mobilise from the social movements activists themselves (in this case, service delivery protesters). This is what Snow (2004) regards as movement actors' interpretation of their own world. I use the FPT to analyse the service delivery protesters conscious interpretative, meaning-making and meaning-maintenance work which is geared toward building solidarity and collective action.

Scholars, including those of new social movement theory, have long underlined the importance of Framing Processes in understanding social movements (Goffman, 1974; Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1989; Benford and Snow, 2000). New social movement (NSM) theory has its roots in European traditions of social theory as well as political philosophy (Larana, Johnston and Gusfield, 1994; Klanderman, 1991). NSM emerged chiefly as a critique of the Marxist inadequacies in explaining collective action. The inadequacies related to classical Marxism's economic reductionism which believed that key political social action ensued from the "fundamental economic logic of capitalist production and all other social logics are secondary at best in shaping such action" and Marxism's class reductionism which held that "the most significant social actors will be defined by class relationships rooted in the process of production and that all other identities are secondary" in the composition of collective actors (Buechler, 1995:442). These Marxist premises prioritised proletarian revolution centred around production and marginalised other forms of social protest.

To address this, NSM has considered other reasons for collective action rooted in culture, ideology and politics and underlined other sources of identity such as ethnicity, sexuality, and gender as central in collective identity (Kendall, 2005; Buechler, 1995). Theorists of new social movement, for example, Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989) stress the value of framing and emphasise subjective elements including identity, values, and status.

Frame refers to the interpretations that individuals use to identify, label, and perceive occurrences/events in their immediate world and the world at large (Snow et al., 1986). Frames can also be defined as comprising of a broader interpretive definition or answer to the questions: 'what is going on' or 'should be going on' (Benford and Snow, 2000). This process creates shared meanings which help in social movement operations. Even Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory underscored the importance of shared feelings of grievance in protest mobilisation. Essentially, Framing Processes theorists argue that it is not about what outsiders to a movement explain as problems, grievances, circumstances, and social world, but how movement adherents and other relevant actors define and understand their world. I employ the Framing Processes to explain how protesters view themselves, their situations, and the organisation of protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This bottom-up approach is crucial in that it gives marginalised people a voice by excavating their knowledge and experiences, thereby deter a top-down approach which voices over participants.

While there is a danger that such construction and meaning-making by members of a social movement might be overly subjective, it is important to understand how a movement defines itself and understands its moral standings to a given problem (Leach and Scoones, 2007). This is vital because apart from identifying, perceiving, labelling, and locating phenomena that directly affect social actors and those they are concerned about, activists also make sense of such occurrences (Goffman, 1974). Such understandings are crucial in making sense of the reasons people protest and the choice of repertoires they deploy.

Frames thus give meaning to happenings which helps in organising experience and generating action (Benford and Snow, 2000). Framing in social movements and protests forges collective identity (through shared values, identity, and status) and solidarity among members which is important in mobilising and in sustaining social movements (Hunt and Benford, 2004; Ballard et

al., 2006). Similar framing processes may produce 'collective action frames' which transcend individual constructs to include cognitive processes, ideological concepts, culture, emotions which encompass beliefs and meanings that are action-oriented and involve the negotiation of shared meanings (Tarrow, 2011; Snow and Benford, 1988). Collective action frames are used in interpreting and assigning meaning to important events and conditions and hence framing processes act as "conscious strategic efforts … to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:6). I utilise the FPT to analyse the deliberate effort, if any, by protesters to make sense of occurrences in their communities. This helps determine whether protests pop up with no analysis, strategy, and deliberate meaning-making prior to the protest event.

Values, beliefs, and ideas are often classified under ideology. Ideology refers to a set of "beliefs, values and principles, attitudes and/or ideas" (Gerring, 1997:967). Ideology aims at "justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community" (Freeden, 2003:32). In some social movements, ideology links to violent collective action; violence is often used as a tool for achieving political, economic, social goals, stated ideology or specific collective action frames (della Porta, 1995). Often, violence is seen as the only means when objectives are radical or rigid and when members of the same group classify other groups or the other group or persons as enemies or different (Cohrs, 2012; della Porta, 1995). Such reasoning is crucial in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, where protests have involved both 'orderly', 'disruptive', and so-called 'violent' protests.

Effectively, frames and framing processes involve constructing reality, producing and maintaining related meanings (Benford and Snow, 2000). Actors cognitively process ambiguous, vague, problematic, and complex situations to make them more intelligible, a process Schon and Rein (1994) call 'naming and framing' which involves actors constructing selective stories. This means that social movement actors simplify and condense frames strategically. This also involves decisions about elements to emphasise and focus on. Yet who decides what elements to pay close attention to? Here, Leach et al.'s (2010) argument that specific actors produce frames which are embedded in political, institutional and life settings is crucial. Drawing from the FPT, I analyse the kind of leaders whose influences sway the other protesters and consider where they draw such

influence from and how they use the influence in their constituencies. I also consider the kinds of structures the people have set to organise their protests.

Social movements' actions and their interpretive work are well calculated and used tactfully. For one, social movement adherents assign and interpret phenomena in such a way as to mobilise and garner support from prospective adherents, on the one hand, and to neutralise and demobilise antagonists, on the other hand (Snow and Benford, 1988). To this end, social movements not only locate problems, but they also identify who is to be blame for the problem, and advance solutions that help realise the desired change (Larana, 1994). Framing, then, is an important step in the journey towards social action.

To ensure the longevity of social movements, this tactful interpretive work is conducted continually. It is important to note, as Snow (2004) does, that framing perspectives explain how social movement actors do the double work of 'producing' and 'maintaining' meaning to different groups such as protagonists (those who are active supporters of a movement), by standers (those who are not interested or who are neutral) and antagonists (those strongly opposed to the views, values and arguments of a movement). Clearly, once produced, meanings must be maintained which is one reason why, upon the construction of identities and meanings, they undergo a process of continual redefinition to include new experiences and phenomena (Snow and Machalek, 1984). The interpretive work is useful in analysing the different narratives protesters present to prospective adherents and those they tell antagonists.

Framing processes create mental structures (collective action frames) which include cognitive processes, beliefs, values, identity, culture, emotions, ideological concepts; these factors shape social movements and collective activities (Tarrow, 2011; Oliver and Johnston, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988). Actors give meaning and interpretations to happenings using collective action frames (Snow and Benford, 1988). In this way, framing processes are a conscious strategic effort meant to mould shared meanings in a manner that motivates and legitimises collection action and delegitimises opponents (McAdam et al., 1996).

There are three core tasks a frame must fulfil to successfully create meaning: to (i) identify a problem and the person or group responsible for causing it (diagnostic framing), (ii) offer a solution

to the problem and ways to achieve the target (prognostic framing), and (iii) detail 'a call to arms or rationale for action' (motivational framing) (Snow and Benford, 1988:202). Karriem and Benjamin (2016) apply the Framing Process to analyse the Brazilian Landless Movement (MST); they argue that activists use religious motivations to diagnose the injustice frame and justify their right to occupy land. They show that activists "highlight the diagnostic and prognostic frames, how the organisational practices in the encampments promote insurgence, and how new meanings of citizenship are produced" (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016:27).

Crucial components of collective action are thus injustice which arises from individual cognitive judgment and emotional reactions to a given situation, agency and identity which involve building a collectivity, 'us', while distinguishing particular others, 'them' (Gamson, 1992:7). Using FPT, I show how protesters consider what they regard as marginalisation from authorities and the distinction they make between them and the other. Regrettably, the framing processes has a tendency of elite bias. Elite bias refers to the tendency of focusing on the framing by elites, leaders, and activists "to the neglect of rank-and-file participants, potential recruits, bystanders, and others" (Benford, 1997:421). Consequently, framing analysis often tend to have a top-down bias. Such top-down bias is self-defeating in this study that seeks to excavate meanings of both the leaders and the-rank-and-file, to understand how so-called popcorn protests come about. As I have mentioned, in order to give voice to my participants, I adopted a bottom-up approach to research and gave a voice to both protest leaders and rank-and-file protesters.

4.5. Complementing Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory is useful in understanding collective action. However, SMT has been found wanting in helping me understand some aspects of the 'why' and 'how' of movements. First, while resource mobilisation theory sheds light on the human, financial and other resources necessary for mobilisation, it places too much focus on centralised social movement organisations. Second, the political opportunity structure helps highlight the political context that either constrain or enable mobilisation, but it fails to place due emphasis on activists' agency. Third, the Framing Processes Theory helps us appreciate actors' interpretive work in ways that build solidarity and increase chances of collective action, but it too has its shortcomings such as its top-down elite bias.

Although SMT is useful in explaining collective action, it does not help us understand how these movements come and go, nor do they explain the means of organisation they employ. Additionally, the SMT provides a strong rationale for (i) the reasons people participate in protests, (ii) the repertoires they deploy to achieve their urban development objectives but (iii) is limited in explaining the modus operandi of 'unorganised' protests. As such, I draw on the strengths of different concepts that shed light on SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha and thereby address the shortcomings of the SMT. I triangulate the literature on horizontalism, autonomism, and spontaneity to better understand the organisational practices in SDPs.

Horizontalism, autonomism and spontaneity are not part of mainstream social movement theory, but they deal with collective action hence the need to bring them into the discussion of SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. It is easy to misconstrue activism by individuals who reject the vertical, hierarchical forms of organisation and adopt the logic of horizontalism as spontaneous. Yet congruent with the horizontal logic of organisation, groups which are amenable to these ideas decentralise decision making and adopt a leaderless movement. Observers can mistakenly ascribe actions that ensue from such groups as spontaneous. This is best exemplified in the autonomous movements which utilise non-hierarchical structures and refuse to use party and union acronyms, banners, and flags at their events. This study benefits from ideas of horizontalism, autonomous movements and spontaneity because, in many ways, SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha apply their own version of these ideas in their contexts. This helps me to ask whether what is happening in SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha can be regarded as spontaneous or an embrace of a decentralised way of organisation.

4.5.1. Horizontalism

I use ideas of horizontalism to analyse Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's organisational processes. This allows me to ask whether what is happening in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is a lack of organisation or a departure from vertical hierarchy and the logic of representation to an embracing of horizontal ideas. Horizontalism is a form of organising that assumes that all people are equal and should be actively involved in basic decisions that affect their lives (Rowe and Carroll, 2015). Horizontalism advances a leaderless movement philosophy. Horizontal relationships are a departure from vertical ways of organising and a logic of representation (Sitrin and Azzellini,

2012). A good example of horizontalism was displayed in the General Assembly process during Occupy Wall Street protests in the USA in 2011 (I have discussed this in the Literature Review).

One of the leading intellectuals on horizontalism, David Graeber, situates horizontalism within the broader social change theory he calls 'contaminationism' which he regards as "the faith that the experience of direct democracy is infectious, that anyone exposed to it will never be the same, that exposing any significant number of people to it would inevitably lead to the creation of a new political culture" (Graeber, 2012:424). Arguably, contaminationism was at play in the case of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) where in only two months, the OWS kind of horizontalism had spread to 750 cities globally. Basically, the theory views mass exposure to the process of consensus as one which kindles a desire for a different politics which profoundly decentralises decision making power in all institutions including governing bodies, schools, and workplaces (Rowe and Carroll, 2015). OWS held leaderless and partyless ideals. Ideas from horizontalism help in analysing the organisational structure of Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's protests to determine whether what is at play is a lack of organisation or an adoption of more horizontal ways of organisation instead of the hierarchical and representative logic of organisation. Horizontal ways of organisation are prevalent in autonomous movements.

4.5.2. Autonomous movements

South Africa's service delivery protests bear some resemblance to the autonomous principles which are characteristic of autonomous movements. Autonomous movements are characterised by horizontal (non-hierarchical) structures, participatory models, diversity, autonomy, direct democracy, and self-governance with decision making done through consensus where possible and necessary and this is often done in an open assembly (Pruijt and Roggeband, 2014). Autonomy refers to internal organisation models and dissociation from trade unions and political parties (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). A good example of autonomy is the refusal to use union and party acronyms, flags, and banners at protest events. Actors who participate in autonomous movements can do so without a fixed commitment (Katsiaficas, 1997; Tarrow, 1994). In keeping with their refusal to label themselves, not all movement actors who fit the description of autonomous movements identify their movements as such.

Autonomous movements reject representative politics and differentiate themselves from the vertical institutional left (Flesher Fominaya, 2015 Katsiaficas, 1997; Tarrow, 1994). Institutionalised orientation has "a clear division of labor and authority, a centralised organisation, and a loose coupling of ends and means" (Pruijt and Roggeband, 2014:145). While the civil rights movement was an institutional movement, the Occupy movement was predominantly autonomous. The difference between institutional left and autonomous logic of collective action is usually shorthanded as a difference between verticals and horizontals.

Autonomous movements are important to this study because they are associated with spontaneous actions. Although autonomous movements are associated with spontaneity, they can engage in institutional actions which include placing demands on the state, utilising the legal system and welcoming subsidies (Pruijt and Roggeband, 2014). In this sense, autonomous movements should be seen as involving elements of both spontaneity and organisation. This is key to my study which analyses the level of spontaneity and organisation in service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

4.5.3. Spontaneity in social movements

South Africa's service delivery protests have been described as spontaneous. In this dissertation, I question the characterisation of service delivery protests as spontaneous. I explain that while these protests are not as well coordinated and organised as contestations by social movement organisations, they are not as uncoordinated as to describe them as spontaneous, ephemeral, mushroom, or popcorn protests.

In his study of collective behaviour, Blumer (1951:168) invoked the word 'spontaneity': he understood collective behaviour to be what emerges "spontaneously" rather than that which arises from "pre-established understandings or traditions." Spontaneity is also associated with collective excitement and contagion suggesting behaviours that are driven by emotion which can be impulsive, ludicrous, and irrational (Marcuse, 1972; Blumer, 1951). Collective behaviour is contrasted with social movements; social movements are seen as organised and collective behaviour as mainly spontaneous actions which lack organisation. Social movements are seen as pursuing socio-political goals through their activities, but manifestations of collective behaviour

are considered ridiculous such as looting shops (Imhonopi et al., 2013). Some scholars however simply view spontaneity to refer to a lack of planning; here spontaneous events are contrasted with planned ones.

Social movement scholars and newspaper articles that write about spontaneity rarely define it. For example, Flesher Fominaya (2015) did not define spontaneity in the article "Debunking Spontaneity: Spain's 15-M/Indignados as Autonomous Movement." Similarly, in an article titled "Between organisation and spontaneity of protests: the 2010-2011 Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings," Pilati et al., (2019) did not define 'spontaneity', despite their frequent use of this term. However, Snow and Moss (2014:1123) offer a helpful definition of spontaneity in their article titled "Protests on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements", as "events, happenings, and lines of action, both verbal and non-verbal, which were not planned, intended, prearranged, or organised in advance of their occurrence." The Lexico dictionary (2020) defines spontaneity "as a condition of being spontaneous" where "spontaneous" means "performed or occurring as a result of sudden inner impulse or inclination and without pre-meditation or external stimulus." The central theme about spontaneous events and actions is that they are not deliberately thought through prior to their occurrence.

The definitions above do not mean spontaneous events and actions are "random and unpredictable" but that they "are not premeditated" and do not form "part of a formalised system of action" (Snow and Moss, 2014:1123). Also, it does not mean spontaneous actions lack "cognition or rationality" but as Snow and Moss (2014:1123) argue, although some verbal and nonverbal spontaneous actions:

> [H]ave calls for specific lines of action embedded within them, for example a "yell out" 'run!' on the scent of smoke is a call to action and may thus be construed as strategic in the means/end sense. But such sudden and startling actions are spontaneous inasmuch as they were not planned in advance of the stimulus event.

This terminology suggests that these protests lack proper organisation, unlike the formal movements and social movement organisations with proper organisation, formal mobilisation, and planning. Whereas the "synonyms for spontaneity include adlibbing, improvisation, winging it, extemporaneous, impromptu, off the cuff, off the top of one's head, and unplanned" (Snow and Moss, 2014:1123), the key terms used to describe South Africa's service delivery protests include

'popcorn', 'spontaneous', 'mushroom' and 'ephemeral.' Bond (2017:107), who is credited for coining the term 'popcorn' protests in South Africa, argues that because SDPs have "no analysis, strategy and intra-protester alliance, …popcorn is still an appropriate concept" to describe them.

In South Africa, popcorn protests are described as sporadic but enough to form a trend. Interestingly "spontaneity is triggered by certain conditions: non-hierarchical organisation; uncertain/ambiguous moments and events; behavioural/emotional priming; and certain ecological/spatial factors" (Snow and Moss, 2014:1122). Remarkably, even the formal hierarchical organisations also engage in spontaneous actions to further their demands, thus both formal organisations and informal ones employ spontaneous activities to varying degrees in their struggles. The dynamism in the field of protest means that spontaneous activities sometimes happen during or after planned protests (Snow and Moss, 2014). Sometimes the ambiguous situations or a disruption in planned activities opens a door for improvisation. This suggests that movement scholarship has chiselled an overly structured and organised understanding of protests. The resulting effect has been to neglect and trivialise spontaneity. I take this further and question the characterisation of service delivery protests as spontaneous and show that while they are not strictly organised as traditional social movements, they fit the social movements description and use the logic prevalent in autonomous movement which includes a horizontal form of organisation.

To be sure, service delivery protests are not as formalised and well organised and coordinated as struggles in social movement organisations, but they are not as unorganised and uncoordinated as to describe them as popcorn or mushroom protests. I seek to understand why these movements ebb and whether all of them pop and die down? In the context of my study, much of the literature on service delivery protests only focus on the struggle for services. While this is important, I am also interested in finding out how protesters go about effecting the struggle for basic services. If these movements come and go, do they have a form of organisation as seems to be the case in some instances? This is the gap I investigate.

Much of the collective action in the immediate post-apartheid South Africa were formal organisations, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee which later became defunct. There emerged other forms of protests. What was ubiquitous were the widespread protests. For instance, figures from the South African Police Service show that 3000

service delivery related protests were recorded between 2009 and 2012, which means there were almost 3 protest incidents every day (Saba and van der Merwe, 2013). I seek to understand why these protests pop up and die down. Yet, do all the protests really pop up and die down or some become organised? To this end, my study investigates the level of spontaneity and organisation and how they come together. Doing this helps us to understand the role of spontaneity and organisation in service delivery protests.

This study benefits from horizontalist in that horizontalism ideas advocates for the decentralisation of decision making and adopts a leaderless movement. It is easy to dismiss mobilisations which do not employ the vertical way of organisation and where there are no clearly defined roles in the organisation as spontaneous. Autonomous movements employ horizontal (non-hierarchical) structures, participatory models and strive to make decisions based on consensus. Although autonomous movements also have elements of organisation, they are associated with spontaneous activities. It is easy to misinterpret autonomous movements' organisation as spontaneous (as acts not intentionally thought through in advance) because they disassociate themselves from trade unions and political parties, and representative politics which characterise formal organisations. I draw on ideas from horizontalism and some of the practices of autonomous movements including spontaneity to analyse the dynamics of SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Gramsci also considers spontaneity and notions of power.

Gramsci (1971) explains how the elites maintain power and ways in which the grassroots movements can engage in counter-hegemonic activity. To do this, he critically analyses subaltern groups' lived reality, factors which contribute to their subordination (some factors impede while other empower these groups to transform their conditions), culture, modes of thought and degrees of political organisation. Gramsci argues in 'Past and present. Spontaneity and conscious leadership' that subaltern groups' political contestations are usually characterised by spontaneity. He uses spontaneity to refer to these groups acting by 'instinct' or restless impulse to revolt, necessitated by intolerable conditions.

Although the spontaneous rebellions necessitated by social discontent reveal a desire for socio-political change, subaltern groups often fail to transform the conditions by themselves. Given this, Gramsci argues that subaltern groups need 'conscious leadership' – described as political activity

guided by revolutionary theory and entrenched in a broad systematic understanding of historical factors/conditions that bears on subalternity. Interestingly, Gramsci considers pure spontaneity and conscious leadership as nonexistent representations of scholastic 'abstract theory.' In other words, all movements have degrees of both spontaneity and conscious leadership. He differentiates marginal and advanced subaltern groups with different degrees of organisation, consciousness and leadership; marginal and less advanced groups actions are informed by unclear combination of ideas.

Gramsci (1971) argues that the ruling class' hegemony is based on both coercion and consent. Ideological leadership is exercised through a combination of imposition and persuasion; subaltern groups are persuaded to accept dominant ideas as 'common sense.' Gramsci (1971) defines 'common sense' as individuals' uncritical and unconscious acceptance and perception of their world e.g. tradition, folklore, everyday experience, religion and popular science inherited from the past. While common sense is the domain where hegemony operates, it is also a sphere where counter-hegemonic efforts are waged. A process of sustained critique of common sense moves individuals to what Gramsci calls 'good sense' or what Karriem (2009b) regards as 'popular common sense.'

Gramsci interrogated why capitalism remained strong and communist parties failed to seize power in Western Europe. This led him to assess the interplay between the state and civil society. Power centralized in the state maybe seized through 'war of movement' or head-on attack; where power is diffused across civil society – such as in liberal democracies – the 'war of position' involving a protracted strategy is necessary to form an alternative hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). War of position succeeds if a counter-hegemonic force goes beyond its own class or interests to incorporate broader national-popular demands. It also has to engage in political and ideological struggle or 'intellectual and moral reform' which involves critiquing the hegemonic ideas as 'common sense.' Ideology then helps people to gain consciousness of their position and struggle and works as the cement that unites diverse social groups. 'Organic intellectuals' play a critical role in raising consciousness and transforming ideas. Transformative politics thrives on mass participation; movements should continue to raise new organic intellectuals.

I use Gramsci to understand how protesters (particularly seasoned activists) in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha contest common sense about private property and move towards good sense – occupying land, for example. Given that the focus of this thesis is not whether these movements are revolutionary or not, I constrain myself to struggles for urban development. As I will show, the protests are not revolutionary per se but struggles for urban development although, there are some elements of rebellion. Again, this fits within the hybrid frame where the protests are not fully social movements organisation or counter-hegemonic and fully spontaneous – but occupying a middle ground with elements of both.

I use Gramscian ideas to analyse the ways protesters seek to change their conditions, and whether or not they act on a clear political strategy. I analyse the people who provide 'conscious direction' to protesters thereby turn them from 'common sense' to 'good sense' comprised of critical and historical awareness. Gramsci argues that this process consists solely of subaltern groups seeking to give conscious direction to their political activity along with 'organic intellectuals' and 'democratic philosophers' who rise in the struggle. Gramsci (1971:334) argues that:

> critical self-consciousness means, historically and politically, the creation of an elite of intellectuals. A human mass does not 'distinguish' itself, does not become independent in its own right without, in the widest sense, organising itself, and there is not organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders.

Gramsci considers the establishment of subaltern autonomous political organisations as an intermediate phase of conscious leadership and the launching of a revolutionary part which can unite leading subaltern groups to transform the hegemony of the state and civil society as the summit of subaltern political growth (Gramci, 1971). As I will argue, SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, but particularly in Gugulethu are at an important stage of their struggle – which falls between spontaneity and fully organised social movement organisations.

4.6. Conclusion

Three sub-theories of Social Movement theory have provided lenses to view protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Essentially, the theories discussed 'how' 'when' and 'why' protests emerge. RMT underlined the resources necessary to rally people to stage a 'protest' and the organisation required to aggregate the resources. The POS has shed light on the political contexts and structures

within which protests may or may not emerge. FPT chiefly underlined the aggrieved group's construction of meaning and what they consider to be their problems, the people responsible for the problems and the necessary solutions to address the problems. I use these theories to analyse the ways in which Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protesters mobilise resources, interact with the political structures that enable or constrain activism, the tactics they deploy in the fight for urban development, and the ways they frame their problems.

I have noted that some social movements are autonomous and use the horizontal logic of organisation. Given that such movements do not organise like the traditional social movements, they are often associated with spontaneous action. Indeed, non-hierarchical organisations' activities can easily be misconstrued as spontaneous because these organisations sometimes employ spontaneous actions. Yet what is not always apparent to many people is the 'logic' and 'organisation' behind the actions. Deliberations are not overly structured which encourages flexibility, but that logic is part of the organisation. Crudely put, there are times when these organisations 'deliberately' decide to act 'spontaneously' in order to allow inventive manoeuvres. In such cases, what appears like an unplanned outburst would actually be a result of plan. More importantly, processes behind these actions, and the people involved reveal a level of organisation which does not match the spontaneity narrative. I ended the chapter with a brief consideration of Gramsci's understanding of spontaneity and power. While this chapter provided ways to understand and interpret data from the protesters, the next chapter, discusses the ways in which I selected, met, interviewed the protesters and analysed data.

CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the research design and methodology employed in this study. I explain the mixed methods approach that guided this study which involved combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies. I will also discuss the methods of data collection which included both primary and secondary sources with the former involving in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires. I explain that the triangulation of different research methods helped capture a more complete, contextual picture of service delivery protests (SDPs).

Although I employed a mixed methods approach, I consciously placed a heavy reliance on qualitative methodology because my primary concern was on the 'depth' of understanding dynamics of SDPs instead of 'breath' thereof (Blaxter, 2001). Moreover, the intention of the quantitative methodology I utilised in this study was not to engage in statistical analysis or generalise the findings; rather, the questionnaires were geared towards generating basic demographic data that complements the qualitative 'depth' of understanding or lived experiences of my interviewees who participated in service delivery protests.

I used the intrinsic case study approach to focus on service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This demarcation helped narrow my inquiry to boundaries of place (Gugulethu and Khayelitsha), activity (protests) and definition (service delivery protests). In this chapter, I also explain how I avoided harming my participants by strictly adhering to laid down ethics of research. Finally, I explore the challenges I encountered in the field and how I adapted and worked around the challenges.

5.2. Research Design

A research design is a plan or framework which stipulates how a researcher will conduct a research project (Babbie, 2004). Basically, the research design sets a general plan which helps in answering the research problem (Polit and Hungler, 1997). The nature of this study called for a qualitative study. Qualitative research helps in understanding dynamics of people's experiences, behaviour, suppositions, attitudes, assumptions, perceptions, structure of their lives and judgments in the social world (Berg and Latin, 2008; Mouton, 2001).

