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dc.contributor.advisorLerm, Jessica
dc.contributor.authorCollison, Miles
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-16T06:40:51Z
dc.date.available2023-02-16T06:40:51Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11394/9568
dc.descriptionMasters of Arten_US
dc.description.abstractIs it morally permissible to bring children into existence? We often go our whole lives never asking ourselves this question, since procreation and parenthood are societal norms. However, a local (and controversial) philosopher, David Benatar, thinks there are strong philosophical reasons to abstain from procreation. In his book, Better Never to Have Been, he presents the argument that bringing children into existence is morally impermissible on account that coming into existence is always a harm. This argument has been met with much criticism and scrutiny, thus producing a great deal of contemporary literature. One more recent critic is Nicholas Smyth. His claim, as opposed to the many others who have focused on the small details of Benatar’s work, is more deeply fundamental; Smyth claims that Benatar, as well as the procreation ethicists who have gone on to discuss his work, are not doing ethics at all.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of the Western Capeen_US
dc.subjectAnti-natalismen_US
dc.subjectContemporary literatureen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectChildrenen_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.titleAnti-natalism and internalismen_US
dc.rights.holderUniversity of the Western Capeen_US


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