The qualitative research enables participants to give subjective responses and thereby provide the researcher with a deeper understanding of people's experiences (Silverman, 2010). It also helps the researcher to be knowledgeable of the participants' contexts and the ways in which these contexts influence their behaviour (Berg and Latin, 2008). The qualitative paradigm allowed me to have an in-depth understanding of service delivery contexts and the protests that have ensued in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

5.3. Research Methodology

This study employed a mixed methods approach, that is, both qualitative and quantitative research methodology but with a heavy reliance on the former. The term Mixed methods refers to the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods (Leech et al., 2010). Qualitative research can be described as a research whose findings can be verbally described. The nature of this research necessitated this methodology because as Mouton (2001) notes, qualitative research enables an understanding of the dynamics of people's experiences, behaviours, attitudes, assumptions, structure of their lives, suppositions, and their judgements in their social world's context. While there is a move towards quantitative research which employs numeric data and provides generalisations, the primary concern of qualitative research is achieving 'depth' of understanding and not 'breadth' (Blaxter, 2001). Thus, the focus of this study is not so much on representativeness as it is on understanding a small collection of cases in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha that shed light on the contexts and processes of social life in these areas (Neuman, 2007). Using the qualitative approach afforded me an opportunity to gain an 'insider perspective' from the protesters themselves. In this study, service delivery protesters are Gugulethu and Khayelitsha residents who

have participated in protests which included at least one of the following: housing, electricity, water, land, and sanitation. Given that actors and their actions are best understood in their context (Blaxter, 2001), I immersed myself in the two case study areas in order to get a vantage point of protests from the actors themselves.

The qualitative methodology allowed me to give voice to the respondents because it afforded them ample opportunity to express themselves in verbal and non-verbal cues. At the same time, because of the natural setting in which I interviewed the participants, they were comfortable enough to give detailed responses. Importantly, because I once conducted research in Gugulethu (for my Masters research) many of the protest leaders remembered me and were open enough to give relevant information because of the rapport I built with them over the years. I am familiar with Khayelitsha because I often attend religious gatherings in the area; this made me connect easily with the participants. In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, I walked around with someone who resides in the community. The person was responsible for introducing me to community members which made it easier for people to open up due to the presence of 'one of their own.' That said, I was responsible for facilitating the interviews and focus groups; community workers helped connect me to the protest leaders and also acted as a cover in a sometimes crime-ridden Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Although the nature of the study primarily required a qualitative study, I also made use of a survey – albeit at a small scale to gather basic demographic data from the protesters. A survey allowed me to collect information on a range of issues with each case being investigated on a given aspect under consideration (Bless, Smith and Kagee, 2006). A survey helped me to provide numeric or quantitative description of a variety of topics which enabled me to compare the socio-economic composition of my subjects. A quantitative methodology, however, has its own disadvantages such as a failure to adequately capture interviewees' feelings and views in depth. This weakness was addressed by the qualitative aspect of the study. Whereas the quantitative data provided basic numeric descriptions of service delivery, qualitative methods escavated detailed lived experiences of service delivery protesters in the case study areas.

5.4. Case Study approach

A case study is a concentrated study of a single unit (Yin, 1994; Handel, 1991; Runyan, 1982). The choice of the case study was arrived at because, as Yin (2003) notes, case studies are useful when seeking to answer the 'how' and 'why' questions, when one cannot manipulate the subjects/participants, when contextual issues are important to the study and when there are no clear boundaries between context and phenomenon, for example, when decisions are influenced by the environment they find themselves in. However, case studies make use of several perspectives; some case studies consider a few variables which are measured over time and ignore context (Hersen and Barlow, 1984). Case studies have an advantage of in-depth examination of social phenomena in a real-life setting (Soy, 1997). The case study method can cover one or several cases. I used the case study method to cover two neighbourhoods in the city of Cape Town namely, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

To make the study more focused and manageable, I placed boundaries of place (Gugulethu and Khayelitsha), activity and definition (service delivery protests) on the case studies (Yin, 2003; Cresswell, 2003; Stake, 1995; Miles and Huberman, 1994). In Gugulethu, respondents came from Wards, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 44; in Khayelitsha, respondents were drawn from Wards 18 (Site C), 92 (Site B), 95, 96 and 98 (To protect the identity of my participants, I largely avoid mentioning the exact Wards and places in the case study areas in the 'Analysis chapter.' I only refer to the broader 'Gugulethu' and 'Khayelitsha'). Given that a case study is especially helpful when answering the 'why' and 'how' questions, it is a perfect fit for the research objectives of this study. Also, a case study design is preferable because it allows for 'detailed and in-depth inquiry', narration of cases and a focus on people (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007).

There are different types of case studies namely descriptive, exploratory, explanatory, multiple, collective, instrumental, and intrinsic (Yin, 2003; Stake 1995). A descriptive case study is useful in describing a phenomenon or intervention and the real-life setting it happened. An exploratory case study is helpful in exploring interventions which have vague and multiple outcomes. The explanatory type is appropriate in answering a question that seeks to explain assumed causal links in highly complex real-life interventions where survey or experimental strategies fall short.

Multiple-case studies are useful in exploring differences within and between cases; they are oriented toward the replicating of findings across cases. Collective case studies are similar to multiple case studies in nature and description. Instrumental case studies are useful when the researcher is not primarily interested in the case. Here, the case helps refine a theory or provide insight into an issue and provides a supportive role in facilitating the researcher's understanding of something else. Unlike the instrumental case study, an intrinsic case study is useful when the researcher has genuine interest in the case and better understanding it. Here, the case itself is of primary interest. Intrinsic case studies are ones where the "exploration is driven by a desire to know more about the uniqueness of the case rather than to build theory or how the case represents other cases" (Mills, Durepos and Wiebe, 2010:500).

In view of this, this study makes use of the intrinsic case study. My case studies involved the study of a single unit – social group (protesters) – in two selected communities, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. My interest is not in triangulation of several perspectives from the government and other stakeholders but on the social groups' context/circumstances and reasons for protests, what the group does in protesting (repertoires and organising) and why they do what they do (the reasons behind their chosen strategies and tactics). The primary concern of this study is on the nuances, particularities, and ordinariness of Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's protesters.

My first research objective seeks to understand the reasons for Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protests. To fully comprehend the reasons people protest against and for, there is need to understand the contexts within which activism occur. A case study approach is significant in this study because it is concerned about environmental factors that affect a unit of analysis. Understanding the contexts within which protesters are imbedded is crucial because contextual variables often affect and influence the unit of analysis. In view of this, I provide detailed information about protesters and their settings as this helps in better appreciating the reasons for the protests.

Comparative case studies allow for the comparison of a unit or units exposed to an event and another which is not, or when these units' exposure level significantly differ. Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are important sites to use in this study: Gugulethu is an old township with a rich history

of anti-apartheid protests and Khayelitsha is a newer township with high levels of protests. While I note the differences and similarities of these two case studies I do not seek to strictly compare these two cases but to learn the peculiarities of each research site.

This study's second research objective seeks to assess the repertoires (what protesters do and how they do it in their contestations) utilised in service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha with a view of understanding how they are tailored to achieve urban development. This objective necessitated hearing the views of the protesters themselves and understanding the reasons for choosing one tactic over another and the circumstances within which a tactic is deployed. My interest here was in understanding how protesters viewed their own protests as a means to achieve an end – and whether this end was more and better service delivery. Hence, interpretations by any other informants other than the protesters themselves would not have revealed whether the protesters themselves see the logical link between the means (repertoires) they employ and the end (development) they want to achieve. This was crucial because such understandings uncovered the processes, strategy, analysis and meaning making involved in the so-called popcorn protests.

The third and final research objective contemplated the level of organisation involved in the service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. To comprehend the character and level of organisation of service delivery protests, there was need to immerse myself in the field. Such immersion helped unearth the diverse processes protesters engaged in prior to the protest events. I was able to even attend one of the meetings held in a community hall in Gugulethu.

It is usually important to use several sources of data in case studies, such as employing at least two methods, conducting multiple interviews and drawing evidence from several informants. Importantly, the research question determines the type and number of methods to be employed. In recognition of the need to use several sources of data and as necessitated by the research questions, I employed both qualitative and quantitative methods and interviewed multiple informants with diverse life experiences including the youth, old, women, men, protesters who were involved in anti-apartheid protests and those only familiar with post-apartheid protests. Below I discuss how I gathered data.

5.5. Methods of Data Collection

I gathered data from primary and secondary sources. Secondary data involved the review of existing literature on South Africa, Cape Town, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. I also utilised in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires to gather primary data.

5.5.1. Review of secondary literature

Given the importance of context in understanding what people do, how, why and when they do it, I reviewed policy documents on service delivery. These included the Constitution of South Africa, municipal publications in order to understand the place and processes involved in service delivery protests. Also, I reviewed relevant documents pertinent to Gugulethu and Khayelitsha to ascertain the history, demographic make-up, and other social, political and economic circumstances in the chosen case studies. Also, I found the census data to be especially important in providing the socio and economic contexts of the case study areas. Although not always reliable, I drew evidence from popular media – such as newspapers in order to understand 'what' and 'how; service delivery protests are reported. Secondary literature helped gather a wide variety of data using a limited amount of money and time (Babbie and Mouton, 2001). Furthermore, I reviewed police reports to understand how the state apparatus view and interact with protesters. Secondary documents allowed for comparison between past and present policies and circumstances which are difficult to collect through primary research. However, because secondary data is sometimes dated, inaccurate and insufficient, I complemented it with primary data from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires.

5.5.2. In-depth interviews

To answer the research questions, I conducted 20 face to face interviews in Gugulethu and 20 in-depth interviews in Khayelitsha between 18 August 2016 and 18 August 2017. All the participants had been involved in protests in their communities. At the time of the interviews, my participants ages ranged from 18 to 70 years. Some of the protesters had been involved in the anti-apartheid protests and some were young and had only engaged in post-apartheid protests. Interviews ranged from 35 to 120 minutes. In some cases, I had follow-up interviews with participants. I had several

informal conversations with participants before and after the formal interviews. The formal interviews were held mostly in people's homes and other places where the participants felt comfortable. Indeed, face to face interviews are often hailed because they allow the interviewees to express their views in a relatively open and non-threatening environment (Abiche, 2004). Participants ranged from those who stayed in old apartheid formal houses, RDP houses, backyard rooms, hostels, and shacks.

To allow the process to be "flexible, iterative, and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and locked in stone" (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:43), I used a semi-structured checklist. The questions were open ended which gave room for rich detailed information. In-depth interviews allowed me to probe further or seek clarity where necessary and also gave the participants more room and time to explain themselves. To ensure accuracy, I made use of an audio tape recorder to record respondents' responses. I first sought consent from all the interviewees. In cases where permission to audio record was not given, I took notes during the interview or as soon as I got home. The common comment I got from my participants when I asked them for permission to audio record them was "Record, I am not afraid of anyone." I promptly transcribed audio recorded responses while I still had visual images of what transpired in the meetings.

5.5.3. Focus Group Discussions

I conducted 2 focus groups in each site. One of the focus groups in Gugulethu was initially meant to be an in-depth interview but many activists crowded around and started answering the questions as a group. Following Goldsmith's (2003:112) advice that "adaptability is a necessary response to the uncertainty surrounding many aspects of the field", I quickly changed this in-depth interview into a focus group discussion. I actively facilitated the discussions so that all group members got a chance to speak. I only interviewed a maximum of 8 people in each sitting to make it easier to manage the group dynamics as compared to a group with 13 people, for example. Focus groups are quicker, and they allow for rich responses given in a group context by different respondents (Gibbs, 1997). Focus group interviews also provided similarities and differences in participants' values, opinions and experiences on a given topic rather than drawing such conclusions from "post hoc analyses of separate statements from each interviewee" (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:292). In one of the focus groups in Gugulethu, there were interesting debates on the land question with

some participants stating that President Mandela and the ANC sold the people of South Africa out with respect to the land negotiations they had. Apart from responses of the group members, I observed the non-verbal communications particularly body movements, facial expressions, and other gestures. Some questions led to participants frowning, getting angry and cursing as they recounted the situations they faced in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. I asked the focus group discussants not to divulge information from the focus groups.

5.5.4. Questionnaires

To solicit relevant information from respondents which help provide a basic descriptive picture of the social and economic situations of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha service delivery protesters, I administered 50 questionnaires in Gugulethu and 50 questionnaires in Khayelitsha. My questionnaire covered demographic issues, social and economic conditions. I designed the questionnaire in such a way as to attain construct and content validity. Construct validity refers to the ability of an instrument or test to measure the dimension it intends to measure. Content validity refers to the degree to which items in an instrument are representative of the whole domain under study. For construct validity, I formulated questions and items that are relevant to the objectives. To ensure content validity, I included information pertaining to the objectives in the questionnaire (Bless et al., 2006). I established the reliability of the instrument by pilot testing the questionnaire before the actual data collection. Also, I conducted member checks; here I asked respondents to verify the accuracy of recorded data.

5.6. Triangulation

To capture a more complete, contextual portrayal of service delivery protests and urban development, I triangulated different research methods. Denzin (1978:291) defines triangulation as "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon." The triangulation metaphor draws from military and navigation strategy that uses several reference points to locate the exact position of an object (Smith, 1975). Basic geometry principles suggest that multiple viewpoints provide greater accuracy (Jick, 1979). Campbell and Fiske (1959) introduced triangulation in social sciences by developing the idea of 'multiple operationism.' They argued that multiple methods should be used to validate the process by ensuring that the variance reflected

that of the trait and not of the method. Convergence between two methods "enhances our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact" (Bouchard, 1976:268). This is called "between (or across) methods" type (Denzin, 1978:302) and its main advantage is cross validation especially when several distinct methods are congruent and produce comparable data (Jick, 1979). A second type is called "within-method" (Denzin, 1978:301) which employs numerous techniques under the same method to collect and interpret data. 'Within-method' triangulation tests cross-checking for reliability or internal consistency while 'between-method' measures the degree of external validity (Jick, 1979). This study used both between methods (qualitative and quantitative methodology) and within-method (in-depth interviews and focus group discussions).

Multiple measures can help uncover unique variance that a single method may neglect (Jick, 1979). The effectiveness of triangulation rests on the assumption that multiple independent strengths do not share the same weaknesses and as such, "each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another" (Jick, 1979:604; Rohner, 1977). It is argued that triangulation exploits the strengths and neutralise, rather than compound, the weaknesses of different methods. Yet although I used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, the former was stronger and heavily relied on while the latter was used for basic descriptive data. This is because qualitative data and analysis acts as "the glue that cements the interpretation of multimethod results" (Jick, 1979:609). Furthermore, "qualitative data are apt to be superior to quantitative data in density of information, vividness, and clarity of meaning – characteristics more important in holistic work [thick description], than precision and reproducibility" (Weiss, 1968:344-345).

I am more concerned about the vividness, density of information in SDPs and urban development and clarifying meanings rather than generalisability and reproducibility. To this end, I draw from different data sources namely secondary literature, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires to gather a much more robust set of data than I can gather from a single data set. Thus, triangulation enabled me to pull different data methods together to get a deeper understanding of SDPs and urban development, something that enhanced the reliability of my observations by balancing out the limitations of each data collection technique (Mouton, 2001).

5.7. Sampling Techniques

Sampling, a process of taking a representative selection of a population using data collected as research information, is widely used in research (Frey et al., 2000). In this study, as in many studies, it was not possible to study the whole population due to time, money constraints and lack of a drawn-out population list of service delivery protesters and, as such, I selected a smaller and manageable subgroup of the target population using purposive and snowballing sampling. Under purposive sampling, the researcher uses his or her judgment to draw out information-rich individuals from the population (Neuman, 2007; Achola and Bless, 1988). I handpicked information-rich individuals who had participated in service delivery protests. Purposive sampling enabled me to pay attention to characteristics of service delivery protesters that answer research questions of this study (Kelly et al., 2003). Using purposive sampling, I located the first contacts to distribute questionnaires to by targeting SDPs leaders and rank-and-file protesters.

Informed by snowball sampling, I then asked the identified leaders or protesters to nominate the next SDPs activists; I repeated this process until I reached a point of saturation. Snowball sampling – also known as network, reputational or chain referral sampling – involves identifying and selecting subjects in a network and it "begins with one or a few people or cases and spreads out on the bases of links to the initial cases" (Neuman, 2007:144). Given that protesters are difficult to locate, identified protesters helped identify other protesters. I used this process to distribute 50 questionnaires in each site. Snowballing is advantageous because it is flexible and cost effective. Although snowballing allowed me to locate participants who are difficult to access, it tends to bring participants who share similar views and experiences (Cresswell, 2008). For this reason, I interviewed other participants who fell outside of the snowballed network for example random activists I was not referred to by my participants.

5.8. Data Analysis and Presentation

Yardley (2008) toolbox of verifying qualitative data informed my analysis of qualitative data. This process involved coding data, through selecting and grouping themes from data. I ascertained the depth of comprehension of the phenomena under investigation by comparing the present research with other studies done in service delivery protests. Also, I gave equal analytic attention to all

transcripts. Each transcript was rigorously analysed and considered as a stand-alone script. In sum, I organised data, generated categories, themes and patterns, tested emergent hypotheses against data and search for an alternative explanation of data and wrote a report (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). I used STATA to aid analysis of quantitative data.

5.9. Ethics Statement

I astutely ensured that no harm, threat, or other problems were made as a result of this research. Social scientists are concerned about research ethics because many people's human rights have been trampled in the process of social research (Bless and Smith, 2006). Babbie and Mouton (2001:520) delineated four ethical issues that must be considered in social research to be "voluntary participation, no harm to participants, anonymity and confidentiality and deceiving subjects." This research upheld these ethical considerations. First, the participants were not forced to participate. Participants willingly participated and signed proof of consent. Additionally, I informed interviewees that they were free to withdraw from the process at any time if they so wished. Second, I exercised caution to ensure that no harm befell participants during or after the research process. Third, although it was not possible to attain anonymity – at least to the researcher because of face-to-face interviews – their responses were treated with a high level of confidentiality. Given the sensitivity of the information provided, I do not reveal respondents' real names; I use pseudonyms. I also consciously avoid using the specific areas my participants reside in and opt to mostly refer to the general 'Gugulethu' and 'Khayelitsha' in order to protect the identity of my participants. Fourth, no participant was in any way deceived. To ensure this, I told them the purpose of this research, that is, to understand SDPs and urban development in fulfilling requirements for my Doctoral studies. All the above ethical considerations were adhered to and consent from in-depth interviewees, focus group discussions and respondents to questionnaires was sought. Finally, I only stepped into the 'field' for data collection purposes after receiving ethical clearance from the University of the Western Cape to conduct this research.

5.10. Challenges of the Research

As is usually the case when conducting research, I ran into some challenges. I briefly reflect on the challenges in this section. van Maanen (1988:2) succinctly captures the realities of fieldwork:

> Fieldworkers, it seems, have to learn to move among strangers while holding themselves in readiness for episodes of embarrassment, affection, misfortune, partial or vague revelation, deceit, confusion, isolation, warmth, adventure, fear, concealment, pleasure, surprise, insult, and always possible deportation . . . This may not be the way fieldwork is reported, but it is the way it is done.

While interviewing protesters in their natural setting made them feel comfortable, there were incidents which, as van Maanen (1988) described above, made me feel uncomfortable. In Gugulethu, when I was in one of the backyard dwellers' room holding a focus group, I saw machetes and knives concealed by the young men who had come for the focus group discussion. As they were filling in their questionnaires, I counted at least 12 different sizes of knives. I later learnt that that all the young men who were in the focus group were gangsters. The weapons were meant to defend themselves from rival gangsters. While in this room, there were a few who were on the lookout outside on the road to see if it was still safe to be in the room.

The reaction my community worker's friend who had paid him a visit and was with us during the interview on this day made me realise the dangers of the community I was in. When the people came for the interview and to fill the questionnaires, I realised that there were not enough pens for everyone. I asked this young man – my community worker's friend – to escort me to the nearby spaza shop. He refused. When I insisted, he stepped aside from where everyone was and openly told me his reason for refusal – "I don't like this place. These guys are gangsters – let's just stay with Mr X." Indeed, we were safe with Mr X. Given Mr. X's pre-1994 and post-1994 credentials, he is respected by gangsters and protesters.

Similarly, in Khayelitsha, while getting ready to conduct an interview, I heard about 9 gunshots not far from where I was, which triggered emotions of fear discussed above by van Maanen (1988). While a few people looked on, for most, it was business as usual as people went on their businesses. It made me realise that gunshots are not as uncommon in neighbourhoods I was conducting my

research. Crime in general is pervasive in my research sites; indeed, my community worker had advised me to leave my smartphone at home due to the high levels of crimes.

Another challenge relates to my own biography. As part of the social world they study, qualitative researchers should be mindful of their biographies – what is called reflexivity. Notwithstanding the importance of reflexivity, there exist difficulties and practicalities in understanding this important exercise (Finlay, 2002; Handerson et al., 2012). Crucial in the debate on reflexivity are power dynamics in the process of knowledge production (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). Among other things, reflexivity concerns itself with the analysis of interviewer and interviewee dynamics (Koole, 2003; Arendell, 1997). Reflexivity deals with the ways in which researchers' social and historical locations shape their values, interests, and orientations (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). In this regard, Roberts and Sanders (2005) suggest that researchers need to be reflexive of their reasons for wanting to enter into a research study before they step into the field. I have been interested in protests as far back as my school days. This interest has grown especially given the number, reasons, and character of the protests. Indeed, Wright Mills (1959:207) suggests that "an educator must begin with what interests the individual most deeply, even if it seems altogether trivial and cheap." While I do not stay in my case study areas, I am concerned about social justice and the upholding of people's dignity. I have also conducted a related study in Gugulethu. Further, my interactions with the participants led to the development of attachments which have allowed me to communicate with some of the participants even after the fieldwork. Yet in a quest to produce valid and reliable knowledge, I committed myself to realism in order to avoid bias.

5.11. Conclusion

This inquiry's research questions necessitated a mixed methods study which involved a blend of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Data collection involved both primary and secondary sources with the former involving in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires. The triangulation of different research methods helped capture a more complete, contextual picture of service delivery protests. Such triangulation helped boost my confidence in the results; basic geometry suggests that several viewpoints of an object provide greater accuracy

(Jick, 1979). That said, I consciously placed a heavy reliance on qualitative methodology because the primary concern was on the 'depth' of understanding instead of 'breath' (Blaxter, 2001). Using the intrinsic case study approach, I focused on service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This helped narrow my inquiry to boundaries of place, activity and definition. To avoid harming my participants I strictly adhered to laid down ethics of research. As expected, I encountered some challenges in the field; notwithstanding these, I managed to adapt and work around the challenges. Having taken an audit trail of my time 'before', 'during' and 'after' my fieldwork excavation, I present, analyse and discuss the findings of these efforts and manuevres in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed how I went about collecting and analysing data. In this chapter, I present the findings, analysis and discussions of this study. I restate the research questions that this thesis seeks to answer: (i) What are the reasons for participating in service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha?, (ii) What are the repertoires of service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha and how have they been used to achieve urban development?, and (iii) How are Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protests organised?

The main findings of the chapter reveal that service delivery protests are meant to fast track the provision of urban services (e.g., housing, water, electricity, sanitation) or urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This is so, in a context of the slow pace of service delivery such as housing, electricity and water. The study also found that while the repertoires employed are meant to speed up service delivery, some directly address the need of activists. Importantly, most of the repertoires employed are thought through and require a level of planning and coordination prior to the protests. Finally, contrary to the widely held views that service delivery protests in poor communities are spontaneous, this study found that overall, activists think, plan, and organise prior to the protest event.

The chapter is organised as follows: In Section 6.2, to contextualise the findings, I start by briefly discussing the profile of protesters. Following this, in Section 6.3 I present the reasons for engaging in service delivery protests. I show that the reasons residents protest for are justifiable. In Section 6.4, I analyse the repertoires Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists employ in service delivery protests. The purpose of this section is two-pronged: (a) to show that the repertoires are meant to pressure the government to deliver better and more services or urban development, and (b) to highlight the planning involved in deciding the repertoires of protests. Finally, in Section 6.5, I discuss the organisation of service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. In this section, I critically analyse the popcorn description that characterises most service delivery protests.

6.2. Profile of Service Delivery Protesters

A brief analysis of the activists and their histories helps unlock the internal workings of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests that I will discuss in the rest of the chapter. To understand the changes social movements bring about, there is need to consider the inner workings of a movement (Tilly, 1999). Flowing from this, I argue that in order to comprehend the internal workings of Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protests, we have to first understand who the activists/protesters are. The activists' background helps us better appreciate their service delivery realities and what motivates their protests; moreover, understanding protesters' backgrounds provide deeper insights into their choice of repertoires and the level of organisation behind the protests.

As shown in Table 1, respondents in this study ranged from 18 years to above 51 years. Most of the respondents were between 21 years and 30 years followed by the 31 to 40 years cohort. Approximately 8% of the respondents were 51 years and above. Given that one of the criteria for answering the questionnaire was having participated in service delivery protests, the findings show that activists of different ages participate in service delivery protests. Older protesters particularly those who had anti-apartheid struggle experience lamented what they called 'youth of today', for lacking political consciousness stating that the youth did not participate enough in the community meetings they held. Notwithstanding, the youth are often more engaged during the protests and mount dramatic protests.

Table 1 also shows that respondents had diverse marital statuses: for example, married, living together as married, single, widowed and separated. Many of the respondents were single men and women (62%). The second largest group (28.74%) was made up of married activists or persons who lived together as married. Generally, the assumption is that married individuals require more basic services compared to single men and women.

Table 1: Socio-demographic data of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha respondents

Characteristics		Gugulethu	Khayelitsha	Combined
Gender	Male	85.42%	57.78%	72.04%
	Female	14.58%	42.22%	27.96%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=93)**
Age category (years)	Below 20	20.00%	13.64%	16.85%
	21-30	37.78%	36.36%	37.08%
	31-40	20.00%	31.82%	25.84%
	41- 50	13.33%	11.36%	12.36%
	51+	8.89%	6.82%	7.87%
	Total	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=44)**	**100.00% (n=89)**
Marital status	Married-civil/religious	20.93%	25.00%	22.99%
	Married–customarily/ traditional	0.00%	9.09%	4.60%
	Living together as married	11.63%	0.00%	5.75%
	Single - Never married	65.12%	59.09%	62.07%
	Widow/Widower	2.33%	4.55%	3.45%
	Separated	0.00%	2.27%	1.15%
	Total	**100.00% (n=43)**	**100.00% (n=44)**	**100.00% (n=87)**
Employment status	Full time employed	14.71%	30.23%	23%
	Part time employed	26.47%	13.95%	19.48%
	Informally employed	2.94%	2.33%	2.60%
	Unemployed	55.88%	53.49%	54.55%
	Total	**100.00% (n=34)**	**100.00% (n=43)**	**100.00% (n=77)**
Average no. of household members schooling		2.8 (**n=48**)	2.4 (**n=45**)	2.6 (**n=93**)
Average no. of household members employed		2.3 (**n=47**)	1.3 (**n=45**)	1.8 (**n=92**)
Average no. of household members unemployed		2.6 (**n=47**)	2.5 (**n=45**)	2.6 (**n=89**)

Source: Author's own compilation of field data

In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, activists are ethnically, socially, economically, and politically networked to engage in protests. Some of the protesters, particularly in Gugulethu, had participated in the anti-apartheid struggle. Indeed, movements are built on both formal and informal networks; some of these networks develop along racial, ethnic, class, gender, religious lines and other that go beyond these (Ballard et al., 2006). Such networks, which build collective identity, are crucial in mobilisations (Oldfield, 2002).

The activists came from diverse backgrounds; many in Khayelitsha, hailed from the Eastern Cape. In Gugulethu, the older protesters stated that they were Cape Town 'borners' (born in Cape Town) and some of these were displaced by the Group Areas Act policy during the apartheid era (Western, 1996). People who were born in Cape Town felt that they should be given services before others who came to the city. That said, this was not the position of all Gugulethu residents. This is consistent with Staniland's (2008:52) finding that Gugulethu residents verbally abused and at other times attacked recent immigrants from the Eastern Cape, who benefited from a housing scheme; Gugulethu residents felt that the recent immigrants "had no right to housing before Gugulethu residents, some who had been on the housing list since the late 1980s." Similarly, in Mitchells Plain, activists who were removed from District Six in 1980 felt that they should be prioritised before others (Oldfield and Stokke, 2004). Elsewhere in South Africa, Paret (2018) found that protesters from Motsoaledi informal settlement in Soweto felt betrayed because they believed that other communities which were established after theirs were treated better than their community.

Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists invariably defined themselves as poor, Black and neglected. The average number of employed respondents in the case study areas was 1.8 compared to the 2.6 unemployed and 2.6 schooling. Most respondents in both study areas were unemployed (54%) with the rest either full time employed (23%), part time employed (19.48%) or informally employed (2.60%). South Africa has high levels of unemployment; in the first quarter of 2019, the national unemployment stood at 27.6% (using strict definition) and 38% (using the expanded definition), and youth unemployment of 35.2% for the 25 – 34 age cohort (Stats SA, 2019). The unemployment rate for the age cohort 15 – 24 stood at 55.2% (Stats SA, 2019), slightly higher than the 54% in this study. This finding is important in understanding how unaffordable basic services are to low-income residents and speaks to the 'two Cape Towns' I discussed in chapter 2. Table 2 paints a picture of the basic services realities of the respondents.

Table 2: Basic Services data of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha respondents

Characteristics		Gugulethu	Khayelitsha	Combined
Housing situation	House	52.08%	42.22%	47.31%
	Flat	4.17%	2.22%	3.23%
	Hostel	6.25%	0.00%	3.23%
	Room in backyard	31.25%	13.33%	22.58%
	Squatter hut/shack	6.25%	42.22%	23.66%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=93)**
Type of toilet	Flush – internal	43.75%	53.49%	48.35%
	Flush – yard	45.83%	16.28%	31.87%
	Flush – communal	8.33%	16.28%	12.09%
	Improved latrine yard	2.08%	0.00%	1.10%
	Chemical toilet – yard	0.00%	4.65%	2.20%
	Bucket toilet	0.00%	4.65%	2.20%
	No toilet access	0.00%	4.65%	2.20%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=43)**	**100.00% (n=91)**
Main source of water	Piped – internal prepared meter	44.68%	42.50%	43.68%
	Piped – yard tap meter	44.68%	22.50%	34.48%
	Piped – yard tap with meter	2.13%%	2.50%	2.30%
	Piped – paid communal	6.38%	5.00%	5.75%
	Piped – free communal tap	2.13%	27.50%	13.79%
	Total	**100.00% (n=47)**	**100.00% (n=40)**	**100.00% (n=87)**
Ways to access electricity	Prepared	85.11%	88.64%	86.81%
	Other	2.03%	4.76%	3.33%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=42)**	**100.00% (n=90)**

Source: Author's own compilation of field data

As shown in Table 2, slightly more than half (52.08%) of the respondents in Gugulethu stay in formal houses and nearly half (42.22%) of the respondents in Khayelitsha stay in formal houses. The formal houses include apartheid era public housing, and post-1994 RDP houses (old and new versions of RDP). In Gugulethu, this is followed by 31.25% who stay in a room in the backyard. In Khayelitsha, the number of respondents who stay in squatter shack (23.66%) is almost the same with the people who stay in a room in the backyard (22.58%). Comparatively, more respondents in Gugulethu stayed in flats and hostels as compared to the percentage of respondents who stayed in flats and hostels in Khayelitsha. Less than half of both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha respondents (48.35%) in this study have flush toilets in their house. The rest either had flush toilets in the yard or used communal toilets, improved latrine in the yard, chemical toilet in the yard, or bucket toilet while others did not have access to toilets at all. Less than half of the respondents in both Gugulethu (44.68%) and Khayelitsha (42.50%) have piped – internal pre-paid meter. This is followed by respondents with piped yard tap meter 44.68% in Gugulethu and 22.50% in Khayelitsha. The rest used either piped free communal taps or piped – paid communal taps.

This study's findings also show that approximately 92% and 89% of respondents in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, respectively, use electricity for cooking (Table 3 in the Appendices). The second most used source of energy among the population studied was gas at 8.33% in Gugulethu and a meagre 4.44% in Khayelitsha. Respondents in Gugulethu felt that the price for electricity was too high, 63.83%. Most of the respondents in Gugulethu (58.33%) and almost 40% of the respondents in Khayelitsha have had their electricity disconnected before.

Findings from the study show that of the population that pays for water, 69.77% of Gugulethu respondents think the amount is too high (Table 4 in the Appendices). In Khayelitsha, the majority of the respondents (61.76%) did not know whether the cost of water was high or not. This could be because other family members, not my respondents, footed the water bill or because respondents illegally connected themselves and did not have to pay. The majority of the respondents in Gugulethu (65.22%) and nearly half of the respondents in Khayelitsha (42.50%) have had their water disconnected before. Clearly, the majority of the respondents share similar struggles.

Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists come from diverse backgrounds and life experiences but identify themselves largely as poor, neglected, and Black. Most of them are unemployed or precariously employed and who experience the harsh conditions of living in a capitalist Cape Town characterised by striking inequalities. More than half (53%) of Khayelitsha and 33% of Gugulethu respondents believed that SDPs could bring development (Table 5 in the Appendices).

Drawing from the profile of service delivery protesters and given that a social movement is comprised of a network of informal persons or formal organisations with a collective identity who share the same political or cultural conflict which promote social change (Tarrow, 2011; della Porta and Diani, 2006: Diani, 1992), Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists can be regarded as a part of a social movement. However, I do not regard these protesters and their protests to have coalesced and developed into a social movement organisation (SMO). This is because although my participants have informal networks, mobilise and have goals, they are not at the same level with SMOs which are formally organised, mobilise more consolidated struggles towards their clear-cut goals (Armstrong and Bartley, 2013; della Porta and Diani, 2006). Armed with this background, I now turn to the activists' reasons for participating in service delivery protests.

6.3. Reasons for Participating in Service Delivery Protests

This study's findings show that Gugulethu and Khayelitsha residents protest against the slow pace of service delivery such as housing, water, electricity, and sanitation. The findings also show that protesters' demands extend beyond basic service delivery to include, *inter alia*, the discrimination that protesters believe they face, a demand for the government to fulfil election promises and be transparent; these reasons have a bearing on service delivery. Indeed, South Africa's protests involve a conflation of issues which include demanding service delivery and the daily practise of democracy such as fairness and transparency (Paret, 2018; Mottiar, 2013). Although I employ all the theories, I discussed in chapter 4, the Framing Processes Theory will especially be helpful in this section to interpret how movement actors interpret their own world, identify, label, perceive and locate phenomena that affect them (Snow, 2004; Goffman, 1974). In a sense, this section grapples with what Olson (1965) considered in his book titled "The Logic of Collective Action" wherein he asked 'why' and 'when' individuals would protest, if they were purely rational and

carefully weighed the costs and benefits of their choices. While this section sidesteps from the purely economistic formulation of Olson, I consider the subjective reasons – what Snow (2004) regards as social movement actors' interpretation of their own world – crucial in understanding the reasons protesters mobilise. I present each of these reasons below.

6.3.1. Fast-tracking the process of development

In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, most participants believed that protests stood a better chance of their demands being addressed quickly. Tata Mpho, an elderly male shack dweller in Khayelitsha, captured the heart and soul of what the other protesters said: "So one of the reasons is that for the government to listen to us, we have to stand up for ourselves so that the government will be able to give us services." Similarly, in Gugulethu, Lerumo a recent graduate stated that people participate in protests because the government will not listen "until we stand up and show them that we are really angry now." Likewise, a turn to more disruptive protest tactics is premised on the belief that dramatic protests speed up the government's response to a community's grievances. In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, participants stated that 'violence' was meant to fast-track the process of development. For example, Tshidi, a Gugulethu woman who stays in a backyard room stated:

> There is a belief that when things are being destroyed the government will quickly answer. It's an idea of *fast-tracking* the process believing that it will do something for the government to respond. So, either burning tyres or putting a container on the road will fast-track the process.

Clearly, one of the key reasons for protests is the belief that protests (over other means of engagement) would be attended to swiftly. The transition from peaceful protests to more militant protests is premised on the view that more dramatic protests speed up the government's response. What is often called 'violence' is framed as a necessary evil to compel the government to deliver better services in a timelier manner. Contrariwise, government officials, media outlets and the public often criticise the use of violence in SDPs. Findings from this study give a better idea of the rationale for why protesters resort to what is often called violence. I will return to the discussion on violence in Section 6.4, where I consider the repertoires that protesters deploy in their struggles.

The prevalent 'belief' (as stated by Tshidi) that 'disruptive' protests and other dramatic tactics fast-track the government's response is a resource which is helpful in mobilisation. Given that movement formation is a result of long-term changes in resources, coordination, organisation and the opportunities for collective action rather than an increase in grievance (Oberschall, 1978; Tilly, 1978), I argue that the oft-held 'belief' that protests receive better response from the South African government is a resource which is useful in mobilisation. This belief has led communities to include protests as part of their repertoires for political participation (Booysen, 2007).

From the extracts above, the reason for protests is to force the government to listen to them. The idea of 'standing up for themselves' and 'fast-tracking the process' speaks of protesters' acknowledgment of their agency. de Souza (2006) captures the differentiated ways in which social movements use their agency in his article titled "Together *with* the state, *despite* the state, *against* the state: Social movements as 'critical urban planning' agents" (emphasis added). The idea of standing up for themselves suggests that activists act 'despite' and sometimes 'against' the government in order to get the government to deliver. Protesting is a means through which activists demonstrate their agency. It follows that when the government fails to respond to other means of engagement, activists protest to be heard. Understandably, the activists' agency is necessary to bring about development and stop the harsh living conditions they experience. Interestingly, activism can engender empowerment. Indeed, insurgent citizenship is related with empowerment because insurgent action often starts with an individual's belief in his/her own agency (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016).

The general idea emerging from the extracts above is that there are rational reasons for participating in SDPs. As Klandermans (1984) notes, although grievances and ideology are unable to explain the rise of movements, they affect people's individual decisions to participate in a movement; the participation is a by-product of rational decisions which involves assessing costs and benefits of engaging in a social movement. This is different from Le Bon's (2002) collective behaviour thesis which argues that when an individual is submerged in a crowd his behaviour becomes primitive, irrational, and spontaneous. In this formulation, an individual is helpless in the face of an overpowering crowd. The result is that an individual:

> [I]s no longer himself, but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will … An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the *wind* stirs up at will (Le Bon, 2002:8, emphasis added).

As in Le Bon's (2002) case, Bond (2011:118) uses the analogy of 'wind' to describe the lack of pre-set ideology, stating that:

> [S]eemingly ubiquitous 'service delivery protests' … have been called 'popcorn protests' because with the application of intense heat, the leading grains explode high into thin air, but the *wind* may take them leftwards or rightwards, up and down, with no pre-set ideological strategic landing, and no discernible pattern that would merit the description 'urban social movement' (emphasis added).

While not at the same level as Le Bon (2002), Bond (2017) insists that SDPs lack analysis and strategy. The findings of this study show that protesters analyse what works to pressure the government to respond. While there may not be a formalised strategy, decisions on more militant tactics aimed at fast-tracking the process of development shows that these protests are not just at the mercy of the 'wind.' The belief that protests fast-track the process of urban development has to be understood within the context of South Africa's often slow pace of service delivery.

6.3.2. The slow pace of delivery: 'Slow moving train'

Gugulethu and Khayelitsha activists protest against the slow pace of development. In Gugulethu, Siya, a male protest leader who actively participated in the anti-apartheid struggle best explained the slow pace of delivery with a train metaphor: "Development in Gugulethu is like a slow-moving train; it is a train that delays and when it delays – people get angry. They end up destroying the railway line." The idea of the slow-moving train suggests that there is some form of progress in Gugulethu: however, this progress is awfully slow. The train metaphor is particularly interesting when one thinks of the scheduled timetable of trains in South Africa. The failure to bring about development at the scheduled/promised time creates frustrations. Similarly, in Khayelitsha, Nkululeko a young man who stays in a backyard room lamented the slow pace of development, stating that:

> This community where I am staying, the development is very slow. I am not sure in other areas but in this area, development is slow in terms of the building of houses and stuff but other development the government do that a bit good. We do have sport facilities, we do have parks so other developments are fine but then it is only that.

Interestingly, the extract above shows that in apportioning blame to the government, the protesters provide a balance between what the government does well and other things the government fails. As Larana (1994) notes in the Framing Processes Theory, social movements identify problems and those who are to blame for the problems, e.g., housing delivery in Nkululeko's comment.

The slow pace of development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is not unique. In South Africa, it has often taken months and years for the government to respond to community demands (Paret, 2018; von Holdt et al, 2011; Marais et al., 2008). After several children were hit by cars in Valhalla Park, Cape Town, the Valhalla Park United Civic Front (the Civic) spent two fruitless years trying to get the municipality to build speed bumps (Oldfield and Stokke, 2004). To fast-track the process, the Civic activists dug a deep and wide hole across the main road at night. In the morning, cars slammed into the hole – a protest that led to the building of speed bumps that day. Likewise, in Tsakane10, Ekurhuleni municipality in Gauteng, respondents asserted that although the government had promised to move them into formal houses or own stands, after seven years the state had only relocated 50 families (Paret, 2018). Elsewhere, MST members in Brazil believe that if they do not mobilise the state will either take long or not meet their demands (Karriem, 2016). Results from my study show that participants particularly feel the slow pace of delivery in housing.

6.3.3. The struggle for housing and other basic services

This study's findings show that one of the key reasons people protest is for housing. The contestation for formal houses is waged by those who already have formal houses and those who reside in informal settlements and backyard shacks. Residents find RDP houses too small to accommodate their growing families hence fight for additional housing, more services and a better design of the houses. In Gugulethu for example, Ndiko who stays in a backyard shack at his parent's formal house, stated "we are not like whites, … who have 1 child or 2 children; we have many children, brothers, sisters, uncles and cousins that we stay with. This small RDP house is not

enough." I will return to this in the discussion of the RDP houses in Site B and Kuyasa in Khayelitsha. For now, I discuss informal settlements residents' and backyarders' fight for houses. As I alluded to before, the demand for houses should be understood in the context of a conflation of services. This means the fight for houses has in it a belief that a better house would have electricity, water and toilet(s) inside the house and better sanitation. In other words, when people are fighting for formal houses, they are fighting for houses and the other services that the house brings along. In Khayelitsha, Mama Mtombeni's shack captures the conflation of issues quite well. While she has since moved to an RDP house, she recounted her experience of living in a shack:

> I used to wake up early to go to work. I remember one day I peeped through a hole in my shack's walls to see whether there was enough sunlight for me to walk to the train station. I was gripped by fear when I saw an eye peeping [a man was peeping through the same hole] into my shack as early as around 5am! You know, right, that those shacks do not have a bathroom, a toilet, running water – so I bathed [using a bucket] in the shack. I would fetch the water from the communal place during the day ... After that incident it made me feel so uncomfortable to bath even in my shack … My things were stolen several times. I ended up hiding my money in the ground. The shack did not have a cemented floor, it was just soil, so I dug a hole and put my money and ID [Identity Document] in the ground, I then put a carpet on top and put a water bucket on top.

This extract reveals the precarious realities of shack dwellings. Holes in the shack, an absence of a bathroom, running water, electricity and a toilet do not only pose a health risk but require shack dwellers to access most basic services outside their dwellings. Having to leave the houses to access these basic services creates perpetual fear in crime prone townships like Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The fight for houses should be understood in the context of the types of shelters people reside in versus the services that a formal house has. In this light, many participants lamented the slow pace of formal housing delivery. The realities of Mama Mtombeni's housing and related basic service delivery challenges reveal the lack of dignity shack dwelling presents. When people like Mama Mthombeni take to the streets, they recognise, as the Zapatistas in Mexico do, that although their dignity has been trampled upon, they have enough dignity to fight against such a repudiation (Holloway, 2011). Sive, a male backyarder who uses illegally connected electricity in Khayelitsha, stated his reasons for participating in protests:

> We have been waiting for a house for the past 20 years, so not only us are waiting for the house but other people have also been waiting maybe for 23 years, so if you haven't had a house for 20 years I am going to strike this year, the other person will strike the next year for the same reason because you are not giving out the services.

Given that many people have not received the promised houses, protests for housing have become a perpetual feature in the case study areas. The slow pace of delivery means that many people wait for long periods before they received a house. Waiting for houses for over 20 years creates what Yiftachel (2009) called "permanent temporariness" where there is no predictable "waiting period" (Auyero, 2012). This creates "a tense endlessness, where something is always about to happen" and then fails to happen, "in limbo. Waiting. Not waiting. But waiting" (Ndebele, 2003:14).

In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha there was confusion on the way the waiting list (housing databases) works. Some scholars, like Tissington et al., (2013:80) in their work titled "'Jumping the Queue', Waiting Lists and other Myths: Perceptions and Practice around Housing Demand and Allocation in South Africa", even argue that:

> [T]here is no waiting list, whether one conceives of 'the waiting list' as a mechanism which simply allocates housing to those who have waited the longest, or as a slightly more complicated device meant to take special needs and/or geographical location into account [but] a range of highly differentiated, and sometimes contradictory, policies and systems in place to respond to housing need.

There seems to be no clarity on whether there is a rigid and structured process with which a person can access a house. One thing is clear, waiting is characterised by uncertainty, misunderstanding and confusion (Auyero, 2012). Notwithstanding the state's arbitrary procedures, citizens wait for the state to provide housing because waiting is one of the few ways they have to secure a formal house (Oldfield and Greyling, 2015). I argue that desperation for a formal house, few options to access one, frustration, anger and despondency at the government's waiting procedures make people band together to protest whilst waiting. Congruent with the Resource Mobilisation Theory, grievances, such as slow delivery of housing and the confusing waiting list, in and of themselves are not enough to steer collective action. Rather, activists should define and use these grievances in a manner that spurs collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Activists should act with tact and creativity to reproduce and reinterpret housing grievances differently depending on the

contexts they find themselves in and the strategies they seek to deploy (Martinez Lucio et al., 2017).

Indeed, residents have staged numerous protests to demand houses and at other times they have illegally reconnected electricity and destroyed prepaid water meters. In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, backyard dwellers and many informal settlements have illegally reconnected electricity and water. In one of the backyard houses in Gugulethu where I held a focus group discussion, participants stated that although they know the dangers of electricity reconnection, it is the only option they have. Similarly, in Khayelitsha, an informal settlement resident, Sibonelo who uses illegally connected electricity remarked "I know that the electric wires are dangerous to our children but what can we do? We need electricity here." While illegal electrical connections have caused the death and injury of many people (Shozi, 2020; Grobler, 2020; Manyane, 2020), participants recognised that these reconnections were necessary to access electricity. Alternative sources of energy such as paraffin stoves also have related challenges. There have been several deaths and displacements owing to shack fires (Tshuma, 2021; Kassen, 2019). Interestingly, 'struggle' electricians from organised social movement organisations in South Africa such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) have also illegally bypassed pre-paid meters and reconnected electricity to poor residents in Soweto (Dawson, 2010).

Two things stand out from the experiences of 'illegal' reconnections. First, both individuals involved in so-called popcorn protests and those who belong to organised movements such as the APF and the SECC employ similar tactics – 'illegal' electricity reconnections. Second, some of the 'struggle' electricians who reconnect people to the electricity grid do so to both social movement organisation members and non-members, as was the case in the SECC (Egan and Wafer, 2006). This is unsurprising because some 'struggle' electricians and plumbers stay in the same low-income areas and experience somewhat similar service delivery situations. In that sense, care should be taken to avoid over dichotomising protesters in 'organised' movements and those in so-called 'popcorn' protests. I argue that because some struggle electricians and plumbers stay 'in' these localities and their social movement organisations fight 'for' people in these low-income areas, they should be seen as, in some ways, at one with so-called 'popcorn' protests. They are 'in'

the communities, their movements are 'for' the communities, and they are 'with' the communities in offering support in the struggle for services. That said, in some cases, residents hire illegal reconnectors – called iZinyokaNyoka (snakes) in Zulu at a cost (Mottiar, 2019).

Residents have also demanded free water and even destroyed water meters. Activists in Gugulethu held hostage a White contractor who was installing water meters. The hostage situation occurred when a contractor installed new water meters in their yard. Recounting this incident, Bulelani a protest leader in Gugulethu stated:

> A white private contractor came with his team and started installing water meters. We called each other and told the contractor that we are not going to let you go until the people who sent you to install the meters come. Some people wanted to beat him up a little, you know, to make an example out of him but we [the leaders] said no, let's just destroy the meters and hold him here … Because of this hostage, we had our water, free flow. Then we released him.

Bulelani's explanation shows leadership and a strategic decision to take the contractor hostage which reveals a level of organisation and coordination which is not accorded to SDPs. The extract also shows how this tactic helped to secure urban development: activists only released the contractor when the community had their 'water, free flow.' Further, the extract shows that leaders in so-called popcorn protests shaped the dynamics of the hostage by discouraging protesters who wanted to beat up the White contractor. Although this case is different because it involved a 'hostage' situation – which arguably posed a danger to the life of the contractor – one can easily distinguish between deliberate damage to property to send a message and protecting the contractor from harm. Here, leaders sought to de-escalate radical tactics that other protesters were advancing. Likewise, the Occupy Umlazi activists' decision to 'Occupy' the councillor's office was initially "motivated by a need to *protect* the councillor's office from angry residents who threatened to burn it down rather than occupation as a strategy" (Mottiar, 2013:612, emphasis added). As opposed to narratives that portray protesters as violence prone individuals, evidence in the hostage situation shows that protesters protected the contractor and his team. In Gugulethu, the fact that leaders successfully stopped angry activists who wanted to make an example out of the contractor shows that there is some order, deliberation and negotiation.

The hostage situation, which activists celebrate widely, demonstrates people's agency and the lengths they are willing to go to secure water. Elsewhere in South Africa, the APF's struggle plumbers have bypassed prepaid water meters; likewise, communities which had been cut due to non-payment of water and electricity illegally reconnected water and electricity (Mottiar, 2019; Dawson, 2010).

Bulelani, like other participants, underlined the importance of water and even questioned the need to pay for water. Some of the leaders associated water with religious connotations stating that water is from God and as such it should not be charged just as sunshine is not charged. Likewise, in Brazil's MST, Karriem and Benjamin (2016) note that participants drew on religious motivations to diagnose injustice while validating the right to access land. Their participant, Fabiana, stated:

> God did not leave land to be sold, but to be distributed to all who live on it and this is the most loyal motive there is. It not right that they have 1,000 hectares of land while a father of 4 or 5 children does not have a piece of land to farm. Therefore, land has to be redistributed (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016:27).

Slow and inadequate housing provision (including electricity and water) is also linked to issues of race. Many participants in both cases invoked race, believing that Blacks are not treated unfairly when it comes to housing provision. Sifso, a Gugulethu male activist in his late 30s who still stays with his mother in an old apartheid house, stated that:

> We engage ourselves in these protests because the government doesn't deliver. My mother has applied for an RDP house. I am sure it has been 20 years now [he paused and asked his mother when she applied for the RDP house] but she hasn't received that RDP house. So now in order for the government to listen to us as *Black people* and to act in what we need. We have to engage ourselves in those kind of strikes (emphasis added).

The reference to 'us as Black people' in the extract above suggests that there is a belief amongst many activists (this was prevalent in most of the in-depth interviews) that Black people are treated differently from other races which suggests that activists compare their circumstances with others in Cape Town. It harks back to memories of the apartheid era where people groups were treated and rendered services according to race (Besteman, 2008; Western, 1996). This finding echoes my finding in Gugulethu where activists believe Blacks and Whites are treated differently. In line with

the Framing Processes, movement actors interpret their own world and as such it is important to understand these actors' 'subjective elements' and the processes by which they define and view themselves (Snow, 2004; Ballard et al., 2006) in this case, as Black people. This should be understood in a context where most Whites live in neighbourhoods which are well endowed with basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, and housing. While houses in White neighbourhoods are not delivered by the government, other services such as electricity, sanitation and water are. Blacks often work in the White neighbourhoods as maids and witness the sharp contrasts with the services they receive.

Elsewhere in South Africa, activists in Thembelihle, Gauteng captured their feelings of discrimination in their fight for electricity (Paret, 2018). As part of their protests (and in a move which can be construed as effecting equality) activists burnt electricity supply boxes which led to an electricity blackout in nearby Indian neighbourhoods. The activists explained that the burning the electricity supply boxes was meant, "to keep the Indian communities in [the] dark, as we are also living in the dark" (Paret, 2018:345). Again, in 2014, Thembelihle activists rejected discrimination declaring that: "We will not be treated as second-class citizens. Apartheid is over. If we can't have electricity, then no one will" (Paret, 2018:345). While a newspaper article could have described the deliberate destruction of a meter box as criminal and nonsensical, the in-depth analysis revealed the rationale behind their tactic. Herein lies the strength of an in-depth qualitative study in understanding subjective reasons for protests and the repertoires employed in protests. Certainly, there is logic to what seems like madness.

Both the lack of housing and the poor quality of the RDP housing is of concern. In explaining the efficacy of protests, Hlumisa, a Site C Khayelitsha lady, who was sympathetic to the municipality's efforts and did not frequently attend protests brought the idea of poor quality of RDP houses to light:

> Strikes do help at times, for example, the situation here. This used to be a squatter camp, one of the oldest in Khayelitsha. In Kuyasa there, they have RDPs and these ones here [in Site C] are RDPs as well. The design [of the RDP houses] in Kuyasa is poor. It's a poor design. This one here – you can see it has two doors that one [in Kuyasa] has one door and the roof is asbestos. This one here has tiles. So this one is much better. We complained and protested. We said we do not want that design [in Kuyasa]. We don't want that type of

> housing, the quality is poor. So you can see the outcome was this. The houses [here] are better. The design in Kuyasa is poor.

Residents in the neighbourhood of Kuyasa in Khayelitsha corroborated the views of residents in Site C regarding the quality of RDP houses. For example, Kumkani, a married university student in Kuyasa regarded his RDP house as a "very cheap design." He continued "I am not sure if money was not 'chowed' [misused]. So, the strikes do help because other communities now have better RDPs." This shows how activists consistently compare their current situations with those elsewhere in other impoverished neighbourhoods and townships and exercise their agency to effect change, as was the case in the design of the better RDP houses in Site C. While the government has several financial constraints, protesters deplore the sub-standard houses which can pose a danger to their lives.

In South Africa, key areas such as housing have been underfunded. In this context, protesters even think that the government officials 'misused' the money. Underfunding and 'chowing' of money has serious consequences for the poor and needy. Indeed, corruption and favouritism feature prominently in demonstrations meant to remove local officials (Dawson, 2014). Similarly, Alexander (2010) noted that the Piet Retief Memorandum included complaints about individual enrichment. Indeed, "[c]omplaints about corruption and maladministration frequently accompanied protests for improved service delivery" in South Africa (Paret, 2018:351). Whether or not there was the misuse of the money, such speculations can fuel community's mistrust of government and lead to protests.

While protests are to be praised for the improvement in Site C's RDP houses (compared to those in Kuyasa), the government should also be commended for heeding the protesters' demands and providing better houses in Site C. That said, one wonders whether there had been proper consultation before building the 'cheap' RDP design in Kuyasa. Following this, I argue that people are concerned not only with the provision of RDP houses but with the quality thereof as well. Somewhat similarly, in the predominantly Coloured area of Mitchel's Plain, people protested poor workmanship in the building of RDP houses (Atkinson, 2007). In a sense, protests work to empower the poor by helping them demonstrate their agency and engender responses from the state (Paret, 2018; Karriem, 2016). What is interesting is how protesters compare their housing circumstances with those of others outside their immediate community.

Housing complaints have featured prominently around South Africa. Interestingly, every South African "has the right to have access to adequate housing" – regarded as a basic need and enshrined in the Bill of Rights (1996) and Housing Act of 1997 (Republic of South Africa, 1996:11; Republic of South Africa, 1997). Despite these legal specifications, "waiting for state-provided homes is normal, taken-for-granted, everyday, intergenerational condition" which can take decades (Oldfield and Greyling, 2015:1100). Experiences with waiting shape what the poor do on a daily basis, what Oldfield and Greyling (2015) called the 'modalities of waiting.' Engaging in protests and strikes can be seen as a modality of waiting for the delivery of 'promised' houses.

6.3.4. Failure to deliver on election promises

The study's findings reveal that communities receive numerous promises related to service delivery or some form of development from government officials or those who intend to be in government; a failure to fulfil the promises may lead to protests. In a focus group in Khayelitsha, Jack, a male participant who attends committee meetings regularly explained this relationship:

> You see when we put someone in government, they give us a lot of promises that this is what I am going to do. This is what is going to be happening […] and we vote for them because of those promises. They [promise-givers] either will be slow in providing those services or if they are not slow they are not going to deliver at all.

In the extract above, although there are three things that can happen to the promises (delivery, slow delivery and no delivery), participants gave two negative options (slow delivery and no delivery); the protesters did not mention the third response to promises – timeously making good on the promises. While it is probable that participants were only referring to what causes protests and as such did not mention what does not lead to protests, many people even without prompting mentioned the two negative responses.

A good example of a failure to fulfil promises can be seen in a squatter camp in Site C, Khayelitsha. Hlengiwe, a woman who stays in an RDP house close to an informal settlement in Khayelitsha recited the numerous protests that the squatter camp mounted to put pressure on the government to provide services. She claimed that the:

> Government said that they cannot provide services for them there because they were going to move them. However, it has been a year since the promise was given but the informal settlement is still there and the people have not yet been moved.

Slow and unfulfilled promises of service delivery is prevalent in South Africa. In Thembelihle, Johannesburg municipality, after 10 years since the construction of a new housing settlement several residents had not yet been relocated which prompted protests (Paret, 2018). Such unfulfilled promises fuel protests. In Port Elizabeth, Botes et al., (2007) note that the local government's unresponsiveness and unfulfilled promises caused protests. Similarly, an analysis of a 2009 memorandum by a local activist in Elias Motsoaledi Squatter Camp shows that numerous promises of development before 1994 and after 1994 had not been fulfilled, propelling protests (Paret, 2018).

Promises by nature raise people's expectations and hopes necessary in poor communities where residents experience the harsh living conditions which can demoralise and leave them hopeless. In this case, patronage politics creates access and relations with the state which creates 'spaces of hope' (Rubin, 2011). As the two extracts above show, residents vote for government officials because of the promises they give. For example, Zuma's election to the presidency raised expectations; although the failure to fulfil the expectations engendered a heightened level of protests, for some time people were hopeful (Alexander, 2010).

Although promises create hope and enable communities to anticipate for the promises to be fulfilled, a failure to fulfil them makes people feel betrayed, get frustrated and angry. In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, participants felt that they are used as political pawns whose sole purpose is to act as steppingstones for politicians to get elected. Asked to describe the relationship that exists between the community and the municipality, Themba an unemployed man in Khayelitsha who uses the bush toilet, stated:

> I wouldn't say we do have a relationship with the municipality *at all*. We only hear about them when it comes for us to vote for them [during election time]. That is when they are going to say there will be no water tomorrow. They will not just call us for meetings and say come just put your grievances forward without us going to them. They don't engage us in that manner in whatever they are doing. Tell us that ok we had this budget this is how far we went. We don't know those things until we get up and strike. So, I don't think there is a relationship. If there is, it is minimal (emphasis added).

While it is not true that municipal officials do not engage the community 'at all' regarding what they are doing, the engagement is limited and it is not as robust as community members would want it. For example, activists want the municipality to proactively engage with their communities as they do during election time. Clearly, election time brings the best out of municipal officials. Similarly, in Gugulethu protesters stated that during elections they saw progress in the form of cleaning of streets and regular refuse collection – developments that made activists think that everything was up and running. They stated that after the election, the developments stopped. Similarly, in his study on Gugulethu, Staniland (2008:35) found that "whilst policy claims to be promoting participation, it is ... in fact failing." Although people praise popular participation, officials usually view such participation as a nuisance (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). In line with the Framing processes, activists identify who is to blame and what needs to be done to achieve a desired change (Larana, 1994).

Usually, protests fall during election time as people concentrate on the electoral process. Electioneering creates a new political environment which can either encourage or discourage activism which Tarrow (1998) refers to as windows of opportunity. Protesters use elections as a Political Opportunity Structure to mobilise for better services in their communities. In 2005 there was an initial peak of protests in South Africa followed by a marked fall in 2006, the year of local government elections. Commenting on this lull in protests, Alexander (2010:28) argues that "for a period, activists put their energies into the elections and/or that broader populations placed some hope in the possibility of electoral politics addressing their concerns." Not only do people put their energies and hopes in the electoral processes during election times, but there tends to be an increased level of engagement between the state and the community and a better responsiveness from the state.

South Africa's community protests have also been affected by patronage and clientelism. Patron-client relations involve reciprocal trading public goods, services and employment with political support between politicians and voters (Dawson, 2014; Lodge, 2014; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Certain groups benefit from such exchanges while others are excluded from particular benefits. Staniland (2008) captured this exclusion in his article on Gugulethu titled "'They know me, I will not get any job': public participation, patronage, and the sedation of civil society in a

Capetonian township." Social contracts are not new to South Africa. Paret (2018:341) writes about a "national liberation social contract" described as "a tacit understanding, forged through the democratic transition, that the post-apartheid state would lift the black majority out of poverty." People vote or decide not to vote officials into office based on the promises and or lack of delivery. This was best captured in Abahlali baseMjondolo's slogan "No Land, No House, No Vote" where they boycotted the March 2006 local government elections (Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2006). Once voted into office, demonstrators often seek to remove local officials who are perceived as having failed to deliver on their electoral promises; battles for patronage occur within the ANC and not against the party (Dawson, 2014). This is what Dawson (2014:524) has called a 'network breakdown' to refer to a situation "whereby protests emerge as a response to a disruption and malfunction of patron-client arrangements, such as differential access to public goods." Interestingly, in South Africa, there is a "pervasive sense that the state disrespects people by lying to people at election times and failing to listen to them at other times" (Pithouse, 2007). In a sense, poor communities all over the world feel that they are 'used' by political elites because they are only remembered during elections.

I refer to a story that occurred in a rural community of Ndieme, in the Manicaland province of Zimbabwe. At the end of a political campaign by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party during President Robert Mugabe's reign, which residents claim were forced to attend, a government official asked anyone willing to close in a word of prayer. When no one volunteered to pray, the official then nominated a few people to pray but all of them refused. One elderly man, perhaps the oldest present at the gathering – Sekuru Mutunhuunemago – then stood and prayed:

> Lord God, we thank you for *mhondoro* (the lions in the Ndau language) you have enabled us to see today. They were in their caves all these years, not caring about us, but they have thought about us today because they want us to vote for them. The only time they remember us is when they want our votes. Remember these lions who are – today – out of their caves to gain our votes. We will see them again the next time they want our votes.

Those who were present recite this story with admiration. They say that the government officials were extremely embarrassed and left unceremoniously. The brave elderly man's prayer best reveals a recurrent cycle of unfulfilled promises in poor communities. The 'lions' represent the

political elites who left the comfort of their caves (mansions) to make several promises to the political pawns – persuading them to vote in order that the 'lions' may bring development/change to their communities.

Whereas Sekuru Mutunhuunemago referred to the powerful elites as 'lions', the Abahlali baseMjondolo likened political parties to 'cockcroaches' crawling from every direction to seek people's votes. In an article titled "By Voting We Are Only Choosing Our Oppressors" the organised shackdwellers movement registered their critical stance towards political parties stating:

> With the local government approaching, politicians (whether the DA, ANC, COPE or PAC) once again crawling out, like cockroaches, to ask for our votes. As part of this, they are once again promising houses, jobs and service delivery – the usual old recycled lies. The reality is, however we don't have houses and proper service delivery because we live in a system of total inequality – a system of capitalism and the state. The councillors lying to us know this, but they want our votes so that they too can be comfortable and rich (Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2011:np).

Although the AbM later summersaulted and endorsed the main opposition – Democratic Alliance – in the 2014 national vote, there is a sense in which activists feel that they are used as political pawns. Similar to the impression expressed in the extract above, in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, residents' experiences suggest that communities have a feeling that government officials stay in the comfort of their 'caves' only to reintroduce themselves in ('craw' back to) poor communities when they need votes from these communities. Such neglect has fuelled protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This creates feelings of betrayal and propel protests especially in informal settlements (Paret, 2018) and impoverished townships where residents believe they are unfairly treated and discriminated against.

6.3.5. Discrimination according to social class

In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, respondents believe that taken for granted democratic principles existent in rich areas are not present in their impoverished areas. The findings from this study reveal that Gugulethu and Khayelitsha residents believe that the government treats different social classes differently. The general belief from the participants is that the government does not really care about the needs of poor/Black people in South Africa. That is why, among other reasons, present action is fuelled by enduring inequities (Alexander, 2010). Feelings of discrimination were

best captured in a focus group discussion by a religious leader, Mfundisi Zama, who mobilises and conscientises people about the importance of activism in Khayelitsha. In building his argument, he stated:

> I think there is *a lot of discrimination in South Africa*. We got three statuses … it could be four. There is (i) the poor of the poorest, (ii) the poor, (iii) the middle class, [and] (iii) the rich. We can't say the rich and the richest - they are the rich. So if you are the poor or the poor of the poorest, you remain [that way], when I am talking about the poor I am talking about the teachers, police, nurses. All those who are earning R10 000 they are poor. The poor of the poorest are those earning R2500 and nothing. Then those who are earning, R15 000, R30 000, R40 000 those are the middle class. Now if we are going to speak about people like Zuma [former President of South Africa] who earn R189 000 a month, these people are rich (emphasis added).

The extract above divides the South African population into different classes depending on their income level. Indeed, income inequality ranks "highly among the structural determinants of the protests" Alexander (2010:32). For example, in the Free State, protesters felt that the municipality discriminated against Phomolong residents but favoured Welkom residents in awarding tenders (Botes et al., 2007). The general consensus in the focus group and in both research sites was that the government appears to be concerned about the middle class going up. Considerations of class are important in challenging the prevailing 'common sense' which is passive to the status quo. Mfundisi Zama continued:

> So, what the government does, the government *seems to be concerned about the middle class upwards.* Look at the service delivery from Gugulethu to Enkanini [an informal settlement in Khayelitsha] it is different from the service delivery from Gugulethu to Cape Town. You just walk there, you will see that these are Black people, these are Coloured and these are White (emphasis added).

While Geyer and Mohammed (2016) argue that class-based segregation has replaced racial segregation in South Africa, my participants would argue that there is still race and class segregation. My participants noted that a person can easily tell the race that reside in the area from the services in an area suggesting a close relationship between class and race. The participant believed that the differences are so stark that everyone can notice them. The extract divides Cape Town into two – Gugulethu to Enkanini and Gugulethu to Cape Town – where there are more

Coloured and White people – associated with better and well serviced classes/races. From the extract and throughout the interviews, respondents intricately connected class with race. Again, here activists compared their circumstances with those of other races in other areas in Cape Town. Framing their problems using race gives meaning to happenings and help in organising experience which leads to action (Benford and Snow, 2000). In a focus group in Khayelitsha, Lutho, a male protest leader who stays in a backyard shack interjected:

> I can make an example, do you know where Milnerton is? Do you know where Joe Slovo is? Joe Slovo is just next to the road and over the road there is Milnerton. Black people are staying in Joe Slovo; White people are staying in Milnerton. Those White people are not fixing their infrastructure with their money, they are only using their money to fix their houses but the infrastructure depends on the government – the lightning [street lights] depends on the government; the streetlights that we find in Milnerton are different from the streetlights than we find in Joe Slovo.

Joe Slovo was established through an occupation necessitated by a desire to get closer to employment opportunities such as the Montague Gardens industrial area and the Milnerton Race Course (Barry, 2006). Also, in the mid-1980, many Xhosa women moved close to the Milnerton Race Course where their families were employed as grooms and stayed in single quarters at the race course. About 200 grooms later moved into the shacks in Marconi Beam where their families were or put-up new shacks (Rollins, 1991). Following a series of negotiations, Marconi Beam residents were later housed in Joe Slovo Park and others in Dunoon. Today, Joe Slovo is an informal settlement with many shacks and experiences frequent service delivery protests. The events described above deracialised what was a lily White Milnerton. This suggests that this interviewee does not see Khayelitsha's struggles in isolation from the rest of the city. In this light, Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's struggles should not be ghettoised. Again, the protester here sees the quality of provision as dependent on the race of a people group even where the communities lie next to each other. Considerations of a dual city shows a level of consciousness. At this point, Mfundisi Zama drew this issue to a close and explained why he thought there was still discrimination in South Africa:

> So, the government seems to be concerned about the rich and the Whites. If you are poor they will see according to your standard, [and say] this is what we can give you. They will give you those street lights that will die after 3 months. You see.

Commenting on the recent South African Human Rights (SAHRC) annual report 2018, senior legal officer, Alexandra Fitzegerald said "The stats are undeniable; black South Africans are being subjected to routine and frequent discrimination. This questions the effectiveness of transformation efforts" (Maphanga, 2018). Differences in service provision should be understood within the context of Section 195 clause d which states that “services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996).

In Gugulethu, some participants even went as far as alleging that the councillor did not care for the Blacks in the community but the Coloureds whose areas were better serviced. In one of the focus groups, discussants chanted ‘down with the councillor.’ Sipho, who stays in a hostel in Gugulethu reasoned that “If they [the municipality] give to white people the things that they give to us, I think they [the Whites] are going to be angry and they are not going to put money into their pockets.” These accounts suggest that at least in the eyes of Gugulethu’s and Khayelitsha’s protesters, the National Development Plan’s aim of achieving among other things social cohesion and “a united, prosperous, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa” (National Planning Commission, 2013:75) has not yet been realised.

South Africa has a long history of discrimination which goes back to the pre-1994 era. For protesters, discrimination has continued post-1994. The government has made strides in providing for its township citizens but the provision pales in comparison to the upgrading in the City core. Yet, skewed development and high socioeconomic inequality are typical of world class cities (Tyner, 2006; Sassen, 2002). Indeed, Cape Town provides state of the art services to transnational elites while the poor and Black people receive inadequate and substandard services (McDonald, 2008). The government argues that it cares for all its citizens but participants argue that poor people are discriminated against, while the rich and White receive preferential treatment compared to the poor and Black. For this reason, as noted earlier, in Thembelihle, Johannesburg, protesters burnt electricity supply boxes thereby shutting electricity for the Indian neighbourhoods to keep Indians in the dark just as they (the Black protesters) live in the dark (Paret, 2018). In a public statement in 2014, Thembelihle “local activists pronounced ‘We will not be treated as *second-class citizens*. Apartheid is over. If we can’t have electricity, then no one will’” (Paret, 2018:344-345, emphasis added). This suggests that the protesters recognise their agency to fight for equality. Karriem

(2016) sees the importance of empowering group members to believe in their power and ability to fight against social exclusion particularly where there is highly unequal power dynamics such as in rural Brazil.

In chapter 2, I referred to the idea of a dual city. In the interviews, it was clear that residents believe that Cape Town is a dual city when it comes to both service delivery and the processes and practices of democracy. That is why it is beneficial to consider the two case studies in the context of greater Cape Town. There is, at least in the minds of my participants, a preferential treatment between people of different classes. In fact, without prompting participants easily compared services between different parts of Cape Town. Given this, one can argue that "[i]n an important sense, Khayelitsha [and Gugulethu] is *in*, but *not* of Cape Town" (Du Toit and Neves, 2007:19, emphasis added). Botes et al., (2007) similarly note that important structural considerations in their study included high socio-economic inequality in Port Elizabeth. While statistics often show important improvements in the roll out of services compared to pre-1994 delivery, they "gloss over the realities of uneven and insufficient delivery to the neediest in society" (Booysen, 2007:23).

Given South Africa's apartheid history, there is debate about whether race and class are still related. Yet even for scholars, like Seekings and Nattras (2008) who argue that at some point social stratification changed from race to class concede that class structure is affected by "the racial structure of society in the past" (Seekings, 2003:3). Cape Town is "one of the most – if not the most – unequal cities in the world" (McDonald, 2008:42). One part of the city – is rich and mostly White and the other part is Black and often poor. As McDonald (2008:31) notes, the:

> [S]patial legacy of apartheid has … meant that the city core and virtually all of the upper-income housing in the city (situated in the city center and along the mountain spine and coastline that run southward from the city centre), are separated from the vast, sprawling low-income townships on the Cape Flats by rail and road corridors, commercial and industrial space and/or parkland.

Privatisation of water and refuse collection has worsened socio-economic and spatial inequalities. Exorbitant rentals in the city centres have pushed unemployed families and the working class to peripheral areas, leading to a new form of geographically peripheralised ghettoisation where poor households occupy Cape Town's periphery townships (Smith et al., 2001). Unsurprisingly then, South Africa is associated with hyper segregation where poor communities become more and more

economically homogenous owing to outmigration of residents who can afford to live in better places. This leads to more racially homogenous poor neighbourhoods made up of those who do not have the means to leave these communities (Massey and Denton, 1993).

6.3.6. Transparency

While Alexander (2010) sees protests as expressing "disappointment with the fruits of democracy", this study found that protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha believe there is no real democracy in their locations. Many participants bemoaned the lack of transparency, consultation and communication. In Khayelitsha, Vuyo, a man who stays in an RDP house and is studying towards a tertiary degree, and participates in community meetings, stated:

> We are striking for the transparency of the government either national, provincial or local. They are not transparent. Many people do not know the Ward Councillor. Many people don't even know the council number they are in. This is because of one thing; our government is not transparent. And I think transparency is one of things that the old politicians like Nelson Mandela have promised to the people. They promised the government that is accountable … responsive … [and] transparent.

Similar issues were raised during the Mbeki-era and Zuma-era protests notably "inadequate service delivery and lack of accountability by local councillors" (Alexander, 2010:37). In fact, the idea of transparency dates back to the apartheid era. The extract above shows that South Africa's history and the promises made and the people who made such promises have a bearing on today's protests. Poor communities reflect on the promises made by old politicians and consider today's realities. Names such as Nelson Mandela bring back hope and solution to communities and are used as a reference point. The need for accountability, responsiveness and transparency was raised in a context of an oppressive apartheid government whose sole purpose was to enrich a privileged few at the expense of the majority (Western, 1996). Protesters decried the new government's failure to uphold tenets of democracy they promised pre-94 – transparency, accountability and responsiveness. Buhle, a female activist who stays in backyard shack in Khayelitsha developed this point:

> Meaning that each and every month, there will be a report coming from the government. That is this is the state of this and that. This is how we are doing as the Ward Council, to the provincial council because we need to know from time to time what is happening. That is what we don't know. Hence, we think that maybe they are doing nothing or planning nothing because they are not communicating to us.

The extract above is in line with the Batho Pele principles which require the municipality to provide accurate and up-to-date information about services, enhance openness and transparency about services (White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service: The *Batho Pele* White Paper, 1997). This study's findings are consistent with Dawson's (2014) argument that the councillor's and residents' lack of feedback and communication coupled with rampant corruption has eroded resident's trust of the ANC's ability to fulfil their promises. Similarly, in her research, Mottiar (2014) noted that there was a feeling that ward committees are doing nothing. In Khayelitsha, residents stated that they sometimes feel that they are 'municipal-less' to imply that they feel that they do not have a municipality which attends to their service delivery needs. Residents in Zandspruit, in Gauteng, also felt 'municipal-less': Dawson (2014:538) noted that before the 2006 local government, residents had very little delivery of services and "experienced the government as essentially absent". Similarly, in Motsoaledi residents "referred to their apparent invisibility to the state by suggesting that state officials did not 'know' them" (Paret, 2018:351). In this context, I concur with Alexander (2010:38) who concluded that the government "is doing too little, too late."

To be fair, the government does provide services to the people. That said, the manner in which the government provides is problematic. Communities should not be left to guess whether the government is planning to provide or providing. From the extract, the people's desire to know what the government is doing suggests that it is not only a matter of delivering on the promises, but people are concerned about processes involved in the delivery of these services. That is why social movements like AbM do not simply fight for houses or political power but seek to effect changes on how things are done. They thus are struggling "for a vision of different kind of politics" (Gibson, 2011:171). In a sense, communities in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha seek to change how things are done in terms of more consultation, participation, increased levels of transparency and the delivery of services.

The fight for both the delivery of services and a different kind of politics can be best understood using the Framing Processes Theory. Frames help us understand the desire to change how things are done in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha because they provide a broader interpretive definition or answer to the questions: 'what is going on' or 'should be going on' (Benford and Snow, 2000). Top-down development assumes that the government knows what the community needs without the participation of the community itself. Democratising society from below seems plausible in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha given the protesters' view that the top-down approach from the government has failed to yield real democratic tendencies in the impoverished communities. Likewise, in Durban, Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) mount campaigns aimed at improving the poor's living conditions and "to democratise society from below" (Mottiar, 2014:372). Remarkably, activists in so-called 'popcorn' protests seek both services and a different way of doing thing just as the 'organised' AbM seeks both services and a change in the practice of democracy.

What is required is a genuine consultation and active engagement between communities and the government that should serve them. People should be involved in issues that pertain their well-being and development this is both empowering and makes people feel an important sense of ownership towards the product and service (Phillips et al., 2009). In Gugulethu, Sanele a male protester who stays in a formal house explained the reason for participating in protests:

> We are not sure if it is the councillors that are not delivering or whether the process is stuck but it seems to be stuck somewhere. And the only voice or the only way that our government listens to us is strikes. The only way is for us to block the roads and start something so that we can be listened [to] and our grievances can be heard. So that is why we protest. It is not because nobody has nothing better to do but it is because we want to be heard.

Framing Processes show that social movement actors identify, label and locate phenomena that affect them in order to make sense of such occurrences (Goffman, 1974). Yet in trying to make sense of occurrences in their community, Gugulethu protesters are sometimes unsure whether the councillors are responsible for not delivering or the process hinders and stalls delivery. Although activists look at problems and identify who is to blame (Larana et al., 1994) through a process Schon and Rein (1994) call 'naming and framing', at times protesters are unsure who is responsible

for their problems as shown above. Notwithstanding this lack of certainty, protesters understand what needs to be done to achieve the desired change. In this case, protesters reason that for the government to listen to them, they should protest. In the extract, the phrase "nothing better to do" serves to debunk common views about the reasons for protests – this is what Benford and Snow (2000:613) regard as producing "countermobilising ideas and meanings." Activists proffer ideas that are different from the views of people who vilify their activism to show that they forgo their normal day to day activities to embark on protests in order to better their service delivery needs.

6.3.7. A fight for a relationship

In South Africa, there have been times when protests "have reached insurrectionary proportions with people momentarily taking control of their townships," prompting Alexander (2010:37) to describe this phenomenon as the "rebellion of the poor." However, for Sinwell (2011) radical tactics of protest movements do not necessarily ensue from revolutionary politics. Similarly, Paret (2015) found that disruptive tactics, for example, barricading roads, burning tyres and destroying property were meant to only attract state officials' attention. I take this further and argue that protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha fight for a relationship with the government.

In Gugulethu, protesters once took a White contractor who was installing water meters hostage until the City of Cape Town addressed the protesters and stopped the installation (Chiwarawara, 2014). Although this incident, which is widely celebrated in Gugulethu was militant, I argue that such protests cannot be regarded as a rebellion of the poor. While the protests are by the poor – evidence from the two case studies show that protesters seek a 'relationship' with the government. Additionally, in Gugulethu, the older protesters who were involved in anti-apartheid protests invariably referred the current government as "our government" – even some who belonged to the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) made such comments suggesting that what is happening here is not really a rebellion. Some people, even those from other parties regarded their protests as a cry for attention, as John, an area leader in Gugulethu with a wealth of anti-apartheid protests stated: "why should we apply [seek permission to protest] to cry [protest]?" suggesting that protests are not a rebellion but a means of getting the state's attention. After all, there is evidence which suggest that municipalities usually deny residents permission to protest or set preconditions which discourage activism (Duncan, 2014).

Indeed, Mottiar (2014:382) is right in arguing that although Carto Manor protesters desire to 'create chaos' "they continue to make their demands well within the system and within a loyalty to the ruling party." She continues, indicating that such evidence dilutes the rebellion stance. Similarly, Sinwell (2011) found that protesters' demands are not against the ANC's national policies but rather the local government's failure to implement the policies. Bond, Desai and Ngwane (2012:7) best described South Africa's protest movement as "extraordinarily militant in its actions and profoundly moderate in its politics." These militant actions and moderate politics should be understood in light of invited and invented spaces.

Miraftab (2006; drawing from Cornwall, 2002) distinguish between 'invited' and 'invented' spaces of citizenship. Whereas invited spaces are those legitimised by the government and donors and involve grassroots actions and partner NGOs, invented spaces are spaces of collective action of the poor occupy that directly confront and challenge the authorities and the status quo. Invited spaces seek to cope with the established systems and invented spaces defy and resist the status quo. Effectively, Miraftab (2006) argues that invented spaces serve to confront and challenge the status quo.

Drawing from Miraftab's (2006) idea of invented spaces, Mottiar (2014) argues that Cato Manor residents turn to invented spaces to confront authorities but not necessarily to challenge the status quo – but to demand a new ward councillor, not the transformation of the councillor/ward committee system. While this is the case, in Gugulethu, some senior protesters – particularly those who were involved in anti-apartheid protests see flaws in the ward committee system. A number of these leaders bemoaned the lack of progression that exists when a councillor leaves office. They saw the need to change the system to allow agreed upon developments to be completed even by a new councillor from a different party. Chiwarawara (2014:92) underlined the flaw in the structure of ward council, quoting a protest leader Andile who explained:

> Before this councillor, there was a councillor lady. You know we had big [a] gathering in this [community] hall. All the wards, all the areas … [came] … we thought we were in the bottleneck of this, [we thought] we were about to achieve what we were fighting for. But her term ended and there was a new councillor who said no, I did not know about it [the planned programs], I was not part of that. So there is no progress, you know, but hope is still there, but it's a pipeline hope now.

Understandably, old residents who participated in anti-apartheid protests understand that some problems go beyond individual councillors to the system within which officials operate. That said, as Paret (2018:351) found in his study in and around Johannesburg, "[f]or many activists … protests were crucial for correcting the actions of public officials and getting the state to 'work' as it should." In other words, unlike social movements which push for systematic change, local protesters often work like social service organisations which seek to address individual problems within the system (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016). The protesters' lack of enthusiasm to push for systemic change should not be equated to a lack of organisation, as I will show later in the chapter. Their organisation and contestation, I argue, does not amount a rebellion of the poor.

I contend that that while generally the protesters harbour feelings of anger, betrayal, and a general belief that the state does not really care for the poor, South African's protests are not a rebellion but a contestation for the government to hear, listen and act. In any case (and arguably), there is not yet an alternative political party which the Black majority would want to align with: Julius Malema's Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has gained some traction in impoverished townships particularly with its 'land redistribution (and occupation) without compensation' rhetoric, but it does not yet have the numbers to turn the political landscape. To highlight that what is at work in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is not a rebellion, this study's findings show that protesters consider a successful protest as one which ultimately leads to a solid relationship between residents and the government. Ben, a frequent protester in Gugulethu who advocated the need to use disruptive tactics and vandalise public buildings where necessary, explained what he regards a successful protest:

> But I can regard as a successful protest when people have striked and the government *saw* that really these people were in need and the problem is us as a government and this is what we are going to do and after that the government continues to be transparent to the people and the government continues to have a solid relationship with the people. I can regard it as a successful protest (emphasis added).

It can be argued that the government's realisation that people are protesting for a genuine need – as opposed to the 'Third Force' explanation – can help build a good relationship between the government and the community. Similarly, the government's admittance that it was at fault in its actions and or inactions can serve as a necessary ingredient towards peace and a good relationship

with the aggrieved community. Transparency and engagement are processes which show progress in the state's dealings with impoverished communities. Protests are not meant to solely bring about services but are also meant to bring processes that characterise a democracy. In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha these include more consultation, and participatory approaches to development. Importantly, a desire for a 'relationship' with the government makes the protesters not challenge the status quo – a finding consistent with many scholars' finding (Paret, 2018; Mottiar, 2014; Booysen 2007).

There are some people who are happy with the government's provision though. Asked about the relationship between the municipality and the community, a Khayelitsha woman, Lerato, stated, "They [the government] built children's playground and they sweep in the streets – there are opportunities. When drainages are blocked they come quickly." As opposed to many participants who stated that there is no good relationship between the government and the community, for this participant there is a good relationship. In the discussions she indicated that she and her house were once stoned – when she did not participate in protests. Her supposedly uncritical approval of the government might have led her to face the wrath of other community members – who she claims stoned her and her house when she did not participate in protests. In stoning Lerato and her house, activists used selective incidents – here disciplining defectors encourage participation in collective action (Heckathorn, 1996). While Lerato's comment seems to show a departure from the general sentiments, a close scrutiny of her comments shows that there are only a few deviations (the majority of participants stated that the government is slow to respond) because even the protesters in Khayelitsha who lamented the slow pace of delivery hailed the government for delivering parks and playgrounds.

In sum, activists in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protest for the speedy delivery of services such as housing, electricity, and water. Protesters also fight for the government to fulfil their election promises to bring about development in their communities and to do so with fairness and transparency. The fight against discrimination and lack of transparency is premised on the belief that such tendencies hamper the smooth delivery of basic services and that such practices are necessary in a functioning democracy. With these reasons in mind, I now consider the diverse tactics protesters deploy from their bag of repertoires to fast-track the process of development.

6.4. Repertoires employed in Service Delivery Protests

This section presents two-pronged arguments. First, I argue that while the choice of each repertoire is meant to speed up service delivery, some tactics like land occupation and illegal electricity reconnections directly address the needs of activists. Second, I argue that most of the repertoires service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha employ are thought through, planned, organised and coordinated prior to the protest events which puts to question the popcorn categorisation of these protests.

6.4.1. Decisions on protest tactics

This study's findings reveal that participants believe that, among other things, the level of anger, frustration, ineffectiveness of prior tactics and the urgency with which a grievance must be addressed determines the tactic protesters employ. In describing the choice of a protest tactic, Unati, a man who often help burn tyres on the day of protests in Khayelitsha stated:

> There is a belief that when things are being destroyed the government will quickly answer. It's an idea of fast-tracking the process believing that it will do something for the government to respond. So, either burning tyres or putting a container on the road will fast-track the process.

Unati's comments are consistent with the prevalent belief that disruptive and violent protests receive quicker responses (Paret, 2018; Alexander, 2010). In a sense, this belief incentivises residents to engage in collective action by affecting expectations of success or failure (Tarrow, 1994). Given this view, radical activism is meant to fast-tract development in the community. This view suggests that the government must be coerced to deliver to poor communities. Understandably, the government has limited resources at its disposal; at the same time impoverished communities have pressing needs which would have been raised repeatedly but would not have been addressed.

In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, some sub-groups in the protests took a decision to employ disruptive and other dramatic protests. While radical forms of protests usually start owing to their resonance with some of the movement's actors (della Porta, 1995), in Khayelitsha, some radical forms of protests were employed even by those who do not necessary support 'disruptive',

'vandalistic' and 'violent' protests that are meant to achieve a certain end. A number of particularly elderly people did not support 'disruptive' and 'violent' protests but took exception when it came to fast tracking the development process. For example, after Mfundisi (pastor) Zama distinguished between peaceful and violent protests, I asked him whether he thought there were times violence was important in a protest. He responded:

> I will not say violence is important but we have seen that when we do violence, [the] government responds but when we just don't [protest violently] then they don't [respond]. You know I think, according to that context, I will nod my head two times to violence.

Asked whether the destruction of public goods does not deprive the community of the services they already have, Thembeka a female activist who illegally reconnected her electricity in Khayelitsha stated:

> Some people think about it but there are dominant voices. And sometimes, the guys who are thieves and *tsotsis* in the community have some influence of some sort [take advantage of the situation] and suddenly the direction takes another tone which is not a good one which ends up damaging the same things that we need in the future.

There is no uniformity in protests; some protesters are against some protest tactics but (i) dominant voices win – which is consistent with the view that radical forms of protests often start due to their resonance with at least some of the movement's actors (della Porta, 1995); and at other times, (ii) thieves and tsotsis take advantage of the protests to engage in criminal activities. A similar sentiment was advanced by an elderly man in Gugulethu who stated that at times protests are 'hijacked' (Chiwarawara, 2014). There is a clear understanding that damaging the things that the community needs in future is counterproductive, but such vandalism is sometimes deemed necessary to achieve a greater good as the pastor above stated. The word 'violent' used in the extract, should be understood in the contexts of binary, peaceful and violent protests or the three-way categorisation of protests as 'orderly', 'disruptive' and 'violent' protests (Alexander et al., 2018). What is being discussed here does not fall under the 'disruptive' or 'violent' protests though, but what I have called 'vandalistic' protests (I discuss this in sub-section 6.4.2 below). Interestingly, Thembeka's comments show some level of deliberation – where 'dominant voices' win, leading to the protests taking another 'tone' different from the agreed upon – which again suggests a degree of plan and decisions before the protests.

Consistent with the Resource Mobilisation Theory, some tactics and strategies may work well to achieve one aim but may conflict with the necessary behaviour desired to achieving another (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Understanding this is important because even protests themselves are used as a last resort just as violent protests are used as a last resort after, 'orderly', 'disruptive' and 'vandalistic' protests have failed. The idea in the extract above that at times protests take a different turn or are hijacked suggests that protests sometimes deviate from repertoires planned before the protests which suggests that such protests are planned. I will dwell on this under section 6.5 on the organisation of service delivery protests. Below I consider the disruptive tactics and what I have regarded 'vandalistic' tactics.

6.4.2. Disruptive and Vandalistic tactics

A key feature of South Africa's protests is erecting barricades on the road and attacking public property. Many protesters believe disruptive tactics (barricading roads and burning tyres) and – what I call – 'vandalistic protests' (destroying properties) are the only way to attract the government's attention (Paret, 2015; von Holdt et al., 2011, Alexander, 2010). Traditionally, tactics that include road blockages, tyre burning, property destruction and attack on people were grouped under 'violent' protests, especially in media. Paret (2015) has warned analysts of using the concept of violence uncritically. He aptly highlights the conflation of meanings imbued in the term violence, noting that violence is carried out by different actors – such as the police and the protesters – and violence refers to diverse actions, namely social disruption, destruction of property and personal attacks. He went as far as suggesting to scholars to "avoid the notion of violence altogether and search for more precise analytical concepts" (Paret, 2015:121). It is worth heeding this call.

Indeed, researchers at the University of Johannesburg developed a 3-way categorisation of protests as 'orderly', 'disruptive' and 'violent' (Alexander et al., 2018). While appreciating the value of the 3-way categorisation, I go further to argue for a 4-way categorisation which distinguishes between 'vandalistic' protests and 'violent' protests.' In the end, I argue that we have 'orderly', 'disruptive', 'vandalistic' and 'violent' protests. I regard a deliberate attack on public or private property as 'vandalistic' protests and an attack or harm on people as 'violent' protests. I find fault with grouping attack on property and injury to people under the same umbrella phrase – violent

protests. Doing so obfuscates the intentions behind different tactics and reinforces vilification and demonisation of protests and protesters. My distinction is guided by qualitative excavation of marginalised voices. For example, in Khayelitsha, a male protester, Uuka who sees the value of protests described the disruptive protests they engage in on the day of protests:

> We also take rubbish bins and scatter it on the roads. There are green containers that we have here, there is an area here where they don't have a formal rubbish system - that container is used to burn rubbish. So, we will take such containers and close the roads. You see that 6X3 it's a container. We will take it and close the road and burn tyres on the road.

Public goods such as roads, rubbish bins are strategically utilised in the fight for development in the impoverished community. Barricading roads is meant to disturb the flow of traffic and temporarily hold 'progress' for the greater good of airing grievances. Barricaded roads bring about delays, inconveniences, confusion, frustration, and chaos to commuters. Similarly, in Cato Manor, Durban, Mottiar (2014) found that obstructing main roads and burning tyres was meant to create chaos in order to publicise grievances and sending a message. Arguably, this tactic is meant to say, our lives in impoverished townships are stagnant and inconvenienced on a daily basis; seen this way this tactic is meant to inconvenience the commuters and thereby exert pressure on the government to deliver. Figure 5 captures the disruptive protests.

Figure 5: Disruptive protests in Isiqalo, Cape Town. Source: Cronin (2014) Picture: C Waxa

Another crucial characteristic of South Africa's community protests is the deliberate destruction of property, what I have called 'vandalistic' protests – to distinguish them from 'disruptive' protests as well as 'violent' protests. In sub-section 6.3.2, I referred to Siya, a protest leader in Gugulethu, who lamented the slow pace of delivery as 'a slow-moving train.' I repeat his words here because they capture vandalistic protests: "Development in Gugulethu is like a slow-moving train; it is a train that delays and when it delays – people get angry. They end up destroying the railway line." Here, Siya equates development to a scheduled train, which when delayed, infuriates people, as anyone would. To strategically bring their grievances to authorities and the public, activists destroy elements of that development or any other public building or property. For example, in the hostage situation I referred to earlier, Gugulethu residents deliberately vandalised water meters as an act of defiance and to send a message about water restrictions.

Part of Tshidi's comments in section 6.3.1, where I discussed protests as a means of fast-tracking the process of development, is worth repeating. Tshidi, who stays in a backyard room in Gugulethu underlined the belief behind the vandalistic protests:

> There is a belief that when things are being destroyed the government will quickly answer. It's an idea of fast-tracking the process believing that it will do something for the government to respond.

A closer look at what would normally be called violence in Tshidi's words would be what Alexander et al., (2018) called 'disruptive' protests (burning tyres and blockading the road) and the deliberate destruction of property is what I have called 'vandalistic' protests. Conflating deliberate destruction of property with injury to people obscures the message protesters seek to send. The strength of the four-way categorisation of protests that I advance in this thesis over the three-way categorisation of protests by Alexander et al., (2018) can be found in Tshidi's deliberate omission of injury to people. In such cases, to regard destruction of property as 'violent' is as misleading as regarding barricades of roads as violent, as Alexander et al., (2018) have argued.

Vandalistic protests are also evident in the distinction that protesters make between protests/picketing and striking. Participants stated that a protest/picket involves peaceful demonstration where a memorandum [of demands] is handed to officials and a strike involves a forceful demonstration. Letlhogonolo, a university student who stays in Khayelitsha explained the difference:

> During a protest we have marshals – from the community – who make sure that people are not doing illegal things. The marshals will be there if it is a picketing but if it is a strike, we never have marshals because it will be chaos. And during the trike there is nothing else that we do except all vandalising. We don't talk. There is no time to talk. … We are looking forward, that if we are going to the police station or the councillor, we are going to vandalise his office, whatever we meet along the way. There is nothing that is happening. The only thing that is happening is that we are going to that guy [councillor] and we are going to vandalise so that they see that we are really angry.

Remarkably, Letlhogonolo does not mention personal attack on individuals. His reference to 'going to that guy' (councillor) is not to beat him up but 'going to vandalise' property. Vandalistic protests as described in this extract are informed by history. Asked why protesters sometimes destroy or burn buildings, Lerumo, who recently completed university and stays in Gugulethu stated that vandalistic protests are informed by history:

> The history or history has taught us and continues to teach us that from the apartheid until today, the government will never listen to you and respond very well according to what we want until we stand up and show them that we are really angry now. Eh … if you see a strike, you must know that the vandalism is going to start. There are no second thoughts. In strike we say we are going to vandalise at 3:00; as soon as a strike begins expect vandalism to start soon.

These two extracts show that there are two different rules of engagement in 'protests' and 'strikes.' In protests, activists have 'marshals' who ensure that protests unfold as planned and no one engages in illegal activities. Sticking to the agreed upon repertoire helps avoid clouding the message of the protest with other unplanned activities. Marshalls, however, are only necessary when it is an orderly protest. If it is a vandalistic protest, protesters seek to cause 'chaos' in order to show the extent of their anger.

What is apparent in these extracts is that there is a degree of organisation in assigning marshalls who help protesters adhere to the 'agreed upon' repertoires. Yet, even the vandalistic protests, do not always just pop up. When repeated 'orderly' efforts to air a view fail to yield results, protesters plan a 'strike' to express the extent of their anger. Such transition from 'orderly' and 'disruptive' protests to 'vandalistic' protests are informed by lessons from history which people reflect and act upon. Likewise, Paret (2015:115) found that his participants distinguished a 'march' from a

'strike'; a march was viewed as "a relatively benign and entirely legal affair" and a strike as "illegal and involves the destruction of property."

Protesters have at times torched "symbolically significant buildings (e.g., council offices and councillors' houses)" (Alexander, 2010:32). While this is sometimes the case, I found that in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, as elsewhere, there are times people do not target symbolically significant buildings. For example, when people burn libraries; often it is not because the activists find fault with the library and are demanding a better library, but it is merely a call to be heard. As I have argued, it would be wrong to regard a deliberate attack on a library and injury to persons under one term, violent protests. In explaining the need for disruptive and vandalistic tactics, a pastor in Khayelitsha, Mfundisi Akhona used a compelling metaphor:

> Actually, … in order to make someone to respond, pain must be there, I believe. You know, so that is the issue with our government. Our government knows that there is a pain somewhere. If there is a sore in your arm then you are turning a blind eye on it but if someone starts to *pinch* that sore arm you will feel the pain and you will want to do something, so I think that's what happens. They [government officials] have to respond (emphasis added).

It was surprising to hear a pastor openly admitting to supporting disruptive and vandalistic tactics in the presence of his colleagues. Yet Mfundisi Akhona's support of disruptive and vandalistic protests should be seen as a last resort to make the government listen and address the inconveniences in impoverished townships which they believe the government knows but ignores. In line with the Framing Processes activists blame certain people or institutions they believe are responsible for the problems they face (Larana, 1994), in this case – the government. Activists' actions in their 'interpretative work' (Snow and Benford, 1988) are well calculated hence the 'pinching' to inflict pain (disruptive and vandalistic tactics) to solicit a quick response from the state to address the otherwise ignored sore arm (poor conditions). What seems to be a mindless 'popcorn' activity has a level of thought and plan, to determine the sore and feasible arm they can find to inflict pain proportionate to the objectives of a protest event, which activists can explain well after the event. What is interesting here is that activists believe the government knows the problems exist but ignores them. Pinching, by means of disruptive, vandalistic and even violent protests, helps remind authorities and onlookers of the ignored sole arm/service delivery problems.

6.4.3. Violent tactics

It is worth briefly discussing what is often called 'violent' protests. As Paret (2015) has argued, violence is an ambiguous "empty concept" which should be avoided and that critical scholars should opt for more precise concepts that capture the dynamics of protests. This does not mean people have not been harmed or targeted in protests. There have been incidents where unpopular people have been targeted and even hounded out of communities. At other times, this has been acts by a few individuals engaged in criminal elements who 'hijack' the protest for their own ends. However, media outlets have blown the 'violent' protest descriptor out of proportion.

In their desire to sell newsworthy stories, media outlets have over-reported so-called violent protests and under-reported orderly protests. In so doing, "journalists continue to repeat the chime 'violent service delivery protests' even in cases where it is not warranted" (Duncan, 2014:np). Yet as Paret (2015:121) has argued, the media outlets' lumping up of burning tyres, destruction of property and throwing stones at motorists, police brutality as violence "enables the state to raise alarm, demonise protesters and justify repressive responses." For example, the then Secretary General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe once said "by participating in violent protests you are actively destroying your right to protest because you are inviting the police to be there, while it not their place" and went on to direct the "state to find ways and implementable means as a matter of urgency to deal with the twin phenomenon of violent strikes and violent community protests" (Burger, 2013:np). Following Mantashe's speech, Ngoako Ramathlodi, the then head of the ANC elections committees stated that the government would deploy an 'iron fist' to quell what he called the 'seas of anarchy' in violent strikes and service delivery protests (Burger, 2013:np). Here the police are viewed as the solution and never the perpetrators of violence.

Under sub-section 6.3.3, I referred to the hostage situation that took place in Gugulethu. In this well-celebrated hostage, a White man and his contracted company's employees were installing water meters. Important here is that some protesters, as Bulelani a protest leader recounted, wanted to "beat him up a little … to make an example out of him" but "we [the leaders] said no, let's just hold him here." Certainly, the lives of the contractor and his team were in danger, but leaders acted as a buffer to avoid physical harm to the contractor. Interestingly, the decision to only hold the contractor hostage occurred after, the earlier tactic to 'vandalise' the water meters did not yield

fruit, as recounted by Chiwarawara (2014:96-100). Solly, a well-connected leader in and outside Gugulethu who fought in the anti-apartheid struggle, narrated what transpired:

> They came [Contractors] and they implemented it [the new water meters]. We just saw private company cars coming to our yard [and] [d]igging holes and put[ting] up this blue thing. Now what is this here, we asked [in an astonished voice] … maybe you are planting a time bomb into my yard … Fine, it went on.

Later, the installed water meters created problems. In a focus group, Chipa – a well-respected leader in the community – remembered that:

> Before we knew it, people started to come to me, saying … we do not have water. I asked, you don't have water? What do you mean? People responded 'no, there is no water and yet some of our neighbours have …' Then we [protesters] said, okay, we called the officials saying, so and so doesn't have water. They [the municipal officials] said, 'no it's because you have a new system, she used up all the water that she was provided with.' What do you mean, used up all the water, we asked. 'Well, there is a new system' [officials responded]. Then we said, okay fine. Hold it right there. Is this the new system that the mayor was talking about? […] Then we said [amongst ourselves] we need to do something here [in a serious voice]. We said to them, come here. They [did] not want to come. We need to go to them. But who did they come to, when they installed [water meters]? We took action [in a stern voice]. We started a protest. We vandalised that [the water meters] […]. We even took some [of] the water meters. Now it's going to cost the city millions of Rands.

In the same focus group, Mbuyiso explained the transition from the vandalistic protests to the hostage taking:

> They didn't feel the pain [when we vandalised water meters] but when we caught up with the contractor who was contracted to install these things we took them in for hostage. We said to him come here. We told him: Now, you call the person that gave you the tender. And the person is the City. Call the person that gave you the tender. That person came. We had said to him, if he or she does not come, you can just as well call your family and tell your family that you are not coming home tonight until those people [affected people in Gugulethu] have their water back! They came! [Following the call, the municipal officials came].

If one is to think of the hostage situation as a 'violent' protest given the danger that the White contractor and his team were in, then the protests moved from 'negotiation' to 'vandalistic' to 'violent' protest in order for the water to be restored. The move to vandalistic protests only happened when officials did not come to resolve the water dilemma through 'negotiation'. When

the municipality did not feel the pain of vandalistic protests and so restore water, residents, in their bid to have their water back took in the contractor hostage. Yet even in the hostage situation, leaders barred individuals who wanted to 'beat up' the contractors and make an example out of them. Thus, conflating destruction of water meters and hostage or beating up the contactor as all violent protests would be incorrect. Indeed, the concept of violence is empty and ambiguous and does a disservice to protesters. As Paret (2015:121) has shown, the media outlets' use of violence is ambiguous and only serves to advance an "empty concept that may be wielded by state officials." Sometimes, protesters employ elements of 'orderly', 'disruptive', 'vandalistic' or even 'violent' protests in a bid to shame the government.

6.4.4. Shame tactics

At times, protesters stage dramatic protests meant to shame and embarrass the government – what I have regarded as shame tactics. Shame tactics are thoughtfully utilised to soil the government's public image nationally and internationally. Asked the reasons for throwing litter on the roads, a male protester Fundani, in a focus group in Gugulethu stated that:

> Because we believe – it's a popular belief – you see the infrastructure, the roads are the most important thing to our government. Because it *embarrasses* them if the tar[red] road is dirty. The City of Cape Town doesn't want to see that the City is dirty so if we throw the bucket [with human waste] on the road, they are going to – within two weeks – that road is gonna [going] be cleaned. If we dig holes in the road they are going to be mended but they don't respond to us if we write them a letter and say this is what we need in Gugulethu unless we show them that we are really angry (emphasis added).

The general belief in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is that other means of engagement such as writing letters are not as effective as 'shame tactics.' I will return to the discussion on letter writing and what they mean in relation to organisation and engagement under Section 6.5.

Cape Town made news when activists dumped buckets of human faeces in full view of international and national travellers at the Cape Town International airport (Dano and Barnes, 2013). Reflecting on this incident, protesters in Khayelitsha indicated that the government is not as concerned about Khayelitsha residents as it is about its public image. Tactics of shame are meant to soil the government's public image. It is interesting to understand the reasoning behind poo throwing at the airport. Jack, a protest leader in Gugulethu explained that:

> When we pour poo that we stay with in our houses on international platforms such as the Cape Town International Airport we are saying to the whole world see what we people in South Africa live with in Cape Town.

In Khayelitsha, Mfundisi Zama, the pastor who gave a double 'nod' to violence recited the Cape Town poo protest with a smile on his face and associated himself with the activists who threw waste at the airport using the word 'we':

> When we went to this place … the airport. And boom we threw waste [human waste] there. The way we threw waste there … was very good. That one was awesome because that's how we live. Actually, now if government does not hear us then let other nations see us and smell us and how we live … So yeah, it worked and immediately after that there were pipes that were set up and water started running and although the process is not that much, in that community alone, the toilets were built.

These excepts reveal the appalling sanitation experiences which informal settlements residents face. Some of my interviewees did not have access to a toilet inside their dwelling or yard. Some of the people used the bucket at night and emptied their waste during the day. Such sanitation realities do not compare with the sanitation that middle class and upper middle neighbourhoods experience. Basic services such as sanitation, which are often taken for granted in middle and upper middle neighbourhoods are elusive in poor Black neighbourhoods in South Africa. This highlights Cape Town's racial and spatial inequalities which McDonald (2008) highlights. The struggle for basic services (e.g., sanitation) or urban development should be understood within the context of no-toilets in the house/shack, yard or no toilet nearby.

The excerpts reveal that shame tactics play a double role of sending a message to the international world and in the process shame the government. This explains the reason protesters picked the Cape Town International Airport to pour poo. Such protests inconvenience elites, national and international tourists who use the airport as well as disgracing the government. Social media will further publicise the incident and thus reach a wider audience and embarrass the government. These protests are like 'the smoke that calls' people to the deeper issues affecting the poor who are situated at the periphery of the City (von Holdt et al., 2011). In this case, protests help portray the shame the residents feel about their living conditions. Studies have shown that protesters feel the shame of living in appalling conditions. For example, in Motsoaledi, Johannesburg, an activist described the "*shame* … he felt for living in a tin shack" (Paret, 2018:349, emphasis added).

In Khayelitsha, activists shamed the government when they poured buckets of raw sewage at the then premier of the Western Cape, Hellen Zille's convoy as she was leaving an official event in Harare, Khayelitsha on June 2013 (Mposo, 2013). Figure 6 below shows a graphical representation of the shame tactics unleashed on Zille's convoy.

Figure 6: Human excrement thrown at Hellen Zille's convoy Source: Mposo (2013).

The desire to publicise protests and reveal what exists in poor communities was best captured by a yearly protest march by pastor Xola Skosana of the Way of Life Church. During all the protests, Pastor Skosana along with other people from different formations, brandish banners written "Welcome to hell; SA townships" (Meyer, 2011). These protests are meant to publicise the abnormalities existent in townships and interrupt "the ongoing hypnosis that makes us accept such abhorrent living conditions" (Way of Life Church, 2013:np). In a sense, then, tactics of shame help wake people from their hypnosis – be they those who live in the 'hell' (townships) or others who live in their 'paradises' (those who enjoy the comfort of their homes and neighbourhoods). This wakeup call takes what is hidden from the public eye (hidden from those who do not stay in Khayelitsha or other impoverished communities) and showcasing it at national and international

platforms like the Cape Town International Airport. Indeed, the poo protests made international headlines. For example, after activists dumped human excrements on the Western Cape's provincial legislature and the Cape Town International Airport in protest over inadequate and unacceptable sanitation in 2013, the BBC reported the news. The BBC (2013) reported the arrest of 180 people with some carrying bags of faeces ahead of a planned protest for better sanitation in Cape Town.

Similarly, Oldfield and Stokke (2004) detail an incident where after several children were hit by cars in Valhalla Park, Cape Town, the Valhalla Park United Civic Front (the Civic) spent 2 fruitless years trying to persuade the municipality to build speed bumps. As a last resort, the Civic activists dug a deep and wide hole across the main road during the night. As expected by the activists, cars slammed into the hole. The municipality then built speed bumps that day. Just like the poo protest at the Cape Town International Airport which embarrassed the government and posed a health risk to travellers, the building of the speed bumps in Valhalla Park was necessitated by the embarrassment, danger, and disruption the hole posed.

Likewise in neighbouring Zimbabwe, residents employed tactics of shame that bore fruits. In protest to the nature of roads which were riddled with huge potholes, Kadoma youth planted banana trees and grass in the potholes. Mbamalu (2018) reports that city officials were 'embarrassed' by the protests and after the protest, the government quickly fixed the roads. This was an activity conducted by fed-up citizens who sought to see their roads fixed and not a bunch of hooligans. Figure 7 shows the state of the roads. The second picture advertises the banana fruits; 2 for US$1 (Zimbabwe currently uses US dollars).

Figure 7: Shame protests in Kadoma, Zimbabwe **Source: Mbamalu (2018).**

In all the tactics of shame detailed above, activists carefully thought, planned, organised, chose, and implemented a preferred course of action. In Cape Town, activists gathered the buckets with human faeces, secured transport to and from the airport. In Valhalla Park, activists dug a hole in the road at a convenient time – the night. Finally, in Zimbabwe holes were readily available in the roads; activists dug up a few banana trees elsewhere, ferried them to the road and planted them in the potholed roads. Such prior considerations put to question the often-romanticised popcorn protests label attached to these protests. Even if there was no formal organisation, there was clearly a level of organisation quite unlike the popcorn or ephemeral SDPs. Another tactic which requires aforethought, and planning is land occupation.

6.4.5. Urban land occupations

My findings show that land occupations were more prevalent in Khayelitsha than in Gugulethu. Khayelitsha, as a newer location compared to Gugulethu, still has empty land which people can occupy. In fact, so scarce is land in Gugulethu that participants in a focus group remembered a time when people wanted to occupy a gravesite to build houses. Backyarders have targeted both council-owned land and private land to build houses. Mayoral Committee member for human settlement, Benedicta van Minnen acknowledged the housing crisis in the city, with approximately 80 000 people living in backyard dwelling in Cape Town:

> There are approximately 45 000 backyard dwellers residing on council property and approximately 35 000 backyard dwellers residing on private property. In general, it is a prevalent type of accommodation across the metro, but especially in areas such as the metro south east and also in areas where there are good transport facilities, economic and educational opportunities and basic service delivery (Khoisan, 2016:np).

The conflation of issues, comes into play again in the fight for land. The fight for land to build houses is meant to achieve not only houses but gain access to basic services such as water, electricity, proper toilets and sanitation that most South Africans take for granted. These struggles for urban development highlight how grassroot mobilisations for basic services are ever present in the everyday lives of many on the periphery of Cape Town and, indeed, of South African cities.

The rise of land occupations in Khayelitsha should be seen in light of the broader political environment where there is a call for land expropriation without compensation. This is not a new grievance, but the land expropriation without compensation discourse that was championed by Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party and then embraced by the African National Congress (ANC) has created a new space or political opening where this repertoire can be employed with a greater degree of legitimacy. The land expropriation without compensation rhetoric can thus be seen "as a political condition that exists outside of the social movement forces and affects the process of social movement mobilisation" (Cloe and Kim, 2012:56). Using the "structuralist discussions of political opportunity" I argue that mobilisation is more likely in the prevailing context of the aforementioned discourse (Ballard et al., 2006:4). These political openings play a role in the broader structure, the broader structures affect how actors respond, for instance, to the rampant land invasion in Khayelitsha and around Cape Town. Indeed, as della Porta (2008) opines, social movements emerge and succeed not necessarily because they seek to address new grievances, but because changes in the broader political environment allow already existing grievances to be heard.

Land occupations in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu can be seen as a resource acquisition strategy. The direct action (land occupation) acts as an alternative to protest because the very process of the struggle addresses the needs of members (Bourdreau, 1996). While land occupation is a form of protest, it is different in that activists forcefully take the object of their struggle (land) and not merely pressure the government to deliver the service as they usually do in normal service delivery

protests. Many respondents in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu indicated that they needed the land to build houses. Similarly, organised movements like the Landless People's Movement of South Africa (LPM) have occupied land as a self-activity method of redistributing land to the landless (Greenberg, 2004). In Gauteng, the SECC and APF employed tactics such as illegally reconnecting electricity and water and disconnecting pre-paid meters (Mottiar, 2013). A distinction is made here between 'greed' and 'grievances'; here insurgencies are propelled by either political demands or economic aspirations (Korf, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001). Widespread land occupation particularly in Khayelitsha, show that land is addressing the needs of the occupiers. Elsewhere, Karriem and Benjamin (2016) noted that the Brazilian Landless Movement's grassroots struggles led to land acquisition and improvement of livelihood for poor people. In fact, although land inequality remains high in Brazil, sustained and concerted land occupations have reduced inequality in some areas of Brazil (Karriem, 2016, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, as Bourdreau (1996) noted, more confrontational repertoires are sometimes a more reasonable way of satisfying needs and creating resources.

Other participants, however, viewed the land with notions of citizenship and democracy. For them, ownership of land is seen as one of the key things necessary in the post-1994 era. Ndiko, a man in Gugulethu who was conversant with developments throughout Cape Town, explained the recent wave of land occupations:

> There I support Julius Malema. We should take the land! We Black people still do not have anything after more than 20 years of democracy. The only thing we can show that we are South African is our face. We must be able to point to a piece of land and say that is mine. So, we have to take the land back.

The desire to take back or occupy land is interesting because it shows a challenge to the dominant 'common sense' of private property as sacrosanct. Drawing on Malema – who has arguably offered some level of political education to the poor and marginalised youth – Ndiko's sentiments show some level of political consciousness, defiance, and challenge to the prevailing status quo. Tarrow (1988:429) argues that "[i]f collective action is a form of politics, then as in conventional politics there must be a set of constraints and opportunities that discourage this kind of behaviour and lead it in certain forms rather than others." Arguably, Julius Malema's utterances have created a dimension "of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective

action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994:85). Further, the 20 years referred to in the extract make people feel that if they do not take land by force, they may never realise one of the important resources of South Africa. As I have shown before, access to land is key to meeting basic services such as shelter, water, electricity, toilets, and better sanitation.

Somewhat similarly, in a focus group in Gugulethu, a visibly angry Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) veteran, who fought in the anti-apartheid struggle, registered his displeasure at the deal Mandela, the ANC and the National Party negotiated. He shouted "Mandela sold us out. They reached a compromise that favours Whites. Where is the land?" In this focus group, there were activists aligned with the uMkhonto we Sizwe and APLA, the ANC's and Pan Africanist Congress' (PAC) apartheid era armed wings, respectively. The former APLA veteran stated that although all the different soldiers fought for land, the ANC failed the people of South Africa. The land issue is so central to South Africans that even the revered and highly respected Mandela is referred to as a sell-out (activists aligned to the uMkondo weSizwe did not agree with him though) in this extract because he did not redistribute land from the White minority to the Black majority. Arguably, such anger at the way Mandela and the ANC have dealt with the land issue makes the people ready to take it by force. Notions of 'selling out' are interesting in understanding the role of experienced activists (having participated in the struggle against apartheid and now imparting knowledge and tact to the younger generation) activists in contesting the 'common sense' of land regarding private property or public property and move towards the 'good sense' of occupying the land. Certainly, for the APLA leader and those who side with him, they are challenging the ANC's hegemony and the need for urban land redistribution.

Protesters shape political opportunity structures and improve their protests' conditions (negatively, they can improve the conditions for their opponents) of their protest via collective action. Arguably, the ANC's adoption of land expropriation without compensation stance is one of the gains of community land occupation. The government has quelled speculation that there would be a 'smash and grab' land invasion reminiscent of what happened in neighbouring Zimbabwe's land reform programme. The South African government has insisted that there would be an orderly land expropriation without compensation (Phakati, Kahn and Menon, 2018).

What the land invasion by poor communities suggests is that communities want to achieve a better life; sometimes they do it 'with' the government and at other times they do so 'in spite of' the government and sometimes 'against' the government by defying 'processes' that the government wants to follow to acquire land for building a house (de Souza, 2006). Land occupation requires identification of the land, planning for and agreeing on the day of the occupation and having many people (numbers matter in a context of forced removals from the police) who will occupy the place, thus suggesting some considerable degree of planning and coordination which is not at the level of spontaneous/ephemeral protests. The spontaneous protests description assumes that aggrieved people suddenly occupy land without considerable planning in advance. The popcorn metaphor seems to paint a picture of a phenomenon which springs from nowhere. The reality is that people think through the risks involved and consider how they will deal with, for example, the police and the Land Invasion Unit.

Although more radical means of services like land occupations and electricity reconnections are used along with the elite conforming means such as approved demonstrations, activists in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha rarely use courts of law to settle service delivery disputes with the government. This has to be understood within a context of South Africa's impressive democratic institutions (the implementations of the institutions leave a lot to be desired, but it cannot be regarded as a closed political system) and the grinding poverty in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Protesters have often used elite conforming protests and only employed more dramatic and elite challenging protests when elite conforming elites failed to yield the desired results. While confrontational and non-institutionalised repertoires are associated with poverty in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, these repertoires are chiefly due to the failure of elite conforming repertoires to bear fruit. Thus, this study's findings agree in part with Bourdreau's (1996) argument that a blend of democratic institutions and considerable prosperity are likely to allow elite conforming protests, protests that obey existing institutions such as approved demonstrations, while a combination of a more closed political system and relative poverty call for elite challenging or more confrontational and non-institutionalised repertoires.

Lwazi, a male protester who advocated for peaceful (orderly) protests in Khayelitsha stated that they do not use courts, stating "Maybe it's for those who are in the upper level [upper class]. Maybe they can take that road … Ah we never do that." Asked why they do not use courts he responded:

> Ah, which means you are telling us that we should wait for another year. Whereas we are under pressure currently, for example, the water just burst out for sometime and the municipality drives here everyday but they don't do anything about it. Then taking that to court that would mean that I must wait for 3 years for that water to be fixed. No!

One incident stood out in Khayelitsha Site C, where protesters engaged the courts to deny a suspect bail; the community claims the suspect raped, killed and dumped a lady's body in a pit. Along with courts, community members staged protests and threatened mob-justice if the alleged perpetrator was released on bail. Participants recounted this story with admiration. It is quite telling that even in this incident, protesters felt the need to include protests to the court process. This suggests that in Khayelitsha and Gugulethu, engaging courts for community development is rarely included in their bag of repertoires partly due to the long process involved. In Kutsong in Gauteng province, people protested for five years and included protests, election boycotts and a legal battle (Alexander, 2010). Most of my interviewees stated that they used courts to deal with civil matters, not public disputes with the government. The general idea was that if the community has a problem with the government, then deal with the government. Yet, without prompting, Samuel, a male protester in Khayelitsha proudly stated "It is the government which can take us to court after we have vandalised."

What emerged from this section is that often, protesters consciously choose the appropriate tactic prior to the day of the protest. Protesters employ repertoires meant to speed up the delivery of services and at other times the tactics they use such as land invasion and illegal reconnections of water and electricity serve to meet their service delivery needs. A close scrutiny of most of the repertoires shows that the protests are somewhat carefully decided and planned before the day of the protests. This means Gugulethu and Khayelitsha service delivery protests do not come from nowhere and are not activities by irrational people who suddenly find themselves protesting on the streets, or pouring poo at the Cape Town International Airport, or occupying land in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. What makes a group of people choose one course of action and not the other at a particular protest event? While the planning and organising is not at the level of social movement organisation, there is a considerable level of organisation which does not fit the spontaneous protests description. I argue for a rethinking of the popcorn metaphor of categorising Gugulethu

and Khayelitsha protests. This argument is further cemented by the way service delivery protests are organised in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

6.5. The organisation of Service Delivery Protests

This section considers the inner workings of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests to determine whether SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are 'spontaneous' or 'popcorn.' Popcorn protests are defined as contestations which burst on to the scene and then quickly subside. Spontaneous protests suddenly 'pop up' or 'mushroom' from nowhere; they are not intended, planned, or organised ahead of time. I rethink this popcorn description, that characterises most service delivery protests. To do this, I present what activists think about the protests, the processes they engage in before and after a protest, the leaders who command respect, and structures that exist in the communities. I argue that unlike the oft-held spontaneous characterisation of these protests, activists often plan and organise before the protest event.

6.5.1. Fighting for what we deserve

As opposed to the common belief that protesters are eager to protest, participants in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha revealed that protests are not the preferred means of engagement. In a focus group discussion, Madoda a protest leader in Khayelitsha best captured the essence of the other discussants. He stated, "I think that we don't need to protest for what we deserve. We deserve houses and refuse removal." Indeed, the Constitution of South Africa and international human rights instruments recognise adequate housing as a crucial basic human right (South African Human Right Commission, 2016; United Nations General Assembly, 1948). Madoda's comment reveal an understanding of the right to basic services. This should be understood in a context which, as the Political Opportunity Structure shows, allow protesters to stage protests such as the right to protest enshrined in the Constitution (Constitution of South Africa, Section 17). While South Africa has the right political condition outside of social movements which affects a movement's mobilisation – as the POS asserts (Chloe and Kim, 2012), activists in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are not eager to capitalise on these conditions. Also, although under Zuma's administration there was a general belief among communities that grievances expressed in the form of protest action

stood a better chance to be addressed (Alexander, 2010), my participants considered it unfair that they must fight in order to receive basic services such as housing and refuse removal that they are entitled to.

Some once very active older protesters in a focus group in Gugulethu revealed their lack of enthusiasm to fight for what they deserved, stating that they did not want people to view them as 'beggars' and say, "see them, they are doing it [protesting] again." The phrase 'beggars' suggests that protesters feel that their fight for better service delivery is sometimes misunderstood by other people. There is a sense in which these once active protesters believe that some people are unsympathetic to their service delivery challenges and such people consider SDPs as a nuisance, waste of time and an inconvenience to the general public. Perhaps this also explains the level of protest fatigue for Gugulethu, a community which has engaged in numerous protests pre-1994 and post-1994. Indeed, boredom, tiredness (protest fatigue), disillusionment and frustration can cause the ebbing of protests (Tarrow, 1994; Zeurn, 2001). Despite this reluctance, Gugulethu residents still protest but not to the level of Khayelitsha.

In Khayelitsha, a newer township compared to Gugulethu, hopes are still high, and residents keep on fighting for more and better services. Interestingly, younger activists in Gugulethu admired activists in Khayelitsha who keep on protesting to pressure the government to deliver what it is duty bound. Elsewhere in Brazil, although the Constitution of Brazil "sanctions the expropriation of unproductive land, successive governments have applied the clause only after grassroots pressure" (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016:24). Given this, Karriem (2016:185) is right in arguing that "while state policies or 'politics from above' in Brazil can promote development in rural [and urban] areas, social movement 'politics from below' can pressure the state to implement policies." Protests thus serve to pressure the government to deliver what it is obligated to provide and what richer communities in Cape Town receive such as refuse removal, more visible policing to reduce crime. So, while Alexander (2010) is right in asserting that the general belief among communities is that grievances expressed in protest form are more likely to be addressed, I argue that care should be taken to avoid characterising all service delivery activists – at least in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha – as 'protest hungry.' In fact, protesters first engage in several processes and only engage in protests as a last resort, after all other means of engagements have failed (Chiwarawara, 2014; Akinboade et al., 2013; von Holdt et al., 2011).

6.5.2. Engagements before and after protests

The general consensus in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is that certain processes are followed before the community decides to protest. Xoliswa, an elderly woman abreast with developments in Gugulethu, described means of engagements before a protest in an in-depth interview:

> We first call the street committee with the service delivery complaints, the street committee then addresses the ward councillor. But if the ward councillor doesn't do anything then the community members will go to the ward councillor. Before we confront him, we call meetings with him [...] when there are no answers and there is nothing satisfactory we resort to protests.

Engagement with the local structures and state is in line with the democratic constitution which mandates the local government, through its White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) and the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), to enable citizens to participate in basic service delivery and development related matters (WPTPS, 1995; Municipal Systems Act No.32 of 2000). In the extract above, the idea is that if the ward councillor does not respond to a few representatives from the community then the activists will 'swarm' to him/her. Xoliswa's statement shows that people do not suddenly find themselves marching to the councillor's house. If that were the case, the popcorn metaphor would fit such protests well. What the extract and several participants show is that before people embark on protests, they call street meetings and lodge their complaints. It is only when the ward councillor does not do something about service delivery related problems that people go, in their numbers, to the ward councillor in protest for his/her lack of responsiveness. What is not often apparent to the onlookers are the organisations and meetings that precede the protest events. Similarly, in his research on networks for service delivery protests in Gugulethu, Chiwarawara (2014:88) quoted Tata Xolani who explained the processes before a protest occurred:

> It's not because people do these protests deliberately. No! It's all about red-tape … coming from these people who are not willing to serve us. So it's from the community to the executive committee of that structure which is spearheading the protests and then to the councillor goes up front and then if nothing comes up, trouble starts. Because now the councillor will be targeted and then from there it's … chaos because all people will rise and mobilise to say look nobody is listening to our plight. So the best thing to do is we go on this route [protests] that's the last resort.

Tata Xolani's sentiments echo other participants' comments which reveal the presence of a structure which spearheads protests. Similar to Xolisa's comments earlier, the mandate comes from people/the community to the community structures spearheading protests. These representatives take service delivery problems to the councillor. 'Trouble starts' when there is inactivity from the councillor and from that point on there will be 'chaos' when people mobilise to protest against a failure to address their service delivery problems. The extract clearly reveals that these protests have an antecedent. What appears to be a sudden eruption of 'trouble,' 'chaos' or 'confrontation' to everyone starts with people following certain processes before protests.

Similarly in Cato Manor in Durban, Mottiar (2014) found that respondents made use of formal methods of participation such as engaging with the ward councillors and attending ward committee meetings and only resorted to protests when these formal structures were 'ignored.' These findings support the contention above, that protesters do not have an insatiable appetite for protests; rather activists wonder why they have to fight for what they deserve. It also puts to question the oft-romanticised spontaneous protests as though no processes are followed before people take to the streets. The evidence suggests that activists pursue peaceful means of engagements before they protest. These means require some level of intention, planning and organisation. If these pre-protest processes require some level of planning and coordination, why do we suppose the protests, which include people involved in the pre-protests engagements, do not also meet, reflect on the failed peaceful consultations and decide to employ protests aimed at realising service delivery grievances quicker? Equally, if more radical means of engagement are opted for when peaceful means of engagements yield no satisfactory results (Chiwarawara, 2014; Mottiar and Bond, 2012; von Holdt et al., 2011; Marais et al., 2008; Oldfield and Stokke, 2004), do activists suddenly find themselves on the streets or do they sit down and reflect on the failed peaceful protests and decide on more radical protests? While I concede that at first SDPs were spontaneous, over time due to repeated protests by more or less the same activists there is now a somewhat established way of doing protests which is imbued with a level of organisation. As in autonomous movements, SDPs' lack of a visibly recognisable organisational framework makes journalists and scholars persist with spontaneity explanations. This organisation is exemplified by the role of leaders, letters and committees in SDP mobilisation.

6.5.3. Letters and Committees

I contend that the process of SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha involves certain structures which do not comprise the popcorn protests categorisation. The processes include community meetings, signing of registers, drafting of letters, seeking permission from community leaders, mobilising communities for protests and assigning marshals for the day of protest. Reflecting on how activists mobilise their community to protest, Mandla a male protester in Khayelitsha with a wealth of knowledge on protest dynamics stated:

> Ah there are letters neh. You have to speak to the head of the area, neh then he will give you the go-ahead for the meeting that is to be called. Then letters will be sent like to each and every household. This happens way before the day of protest. You see, today is Monday, they can start calling the meeting today when they want the meeting on Sunday when everybody is not at work – after church around about 3pm. And they will call the meeting at that time…we would want all household members to be there – but if the household members are not there then maybe one person from that house must go and represent that certain house because sometimes there are registers so that they can know that these people are actually coming to our gathering.

In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, leaders wield authority and are listened to and approached for mobilisation purposes and other community related concerns. An appreciation of these leaders helps us understand how protests come about, the local networks they capitalise on, and the access they have to material and political resources (Ballard et al., 2006). The leaders' desire for 'all household members' to attend meetings resonate with ideas of horizontalism. Horizontalism, as a form of organising assumes that all people are equal and should actively participate in fundamental decisions that affect their lives (Rowe and Carroll, 2015; Sitrin and Azzellin, 2012). Horizontalism was best displayed in the General Assembly process during Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests in the USA in 2011. Although not at the same level as the horizontal democracy decision making practices applied in the movements in Egypt, Spain, and the United States' OWS movement (Sitrin, 2011), Gugulethu and Khayelitsha community structures aspire to make collective decisions through modified consensus. Given that it is not always possible for everyone to attend the community meetings, leaders encourage families to send their representatives to the meetings. Sending family representatives to the meetings ensures that there is a family member who can contribute to decisions that affect the family and community. Participating in meetings also helps

build solidarity and collective identity necessary for collective action. Leaders, household members, letters, and registers are crucial resources in mobilisation. Indeed, both material and non-material resources such as money, services, concrete benefits, friendship, labour, legitimacy, technical expertise and authority are important in mobilisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978; Jenkins, 1983, della Porta and Diani, 2006).

Mandla's comments above suggests that there is some level of organisation in the community protests. Registers are meant to provide a general idea to the organisers of the number of people who promise to attend the protests which is helpful in planning; the registers can also be used to identify and even discipline the people who do not participate in these processes. Activism in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha is, as Ballard et al., (2006) note, "built upon existing and material resources" such as leaders, letters and registers. For Alexander (2010:36), "while there are class interests that can unite workers and non-working or underemployed township residents, there are also divisions, especially in terms of use of time and organisation." While this is plausible, in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, I found that communities take considerations of days when most of the members of the community will be available – for example on Sundays to hold the meetings for planning purposes. Considerations for 'Sundays' are in tandem with the RMT's emphasis on organisational processes, organisational base and coordination by the majority of political actors (Carey, 2009).

While the actual protests are usually conducted on weekdays to disrupt the normal routine of business days and get the attention of the government and media, the planning for the protests is done prior to the protest event. Meetings for the protests are usually done at a time which affords many people an opportunity to attend. This suggests aforethought and planning, which does not suit the popcorn protests. This does not mean there are no protests that suddenly erupt. There are times when a pressing need requires an immediate reaction. This was best exemplified by the hostage situation that took place in Gugulethu that I referred to earlier.

The hostage situation shows that sometimes protests erupt when an urgent need such as water is shut without people's knowledge. In these cases, people sometimes take to the streets right away to pressure the government to deliver the service in question immediately and to register displeasure at the lack of consultation. Clearly, activists do not passively accept the actions and

inactions of municipalities. They resort to the quickest way that will restore their services. In one such similar case, protesters held hostage a contractor who was installing water meters in Gugulethu – an action that led to the provision of water. Mama Dlamini praised the hostage situation:

> Now reflecting on this success story that happened here, the water meter, it was a great success... If we look at the hostage that we had about those guys who were installing water meters, because it was just like that, in less than 30 minutes everything was sorted out, and the debate that everyone was running away from, it happened you know, at that moment. And then that leads me to conclude that cellphones, people's contacts are very useful in protests. Because it was just a question of calling us. 1, 2, 3 is happening. And then we called people to come. People came and gathered. We informed them in seconds (quoted by Chiwarawara, 2014:100).

In a short space of time, activists staged a protest. A protest erupted and rapidly subsided. Yet before the hostage, activists tried to engage with the municipality and only adopted a more radical tactic when other means failed. Mama Dlamini's comments reveal that activists utilised the networks they had to phone people to fight for water provision. Clearly this protest did not require a lot of planning and organising. Interestingly, spontaneity is not only prevalent in SDPs, but organised movements also engage in spontaneous actions. A Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC) activist and Valhalla Park Civic member, Gertrude Square, applauded her community's display of power through, among others, spontaneous action, negotiation, persuasion and force:

> If someone saw a white man or somebody just hanging around a letterbox or by the water meter, then they [would] just call the people. A lot of people are out of work here and that is what makes us so strong. If something happens during the day, then we get all of the people together and we hop in our cars and we chase them right out. And we warned them, if ever you come in here again, there is going to be trouble ... [But in one case] we talked [to them], and they said: "No, we don't want to come here to cut people's water off, but we are the contractors. The contract is a piece of bread." [We said to them:] "It's a shame...you leave me without water, you leave me thirsty with children, yet it's your piece of bread." [Then] they made an agreement with us. [They said:] "So, that my children can eat, we will come in here and we will issue the water cutoff papers." So they asked us nicely, can they come in here and issue the papers to the people, but if it comes to the point when the people don't pay, then they won't cut the water off. So we said fine. (Gertrude Square, interview, in Miraftab and Wills, 2005:208).

In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, activists draw on social, religious, and political networks they have in the community. Interestingly, I found that members of different political organisations have separate political meetings in the community hall. Although these political meetings serve the needs of each political organisation, leaders use their networks to connect with leaders of the political organisations who then mobilise their members when the need for protests which affect the community, such as service delivery, arises. Leadership and organisation ensue from pre-existing association, networks or community that exist in a population (Oberschall, 1973). Participants were quick to point out that committees that address political meetings are apolitical. In underlining this point, Fezile, a street leader in Gugulethu stated that "you do not drink water as a political entity." Indeed, networks against service delivery protests are strong and transcend party lines. A caveat to this involves individuals and political parties using legitimate service delivery needs to benefit their political ambitions.

However, as is often the case, individuals and parties are advised to steer clear of party regalia and slogans to accommodate all aggrieved community members. This is in keeping with the logic espoused by autonomous movements which refuse to use party and union flags, acronyms, and banners at protest events (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). Similarly, the Movement for the Right to Housing, a precursor movement for the 13-M (after 13 March) forbade the use of flags and acronyms and barred unions and parties from 'advertising' at their events (Haro Barba and Sampedro, 2011). Understandably, the refusal to use recognisable names, labels and flags makes it difficult for analysts to get a handle on the protests; analysts then mistakenly regard such protests as popcorn. In this context, journalists, scholars, and other commentators often regard episodes of intense protest as "spontaneous, unprecedented and unexpected" due to a lack of clear visible network between established social and political organisations and protesters (Flesher Fominaya, 2015:142). Although observers fail to recognise a known network between protesters and conventional organisations, different individuals play a critical role in mobilisation which challenges the 'spontaneous' descriptor.

6.5.4. Youth, Women, Men, Leaders and Comrades in mobilisation

My study found that the youth are not actively involved in the community structures that meet on a regular basis to discuss community problems. The youth, many of them unemployed, who felt hopeless about prospects of getting a job were quite instrumental in protests. Many of these were school dropouts and some of them were involved in petty crimes. In both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, there were some youth who were involved in gangsterism. One of the focus groups in Gugulethu had about 12 members of the same gang. In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, the youth were not as actively involved in the community meetings that took place as the elders. The elderly people stated that the youth often got involved in protests on the day of the protest action. For the older protesters, some youth 'hijack' protests. The youth were actively involved on the day of protests and helped in staging dramatic protests – which made the protests more visible. Youth who are students at local colleges and universities also got involved in the protests – whenever they could. Given the low involvement of the youth in community meetings, older people often use the more traditional forms of communication such as 'letters' and 'word of mouth' instead of social media. In the case of OWS, the youth creatively used social media platforms to disseminate their messages.

Both women and men actively participated in service delivery protests. Women's involvement is understandable in the often-patriarchal communities of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha where women are responsible for some daily chores such as cooking, washing and bathing children. In view of this, services such as water, electricity and housing directly affect them. Women were also actively involved in the community meetings. Several women got emotional as they discussed the basic services and developmental challenges they faced in their communities. This finding echoes results elsewhere in South Africa where women played prominent roles in the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) struggles; older women – called the 'grannies of Soweto' – actively participated in SECC (Egan and Wafer, 2006; Buhlungu, 2006). Men played a crucial part in both the community meetings and in the protests. They held several key positions in community structures. However, in the party-political structures, both men and women occupied key leadership positions. Men who had anti-apartheid struggle credentials were

held in high regard and were listened to in the community even by the notorious youth. The youth, women and men played diverse roles in mobilisation and protests.

Leaders were central in organising meetings as well as in consciously mobilising people to join the protests. To expand the protest network, protest leaders mobilised different people – not merely friends to get involved in protests. In Gugulethu, Sithembiso, a protest leader, reflected on whether protesters network with friends or friends of friends. The protest leader explained with enthusiasm:

> Not really … it's not about friends, it's about talking. To say … our interest is seeing such and such happening in our area… We just talk about it informally. Now maybe two or three will buy into it … [then] I am going to sell it. Now whilst I am busy [doing his business from home] … I usually sit under that tree when it is hot. Then I meet people who pass by and I sell it. It's going to be my way of selling it … Because when you are leading people, you have a way of talking (quoted by Chiwarawara, 2014:88).

In interpreting this extract, Chiwarawara (2014) argued that the phrase "buying and selling" articulates ways the leader influences others to join protests. The extract brings out economics ideas of demand and supply to speak about the marketability of protest ideas; "they can be 'sold' or communicated – using persuasion not money as a means of exchange. It also suggests that there are people who can 'buy' or have an affinity with these ideas – potential customers who are willing and able to buy protest ideas" (Chiwarawara, 2014:88). This study revealed similar sentiments in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This suggests that protesters actively mobilise other residents and frame their problems in a way that garner bystander support.

As discussed, while I see SDPs as a form of social movements, I do not regard them as SMOs. In fact, although the market-centeric formulation of movements which views SMOs as firms which accumulate resources, employ staff, and 'sell' ideas to potential recruits (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) applies to rich Western NGOs and not necessarily many movements in the global South, I found that leaders tactfully 'sell' protest ideas through persuasion and painting a picture of urban development and thereby win over potential 'buyers' into the protest network. Also, although I do not view leaders in SDPs as issue entrepreneurs in the strict Resource Mobilisation Theory sense, I consider leaders particularly those with prior mobilisation experiences as crucial in defining, creating, and manipulating grievances in a manner that steers collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Essentially, while RMT is overly economistic and fails to fully reflect on SDP praxis,

its value lies in acknowledging that activists engage in producing and interpreting grievances differently based on strategies they seek to utilise (Martinez Lucio et al., 2017).

If a protest is regarded as 'spontaneous' partly because it has no connections to leaders or an organisation, then Gugulethu protests do not quite fit the description. Sithembiso, was keenly aware of his leadership role in mobilisation as exemplified by going about his business while at the same time 'selling' protest ideas well before the protest event. As a leader, he was also conscious of his influence – for example in the 'way of talking' consciously framed to garner support from prospective adherences and neutralise and demobilise anatagonists (Snow and Benford, 1988). I interviewed Sithembiso for the current study. He lamented popular media's reluctance to 'attend' protests they organise in Gugulethu. He commented:

> Now, when we call these media guys (people) to come and cover our protests they do not want to come. And we even call them to tell them about the protests before so that they may prepare but they don't want to come. So that's a problem.

Sithembiso's account reveals an understanding of the value of publicising their protests through the infrastructure that society provides such as 'communication media' (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Indeed, popular media selectivity involves cherry picking the big and dramatic protest; small, orderly protests without incidents are underreported. Aside from cherry picking large, dramatic protests, sometimes newsmedia only graces the scene of the protests when the protest action is already underway and report only one side of the story. My findings reveal conflicted views regarding the involvement of popular media in protests. On the one hand, protesters want the popular media to publicise their protests, on the other hand, they are aware of media's tendency to misrepresent them.

The act of inviting popular media personnel to report on the protests ahead of time shows that protests are planned in advance. In fact, Tata Xolani in Gugulethu mentioned that protests only happen when other processes have failed: "But you know when you have exhausted all avenues you know the outcome [people resorting to protests]" (quoted by Chiwarawara, 2014:89). While activist-scholar Trevor Ngwane recognises "all [the] protocols observed" (van Schie, 2014:np) before a protest as insufficient to rename the 'popcorn' descriptor, I see a close link between 'exhausting all avenues' with the 'avenue' of protest itself. If people take the trouble to follow all the peaceful processes to secure development, why do we suppose that they do not tap from their

‘organisational base’ of the formal processes to prepare and execute protests. Suggesting that processes involved prior to protests do not exist in protests only makes sense if we divorce actors involved in the ‘protocols’ or ‘avenues’ from the people involved in the protests that follow the failed formal processes.

Another reason South Africa’s SDPs are regarded as popcorn protests is because they are often localised. Indeed, South Africa’s protests tend to be localised in nature (Paret, 2018). While this is true of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, evidence in these two localities also show that protesters mobilise and organise beyond the immediate locality. Olwethu, a woman protester in Khayelitsha who has been on the housing waiting list for the past 20 years explained:

> On the day of the protest, besides us gathering here at one place [pointing to an open area], we move from this place. Like we know where our councillors are. They are at X section [pseudonym to protect the identity of my participants] … so on the day of the protests we will go from here to the first councillor there and give out our grievances. And then again we march to a second councillor there on Y section.

Prior planning helps to know when and where activists will gather on the day of protests. From the open field people visit councillors, sometimes of different Wards. This is important because it shows that problems and demands of protesters transcend ward divisions and, in many ways, townships have similar problems. Importantly, it suggests that there is camaraderie between people of different wards and communities. The same issue was raised by Gugulethu protesters where Ward 44 residents sometimes join with other wards and at other times with other locations outside Gugulethu – under the leadership of well-connected leaders (Chiwarawara, 2014). This is important as it suggests a level of coordination. Interestingly, some protesters, particularly the protest leaders or students at tertiary institutions, made connections to other struggles. For example, some protesters mentioned protests of poor people as the same, citing examples of the farm workers strikes in the Western Cape, the Fees Must Fall protests of students, the workers’ strikes, and service delivery protests. While these links are not at the level of well-established SMOs, it is clear that protesters do not see their struggles in isolation. In the case of Gugulethu, connecting Ward 44 protesters with protesters from other wards ensue from planning, networking, and coordination.

In both case study areas, but particularly Gugulethu, many protesters who had anti-apartheid experience in activism assumed the role of leaders and they – as one of the protest leaders stated – 'conscientise' potential recruits. Such conscientisation is crucial in building a political consciousness. Some of these experienced leaders were also former soldiers in the liberation struggle with connections and a wealth of organisational knowledge. Well-connected protest leaders with anti-apartheid experience were respected even by the notorious youth gangsters and had what Chiwarawara (2014) called a 'badge of honor' at least among protesters especially the not-so-connected protesters. In a Gramscian sense, these leaders are 'organic intellectuals' who provide 'conscious direction' to protesters; they help turn rank-and-file protesters from 'common sense' to 'good sense' comprised of historical awareness. Likewise, Runciman (2011) found that 'bridge leaders' are central for political education in the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF). Similarly, in Brazil, the experienced MST members (called militants) who have participated in or led several land occupations "clarify to potential recruits their constitutional rights to land which they explain will only be enforced by the government after land is occupied" (Karriem and Benjamin, 2016:24; Karriem, 2005). Effectively, in my case studies there is a desire for everyone to participate and avoid the non-hierarchical forms of organisation. At the same time though, there are leaders who wield experience and power which are relied upon for organisational experience, which seems to show a level of hierarchy. Here, there is a disconnect between what people aspire and what actually happens in practice.

The centrality of leaders in protests clarifies the structure in protests and gives grounds to question the popcorn descriptor which characterises SDPs. For example, the 13-M is often described as spontaneous with scholars like Blakeley (2006:342) arguing that 2004 Madrid train bombings were "entirely spontaneous and were organised through mobile phones." The reality though was that a handful of seasoned activists with extensive networks they had built in prior mobilisations organised the protests (Flesher Fominaya, 2011; Sampedro, 2005). Although individuals who did not have initial contacts to the instigators joined the movement when it was underway, Blackeley's (2006) 'entirely spontaneous' description is flawed. Similarly, in Gugulethu I noted that some leaders who had anti-apartheid struggle experience played an important role in mobilisation. Although people who are not initially connected to leaders and mobilisers join once the protests are underway, this does not make them an 'entirely' popcorn protests which spring from nowhere.

I found that many protesters in Gugulethu called each other ‘comrades’ – suggesting that there existed a comradeship which helped in their struggles. The word ‘comrade’ is a struggle term which speaks of the people who had participated in the struggles against apartheid; these seasoned activists serve as mentors of the next generation while at the same time also participating in the struggle for urban development. These seasoned activists kept refererring to having waged a struggle against apartheid and having to fight again in the post-apartheid era. Indeed, activists come from diverse backgrounds; protesters stated that their activism includes people from different religious backgrounds (even pastors) and political parties. To accommodate everyone, protesters are discouraged from wearing party regalia. Interestingly, protesters stated that activism is sustained through the meetings of different political parties – who meet for their own political agendas. When community needs arise, protest leaders make use of their connections to mobilise the different political party leaders and members to take part in the protests. In Gugulethu, one of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) leaders took me to an ANC meeting – suggesting some level of cooperation between people from different political parties. Somewhat similarly, Staniland (2008:41) found that “[e]ven the ANC and SANCO members in the area [in Gugulethu] acknowledge that the local council is failing to deliver on its promises and to include people in decision-making promises.” This then makes people of different parties band together not as ‘political entities’ but as suburban residents. Residents’ meaning-making helps to forge collective identity and solidarity among social movements and protesters, which helps in mobilising and movement activities (Hunt and Benford, 2004). Social movements participants’ ‘subjective elements’ which include values, identity and status are crucial in activism (Ballard et al., 2006). One protest leader in Gugulethu, Moses, stated that the regular meetings “keep the fire of protests burning.” I argue that although protest actions die down after a while, these regular meetings keep the network and momentum which help in future mobilisation. Such periodic meetings suggest a level of organisations which is unlike the spontaneous categorisation. While von Holdt, et al., (2011) found that many community protests do not leave any lasting level of organisation in their cases, I found elements of continued activism in Gugulethu. These are certainly not similar ‘in every word’ to the organisation in social movement organisations, but I found that some of the people I interviewed for my Masters thesis – in 2013 and 2014 were still actively involved in protests when I interviewed some of them in 2016-2017 for the PhD thesis. There is no data for

this in Khayelitsha because I only conducted research for the PhD thesis. These insights require further interrogation in Gugulethu, Khayelitsha and other areas where SDPs have taken place. Research would benefit from a longitudinal study of service delivery protests to ascertain levels of continuity, organisation, coordination, and growth over time.

Service delivery protesters in Gugulethu engage in different processes before they protest. When these processes fail, they make use of their structures to plan and organise protests. Community committees call meetings, send out letters to call residents, consciously mobilise residents, meet to discuss their grievances, course of action and the protest they will take, the repertoires they will use. Flowing from these inner working of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, I have argued that the popcorn metaphor does not correctly capture the dynamics of protests in these two communities.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter captured the subjective reasons, feelings, thoughts, views, and perceptions of the protesters. While service delivery circumstances painted a picture of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha communities, the ways in which the community members understood these circumstances, what they felt and thought about actions and inactions of the state and what they thought should be done helped understand what contributed/gave rise to protests. I argue that the reasons provided show that protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha compared their community circumstances and delivery with other places in Cape Town. This, I argue, helps us think about township struggles, not in isolation, but in the context of the greater Cape Town.

Findings from this study showed that the repertoires and organisation of service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha involved an important degree of planning and organisation which I argued fell between the social movement organisation and popcorn/spontaneous protests. The activists had diverse backgrounds which they drew upon in mobilising for protests. Different categories of people brought to the fore their own unique contribution to the protests. Protesters were sustained by different political and other meetings which were then drawn upon when the time for mobilisation came. This meant that the community networked before a protest action, during a protest action and after a protest action. However, protests were not the preferred means of engagement. Activists protested owing to the failure of the other means of engagement to yield

results. Protesters employed different tactics in order to pressure the government to deliver more and better services. In Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, protesters used a variety of means to secure service delivery, for example land occupations, electricity reconnections, etc. but rarely used courts for service delivery related complaints.

Service delivery protesters in both Gugulethu and Khayelitsha followed peaceful and formal processes before they resorted to protests. These processes required planning and organisation which included getting permission from community leaders, drafting letters, making decisions about the tactics necessary to solicit a response from the government. Based on these processes, I argued that although the service delivery protests and other struggles for development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha were not as organised as to call them social movement organisations, but they were also not as unorganised as to call them popcorn/spontaneous protests. It is my contention that these community protests occupy a place between these two extremes. The next chapter concludes the thesis with a general summary of the findings and their relation to the research questions.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

This study investigated service delivery protests and the struggle for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town. In this chapter, I tie up all the key ideas developed from all the chapters. Crucially, I provide a general summary of the findings that emerged from the study and their relation to the research questions set out in this thesis. To do this successfully, I first trace the journey I have trodden starting from the background of the study, the gaps I found in the literature, the theory I employed, the ways I gathered data and the findings that emerged from the research. This synopsis highlights my triangulation of different data sources which has enriched the insights of the study.

Following this, I consider the findings in relation to each of the 3 interelated research questions. The first question restates and reinforces the 'end' or reasons for service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Apart from highlighting the real and justifiable reasons residents protest for, the discussion shows that so-called spontaneous SDPs struggle for the same things that the more organised social movements fight for as well. The second research question considers the repertoires deployed in the SDPs and the reasons for choosing each of the repertoires. The aim of the second research question is to show the repertoires activists choose, why they choose these repertoires and the level of thought and preparation required in each of the tactics. The section also shows that some of the repertoires deployed in these protests are similar to those utilised in organised social movements. The third and final research question analyses the organisational processes that characterise SDPs in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Here, I consider the 'form' of the service delivery protests to evaluate the oft-held view that contemporary service delivery protests are popcorn/spontaneous. I see my contribution to be the insight that service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are not as rigidly organised as to call them social movement organisations but they are not as unorganised as to call them popcorn protests. Service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha occupy a middle ground, a hybrid (spontaneous-organised movement) which incorporates both relatively organised and informal means of mobilisation and

organisation. I end the chapter with the implications my study has on literature, Social Movement Theory and practice.

7.2. General summary of the chapters

In **Chapter 2**, I highlighted South Africa's impressive legal framework. I considered the Constitution of South Africa, the supreme law of the country, which emphasises that citizens' rights to basic services, including housing and water, should be provided equitably, fairly, and impartially. I also discussed the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) and its emphasis on transforming the public services, including service delivery. I also considered the Integrated Development Planning (IDP), an umbrella plan that guides municipalities' budgeting and decision-making processes aimed at improving the quality of life. Following this, I painted a picture of the contexts within which protests occur in South Africa. Historically, three centuries of colonialism, four decades of apartheid and Cape Town's neoliberal stance are to blame for creating unparalleled forms of inequality (McDonald, 2008). In 1950, the then government passed the Population Registration Act (PRA) which grouped people into three distinct racial types. Informed by the PRA, the Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950 segmented cities and towns into racially exclusive suburbs and thereby eliminated racial residential mixing. By 1991, towns were hypersegregated – a condition where there was high racial residential segregation. In 1994, South Africa transitioned to democracy, which brought new hopes for inclusive development. However, South Africa is still characterised by marked inequalities which manifest themselves in, *inter alia*, the delivery of housing, electricity, water, and sanitation. I contrasted service delivery in the greater Cape Town with that in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Essentially, the chapter showed that there are two Cape Towns – one which is well serviced and rich and another which is poorly serviced and requires urban development such as Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

In **Chapter 3**, I reviewed literatures on global protests for urban development as well as 'organised' and so-called 'unorganised' service delivery protests in South Africa. I considered the experiences of what is often considered spontaneous protests around the world, namely, in the United States of America's student sit-ins in the 1960s, Eastern Europe's and post-Soviet republics' colour revolutions in the 1990s and 2000s, Spain's 13-M, Spain's indignados/the 15-M movement, the Arab Spring, and South Africa's so-called 'popcorn' protests.

In South Africa, I considered the struggle for better services or urban development. The struggle for service delivery has been fought by 'organised' and 'unorganised' protests. When the African National Congress (ANC) won office in 1994, it introduced a raft of measures to address the historic marginalisation of Black communities and neighbourhoods throughout the country which had very little access to basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, and housing. However, South Africa is still characterised by extreme inequalities which manifest themselves in many areas including service delivery such as housing, electricity, water, and sanitation.

Almost paradoxically, protests for service delivery have increased since 1994. Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, organisational forms and repertoires that were used in the anti-apartheid struggle continue to shape post-94 struggles in both 'organised protests' and 'unorganised protests.' After the ANC government adopted a neo-liberal macro-economic policy framework it considered non-negotiable in 1996, it censured and even expelled members who publicly criticised its new framework. These activists and other dissatisfied activists who felt the brunt of the policy shift which resulted in privatisation and commodification of services, health spending cutbacks, trade liberalisation and the adoption of the willing buyer and willing seller to land redistribution banded together. The disgruntled members engaged in protests between 1997 and 2006 which, over time, became more formal and structured organisations, called new social movements, which fought for a range of services.

Although some of the community formations that comprised the new social movements remained existent at the local level, by 2006 the majority of these movements were either in decline or defunct due to a host of reasons (Runciman, 2015; Naidoo and Veriava, 2013). Paradoxically, around the time organised movements declined, unorganised or 'spontaneous' service delivery sprang onto the national scene, many of which protested for similar issues demanded by the new social movements before them. While such protests dotted the socio-political sphere since the 1990s, from 2005 South Africa witnessed a steady increase of such, reaching sustained levels of protests in 2009 (Municipal IQ, 2017; Runciman et al., 2016). These protests were over housing, electricity, water, other municipal services, corruption in the allocation of houses and plots, and actions and inactions of authorities. These protests that have appeared on the South African scene as unorganised, not under the umbrella of any organisation, the ones often called spontaneous protests. These protests have occurred in many cities and are widely reported by popular media

and scholars. South Africa's post-1994 protests have predominantly emanated from Black and Coloured areas and communities, with rare protest action from better serviced and resourced suburbs (Alexander et al., 2018). My study focused on service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, two predominantly Black communities in Cape Town which has many socio-economic problems.

Then, in **Chapter 4**, I presented three sub-theories of Social Movement Theory that provided the lenses to view protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The theories explained 'why', 'when' and 'how' protests emerge. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) underlined the key resources that are necessary for rallying people to stage a 'protest' and the organisation necessary in aggregating resources. The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) underscored the political contexts and structures within which protests may or may not emerge. Framing Processes Theory (FPT) underlined an aggrieved group's meaning-making and what the group considers to be its problems, the people responsible for the problems and the necessary solutions to address the problems.

I used the RMT to analyse the ways in which Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's service delivery protesters mobilise resources. I then utilised POS to explain the ways protesters interact with the political structures that enable or constrain activism, the tactics. Finally, I employed the FPT in explaining the ways activists frame their problems to determine whether such protests can be regarded popcorn protests. To complement the efforts of the SMT, I also drew from the logic of horizontalism, the practice of autonomous movements and discussions around spontaneity and Gramscian notions of 'common sense' and 'good sense.' Based on these complementary works, I noted that some social movements are autonomous and use the horizontal logic of organisation. Such movements do not organise like the traditional social movements, and they are often associated with spontaneous action. The findings of this study show both the logic of organisation activists hold and the actual organisation that happens on the ground. For, while activists aspire to use the horizontal logic of organisation, there are prominent leaders who wield great power in the community and in the protests.

In **Chapter 5**, I presented the research methodology that the study followed. My research questions necessitated a mixed methods study which involved a blend of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. I collected data using both primary and secondary sources with the former

involving in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires. I consciously triangulated different research methods to capture a more complete, contextual picture of service delivery protests. Triangulation helped boost my confidence in the results; particularly given that basic geometry suggests that several viewpoints of the same phenomenon provide greater accuracy (Jick, 1979). Notwithstanding, I heavy relied on qualitative methodology because my primary concern was on the 'depth' of understanding instead of 'breath' (Blaxter, 2001). Using the intrinsic case study approach, I focused on service delivery protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. This helped narrow my inquiry to boundaries of place, activity and definition. To avoid harming my participants I strictly adhered to laid down ethics of research. This also involved not mentioning the specific areas my participants reside in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, and using pseudonyms instead of their real names. Expectedly, I encountered some challenges in the field; notwithstanding these, I managed to adapt and work around the challenges.

In **Chapter 6**, I presented the findings and analysis of the study. In the next section, I discuss the findings in relation to each of the research questions of the study. The aim is to see whether the study succeeded to answer the questions it set out to answer.

7.3. Summary of findings and their relation to the research questions

7.3.1. Research question 1

This study's first research question sought to understand the reasons for participating in protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The findings show that Gugulethu and Khayelitsha residents protest in order to fast-track the process of development. The belief that protests will fast-track the process of urban development should be understood within the context of South Africa's often slow pace of service delivery of housing, water, electricity, sanitation etc. The findings show that one of the key reasons people protest is for housing. The struggle for formal houses is waged by both people who reside in formal houses as well as those who stay in informal settlements and backyard shacks. Residents who stay in RDP houses, hostels and council houses built during apartheid demand bigger houses to accommodate many family members, more services, and a better design of the houses. There is an intersection between the formal and informal, where backyard shacks are

erected behind formal houses. These backyard dwellers and residents in informal settlements also mount dramatic protests to fight poor and or non-existent service delivery. The struggle for houses should be understood within a context of the conflation of services. Essentially, this means the fight for a house has in it a belief that a better house comes with better services such as electricity, water, toilet(s) inside the house and better sanitation. Seen this way, when people fight for formal houses, they are also fighting for better services that a modern house offers.

The struggle for service delivery or urban development is also marked by a conflation of issues. Protesters' demands extend beyond basic service delivery to include, among others, a demand for the government to fulfil election promises, be fair in the way the government delivers services to different communities and be transparent with the community. As I have shown, these reasons have a bearing on service delivery in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Indeed, South Africa's protests are characterised by a conflation of issues which include demanding services (services are loosely conceptualised) delivery and the daily practise of democracy such as fairness and transparency (Paret, 2018; Mottiar, 2013).

South Africa has had times when protests "reached insurrectionary proportions with people momentarily taking control of townships," a phenomenon Alexander (2010:37) described as the "rebellion of the poor." However, radical tactics of protest movements do not necessarily ensue from revolutionary politics (Sinwell, 2011). As Paret (2014) found, disruptive tactics for example barricading roads, burning tyres, and destroying property were only meant to attract the attention of state officials. I took this further and argued that protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha fight for a relationship with the government – a relationship which is beneficial for a better delivery of services and other benefits to their communities.

I argued that although activists in my two case study areas generally harbour feelings of anger, betrayal, and hold a belief that the state does not really care enough for the poor, service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are not a rebellion of the poor but poor people's contestation for the government to hear, listen and act on demands for service delivery and other grievances. Generally, most activists considered a successful protest as one which ultimately leads to a better relationship between the government and residents. This happens when the government acknowledges that the protests were for genuine service delivery demands and communities reach

a compromise with the government through consultation and participation. Activists' desire for a relationship with the government makes protesters avoid challenging the status quo. Notwithstanding the reluctance to challenge the status quo, protesters employ several tactics from their bag of repertoires to fast-track the process of development in their communities.

7.3.2. Research question 2

The study's second research question aimed to assess the repertoires used in Service Delivery Protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha with a view of understanding how they are tailored to achieve urban development. The findings that emerged from research question 2 led to two-pronged arguments. First, I argued that although the choice of each repertoire is intended to speed up service delivery, some tactics such as land occupation and illegal reconnection of electricity and water directly address the needs of activists for housing, electricity, and water. Second, I showed that most repertoires that Gugulethu and Khayelitsha service delivery protesters utilised are thought through, planned, organised and coordinated prior to the protest events, which as I have argued, puts to question the often-romanticised popcorn categorisation of these protests.

The findings from this study revealed that protesters choose a given protest tactic for each protest event. The level of anger, frustration, the urgency with which a grievance has to be addressed, and the type of service(s) protesters would be fighting for determine the choice of protest tactic(s) activists select from their bag of repertoires. Sometimes protesters choose to utilise 'orderly' tactics; at other times they employ 'disruptive' tactics such as barricading roads, burning tyres and destroying property, what I have regarded as 'vandalistic' tactics, in order to attract the government's attention. At other times, protesters decide to mount dramatic protests meant to shame and embarrass the government. I have regarded these protests as shame tactics; where activists' intentions in employing these tactics is to soil the government's public image nationally and internationally, by, for example, pouring raw faeces at airports and municipal buildings. Also, sometimes protesters occupied land to build houses. Here I showed that the fight for houses involves the conflation of services where the fight for land to build a house is meant to achieve the house along with access to basic services such as water, electricity, proper toilets, and sanitation that many South Africans take for granted.

In most of the repertoires I considered, activists engaged in some form of thought, planning, organisation prior to utilising the tactic. This involved, choosing the road to barricade, when and at what time to barricade and with what objects to barricade it, gathering buckets with human excrements, securing transport to and from the airport, digging a hole in the middle of the road at a convenient time – the night, and digging up a few banana trees elsewhere, carrying them to the road and planting them in the potholed road. Following this, I argued that the Gugulethu and Khayelitsha service delivery protests I considered do not spring from nowhere and are not activities by irrational people who suddenly find themselves engaged in these activities. I did not consider the planning and organising in these protests to be at the same level with that present in social movement organisations, but I saw a considerable level of planning which does not fit the spontaneous protests description (of course some actions were spontaneous, just as organised movements also strategically include spontaneous actions in their struggles). Given this, I argued for a rethinking of the popcorn metaphor when describing Gugulethu's and Khayelitsha's protests. I buttressed this argument by considering the way service delivery protests are organised in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

7.3.3. Research question 3

The third research question sought to understand the character of service delivery protests' organisation in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The findings which answered research question 3 focused on the inner workings of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests with a view of understanding the character of service delivery protests' organisation. I also sought to understand the popcorn description of protests in relation to Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests. To do this successfully, I presented protesters' thoughts about protests, the processes they engaged in prior to a protest, leaders' involvement in protests, structures in the community and the processes they followed 'before' and 'after' a protest event. I noted that activists involved in the protests had varying degrees of experience; some leaders had extensive mobilisation experience with roots in the anti-apartheid protests. I argued that quite unlike the oft-held spontaneous characterisation of service delivery protests, where protests are considered to emerge from nowhere with no proper planning and organisation, activists in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha plan and organise prior the protest event. While there is not much coordination between different protest groups outside the locality and no

desire, in the main, to change the status quo, some activists – particularly those who were involved in the anti-apartheid struggle are crucial in raising political consciousness among participants of SDPs.

Activists consider it unfair that they have to fight for what they deserve. Interestingly, unlike the commonly held view that protesters are eager to protest, this study found that in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, protests are not the preferred means of engagement. In fact, protesters in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha engaged in different processes before they resorted to protests. It is only when these processes failed that activists utilised their structures to plan and organise protests. Community called meetings, sent out letters to invite residents, consciously mobilised residents and met to discuss their grievances. Here they discussed the course of action they would take, the protests they would engage in, and the repertoires they would deploy. After considering these inner workings of Gugulethu and Khayelitsha protests, I argued that the popcorn metaphor does not correctly capture the dynamics of protests in these two communities. I contended that although the current service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha are not as organised as to call them social movement organisations, they are also not as unorganised as to call them popcorn/spontaneous protests. Service delivery protests in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha occupy a place between these two extremes – a hybrid (spontaneous-organised movement).

While I concede that, by and large, SDPs have not yet coalesced into one 'social movement', is a strictly 'formalised organisation' what the protesters want? Sometimes, there is a disjuncture between what scholars think works to bring change and what activists on the ground 'can' do and 'want' to do. This is important given that even formal organisations also subside and become defunct as exemplified by the new social movements I discussed. More research is needed to consider whether protesters in the SDPs want 'formally' organised social movements or they are content with their hybrid protests (spontaneous-organised movement) which marry both an important level of organisation and a dose of flexibility.

7.4. Concluding remarks

Post-apartheid South Africa is still marked by inadequate and, in some cases, non-existent service delivery in low-income communities such as Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. Poor or nonexistent service delivery of housing, water, electricity, and sanitation inconvenience and endanger people. I considered the fight for the services which improve the quality of life for example housing, electricity, sanitation, and water as struggles for urban development. One may wonder whether Cape Town requires urban development. After all, Cape Town has managed to earn the label of a 'world city' with state-of-the-art infrastructure due to massive upgrading. Yet Cape Town is a divided city juxtaposed with affluent suburbs at the core of the city and in economic centres, and low-income and poverty-stricken communities at the fringes of the city with poor service delivery such as housing, water, electricity, and sanitation. In a city where elites and the rich lead lavish lives and the poor wallow in squalor, Cesar Chavez's words ring true. Ceasar Chavez, a farm worker and labour oganiser who burst onto the America's national scene in 1965, rightly noted that:

> History will judge societies and governments — and their institutions — not by how big they are or how well they serve the rich and the powerful, but by how effectively they respond to the needs of the poor and the helpless (Del Castillo and Garcia, 1997:116).

In the context of my study, the poor and helpless live in sub-standard houses, such as poorly built RDP houses, shacks at the back of formal houses or in informal settlements. With Chavez's words in mind, politicians and all concerned stakeholders should heed S'bu Zikode's words:

> Those in power are blind to our suffering. This is because they have not *seen what we see*, they have not *felt what we are feeling* every second, every day. My appeal is that leaders who are concerned about peoples' lives must come and stay at least one week in the *jondolos* [shacks]. They must feel the *mud*. They must share 6 *toilets* with 6 000 people. They must dispose of their own *refuse* while living next to the *dump* … They must chase away the rats and keep the children from knocking the *candles*. They must care for the sick when there are *long queues for the tap* … They must be there when we bury our children who have passed on in the *fires*, from *diarrhoea* or AIDS (Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2006:np, emphasis added).

In this except, Zikode, the chairperson of AbM, makes a passionate plea to the political leaders to stay in the 'jondolos' [shacks] for at least one week. Doing so, it is argued, would make them 'see'

and ‘feel’ the lived realities of shack dwellers. The lived realities that pertain service delivery include housing (shacks, mud due to lack of proper floors, overcrowding), ‘shared toilets’, uncollected ‘refuse’ and the stench that is emitted from ‘nearby refuse dumps’, ‘candles’ (due to no electricity) and the threat of ‘shack fires’, ‘water’ (long queues for communal taps) with the danger of water borne diseases.

The general aim of the study was to assess how SDPs are used to achieve urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The study revealed that activists use their agency to deploy varied tactics from their arsenal of repertoires in their fight for more and better services as well as dignified treatment and relationships with the government and state apparatus. Although SDPs have been labelled popcorn protests by the media and many academics, my study showed that these protests are marked by some level of organisation which does not fit the spontaneous descriptor. Thinking about SDPs as popcorn has implications for theory and practice.

Theoretically, analysists risk viewing SDPs as a form of collective behaviour characterised by spontaneous, unorganised, irrational, and emotional reactions. Evidence from this study revealed that service delivery protesters engage in resource mobilisation (Resource Mobilisation Theory), deliberations about the structure that exists in South Africa which enables or constrains protests such as the right to protest enshrined in the Constitution (Political Opportunity Structure) and making sense of occurrences in their settings (Framing Processes Theory) with a view of forging collective solidarity necessary for collective action. Also, SDPs manifest a level of organisation which borrows some aspects of horizontal ways of organisation as practiced by autonomous movements e.g., a refusal to use party and trade union banners, colours, and flags. While there is no outright desire to challenge the status quo, there are elements of political consciousness and movement building. Given these theoretical considerations, I contend that service delivery protests fit the social movement categorisation, albeit with their own uniqueness. In that light, SDPs contributions should not be underestimated.

In practice, the underlying belief that SDPs are not organised has proved helpful to sceptics of the protests. Some commentators particularly government officials, have found grounds to label the protests as the work of the ‘Third Force.’ The term the third Force “is highly pejorative, [and it] implies covert white manipulation towards evil ends and, in its contemporary avatar, assumes an

absolute inability for poor black people to exercise historical agency on their own" (Zikode, 2006:np). Turning the phrase on its head, S'bu Zikode, the chairperson of the Abahlali baseMjondolo argued that:

> We are driven by the Third Force, the suffering of the poor. Our betrayers are the Second Force. The First Force was our struggle against apartheid. The Third Force will stop when the Fourth Force comes. The Fourth Force is land, housing, water, electricity, health care, education and work. We are only asking what is basic – not what is luxurious. This is the struggle of the poor. The time has come for the poor to show themselves that we can be *poor in life but not in mind* (Zikode, 2006:np, emphasis added).

Indeed, the materially poor people are, by no means, 'poor in mind.' They can, and do, organise. While governments and the state apparatus should be wary of sordid internal and foreign interferences in the smooth running of their countries, they should be careful not to view poor people as gullible, irrational and whimsical individuals who can be easily swayed. As I have argued, scepticism about the alleged existence of a cabal fixated on destabilising South Africa's democracy should not blur the government's, police's, scholars' and development practitioners' image of the real and justifiable service delivery problems people fight for. Although the findings of the study were specific to the studied cases, the government will do well to heed the struggle for urban development (land, housing, water, electricity, refuse collection, transparency, and fairness) in low-income communities.

The media should avoid an unbridled overemphasis on the vague 'violent' protests. Equally, academics should deploy media generated terms and accounts with a fine toothcomb in order to avoid being an accomplice in misrepresenting, vilifying, demonising and further marginalising protesters. The notion of 'violent' protests should be carefully considered; the media and academics should explicitly distinguish the actors who are responsible for the violence – the police or activists. It is helpful to think about the 'orderly', 'disruptive', 'vandalistic' and 'violent' protests (by the police or activists); in the case of activists, these tactics should be considered light of the reasons they are protesting and the previous attempts to get the government's attention.

I hope my little 'excavation' helped shed some light on the not-so-popcorn protests for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, which I argued, constitutes a hybrid (spontaneous-

organised movement). Importantly, it is plausible that SDPs and other forms of protests are likely to continue for as long as there is a deficit of basic services, lack of transparency, fairness, genuine consultations as well as other factors and practices that impinge on urban development.

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APPENDICES

A. Table 3: Cost of Electricity and Electricity disconnections

Characteristics		Gugulethu	Khayelitsha	Combined
Main source of energy for cooking	Electricity	91.67%	88.89%	90.32%
	Paraffin	0%	2.22%	1.08%
	Gas	8.33%	4.44%	6.45%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=93)**
Perceptions regarding the price of electricity	Low	6.38%	4.26%	5.32%
	About right	6.38%	38.30%	22.34%
	High	23.40%	23.40%	23.40%
	Too high	63.83%	23.40%	43.62%
	Do not know	0%	10.64%	5.32%
	Total	**100.00% (n=47)**	**100.00% (n=47)**	**100.00% (n=94)**
Electricity disconnections	Yes	58.33%	39.58%	48.96%
	No	41.67%	60.42%	51.04%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=96)**

Source: Author's own compilation

B. Table 4: Cost of Water and Water disconnections

Characteristics		Gugulethu	Khayelitsha	Combined
Pay for water	Yes	80%	33.33%	55.91%
	No	17.78%	66.67%	43.01%
	Total	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=93)**
Perceptions regarding the cost of water	Too low	4.65%	0%	2.60%
	Low	6.98%	5.88%	6.49%
	About right	9.30%	20.59%	14.29%
	High	0%	2.94%	1.30%
	Too high	69.77%	8.82%	42.86%
	Do not know	9.30%	61.76%	32.47%
	Total	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=93)**
Water disconnections	Yes	65.22%	42.50%	54.65%
	No	19.57%	42.50%	30.23%
	Total	**100.00% (n=46)**	**100.00% (n=40)**	**100.00% (n=86)**

Source: Author's own compilation

C. Table 5: Efficacy of Service delivery protests

Characteristics		Gugulethu	Khayelitsha	Combined
Effectiveness of SDPs to bring development in the community	Yes	33.33%	52.94%	41.77%
	No	33.33%	29.41%	31.65%
	Not sure	31.11%	17.65%	25.32%
	Total	**100.00% (n=45)**	**100.00% (n=48)**	**100.00% (n=93)**

Source: Author's own compilation

D. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Demographic information
How many persons stay with you in the same house?
How many people are employed in your family?
Describe the state of basic services in this area?
Do you think this area is developed?
What are the areas you would want to see develop?

Other means of engagement before protests
What does this community do before it engages in protests?
Have you ever approached the courts to hear your concerns?
If yes, what were the challenges you encountered?
If yes, what was the outcome of this encounter?

Motivations for participating in service delivery protests.
What are your reasons for participating in service delivery protests?
What is the main reason that people protest for?
How would you describe the relationship between the municipality and this community?

During the protest
What tactics do protesters use on the day of protests?
Why do you use such tactics?

Results of a protest
What changes have occurred as a result of service delivery protests?
How has the government responded to protesters' demands?
What are the challenges you have encountered in trying to utilise protests for better services?

Perceptions on protests
What do you regard as a successful protest?
What do you regard as an unsuccessful protest?
Which are some of the most successful protests you can remember?
What were the outcomes of each of the protests you mentioned?

E. FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE

What are the reasons that people protest for?
What is the main reason that people protest for?

Describe the state of basic services in this area?
Do you think this area is developed?
What are the areas you would want to see develop?
How would you describe the relationship between the municipality and this community?

How do you organise protests?
What tactics do you use on the day of protests and why do you use those tactics?
Describe to me some of the outstanding protests you can remember?
What were the outcomes of each of the protests you mentioned?

What do you regard as a successful protest?
Why do you regard these as successful?
What do you regard as an unsuccessful protest?
What do you think should be done to bring better services in this community?



F. QUESTIONNAIRE ON SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

Good day. My name is Kenny Chiwarawara. I am from the University of the Western Cape, a university located in Bellville. I do not represent the government or any political party. I am studying the views of residents on service delivery protests and urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha.

Your answers will be confidential. Please feel free to tell me what you think. This interview will take about 25-30 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. Do you wish to proceed?

Name of interviewer: _____ Interviewer Code: _____

Survey Site: ☐ Gugulethu ☐ Khayelitsha

Ward Name: _____ Code: _____

Language of Interview: _____ Date of Completion: _____

Interviewee Code: _____ Number of Household Members: _____

SECTION A: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

Instruction: Please tick the box that applies to you and fill in the space provided

1. Gender	☐$_1$ Male ☐$_2$ Female
2. What is you age?	☐$_1$ Below 20 years ☐$_2$ 21-30 years ☐$_3$ 31-40 years ☐$_4$ 41- 50 years ☐$_5$ 51$^+$
3. What is your marital status?	☐$_1$ Married-civil/religious ☐$_2$ Married-customary/traditional ☐$_3$ Living together as married years ☐$_4$ Single - Never married ☐$_5$ Widow/Widower ☐$_6$ Separated ☐$_7$ Divorced
4. Which language do you speak at home?	☐$_1$ Xhosa ☐$_2$ Zulu ☐$_3$ Swazi/ Swati ☐$_4$ Venda ☐$_5$ SiPedi/North Sotho ☐$_6$ SeSotho/South Sotho Separated ☐$_7$ Shangaan/SeTshangane ☐$_8$ Ndebele ☐$_9$ SeTswana ☐$_{10}$ English ☐$_{11}$ Afrikaans ☐$_5$ Other (specify) _____
5. How many people in your household go to school?	_____
6. How many people in your household are employed?	_____
7. How many people in your household are unemployed including yourself?	_____
8. Which of the following applies to you?	☐$_1$ Full time employed ☐$_2$ Part time employed ☐$_3$ Informally employed ☐$_4$ Unemployed
9. How much do you earn monthly?	☐$_1$ R1000 and less ☐$_2$ R1001-2000 ☐$_3$ R2001-3000 ☐$_4$ R3001-4000 ☐$_5$ R4001-5000 ☐$_6$ R5001-6000 ☐$_7$ R6001-7000 ☐$_8$ R7001-8000 ☐$_9$ R8001-9000 ☐$_{10}$ R9001-10000 ☐$_{11}$ R10000 and above
10. How long does it take you to get to your place of work?	hours_____minutes_____
11. How often, have you been late for work?	☐$_1$ Not at all ☐$_2$ A few times ☐$_3$ A lot ☐$_4$ Don't know
12. Which of the following applies to your housing situation? (*Tick one*)	☐$_1$ House ☐$_2$ Flat ☐$_3$ Hostel ☐$_4$ Room in backyard ☐$_5$ Squatter hut/shack ☐$_6$ Other (specify) _____
13. What type of toilet do you use?	☐$_1$ Flush – internal ☐$_2$ Flush – yard ☐$_3$ Flush – communal ☐$_4$ Improved/VIP latrine – yard ☐$_5$ Improved/VIP latrine – communal ☐$_6$ Ordinary pit latrine – yard ☐$_7$ Ordinary pit latrine ☐$_8$ Chemical toilet – yard ☐$_9$ Chemical toilet – communal ☐$_{10}$ Bucket toilet ☐$_{11}$ No toilet access ☐$_{12}$ Other (specify) _____
14. What is your household's main source of water?	☐$_1$ Piped – internal with prepaid meter ☐$_2$ Piped – yard tap with meter ☐$_3$ Piped – yard tap with prepaid meter ☐$_4$ Piped – paid communal tap ☐$_5$ Piped – yard tap with no meter ☐$_6$ Piped – free communal tap ☐$_7$ Other (specify) _____
15. Does your household have access to electricity?	☐$_1$Yes ☐$_2$ No
16. If yes, how do you access electricity?	☐$_1$Contract ☐$_2$ Prepaid metre ☐$_3$ Other (specify) _____
17. Which of the following do you use for lighting?	☐$_1$ Electricity ☐$_2$ Paraffin ☐$_3$ Gas ☐$_4$ Other (specify) _____
18. What is your main source of energy for cooking?	☐$_1$ Electricity ☐$_2$ Paraffin ☐$_3$ Gas ☐$_4$ Firewood ☐$_5$ Other (specify) _____

SECTION B: PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE DELIVERY AND PROTESTS

Instruction:Please tick the box that applies to you

19. How would you describe the economic conditions of this community?	☐1 Very good ☐2 Fairly good ☐3 Neither good nor bad ☐4 Fairly bad ☐5 Very bad ☐6 Do not know		
20. How would you describe your own living condition?	☐1 Very good ☐2 Fairly good ☐3 Neither good nor bad ☐4 Fairly bad ☐5 Very bad ☐6 Do not know		
21. How do you think the Municipality is performing in the following services?	**a) Housing**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	
	b) Water Supply	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	
	c) Sanitation	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	
	d) Refuse removal	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	
	e) Electricity	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	
22. Over the past year, how often, have you or anyone in your family gone without the following	**a) Basic food to eat**	☐1 Not at all ☐2 A few times ☐3 A lot ☐4 Don't know	
	b) Clean water for home use	☐1 Not at all ☐2 A few times ☐3 A lot ☐4 Don't know	
	c) Medicine or medical treatment	☐1 Not at all ☐2 A few times ☐3 A lot ☐4 Don't know	
	d) Fuel to cook your food	☐1 Not at all ☐2 A few times ☐3 A lot ☐4 Don't know	
23. Do you pay for water?	☐1Yes ☐2 No		
24. If you pay for water, what do you think of the amount you pay?	☐1 Too low ☐2 Low ☐3 About right ☐4 High ☐5 Too high ☐6 Do not know		
25. If you pay for water, have you ever had your water disconnected?	☐1 Yes ☐2 No ☐3 Not sure		
26. Do you pay for electricity?	☐1Yes ☐2 No		
27. If you pay for electricity, what do you think of the amount you pay?	☐1 Too low ☐2 Low ☐3 About right ☐4 High ☐5 Too high ☐6 Do not know		
28. Have you ever had your electricity disconnected?	☐1 Yes ☐2 No		
29. How well or badly would you say the ***National Government* is**	**a) Narrowing the gaps between the rich and the poor**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know	

performing in the following matters?	**b) Fighting corruption in government**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	c) Creating jobs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	d) Reducing crime	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	e) Delivering household water	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	f) Improving basic health services	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	g) Addressing educational needs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
30. How well or badly would you say the *Provincial Government* is performing in the following matters?	**a) Narrowing the gaps between the rich and the poor**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	b) Fighting corruption in government	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	c) Creating jobs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	d) Reducing crime	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	e) Delivering household water	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	f) Improving basic health services	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	g) Addressing educational needs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
31. How well or badly would you say the *Local Government* is performing in the following matters?	**a) Narrowing the gaps between the rich and the poor**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	b) Fighting corruption in government	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	c) Creating jobs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	d) Reducing crime	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	e) Delivering household water	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	f) Improving basic health services	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	g) Addressing educational needs	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
32. How much do you trust each of the following in	**a) National government**	☐1 Not at all ☐2 Just a little ☐3 Somewhat ☐4 A lot ☐5 Do not know

relation to service provision, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?	**b) Provincial government**	☐1 Not at all ☐2 Just a little ☐3 Somewhat ☐4 A lot ☐5 Do not know	
	c) Municipal government	☐1 Not at all ☐2 Just a little ☐3 Somewhat ☐4 A lot ☐5 Do not know	
	d) Courts of law	☐1 Not at all ☐2 Just a little ☐3 Somewhat ☐4 A lot ☐5 Do not know	
	e) Ward councillor	☐1 Not at all ☐2 Just a little ☐3 Somewhat ☐4 A lot ☐5 Do not know	

33. What do you consider to be the 4 most important problems facing this community that the government and the municipality should address?

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
a) Unemployment				
b) Education				
c) Housing				
d) Water supply				
e) Sanitation				
f) Refuse removal				
g) Storm water/Drainage				
h) Electricity				
i) Rates and taxes				
j) Health				
k) Roads				
l) Crime and Security				
m) Nothing				
n) Do not know				
o) Other 1 _____				
p) Other 2 _____				
q) Other 3 _____				
r) Other 4 _____				

34. Most important issue facing your community?	☐1 Unemployment ☐2 Housing ☐3 Crime/Safety ☐4 Services ☐5 Street lighting ☐6 Roads ☐7 Poverty ☐8 Poor living conditions ☐9 Health ☐10 Drug/Alcohol abuse ☐11 Pollution/environmental issues ☐12 Sport and recreational facilities ☐13 Grants ☐14 Corruption ☐15 Education
35. How well or badly would you say your municipality has addressed the issue in number 34 in the past year?	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
36. How satisfied are you with the delivery of services in your area?	☐1 Very satisfied ☐2 Fairly satisfied ☐3 Not very satisfied ☐4 Not at all satisfied ☐5 Do not know
37. How much of the problems in your area do you think your municipality can solve?	☐1 All of them ☐2 Most of them ☐3 Some of them ☐4 Very few of them ☐5 None of them ☐6 Do not know

38. If you think your municipality cannot solve all the problems, who do you think can solve the problems?	_____	
39. How well or badly would you say your ward councillor is handling the following matters.	**a) Allowing citizens like yourself to participate?**	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	b) Making council's programmes known to ordinary people?	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
	c) Providing effective ways to handle complaints about councillors or officials?	☐1 Very well ☐2 Fairly well ☐3 Fairly badly ☐4 Very badly ☐5 Do not know
40. What is your perception of the work of the councillor as it relates to the following:	**d) Ability to perform tasks**	☐1 Not at all competent ☐2 Not very competent ☐3 Somewhat competent ☐4Totally competent ☐5 Do not know
	e) Experience in managing public service programmes	☐1 Not at all competent ☐2 Not very competent ☐3 Somewhat competent ☐4Totally competent ☐5 Do not know
	f) Extent he/she is concerned about the community	☐1 Not at all caring ☐2 Not very caring ☐3 Somewhat caring ☐4 Totally caring ☐5 Do not know
	g) Honesty in handling public funds	☐1 Not at all honest ☐2 Not very honest ☐3 Somewhat honest ☐4 Totally honest ☐5 Do not know
	h) Fairness in allocating services	☐1 Not at all fair ☐2 Not very fair ☐3 Somewhat fair ☐4 Totally honest ☐5 Do not know
	i) Fairness in allocating employment opportunities	☐1 Not at all fair ☐2 Not very fair ☐3 Somewhat fair ☐4 Totally honest ☐5 Do not know
41. How much can you do to solve the problems in your area?	☐1 Nothing ☐2 A small amount ☐3 Some ☐4 A great deal ☐5 Do not know	

SECTION C: PROTESTS AND DEVELOPMENT

Instruction:Please tick the box that applies to you

42.	**Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following:**	**a)**	**People like me do not have any influence over what the government does** ☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
		b)	**Politicians do not care much about what people like me think** ☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
43.	**Have you taken part in a protest or demonstration in the last 12 months?**	☐1Yes ☐2 No	
44.	**If *yes*, how many protests have you participated in?**	_____	
45.	**I am going to read out a list of groups that people attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are a leader/official, a member, attend meetings even though you are not a member or are not involved in the group at all.**	**a)**	**A religious group (e.g., church, mosque)** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
		b)	**Political party** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
		c)	**A community policing forum** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
		d)	**A street committee** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
		e)	**A school governing body** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
		f)	**Some other association or community group** ☐1 Leader or official ☐2 Member ☐3 Not a member, but attend meetings ☐4 Not involved at all ☐5 Don't know/haven't heard enough
46.	**Have you ever attended a meeting organized by:**	**a)**	**Your ward committee?** ☐1 No, never ☐2 Yes, once or twice ☐3 Yes, often
		b)	**Your street committee?** ☐1 No, never ☐2 Yes, once or twice ☐3 Yes, often
47.	**If *no*, why have you not attended Ward committee/Street committee/School governing**	**c)**	**I did not have any information about the meetings** ☐1Yes ☐2 No
		d)	**I did not have the time** ☐1Yes ☐2 No
		e)	**I am not interested** ☐1Yes ☐2 No
		f)	**It will make no difference, nothing will change** ☐1Yes ☐2 No

	g) They will not listen to my opinion	☐1 Yes ☐2 No
	h) I am not aware of this committee	☐1 Yes ☐2 No
	i) Don't know	☐1 Yes ☐2 No
48. Do you think Service delivery protests can bring development in this area?	☐1 Yes ☐2 No ☐3 Not sure	
49. Do you agree with this statement?	**a) Protests have brought an improvement in our community**	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	b) After protests there have been improvements on roads	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	c) After protests there have been improvements on sewer pipes	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	d) After protests there have been improvements on residential houses	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	e) After protests there have been improvements on water supplies	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	f) After protests there have been improvements on street lighting	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	g) After protests there have been an increase in employment levels	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	h) After protests there has been more inclusion of youth in the job market	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	i) After protests there have been improvements in participation and engagement between the municipality and the community	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree

	j) After protests government officials have become more accountable to this community	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree
	k) After protests there has been a decline in crime rates	☐1 Strongly agree ☐2 Agree ☐3 Indifferent ☐4 Disagree ☐5 Strongly disagree

THANK YOU!

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22 August 2016

Mr K Chiwarawara
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Ethics Reference Number HS/16/4/7

Project Title: Service delivery protests and the struggle for urban development in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, Cape Town.

Approval Period: 18 August 2016 – 18 August 2017

I hereby certify that the Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Western Cape approved the methodology and ethics of the above mentioned research project.

Any amendments, extension or other modifications to the protocol must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for approval. Please remember to submit a progress report in good time for annual renewal.

The Committee must be informed of any serious adverse event and/or termination of the study.

Ms Patricia Josias
Research Ethics Committee Officer
University of the Western Cape

PROVISIONAL REC NUMBER - 130416-049